ML071410442
| ML071410442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/2007 |
| From: | Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee |
| To: | Todd Fish Operations Branch I |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062050096 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML071410442 (64) | |
Text
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Vermont Yankee 2007 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is initially operating at 90% power. The crew will perform weekly remote testing of the turbine oil pumps IAW OP 4160. Immediately after testing of the turbine oil pumps, the crew will restore power to 100% IAW OP 0105 via recirculation flow.
As the power ascension continues, the crew will be evaluated responding to a loss of a Circ Water pump. ACRO must start spare pump before vacuum degrades to a critical value requiring a power reduction.
As the power ascension continues, the crew will be evaluated responding to a fault on Bus 89B.
After reviewing TS, a 7 day LCO will be entered.
After the Tech Spec have been addressed, the operating CRD pump will trip requiring the CRS to enter and direct actions IAW ON 3145. The B CRD pump will be started.
Once the standby CRD pump is started, control rod 18-31 will drift outward. The crew will respond IAW OT 3167 (Control Rod Drift) and OT 31 10 (Positive Reactivity Addition). The crew will manually scram and electrically disarm the drifting control rod.
After the control rod has been scrammed and electrically disarmed, the crew will respond to an inadvertent HPCl initiation. HPCl will be inhibited, and a Tech Spec LCO will be entered. Also, an AP-0156 NRC 50.72 notification will be evaluated.
After HPCl is declared inoperable, the crew will respond to a loss of offsite power and the resulting loss of high pressure feed. This will require entry into OT 3122, LNP and OT 3100, Reactor Scram. Following the scram and loss of offsite power, an attempt will be made to feed with RCIC. At this point a leak will result in the inability to restore level with RCIC alone and HPCl will be started (must be taken out of inhibit). HPCl will fail to inject automatically due to a failure of the HPCl flow controller. The HPCl flow controller must be placed in manual to establish HPCl injection. EOP-1 will be entered.
After level is being restored in manual, , HPCl will trip. Actions will continue to be directed per EOP-1, and EOP-3 will be entered to combat the Recirc leak in the containment. Level will continue to lower, and before RPV level lowers to minus 19 inches, emergency depressurization will be required (Critical Task). As depressurization progresses, the available ECCS injection valves will fail to open automatically when the low pressure permissive is reached. Operator action will be required to manually open the valves and establish ECCS injection (Critical Task).
Critical tasks are to emergency depressurize before RPV level lowers to minus 19 inches and to manually open the low pressure ECCS injection valves within 1 minute of reaching valve open permissive pressure.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 3 of 22 SIMULATOR EVALUATION GUIDE Evaluators: Crew:
SM CRS CRO BOP STA Senior Management Observer Critical Task Performance: SAT UNSAT (Circle One)
Lead Evaluator:
Signature Date Administered:
Activity Code:
Prepared by: Date:
Reviewed by: Date:
Approved by: Date:
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 4 of 22 CREW BRIEF:
-Power level: 90
-Rod Sequence: Rapid Shutdown Sequence Latched -Rod Group: 23 (MOC)
-Equipment out of service and/or tagged or abnormalities:
- 1. Annunciator 4-J-6 RWCU DRAIN LINE PRESS HVLO due to leakage past PCV-55.
-Reason For Equipment out of Service or tagged:
1.
-Applicable Tech Spec LCOs:
- .r, ORAM Sentinel Color:
Green
-Plant evolutions in progress/Scheduled Shift Evolutions:
- 1. Perform weekly remote testing of turbine oil pumps per OP-4160.
- 2. Power Ascension to 100% with recirculation flow (RE guidance).
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 5 of 22 u
SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The plant is initially operating at 90% power. The crew will perform weekly remote testing of the turbine oil pumps IAW OP 4160. Immediately after testing of the turbine oil pumps, the crew will restore power to 100% IAW OP 0105 via recirculation flow.
As the power ascension continues, the crew will be evaluated responding to a loss of a Circ Water pump. ACRO must start spare pump before vacuum degrades to a critical value requiring a power reduction.
As the power ascension continues, the crew will be evaluated responding to a fault on Bus 896.
After reviewing TS, a 7 day LCO will be entered.
After the Tech Spec have been addressed, the operating CRD pump will trip requiring the CRS to enter and direct actions IAW ON 3145. The B CRD pump will be started.
Once the standby CRD pump is started, control rod 18-31 will drift outward. The crew will respond IAW OT 3167 (Control Rod Drift) and OT 31 10 (Positive Reactivity Addition). The crew will manually scram and electrically disarm the drifting control rod.
After the control rod has been scrammed and electrically disarmed, the crew will respond to an inadvertent HPCl initiation. HPCl will be inhibited, and a Tech Spec LCO will be entered. Also, an AP-0156 NRC 50.72 notification will be evaluated.
After HPCl is declared inoperable, the crew will respond to a loss of offsite power and the resulting loss of high pressure feed. This will require entry into OT 3122, LNP and OT 3100,
- ii Reactor Scram. Following the scram and loss of offsite power, an attempt will be made to feed with RCIC. At this point a leak will result in the inability to restore level with RCIC alone and HPCl will be started (must be taken out of inhibit). HPCl will fail to inject automatically due to a failure of the HPCl flow controller. The HPCl flow controller must be placed in manual to establish HPCl injection. EOP-1 will be entered.
After level is being restored in manual, , HPCl will trip. Actions will continue to be directed per EOP-1, and EOP-3 will be entered to combat the Recirc leak in the containment. Level will continue to lower, and before RPV level lowers to minus 19 inches, emergency depressurization will be required (Critical Task). As depressurization progresses, the available ECCS injection valves will fail to open automatically when the low pressure permissive is reached. Operator action will be required to manually open the valves and establish ECCS injection (Critical Task).
Critical tasks are to emergency depressurize before RPV level lowers to minus 19 inches and to manually open the low pressure ECCS injection valves within 1 minute of reaching valve open permissive pressure.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 6 of 22 wu TERMINATING CONDITION(S):
- 1. Once the SRVs are opened and the crew has demonstrated that they can monitor and control level during an RPV-ED, the scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
REFERENCES:
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Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 7 of 22 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS y4u.
Simulator Set Up:
- 1. IC-801 Discretionarv Distracter Malfunctions/RFs/lOs:
No. I MF/RF/IO # I Severity I Ramp REM# I Act.Time I Description
- 1. mf ED-1 9B 1 Loss of Bus 898
- 2. mfMC-01 B 2 Circ Water B Pump Trip
~ ~
3.T m f R K O l A 3 1 CRD A Pump Trip
- 4. mfRD-051831 lOO0/0 4 CRD 18-31 drift out
- 5. I mfHP-03 I I 1 5 1 HPCl Inadvertent Initiation
- 6. I mfED-17 I I 1 6 1 Loss of Offsite Power
- 7. I mfHP-04 I 0% I 7 1 HPCl Flow Controller Failure
~
- 8. mf RR-01 A .7% 300sec 8 Recirc Loop A Discharge Rupture
- 9. mf HP-0 1 9 HPCl Turbine Trip
~
- 10. mfCS-03A Pre-insert I CS-12A Fail to Auto Open
- 11. mfCS-03B Pre-insert I CS-12B Fail to Auto Open
- 12. I mfRH-07A Pre-insert I RHR-27A Fail to Auto Open
- 13. I
- 14. I
- 15. I Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 8 of 22 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Additional Instructions:
- 1. When/if contacted to investigate the loss of MCC-89B, acknowledge then report there is an electrical fault on the bus and no other sources of power (maintenance tie) should be brought on. Additional troubleshooting is required to determine the cause and extent.
