ML072110404
| ML072110404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/2007 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2007-0180 | |
| Download: ML072110404 (90) | |
Text
use for thi exaple Cosie a hyoheia inpcto finin cicmeetal cacko a
wel on a 2 inc lin conete to tha reactor colnSytm vdneftecakrmie undnife o
aou aots Th inpctr deemie tat a
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los ofcoatacdn oulSeuti hswlald Asum tha reovr crdtiaotaporat oh cicusane surudn thi hyohtclfnig
1.2 Inpcto Fnig (No Inovn a
Supor Sytm)ta byon ore of mgiue.
If speifi inorato exst that reioa Seno Reco Anls 5-5 5
to deerin the approriat Intatn Evn Likelihood.
+
Table I -Categoresof Initiating Events for Generic PWR Nuldear Power Plant 9 Row Approximate Example Event Type Initiating Event Frequency Ukelihood (IEL)
I
> 1 per 1-10 yr Loss of Pover Conversion System (TPCS) 9 1
2 3
II 1 per10-102yr Loss of offsite power (LOOP), Loss of Class 1E 125V DC Bus Aor B 2
3 4
(LODC)9 II 1 per 102 - 103 yr Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Stuck open PORV/SRV/
3 4
5 (SORV), Small LOCA including RCP seal failures (SLOCA), Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (MSLB)
IV 1 per10 3-104yr Medium LOCA (MLOCA), LOOP with Lossof One Class 1E 4.16-kV 4
5 6
Bus (LEACJ V
1 perl0 4-105yr Large LOCA(LLOCA), Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCW) 5 6
7 VI less than 1 per 105 ATWS(1) 6 7
8 yr 3-
<3 30 30 day day day s
S s
Exposure lime for Degraded Condition mM Note
Table 3.2 SDP Worksheet (SLOCA) for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
Small LOCA Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/3 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)
Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed 2/2 PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)
(F B)
Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/3 LHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/3 LHSI pumps with associated 1/3 RHR heat exchangers or2/6 RCFCs with cooling flow from CCW (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions JEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Recover Results Affected Sequence Credit 1SLOCA - LPR (2,4,7) 6 2
3 0
5 3
+
4+2 0
8 3
+
4+2 3 SLO CA - EIHP (8) 6 2
3 0
5 3
+ 3 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met:
1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Counting Rule Worksheet Step Instructions (1)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 9.
(1) 0 (2)
Divide the result of Step (1) by 3 and round down.
(2) 0 (3)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 8.
(3) 1 (4)
Add the result of Step (3) to the result of Step (2).
(4) 1 (5)
Divide the result of Step (4) by 3 and round down.
(5) 0 (6)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 7.
(6) 0 (7)
Add the result of Step (6) to the result of Step (5).
(7) 0 (8)
Divide the result of Step (7) by 3 and round down.
(8) 0 (9)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 6.
(9) 0 (10)
Add the result of Step (9) to the result of Step (8).
(10) 0 (11)
Divide the result of Step (10) by 3 and round down.
(11) 0 (12)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 5.
(12) 2 (13)
Add the result of Step (12) to the result of Step (11).
(13) 2 (14)
Divide the result of Step (13) by 3 and round down.
(14) 0 (15)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 4.
(15) 0 (16)
Add the result of Step (15) to the result of Step (14).
(16) 0 U
U mIf the result of Step 16 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of high safety significance (RED).E on If the result of Step 13 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of substantial safety significance (YELLOW).E
°.
If the result of Step 10 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of low to moderate safety significance (WHITE).E UM If the result of Steps 10, 13, and 16 are zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of very low safety significance (GREEN).E P
Phase 2 Result:
o GREEN E-WHITE U
YELLOW E~RED
ineto ga ayte an accordanc ait Inseca o
Prcdr a11.4 aEupmn Algmn, an an tefopath duin quarel suvilac tetn ofa the sse
.Iwas suseuetl deemie that th vle had aee ou of poito sicaneanc was las pefr e
on t
e syte ae aoth aror ahe anpctr a
eemie that ah criaera aor ardtn oeato reovr of th a
trai aer asatife an tha crdi fo reovr of th tri wa aprprae
2.npeto Findn tha Derdes Miiato Capailt an Doe Not Reuc Reann Mitgio Capabilit Crdi to a
Valu Les Tha Ful MiiainCei Fo inpcto fidig tha inov th unviablt of miiatn syte eqimet suc tha sufcin mitgaio caailt rmis to reev ful miiato crdi fo the afece saet fucin sov al of th wokhe sequen-es-that coti th saet fucto giin ful miiato credit
Table 2 Initiators and System Dependency for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant 9 Affected Systems Major Components Support Systems Initiating Event Scenarios Bginrd Safeguards Features Three actLation trains, each \\th a 1)Vvitl AQ DC Al Aduam cn 9-stem (ESFAS) load sequmee Essential Coding Watr Systen Threetrains, eachdWi cnepurrp 4.16-kV, 48DV(forMOls), DC, Al (EMOS)
ESFAS High Head
-Three,'s(800
Safety Injection LLOCA ATVW, (HHSI) System LODC Insruret Air (IA)
TMo IA mpressor (per mit).
Tf, te por, BOP d ee 5 )
LaA Back upistwo sation air c
xnlesaxs LoNl-ead,afdy Irjection(U-BI)
Threeptnps 4.16-kV, 480V, [C, ESFAS, SI Al exoptATMS, L(ON, LCDC Syem punp ronm od ing 8)
KUin Stearn Isadim System For each steamgenerator one Cffste puarad LA, DC, EFAS SG-R, MS3B NOV[M iPati n and C0-td Vdves(10]
For eadi Eeamgenerator ore 480V, DC, 123Vvital AC Al exoept LLOCA aid IVLOCA For each steamgenetor five Nrre iRS, LOCP, ATV'S, LEAC safety relief v-aves
Table 1 - Categories of Initiating Events for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plantq 9i Ro Approximate Example Event Type Initiating Event Likelihood (IEL) w Frequency I
> 1 per 1-10 yr Loss of Power Conversion System 2
3 (TPCS).
1I 1 per 10-102yr Loss of offsite power (LOOP), Loss o 2
3 4
a ass 1E 125V DC BusA or B (LODC)E III 1 per 102-103 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 3
4 5
yr (SGTR), Stuck open PORV/SRV (SORV), Small LOCA including RCP seal failures (SLOCA), Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (MSLB)
IV 1 per 103 - 10 4 Medium LOCA (MLOCA), LOOP 4
5 6
yr with Loss of One Class 1E 4.16-kV Bus (LEAC)u V
1 per 104 - 10 5 Large LOCA (LLOCA), Loss of 5
6 7
yr Component Cooling Water (LCCW)
VI less than 1 per ATWSM 1 )
6 7
8 105yr
> 30 days 3-30 days
<3 days
Table 3.1 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant Transients with Loss of PCS (TPCS) (1)
Saey Funchons Nmded R-Qp i NMt Qaiiirly for Fadh Safty FuRixan:
1 1/3 IVDWFtrans (1 rnu -trai n systen) or 1/1 TDfFWtran (1 ASD train) ilh (1/1 SG PFR or 1/5 safety relide ves) per SG tat is fed by AFW High Pressure Injection for FB (EiHP) 1/3 HHSl punrs (1 rrulfi-train systerm)
Phma EtI-I Pe xo Freadled (MB) 2J2 preaurizer POFIs cpmnfor Feed/Beed (operAr action =2)(2 H4i Resmzedrmulalion (LFFI 1/3 LUSI trains ard v&q assod d 1/3 R-R heat exa-gngrs or 2/6 1FUCs.ith codi ng flowaig-e to mCW(1 rrut-Arai n systErn)
(rde.feded RFros EL fbn~rim Mtiaiicn QUIity Rang fr RsIl Eac eded F I a led Trin 1rPCS-AFW-LFR (3) 8 1+4+3 2TY-/AFW-FB (4) 7 1 + 4 +2 3TPGS-AFw-EBHP (5) 8 1
4+3 1
9 1 +4 + 3 Icda any qerambr reooJery actions h-A are crediid to d redly restore th cegradced eqd pTfft or initiating ee-t:
Coerdir open wm i l %d
,e.
If qperaoracticnsare reqcidredb cedt IJadng ritigaltcn eqiprmt in s-rvioe orfor reomery actims, such credt 4iold begi\\encriy if bhefdloMng aitedaare rret 1) suffi dert tnie is a\\lal~e to iruerert thes action
- 2) eri rmEnal cord icns allw aoceavhe reeded 3) prooeiJres est, 4) tri ring is ordLed on te ed srg procadures ncbr nrdi cns si rrilar f the senario assinaý and 5) my eqLpn-et reeded to oornliete shm adimns is aalable and ready for uLs.
Table 3.2 SiPVWxksheet for Germic MIVR NIdear Powr Plant SM LOCA(SLOCA)
S1fety RxFndians RA Oafl te Mfim Q v for Eadh aft* Rundion:
EadyInventory, HP Injecion (BH1P) 113 HHSI punps (1 rl-trzin system)
Smm Ia1-1 Rdmrukd WF 1/3 MJOFWtmins (1 mh.trd-n syste or 1/1 TD8FWtran (1 ASD train)
Fiinlay -bAt Rlruia, Feafleed (FB) 22 FCRRs q~en for Feedeed (oMabr acdm = 2)
Low Pfm Injedian (LR) 1/3 U-9 prrps(1 rrfti-tran s)do Low Resse Rt~drcuaiorn (LFR 1/3 U-l purpsvwth amaal~l 1/3 R-Rheat ehr-argsor 2/6 R1C aWh coding floNfiom O(XN(1 rn*-tran qjstEm) arde~ffixtd RKfiicor EL Fbdf Mycj IaiWfagBm1fPef Eahlfe*l*d,xIlme Filedl-in 1 SILXA-LPR(2,4,7) 6 3+3 2 SICA-AFW-FB (5) 9 3 + 4+2 3 SOA-BHP(8) 6 3
3 7
3 +3 MOE-Idbtify any yqral rea~x y alionslth are aedird todreclly restorethe cdjrac( aqd pmt or initiarng et:
Cýa or apm n to dw If cpe'doracicnsare reqL red b aedt laang ritgom m eqd pTint in sraoe orfor reomay acmicns, such credt hoJd be jen crty if thefdlomri citeria are nret 1) sffidert tirre isavilaUeto irrjeTert tfee ations 2) ernronrrn b ordticnseIloNaooefvqheereedes
- 3) proomresei,
- 4) tr;i ring isoordLcted on th ed ei rg proedures unbr cnorditicns sirilar b the senaio as-io ard 5) my eqLprrt neead to ocnnIete actims isaelle nd ready for use.
