Information Notice 1983-69, Improperly Installed Fire Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants
SSINS No.:
6835 IN 83-69
UkITTCn STATEC
NUCLJ>4' REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
20555
October 21, 1983
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-69: IMPROPERLY INSTALLED FIRE DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL)
or con- struction permit (CP).
Purpose
This information notice is provided as notification of three related potentially
generic problems involving the improper installation of fire dampers in ventila- tion ducts which penetrate fire barriers in safety-related areas.
Any one, or
all three problems may exist at a facility.
It is expected that recipients
will review this information notice for applicability to their facilities.
No
specific action or response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On June: 13, 1983, at the Crystal River Station, while moving duct work to
accommcodate a plant modification, the licensee's personnel discovered that a
.required fire damper had not been installed in a ventilation duct between the
Auxiliary Building and the Control Building.
In evaluating and implementing
corrective actions, the licensee identified two additional problems.
The- design drawings called for 3-hour fire rating on the dampers, but the procure- ment documents specified only 1-1/2-hour rating.
Thus, 56 dampers installed in
safety-related areas did not have the required fire rating.
Further investi- gation revealed that 21 of the 56 identified fire dampers were not properly
located within the duct system.
These dampers were installed within the ducts
in the fire area and not within the fire wall penetration as required by the
design and installation Code, National Fire Protection Association Standard
90A. Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems.
The situation may also exist at other facilities.
Improperly installed fire
dampers have been identified during recent NRC inspections at other nuclear
power plants including Bellefonte, Farley, Grand Gulf, McGuire, and Watts Bar.
These discrepancies existed primarily because of inadequate design data or
because the design documents did, not conform to the criteria of NFPA-90A or
of the damper manufacturer.
8308300797"
October 21, 1983
Redundant safety-related equipment and components at nuclear power plants are
required to be separated by distance or by fire-resistant walls, floors, en- closures, or other types of fire barriers.
All penetrations in the fire barriers
are required to be protected against the spread of fire in order for the
barriers to be effective.
Ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers are
required to be protected by means of fire dampers which are arranged to close
in the event of fire.
Improperly installed fire dampers could permit the
passage of fire through a fire barrier and thereby jeopardize redundant
safety-related sytems.
Licensees are encouraged to review the fire damper installations at their faci- lities and determine whether the correct dampers are installed and whether the
damper installation is in accordance with relevant criteria.
No written re- sponse to this notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC
Regional Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
J. B. Henderson, IE
(301)
492-9654 Attachhbent:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
- SEE
PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE
JBHenderson
AWDromerick
RLBaer
8/
/83:1j
8/
/83
10/
/83
- PSB: IE
RSanders
- 0/ /83
- DEPER:IE
ELJordan
10/ /83
IN 83-
October 1983
Redundant safety-related equipment and components at' nuclear power plants are
required to be separated by distance or by fire-resistant walls, floors, en- closures, or other types of fire barriers.
All penetrations in the fire barriers
are required to be protected against the spread of fire in order for the
barriers to be effective.
Ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers are
required to be protected by means of fire dampers which are arranged to close
in the event of fire.
Improperly installed fire dampers could permit the
passage of fire through a fire barrier and thereby jeopardize redundant
safety-related sytems.
Licensees are encouraged to review the fire damper installations at their faci- lities and determine whether thecorrect dampers are installed and whether the
damper installation is in accordance with relevant criteria.
No written re- sponse to this notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC
Regional Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Techniqal Contact:
J. B. Henderson, IE
(301)
492-9654 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued 1E Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE
- DEPER:IE
JBHenderson
AWDromerick
RLBaer
8/
/83:lj
8/
/83
10/ /83.
- PSB: IE
RSanders
10/
/83
- DEPER: IE
ELJordan
10/
/83
IN 83- October
, 1983 Redundant safety-related equipment and components at nuclear power plants are
required to be separated by distance or by fire resistant walls, floors, en- closures, or other type fire barriers.
All penetrations in the fire barriers
are required to be protected against the spread of fire in order for the
barriers to be effective.
Ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers are
required to be protected by means of fire dampers which are arranged to close
in the event of fire.
Improperly installed fire dampers could permit the
passage of fire through a fire barrier and thereby jeopardize redundant
safety-related sytems.
Licensees are encouraged to review the fire damper installations at their faci- lities and determine whether the correct dampers are installed and whether the
damper installation is in accordance with relevant criteria.
No written re- sponse to this notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC
Regional Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
J. B. Henderson, IE
(301) 492-9654 Attachm6nt:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
- SEE
PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
DEPER:IE
D;EIR:U
DEP,*4*
JBHer derson
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RL haro
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IN 83- August
Page 2
,' 1983 of 2 are required to. be protected against the spread of fire in order for the barriers
to be effective.
Ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers are required to
be protected by means of fire dampers which are arranged to close in the event
of fire.
Improperly installed fire dampers could permit the passage of fire
through a fire barrier and thereby jeopardize redundant safety-related sytems.
Licensees are encourage to review the fire damper installations at their faci- lities and determine whether the correct dampers are installed and whether the
damper installation is in accordance with relevant criteria.
No written re- sponse to this notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional
Office, or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
J. B. Henderson, IE
(301)
492-9654 Attachment:
List fo Recently Issued IE Information Notices
4 DEPER:IE
08Hp derson
81/ U83:lj
A fdoa ric k
8/4/83 DEPER:IE
RLBaer
8/ /83 PSB: IE
RSanders
8/
/83 DEPER: I E
ELJordan
8/
/83
Attachment
October 21, 1983
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issue
Issued to
83-68
83-67
83-66 a
Respirator User Warning -
Defective Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus Air
Cylinders
Emergency-Use Respirator
Material Defect Causes
Production of Noxious
Fatility at Argentine
Critical Facility
Surveillance of Flow in RTD
Bypass Loops Used in Westing- house Plants
Lead Shielding Attached to
Safety-Related Systems
Without 10 CFR 50.59
Evaluations
Potential Failures of
Westinghouse Electric Cor- poration Type SA-1 Differen- tial Relays
Failure of Redundant Toxic
Gas Detectors Position at
Control Room Ventilation
Air Intakes
10/11/83
10/11/83
10/7/83
10/07/83
All nuclear power
facilities holding
and test reactors, fuel cycle licensees;
Priority 1 material
licensees
All nuclear power
facilities holding
and test reactors, fuel cycle licensees;
Priority 1 material
licensees
All nuclear power
facilities holding
an OL or CP; non- power reactor ,
critical facility and
fuel cycle licensees
All Westinghouse
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
All power reactor
facilities holding
83-65
83-64
83-63
83-62
09/29/83
09/26/83
09/26/83 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit