ML062710061
| ML062710061 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/2006 |
| From: | Demoss G NRC/RES/DRASP/DDOERA/OEGI |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML062710061 (4) | |
Text
Final Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Catawba Duel Unit Loss of Offsite Power Event Units 1 and 2 Event Date:
05/20/2006 LER:
413/2006-001-00 CCDP (Unit 1):
.6E-05 09/25/2006 Event*SunMmary__
77-7
_7 Description. On May 20, 2006, at 2:01 p.m., an electrical fault in the Catawba 230kV switchyard caused several power circuit breakers (PCB's) to open resulting in a loss of all offsite power (LOOP) and a subsequent reactor trip of both units from 100 percent power. All reactor trip breakers opened as expected and all control rods fully inserted into the core on the two units. Both main turbines tripped upon receipt of the P4 protective signals following the reactor trips, Control room operators responded to the event using normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
Following the LOOP, the four (4) emergency diesel generators started and supplied power to the 4.16kV vital busses. Designated vital equipment was re-energized in accordance with the plant design through the diesel generator load sequencers. During the LOOP. events, two pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) in Unit 1 cycled for a total of 62 times; one PORV in Unit 2 cycled 35 times. The PORVs on both units operated as designed to control primary plant pressure.
Power was restored to the Unit 2 6.9kV busses at 8:27 p.m. on May 20, 2006, and to the Unit 1 6.9kV busses at 8:40 p.m. Due to existing lockouts on the 1A and 2B main transformers, full realignment of breakers to provide offsite power to the vital busses and securing of all four diesel generators did not occur until approximately 1:10 a.m. on May 21, 2006.
Recovery assumption. Offsite power to the first vital bus could have been restored within one hour given a postulated station blackout.
Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP).
The mean CCDP for the loss of offsite event is 9E-05 for Unit 1 and 6E-05 for unit 2. The uncertainty distribution is as follows:
5th percentile meanX 95th percentile lUnit 1 I
8E-06 I
9E-05 I
3E-04 Unit 2 6E-06 6E-05 2E-04 ASP Program thresholds (CCDP). This event is a precursor in the ASP program. However, since the CCDP is less than 1.OE-03, this event is NOT a significant precursor.
Dominating sequences. The two top dominant core damage sequences for this assessment are loss of offsite power (LOOP)/station blackout (SBO) sequence 20-74 and LOOP sequence 13 (81%
of the total CCDP). The LOOP and SBO event trees are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The events and important component failures in LOOP/SBO Sequence 20-74 are:
o Loss of offsite power occurs o Reactor shutdown succeeds o Emergency power fails o Auxiliary feedwater succeeds o Pressurizer power-operated relief valve sticks open o Offsite power is not recovered in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o An emergency diesel generator is not recovered in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> The events and important component failures in LOOP Sequence 13 are:
o Loss of offsite power occurs o Reactor shutdown succeeds o Emergency power is unavailable (at least one of two trains) o Auxiliary feedwater succeeds o Pressurizer power-operated relief valve sticks open o High pressure injection fails o Offsite power is not recovered in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Sensitivity analysis results. A sensitivity analysis was performed assumes that no pressurizer PORV opens during the event. The resultant CCDP for both units still exceeds the ASP program threshold of a precursor (i.e., COOP > 1 E-06).
An additional sensitivity analysis was performed that assumes (1) offsite power can not be restored to required vital buses within one hour, but was recoverable within two hours, and (2) multiple pressurizer PORVs cycles. The resultant COOP for either unit does not exceed the ASP Program threshold of a significant precursor (i.e., CCOP < 1 E-03).
Attchments Analysis Background Do~cuments
- 1. Analysis Worksheet
- 2. GEM Reports: Units 1 and 2
2 T
10 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 T
22 T
LOOP - Catawba 1 & 2 PWR B loss of offsite power Figure 1. Loss of Offsite Power Event Tree
EMERGENCY AUXILIARY PORVs STANDBY RAPID RCP RCP RCP RCP LONG TERM SHED DC LOADS OFFSITE DIESEL POWER FEEDWATER ARE SHUTDOWN SECONDARY SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAL OPERATION 0 EXTEND BAT POWER.GENERATOR PAILS CLOSED FACILITY DEPRESS STAGE I STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 2 OP SEP AFE TO4HOURS RECOVERY RECOVERY SEAL COOLING INTEGRITY INTEGRITY INTEGRITY INTEGRITY (IN 2 HR)
(IN 2 HR)
EPS ASFW PORV SSF-SBO RSD BPI 01 BP2 02 SSF-LT DC-SHED OPR-02H DGR-02H
- I END-STATE NOTES 01K CD OK OK CD OK 01K CD OK OK CD OK OK CID SB8-1 OK CD SBD-1 OK CO SBO-I OK CD SBD0I OK CID 550-1 OK CD SBO-2 OK CID SBO-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CO SBD-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CD~
SBD-2 OK CD SBD-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CD BED-2 OK CD SBO-2 OK CO SBO-2 OK CO SBO-2 OK CO SBO-3 OK CD 25-hour-Tu 25-hoor.Tcu 4-hour-Tcu 4-hour-Tcu S-hour-Teu 9-hour-Tcu 2-hour-Tcu 25-hour-Too 25-hour-Too 3-hour-Too 3-hour-Tcu 3-hour-Tcu 3-hour-Tou 6-hour-Tcu 6-hour-Too 2-hour-Tco 2-hour-Tco 6-hour-Too 6-hour-Tcu 2-hour-Too 2-hour-Tcu 1 -hour-Too 2-hour-Too SBO - Catawba 1 & 2 PWR B station blackout 2006/06/12 F-igure 2. btatIon Blackout Event Tree
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis Worksheet Office of Nuclear Requlatorv Research Worksheet Date:
09/25/2006 Analysis Status:
Final Plant Name:
Catawba Affected Unit Number(s):
Units 1 and 2 Event
Title:
Duel Unit Loss of Offsite Power Event Occurrence/Discovery Date:
05/20/2006 Licensee:
Duke Energy Nuclear, LLC Docket Number(s):
05000413, 414 Inspection Report Number(s):
0500041 3/2006-009 and 0500041 4/2006-009 (AlT),
06/29/2006 Enforcement Action Number:
na LER Number(s):
413/2006-001-00 LER Date:
07/19/2006 ASP Analysis Number Unit 1:
41 3-06-001 Unit 2:
41 4-06-001 ASP Analysis Type:
Initiating Event - Loss of Offsite Power Lead Analyst:
Don Marksberry SRA Reviewer(s):
Walt Rogers ASP Reviewer(s):
Gary DeMoss MD 8.3 Result:
na ASP Results Unit 1:
CCDP = 6E-5 Table of Contents:
Title Page Facts Assumptions SPAR Model Changes Results - Sequence of Events - SPAR-H Adjustments End Notes References IFigu res
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (FACTS)
Worksheet Date:
0/520 (Loss.of Offsite Power Version)___________________
Plant Response
~Rfrne
- 1. Reactor Trip:
Both units
()I
- 2. Trip initiator:
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to reactor
____________________________coolant pumps (ROPs)
()I
- 3. Time of trip/LOOP:
14:01:45
()I
- 4. Pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) lift
- a. Unit 1:
T1 NC-32B stroked 5 times; 1 NC-34A stroked 57 times (1) IR
- b. Unit 2:
I2NC-34A stroked 35 times (1) IR
- 6. Automatic/Manual actuation of safety systems
- a. Safety injection pump(s):
Not demanded (1) IR
- b. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump(s):
All AFW pumps auto started (2 motor-driven
-pumps, 1 turbine-driven pumpsy each unit (1) IR
- c. Other systems:
None reported in inspection report or
_______________________________,Licensee Event Report (LER)
- 7. Emergency diesel generator (EDG) operations during the event
- a. EDGs automatically started and load:
All EDGs operated as designed (2-EDGs per unit)
(1) IR
- b. Run time of longest running EDG:
11 hrs 9min (1) IR No problems reported during the LOOP
- c. Any problems with an EDG reported?
eetI/E
- 8. Alternate ac power source operations
- a. Alt. ac source started and load:
Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator not needed given that all EDGs operated successfully through out the event (1) IR
- b. Start time (after LOOP initiator):
na c: Run time of longest running generator:
na
- d. Any problems reported?
na
- 9. Electrical grid and switchyard status Offsite power sources to the switchyard were only momentary lost during the event.
Power to the Yellow and Red buses was automatically restored within a fraction of a second aft6r the fault was isolated. See note 3.
(8) SRI Cpomplications; Failures, Degradations
.Cause Reference Failed equipment
- 1. (Unit 1) Main transformer 1lA not available to Zone 1lA lockout of Power Circuit Bekr provide offsite power to vital bus 1 ETA (feed (PCBs) 18 and 17
,from main transformer 1 B was available) 1_____________1_______
IR
- 2. (Unit 2) Main transformer 2B not available to Zone 2B lockout of Power Circuit Breakers provide offsite power to vital bus 2ETB (feed (PCBs) 23 and 24 from main transformer 2A was available)
(1) IR
- 3. (Unit 1) Excess letdown control valve fail to Variable orifice control valve fail to close open on demand (1) IR
- 4. (Unit 1) Pressurizer heaters did not energize Blown control circuit fuse(2LE
- 5. Train A control room area chilled water Loose wire on the program timer within the system chiller did not automatically start once chiller control panel signal from load sequencer was received.
Chiller was manually started.
(2) LER Equipment performance degradations/compilications
- 6. (Unit 1) 2 days later - Water overflow from Due to unsealed electrical conduits cooling tower spreads into EDG Room 1 A. Both sump pumps failed following being submerged.
(1) IR
- 7. (Unit 1) 2 days later - High RCP stator Cause due to biological debris swept into the winding temps on two pumps resulted in the motor coolers when the source of cooling decision to cool down to Mode 5 using natural water swapped from normal containment circulation.
chilled water system to backup nuclear service water system on the loss of offsite power.
(1) IR Operator response issues
- 8. Initial notification to the NRC Operations The senior reactor operator normally Center was made 61 min. late available to make the notifications was tasked with plant recovery and procedure implementation responsibilities; and failure to task a non-licensed operator to make the call.
(2) LER R~ecover Actions Taken Du ing Event'9 eeec 1. Offsite power restored to first vital bus
- a. Unit 1:
9 hirs 1 min (4 kV Bus 1 ETB)
(1) IR
- b. Unit 2:
9 hrs 29 mins (4 kV Bus 2ETA)
(1) IR
- 2. Offsite power restored to all vital buses
- a. Unit 1:
11 hrs 9mins (1) IR
- b. Unit 2:
9 hrs 51 mins (1) IR
- 3. Offsite power recovered past electrical fault Power restored to 6.9kV buses: 6 hrs 38 to first (usually non-vital) bus mins (Unit 1); 6 hrs 25 mins (Unit 2)
(1) IR
- 4. Problems in restoring offsite power:
No operator action was needed to restore power to the Yellow and Red switchyard buses.