Table 3.3 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant Stuck Open PORV (SORV)M)
,94Wv Funclions Np FlRA Qedtdble Mgaon apa bilty for Each Say RzFnion:
Isobion of Snal LOCA(BLK)
The dosure of the blockv-ae asscdatEd wth stuck open PCRV(operaor action = 2) (2)
Early Inventory, HP Irjection (BHP) 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
SeondiayIHeat HadRenm (AFW) 1/3 VDAFW trans (1 rrulni-trai n system) or 1/1 f1DAFW tran (1 ASD train)
PRnr*y Heat Fbimd, Feedfleed (FB) 1/1 rerraning PR(Js open for Feed/Beed (operabr action = 2)
Low Pressre Injedion (LR) 1/3 LIS pLnps (1 rrulti-train system)
Low Fressm Redrualion (L.R§ 1/3 LHS punrps with associ alld 1/3 R-Rheat exchangers or 2/6 RJ;Cs with coding flow from ODW (1 nlJti-train system)
OrdeAffefded Function 13-iarirah Mlalon Ga~li Rilrin for Eof Resul Eadh Af~lbed Sauenp Failed Tkin 1 SCRV-BLK-LPR(2, 4, 7) 8 3 +2+
3 2 SCR\\- BLK -AFW - FB (5) 11 3
+2+4+2 3SCR/- BLK-EIHP (8) 8 3
2+3 3 +2+3 1
9 Identify any operator reooery actions that are credited to d redly restore the degraded eqLi pTmnt or initiating emt:
Cperalor open manual \\*ae If operatoractimns are reqi red to credt pladng rtiticn equi pInmt in senvioe orfor reco\\ery actions, such credit shodd be gi\\en coly if the fdlcong criteria are met 1) affiderttirrn isa\\Ilatieto inrre-rtthe* actions, 2) eNrrorm l e
oordfimnsaalloNacoe.
where reeded, 3) procedures eist, 4) trairing is conducted onthe edxsing procedures Lnder oonditons msnilar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equprrwa needed to corolete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table U4 SDP VWrkshee*for Genae PAR Nuclear Roer Patnt MedmLOCA(MLOCA) afdvlzudon
- uNeid RA Cket1e Mf l Qvihityru-Each,.fl Furnxin:
Eay Inwrn HP Injectin (BH P)
%rendring HHS1 trains (1 muti-n sysWm*
mwlrnek aion (LIR) 1/1/2rEirg LH-tains(1 rrdti-ran syedo Low Resue RIdralami (LfR 1/2rerranirg LIB tainswth agmal~
1/3 R-Rhed edwgsor 2/6 RFRQ Wh cclingflomftn CW(V(l
-trrnsyel
(]rde*fEFins Rrdcji EL.
Ftrdrm Mflin (ditvdyRligfr RHMervU E~chatiffieded umo iled-I-gn 1 MCGA-LFR(2) 7 4
+ 3 2 MC1A-LR (3) 7 4
+3 3MIA-B3HP(4) 4 2
1 7
4
+ 3 Icdti amy qmrk r xmey atonsmfi are aBabto d rncy restoret-cbgdacdl ed pTol or inibating eAt:
q3pkarqpm nard *d,,e If qeraoraicnsae re red b redt lading rritigAm eqi pTmt in saioe crfor rmery acbcns, suxh aeJt dd begienacy if fefdIong alteriabae n-e 1) sffiderttirreisaýdladietoirrleTerlttl-eP atior-2) er-ic-n ca-dtaismIoAaxefi vh*ferna
- 3) prtnreist, 4) ti ring isoxrtded on ftedsli rg pxediresur-x oi-iicnssiilabt-e sioasner a-d 5) my edpn'u r-eet tocnrrldeteheacticns isadla*ea-d m for Lm.
Table 3.6 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
Safety Finctons Neede RA edble MigiMU xabilty for Eadc hfety FuncSion:
Enirg AC Fbwer (EAC) 1/3 Standby Desel Generators (1 mnlti-train system)
Swndary Heat RemovalQ VDW) 1/1 TDAFW pu*p (1 ASD train) with 1/5 safety reliief vaves per SG that is fed by AFW Seondary Heat Renmd (AFW) 1/3 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train)
F ryof AC Poer in < 2 hrs (REC2)
Recovery of AC power (operator act on = 1)"1 Reryof AC power in < 5 hrs (REC5)
Recovery of AC power (operator act on = 2) 13. 11 Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Pnrmary Heat PfrvaI Feed/baleed (FB) 212 pressurizer POR\\s open for Feed/Beed (operator action = 2)
Low Pressure FRdrclation (LPR) 1/3 LHSI trains and Wth the assodated 1/3 RJ-R heat echgers or 2/6 RCFCs wth cooling flowaligned bo CO-l (1 muti-train system) ircle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mfigadion Qaa*ity Rafing for H
oY f
RsulA Each Affed* aeomn(
Fdiled Train 1 LOCP-AFW-LPR(3) 9 2+
4
+3 2 LOOP-AFW-FB (4) 8 2+
4
+-2 3LOCP-AFW-EIHP (5) 9 2
4+3 1
10 2+
4
+3 4 LOCP -EAC - LPR (7, 11) 2+
3
+3 8
(AC Recovered) 5LOCP-EAc-EIHP(8, 13) 8 2
3+3 1
9 2+
3
+3 6 LOCP-EAC-REC5 (9) 2+
3 +2 7 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - FB (12) 2+
3
+
1
+2 8
(AC Recovered) 8 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW - REC2 (14) 7 2+3
+
1
+
1 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to d redly restore the degraded eqi pment or initiating eve:nt
Table 3.7 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) (1)
Safety Functions Needed-Full Creditable Mitigation Caoabiitv for Each Safety Function:
Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/3 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system)(2)
Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP) 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Primary Heat Removal Feed/Bleed (FB) 2/2 pressurizer PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)
Pressure Equalization (EQ)
Operator depressurizes RCS to less than setpoint of relief valve of SG using 1/3 pressurizer spray valves or 2/2 pressurizer PORVs (operator action = 2)
Isolation of Faulted SG (ISOL)
Operator isolates the faulted SG by closing 1/1 MSIV and associated Feedwater Isolation Valve (operator action = 2)
Cooldown and depressurization (DEPR)
Operator cools down and depressurizes the RCS using 1/4 SG PORVs or 11/2 pressurizer PORVs (operator action = 2)
Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/3 LHSI trains and with the associated 1/3 RHR heat exchangers or 2/6 RCFCs with cooling flow aligned to CCW (1 multi-train system)
Low Pressure Injection (SDC) 1/3 RHR trains (pumps & HXs) and 1/2 charging pumps (operator action = 3)1,3 Circle Affected Functions EL Remaining Miloation Caoabiltv Rating for Recovey oful Each Affected Sequence Failed Trin 1 SGTR-EQ - ISOL (3) 3 +
2+
2 2 SGTR-EIHP-SDC (5) 3 3 + 3 1
10 3
+
3
+
3 3 SGTR-EIHP - DEPR (6) 8 3
3 + 2 9
3
+
3
+
2 3
3 4 SGTR-EIHP - EQ (7) 8 3
3 + 2 9
3
+
3++
2 5 SGTR-AFW - LPR (9) 3
+
3
+
3 6 SGTR-AFW - ISOL (10) 8 3
+
3
+
2 7SGTR-AFW-FB (11) 8 3
+
3
+2 8SGTR-AFW-EIHP (12) 3 3 + 3 1
10 3
+
3
+
3 3
3 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:
Operator open manual valve If operatoractions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service orfor recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.9 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (MSLB)
Safety Functions Needed-Ful Creditable Nitigation Caoabiity for Eadi Safety Function:
.MSLB Isolated (MSIV)I" 3/4 MSIVs close [ failure means at least 2 MSIVs failed] (1 multi-train)
High Pressure Injection (EIHP) 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Seaondary Heat Removal (AFW) 1/3 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system)
Feedwater valves dose (FWVC)
Isolation of the feed to the SG whose MSIV did not close by auto trip of MFW pumps or isolation of MFW line, and operators close the valves feeding the SG from AFW, or trip of the AFW pump (operator action
=2) (2)
Stop Injection (S-IN)
Operators stop high pressure injection (operator action = 1 )
Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB) 2/2 pressurizer PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)
High Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/3 LHSI pumps and with the associated 1/3 RHR heat exchangers or 2/6 RCFCs with cooling flow aligned to CCW (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions REL 1emaning Mifigation Caoability Rating for Recovery of Results Each Affected 'auence Failed Trin 1 MSLB - FWVC - STIN (3) 6 3
+
2
+
+ 3
+
+ 3
+2 4MSLB-EIHP-FWVC(8) 8 3
3+2 1
9 3
+ 3
+
2 5MsLB-EIHP-AFW (9) 9 3
3+3 1
10 3 +3+
+ 3 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:
Operator open rnanua valve If operatoractions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service orfor recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures edst, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.10 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCW) (1) ft r--unons N RA etdabe "Mlafon C bIty for Eadh Safey RFudion:
RG'Trip (RI'0 )
Ope r tri psthe RCPs to prevnt a sea LOCA (operalor action = 2) (2 Seal hIjecfion usng PIDP (PM)
Operalor starts PMP for seal ijedi on (operaor adion = 2) 121 High Pressure Iriection (BHP) 1/3 HHSI trains (1 multi-train system)
SaxKkNy Hadt Ibi i (,AFW) 1/3 MDAFW trains (1 rruli-trz n systern) or 1 /1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) ardeAff**ed RFuEions EL F
Rrru*r,*
tpion Q
dy R*ing for Bt R
Each Affected aae*oePFailed Train 1 LOCW-AFW (2) 9 5+4 2,
L,-- EIHP(3) 8 5
3 1
9 5+3 3 LCCWN-RCP (4) 7 5+
2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event Operator open manual valve If operator actions are required to credit placing rritigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) trai ring is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipmert needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.12 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
LOOP and Loss of One Class 1 E 4.16-kW Bus (LEAC) 5afeft Funclions RA Fu redM** Mfita!m Cap~it for Each Sa4eW Fumblon:
PORVRedoses(PORV) 212 Pressurizer PCRs reclose after open rg during tranment (1 train)
Swmdary I-Heat Rm (W)
Y2 Nv3AFW trains (1 multi-tran sysemn) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) Wth 1/5 safety relief \\eke per SG hat is fed by AFW High Pressure Irjection for FB (BEHP) 1/2 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Prinjary Had Fw4 Feeed/eBId (FB) 212 pressurizer PCRh/s open for Feed/Beed (operabr action = 2)
Low Pressue Redroiiation (LPF Y2 LHBI purrpsWvth (assodacted 1/2 RH-Rheat exchangers or 2/4 RCFCs Wfth cooling flow eigned to OCV) (1 nirti-train sysemn)
Clird e/*fecled Funcfis U.L Ramnmg Mil on CMMlit Rahngh fB K
f eslt Each A
,fe ouen
-x~c Failed Train 1 LEAC-AFW-LPR (3) 11 4 +4+3 1
2 LEAC-AFW-FB (4) 10 4 + 4 +2 3LEAC- &*v-EIHP(5) 11 4
4+2 1
11 4 + 4+3 4 LEAC-PORV-LPR (7) 9 4 + 2+3 5 LEAC-PORV-EIHP(8) 9 4
2+2 1
9 4+2+3 6 LEAC - PORV-AFW (9) 10 4 + 2+4 Identify ary operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or iritiating event Operator open manual valve If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met:
- 1) suffident time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) trairing is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to thescenario assumed, and 5) any equipmert needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Counting Rule Worksheet Step Instructions (1)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 9.
(1) 8 (2)
Divide the result of Step (1) by 3 and round down.
(2) 2 (3)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 8.
(3) 0 (4)
Add the result of Step (3) to the result of Step (2).
(4) 2 (5)
Divide the result of Step (4) by 3 and round down.
(5) 0 (6)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 7.
(6) 2 (7)
Add the result of Step (6) to the result of Step (5).
(7) 2 (8)
Divide the result of Step (7) by 3 and round down.
(8) 0 (9)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 6.
(9) 0 (10)
Add the result of Step (9) to the result of Step (8).
(10) 0 (11)
Divide the result of Step (10) by 3 and round down.
(11) 0 (12)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 5.
(12) 0 (13)
Add the result of Step (12) to the result of Step (11).
(13) 0 (14)
Divide the result of Step (13) by 3 and round down.
(14) 0 (15)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 4.
(15) 0 (16)
Add the result of Step (15) to the result of Step (14).
(16) 0 U
U If the result of Step 16 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of high safety significance (RED).E oM If the result of Step 13 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of substantial safety significance (YELLOW).E oU If the result of Step 10 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of low to moderate safety significance (WHITE).E
°M If the result of Steps 10, 13, and 16 are zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of very low safety significance (GREEN).E Phase 2 Result:. `
GREEN7 E WHITE E YELLOW E RED
Exrcs 3
Seario Us heGnei BRRikInome nsetinNoeoo o
thi exrie a
h "A
intumn ai IA copesrsie shrl fe i
a tre fo peioi roato of the oeaig syste a
is a
nrally crs-te supor sytm The inspectorsa deemie tat th crtra fo crediti g
oprao reovr ofa thAcmrso wer no satife and tat ardi for reovr af ah co peso aa anot approprate, ga
Sytm tha Inrae th Lieiho of anIiitn Evn
Table 2 Initiators and System Dependency for Generic BWR Nuclear Power Planter 91 Affected System Major Components Support Systems Initiating Event d
NScenarios Cod Name e
DGN D ese generor Cod ing PURps 480 V-AC All Water SW Ser\\Aoevvater 5 punpsin Uhit 1/2Oib house; 4160V-AQ 125V-IX IA LCBW shared sysem supplying a onmon header TB3)N Turbine Bd Iding
=
or d 2 punrp 2 M-s, an eNpaiontank SW, IA 4160 V-AC TRAN TPC SLOCA l CR, Cod ing Water Symem LOOP, ATV\\6 F-PF Hgh ressure Coolant 1 TP, IVtV 125 V-D, 250 V-EX1 RomHWAC All except LLOCA L.CSW Injection LFCS LoNPressure Core Soray 2TrainsorLoops; 1 LPCSpurrp 4160 V-AQ 480 V-AQ 125 V-DQ All except LCOSW pertrain SW Purp RFxm h/AC RIC F.ator Core Isolation 1 TDP, [VDV 125 V-DC, Rnom I-MAC All except LLOCA MVOA Coding FPS Fre Protectimn Stem 2diesel fire purrps NVDV 120VAQ SWV 24VNdcet-cadrium LCSW, LOIA batteries CFU Cortrol Rod Di've Hydradic 2 Vi/R [VDV I'nb pr c ESyEAC Bjse5 TRAN TPC-S SLOCXA ICRe, Syem TBOOW LCOP, ATVS Instrumen Ar 2 compressors for each unit plus a charm t-nrnnraccinr SW, 480V AC LOIA
Table I - Categories of Initiating Events for Generic BWR Nuclear Power Plant9l 91 Ro Approximat Example Event Type Initiating Event w
e Frequency Likelihood (IEL)
> 1 per 1-10 Transient (Reactor Trip) (TRAN),
1 2
3 yr Loss of Power Conversion System (Loss of condenser, Closure of MSIVs, Loss of feedwater) (TPCS)9 1 per 10-102 Loss of offsite power (LOOP),
2 3
4 yr Inadvertent or stuck open SRVs (IORV), Loss of Instrument Air (LOIA)
III 1 per 102-Loss of Service Water (LOSW), Loss 3
4 5
10 3 yr of an AC Bus (LOAC)N IV 1 per 103-Small LOCA (RCS rupture) (SLOCA),
4 5
6 10 4 yr Medium LOCA (RCS rupture)
(MLOCA)N V
1 per 104-Large LOCA (RCS rupture)(LLOCA),
5 6
7 10 5 yr ATWSE VI less than 1 ISLOCA, Vessel rupturem 6
7 8
per 10 5 yr
> 30 days 3-30 days
<3 days Exposure Time for Dearaded Condition
Table 3.4 SDP Worksheet for Generic BWR -
Loss of Instrument Air (LOIA)(12 Safety Functions Needed:
Ful Creditable Ptigation Caoabmitv for Each =aely Function; I-Igh Pressure Injection (HPI)
IPCI (1 ASD train) or RCIC (1 ASD train)
Depressudzation (DEP) 1/5 ADS valves (RVs) manually opened (operator action = 2)
Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 1/4 RHR pumps in 1/2 trains in LPCI Mode (1 mult-train system) or 1/2 LPCS trains (1 multi-train system)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 1/4 RHR pumps in 1/2 trains With heat exchangers and 1/4 RHRSW pumps in SPC (1 multi-train system)
Circle Nfected Functions EL Remaining Fitgiation Caabitv Rating for Each Recovery of Result Affected Seouence Failed Train 1LOIA -cHR(2,4) 5 3
3 0
6 2 +
2+6 0
11 2+2+6 3 LOIA * -PI-DEP(6) 6 3
2+2 0
7 2+2
+ 2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to degraded equipment or initiating event:
directly restore the None If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met:
1 ) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental co nd itio nsa Ilow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4)training is conducted on the existing procedures underconditions similarto the scenario assumed, and
- 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and available and ready for use.
hpteial inpcto fidig thtivle th uavalblt At Sain
- Lucia, thmCyt m
mm a api ri upr ytm Asu etat reovr crdi isaporatfoth cirumtanessuroudin tis yptheicl fndng
1.4 Inspection Finding (Normally Running Components of a Split Train Support System) that Increases the Likelihood of an Initiating Event and the Impact on Mitigating System Capability Can Be Explicitly Determined For inspection findings that involve the unavailability of a normally running component of a split train support system that increases the likelihood of an initiating event, increase the Initiating Event Likelihood by one order of magnitude for the associated special initiator. In addition, determine the impact on the mitigation capability of the supported systems and evaluate each of the worksheets directed by Table 2. "Initiators and System Dependency," for the unavailability of the affected supported systems.
Table 2 Initiators and System Dependency St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I (1,2)9 Initiating Even Affected Systems Major Components Support Systems Scenarios AC Power System (AC)
AC Power Distribution (two safety related DC, HVAC(3)
All buses), 9 AC Instrument Power, and fast transfer Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
Two MDPs (one per SG) with normally closed AC, ESFAS, DC All except MLOC cross-connections, Unit 1 condensate storage and LLOCA tank (UI CST)
One TDP to both SGs, UICST ESFAS, DC, Main Steam Long Term AFW Make up Automatic CST make up from demineralized IA backed by EDG water through an air operated valve LCV-12-9 AFW cross tie to Unit 2 CST through a manual None valve CST make up from Treated Water Storage Tank Non safety related (TWST) through TWST pumps and manual AC valves CcW Three pumps in two trains with one CCW heat AC, ESFAS, ICW, All except exchanger in each train and the third pump as a DC swing pump LlCW Condensate / MFW Three Condensate pumps AC, DC, TCW TRANS, LCCW, SLOCA Two MFW pumps AC, DC, IA, TCW Containment Cooling System Four fan coolers AC, ESFAS, CCW All except LCCW (CCS) and LICW Containment Sr)rav Svstem Two trains with non-nalIv closed cross-AC.DC.ESFAS.