- 2. When/if contacted to investigate the loss of B CW Pump, acknowledge then give a follow-up report that there is no apparent cause and Electrical Maintenance will continue to troubleshoot.
- 3. When/if contacted to investigate the loss of the A CRD Pump, acknowledge then give a report that there was an overcurrent device activation (50) on phase C. The cause is unknown and Electrical Maintenance is continuing to troubleshoot.
- 4. When asked to place secure seal purge following the pump trip, insert: rfRD-11 and rfRD-12 to 0 gpm.
- 5. When asked to place seal purge back in service following the pump start, insert:
A
- rfRD-11 and rfRD-12 to 3 gpm.
- 6. When/if contacted to investigate the inadvertent initiation of HPCI, acknowledge then give a follow-up report that there was an electrical short in the Rx Low-Low Level sensing circuit (K1&K2 relays) energized. If asked, these relays affect HPCI only, but that you follow-up on this to make sure.
- 7. The sequence of events post scram will be at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator based on the crew level mitigation strategy. If the crew elects to start RCIC, the most likely sequence of events will be key 8, then key 7, and lastly key 9.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 9 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 1 Crew Task
Description:
Weekly Remote Testing of Turbine Oil Pumps per OP-4160.
~~~
STEP
~
POS. I CANDIDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I IS U N/O I COMMENTS I CRS I Direct Turbine Pump Performance IAW OP 4160 Section 6. I I Performs OP 4160 Section Ill. Steps 1.a thru 1.f EXAMINERS NOTE: SEE ATTACHED COPY OF PROCEDURE FOR SPECIFIC STEP DETAIL.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 10 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 2 Crew Task
Description:
Power Ascension IAW OP 0105 I N/O I
~~ ~
1 STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S U COMMENTS CRS Directs Power Increase IAW OP-0105 With recirc flow CRO Increase recirc flow with master recirc flow controller Q 1% per 3 minutes CRO Monitors power, pressure, level.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 11 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 3 & 4 Crew Task
Description:
Respond to a Loss of Bus 896; Loss of Circ Water
~ POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS
' CREW I Recognizealossof Bus89Bpower. I I I I CRS CRS I Enter and direct actions IAW OP 2143 and ARS.
Direct maintenance to investigate the loss of MCC 898.
SM/CRS Review Tech Specs and determine per 3.10.8.4 and 3.5.A.4 enter a 7-day LCO for "B" LPCI.
CRS Direct A 0 to document indicating lights at RUPS 1B and MCC 89B per OP 2143.
CRS Conduct a shift brief CREW Recognize a loss of Circ Water Pump 'B'.
BOP Enter ARS 6-8-2 for loss of the Pump-CRS Directs contacting maintenance due to pump trip and auxiliary operator to investigate locally.
CRS Conduct a shift brief.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 12 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 5 Crew Task
Description:
CRD Pump A Trips (ON)
STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR IS N/O I COMMENTS CREW
~
Recognizes Trip of A CRD pump.
~~
I CRS Directs actions ON 3145
-Step 2 immediately stop B RWCU I
-Step 4 - start Alternate CRD pump
-seal purge must be secured when
>2 minutes Directs A 0 and maintenance to investigate.
NOTE: SEE Attached copy of ON 3145 for specific steps, CRO References ON 3145
-Takes action to stop RWCU pump 6.
- Starts 6CRD pump per ON 3145
- Takes action to isolate seal purge CREW Recognizes the following alarms are in due to excessive drywell cooling due to loss of RWCU heat loads:
5-G DW Pressure HVLO 5-G DW Pressure Low NOTE: Operator will open 156-3 IAW ARS to clear alarms.
k* NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 13 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 6 Crew Task
Description:
Control Rod 18-31 Drifts Outward (OT)
~~
STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S U N/O COMMENTS CREW Acknowledge/respond to Rod Drift annunciator (5-D-5); inform CRS.
CRO Identify rod 18-31 as drifting rod; inform CRS.
CRS 0 Enter and direct actions IAW OT 3167 (Control Rod Drift):
0 Observe drive water flow indication Fl-3-305 0 Select rod 18-31 and attempt to insert ONCE to original position.
When directed:
0 Observe drive water flow indication Fl-3-305 0 Select rod 18-31 and attempt to insert ONCE to original position 0 Identify that rod continues to drift outward when insert signal removed; inform CRS b, NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 14 of 22 STEP POS.
~~
CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR Direct the following IAW OT 3167 and OT 31 10 (Positive Reactivity Insertion):
Reduce Recirc flow to 27.5 - 29 Mlb/hr at a rate not to exceed 10% / minute.
Notify Reactor Engineering.
Attempt to determine if cause of control rod drift is a stuck collet.
Consult OT 3166 (Mispositioned Control Rod).
BOP When directed, manually scram rod 18-31.
CRO When directed, reduce Recirc flow to 27.5 - 29 Mlb/hr at a rate not to exceed 10% / minute.
CREW When directed, notify Reactor Engineering of Rod 18-31 drift.
CRS Conduct a crew brief.
I I I NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 15 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 7 Crew Task
Description:
Inadvertent HPCl Initiation (TS)
STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS I CREW CRS I Recognize and inform the CRS of a HPCl initiation.
Enters OT 31 10 - Positive I l l I Reactivity Insertion, Step 2.F.
NOTE:
BOP Confirm no initiation signals present.
(Two indications at least).
CRS Directs that HPCl be secured (trip or inhibit) per Step 4.
May direct opening SGT 1A & 1B due to auto start of SBGT per OP 21 17.
BOP Places Autohhibit switch to Inhibit.
May open SGT 1A & 1B per CRS direction.
CRS Consult Tech Specs and determine that a 14-day LCO condition has been met per 3.5.E.2.
OT 31 10 - Step 9.Contacts RE Consult AP-0156 and determine that an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification is required for spurious activation of an ECCS System [50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(4)].
I CRS I Brief the crew.
a NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 16 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 8 Crew Task
Description:
Loss of Offsite Power STEP POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS CRO I Report reactor scram. I l l I CREW Recognize and inform CRS of Loss of Off Site Power.
Report power on buses 3,4,8,9 from the Diesels.
CRO Report feed and condensate are unavailable.
3122, LNP CREW Respond to LNP IAW OT 3122.
Verify both DGs start and power buses.
Verify SW pumps start.
Restart station AC A & B.
CRS Enter and direct crew actions IAW OT 3100, Rx Scram and EOP-1, RPV Control.
CRO Verify all rods fully inserted.
When steam flow < 0.5 Mlbmhr per steamline, place the mode switch in S/D.
CRS Direct reactor water level maintained 127" - 177" using RClC initially/ then HPCl as needed (must take out of I NHI BIT).
Direct pressure maintained 800 -
1000 psig using SRVs/HPCI.
k NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O= Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 17 of 22 STEP POS. I CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR COMMENTS BOP Maintain RPV level as directed with RClC initially.
HPCl (must be taken out of inhibit).
NOTE: HPCI cannot be used for pressure control until/unless lo lo level signal is bypassed.