Paths with no faults were available from Zone 1lA (Unit 1) and Zone 2B (Unit 2) to vital loads.
Emergency operating procedure (EOP) ECA-O.O provides instructions for restoring offsite power from the switchyard to vital loads using a zone from either unit. The expansive time actually taken during the event to restore power to vital buses was due to precautions and not complications experienced in the event.
(8) SRI
- 5. Failed or out-of-service equipment restored during event None
PlanCnfiguration Prior to.Reactdrri
____________________Rernc
- 1. Equipment out of service
{None reported in inspection report or LER
- 2. Unusual electrical power lineups jNone reported in inspection report or LER
- 3. Power history (last plant shutdown)____________________
Caus of OOPReference Licensee has concluded the initiating event was the X phase of the current transformer to PCB 18. Losing PCB 18 should have caused only a 50% runback on Catawba Unit 1 and nothing on Unit 2. However, because the switchyard differential relays were not set correctly (since initial construction), several switchyard breakers to trip sooner than they should have, on undercurrent. In the end, enough breakers tripped to cause a total loss of offsite power to both, units.
(1) IR Unique_;Plant Design eatures.-
Reference
- 1. Number of EDGs per unit:
2 (3) FSAR
- 2. Alternate ac power source(s).
One diesel generator (non-safety) in SSF
________________________________with limited capability (see below description) (3) ESAR
- 3. Rated battery depletion times 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (w/o load shedding); 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (w/
- a. Station batteries:
load shedding)
(3) FSAR
- b. SSF batteries:
- c. Switchyard batteries:
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (EOP ECA-0.O, Enclosure 22)
- d. Procedures for load shedding:
Yes, EOP ECA-O.0 (Enclosure 12 for station batteries and Encl. 22 for switchyard batteries)
- 4. Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Design:
- a. Seal design type High temperature seals on all pumps SRA
- b. Coping time w/o seal injection/cooling 13 mins. ECA-0.0, Enclosure 2, provides instructions for establishing seal injection from the SSF during SBO.
- 5. Cross ties between units
- a. Shared EDG?
No (4) WPE
- b. Bus cross connect(s):
No.
(4) WPE
- c. AFW:
No (4) IPE
- d. Other event-important cross ties:
Each 4 kV vital bus can be powered from a designated main transformer from the other unit. ECA-0.0, Enclosure 7 provides the necessary instructions to perform this crosstie.
(9) EOP
- 6. Diesel driven pumps None
- 7. PZR PORV block valves closed at power:
No
- 8. Delineation of owner controlled breakers in No alternate ac blackout power source other
,switchyard and alternate ac power source(s) than the SSF (4) FSAR
- a. Plant control boundary Hardwired controls are provided in the control room for eight PCB's and four motor operated disconnects associated with the unit feeder. The remaining breakers are controlled from the area operating center via a supervisory system.
(4) FSAR
- b. Breaker controls and start capability in (UM)
PCBs 14, 15, 17, 18. (U2) PCBs 20, control room 21, 23, 24.
(9) EOP
- c. Communications needed with outside Transmission Control Center available 24-organization (including another control room hours, 7 days a week (24/7) of a multi-unit site)
(9) EOP
- d. Availability of outside organizations (24/7) Transmission Control Center available 24/7 (9) EOP
- 9. Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) - designed to provide an alternate and independent means to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions for one or both units. SSF features include: one diesel generator, SSF heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, ac and dc power supplies to key components and instrumentation, one standby makeup pump for each unit (26 gpm); instrumentation and controls for remote operation of the turbine-driven AFW pump, manual action required to start the SSF.
(4) IPE
- 10. AFW turbine-driven pump (TDP). Features include: one TDP per unit; each AFW pump mounted in a separate pit for NPSH requirements; cooling water from the turbine oil cooler empties directly into the TDP pit (if the sump is not drained, failure of the TDP could occur as early as 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />); one of the two sump pumps for the TDP is power from the 5SF; HVAC is not needed for the operation of the TDP; air-opera ted flow throttle valve for the TDP fails in the 50% position upon the loss of air (a handjack provides local operation of the ai~r-operated valve).
(4) IPE
,Reference List
Fault Tree/Basic Ke______4Y~ ac ssm1 Ba~sis Event/Projet ul Model Chang Note: The SPAR model changes discussed below are made to reflect the modeling of the actual event.
Duel unit loss of offsite (LOOP) Model as switchyard centered Reflect the actual event GEM initiating event Switchyard centered event due to fault in switchyard dual unit LOOP initiating selection LOOP event DUEL-UNIT-LOOP Set to True. This function limits the power cross-ties from the opposite unit, since this event is a loss of offsite power event.
The earliest time that offsite Assumption: Power to the first vital bus could have been OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H 2.OE-O1 power was restored to the first restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> given a postulated station blackout.
(see below for additional vital bus in either unit was 9 hrs Bases: One-hour restoration possible: (1) switchyard adjustment) following the LOOP initiator energized --- no action needed, (2) only one of two zones OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H 2.5E-02 (Unit 1); however, power to the (main transformers locked out); no fault in the electrical OPXEX-R4
.E0 6.9kV buses were restored at 6 success paths, (4) Emergency operating procedure (EOP)
OPHXNOH 250 hrs 25 mins (Unit 2).
ECA-0.0, Enclosure 6, provided instructions for energizing OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H 5.OE-04 vital loads from the switchyard to vital buses, (5) 30 mins needed to restore power from switchyard to vital loads, OEP-XHE-XL-NRO24H 5.0E-04 based on procedures and practice, and (6) lockouts identified during the actual event within 20 mins (would be idetnified sooner once ECA-0.0, Enclosure 6 is entered). Assume an extra 30 minutes to respond to initial transient and understand switchyard conditions (Ref. 8). See SPAR-H human reliability analysis (HRA) worksheets for. SPAR model "OEP" events. Use same nonrecovery prob. for 6 hrs and 24 hrs. No other "OEP" basic events modeled in the Catawba SPAR model, other than 1, 2, 4, 6, and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Emergency operating procedure (EOP) abnormality: EOP for restoration of offsite power (ECA-0.0, Enclosure 6, Step 6) requires that all 6.9kV motor load breakers are open before the 6.9kV bus is energized.
("Do not continue in this procedure until all 6.9 KV motor load breakers are open.")
Assume off site power can not INo credit given for intentional JOEP-XHE-XL-NROlH 3.1 E-01 be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1procedure violation. If a given that 1 of 42 breakers faill breaker fails to open on to-close. Probability of 1 of 42 breakers fail-to-close is 2.6E-5/demand (Ref. 10) x 42 breakers (=0.11). For simplicity, add probability to OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
LOOP, then the operat~ors would be procedurally held up. Time to locally open a 6.9kV breaker would most likely exceed the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> that is needed to bring offsite power to the required vital loads (see SPAR-H HRA worksheet).
Presssurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) 1 NC-32B stroked 5 times (Unit 1 PORV);
1 NC-34A stroked 57 times (Unit 1 PORV); 2NC-34A stroked 35 times (Unit 2 PORV)
Model Pressurizer PORV fail to close (FTC) probability given the number of demands (see modeling uncertainty discussion below)
SPAR model top event.
Reflect that PORVs were challenged during event.
PPR-SRV-CO-L Set to True PPR-SRV-CO-SBO Set to True ASP modeling method (FTC/demand x no. of demands). Reflect the potential increase in FTC probability given multiple demands; use updated PORV FTC probability of 1.6E-03/demand (Ref. 10). Note:
GEM Calculation Type No. 9 (Base probability
- Probability Field) selected in the "Event probability Change" Window with Probability Field = no. of demands.
PPR-SRV-00-NC34A (Unit 1)
Prob. Field = 57 (GEM calculated total FTC prob.
= 9.1 E-2)
PPR-SRV-00-NC32B Prob. Field = 5; (GEM (Unit 1) calculated total FTC prob.
= 8.OE-3)
PPR-SRV-00-NC34A (Unit 2)
Prob. Field = 35; (GEM calculated total FTC prob.
= 5.6E-2)
No equipment in test and Use nominal T/M.
ASP modeling method No changes required.
maintenance (T/M) during the event
Offsite power was recovered to Emegency diesel generator ASP modeling method. Used IZT-DGN-FR-L (for run Set SPAR event mission Offsite power was recovered to I Emegency diesel generator ASP modeling method. Used ýZT-DGN-FR-L (for run Set SPAR event mission the last vital bus 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> following the LOOP initiator (EDG), Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator (SSF-DG), and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump mission times are bounded by the longer of: (a) the 95th percentile of the industry average potential bus recovery time for switchyard-centered LOOPs or (b) the actual offsite power recovery time to the last vital bus plus 30 minutes for lineups.
longest EDG run time for both units. From NUREG/OR-6890, Vol. 1, Table 4.1, the 95th percentile is 5.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (Ref. 11). Note: mission time set in GEM "Event Probability Change" Window in the "Mission Time" field times > 1 hr) time to 10.5 hrs (=1 1 hrs -
1 hr +0.5 hr)
ZT-TDP-FR-L (for run times > 1 hr)
Set SPAR event mission time to 10.5 hrs (=1 1 hrs -
1 hr + 0.5 hr)
Other complications: letdown No additional changes to the Treated as distractions system, pressurizer heaters, model necessary.
already factored into HRA of control room chillers offsite power recovery
[performance shaping factor (PSF) for complexity assumed to be highly complex]
Complications occurring a day Not modeled Events occurred following 24-later: EDG room flooding, clams hour mission time of the in the reactor coolent pump LOOP initiating event (RCP) motor cooler IiiikriownsýY Klformation Needdd Tem"Poay~uiV See uncertainties
Ke Ucetantesj~-Reasoni Resoluion PORV fail-to-close (FTC)
Pressurizer PORV fail-to-close parameter has high Perform sensitivity analyses to determine if ASP probability importance in dominating sequences. PORVs at Catawba reiect (<1 E-6) or significant precursor (>1 E-3). See (and McGuire) are unique in the industry in both design and results section. Relevant considerations to use operation. They are similar to a steam generator PORV (see existing ASP modeling method (no. of demands x note 4). The inspection of the PORVs during the LOOP failure to close probability) in best estimate analysis:
event in 1996 showed no wear after 74 cycles --- 31 times (1) operating experience show that steam generator passing water. Appling the standard method for calculating PORVs do fail to close on demand (Ref. 10Q), (2) total failure probability given x demands may be operating experience show that pressurizer PORVs conservative. Industry generic pressurizer PORV fail-to-do fail on multiple cycles (Salem 1994), although of close probability may not apply.
different design, (3) pressurizer PORVs are subject to higher pressure and boric acid environment; therefore, may be subject to a higher probability of initial sticking than steam generator PORVs, (4) operating experience with multiple cycling not documented in EPIX, and (5) NRC study on SRV/PORV reliability just underway and no other publicly available industry study to support justification of a lower failure probability given multiple
________________________________________cycles.
EDG room exhaust fan success Both exhaust fans are required for success in the SPAR Use 2 of 2 success criteria. Given the lack of, criteria model and Individual Plant Examination (IPE). Both fans are analysis to determine postulated room temperature required when ambient temperature in EIDG room exceeds with one fan and the importance of EDG room 85 degrees F. Room temperature during the event was 78 cooling is only about 9% of the CCDP.
degrees F with the EDG and both exhaust fans running (Ref.