All excer)t LCCVV
+
Table 1 Categories of Initiating Events for St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1I R
Approximate Example Event Type Initiating Event o
Frequency Likelihood (IEL)
W I
>1 per 1-10 yr Reactor Trip (TRANS), Loss of Power Conversion System (TPCSN 1
2 3
1 per 10-102 yr Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), Loss of Instrument Air (LIA)M 2
3 4
III 1 per 102-103 yr Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Stuck open PORV/SRV 3
4 5
(SORV), Small LOCA including RCP seal failures (SLOCA), Main Steam Une Break (MSLBJ IV 1 per 103 -10 4 yr Medium LOCA (MLOCA), Loss of CCVV (LCCW), Loss of 1CW 4
5 6
(LICW), Loss of a DC Bus (LDCBUS)E V
1 per 104 -10 5 yr Large LOCA (LLOCA*
5 6
7 VM less than 1 per 10 ATWS, Interfacing System LOCA (ISLOCAJ 6
7 8
5yr
>30 3-30
<3 days days day s
Exposure Time for Degraded Condition
4*
Table 3.1 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Transients (Reactor Trip) (TRANS)9 Safety Functions Needed:
Power Conversion System (PCS)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capabilityfor Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 Main Feedwater trains and 1/3 condensate pumps (operator action = 3) (1) 1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action=2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capabilit Recove Results Rating for Each Affected Sequence y Credit 1 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR(50 14 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 1
+
3
+
5
+
2
+
3 2TRANS-PCS-LTAFWMU-SDC-HPR(6) 14 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 1 +
3
+
5
+
2
+ 3 3 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPSI (7) 1 +
3
+
5
+
2
+ 3 14 3
3+5+3+2 1
17
2 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPR (6) 1
+
3
+
5
+
2
+
3 14 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 3 TRANS-PCS-LTAFWMU-SDC-HPSI (7) 14 3
3+5+3+2 1
17 1 +
3
+
5
+
2
+ 3 4 TRANS-PCS-LTAFWMU - SDC-FB1 (8) 13 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 1 +
3
+
5
+
2
+ 2 5TRANS-PCS-AFW-CHR (10) 11 3
3+4+2 1
13 1
+ 3 +-4
+
3 6 TRANS-PCS -AFW-HPR (11)
+
3 3+4+2 1
13 1
+ 3 +4
+3 7 TRANS -PCS -AFW -HPSI (12) U 1
3 3 +4+2 1
13 1
+
3
+
4 +
3 8TRANS-PCS-AFW-FB (13) 10 1
+
3
+
4 +
2
Table 3.2 SDP Worksheetfor St. Lucie, Unit I -
Transients without PCS (TPCS)9 Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action=2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (1) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from trains Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator U action = 3) (2) 1/3 charqin. pumps and 1/ 2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers (operator I action = 2)(3) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitiaation Capability Recovery Result Rating for Each Affected Sequence Credit s
1 TPCS-LTAFWMU - SDC-CHR (4)E 1
+ 5
+2+3 11 3
5+2+2 1
13 2 TPCS-LTAFWMU-SDC-HPR (5) 11 3
5+2+2 1
13 1
+
5
+ 2
+ 3 3 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPSI (6) 1
+
5
+
2
+ 3 11 3
5+2+2 1
13
4 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - FB1 (7) 1
+
5
+
2
+ 2 10 3
5+2+2 1
13 5 TPCS - AFW-CHR (9)m 8
3 4+2 1
10 1
+
4 +3 6TPCS-AFW-HPR (10) U 8
3 4+2 1
10 1
+ 4+3 7 TPCS -AFW-HPSI (11) 8 3
4+2 1
10 I
+
4 +
3 8 TPCS-AFW - FB (12) 7 1
+
4+2
Table 3.3 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Small LOCA (SLOCA) (1/ 2"<D<3") (1)9 Safety Functions Needed:
Secondary Heat Removal (SHR)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capabilityfor Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 Main Feedwater trains and 1/3 condensate pumps (operator action = 1) (2) or 1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system) 2/2 PORV (operator action = 2) (3) 1/3 charqinq pumps and 1/2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers with long term AFW makeup and RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation modes (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovery Results Rating for Each Affected Credit Sequence 1SLOCA-SDC-HPR (3) 2 8
5 2+2 1
10 3
+
2+
3 2SLOCA-SDC-CHR (4) 8 5
2+2 1
10 3
+ 2 + 3 3 SLOCA -HPSI (5, 10) 0 6
5 2
1 8
3
+ 3
4 SLOCA-SHR-HPR (7) 11 5
5+2 1
13 3
+
5+311 5+3 11 5 SLOCA-SHR-CHR (8) 11 5
5+2 1
13 3
+
5
+ 3 6 SLOCA-SHR-FB (9) 10 3
+ 5
+ 2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:E 0
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Notes:E
Table 3.4 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Stuck Open Relief Valve (SORV)
Safety Functions Needed:
Isolation (BLK)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Operator closes the block valve (1 train) (1) 1/2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Operator conducts FB using the remaining 1/1 PORV (operator action = 2) (2) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/ 2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers and long term AFW makeup and RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action
= 2) (3) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Ratin Recovery Results for Each Affected Sequence Credit 1 SORV-BLK - SDC-HPR (4) 3
+
2 +
2 +
3 10 5
2+2+2 1
12 2 SORV - BLK - SDC-CHR (5) 10 5
2+2+2 1
12 3 SORV - BLK - HPSI (6,11) 3
+
2 +
3 8
5 2+2 1
10 4 SORV - BLK - AFW - HPR (8) 12 5
2+4+2 1
14 5 SORV - BLK - AFW -CHR (9) 12 5
2+4+2 1
14 6 SORV - BLK-AFW -FB (10) 11
Table 3.5 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Medium LOCA (MLOCA) (3"<D<5")(1)9 Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode( 2) (1 multi-train system)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remainina Mitigation Capability Recovery Results Ratina for Each Affected Sequence Credit 1MLOCA-CHR(20 7
6 2
1 9
4
+
3 7
2 MLOCA-HPR (3) 7 6
2 1
9 4
+
3 3 MLOCA-HPSI (4) 7 6
2 1
9 4
+
3 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:E m
m If operator actions are required tocredit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met
- 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allowaccess where needed, 3) procedures exist,
- 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any eauiDment needed to comolete these actions is available and readv for use.
4+
9f Table 3.6 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Large LOCA(LLOCA) (D > 5")ii Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Safety Injection Tank (SIT) 3/3 unaffected SITs (1 train)
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) 1/ 2 LPSI trains (1 multi-train system)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/ 2 hiqh pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode(l) (1 multi-train system)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovey Results Rating for Each Affected Sequence Credit 1 LLOCA-CHR (2)0 0
7 2
1 10 5
+ 3 8
2 LLOCA-HPR (3)N 8
7 2
1 10 5
+ 3 3 LLOCA-LPSI (4)E 8
7 2
1 10 5
+ 3 4 LLOCA - SIT (5)0 7
5
+ 2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:E U
U U
U U
U I
f l rfl+r.r'f~a-, --
+--
n at A +^
-,.-A;+.a-,;,-
--,;4;-r,*~-t-,
a,,
- mak%
lC~
f
-a ar-a~a an l+iflfl
-1,
^-rA + ýI IA Ira
Table 3.7 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) (1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
Turbine-driven AFW pump (TDAFW)
Recovery of AC Power in < 2 hrs (REC2)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Recoveryof AC Power in < 7 hrs (REC7)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 Emergency Diesel Generators (1 multi-train system) or crosstie other unit EDG (operator action=1 )(2) 1/1 TDP trains of AFW (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves (Operator aclion = 1) (3)
[1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) with steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves] with Pong term AFW make up from demineralized water or unit 2 CST (4)]
1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Recovery of offsite power and establishment of long term AFW make up from demineralized water or unit 2 CST(Operator action = 2) (5) 2/2 PORV (operator action = 2) (6) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recove Results Rating for Each Affected Credit Sequence 1 LOOP - AFW - CHR (3)1 9
4 4+2 1
11 2,
+ 4 ++
131 2 LOOP-AFW-HPR (4) 9 4
4+2 1
11 2+
4+
3 3 LOOP-AFW-FB (5) 2
+
4 +
2 0
8
4 LOOP - AFW-HPSI (6) 9 4
4+2 1
11 2+4+3 5 LOOP - EDG-REC7 (8) 8 2+4
+2 2
4+1+2 1
12 2 +
4 + 1
+ 3 1
+ +
7 LOOP - EDG - TDAFW - HPR (11) 1 4
4+1+2 1
12 2 +4
+1
+.3 8 LOOP - EDG-TDAFW-FB (12) 9 2
+
4
+ 1
+
2 I
9 LOOP-EDG-TDAFW-HPSI (13)E 2
+
4
+ 1
+
3 10 4
4+1+2 1
12
Table 3.8 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Steam Generator Tube Rupture(SGTR) 9 Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Pressure Equalization (EQ)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed with I PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
Shutdown Cooling (SDC2)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR2)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 MDPs of AFW (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDP of AFW (1 ASD Train) to the unaffected SGs and steam relief through 1/1 ARVor 1/8 safety valves Operator isolates the ruptured SG (MSIV, SG blowdown line, main steam bypass valve. AFW steam supply) and depressurizes RCS using SG RV and pressurizer spray to less than setpoint of SG relief valves (operator action = 3) (1) 1/ 2 high pressure injection train (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 PORVs (operator aclion=2) (2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2)
Automatic make up from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator U action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator U action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers with long term RCS makeup from BAM tanks using 1/3 charging pumps and SITs and ultimate isolation of the faulted SG (operator action = 2) (1,4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 hiqh pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode with long term RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs via 1/3 charging pumps and ultimate isolation of the faulted SG (operator action = 3) (1) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
U U
U.
- I -
Circle Affected Functions IEL 5
Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Each Affected Sequence 1 SGTR - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 3
+
5
+
2
+ 3 13 15+2+2 15
2 SGTR-HPR (5)
LTAFWMU 3
+
- SDC-5
+
13 5
5+2+2 1
15 2
3 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC-FB1 (6) 3
+
5 +
2 4 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC-13 5
5+2+2 1
15 HPSI (7) 3
+
5
+
5 SGTR-EQ-SDC2 (9) 9 8
5 3+2 1
11 6 SGTR-EQ-HPSI (10) 9 9
5 3+2 1
11 3
+3+
3 7 SGTR-AFW-CHR (12) 9 1o 5
4+2 1
12 3
+ 4
+
3 8 SGTR-AFW-HPR2 (13) 9 10 5
4+2 1
12 3
+ 4
+
3 9 SGTR-AFW-FB (14) 9 9
3
+ 4 +
2 10 SGTR-AFW - HPSI (15) 3
+ 4
+
3 91 10 5
4+2 1
12
Table 3.9 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS)11 91 Safety Functions Needed:
Turbine Trip (1-P)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Primary Safety Valves Open (SRVO)
Emergency Boration (EB)
Primary Safety Valves Reclose (SRVR)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Manually trip the turbine (operator action = 2)(1) 2/2 MDPs of AFW (1 train) or 1/1 TDP of AFW (1 ASD Train) to both SGs and steam relief through 2/2 ARVs or 2/16 safety valves 3/3 SRVs and 2/2 PORVs open (1 train)
Operator conducts emergency boration using 1/3 charging pumps from boric acid tank (operator action = 2)(2) 3/3 SRVs and 2/2 PORVs reclose (1 train)
Automatic make up from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank. (operator 91 action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure injection train (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions Remaining Mitigation Capability Ratina for Each Affected I,
-.p-T 1 ATWS-TTP (11)E 6
+ 2 2 ATWS -AFW (10)U 6
+ 3
2 ATWS-AFW (10) U 6
+3 3 ATWS-SRVO (9)E 8
6
+
28 4ATWS-EB (8) M 8
6
+ 28 5 ATWS-SRVR-HPSl (7)E 11 8
2+2 1
13 6 ATWS-SRVR-HPR (6) E 11 8
2+2 1
13 6
+2+3 7 ATWS-SRVR-CHR (5) U 6
+ 2 +
3m 11 8
2+2 1
13 8ATWS-LTAFWMU -SDC (3)m 13 8
5+2 1
16 6
+5
+2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:m 0
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficienttime is available to implementthese actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is availabe and ready for use.