CREW I Verify Table A: ECCS/PCIS actuations.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 18 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 9,10, & 11 Crew Task
Description:
HPCl Flow Controller Failure; Recirc Loop Rupture (0.6% Over 600 Sec.); HPCl Trip; RPV-ED on Low Level; CS-12A and CS-12B Failure to Auto Open, RHR 27A Failure to Auto Open CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S 1 U I N/O COMMENTS Ti Report HPCl is not working in automatic and swaps controller to manual. (Controller has failed low in auto).
Reports HPCl trips. (the trip will be inserted after level control is established in manual).
Direct AO/ maintenance to investigate HPCl trip Direct RPV level maintained between 6 inches (TAF) and 177 inches by maximizing CRD flow Maximize available CRD flow Report increasing drywell pressure.
Enter EOP-3 on High Drywell Pressure.
Direct BOP to restart drywell RRUs.
Restart drywell RRUs.
Before torus pressure reaches 10 psig, direct torus spray Sprays the torus, as directed.
When torus pressure exceeds 10 psig:
Verify drywell pressure and temperature in the safe region of the DWSIL graph.
0 Verify drywell RRUs secured.
0 Direct drywell sprays.
Secure drywell RRUs.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 19 of 22 1 STEP I POS. I CANDIDATE ACTIONSIBEHAVIOR BOP Spray the drywell as directed.
NOTE: May throttle open full flow test valve to control flow as DW pressure degrades.
CRS I CRS I When ADS timer initiated, direct ADS inhibited.
Inhibit ADS as directed.
Direct SLC for reactor water level control.
I CRS I Direct RPV level maintained between 6 inches (TAF) and 177 inches Inject SLC, as directed.
Report level approaching 6 .
CRS When RPV level cannot be maintained above 6 , directherify at least 2 injection subsystems lined up for injection.
BOPICRO Lineup ECCS systems as directed.
- CREW With the reactor shutdown and reactor pressure greater than the EOP-1 shutoff head of the low pressure CT-1 systems, initiate RPV-ED BEFORE RPV level reaches -1 9 inches.
I Standard:
Initiate RPV-ED (begin opening valves) BEFORE RPV level reaches - 48 inches Inform CRS when level reaches 6 .
CRS Before level reaches - 19 inches, enter and direct crew actions IAW EOP-5 RPV-ED.
I I CRS I Direct all SRVs opened.
L CROIBOP When directed, place all SRV control switches to open. Inform CRS that all SRVs are open.
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 20 of 22 STEP I POS. CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS I *CREW EOP-1 CT-2 Action is taken to restore RPV water level above -19 inches by operating available low pressure ECCS system(s) when RPV pressure decreases below the shutoff head of the low pressure systems.
Standard: ~~
I At least 2 ECCS pumps are lined up for injection and running prior to RPV pressure reaching the injection valve open permissive pressure.
0 No pumps are secured until adequate core cooling is assured.
0 Initiate manual opening of injection valves once valve open permissive pressure is reached.
I CREW Continue to monitor and report RPV Level and Pressure decrease.
Report failure of RHR-27A, CS-12A and CS-12B to AUTO open.
Direct RHR and CS injection valves opened.
At 350 psig directs crew to monitor RPV level on the shroud level instruments.
BOP Manually open RHR-27A, CS-12A and CS-12B as directed.
CRS Direct CRO/BOP to ensure adequate core cooling and restore water level to 127-177 (shrouds at 350 psig).
CREW Verify adequate core cooling and level rising.
CRS As necessary, prevent injection from Core Spray and RHR Pumps not required to assure adequate core cooling.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 21 of 22
- STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR BOP/CRO When directed, prevent injection S U N/O COMMENTS from Core Spray and RHR Pumps not required to assure adequate core cooling.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 22 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Vermont Yankee 2007 NRC Scenario #2 After the crew places Circ Water in Closed Cycle for chlorination, a reactor power reduction will commence in preparation for a control rod pattern adjustment.
As the power reduction continues, a feedwater regulating valve lockup will occur, requiring the crew to enter OT-3114 and initially take manual control of feedwater in order to recover and stabilize RPV level. A loose airline fitting will be repaired and the FRV can be returned to automatic.
After RPV water has been stabilized in manual, APRM A will fail downscale. The crew will take actions in accordance with the ARS, and with APRM C previously inoperable and bypassed, a Tech Spec LCO will be entered.
After Techs Specs have been addressed for the APRM failure, the crew will respond to a loss of Bus 8. SBGT will fail to auto-initiate upon receipt of the Group Ill isolation signal. The crew will backup the Group 111 isolation and initiate SBGT. Review of Tech Specs will reveal an LCO due to inadequate RHR Torus coolingkpray capability.
Following the Loss of bus 8, a faulty EPR will cause pressure oscillations. The crew will respond IAW OT 31 15 (Reactor Pressure Transients) to take control of pressure with the MPR and place the EPR in cutout.
Once pressure control has been transferred to the MPR and restored to its pre-transient value, u.
a leaking SRV will begin adding heat and inventory to the Torus. The crew will respond in accordance with OT 3121 (Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve), and EOP-3 (due to rising Torus volume, drywell pressure, and Torus temperature). The fault with the RHR-39A valve, combined with the loss of Bus 8, will result in an inability to initiate Torus cooling. The crew will attempt manual manipulation of the required valves. As Torus volume, pressure, and temperature rise, conditions will deteriorate to the point where a reactor scram is required. The manual scram will fail, requiring initiation of ARVRPT to insert the control rods (Critical Task).
When ARI is initiated, some rod movement will occur; however, ATWS conditions will remain due to hydraulic lock on the scram discharge volume. The crew will be evaluated controlling and shutting down the plant in accordance with EOP-1 and EOP-2. After SLC has been initiated (Critical Task) and has been running for several minutes, the A SLC pump will trip.
Alternate means to insert control rods are required to shutdown the reactor The crew will inhibit auto ADS initiation (Critical Task) and terminate and prevent injection as required by EOP-2 (Critical Task). Additional EOP-2 actions to reduce reactor power via control rod insertion and lowering RPV level will also be required. EOP -3 actions to control Drywell and Torus parameters will continue throughout the ATWS event.
Critical tasks are to actuate the ARI/RPT logic and ensure that the Recirc drive motor breakers are tripped within 2 minutes of the scram failure, to inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation, to terminate and prevent injection as required by EOP-2, and to initiate SLC injection.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 3 of 24 SIMULATOR EVALUATION GUIDE Evaluators: Crew:
~~~
STA Senior Management Observer Critical Task Performance: SAT UNSAT (Circle One)
Lead Evaluator:
Signature Date Administered:
Activity Code:
Prepared by: Date:
Reviewed by: Date:
Approved by: Date:
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 4 of 24 CREW BRIEF:
-Power level: 100
-Rod Sequence: Rapid Shutdown Sequence Latched -Rod Group: 54 (EOC)
-Equipment out of service and/or tagged or abnormalities:
- 1. APRM C
- 2. RHR-39A motor actuator repair
- 3. Annunciator 4-J-6 RWCU DRAIN LINE PRESS HVLO due to leakage past PCV-55.
-Reason For Equipment out of Service or tagged:
- 1. Inability to adjust gain-l&C troubleshooting in progress.
&. -Applicable Tech Spec LCOs:
- 1. TS 3.5.8.1 (RHR Subsystem A for containment pressure control)
ORAM Sentinel Color:
Orange
-Plant evolutions in progress/Scheduled Shift Evolutions:
- 1. Place CW in closed cycle for chlorination.