8).
SPAR MODEL CHANGES & UPDATES Worksheet Date:
09/25/2006 SPAR Model Revision:
3.1.2 SAPH IRE Code Revision: 7.26 SPARIMode dhan-g-es todiiiBase Case Moel (Einhancement; and: Flies)
--7 Note: The SPAR model changes discussed below are made to update the model to reflect actual plant design/operations and parameters. These generic changes are made to the base case model.
Fault Tree/Basic Event/Project Rule Model Change Basis Basic Event: SSF-XHE-Update basic event SSF-XHE-XM-LT, HEP based on SPAR-H method. See XM-LT "Operator Controls SSF in Long SPAR-H HRA worksheet.
Term," assign HEP = 1.2E-2 Basic event: ZT-FAN-FR-Lambda = 3.1 E-04/hr Update parameter using EPIX data E
for EDG exhaust fans (see Note 2).
Mission run times are adjusted to that Basic event: ZT-FAN-FR-Lambda = 1.2E-04/hr of the longest running emergency L
diesel generator (EDG) during the Basi evnt:ZT-FN-F
- 7. E-0/deandevent (see assumption section).
Basi evnt:ZT-FN-F
- 7. E-0/deandNote:
mission time set in GEM "Event Probability Change' Window in the "Mission Time" field.
ANALYSIS RESULTS___
Worksheet Dat!, 09,/25/2006 RunCaesKey assumptions Resut (include Nominal TM)
PitEst.
5%tile mean 95%/tile Unit 1_
Offsite power restoration possible within 1 PORV fail to close model (cycling: 1.6E-3/demand x no. demands).
Best estimate SS Grlaiiysm sEG9.1 E-05 7.6E-06 8.6E-0 15 2.7E-04 10.5-hr mission times: EDG, SSF-DG, AFW TDP Sensitivity A Only one cycle ea ch PORV 1.5E-05 Sensitivity B Only five cycles each PORV 2.4E-05 Sensitivity C SPAR model "OEP" HEPs: Stress and.
4.5E-05 Complexity PSE level reduced to x2 Sensitivity 0 SPAR model"OEP" HEPs: Stress or 5.9E-05 Complexity PSE level reduced to x2 Sensitivity E Offsite power recovery NOT possible within 2.6E-04 Sensitivity F Sensitivity E & five cycles each PORV 4.8E-05 Unit!
.I--
Offsite power restoration possible within 1 hr PORV fail to close model (cycling: 1.6E-Best estimate 3/demand x no. demands) 5.9E-05 5.6E-06 5~.6E-05 1.7E-04 SSF DG reliability same as EDG 10.5-hr mission times: EDG, SSF-DG, AFW
____TDP__
Sequence of Events (Source: AlT report)
Catawba Unit 1 ~
TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 20-May-06 14:01:45 An internal fault occurred in a current transformer associated with power circuit breaker (PCB) 18. This fault resulted in a loss of the 230 kV Yellow and Red busses and a 1lA Zone lockout.
14:01:49 The first-out annunciator was "NI Hi Flux Rate - Power Range"; however, a review of reactor power traces do not show any valid increase or change in reactor power at this time (NOTE: The licensee is reviewing data to determine the cause of this signal). Both reactor trip breakers open and control rods insert. -The main turbine trips on receipt of the reactor trip signal.
14:02:13 Diesel generators 1lA and l B start and re-energize the 1lETA and 1 ETB 4.16kV emergency busses as designed.
14:02:30 Both main feedwater pumps trip on Lo-Lo suction pressure as a result of the loss of the hotwell and condensate booster pumps. The auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor-driven and one turbine-driven) start automatically and provide inventory makeup to the steam generators.
14:07:34 Letdown isolation occurs when pressurizer level reaches 17%. Excess letdown could not be established due to the failure of the excess letdown control valve to open on demand. Normal letdown was subsequently re-establ~ished through the fixed orifice line due to the variable orifice control valve failing closed following the LOOP and not re-opening.
14:08:02 Main Steam Isolation signal is received when the 1iC steam generator pressure reached 775 psig on 2/3 channels. Secondary pressure control transitions to the steam generator PORV's.
14:12 Intermediate Range nuclear instrumentation drops below 1 E-10 amps (P6 setpoint).
14:14 Operations Shift Manager declar 'ed a Notice of Unusual Event (Emergency Action Level 4.5.U.1, "AC electrical power from all offsite sources has been lost for more than 15 minutes with onsite power available") due to the dual unit loss of offsite power.
Emergency Response Organization page sent to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) (See Emergency Event Notification timeline for details on the licensee's response to the event).
14:22 Due to the loss of pressurizer spray (no forced circulation following the loss of the reactor coolant pumps), two of three pressurizer PORV's begin to cycle to control primary system pressure. (See section 40A5.4 for details on the pressurizer PORV lifts). No pressurizer safety valves opened during the event.
14:55 Normal letdown is restored through the fixed orifice line.
20:34 Unit is stabilized on natural circulation using emergency, abnormal and normal operating procedures. Primary system parameters are being controlled through the use of auxiliary feedwater and steam generator PORV's.
20:40 Offsite power is restored to the 6.9kV non-vital busses. Work is in-progress to energize the 4.16kV vital busses from offsite power and secure the diesel generators.
21:55 Final pressurizer PORV actuation. Total number of actuations during event on PORV 1 NC-34A was 57 cycles and on PORV 1 NC-32B, five cycles.
23:03 4.16kV vital bus 1 ETB is aligned to offsite power.
23:06 1 B diesel generator output breaker is opened. Actions initiated to secure the 1 Bdiesel generator and place it in stand-by.
21 -May-06 1:11 4.16kV vital bus 1 ETA is aligned to offsite power. Due to the 1lA Zone lockout, power is being supplied from the Unit 2 A SAT using procedural guidance to establish the required alignment.
1:14 1lA diesel generator output breaker is opened. Actions initiated to secure the 1lA diesel generator and place it in stand-by.
1:40 Notice of Unusual Event is terminated following restoration of offsite power to all unit busses.
15:17 The 1lB reactor coolant pump is placed in service restoring forced circulation in the primary system and providing normal pressurizer sprays for pressure control if required.
Primary system is stabilized at 475 F and 1850 psig in Mode 3.
22-May-06 6:03 The 1 B reactor coolant pump motor stator winding temperatures increase to 2950F requiring the pump to be secured. The 1 A reactor coolant pump is started.
8:35 Stator winding temperatures on the 1lA reactor coolant pump motor increase and approach the 300OF operating limit. The pump is secured and the decision made to cool down to Mode 5 using natural circulation in order to place residual heat removal in service. (NOTE: The elevated temperatures were determined to have been caused by biological debris being swept into the motor coolers when the source of cooling water swapped from the normal containment chilled water system to the backup nuclear service water system on the loss of offsite power).
8:49 Briefing conducted to initiate a natural circulation Cooldown to Mode 5.
16:07 Unit 1 enters Mode 4 23-May-06
9:09 Unit 1 enters Mode 5 The unit is stabilized at 170-F and 295 psig in Mode 5. The A train of residual heat removal is placed in-service for decay heat removal. The B train is placed in-service at 21:17. Repair and recovery actions are initiated.
Catawba Unit~ 2 TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 20-May-06 14:01:45 An internal fault occurred in a current transformer associated with power circuit breaker (PCB),18. This fault resulted in a loss of the 230 kV Yellow and Red busses and a 2B Zone lockout.
14:01:46 The first-out annunciator is "Under Frequency Conditions on the Reactor Coolant Pump Busses" as sensed by the reactor coolant pump monitoring circuit. Both reactor trip breakers open and control rods insert. The main turbine trips on receipt of the reactor trip signal.
14:02 Diesel generators 2A and 2B start and re-energize the 2ETA and 2ETB 4.16kV emergency busses as designed.
14:02 Both main feedwater pumps trip on Lo-Lo suction pressure as a result of the loss of the hotwell and condensate booster pumps. The auxiliary feedwater pumps (two motor-driven and one turbine-driven) start automatically and provide inventory makeup to the steam generators.
14:08:05 Letdown isolation occurs when pressurizer level reaches 17%. Excess letdown is placed in service. Normal letdown was subsequently re-established.
14:08:21 Main Steam Isolation signal is received when the 2A steam generator pressure reached 775 psig on 2/3 channels. Secondary pressure control transitioned to the steam generator PORV's.
14:27 Due to the loss of pressurizer spray (no forced circulation following the loss of the reactor coolant pumps), one of three pressurizer PORV's begins to cycle to control primary system pressure. (See section 40A5.4 for details on the pressurizer PORV lifts). No pressurizer safety valves opened during the event.
14:13 Intermediate Range nuclear instrumentation drops below 1 E710 amps (P6 setpoint).
14:14 Operations Shift Manager declares a Notice of Unusual Event (Emergency Action Level 4.5.U.1, "AC electrical power from all offsite sources has been lost for more than 15 minutes with onsite power available") due to the dual unit loss of offsite power.
Emergency Response Organization page is sent to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC). (See Emergency Event Notification timeline for details on the licensee's response to the event)
18:10 Final pressurizer PORV actuation. Total number of actuations during event on PORV 2NC-34A was 35 cycles.
Unit is stabilized on natural circulation using emergency, abnormal and normal operating procedures. Primary system parameters are being controlled through the use of auxiliary feedwater and steam generator PORV's.
20:27 Off'site power is restored to the 6.9kV non-vital busses. Work is in-progress to re-energize the 4.16kV vital busses from offsite power and.secure the diesel generators.
23:31 4.16kV vital bus 2ETA is aligned to offsite power.
23:36 2A diesel generator output breaker is opened. Actions initiated to secure the 2A diesel generator and place it in stand-by.
23:53 4.16kV vital bus 2ETB is aligned to offsite power. Due to the 2B Zone lockout, power is being supplied from. the Unit 1 B SAT using procedural 21 -May-06 23:57 2B diesel generator output breaker is opened. Actions initiated to secure the 2B diesel generator and place it in stand-by.