Table 3.10 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 Main Steam Line Break Outside (MSLB)
Saifpv Funrfinns%
tNepdprd Closure of 1 MSIV (MSIV)
Isolation of Feed to Faulted SG (ISOF)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety F unction:
Closure of 1/22 M SIVs (1 multi-train system)
Isolation of feedwater to the faulted SG (1 train) 1/1 MD AFW trains (1 train) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 HPSI trains (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 PO RVs (operator action=2)( 1) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (1)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water(1 train) oroperator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (2) 1/3 charging pumps and /2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2)(3) 1/ 2 high pressure recirculation trains (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovery Result Rating for Each Affected Credit
.-5 Sequence 5
5+ 2+ 2 115 1 MSLB - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 13 3
+
5
+
2
+
3 2 MSLB - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPR 5
5+ 2+ 2 1
15 (5) 13 3 MSLB - LTAFWMU - SDC - FB1 12 5
5+ 2+ 2 1
15 (6) 4 MSLB - LTAFW MU - SDC -
5 5+
2+ 2 1
15 HPSI (7) 13 5 MSLB - AFW - CHR (9) 9 5
3+2 1
11 3
+
3
+
3
6 MSLB-AFW-HPR (10) 9 5
3+2 3
+
3
+
3 7 MSLB-AFW-FB (11) 8 3
+
3
+
2 3+3+2 1
8 MSLB-AFW-HPSI (12) 95 3+2 3
+
3
+
3 9 MSLB-ISOF (13) 5 10 MSLB-MSIV (14) 6 3
+
3
Table 3.11 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Loss of a DC Bus (LDCBUS)( 1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Closing the block valve (1 train) (2) 1/1 MD AFW trains (1 train) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/1 ARV and 1/16 safety valves 1/1 HPSI trains (1 train)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water(1 train) oroperator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (3) 1/ 2 char~qinq pumps and 1/1 LPSI train with SDC heat exchangers with RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action = 2) (4) 1/1 high pressure recirculation train (1 train) 2/2 fan coolers or 1/1 containment spray train (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating Recovery Result for Each Affected Sequence Credit I
1 LDCBUS - LTAFWMU - SDC (3) 11 6
5+0 1
12 4
+
5
+
2 2LDCBUS-AFW (4,10) 4
+
3 3 LDCBUS-ISO -SDC - CHR (7) 11 6
2+0+0 1
9 4
+
2-+
2 +
3 4 LDCBUS - ISO -SDC - HPR (8) 10 6
2+0+0 1
9 4
+
2+2+2 10 5 LDCBUS-ISO-HPSI (9) 6 2+0 1
9 4
+2+2 8
Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met:
1 ) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similarto the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.12 SDPWorksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of Instrument Air (LIA)(1)9 Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU))
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/2 MD AFW trains(1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) with 1/16 secondary safety valves 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Align AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank. (operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/ 2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers; manual local action to open the heat exchanger outlet valve (operator action=2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovery Results Ratina for Each Affected Sequence Credit 1LIA-LTAFWMU-SDC-CHR (4E 10 4 3+2+2 1
12 2
+
3
+ 2+3 2 LIA-LTAFWMU - SDC-HPR(5) 2
+
3
+
2 3 LIA-LTAFW MU - SDC -
1 12 HPSI (6) 2
+
3
+
4 LIA - LTAFW MU -
(7) 2
+
3 SDC-FB1
+
2
+
4 9
3+2+2 1
12
5 LIA - AFW - CHR (9) 4 +
3 2 +
9 4
4+2 1
11 6 LIA-AFW - HPR (10) 2 +
9 4
4+2 1
11 7LIA-AFW-HPSI (11) 2+
9 4
4+2 1
11 8LIA-AFW-FB (12) 2 +
8 4 +
2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:E 0
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met
- 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allowaccess where needed, 3) procedures exist,
- 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
,Table 3.13 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCVI Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Tripping RCPs (RCPTRIP)
Operator trips RCPs to prevent a seal LOCA (operator action=3) (2)
Power Conversion System (PCS) 1/ 2 Main Feedwater trains (operator action = 3) (3)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) 1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
Automatic CST makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank. (operator action = 3) (4)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recove Results Rating for Each Affected Sequence Credit 1 LCCW - PCS - LTAFWMU (3) 10 5
1 12 4 +
3 +
3 3+3 2 LCCW - PCS-AFW (4) U 11 5
3+4 1
13 4
+ 3 + 4 1
+411 3 LCCW - RCPTRIP (5)
E 7
5 3
1 9
4
+ 3 5
319 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:E U
If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met:
- 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar tothe scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Counting Rule Worksheet Step Instructions (1)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 9.
(1) 7 (2)
Divide the result of Step (1) by 3 and round down.
(2) 2 (3)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 8.
(3) 1 (4)
Add the result of Step (3) to the result of Step (2).
(4) 3 (5)
Divide the result of Step (4) by 3 and round down.
(5) 1 (6)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 7.
(6) 0 (7)
Add the result of Step (6) to the result of Step (5).
(7) 1 (8)
Divide the result of Step (7) by 3 and round down.
(8) 0 (9)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 6.
(9) 0 (10)
Add the result of Step (9) to the result of Step (8).
(10) 0 (11)
Divide the result of Step (10) by 3 and round down.
(11) 0 (12)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 5.
(12) 0 (13)
Add the result of Step (12) to the result of Step (11).
(13) 0 (14)
Divide the result of Step (13) by 3 and round down.
(14) 0 (15)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 4.
(15) 0 (16)
Add the result of Step (15) to the result of Step (14).
(16) 0 oN If the result of Step 16 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of high safety significance (RED).N oN If the result of Step 13 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of substantial safety significance (YELLOW ).N o
If the result of Step 10 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of low to moderate safety significance (WHITE).N
°m If the result of Steps 10, 13, and 16 are zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of very low safety significance (GREEN).N Phase 2 Result:i NGREEN WHITE E[ YELLOW wi RED
Exrcs 5
Sceari Use th Geeic PWR RikIfre Inpcto Noebo fo this Th "B
diese genrao aucssul completeda 24 hou enuanc deemndta h
rtra ao crdiin aprao reovr of thB dislgnrtrwr o
aife and that crdi foaecvr oh dise geeato was no aporate.ag aa
16 Inseto Finig Inovn Emeragenc Diese Geeatars intatr if aplcal at th afece plnt In
- addition, deerin th imac on miiato caailt of the.
supported systems' an evlut th lss of o
st poe (LOOP
Table 2 Initiators and System Dependency for Geneic PWR Nuclear Powr Plant9 A ke d fn d l Mcr a wpxr ts S4 wxxtg kIns a n Bi a
tir U E wtSo n os AdIliay Fbeamtr (APAV) hIe MJpý12 4.16-kV, DCX ESFAS, ded caed Al eco MLCCA LLOCA Monooing Q-e TE 2')
DQ EAS All emv l
_LOCA SGT1
[VSLB Fedar islalon aaKe for MPs 48:V SG3R IELB Fea~aer i son vaMe forTlm DC Qiancd and Vd ume (rtrd Tv an" diag rg pxjps((XP3), 160 4.16-kV, 489V, DX COW, mrom SGTR A1VXS Sy$em(OkC-)
gpn@2575pi codingr 3)
Tvvo :bcicadd transer p*"3)
ArvS rpmintQ dirg VbterS9sem Thretrarns, echv th cnelxrp 4.16kV, DC 1X R SFAS LOXW (cX3' FJectric PT4%(]hree aE 1E4.16-kVbFs EAB I-IfA( 1DC Al System Three Standby Diesel D EFA* EON LOOP, LEAC Generatorso)
Threetrains d aCaa 1E48DVlcadcerters ard 4.16kV, DE : EI-K/AC Al rr__ oortrol oJA (JAs
(]ass1EWia112JVAC(4bijns)
EC 480V, FB I-IAC all
Table 1 - Categories of Initiating Events for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plantii Row Approximate Frequency Example Event Type Initiating Event Li keDihood (EL)
I
> 1 perit-l1 yr Loss of Power Conversion System (TPCS)%
1 2
3 I1 lperl0-10'yr Loss of offsite power 2
3 4
( L O O P ), Loss of Class 1E 125V DC Bus A or B (LODC)M III 1 per 102-10 Steam Generator Tube 3
4 5
3 yr Rupture (SGTR), Stuck open PORV/SRV (SORV), Small LOCA including RCP seal failures (SLOCA), Main Steam Line Break O utside Containment (MSLB)
IV 1 per 10 3 - 10 Medium LOCA 4
5 6
4 yr (MLOCA), LOOP with Loss of One Class 1E 4.16-kV Bus (LEAC)E V
1 per 104-10 Large LOCA (LLOCA),
5 6
7 5 yr Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCW)
VI less than 1 ATWSm1 )
6 7
8 per 10 5 yr
_ET
> 30 days 3-30 days
<3 days Exposure Time for Deciraded Condition
Table 3.6 SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) 9 Sae Functions Needed:
EmergencyAC Power (EAC)
Secondary Heat Removal (AFVV)
FRmvaely of AC Poe in< 2 hrs (FERC2) bmovelyof AIC power in < 5 hsrs(FR(5)
Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP)
Pwmay HHIt Pefmno FeedIeed (FB)
Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR)
FllI Qeditabe Mligaion
_pb xJity for Each Saaly Ftncion:
1/3 Standby Diesel Generators (1 multi-train system) 1/1 T-YAFW purrp (1 ASDtrain)wth 1/5 safety relief valves per SGthat isfed by AFW 1/3 MDAFWtrains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFWVtrain(1 ASDtrain)
Recovery of AC power (operaor ati on = 1)"
Recovery of AC poer (operator action =2) 4 1/3 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system) 2/2 pressurizer FOFVs open for Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2) 1/3 LHSI trains and with the associated 1/3 RHR heat exchangers or 2/6 RCFCs with cooling flow aligned to CCW (1 multi-train system) 9mI q
I arde ffected Functions 1 LOOP-AFW-LPR (3 2+
4 +3 IEL Rnmki Mtigaon cpxfity Rimig for Each Affected q Failed Train 0
pew9 9
2 4+3 2 LOOP-AFW-FB(4)u 8
2 4+2 2+4+2 3 LOOP-AFW-EBHP (5) 9 2
4+3 2+
4 +3 4 LOOP - EAC-LPR(7, 118 2
2+
3 +3M 8
2 3+3 (AC PRcovered) 5 LOOP - EAC-EHP(8,13)M 2+3+3M 8
2 3+3 (AC Recovered) 6 LOOP - EAC -REC5 (9)0 2+3+2 7
2 3+2 0
7
7LQ-E-*-TDqvv-FB(12m 8
2 3+1+2 0
8 2+3+ 1 +2 8 L(XP - EA*-
- mF2 (14, 7
2 3+1+1 0
7 2+3+ 1 +1 Identfy ay oeratcr reoovey acticns that are credited to drecly restore the degraded equipTeri ar itiating ee-t:I If cpeatcr actions ae required to credit jiadng rmitigaion eqiprrert in svice or for recovey adions, such credit sloud be gi wn mnly if theffdloAing aitaia a-e met: 1) sffifdert tirrme is availabe to irrrlerrert these actins, 2) enirnrmtal clxnticns alloNaces sWe reetcd 3) procedues eDist, 4) tranirg is cordded on the edstigr prcedres urrl conditims sinila tothesaeo assurred, and 5) ayequipmT rededto corjieethese acticns is a'lable and ready for usa I
mI
Table 3.12"-
SDP Worksheet for Generic PWR Nuclear Power Plant -
LOOP ai Loss of One Class 1E 4.16-kV Bus (LEAC)(1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable UItigation Capablity for Each Safetv Function:
PORVRedoses (PORV) 2/2 Pressurizer PORVs reclose after opening during transient (1 train)
Secondary Heat Removal (AFW) */2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system)or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) with 1/5 safety relief valve per SG that is fed by AFW High Pressure Injedion for FB (El-P) 1/22 HHSI pumps (1 multi-train system)
Puimary Heat Removal. Feed/Bleed (FB) 2/2 pressurizer PORVs open for Feed/Bleed (operatoraction = 2)
Low Pressure Recirculation (LPR) 1/22 LHSI pumps with (associated /2 RHR heat exchangers or 2/4 RCFCs with cooling flow aligned to CCW) (1 multi-train system)
Orde Affected Functions 1 LEAC - AFW-LPR (3) 4+4+3 LEL Remaining litigation Capability Raling for Each Affected Sequence 0
Results 9
11 2
4+3 2 LEAC-AFW-FB (4)M 10 2
4+2 4
+ 4 +2 3 LEAC -AFWV-ElHP(5)M 11 2
4 + 3 4+4+3 4 LEAC-PORV-LPR (7)E 9
2 2 + 3 4 + 2+3 5 LEAC-PORV-EIHP(8)M 9
2 2 + 3 4+
2
+3 6 LEAC-PORV-AFW(9g 10 2
2+4 4
+
2+4 Identify any operator recovery actions that degraded equipment or initiating event:E are credited to directly restore the
Counting Rule Worksheet Step Instructions (1)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 9.