- 2. Reduce power in preparation for control rod pattern adjustment. Per RE Guidance, the Rapid Shutdown Sequence will be used to reduce power to 80-85%.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 5 of 24
- / SCENARIO
SUMMARY
After the crew places Circ Water in Closed Cycle for chlorination, a reactor power reduction will commence in preparation for a control rod pattern adjustment.
As the power reduction continues, a feedwater regulating valve lockup will occur, requiring the crew to enter OT-3114 and initially take manual control of feedwater in order to recover and stabilize RPV level. A loose airline fitting will be repaired and the FRV can be returned to automatic.
After RPV water has been stabilized in manual, APRM A will fail downscale. The crew will take actions in accordance with the ARS, and with APRM C previously inoperable and bypassed, a Tech Spec LCO will be entered.
After Techs Specs have been addressed for the APRM failure, the crew will respond to a loss of Bus 8. SBGT will fail to auto-initiate upon receipt of the Group Ill isolation signal, The crew will backup the Group Ill isolation and initiate SBGT. Review of Tech Specs will reveal an LCO due to inadequate RHR Torus cooling/spray capability.
Following the Loss of bus 8, a faulty EPR will cause pressure oscillations. The crew will respond IAW OT 31 15 (Reactor Pressure Transients) to take control of pressure with the MPR and place the EPR in cutout.
Once pressure control has been transferred to the MPR and restored to its pre-transient value, a leaking SRV will begin adding heat and inventory to the Torus. The crew will respond in b accordance with OT 3121 (Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve), and EOP-3 (due to rising Torus volume, drywell pressure, and Torus temperature). The fault with the RHR-39A valve, combined with the loss of Bus 8, will result in an inability to initiate Torus cooling. The crew will attempt manual manipulation of the required valves. As Torus volume, pressure, and temperature rise, conditions will deteriorate to the point where a reactor scram is required. The manual scram will fail, requiring initiation of ARVRPT to insert the control rods (Critical Task).
When ARI is initiated, some rod movement will occur; however, ATWS conditions will remain due to hydraulic lock on the scram discharge volume. The crew will be evaluated controlling and shutting down the plant in accordance with EOP-1 and EOP-2. After SLC has been initiated (Critical Task) and has been running for several minutes, the A SLC pump will trip.
Alternate means to insert control rods are required to shutdown the reactor The crew will inhibit auto ADS initiation (Critical Task) and terminate and prevent injection as required by EOP-2 (Critical Task). Additional EOP-2 actions to reduce reactor power via control rod insertion and lowering RPV level will also be required. EOP -3 actions to control Drywell and Torus parameters will continue throughout the ATWS event.
Critical tasks are to actuate the ARVRPT logic and ensure that the Recirc drive motor breakers are tripped within 2 minutes of the scram failure, to inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation, to terminate and prevent injection as required by EOP-2, and to initiate SLC injection.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 6 of 24 TERMINATING CONDITION(S):
- 1. Once all control rods are inserted and EOP-2 is exited to EOP-1, the scenario may be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
REFERENCES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
REFERENCES CONTINUED:
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 7 of 24 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Simulator Set Up: 100% Power
- 1. IC-802 Discretionarv Distracter Malfunctions/RFs/lOs:
- 1. rfNM-71-76 All APRM Gain adjusts made to get APRM GAFs in spec (modeled to the plant at 100%): 71 (1.385), 72 (1.448), 73 (1.378), 74 (1.383), 75 (1.287), 76 (1.375)
I! 4m 5.
mf PC-11 A mfTC-04A 100%
3 4
SBGT A Fan Failure to Auto Start Pressure Reg Oscillations (EPR)
- 6. mfAD-01 B 100°/o 600sec 5 Relief Valve RV2-71B Leak
- 7. mfSL-01 A 6 SLC A Pump Trip
- 0. mfRD-12A 45% Pre-insert Partial Scram A
- 9. mf RD-128 55% Pre-insert Partial Scram B
- 10. mfRP-016 Pre-insert Failure to manual scram 11.
~~~~~
12.
13.
14.
15.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 8 of 24 SIMULATOR OPERATOR I ISTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Additional Instructions:
- 1. When/if contacted to investigate the AFRV Lockup, acknowledge, and then give report that an instrument air line connection was found leaking and the connection has been tightened. I&C recommends resetting the FRV Lockup. At the time delete mfFW-OSA.
- 2. When/if contacted to investigate the A APRM downscale failure, acknowledge, and then give report that that there is an electronic failure of the Averaging Amplifier circuit. Time of repair will be unknown and you will follow-up with the control room.
After the crew discusses Tech Specs and the possibility of inserting a half scram on RPS-A, at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, insert Key 3 (Loss of Bus 8).
This will give a half scram on RPS-A.
- 3. When/if contacted to investigate the loss of Bus 8, acknowledge, and then give report that there is an electrical fault on Bus 8. DO NOT report that you do not recommend cross tying Bus 8 and 9 unless the crew ascertains this and asks.
- 4. When/if asked to investigate the status of RHR-39A (to be able to spray the torus), report that RHR-39A is still disassembled and that it will not be ready for operation for another 2-3 hours.
- 5. When/if asked to operate CRD-56 and/or CRD-40/40A, insert the following remote functions as directed: rfRD-02 and rfRD-04 respectfully.
- 6. Once power is <2%, insert key 6 (ASLC Pump Trip) at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 9 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 1 Crew Task
Description:
Place CW in Closed Cycle for Chlorination
~
1 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR CRS Directs Placing CW in closed Cycle for chlorination.
Procedure OP 21 80 Section F.
Reviews procedure and checks prereqs.
Ensures all Circ Water & Circ Water Booster Pumps running.
BOP Contacts Chemistry - Are we treating service water at the same time.
EVALUATORS CUE: Report back - not treating SW simultaneously.
BOP Opens Circ Water Recirc Gate
>85% by taking Circ Water Recirc Gate switch to open, Observes indicator POI-104-3 >85%
Observes weir level indicator LI-104-10-1is < 225 Bop 1 Calls field operator to throttle valve cw-7.
EVALUATORS CUE: Already throttled.
hand switches Circ Water Intake Gate 1A (16, 1 C) to close.
\ NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 10 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 2 Crew Task
Description:
Power Reduction IAW OP 0105 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR N/O I COMMENTS CRS Directs power reduction IAW OP-0105 Directs maintaining Rx Pressure 100 to 1006 psig with ER during downpower CUE Per RE Guidance, the Rapid Shutdown Sequence will be used to reduce power to 80-85%.
CRO Selects Rod 22-19 first Using Rod Movement Control switch, insert rod to 0 0 Monitors four-rod and full core display, monitors power indications ,
CRD parameters Continues with subsequent control rods.
Uses Recirc Flow to further decrease power.
BOP Maintains RX Press 100 psig to 1006 psig with EPR as directed by CRS NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 11 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 3 Crew Task
Description:
Feedwater Regulating Valve Lockup (OT)
STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR IS U I N/O I COMMENTS CREW Recognizes A FRV Lockup.
CRO Enters ARS 5-E-2 CRS Directs field operator to check problem with AFRV.
CRS Directs FRV lockup reset per ARS.
CRO Attempts to reset FRV lockup by Performing steps 1.b. thru 1.f.,
Step 1.a.g and h. do not apply.
Goes to step 2.
CRS Upon receiving call from the field that an airline connection to the A FRV was found loose and subsequently tightened, CRS directs FRV to be reset per ARS.
BOP Resets FRV lockup CRS CREW Brief on FRV operation and level control per guidance in OTs and ARS 4 NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 12 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 4 Crew Task
Description:
APRM A Fails Downscale (TS)
CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR IS N/O I COMMENTS Recognizes Alarm 5-M-4 annunciates APRM Downscale.
Also, 5-D-3 for Rod Withdraw Block
-I Enters TS and Directs contacting I&C.
TS Table 3.1.1 , Notes 2 and 3, 12-hours to put in trip on A side.
Review ARS 5-D-3 and 5-M-4 direction:
increased board monitoring contacts I&C.
CRS I Crew Brief.
Evaluator Note: Sim Booth operator will insert next event prior to the crew inserting a half scram if it is directed by the CRS NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 13 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 5 Crew Task
Description:
Loss of 480 Volt Bus 8, Failure of SBGT A to Auto Start STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR COMMENTS CREW Recognize and inform CRS of a loss of 480 volt Bus 8.
CRO Inform CRS of half scram.
Report power, pressure, level CREW Recognize/respond to a Group Ill isolation and bus loss.
Board walkdown to recognize equipment affected 0 BCSvalves 0 BRHRvalves 0 DrywellRRUs alarm for seismic panel (in due to power loss, not an actual event)
CRS Direct the following actions:
0 Backup Group Ill isolation 0 Direct call to chemistry for sampling per T.S. 4.6.B.3.b Direct crew to initiate an investigation into bus loss.
BOP When directed, backup Group Ill isolation 0 Recognize failure of the SBGT trains to auto start 0 Start/align SBGT A Inform CRS of failure to auto start.
EVALUATORS NOTE: SBGT B powered from Bus 8.
- i NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 14 of 24 STEP POS. I CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR CRS Consult Tech Specs and identify the following:
24-hour S/D LCOs 3.10.A.3.
(Bus Loss) AND 0 Core Spray and RHR due to loss of valve power 3.5.A.6.
0 7 davs - -3.7.8.3 (SBGT)
CRS Monitor and control DW pressure rise due to loss of Drywell RRUs and isolation.
Direct start of all available Drywell RRUs per OT3111, High Drywell Pressure.
Enter EOP-3 as required due to High Drywell temperature.
BOP Isolates RWCU BOP I Starts available Drywell RRUs.
CRS I Direct the CRO to begin preparations for a normal plant S/D per OP 0105.
~~~
CRS Provide a crew brief on conditions and shutdown.
CRO When directed, commence preparations to shutdown IAW OP-0105.
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
= Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 15 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 6 Crew Task
Description:
STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVlOR COMMENTS CREW Recognize oscillating reactor pressure Enters OT 3115.
CROBOP Coordinate determination of EPR at fault; inform CRS.
CRS Enter and direct actions IAW OT 31 15 (Reactor Pressure Transients):
Place the EPR in CUTOUT Verify that the MPR has control 0 Lower MPR setpoint as necessary BOP When directed:
Place the EPR in CUTOUT at peak pressure Verify that the MPR has control Lower MPR setpoint as necessary.
CRS Direct BOP to restore pressure to the pre-transientpressure.
BOP When directed, adjust MPR to adjust pressure to pre-transient level.
I CRS Direct crew member to contact I&C to check and repair EPR.
CREW When directed, contract I&C, inform them of EPR problem and request repair efforts begin.
---t7%- ~ ~~
Brief the Crew.
~
Direct STNCrew to begin work on a CR to ensure an Operability Determination is made.
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 16 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 7 Crew Task
Description:
SRV-716 Leak (OT) Leads to Rx Scram (100% over 600sec)
STEP I POS. CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR IS IU N/O I COMMENTS CREW BOP CRS EVALUATOR'S NOTE:
Recognize the "B" SRV leaking.
Enter OT 3121, Inadvertent Opening of SRV.
Using available indications, determine that SRV 71-B is leaking:
inform CRS Enter and direct actions IAW OT 3121 (Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve) t SRV is part-way open and may be assessed as either OPEN or leaking.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE: No actions to stop leak will be successful.
0 Confirm that an SRV is leaking 0 Place torus cooling in service EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Recognize
- can't place torus cooling in service.
0 Inform Operations Manager Inform System Engineering 0 Commence plant shutdown IAW OP-0105 0 Determine that SRV has no known pilot valve leakage.
0 Attempt to close valve by cycling control switch from AUTO to OPEN to AUTO (if valve is open enough to indicate it is open and not leaking).
EVALUATOR'S NOTE: (Only if assessed as OPEN.)
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 17 of 24 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S U N/O COMMENTS BOP Attempt to cycle B SRV; report valve failure to close.
EVALUATORS NO E: (Only if assessed as OPEN.)
IF the SRV remains OPEN, Place the ADS Appendix R Bypass Switch on CRP 9-3 to BYPASS.
EVALUATORS NO E: (Only if assessed as OPEN.)
When directed, place the ADS Appendix R Bypass Switch on CRP 9-3 to BYPASS.
-~ ~
EVALUATORS NO E: (Only if assessed as OPEN.)
~~ ~ ~
CRS If core flow is greater than 29 Mlbm/Hr then reduce reactor power 5 10% RTP/min using recirc flow until core flow is 27.5 to 29 Mlbm/Hr.
CRO When directed, reduce reactor power s 10% RTP/min using recirc flow until core flow is 27.5 to 29 MIbm/Hr.
CRS Direct the following actions:
0 Transfer station loads to the Startup Transformers (as time permits).
0 Reactor shutdown/cooldown as required by OT-3121.
CRO/BOP When directed, commence plant shutdown IAW OP 0105.
CREW Recognize torus volume > 70,000 cu ft; inform CRS of EOP-3 entry condition n NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasklStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 18 of 24 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S U N/O COMMENTS CRS When torus volume exceeds 70,000 cu ft, enter and direct actions IAW EOP- 3 0 Direct torus cooling.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Recognize- can't place torus cooling in service.
CREW Report Drywell pressure approaching 2.5 psig.
Enter/direct actions IAW OT-3111 (as time permits):
0 Reduce Recirc flow to 27.5 - 29 Mlbs/hr at a rate not to exceed 10 percent per minute 0 Above the MELLLA boundary, stop lowering core flow and reduce power using the rapid shutdown sequence in reverse order EVALUATOR'S NOTE: May go above MELLLA for a short period of time during a transient.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 19 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 8 & 9 Crew Task
Description:
Failure of Manual Scram; ARI Required; ATWS (45?"55%)
STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACT IONS/BEHAVlOR COMMENTS CREW Recognize failure of pushbuttons to manually scram the reactor
- CREW With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take EOP-2 action to reduce power by CCT-1 tripping the recirc pumps.
Standard:
Actuate the ARVRPT logic AND ensure that the recirc drive motor breakers are tripped within 2 minutes of the scram failure (or within 1 minute of RPV pressure exceeding 1200 psig)
CRO Initiate ARVRPT and Trip the Drive Motor Breakers.
Report Partial Rod Insertion.
CRO When steam flow c 0.5 Mlbm/hr per steamline, place mode switch in SHUTDOWN.
0 Verify all rods inserted; inform CRS.
CRS Direct CRO to maintain level from 127" 177".