1:40 Notice of Unusual Event terminated following restoration of offsite powe r to all unit busses.
11:06 The 2B reactor coolant pump was placed in service restoring forced circulation in the primary system and providing normal pressurizer sprays for pressure control if required.
Exited Natural Circulation EP and transitioned to OP/21A16100/002; Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown 12:00 The unit was stabilized at 460 F and 1900 psig in Mode 3. Recovery actions are initiated.
22-May-06 11:00 Vacuum is reestablished in the main condenser allowing secondary pressure control to be transferred from the steam generator PORV's to the steam dumps and conserve inventory required to feed the steam generators.
SPAR-H HRA Worksheet jSSF-XHE-XM-SYSLT Worksheet Date: 109/25/2006 Basic Event:
Obperator Fails to jbperateSSF in-Long Term Basic Event Context. After the manual initiation of Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) during a station blackout (already modeled), operators must maintain steam generator (SG) level using the TDAFW pump from two locations: SG level indications in the SSF and at the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow control/block valves.
70Part 1: Diagnols Nne-------
Emergency operating procedure (EOP) provides instructions for maintaining SG levels from the SSF Part III: ~Action__
PSFs PSF Level Multipliei Basis for change from nominal Available Time Nominal time (xl) 1.00 Four hours to battery depletion and low decay heat levels provide adequate time to prepare for local SG level control with the SSF indications Stress/Stressors High (x2) 2.0 SBO in progress; however, knowing power is available in switchyard, successful SSF operation, and staffed TSC/EOF does not present extreme stress Complexity Moderately complex (x2) 2.0 Must regulate AFW flow control locally while communicating with SSF for SG level indication; however, routine nature of these actions do not present a highly complex operation Experience/
Low (x3) 3.0 Local SG level control at the turbine-driven Training AFW pump while communicating with SSF for level indications is not an EOP action routinely practiced Procedures Nominal (x1) 1.0 All actions covered in EOP ECA-0.0 Ergonomics/HMI Nominal (xl) 1.0 Fitness for Duty Nominal (xl) 1.0 Work Processes Nominal (xl) 1.0 Composite PSF 12 Nominal HEP 1.0E-03 Action HEP 1.2E-02 If no more than 2 negative PSFs are present HEP w/ Adjustment Factor 1.2E-02 If 3 or more negative PSFs are present Final Action HEP 1.2E-02________
,Part Il[I:'HEP wvithout.DePencen~cY.___
__________Diagnosis HEP 0
__________Action HEP 1.2E-02 _________________
~~Total HEP 1.2E-02 ________________
Part III: D pnecy
'None_____
H HEP w/ dependency 1.2E-02 Zero dependence OatIV:
crt~tyParameter 7______
__________Alpha parameter 0.51 From SPAR-H Figure 2.6 (Ref. 7)
__________Beta parameter 41.61 Beta = alpha*(1 -H EP)/HEP
SPAR-H HRA Worksheet OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H Worksheet Date: 109/25/2006 Basic Evnt:
Operator Fails to' Restore OfiePwrwti or~
Basic Event Context: Station blackout sequences where the pressurizer PORV fails to close given demand results in the start of core uncovery in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Offsite power sources to the switchyard were available throughout the LOOP event. Protective lockouts actuated on Unit 1 Zone A (trips PCB's 17 and 18, GOB 1lA) and Unit 2 Zone B (trips PCB's 23 and 24, and GOB 2B3); however, the other zone in each unit did not received a lockout. A zone lockout basically prevents the use of one of two main step-up transformers in each unit, until the lockout has been reset (and the cause of the lockout been determined). A zone lockout would prevent power from being restored to one of two vital bus divisions; however, that division could be powered from the other unit's main transformer (e.g., Unit 1 4 kV bus 1 ETA powered from Unit 2 zone 2B; Unit 2 4 kV bus 2ETB powered from Unit 1 zone 1 A).
No faults or lockouts would have prevented restoration of power from the unaffected zone path in each unit. Operators identified the zone lockouts in 20 minutes (Ref. 8) following the LOOP initiator.
Emergency operating procedure (Ref. 9) provided sufficient instructions to restore power to the vital bus.
Other relevant information provided in the basis for the performance shaping factors (PS~s), below.
Part I: Diagnosis None..
No diagnosis required. Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) will alert the operators of station blackout conditions and loss of RCS inventory POartllFI:Wc'tion___________
PSFs PSF Level Multiplier Basis for change from nominal Available Time Time available is about the 10.00 Just enough time to restore offsite power to time required (Ml) vital loads within one hour: (1) zone lockout was actually discovered 20 min. into the event (Ref. 8), (2) about 25-30 minutes needed to implement ECA-0.0 and ECA-0.2 to restore offsite power from the switchyard (already energized), through the main transformer of the available zone, and to required vital loads (Ref. 8); (3) weekend staffing level would take longer to perform actions; and (4) other control room activities, such as offsite notifications, declaration of an emergency (SAE or GE),
taking calls from offsite organizations, site evacuation, etc., would further reduce staffing.
Stress/Stressors Extreme (x5) 5.0 Extreme stress: (1) blackout conditions; (2) core uncovery imminent without immediate operator action; (3) operators may not be aware that power restoration would work, given that the origin of the faults in the switchyard was not known; and (4) distractions from offsite notifications and emergency declaration activities.
Complexity Highly complex (x5) 5.0 Highly complex: many multiple, concurrent steps required --- communications with the load dispatcher and operators in the switchyard and plant will be required.
Experience!
Nominal (xl) 1.0 Offsite power recovery actions in EOPs are Training routinely practiced (Ref. 8).
Procedures Nominal (xl) 1.0 All actions covered in EOP ECA-0.0 Ergonomics/HMI Nominal (xl) 1.0 Fitness for Duty Nominal (xl) 1.0 Work Processes Nominal (xl) 1.0 Composite PSF 250 Nominal HEP 1.OE-03 Action HEP 2.5E-01 If no more than 2 negative PSFs are present HEP w/ Adjustment Factor 2.0E-01 If 3 or more negative PSFs are present Final Action HEP 2.OE-O1 Part HI:IEP -witho'ut -Dependency
__________Diagnosis HEP 0 __________________
__________Action HEP 2.OE-01 __________________
~Total HEP 2.OE-O1 _________________
Parti~ll Dependenc None
___________HEP w/ dependency
-2.OE-01 Zero dependence PartIV~
ncerailnjy Paramneter
~
Llpha parameter 1
0.4351 From SPAR-H Figure 2.6 (Ref. 7)
[Beta parameter 1
1.71lBeta = alpha*(1 -HEP)/H EPI
SPAR-H Worksheet OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H Worksheet Date:
109/25/2006 Basic Event-:
Operator Fails to Restore Offsite,*Powerk within_ 2 Hours Basic Event Context: SBO sequences where the turbine-driven AFW pump fails resulting in the start of core uncovery in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Refer to context description for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H. Other relevant information provided in the basis for the performance shaping factors (PSIFs), below.
Part I:,Diagnosis None No diagnosis required. Emergency operating procedures will alert the operators of station blackout conditions and loss of secondary cooling
,Part 11: Action PSFs PSF Level Multiplier Basis for change from nominal Available Time Nominal time (x1) 1.00 Nominal time to restore offsite power to vital loads:
(1) zone lockout was actually discovered 20 min.
into the event (Ref. 8), (2) about 25-30 minutes needed to implement ECA-0.0 and ECA-0.2 to restore offsite pow6'r through the switchyard, through the main transformer of the available zone, and to required vital loads (Ref. 8); and (3)
Technical Support Center activated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 37 minutes into the event (pagers set off within 12 minutes following the LOOP initiator, so additional staffing would be arriving at the site soon thereafter).
Stress/Stressors Extreme (x5) 5.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
Complexity Highly complex (x5) 5.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
Experience/Traini Nominal (xl) 1.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
ng Procedures Nominal (xl) 1.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
Ergonomics/HIMI Nominal (xl) 1.0 Fitness for Duty Nominal (xl) 1.0 Work Processes Nominal (xl) 1.0
__________Composite PSE 25 Nominal HEP 1.OE-03 __________________
Action HEP 2.5E-02 If no more than 2 negative PSFs are present HEP w/ Adjustment Factor 2.4E-02 If 3 or more negative PSFs are present Final Action HEP 2.5E-02 ____________________
?jart _Ill: _HEP ýwithout _Dependency:
__________Diagnosis HEP 0 ____________________
__________Action HEP 2.5E-02____________________
Total HEP 2.5E-02___________________
Part IfI: Dependenc~yNoi HEP w/ dependency 2.5E_2_Zer dependence Part IV: Uncertainty Parameter.
___________Alpha parameter 0.4951 From SPAR-H Figure 2.6 (Ref. 7)
__________Beta parameter 19.31 Beta = alpha*(1 -HEP)/HEP
SPAR-H Worksheet JOEP-XHE-XL-NR04H Worksheet Date: 109/25/2006 1
Basic Evnt Oprao Falls to Restore Ofst oe wti or Basic Event Context: Station blackout (SBO) sequences where the station batteries deplete (with load shedding) resulting in the start of core uncovery in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Plant staff would take diligent actions to restore ac power. Refer to context description for OEP-XHE-XL-NR01 H. Other relevant information provided in the basis for the performance shaping factors (PSFs), below.
Part 1:
Tia-gnosis Non No diagnosis required. Emergency operating procedures will alert the operators of station blackout conditions and loss of dc power Part I: Action___________________
PSFs PSF Lev el Multiplier Basis for change from nominal Available Time Nominal time (xl),
1.00 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO2H.
Not quite 5 times the time required to justify a lower PSF level multiplier.
Stress/Stressors Extreme (x5) 5.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
Complexity Highly complex (x5) 5.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NROl H.
Experience/Traini Nominal (xl) 1.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NROl H.
ng Procedures Nominal (xl) 1.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
Ergonomics/HMI Nominal (xl) 1.0 Fitness for Duty Nominal (xl) 1.0 Work Processes Nominal (xl) 1.0 Composite PSE 25 Nominal HEP 1.OE-03 Action HEP 2.5E-02 If no more than 2 negative PS~s are present HEPw/Adjustment Factor 2.4E-02 If 3 or more negative PSFs are present Final Action HEP 2.5E-02 PiAtill11.HEIP without Dep'endency
__________Diagnosis HEP 0___
__________Action HEP 2.5E-02
___________Total HEP 2.5E-02 Part III: Dependency None
___________HEP w/ dependency 2.5E-02 Zero dependence P'art IV: -Uncertainty Parameter
___________Alpha parameter 0.4951 From SPAR-H Figure 2.6 (Ref. 7)
_________Beta parameter 1
19.31 Beta = alpha*(1 -HEP)/HEP
SPAR-H Worksheet OEP-XHE-XL-NR06H Worksheet Date: 109/25/2006 Basic Event:'
OppratorFails to Restobre O-ffsi-te-Po wer" w'it~hin 6 'H'ours______
Basic Event Context: Non-station blackout LOOP sequence where high-pressure feed & bleed cooling is successful and operators were able to restore offsite power with sufficient time to recover secondary side cooling prior to FWST depletion and recirculation sump switchover. Most likely, important cutsets will include an EDG failure in one train and a AFW pump failure in the other train. Refer to context description for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H. Other relevant information provided in the basis for the performance shaping factors (PSFs), below.
Part 1: Diagnosis N7;one recover power given unavailability of important equipment.
Part II:,Action PSFs PSF Level Multiplier Basis for change from nominal Available Time Time available > 5x 0.10 Offsite power could be restored to vital load(s) the time required within one hour, See basis for OEP-XHE-XL-(xO.1)
NRO1 H.
Stress/Stressors Nominal (xl) 1.0 Failure to restore power within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> does not mean core uncovery. Failure to establish high-pressure recirculation is also needed to complete the core damage sequence.
Complexity Highly complex (x5) 5.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H. May require offsite power feed through other. unit's main transformer, depending on the train needing to be, restored.
Experience/Traini Nominal (xl) 1.0 Same as for OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1 H.
ng Procedures Nominal (xl) 1.0 All actions covered in EOP ECA-0.0 Ergonomics/HMI Nominal (xl) 1.0 Fitness for Duty Nominal (xl) 1.0 Work Processes Nominal (xl) 1.0 Composite PSF 0.5 Nominal HEP 1.OE-03___________________
Action HEP 5.OE-04 If no more than 2 negative PSFs are present HEP w/ Adjustment Factor 5.OE-04 If 3 or more negative PSFs are present Final Action HEP 5.01E-04____________________
Piart11__E_
ll'W~~thoutPepedency
___________Diagnosis HEP 0 ____________________
__________Action HEP 5.OE-04____________________
______________Total HEP 5.OE-04____________________
Part Ilk: Dependenc None_______________
H_______
HEP w/ dependency 5.E04 eodpnec Part IV: -Uncertainty Parameter
[Alpha parameter 0.51 From SPAR-H Figure 2.6 (Ref. 7)
[Beta parameter 1000 [ Beta = alpha*( -H EP)/H EP
Worksheet Date:
109/25/2006 1____
1T Note 1. EDG and AFW TDPUnreliability Parameters for Catawba{
06/20/2006
[ 1 1
1 1
I SA.Eide, IN L[
I__l
_I Plant-seii siae o EDGs and AFWS TIDP for Catawba Units 1 and 2 (EPIX data for Catawba for 1997 -2005)
EDG mission time (h) 24
____1___
TDP mission time (h) 24
__J
_I
+/-_
i_____
_______Updjated Plant-Specific Distributions Industry Aversge____
Industry Average CNID PlantmS ecific Data [both units)
Industry Average Prior InutyAversge O7NID Prior Distribution Component Failure Mode Mean_
Alpha Beta Mean Alpha Beta Failures ]~Demands Hours Mean Alpha Beta Mean Alpha Beta Typ EDG FTS 4.53E-03 1.075 236.2 4.53E-03 0.500 109.9 1I 11 1.26E-03 2.075 1648.2 J9.85E.04 1.600 1521.9 Beta~.
FTLR (note 02.90E-03 1.445 496.3 2.90E-03 0.500
- 17.
17{3.84E-03 6.445 1670.3 4.08E-03 5.500 1343.9.
Beta FTR 8.48E-04 2.016 2377.0 8.48E-04 0.500 589.6 1
4729
-4.24E-04 3.016 7106.0 2.82E-04 1.500 5316.6 Gamma UA 9.01 E-03 5.880 236.2 9.01 E-03 0.500 55.0 9.8E-3 (ROP SSU 2003 -2005)
-9.80E-03 9.80E-03, Beta
_____I (note b)
FTS 6.88E-03 0.414 59.8 6.88E-031 0.500 72.2 i
200
-5.43E-03 1.414 258.8 550E-03 1.500 271.2 Beta FTRC1H
~~~~~2.64E-03 0.805 304.9 2.64E-03 0.500 189.4 0
15
-192-3 085 4.9 14E3 050
{ _______ 11 1.2-3 085 499 16E3 50 304.4 Gamma
_____FTR>1H 7.3511-05 0.500 6803.0 7.35E-05 0.500 6802.7 0
1___
0
-7.35E-05 0.500 6603.0 7.35E-05 0.500
.6802,7 Gamma UA 5.0511-03 3.330 159.8 5.05E-03 0.500 59.8 8.OE-3 (RP SSU 2003-2005)
-8.OOE-03 8.OOE-03
-Beta
~~~~(note c)________
I
- a. Includes output circuit breaker Recommended Distributions
- b. Planned and unplanned outages
- c. Planned and unplanned outages. Average of MOPs and TOD s (data do not indicdite which trains are TOPs).
EDG total UR = FTS + FTLR + FTR*23h + UA =
3.59E-02 Industry average I___
_______ I 2.47E-02 Updated pant-specific_____
2jf:,Q13E Ui dated lant-s ~ecific using CNIO prior TDP total UR =FTS + FTRS1 Wlh + FTR>1 W23h +UA =
1.63E-021 Industry average
__________1
.70E-02 Updated plant-specific I
______ {~ ~ ~0 Updated plant-specific using-CNID prior________
Note 2. IndUstry-average EPS FAN unreliability estimates (no plant-specific data in EPIX for Catawba EPS FANS)
I____
II____ [I___ 11 11I___I_ I
__I__
__I__
__I__
I______II_____I______I______I__
The draft data NUREG/CR generated FAN unreliability estimates using FAN data from a variety of systems. A more detailed look at the data would investigate whether unreliability estimates could be generated for each system.
This analysis looks at FAN data (EPIX, 1 998-202)onl within the EPS. Catawba did not report such data to EPIX, so only i cdustry-averaoe results are ?enerated here.
I 99~2O~j~A~!...... 1
~ ]-
-f
____ ]
11 111 1
___T Industry Data - All Systems Industry Data - EPS Only All FANs EPS FANs Only (EPIX, 1998 - 202)j(E IX, 1998 - 2002)
Component Failure Mode Failures Demands Hours Failures Demands Hours Mean Alpha Beta Men Apa Bt Distribution T
ME Type FAN FTS 33 25099.0 5
7073.8 2.89E-03 0.300 103.9
-7,07E-04
-0.500 7069
~Beta
_____FTR51 H 19 17019.0 1
3234.2 11 1.91 E-03 0.348 181,8 v3.0gE-04 0.500 1617.
Gamma~
_______ 1.076434.0 1.18
-9880.1
- 11.
11 E-04 8.480 76430.0 -1,19E-04 0,500 4186.5 Gamma
_____UA I___Included in EDG UA--
FAN total UR =FTS + FTR 1:1 H1h + FTR>1 H23h + UA =
317O3FAN dlataýf for all systemsRcmeddDsrbtoin 3.76E-03 FAN data for EPS only____
EOG failures, so the results generated here for EPS FAN unreliability estimates may be conservatively hiah.
09/25/2006 NOTES 3 E-mail from senior resident inspector (08/08/2006). All of power circuit breakers (PCBs) in the switchyard automatically reclose when the fault is cleared, except for the zoned breakers associated with the main transformers. Auto closure actually occurred that day (of the event) on all of those breakers and takes a few hundredsth of a second. The zoned breakers could be operated by the operators in the control room located on the control room panels, based on conditions. None of this requires action from the Transmission Control Center (TCC).
4 E-mail from senior resident inspector (06/23/2006). Both Catawba and McGuire are set up the same when it comes to PORV operation. These two plants are the only plants in the country that have the type of valve that is installed. They are similiar to a steam generator PORV. One of the two PORVs in the system are set up to operate using a proportional controller. One PORV will use the proportional controller set at 2235 and the other is set at 2335 and will not use the proportional controller. Either valve can be setup to use the propotional controller. The proportional controller uses Pref as a setpoint and has a 20# blowdown to restore pressure back to Pref, with a 7 cycle time constant whenever the actual pressure is above Pref. This means that whenever the pressure is above Pref the valve will cycle about 7 times to get the pressure back to Pref. This provides for a very controlled parabolic pressure control curve. The proportional controller was setup to replace and act similar to the pressurizer spray valve in this scenario; i.e.- natural circulation which is when the spray valve doesn't work.
5 Parameter uncertainties for "QEP" human error probability (HEP) events are based SPAR-H method (Ref. 7). SAPHIRE/GEM code uses the beta distribution. The beta distribution requires two parameters, alpha and beta. Figure 2-6 in Ref. 7 shows the numerical value of a. as a function of the HEP. For example, using the SPAR-H HRA worksheet, if one determines that the HEP has a value of 0.3, the value of alpha (from the curve) is 0.42. The second parameter, beta, is found via the equation:
a(I-HEP)
/3 HEP In the case where the HEP is 0.3, b is found to be 0.98. The beta factor is entered in the "Event Probability Changes" Window, under the Uncertainty Data section with the beta value entered in the "b" field. The alpha value is not entered.
References (1) IR Catawba Nuclear Station - NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AlT) Report 05000413/2006009 and 05000041 4/2006006, June 29, 2006 (2) LER LER 413/2006-001 -00, Loss of Offsite Power Event Resulted in Reactor Trip of Both Catawba Units from 100% Power, July 19, 2006 (3) SPAR Catawba SPAR Model, Revision 3.31, March 2006 (4) ESAR Catawba Undated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 10, March 27, 2003 (5) IPE Catawba Individual Plant Examination (6) IPEEE na (7) SPAR-H NUREG/CR-6883, "The SPAR-H Human Reliability Analysis Method," August 2005.
(8) SRI Various telephone discussions with Gene Guthrie, Senior Resident Inspector at Catawba (9) EOPs EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 28 EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery With S/I Required, Revision 17 (10)
Draft NUREG/CR-XXXX (INLIEXT-06-1 1119), "Industry Average Performance for Components and Initiating Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," May 2006.
(11)
NUREG/CR-6890, Vol. 1, "Reevaluation of Station Blackout Risk at Nuclear Power -Plants --- Analysis of Loss of Offsite Power Events: 1986-2004,"
December 2005.
230/2:2 KV System Unit 1 shown; Unit 2 is Identical except for PCB #Vs
_______and unit designators Unit Tie CB DISCS as GND DISC\\
D K
I A
BU S LINE
£~0 18 1A I"A" TrainI Figure 3. Main Generator and Switch Yard (Source: AlT Report)
Red Bus Yellow Bus v
y,~
v I______
Is ~
IA 2A rn23j 230 K V S witchyard Figure 4. Switchyard (Source: AlT Report)
o (0 0
(D CD 3
CD CD (nI CD Cn
_0 (0
CD
-0 CD CD.