(1) 4 (2)
Divide the result of Step (1) by 3 and round down.
(2) 1 (3)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to (3) 6 8.
(4)
Add the result of Step (3) to the result of Step (2).
(4) 7 (5)
Divide the result of Step (4) by 3 and round down.
(5) 2 (6)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to (6) 4 7.
(7)
Add the result of Step (6) to the result of Step (5).
(7) 6 (8)
Divide the result of Step (7) by 3 and round down.
(8) 2 (9)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to (9) 0 6.
(10)
Add the result of Step (9) to the result of Step (8).
(1 0) 2 (1 1)
Divide the result of Step (10) by 3 and round down.
(1 1) 0 (12)
Enterthe numberofsequences with a risk significanceequalto 5.
(12) 0 (13)
Add the result of Step (12) to the result of Step (11).
(13) 0 (14)
Divide the result of Step (13) by 3 and round down.
(14) 0 (15)
Enter the num ber of sequences with a risk significance equal to 4.
(1 5) 0 (16)
Add the result of Step (15) to the result of Step (14).
(16) 0 o
If the result of Step 16 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of high safety significance (RED).N N
If the result of Step 13 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of substantial safety significance (YELLOW ).N U
- If the result of Step 10 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of low to moderate safety significance (W HITE).N Um If the result of Steps 10, 13, and 16 are zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of very low safety significance (GREEN).N M
Phase 2 Result:
0 GREENE 0
W 4 ITEl E) YELLOW 0
RED
Table 3.7 SDP Worksheet for Wolf Creek Generating Station -
(TWO TRAIN PWR EXAMPLE)
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for each Safety Function:
Secondary Heat Removal, Turbine-driven pump of AFW (TDAFW)
Secondary Heat Removal (AFW)
Recovery of AC Power in <
2 hrs (REC2)
Recovery of AC power in <
5 hrs (REC5)
Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP1)
Early Inventory, HP Injection (EIHP2)
Primary Heat Removal, Feed/Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (H PR) 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generators (1 multi-train system) 1/1 TDAFW pump (1 ASD train) with 1/5 safety valves 1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) with 1/4 ARVs or 1/5 safety valves Recovery of AC power (operatoraction = 1)(1)
Recovery of AC power (operator action = 1) (1,2) 1/2 CCPs (1 multi-train system) or 1/2 SI pumps (1 multi-train system) 1/2 CCPs (3) (1 multi-train system) 2/2 PORVs (and associated block valves) openfor Feed/Bleed (operator action = 2)
(1/2 CCPs or 1/2 SI pumps) with 1/2 RHR pumps with operatorswitchover (operatoraction = 3)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remnaining Mitiaation Canabilitv R ecoveQYry Result Ratina for Each Affected Sequence 1 LOOP - AFW - HPR 3+ 2 0
7
2 LOOP-AFW-FB (4) 2 3+2 0
7 2
+4+2 8
3+4 0
9 2+4+6 2
4 LOOP - EAC - HPR (7,11) 2 2+2 0
6 (AC recovered) 8 5 LOOP-EAC-EIHP1 (8) 2 2+4 0
8 (AC recovered) 1 6 LOOP - EAC - REC5 (9) 6 2
2+1 0
5 2 +3+
-FB (12) 2 2+1+2 0
7 (AC recovered) 8 8 LOOP - EAC - TDAFW
- EIHP2 (13)
(AC recovered) 2 2+1+2 0
7 9
.1~~~~~~~
Exris Th San Lui Nula Poe Pln Uni I
Rik-nore Inspecton Notbook wll be sedfrti xml.Cnie hyoheia inpcto findin tha inole th unavilablit of th "A"
trai saeyreae batr chre fo I
day For ths exml asum no spr batr chager are available.
Asum tha reovr crdi is aprpit fohcrustne surondn thi hyoheia finding.~
1.7 Inspection Findings Involving Safety-Related Battery Chargers Inspection findings that involve the unavailability of a battery charger for a safety-related DC bus should be treated in the same fashion as a finding that increases the likelihood of the loss of DC bus special initiator.
4+
Tqhla 2 Inifintnrc -qnri -q fam no andan
-qf I
"d-in IU"Aanr Pnmrar Dinnf "nif I (1,2)q Initiating Affected Systems Major Components Support Systems Event AC Power System (AC)
AC Power Distribution (two safety related DC, HVAC( 3 )
All buses), 91 AC Instrument Power, and fast transfer Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
Two MDPs (one per SG) with normally closed AC, ESFAS, DC All except cross-connections, Unit 1 condensate storage MLOCA 9 tank (UICST) and LLOCA One TDP to both SGs, UICST ESFAS, DC, Main Steam Long Term AFW Make up Automatic CST make up from demineralized IA backed by EDG water through an air operated valve LCV-12-9 AFW cross tie to Unit 2 CST through a manual None val ve CST make up from Treated Water Storage Tank Non safety related (TWST) through TWST pumps and manual AC valves CCW Three pumps in two trains with one CCW heat AC, ESFAS, ICW, All except exchanger in each train and the third pump as a DC LICW swing pump Condensate / MFW Three Condensate pumps AC, DC, TCW
- TRANS, LCCW, Two MFW pumps AC, DC, IA, TCW SLOCA Containment Cooling System Four fan coolers AC, ESFAS, All except (CCS) ccw.DC LCCW 9 and LICW
Containment Cooling System Four fan coolers AC, ESFAS, All except (CCS) ccw.DC LCCOW and LICW Containment Spray System Two trains with normally closed cross-AC, DC, ESFAS, All except (CSS)9 connections, each with one pump and one HVAC(3), CCWi LCCWcD shutdown cooling (SDC) heat exchanger and LICW9 HPSI Two HPSI trains, pumps shutoff at 1083 psi AC, DC, ESFAS, All except CCW, HVAC(3)
LCCW 9 and LICW Charging Pumps (CHG)
- TRANS, TPCS, SLOCA, 9
- SORV, LDCBUS,
- SGTR, ATWS, MSLB, LIA DC Power System Buses, Battery Chargers(4) and Batteries AC Dist. (without AM AC, battery capacity is 6 hrs.), HVAC EDG Two EDGs, fuel transfer pumps and storage DC, ESFAS LOOP tanks(5)
HVAC Supply and Exhaust Fans AC, ESFAS, DC, All except CCW (control room LCCW E air conditioning) and LICW Instrument Air (IA)
Two Inside Air Compressors and Four Outside AC, TCW (backed LIA Compressors by alternate cooling fans)
Intake Cooling Water (ICW)
Three Pumps in two trains with normally closed AC, ESFAS, DC All cross-connections Turbine Cooling Water (TCW) 2 pumps, 2 heat exchangers AC, DC, ICW
- TRANS, LCCW, SLOCA Main Steam(6)
Two SGs, each with one ARV (can be manually DC, IA, AC All except operated on loss of IA), eight safety valves, and MLOCA E one MSIV, Five turbine bypass valves with 45%
and LLOCA capacity Pressurizer Pressure Relief(6)
Three Safety valves open at 2500 psia, 2 DC, AC (block All except PORVs with block valves open at 2335 psia valves)
- MLOCA, LLOCA, LCCW and LICW RCP Seals CCW to thermal SLOCA barrier heat exchanger (loss on ESFAS), IA for CCW supply and retum valves Safety Injection Tank (SIT)
Four SITs None LLOCA
4+
Table 1 Categories of Initiating Events for St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1I R
Approximate Example Event Type Initiating Event o
Frequency Likelihood (IEL)
W I
> 1 per 1-10 yr Reactor Trip (TRANS), Loss of Power Conversion System (TPCSE 1
2 3
II 1 per 10-102yr Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), Loss of Instrument Air (LAE 2
3 4
III 1 per 102-103 yr Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Stuck open PORV/SRV 3
4 5
(SORV), Small LOCA including RCP seal failures (SLOCA), Main Steam Line Break (MSLB J IV 1 per 103 -104yr Medium LOCA (MLOCA), Loss of CCW (LCCW), Loss of ICW 4
5 6
(LICW), Loss of a DC Bus (LDCBUS)i V
1 per 104-105yr Large LOCA (LLOCAI 5
6 7
VI less than 1 per 10 ATWS, Interfacing System LOCA (ISLOCAE 6
7 8
5yr 3-
<3 30 30 days day da s
ys Exposure Time for Degraded Condition
Table 3.1 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Transients (Reactor Trip) (TRANS)
Safety Functions Needed:
Power Conversion System (PCS)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capabilityfor Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 Main Feedwater trains and 1/3 condensate pumps (operator action = 3) (1) 1/ 2 MID AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) 1/ 2 PORVs (operator acton=2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2)(4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remainina Mitiaation Recovery Results Capability Rating for Each Credit Affected Sequence 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 1 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR(5) 14 1 +
3
+ 5
+
2
+ 3 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 2 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPR (6) 1 +
3
+ 5
+
2
+ 3 14
3 3+5+2+2 1
16 3 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPSI (7) 14 1
+
3
+
5
+
2
+
3 3
3+5+2+2 1
16 4 TRANS - PCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - FBI (8) 13 1
+
3
+
5
+
2
+ 2 3
3+ 3+ 2 112 5TRANS-PCS-AFW-CHR (10) 1
+
11 3+4+3 1
3 3+
43+ 3 6 TRANS-PCS-AFW-HPR (11) 1
+
3 3+3+2 1
12 3
+ 4
+
3 1
7 TRANS - PCS -AFW - HPSI (12) 1
+
3 3+3+2 1
12 3
+ 4 +
3 11 8TRANS-PCS-AFW-FB(13) 1
+
33 3+3+0 1
10
+ 4 +
2 10
Table 3.2 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Transients without PCS (TPCS)
Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FBI)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action=2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (1) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from trains Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (2) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/ 2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers (operator action = 2) (3) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Recove Resuilts Capability Rating for Each y Credit Affected Sequence 1 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 11 3
5+2+2 1
13 1
+
5
+ 2 + 3 2 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPR (5) 3 5+2+2 1
13 1
+
5
+
2
+ 3 3 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPSI (6) 3 5+2+2 1
13 1
+
5
+ 2+3 3
- r.