CRO/BOP Maintain reactor level as directed.
0 Determine HPCl not required for level control 0 HPCl tripped and inhibited NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 20 of 24 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S U N/O COMMENTS CRS Direct CRO/BOP to maintain reactor pressure 800 - 1000 psig using BPVs.
With the leaking SRV, the pressure band may have to be adjusted based on plant pressure continuing to lower.
~~ ~
CRO / Maintain reactor pressure as BOP directed.
CRS Direct crew to monitor the plant cooldown.
BOP When directed monitor cooldown.
~ ~~
EVALUATORS NOTE: With ARVRPT failure, trip of drive motor breakers required to satisfy critical task.
When informed of the scram failure enter and direct crew actions IAW EOP-1 and EOP-2
~
I STA When directed, verify EOP-1 Table A automatic actions Recognize/respond to high Drywell pressure and entry into EOP-3; inform CRS Enteddirect actions per EOP-3 0 Restart Drywell RRUs.
When directed:
0 Restart Drywell RRUs.
~~
- CREW With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, EOP-2 INHIBIT ADS to prevent an CCT-2 uncontrolled RPV depressurization to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
Standard:
Inhibit ADS prior to automatic initiation.
I CRS Direct per EOP-2:
8 Inhibit ADS S = Satisfactory; -
U Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 21 of 24 1
0 Implement App P to keep the MSlVs Open When steam flow <0.5lbmkr per steamline, place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN EVALUATORS NOTE: This step is an Immediate Action, ai d may be performed without direction.
d 0 Verify ARI/RPT initiated 0 Insert control rods with one or more appropriate appendices EVALUATORS NOTE: Implement appendix F, BB or H of OE 3107.
Stabilize pressure RPV pressure 800-1,000 psig with BPVs.
When directed:
0 Inhibit ADS.
0 Implement App P to keep the MSlVs Open.
Stabilize pressure 800-1000 psig with BPVs.
During an ATWS with conditions met to perform power/level control TERMINATE AND PREVENT INJECTION into the RPV using appendix GG, until conditions are met to re-establish injection.
Standard:
Completion of Terminate and prevent injection IAW OE 3107 Appendix GG within 5 minutes of loss of forced circulation.
CRS Inject SLC with A SLC pump Terminate/prevent injection per Appendix GG.
h NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 22 of 24
- CREW With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, TAKE EOP-2 ACTION TO REDUCE POWER by CCT-4 injecting boron andor inserting control rods, to prevent exceeding the primary containment design limits.
Standard:
Actions taken within 10 minutes of the scram failure to implement appropriate appendices and/or inject SLC. Initially SLC will be available, then one method must result in successful control rod insertion.
CRO When steam flow ~0.5lbmhrper steamline, place Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
EVALUATORS NOTE: This step is an Immediate Action, and may be performed without direction.
SLC will run initially then trip when power is < 2%.
Insert control rods using directed appendices.
EVALUATORS NOTE: After trip of SLC, control rod insertion becomes only means available to satisfy the critical task.
BOP When directed, terminate/prevent injection per Appendix GG.
- CREW When conditions are met to re-establish injection, use available EOP-2 lnjection systems to RESTORE &
CCT-5 MAINTAIN RPV water level above
-19.
Standard:
Restore and maintain RPV level to between -19 and the level to which it was lowered AND no significant power excursion occurs.
EVALUATOR NOTE: Depending on crews pace, Torus temperature may reach 110 degrees before power drops to < 2%. This along with an SRV open and level > TAF will satisfy override to terminate and prevent / enter -19 to 90 level control leg.
~~
CRO Recognize when power drops below 2 %; inform CRS CREW Recognizes A SLC pump trip
~ ~ ~~~~~
CRS Direct RPV level maintained between -1 9 and 90 inches NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 23 of 24 Maintain RPV level between -1 9 91 and 90 inches
=I= I CRO/STA CRS Recognize all rods inserted; inform CRS When all control rods inserted, exit EOP-2 and enter/direct actions IAW EOP-1:
0 Verify Table A automatic actions 0 Restore4 maintain RPV level 127 - 177 inches.
0 Commence cooldown at less than 100 degrees F per hour.
BOP When directed, commence cooldown at less than 100 degrees F per hour.
CRS When all rods inserted, exit EOP-2, enter EOP-I, and direct RPV level restored and maintained 127 -1 77 inches.
Scenario may be terminated once EOP-2 has been exited at the discretion of the lead evaluator.
I I 1 I I I NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasMStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 2 Page 24 of 24 OPERATOR ACTIONS ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Vermont Yankee 2007 NRC Scenario #3 The crew will initiate Turbine Chest Warming and continue with the reactor startup, pulling control rods to continue with the power ascension. As the startup progresses, IRM A will fail upscale resulting in a rod withdrawal block and a half scram, requiring the crew to evaluate Tech Specs, and bypass the failed IRM.
While addressing the IRM failure, the in-service CRD Flow Control Valve will fail closed. When startup is recommenced, the crew must identify the CRD Flow Control Valve failure and respond using ON 3145 to swap to the other CRD Flow Control Valve.
When the startup continues control rod 18-19 will not move at normal drive pressures, requiring actions IAW ON 3143 Appendix A to correct the condition and continue with the startup.
After the control rod is fully inserted and disarmed, the crew will respond to an earthquake using OP 3127, Natural Phenomena. This will cause a trip of the A TBCCW pump and the B TBCCW pump must be manually started when it fails to auto start. Also, the Gland Seal Regulator will fail closed requiring the crew to open the bypass valve to maintain condenser backpressure.
After the seismic and TBCCW issues have been addressed, a RClC leak will develop requiring operator action to isolate the leak. The CRS will evaluate Tech specs after RClC is manually isolated.
% When the crew has isolated the RClC leak and Tech Specs have been evaluated, a subsequent earthquake will cause a Group-1 isolation and a break in the Torus. The auto scram will fail requiring the crew to manually scram (Critical Task). OT 3100 will be entered for the scram, EOP-3 will be entered due to the Torus leak. During the scram, Scram Discharge Volume valves will fail to auto close and operator action is required to attempt to close the valves. EOP-4 entry required.
The crew will be evaluated responding to low Torus level IAW EOP-3. The break will be in excess of makeup system capacity, and the crew will be required to emergency depressurize before going below 7 ft in the Torus due to the rupture (Critical Task).
Critical tasks are to actuate a manual reactor scram and to emergency depressurize when Torus level cannot be maintained above 7 feet.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 4 of 22 SIMULATOR EVALUATION GUIDE Evaluators: Crew:
~~~ ~~
STA Senior Management Observer Critical Task Performance: SAT UNSAT (Circle One)
Lead Evaluator:
Signature Date Administered:
Activity Code:
Prepared by: Date:
Reviewed by: Date:
Approved by: Date:
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 5 of 22 CREW BRIEF:
-Power level: 2%
-Rod Sequence: A2 Rod Sequence -Rod Group: 30
-Equipment out of service and/or tagged:
1.
-Reason For Equipment out of Service or tagged:
1.
-Applicable Tech Spec LCOs:
1.