CD CD 0
CafabiI Uii4P FPeS Lir~zer.P ress Lre G 2,200
-00
/
/W4M4~14A4444V~<
Mwrker Name DesCription l1 CIA0713 PZR PRESS CHII 15:00:0 i CWCoLý 14; 0!0O0O
>>DATE 5i20/2000 14:00:00 - 5/20/2006
0 CD CD "0
CD ~
CD 0D CD 0D CD 0
CD CD.
N 0
0 Catawba Jrift 2 Fr, ýcwuizer Pressure 2~4O0 I.
CL (L 2,100 Legond Marker Name Uciscription
C2A07 13 U2 PZR PRE$S CH 1 21000' 1,9000 14:00 C-O 1 5A0.00 DATE.
6/2W02060 14: 00C:
00 -5612012006
CATAWBA (Unit 1) LOOP Initiating Event -
Final ASP Analysis Fain CATA_3P User INEEL Ev ID: Ul-LOOP-BEST-ESTIMATE Code Ver 7:26 Model Ver 2006/03/10 Init Event: IE-LOOP Total CCDP:
9.OE-005 Desc : Best estimate -
W/ TM, credit recovery at 1 h (0.3)
BASIC EVENT CHANGES Event Name Description Base Prob Curr Prob Type AFW-XHE-XL-SUMPPUMPS CCW-MDP-TM-lAl CCW-MDP-TM-1A2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINA DUAL-UNIT-LOOP IE-ISL-HPI IE-ISL-LPI IE-ISL-RHR IE-LLOCA IE-LOACA IE-LOCCW IE-LOCHS IE-LODCEDF IE-LOIA IE-LOMFW I E-LONSR mE-LOOP IE-MLOCA IE-RXVRUPT IE-SGTR IE-SLOCA IE-SORV I E-TRANS OEP-XHE-XL-NRO lH OEP-XHE-XL-NRO2H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H OEP-XHE-XL-NR0 6H OEP-XHE-XL-NR2 4H PPR-SRV-CO -L PPR-SRV-CO-SBO PPR-SRV-00-NC32B PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A ZT-DGN-FR-L ZT-FAN-FR-E ZT-FAN-FR-L ZT -FAN-FS ZT-TDP-FR-L ZV-LOOP-GR-LAMBDA ZV-LOOP-PC-LAMBDA ZV-LOOP-SC-LAMBDA ZV-LOOP -WR-LANBDA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER SU CCW MDP 1A1 Unavailable due CCW MDP 1A2 Unavailable due CCW Train A Unavailable due Probability that a LOOP is a ISLOCA IE 2-CKV HPI interfac ISLOCA IE 2-CKV LPI interfac RHR pipe ruptures.
Large Loss of Coolant Accide Loss of Essential ac Bus A i Loss of Component Cooling Wa LOSS OF CONDENSOR HEAT SIN Loss Of DC Bus EDF Initiatin LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITI LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Loss of Nuclear Service Wate LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MEDIUM LOCA REACTOR VESSEL RUPTURE INIT*
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTU SMALL LOCA STUCK-OPEN PZR TRANS IENT OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS
- 1. OE÷000
- 8. OE-003
- 8. OE-003
+0. OE÷000 5. 8E-001 4. 6E-006
- 9. OE-003
- 4. OE-004
- 9. OE-002 8. OE-004 8. OE-003 1. OE-001
- 4. OE-004 3. 6E-002
- 4. OE-005
- 1. OE-007
- 4. OE-003
- 4. OE-004 3. OE-003 7. OE-001
- 5. 3E-001
.3
- 1. OE-002 4. 8E-003 l.OE+000 TRUE
+0.OE+000 IGNORE
+0.OE+000 IGNORE
+0.OE+000 IGNORE l.OE+000 TRUE
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0.OE+000
+0.OE+000
+0.
E+000
+0. OE+000
+0.OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000 3.1E-001 2.5E-002 2.5E-002
- 5. OE-004
- 5. OE-004 l.OE+000 TRUE l.OE+000 TRUE
- 8. OE-003 9.1lE-002 8.4E-003 3.2E-003
- 1. 3E-003 7.1E-064 6.3E-004
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
+0. OE+000 SAFETY VALVE TO TO TO TO TO RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER OF OF OF OF OF PORVs/SRVs Open during LOOP PORVs/SRVs Open during STATI PORV NC32B Fails to Reclose PORV NC34A Fails to Reclose DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RU HVAC FAN FAILS TO RUN HVAC FAN FAILS TO RUN HVAC FAN FAILS TO START TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO GRID RELATED LOSS OF OFFSITE PLANT CENTERED LOSS OF OFFSI SWITCHYARD CENTERED LOSS OF WEATHER RELATED LOSS OF OFFS 2006/10/13 14:25:48 page 1
. 2006/10/13 1ý:25:48 page 1
SEQUENCE PROBABILITIES Truncation :Cummulative : 100.0%
Individual:
2.0%
Event Tree Name LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP SEQUENCE LOGIC Event Tree Sequence Name LOOP 21-74 Sequence Name 21-74 13 21-77 21-11 19 11 CCDP
%Cont Logic
/RPS EPS
/AFW-B PORV-B OPR-01H DGR-01H LOOP 13
/ RPS
/AFW-L HPI-L
/ EPS PORV-L OPR- 01H-REC LOOP 21-77 LOOP 21-11
/ RPS AFW-B DGR-02H
/ RPS
/AFW-B SSF-SBO
/BP1
/DC-SHED DGR- 04H
/RPS AFW-L
/OPR-02H-REC
/ RPS
/AFW-L
/ PORV-B
/ RSD
/ BP2 OPR-04H-
/ EPS FAB-L HPR
/ EPS PORV-L OPR-02H LOOP 19 LOOP 11 2006/10/13142:8pg 2
14: 2 5 : 48 page 2
Fault Tree NameDeciin Description AFW-B AFW-L BP1 BP2 DC-SHED DGR-01H DGR-02H-DGR-04H EPS FAB-L HPI-L HPR HPR-L OPR-01H OPR- 0 H-REC OPR-02H OPR-02H-REC OPR-04H PORV-B PORV-L RPS RSD SSF-SBO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER-SBO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER-LOOP RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY SHED DC LOADS TO EXTEND BATT LIFE TO 4 HOURS OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 2 HR)
DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)
EMERGENCY POWER EMERGENCY POWER HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFESITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS FAILURE TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 HRS (AFW + F&B)
OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)
PORVs ARE CLOSED-SBO PORVs ARE CLOSED-LOOP REACTOR SHUTDOWN RAPID SECONDARY DEPRESS STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY SEAL COOLING SEQUENCE CUT SETS Truncation:
Cuinmulative: 100.0%
Individual:
2.0%
Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
'21-74 CCDP:
4.6E-005 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 6.6E-006 3.7E-006 2. 6E-006 2. 3E-006 2. 1E-006 2. 1E-006 1.2E-006 14.25 7.97 5.58 4.96 4.63 4.63 2.57 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU1 PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-XX-RR1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-FAN-CF-FRU`1 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-CF-FSU1
.EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-TM-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H
.EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-IA EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NROlH PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-'DGN-FR-1B
,EPS-DGN-XX-RRlH PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-TM-1B EPS-DGN-XX-RlH PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN~-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-FS-1B 2006/10/13142:8pg 3
14: 2 5 : 48 page 3
- 1. 2E-006
- 1. OE-006 1.OE-006 1
- OE-006 1. OE-006 9. 8E-007 9.8E-007 2.57 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.14 2.14 OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 11-EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DCN-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 11-EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DCN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 15 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS -FAN-ER-EXiAl OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 15 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1lH EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A2 OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 15 ESF-XHE-XL-NRO lH-EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XI-E-XL-NRO 15 EPS-XH-E-XL-NRO1H EPS-DCN-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 15 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO 15 EPS-DGN-TM-1A OEP-X5E-XL-NR015 EPS -DCN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DCN-XX-R15 PPR-SRV-OO-NC3 4A EPS-FAN--FR--EX1B1 EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-OO-NC3 4A ESF-DGN-FR-lB EFS-DGN-XX-R15 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A ESF-DGN-FR-lB EFS-DGN-XX-R15.