0%
0%
4 TPCS - LTAFWMU - SDC - FB1 (7) 3 5+2+2 1
13 1
+
5
+ 2
+2 5 TPCS -AFW - CHR (9) 9 3
3+2 1
9 1
+ 4 + 38 6 TPCS - AFW - HPR (10) 9 3
3+2 9
1
+ 4+3 3
3+2 1
9 7 TPCS -AFW -HPSI (11) 9 8
1
+ 4+
3 3+0 7
1
+ 4+2 7
Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) suffident time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.3 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Small LOCA (SLOCA) (1/ 2"<D<3")(1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitiaation Caoabilitvfor Each Safety Function:
Secondary Heat Removal (SHR)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 1/ 2 Main Feedwater trains and 1/3 condensate pumps (operator action = 1)
(2) or 1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 112 ARVs or 116 safety valves 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system) 2/2 PORV (operator action = 2) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers with long term AFW makeup and RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation modes (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Recovery Result Capability Rating for Each Credit 5
Affected Sequence 1 SLOCA-SDC-HPR (3) 3 5
2+2 1
10
+
2+3 8
2 SLOCA-SDC-CHR (4) 8 5
2+2 1
10 3
+
2
+ 3 3 SLOCA-HPSI (5, 10) 6 5
2 1
8 3
+ 3 4 SLOCA-SHR-HPR (7) 3
+
5
+
3 5
4+2 I
12 11
5 SLOCA-SHR-CHR (8) 11 5
4+2 1
12.
3
+
5
+ 3 6 SLOCA-SHR-FB (9) 5 4+0 1
10 3
+
5
+ 2 10 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:If operator actions are required tocredit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Notes: 1.++
2.*+ The HEP The I PE calls this LOCA a small-small LOCA. 9H
Table 3.4 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Stuck Open Relief Valve (SORV) 0 Safety Functions Needed:
Isolation (BLK)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Operator closes the block valve (1 train) (1) 1/ 2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Operator conducts FB using the remaining 1/1 PORV (operator action =
- 2) (2) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 SDC trains with shutdown heat exchangers and long term AFW makeup and RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action = 2) (3) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovery Results Ratina for Each Affected Credit Sequence 1SORV-BLK-SDC-HPR (4) 3 10 5
2+2+2 1
12
+ 2 + 2+
3 2 SORV-BLK-SDC-CHR 5
2+2+2 1
12 (5) 3
+
2+
2+3 3
3 SORV-BLK-HPSI (6,11) 8 5
2+2 1
10 3
+
2 +
3 4 SORV - BLK - AFW - HPR 5
2+3+2 1
13 (8) 3
+
2+
4 +
3
5 SORV - BLK-AFW - CHR 5
2+3+2 1
13 (9) 3
+
2+
4 +
3 6 SORV-BLK-AFW-FB (10) 11 5
2+3+21 13 3
+
2+
4+2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initlating event:If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Notes: 1.4-The HEP
Table 3.5 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Medium LOCA(MLOCA) (3"<D<5")(1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode(2) (1 multi-train system)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovey Result Rating for Each Affected Sequence Credit 6
2 1
9 1MLOCA-CHR (2) 4
+
3 7
2 MLOCA-HPR (3) 4 7
6 2
1 9
+
3 3MLOCA-HPSI (4) 4 7
6 2
1 9
+
3 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event: If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
(1)1+
Table 3.6 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Large LOCA (LLOCA) (D > 5")
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Safety Injection Tank (SIT) 3/3 unaffected SITs (1 train)
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) 1/ 2 LPSI trains (1 multi-train system)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode(l) (1 multi-train system)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recove Resul Ratina for Each Affected Sequence Credit ts 7
2 1
10 1 LLOCA-CHR (2) 5
+
3 8
2 LLOCA-HPR (3) 5
+
8 7
2 1
10 3
3LLOCA-LPSI (4) 5
+
8 7
2 1
10 3
4 LLOCA-SIT (5) 5
+
7 2
Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event:lf operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and
- 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is
9T Table 3.7 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) (1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
Turbine-driven AFW pump (TDAFW)
Recovery of AC Power in < 2 hrs (REC2)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Recovery of AC Power in < 7 hrs (REC7)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 Emergency Diesel Generators (1 multi-train system) or crosstie other unit EDG (operator action=1 )(2) 1/1 TDP trains of AFW (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves (Operator action = 1) (3)
[1/2 MDAFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDAFW train (1 ASD train) with steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves] with Vong term AFW make up from demineralized water or unit 2 CST (4)]
1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Recovery of offsite power and establishment of long term AFW make up from demineralized water or unit 2 CST(Operator action = 2) (5) 2/2 PORV (operator action = 2) (6) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recovery Results Rating for Each Affected Credit Sequence 1 LOOP-AFW-CHR (3) 9 9
4 3+2 1
10 2+4+394 3+
2 LOOP-AFW - HPR (4) 9 9
4 3+210 2+4+3 1
8 3 LOOP-AFW-FB (5) 9 2 + 4 + 2 8
4 3+0
1 10 4 LOOP-AFW-HPSI (6) 9D 2+4+
3 9
4 3+2 5 LOOP-EDG-REC7 (8) 9D 8
4 3+2 10 2+4+2
- 6. LOOP-EDG-TDAFW-CHR(10) 93 1
11 2
+
4+
1
+3 10 4
3+1+2 1
11 7 LOOP-EDG - TDAFW - HPR (11) 2 10 4
3+1+2
+
4 +
1
+ 3 8 LOOP-EDG-TDAFW-FB (12) 2 9
4 3+1+0 1
9
+
4 + 1
+
2 1
11 9 LOOP-EDG - TDAFW - HPSI (13) 2 10 4
3+1+2 11
+
4 + 1
+ 3 10 LOOP-EDG - TDAFW - REC2 (14) 8 4
3+1+110 2
+
4 + 1
+
1 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event: If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.8 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Steam Generator Tube Rur)ture (SGTR)
Talr.
D okhetfrS.Lce UntI-ta1enrtrTueR ur(GR Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Pressure Equalization (EQ)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
Shutdown Cooling (SDC2)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR2)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capabilityfor Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 MDPs of AFW (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TDP of AFW (1 ASD Train) to the unaffected SGs and steam relief through 1/1 ARV or 1/8 safety valves Operator isolates the ruptured SG (MSIV, SG blowdown line, main steam bypass valve. AFW steam supply) and depressurizes RCS using SG RV and pressurizer spray to less than setpoint of SG relief valves (operator action = 3) (1) 1/ 2 high pressure injection train (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action=2) (2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2)
Automatic make up from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2) (4) 1/ 2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers with long term RCS makeup from BAM tanks using 1/3 charging pumps and SITs and ultimate isolation of the faulted SG (operator action = 2) (1,4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode with long term RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs via 1/3 charging pumps and ultimate isolation of the faulted SG (operator action = 3) (1) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remainina Mitiaation Capability Recovery Result Ratina for Each Affected Sequence Credit s
1 SGTR - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 13 5
5+22 1
2 3
+
5
+
2
+ 3
- 1
1 15 1 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 3+
5+
2
+3 13 5
5+2+2 2 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC-1 15 HPR (5) 3
+
5
+
2 3 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC-1 15 FB1 (6) 3
+
5
+
2 4 SGTR-LTAFWMU - SDC-13 5
5+2+2 1
15 HPSI (7) 3
+
5
+
5 SGTR-EQ-SDC2 (9) 3
+
8 5
3+2 1
11 3
+
28 53+
6 SGTR-EQ-HPSI(10) 3 9
5 3+2 1
11
+ 3+
3 7 SGTR-AFW - CHR (12) 3 10 5
3+2 1
11
+ 4
+
3 8 SGTR-AFW-HPR2 (13) 3 10 5
3+2 1
11
+ 4
+ 3
Table3.9 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS)
Tal".
o okhe o
t uiUi I
niiaeIrniet ihu ca (AW Safety Functions Needed:
Turbine Trip (FTP)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Primary Safety Valves Open (SRVO)
Emergency Boration (EB)
Primary Safety Valves Reclose (SRVR)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Manually trip the turbine (operator action = 2)(1) 2/2 MDPs of AFW (1 train) or 1/1 TDP of AFW (1 ASD Train) to both SGs and steam relief through 2/2 ARVs or 2/16 safety valves 3/3 SRVs and 2/2 PORVs open (1 train)
Operator conducts emergency boration using 1/3 charging pumps from boric acid tank (operator action = 2)(2) 3/3 SRVs and 2/2 PORVs reclose (1 train)
Automatic make up from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank.
(operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operatoraction = 2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure injection train (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Recovery Result Each Affected Sequence Credit 5
1ATWS-'TTP (11) 6
+
2 8
8 1
1 10 2ATWS-AFW (10) 6
+
3 9
8 0
1 9
3ATWS-SRVO (9) 6
+ 2 8
8 2
1 11 A ATMAIQZ -
CM~ /M~
r-La 13 a
O I
I I 4ATWS-EB (8) 6
+ 2 8
8 2+2 1
+
11 2
+
3 1
8 2+2 1
13 6 ATWS - SRVR - HPR (6) 6
+
11 2
+
3 1
8 2+2 1
13 7 ATWS - SRVR - CHR (5) 6
+
11 2
+
3 1
8 5+2 116 8 ATWS - LTAFWMU - SDC (3) 6 13
+
5
+ 2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited todirectly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event: If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service orfor recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) suffident time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Notes: 1.+ffhe I PE
Table 3.10 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Main Steam Line Break Outside (MSLB)
Safetv Functions Needed:
Isolation of Feed to Faulted SG (ISOF)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Injection (HPSI)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Closure of 1/21/ MSIVs (1 multi-train system)
Isolation of feedwater to the faulted SG (1 train) 1/1 MD AFW trains (1 train) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/ 2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves 1/ 2 HPSI trains (1 multi-train system) 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action=2Xl) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (1)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (2) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers (operator action = 2)(3) 1/ 2 high pressure recirculation trains (1 multi-train system) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 multl-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Recover Results Rating for Each Affected Sequence y Credit 1 MSLB-LTAFWMU-SDC-CHR (4) 3 13 5
5+2+2 1
15
+
5
+
2
+ 3 5
5+2+2 1
15 2 MSLB-LTAFWMU - SDC - HPR (5) 3 13
+
5
+
2
+ 3 5
5+2+2 1
15 3 MSLB-LTAFWMU - SDC-FB1 (6) 3
+
5
+
2
+ 2 5
5+2+2 1
15 4 MSLB - LTAFWMU - SDC - HPSI (7) 3
+
5
+
2
+ 3 13
5 1+2 1
9 51VELB-AFW-C--R(9) 3
+ 3 +
9 3
61VLB-AFW-I-FPR(10) 3
+ 3 9
1+2 1
9
+ 3 71VELB-AF-FB (11) 3
+ 3 +
5 1+0 1
7 2
8 81VELB-AFW-I-PSI (12) 3
+ 3 5
1+2 1
9
+ 3 91VELB-I,9F(13) 3
+ 2 5
10 IB-[VEIV(14) 3
+ 3 6
Table 3.11 SDPWorksheet for St. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of a DC Bus (LDCBUS)( 1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
High Pressure Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Closing the block valve (1 train) (2) 1/1 MD AFW trains (1 train) or 1/1 TD AFW train ( 1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/1 ARV and 1/16 safety valves 1/1 HPSI trains (1 train)
Automatic makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank (operator action = 3) (3) 1/ 2 charging pumps and 1/1 LPSI train with SDC heat exchangers with RCS makeup from BAM tanks and SITs (operator action = 2) (4) 1/1 high pressure recirculation train (1 train) 2/4 fan coolers or 1/1 containment spray train (1 multi-train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating Recovey
- Result, for Each Affected Sequence Credit 5
5+0 1
11 1 LDCBUS - LTAFWMU - SDC (3) 4 1+
+
5
+ 2 2 LDCBUS - AFW (4,10) 4 7
5 0
1 6
+
3 3 LDCBUS -ISO-SDC-CHR 5
2+0+2 1
10 (7) 4
+
2+
2 +
3 4 LDCBUS - ISO-SDC-HPR 5
2+0+0 1
8 (8) 4
+
2 + 2 +
2 5 LDCBUS -ISO-HPSI (9) 5 2+0 1
8 R
Table 3.12 SDPWorksheet forSt. Lucie, Unit 1 -
Loss of Instrument Air (LIA)(1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Feed and Bleed with 1 PORV (FB1)
Feed and Bleed (FB)
High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU))
High Pressure Recirculation (HPR)
Containment Heat Removal (CHR)
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
1/ 2 MD AFW trains(1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) with 1/1 6 secondary safety valves 1/ 2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 2/2 PORVs (operator action = 2) (2) 1/ 2 high pressure injection trains (1 multi-train system)
Align AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated watE tank. (operator action = 3) (3) 1/3 charging pumps and 1/ 2 LPSI trains with SDC heat exchangers; manual Ioc action to open the heat exchanger outlet valve (operator action=2) (4) 1/ 2 high pressure safety injection trains in recirculation mode (1 multi-train sysb 2/4 fan coolers or 1/ 2 containment spray trains with SDC heat exchangers (1 m train system)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating for Recovery Result Each Affected Sequence Credit 1 LIA - LTAFWMU - SDC - CHR (4) 2 10 4
3 + 2+2 1
12
+
3
+
2+3 2 LIA-LTAFWMU-SDC-4 3+2+2 1
12 HPR (5) 2
+
3
+
2 3 LIA-LTAFWMU-SDC-4 3+2+2 1
12 HPSI (6) 2
+
3
+
4 LIA-LTAFWMU-SDC-FB1 4
3+ 2+ 2 1
12 (7) 2
+
3
+
2
+
4 3+2 I
10 5 LIA - AFW - CHR (9) 4 +
3 2
+
9
4 3+2 1
10 6 LIA-4 +
AFW-HPR (10) 3 2 +
9 7LIA-AFW-HPSI (11) 2+
4 3+2 1
10 4
+
39 4
3+0 1
8 8LIA-AFW-FB (12) 2 +
8 4 +
2 Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initial event: If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actic such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met
- 1) sufficient time is available to implem these actions, 2) environmental conditions allow access where needed, 3) procedures exist 4) trainin(
conducted on the existing procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5) equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
Table 3.13 SDPWorksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Loss of Cornponent Cooling Water (LCCW)(1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Tripping RCPs (RCPTRIP)
Power Conversion System (PCS)
AixiliaryFeedwater System (AFW)
Long Termn AFW Makeup (LTAFVVIJ)
Full Creditable Mfiticion Capablity for Each Safety Function:
Operator trips RCPs to prevent a seal LOCA (operator aclbon=3) (2) 1/2 Main Feedwater trains (operator action = 3) (3) 1/2 MID AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1/1 TD AFWtrain ( 1 ASDtrain) and steam relief though 1/2 ARfs or 1/16 safety valves Automatic CST rrmeup from derineralized water (1 train) or operator aligns AFW to take sucion from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank. (operator action = 3) (4) rcrde Affected Functions IEL RemaningMNtigationCapalityRatng for Rcovey Result Each Affected Sequene Cdit s
1 LC-W--
PCS-LTAFWr1J(3) 4 10
+ 3+
3 2LOCW-PCS-AFW(4) 4
+
6 3+3 1
13 3+4 1
3LCX/W-RCPTRIP(5) 4
+ 3 7
Identify ary operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equiprment or initiating event:If operator actions are reqcired to credit plating mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be givan only if the fdlowng criteria are met: 1) sufficient time is availableto implement these actions, 2) enviromrnental conditions aIloNaccesswa-e nc*=rl=*lO, nn,'y-,di i nc*:
yict A] tr~nim rv*ie it-r f v-,4
- ri-n th*,-vidlinrg rrv'tv"i rl:
rlld*r r'nndlitimc*'* cimilkr trn th* c-,r'*n~rl *:ie n= d
Table 3.14 SDP Worksheet for St. Lucie, Unit I -
Loss of Intake Cooling Water (UCV) (1)
Safety Functions Needed:
Full Creditable Mitigation Capability for Each Safety Function:
Tripping RCPs (RCPTRIP)
Operator trips RCPs to prevent a seal LOCA (operator actlon =3) (2)
Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) 1/2 MD AFW trains (1 multi-train system) or 1 TD AFW train (1 ASD train) and steam relief through 1/2 ARVs or 1/16 safety valves Long Term AFW Makeup (LTAFWMU)
Automatic CST makeup from demineralized water (1 train) or operator align AFW to take suction from Unit 2 CST or makeup to CST from treated water tank. (operator action = 3) (3)
Circle Affected Functions IEL Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating Recove Result for Each Affected Sequence Credi 1LICW-LTAFWMU(2) 4
+
5 9
6 3
1 10 2LICW-AFWV(3) 4
+ 4 8
3LICW-RCPTRIP(4) 4
+ 3 7
Identify any operator recovery actions that are credited to directly restore the degraded equipment or initiating event: If operator actions are required to credit placing mitigation equipment in service or for recovery actions, such credit should be given only if the following criteria are met: 1) suffident time is available to implement these actions, 2) environmental conditions allowaccess where needed,
- 3) procedures exist, 4) training is conducted on the exdsting procedures under conditions similar to the scenario assumed, and 5' any equipment needed to complete these actions is available and ready for use.
(1)4 4
Counting Rule Worksheet Step Instructions (1)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 9.
(1) 12 (2)
Divide the result of Step (1) by 3 and round down.
(2) 3 (3)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 8.
(3) 5 (4)
Add the result of Step (3) to the result of Step (2).
(4) 8 (5)
Divide the result of Step (4) by 3 and round down.
(5) 2 (6)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 7.
(6) 2 (7)
Add the result of Step (6) to the result of Step (5).
(7) 4 (8)
Divide the result of Step (7) by 3 and round down.
(8) 1 (9)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 6.
(9) 1 (10)
Add the result of Step (9) to the result of Step (8).
(10) 2 (11)
Divide the result of Step (10) by 3 and round down.
(11) 0 (12)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 5.
(12) 0 (13)
Add the result of Step (12) to the result of Step (11).
(13) 0 (14)
Divide the result of Step (13) by 3 and round down.
(14) 0 (15)
Enter the number of sequences with a risk significance equal to 4.
(15) 0
.(16)
Add the result of Step (15) to the result of Step (14).
(16) 0
°m If the result of Step 16 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of high safety significance (RED).N o
If the result of Step 13 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of substantial safety significance (YELLOW ).m
° If the result of Step 10 is greater than zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is at least of low to moderate safety significance (WHITE).N om If the result of Steps 10, 13, and 16 are zero, then the risk significance of the inspection finding is of very low safety significance (GREEN).N Phase 2 Result:
El GREEN
-m,-W--ITE:1 Di YELLOW ED RED mm Table 6-Counting Rule W orksheet