ORAM Sentinel Color:
k Yellow Transient Evolution >50%
-Plant evolutions in progress/Scheduled Shift Evolutions:
- 1. Place Turbine Chest Warming in service and continue reactor startup.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 6 of 22 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The crew will initiate Turbine Chest Warming and continue with the reactor startup, pulling control rods to continue with the power ascension. As the startup progresses, IRM A will fail upscale resulting in a rod withdrawal block and a half scram, requiring the crew to evaluate Tech Specs, and bypass the failed IRM.
While addressing the IRM failure, the in-service CRD Flow Control Valve will fail closed. When startup is recommenced, the crew must identify the CRD Flow Control Valve failure and respond using ON 3145 to swap to the other CRD Flow Control Valve.
When the startup continues control rod 18-19 will not move at normal drive pressures, requiring actions IAW ON 3143 Appendix A to correct the condition and continue with the startup.
After the control rod is fully inserted and disarmed, the crew will respond to an earthquake using OP 3127, Natural Phenomena. This will cause a trip of the A,TBCCW pump and the 6 TBCCW pump must be manually started when it fails to auto start. Also, the Gland Seal Regulator will fail closed requiring the crew to open the bypass valve to maintain condenser backpressure.
After the seismic and TBCCW issues have been addressed, a RClC leak will develop requiring operator action to isolate the leak. The CRS will evaluate Tech specs after RClC is manually isolated.
When the crew has isolated the RClC leak and Tech Specs have been evaluated, a subsequent earthquake will cause a Group-1 isolation and a break in the Torus. The auto scram will fail requiring the crew to manually scram (Critical Task). OT 3100 will be entered for the scram, EOP-3 will be entered due to the Torus leak. During the scram, Scram Discharge Volume valves will fail to auto close and operator action is required to attempt to close the valves. EOP-4 entry required.
The crew will be evaluated responding to low Torus level IAW EOP-3. The break will be in excess of makeup system capacity, and the crew will be required to emergency depressurize before going below 7 ft in the Torus due to the rupture (Critical Task).
Critical tasks are to actuate a manual reactor scram and to emergency depressurize when Torus level cannot be maintained above 7 feet.
TERMINATING CONDITION(S):
- 1. Once the crew has opened the SRVs to commence an RPV-ED on Torus Level and had demonstrated the ability to monitor and control RPV Level during the RPV-ED, the scenario can be terminated at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator.
REFERENCES:
1.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 7 of 22 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Simulator Set Up: -2% Power
- 1. IC-805 2.
Discretionarv Distracter Malfunctions/RFs/lOs:
- 1. rfNM-71-76 APRM Gain adjustments due to APRM GAFs being out of spec; 71 (1.22) 72 (1.33), 73 (1.14), 74 (1.22), 75 (1.11) 76 (1.14)
MF/RF/IO# I Severity I Ramp I REM# I Act.Time I Description mf NM-03A 100% 1 IRM A Failure Upscale mfRD-11A 2 CRD A FCV Failure Closed mfRD-021819 3 Stuck Control Rod 18-19
- 4. tfPP-06 I 1 4 1 I Seismic Event
- 5. mfSW-21 B 4 TBCCW 6 Pump Failure to Auto Start
% 4
- 6. mfSW-14A 4 TBCCW A Pump Trip
- 7. mfMS-09 4 Gland Seal Regulator fails closed
- 8. mf RC-14 5 RClC Group 6 Isolation Failure
- 9. mfRC-10 100% 30sec 5 RClC Steam Leak before 131
- 10. rfPP-06 6 Seismic Event (aftershock)
- 11. mf RP-03 6 Spurious Group 1 Isolation
- 12. mfRP-O1A 6 Failure to Auto Scram
- 13. mf PC-10 I t
50% I 900sec I I I 7 I I
I Suppression 1 .. Pool Leak
- 14. mf RD-O9A Pre-Insert SDV Drain Valve 1A Fails Open I I I I 1
- 15. mf RD-09 B Pre-Insert SDV Drain Valve 2A Fails Open 16.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 8 of 22 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Additional Instructions:
- 1. When/if contacted to investigate the A IRM failure, acknowledge, and then report that there was an electronic failure of the output amplifier. If asked, recommend that the CR bypass the failed IRM.
- 2. When/if asked to monitor FCV-19A parameters, report you have normal filter suction & discharge pressures and no other abnormalities exist. Youll continue to monitor.
When asked to place FCV-196 in service, insert the following: rfRD-08 (OUT) followed by rfRD-09 (IN).
- 3. Following initial drive flow pressure increase (ON-3143), Simulator Booth Operator DELETE stuck rod malfunction (mfRD-021819).
NOTE: Based on the pace of the crew, they may not be on the intended malfunctioningrod (18-19), if this is the case, coordinate with the Lead Evaluator to provide a Stuck Rod malfunction for the rod selected. Ensure the alternate rod selected is at something other than 00 for evaluation purposes.
- 4. PRIOR to inserting key 4, call the CR as the RBAO to talk to the CRO to follow-up on CRD FCV operation. Insert key 4 during dialog (ensure you have a peer check or another simulator operator available to perform this function to prevent inserting the wrong malfunction during this evolution- STAR). This will ensure the ACRO gets credit for either the TBCCW pump trip and auto start failure or Gland Seal Regulator malfunction, Report to the Control room from the Security Shift Supervisor that tremors were felt from officers in the field.
When/if asked to investigate the TBCCW pump trip and failure to auto start, acknowledge, and then report that its believed to be due to the seismic event and that youll report back to the Control Room with a confirmation as soon as possible.
- 5. Report to the Control Room from the Security Shift Supervisor that aftershocks were felt by security officers in the field.
- 6. When/if asked to investigate a leak in the torus, acknowledge, and then report that the leak is about 4 feet up from the torus azimuth near the A RHR Loop Suction and that repairs to fix the leak are ongoing.
- 7. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, the Torus Leak sizehate may be modified to get the crew to the point where they need to RPV-ED on torus level.
When/if asked to open CS-8A or CS-86 for torus makeup, insert the following as needed: rfCS-01 or rfCS-02 respectfully.
Appendix D NUREG 1021 Revision 9
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 9 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 1 Crew Task
Description:
Perform Turbine Chest Warmup STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S COMMENTS CRS Directs Performing Turbine Chest Warmup IAW OP 0105 Phase 2.D.
Step 1.
Direct CRO to monitor Reactor Power, Pressure and Level during Turbine Chest Warm-up.
~ ~ ~ ~~~~
BOP Enters OP 0105 Phase 2.D. Step 1.
for Turbine Chest Warm-up and reviews Takes actions IAW OP 0105 for Turbine Chest Warmup CRO Maintains Reactor Power, Pressure e,
and Level as Turbine Chest Warm-up is placed in service.
~~~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~ ~~ -
VALUATORS NOTE: OP 0105 Phase 2.D. Step 1. specific ! teps attached.
I NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 10 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 2 Crew Task
Description:
Pull Rods to Continue Power Ascension EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Specific guidance for rod pulls in OP 0105.
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 11 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 3 Crew Task
Description:
IRM A Fails Upscale (TS)
I CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR
~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~
STEP POS.
CREW Recognizes IRM A failed upscale Recognizes YZ scram ALARMS CRS Recognizes IRMA upscale, references OP2131 section C.
Directs confirmation of upscale ,
Directs I & C to investigate.
Directs bypassing IRM A.
Directs reset of /2 scram.
Consults Tech Specs - Table 3.1.1.
- no restriction with one IRM inop.
CRO Bypasses IRM Resets Y2 scram per OP 2134 RPS.