FPR-SRV-OO-NC3 4A EPS-FAN-FR-SX1B2 SFS-DON-XX-R15 PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A ESF-DON-TM-lB PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EFS-DON-FS-1B CCDF:
2.9E-005 Event Tree:
Sequence:
LOOP 13 CCDF
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 6.4E-006 3 O0E-006 2.6E-006 2
.6E-006 1.2E-006 1.2E-006 5.9E-007 22.34 10.30 9.08 9.08 4.26 4.26 2.06 FFR-SRV-0OO-NC3 4A OEF-X55-XL-NRO 15 SFS-DON-XX-R15 FFPR-SRV-OO-NC34A OEF-X5E-XL-NRO15 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEF-XSS-XL-NRO15 FFR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEF-XHS-XL-NRO15 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEF-XHS-XL-NRO 15 CCW-MDF-TM-1B2 FFR-SRV-OO-NC3 4A OEP-XSE-XL-NRO 15 CCW-MDF-RUNA1A2 FFR-SRV-00-NC3 4A CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EFS-DON-FR-1A CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EFS-DON-FS-1A CCW-TRN-TM-TBAINB EFS-FAN-FR-EX1A2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EFS-FAN-FR-SX1A1 CCW-TRN-TM-TBAINB ESF-DON-FR-lA CCW-MDF -RUNA1A2 EFS-DON-XX-R15 ESF-DON-FR-lA CCW-MDF-TM-1B1 SFS-DON-XX-R15 OEF-X55-XL-NRO 15 SPS-MOV-CC-1RN2 32A CCDF:
2.5E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
21-77 CCDF
% Cut Set Cut Set Events
- 1. 5E-007 5.88 EPS-DON-C F-FRU1 EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H 2006/10/1314:5:8pg 4
14: 25: 48 page 4
8.2E-008 5.7E-008 5 3E-008 5. 1E-008 3.29 2.30 2.13 2.05 AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DGN-XX-RR2H EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H AFW-XI-E-XM-CR EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-FR-1B OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DCN-CF-FRU1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-XX-RR2I-EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H AFW-XH-E-XM-CR OEP-XHE-XL-NR0 2H EPS-FAN-CF-FRU1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DGN-FR-1A AFW-XH-E-XM--CR EPS-DGN-XX-RR2H EPS-XH-E-XL-NR02H SSF-DGN-FR-DGN EPS-DGN-CF-FSU1 OEP-XH-E-XL-NR02H CCDP:
2.1E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
21-11 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 2. 9E-007
- 1. 6E-007
- 1. 1E-007
- 1. OE-007 9
E-008 9.4E-008
- 4. 6E-008 4. 6E-008 14.16 7.91 5.54 4.93 4.60 4.60 2.56 2.56 2.25 2.25 EPS-DON-CF-FRUl OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE7XM-SYSL EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H-OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H-SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-FR-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-RR4H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF -XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-TM-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-FR-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H-EPS-XH-E-XL-NR04H EPS-DON-FR-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-XI-I-XL-NRO4H
.EPS-DON-FS-1B
/RCS-MVDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-FAN-FR-EX1B2
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2
.EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-XH-E-XL-NR04H EPS-XHE-XL-NR0 4H-
/ RC S-MDP -LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-RR4H-EPS-FAN-CF-FRU1
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS -DON-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF -XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-CF-FSU1
/ RCS -MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DON-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-TM-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF -XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FS-1A OEP-XH-E-XL-NR04H-SSF-XH-E-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XH-E-XM-SYSL EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A2 2006/10/13142548pg 5
14 : 25 : 48 page 5
- 4. 6E-008
- 4. 6E-008 4.4E-008
- 4. 4E-008 EPS-DGN--FR-1B
/RCS-MDP--LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H 2.25 EPS-XHE-XL--NR04H EPS-FAN-FR-EX1B1
/RCS-MDP--LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H 2.25 EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-ER-iB
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DON-XX-R4H 2.12 EPS-XHE-XL-NR0 4H-
.EPS-DGN-TM-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 2.12 EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-FS-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XI-E-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR0 4H-SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-TM-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL
.CCDP:
1.8E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:-
19 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 3.0 0E-007 2. 8E-007 2. 8E-007 7. 1E-008 6.5E-008
- 6. 5E-008 5. !E-008
- 4. 7E-008
- 4. 3E-008 4.3E-008 16.91 15.48 15.48 3.94 3.61 3.61 2.82 2.60 2.58 2.58 2.38 2.38 AFW-XRE-XM-CR AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-MDP--RUNB1B2 AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-MDP-RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-FS-TDP AFW-TDP-FS-TDP CCW-MDP-RUNB1B2 AFW-TDP-FS-TDP CCW-MDP -RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-TM-TDP AFW-TDP-FR-TDP AFW-TDP-TM-TDP CCW-MDP-RUNB1B2 AFW-TDP-TM-TDP CCW-MDP -RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP--FR-TDP CCW-MDP -RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP CCW-MDP--RUNB1B2 CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP -CF -FSALL CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP -CF -FSALIJ CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCDP:
1.8E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
11 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 1. 5E-007 8.37.
PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DGN-.XX-R2H EPS-DGN--FR-1A RNR-MDP-TM-1B 2006/10/1314248pe 6
14: 2 5 : 48 page 6
,2.32 2.09 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DGN-XX-R2H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL--NR02H PPR-SRV-00O-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H HPR-XHE-XM-RECIRC EPS-DGN-FR-lA EPS-DGN-XX-R2H-HPR-XHE-XM-REC IRC EPS -DON-TM-lA PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DGN-XX-R2H EPS-DGN-FS-lA RHR-MDP-TM-lB EPS-DGN-FR-1A RHR-HTX-TM-HTXlB EPS-FAN-FR-EXlA1 RH-R-MDP-TM-lB EPS-FAN-FR-EXlA2 RHR-MDP-TM-lB PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H PPR-SRV-00O-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DGN-FR-lA RHR-MDP-FS-lB BASIC EVENTS (Cut Sets Only)
Event Name Description AFW-TDP-FR-TDP AFW-TDP-FS-TDP AFW-TDP-TM-TDP AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-RUNAlA2 CCW-MDP-RUNBlB2 CCW-MDP-TM-iBi CCW-MDP-TM-1B2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-DGN-CF-FR~jl EPS-DGN-CF-FSUl EPS-DGN-FR-lA EPS-DGN-FR-lB EPS-DGN-FS-lA EPS-DGN-FS-lB EPS -DON-TM-lA EPS-DGN-TM-lB EPS-DGN-XX-RlH EPS-DGN-XX-R2H EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-DGN-XX-RRlH EPS-DGN-XX-RR2H EPS-DGN-XX-RR4I-EPS-FAN-CF-FRUl EPS-FAN-FR-EXlAl EPS-FAN-FR-EXlA2 EPS-FAN-FR-EXlBl AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN (INCLUDI AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO START (INCLU AFW TDP UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENAN OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE AND CONTROL AFW FL CCF OF CCW HTXS lA/lB CCF OF ALL CCWS TO START FRACTION OF FRACTION OF CCW MDP iBi CCW MDP 1B2 CCW TRAIN B CCF OF UNIT CCF OF UNIT TIME lAl AND 1A2 ARE RUNNING TIME CCW MDP iBi AND 1B2 ARE INIT UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M (PSA) 1 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 1 DIESEL GENERATORS TO START DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR 1A lB lA lB 1A lB FAILS TO RUN FAILS TO RUN FAILS TO START FAILS TO START Curr Prob
- 4. 6E-003 7.OE-003
- 5. OE-003 3.OE-002
- 1. OE-005
- 1. 9E-005 5.OE-00l 5.OE-00l
- 8. OE-003
- 8. OE-003 2.1lE-002 3.OE-004 1.OE-004 1.1lE-002 1.1lE-002
- 5. OE-003
- 5. OE-003
- 9. OE-003
- 9. OE-003
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000 1.
E+000 1.OE+000 1.OE+000 1.OE+000 1.7E-004 4.4E-003
- 4. 4E-003
- 4. 4E-003 UNAVAILABLE UNAVAILABLE CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CCF OF UNIT FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR EDO-FR EDO-FR EDO-FR EDO-FR EDO-FR EDO-FR DUE TO DUE TO OPR IN OPR IN OPR IN EDO-FR EDO-FR EDO-FR TEST A TEST A 1 HOUR 2 HOUR 4 HOUR
" OPR
" OPR OPR GENERATOR EXHAUST FANS TO FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE OF OF OF GENERATOR 1A FAN lAl GENERATOR lA FAN 1A2 GENERATOR lB FAN iBi TO RUN TO RUN TO RUN 2006/10/1314248pg 7
14 : 2 5 : 48 page 7
Event Name EventNameDescription EPS-FAN-FR-EX1B2 EPS-MOV-CC-lRN2 32A EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H HPR-XHE-XM-REC IRC OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 RHR-HTX-TM-HTX1B RHR-MDP-FS--lB RHR-MDP-TM-1B SSF-DGN-FR-DGN SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR lB FAN 1B2 TO RUN FAILURE OF NSR/EPS MOV RN232A TO OPEN OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS TO TO TO TO TO TO TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL INITIATE HPR RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN IN IN IN 1
2 4
Curr Prob
- 4. 4E-003
- 1. OE-003 7.7E-001 6.5E-001 4.8E-001
- 2. OE-003 3.1E-001 2.5E-002 2.5E-002 9.1lE-002 2.OE-0O1 2.5E-003
- 1. 5E-003
- 6. 0E-003
- 1. 1E-002
- 1. QE-00l PORV NC34A FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING.0 RHR HTX-1B UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M RH-R MDP lB FAILS TO START RHR MDP lB UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M FAILURE OF SSF DIESEL GENERATOR TO RUN OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND ALIGN SSF DURING 2 006/10/13 1:5:8pg 14: 25: 48 page 8
CATAWBA (Unit 2) LOOP Initiating Event -
Final ASP Analysis Code Ver 7:26 Fain CATA_3P Model Ver 2006/03/10 User INEEL Init Event: IE-LOOP Ev ID: U2-LOOP-BEST-ESTIMATE Total CCDP:
5.8E-005 Desc : Best estimate -
W/ TM, credit recovery at 1 h (0.3)
BASIC EVENT CHANGES Event Name Description Base Prob Curr Prob Type AFW-XHE-XL-SUMPPUMPS CCW-MDP-TM-lAl CCW-MDP-TM-1A2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINA DUAL -UNIT-LOOP IE-ISL-HPI IE-ISL-LPI IE-ISL-RHR IE-LLOCA IE-LOACA IE-LOCCW IE-L;OCHS IE-LODCEDF IE-LOIA IE-LOMFW IE-LONSR IE-LOOP IE-MLOCA
,IE-RXVRUPT IE-SGTR IE-SLOCA IE -SORV IE-TRANS OEP-XHE-XL-NROlH OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H OEP-XHE-XL-NR0 6H OEP-XHE-XL-NR24H PPR-SRV-CO-L PPR-SRV-CO-SBO PPR-SRV-00-NC32B PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A PPR-SRV-00-NC3 6B ZT-DGN-FR-L ZT -FAN-FR-E
- ZT-FAN-FR-L ZT-FAN-FS ZT-TDP-FR-L ZV-LOOP-GR-LAMBDA ZV-LOOP-PC-LAMBDA OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER SU CCW MDP 1A1 Unavailable due CCW MDP 1A2 Unavailable due CCW Train A Unavailable due Probability that a LOOP is a ISLOCA IE 2-CKV HPI interfac ISLOCA IE 2-CKV LPI interfac RHR pipe ruptures Large Loss of Coolant Accide Loss of Essential ac Bus A i Loss of Component Cooling Wa LOSS OF CONDENSOR HEAT SIN Loss of DC Bus EDF Initiatin LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITI LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER Loss of Nuclear Service Wate LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MEDIUM LOCA REACTOR VESSEL RUPTURE INIT STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTU
- 1. OE+000 8.OE-003 8.OE-003
+0. OE+000 5. 8E-001 4. 6E-006
- 4. 6E-006 7.9E-006 5.OE-006
- 9. OE-003
- 4. OE-004 9. OE-002
- 8. OE-004 8. OE-003
- 1. OE-001
- 4. OE-004 3.6E-002 4.OE-005
- 1. OE-007 4. OE-003 4. OE-004
.3
.OE-003 7.OE-001
- 1. 8E-002
- 1. 6E-001
- 3.7E-001 1. 6E-003
- 1. 6E-003
- 1. 6E-003
- 1. 8E-002
- 1. 9E-002 2. IE-003
- 1. OE-003
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0.OE+000
+0.OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000 IGNORE IGNORE IGNORE TRUE SMALL LOCA STUCK-OPEN PZR TRANS IENT OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS OPERATOR FAILS SAFETY VALVE TO TO TO TO TO RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER RECOVER OF OF OF OF OF
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000 1. OE+000
+0. OE+000
.+.OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000 3.1lE-001 2. 5E-002 2. 5E-002
- 5. OE-004
- 5. OE-004 l.OE+000 TRUE l.OE+000 TRUE
- 1. 6E-003
- 5. 6E-002
- 1. 6E-003 8.4E-003 3.2E-003
- 1. 3E-003 7.1E-004
- 6. 3E-004
+0. OE+000
+0. OE+000 PORVs/SRVs Open during LOOP PORVs/SRVs Open during STATI PORV NC32B Fails to Reclose PORV NC34A Fails to Reclose PORV NC36B Fails to Reclose DIESEL GENERATOR FAILS TO RU HVAC FAN FAILS TO RUN HVAC FAN FAILS TO RUN HVAC FAN FAILS TO START TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO GRID RELATED LOSS OF OFFSITE PLANT CENTERED LOSS OF OFFSI 2006/10/13 14:43:31 200/1013 4:4:31page 1
ZV-LOOP-SC-LAMBDA ZV-LOOP-WR--LAMBDA SWITCHYARD CENTERED LOSS OF WEATHER RELATED LOSS OF OFFS l.OE-002 l.0E+000 4.8E-003 +0.OE+000 SEQUENCE PROBABILITIES Truncation :
Cuinmulative : 100.0%
Individual 2.0%
CCDP Event Tree Name Sequence Name
%Cont LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP LOOP 2 1-74 13 2 1-11 19 21-77 20 2. 7E-005
/ RPS
/AFW-B OPR-0 11-EPS PORV-B DGR-0O1H LOOP 13
/ RPS
/AFW-L HPI-L
/ EPS PORV-L OPR-01H-REC LOOP 21-11
/ RPS
/AFW-B SSF -SBO
/BP1
/DC-SHED DGR-04H LOOP 19 LOOP 2 1-77
/ RPS AFW-L
/OPR-02H-REC
/ RPS AFW-B DGR-02H
/ PORV-B
/ RSD
/ BP2 OPR- 04H
/ EPS FAB-L LOOP 20 Fault Tree Name Description AFW-B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER-SBO 2006/10/13144:1pg 2
14:43:31 page 2
AFW-L Bpi BP2 DC-SHED DGR-O1H DGR-02H DGR-04H EPS FAB-L HPI-L HPR OPR-O1H OPR-O1H-REC OPR-02H, OPR-02H-REC OPR-04H PORV-B PORV-L RPS RSD SSF-SBO AUXILIARY FEEDWATER-LOOP RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY SHED DC LOADS TO EXTEND BATT LIFE TO 4 HOURS.