CRS Crew Brief NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 12 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 4 Crew Task
Description:
CRD Flow Control Valve Fails Closed (ON)
STEP POS.
CREW CANDI DATE ACT IONS/BEHAV IOR Recognizes abnormal CRD S I U I N/O I COMMENTS conditions.
Control Rod wont move.
CRS Enters ON 3145 - Loss of CRD R e g Function.
Directs actions per ON 3145, Step 9 for placing flow controller in manual, and swapping controllers.
CRO Takes steps described in Step 9.
0 places in-service flow controller in manual 0 determines problem still exists 0 swaps to alternate controller EVALUATORS NOTE: See attached copy of ON 3145, Step 9. for specific steps.
[ CRS I Crew Brief.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 13 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 5 Crew Task
Description:
Stuck Control Rod 18-19 (ON)
STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS Determines control rod 18-19 (or XX-XX) is stuck and notifies CRS EXAMINER NOTE: The stuck rod will be dependent on how far along the reactor startup/heatup has progressed. Rod 18-19 is the first control rod that may become stuck. If another rod needs to have the malfunction, the steps below will be performed unless the rod is initially at 00. In this case, wait to insert the malfunction on the alternate rod until its at a position other than 00.
CRS Enters ON 3143 - Stuck Control Rod and directs actions contained on ON 3143 flow chart.
CRO Takes actions as directed to unstick control rod per ON 3143 flowchart attempt one notch insert 0 attempt a single notch withdraw 0 determines drive water pressure 0 raises drive water pressure 10-50 psig attempt to insert control rod one notch (successful) 0 attempt to withdraw one notch (successful) 0 insert rod 18-19 one notch 0 withdraw rod 18-19 one notch 0 return drive water press. to 250-275 0 insert then withdraw rod 18-19 one notch (done twice)
CRO 0 insert then withdraw rod 18-19 one notch (done twice).
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed u
All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 14 of 22 CRS Crew Brief.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed Ir All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 15 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBERS 6 and 7 Crew Task
Description:
Seismic Event; Trip of A TBCCW Pump with B TBCCW Pump Failing to Auto Start: Gland Seal Regulator Failure STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U 1 N/O COMMENTS CREW Recognize and inform the CRS of indication of a seismic event CRS Enter and direct crew actions IAW OP 3127 CRS Direct CRO/BOP to dispatch A 0 to check for damage to structures or equipment IAW OP 3127 CRO/BOP When directed, dispatch AOs to check for damage to structures or equipment IAW OP 3127 CRS Direct CRO/BOP to verify the seismic event by checking indications on the seismic monitor monitor report valid indication of a seismic event Direct CRO to check control rod display for rod drift CRO When directed, check control rod display. Report no drifts CREW Direct STA to check the seismic monitor to determine if OBE was exceeded CREW Report loss of A TBCCW Declares ALERT for seismic event A-5-C.
CREW Call Electrical Maintenance to investigate the loss of valve indication, and failed level transmitter NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 16 of 22 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR N/O I COMMENTS CREW Responds to Annunciator 7-K-9 STM SEAL HDR PRESS LO CRS Directs the Gland Seal Regulator Bypass valve be opened to restore gland seal pressure and condenser backpressure. Enters OT-3120 for Rising Main Condenser Backpressure if conditions warrant, to ensure actions taken in the ARS will resolve the condenser backpressure issue.
BOP Refers to Alarm Response Procedure for Low seal steam pressure and opens the gland seal regulator bypass valve (MS-10).
CREW Monitors Main Condenser Backpressure.
CRS Conduct a crew brief on plant conditions and priorities.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 17 of 22 0PERAT0R ACT10NS EVENT NUMBER 8 Crew Task
Description:
RClC Steam Leak (TS); RClC Fails to Auto Isolate STEP I POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S Responds to Annunciator 9-44-2 7 - U N/O I COMMENTS RCIC Steam Line DP High May Enter ON 3158 RX BLDG High Area Tempwater Level DirectsNerifies Isolating RClC when it fails to auto isolate.
Tech Specs 3.5.G.2. - 14 day LCO Refers to Alarm Response Procedure for 9-44-2.
Manually Isolates RClC valves 15 &
16 due to failure to auto isolate.
(Successful)
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; -
U Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 18 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 9,lO & 11 Crew Task
Description:
Seismic Aftershock; Group 1 Isolation; Auto Scram Failure; Manual Scram Required; PClS Group 111 Failure STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O COMMENTS approximately 30 seconds of reaching the RPS auto scram actuation setpoint (9-5-K-3, Reactor Pressure High)
CRO Insert manual scram.
CRS Enter and direct actions per OT 3100 and EOP-1 Verify applicable Table A automatic actions CRO When steam flow < 0.5 Mlbm/hr per steamline, place mode switch in SHUTDOWN 0 Verify all rods inserted; inform CRS 0 Insert IRMs and SRMs CREW Recognizes SDV Drain valves CRD
-33A & 33B fail to isolate on scram.
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 19 of 22 STEP POS. CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR S U N/O COMMENTS
-~
CRO Attempts to Isolate SDV valves (unsuccessful)
I I Reports to CRS failure to isolate.
I I rt Recommends calling operators in the field to manually isolate SDV.
Enters OP 3127 Natural Phenomena due to alarm 7-M Seismic Monitor Alarm from aftershock.
Enters EOP-4 on Alarms 4-L-4 -Equip.drain N/S sump hi 4-M Floor drain N/S sump hi Due to increasing sump levels I=
caused by SDV failure to isolate.
Maintains pressure/level as directed Controls Pressure 800-1000 psig CRO Control RPV water level 127-177 with feedwater NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 20 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT NUMBER 12 Crew Task
Description:
Torus Leak at A RHR Suction (50% Over 900 Secs); PRV-ED on Low Torus Level CANDIDATE ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR Report high sump levels IS -U N/O I COMMENTS building.
Direct an A 0 to investigate. I I When A 0 reports RHR suction line break, enter and direct actions per ON 3108, Loss of Containment Integrity Emergency Procedure and ON 3158, Hi Rx Building Temperature or Water Level.
Direct maintenance to attempt to restore primary containment integrity.
I t-Respond to reactor building sump level alarm.
Re-enter EOP-4, Secondary Containment Control, due to high floor drain sump levels.
Verify all available sump pumps are running.
Enter EOP-3 on low torus volume the torus IAW Table N (multiple When torus level cannot be maintained above 7 ft, perform RPV emergency depressurization.
Standard:
Initiate RPV-ED such that RPV I I pressure is < 50 psig when Torus level reaches 5.5 ft.
S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory: N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 21 of 22 1 STEP I POS. I CANDlDATEACTIONS/BEHAVIOR I S I U I N/O I COMMENTS 1 EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Once the CRS determines Torus Level can't be maintained > 7 feet then RPV-ED is warranted.
When torus level cannot be maintained above 7 ft, enter EOP-5 Inhibit HPCl and and direct all 4 SRVs opened.
HPCl injection is terminated before Torus level falls below 6 ft. if HPCl is running.
level 6" - 177" using condensate and feed. EOP-1, Step RC/L-2 Maintain RPV level as directed.
Scenario may be terminated once level is restored and maintained.
I NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) = Critical TasWStep
VY 2007 NRC Scenario 3 Page 22 of 22 OPERATOR ACTIONS ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.
- 2) * = Critical TasWStep