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN 1 HOUR DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 2 HR)
DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)
EMERGENCY POWER EMERGENCY POWER HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 HOUR OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS FAILURE TO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 HRS (AFW + F&B)
OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)
PORVs ARE CLOSEP-SBO PORVs ARE CLOSED-LOOP REACTOR SHUTDOWN RAPID SECONDARY DEPRESS STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY SEAL COOLING SEQUENCE CUT SETS Truncation:
Curnmulative: 100.0%
Individual:
2.-0%
Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
21-74 CCDP:
2.7E-005 CCDP
- 4. OE-006 2. 3E-006
- 1. 6E-006
- 1. 3E-006 7.3E-007
% Cut. Set Cut Set Events 14.-90 8.33 5.83 5.19 4.84 4.84 2.69 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU1 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-XX-RR1H EPS-XI-E-XL-NRO1H EPS-FAN-CF-FRU1 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-CF-FSU1 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS -DGN-TM-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NROlH EPS-XHE-XL-NROlH EPS-DGN-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO lH EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-XX-RR1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-TM-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H 2006/10/13144:1pg 3
14:43:31 page 3
7. 3E-007 6.
E-007
- 6. 4E-007
- 6. 4E-007
- 6. 4E-007
- 6. OE-007
- 6. OE-007 2.69 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.37 2.23 2.23 EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A1 OEP-X-HE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XH-E-XL-NRO1H EPS-FAN--FR-EX1A2 OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-TM-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-XHE-XL-NRO1H EPS-DGN-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FS-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-FAN-FR-EX1B1 EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A EPS-FAN-FR-EX1B2 EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-FS-1B PPR-SRV-00-NC34A EPS-DGN-TM-1B CCDP:
1.8E-005 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
13 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 4.OE-006 1.8E-006 1. 6E-006 1.6E-006 7.5E-007 7.5E-007 3.7E-007 22.53 10.39 9.15 9.15 4.29 4:'29 2.08 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H EPS-DGN-XX-R1H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO 1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1I-PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H CCW-MDP-RUNA1A2 PPR-SRV-00-NC3 4A OEP-XHE-XL-NRO1H CCW-MDP--TM--1B2 PPR-SRV-00-NC34A CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-DGN-FR-1A CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-DGN-FS-1A CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A1 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-DGN--FR-1A CCW-MDP-TM-1B1 EPS-DGN-XX-R1H EPS-DGN-FR-1A CCW-MDP-RUNA1A2 EPS-DGN-XX--R1H OEP-XH-E-XL-NRO 1H EPS-MOV-CC-1RN2 32A CCDP:
2.5E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
21-11 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 2. 9E-007 11.52 EPS-DGN-CF-FRU1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H
/ RCS -MDP-LK-BP2 2006/10/13 14 : 43 : 3 1 200/1013 4:4:31page 4
- 9. E-008
- 9. 4E-008
- 5. 2E-008 5.2E-008 6.44 4.51 4.01 3.74 3.74 2.08 2.08 SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS -XHE-XL-NR04H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-XHE-XL-NR0 4H-EPS-DCN-FR-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-EP2 EPS -DGN--XX-RR4H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H-OEP-XH-E-XL-NR04H-SSF-XHE-XM--SYSL EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DON-FR-1B
/ RC S-MDP -LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H-EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-TM-1B
/ RC S-MDP -LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-XHE-XL-NR04H EPS-DGN-FR-1B
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H-EPS-XH-E-XL-NR04H EPS-DON-ES-iB
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DGN-XX-R4H-EPS-DON-XX-RR4H-EPS-FAN-CF-FRU1
/RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 EPS-DCN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XH-E-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-CF--FSU1
/RCS-MDP-LK--BP2 EPS -DON-TM-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H-SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XH-E-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-FS-1A OEP-XH-E-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL EPS-DGN-ER-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL CCDP:
1.8E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
19 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 3. OE-007 2.8E-007 2.8E-007 7. 1E-008 6. 5E-008 6.5E-008 5.1E-008 4.7E-008
- 4. 3E-008
- 4. 3E-008 17.41 15.94 15.94 4.06 3.72 3.72 2.90 2.68 2.66 2.66 2.45 2.45 AFW-XHE-XM-CR AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-MDP-RUNB1B2 AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-MDP -RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-FS-TDP AFW-TDP-FS-TDP CCW-MDP -RUNB1B2 AFW-TDP-FSLTDP CCW-MDP-RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-TM-TDP AFW-TDP-FR-TDP AFW-TDP-TM-TDP CCW-MDP-RUNB1B2 AFW-TDP-TM-TDP CCW-MDP-RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP CCW-MDP -RUNA1A2 AFW-TDP-FR-TDP CCW-H-TX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-HTX-CF -HTXS CCW-MDF-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-H-TX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL 2006/10/1314431pg 5
14: 43: 31 page 5
CCW-MDP-RUNB1B2 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
21-77 CCDP:
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 1. 5E-007 8.2E-008 5. 7E-008
- 5. IE-008
- 4. 7E-008
- 4. 7E-008
- 3. E-008 9.98 5.58 3.90 3.47 3.24 3.24 2.33 EPS-DON-CE-FRUl AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DON-XX-RR2H EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DON-FR-lB OEP-XH-E-XL-NR0 2H-EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-XH-E-XkL-NRO2H EPS-DON-TM-1B OEP-XHE-XL-NR0 2H-EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-FR-1B OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS -DON-CF -FRUl AFW-TDP-FS-TDP EPS-DON-XX-RR2H EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-FAN-CF-FRU1 OEP-XH-E-XL-NR0 2H EPS-DON-FR-1A AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DON-XX-RR2H EPS-DON-CF-FSU1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS -DON-FR-lA AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DON-XX-R2H EPS -DON-TM-lA AFW-XHE-XM-CR EPS-DON-XX-R2H EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H CCDP:
1.2E-006 Event Tree: LOOP Sequence:
20 CCDP
% Cut Set Cut Set Events 1.7E-007
- 6. 9E-008 6. OE-008
- 4. OE-008 2.9E-008 2.6E-008 13.97 6.44 5.67 5.67 4.87 3.26 2.33 2.15 EPS-DON-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-XX-R2H EPS-DON-FS-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A2 OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-FAN-FR-EX1A1 OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPI -XHE-XM-FB AFW-MDP-CF-FSAB EPS -DON-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-XX-R2H EPS -DON-FR-lA OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-XX-R2H EPS-DON-FR-1A OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-DON-XX-R2H AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-TRN-TM--TRAINB AFW-XHE-XN-CR CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB AFW-XHE-XM-CR AFW-TDP-FS-TDP CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB AFW-TDP-TM-TDP CCW-TRN-TM-TPAINB AFW-TDP-FR-TDP CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB 2 006/10/13 1:33 ae 14: 43 : 3 1 page.
6
BASIC EVENTS (Cut Sets Only)
Event Name Description AFW-MDP-CF-FSAB AFW-TDP-FR-TDP AFW-TDP-FS-TDP AFW-TDP-TM-TDP AFW-XHE-XM-CR CCW-HTX-CF-HTXS CCW-MDP-CF-FSALL CCW-MDP-RUNAlA2 CCW-MDP-RUNBlB2 CCW-MDP-TM-1Bl CCW-MDP-TM-1B2 CCW-TRN-TM-TRAINB EPS-DGN-CF-FRUl EPS-DGN-CF-FSU1 EPS-DGN-FR-lA EPS-DGN-FR-1B EPS-DGN-FS-lA EPS-DGN-FS-lB EPS-DGN-TM-1A EPS-DGN-TM-lB EPS-DGN-XX-R1H EPS-DGN-XX-R2H EPS-DGN-XX-R4H EPS-DGN-XX--RRlH EPS-DGN-XX-RR2H EPS-DGN-XX-RR4I-EPS -FAN-CF -FRUl EPS-FAN-FR-EXlAl EPS-FAN-FR-EXlA2 EPS -FAN-FR-EXIBi EPS -FAN-FR-EXlB2 EPS-MOV-CC-1RN232A EPS-XHE-XL-NROlH EPS-XHE-XL-NR02H EPS-XHE-XL--NR0 4H-HPI -XHE-XM-FB OEP-XHE-XL-NROlH OEP-XHE-XL-NR02H OEP-XHE-XL-NR04H PPR-SRV-00-NC34A RCS-MDP-LK-BP2 SSF-XHE-XM-SYSL CCF OF AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMPS TO START AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO RUN (INCLUDI AFW TURBINE DRIVEN PUMP FAILS TO START (INCLU AFW TDP UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TEST AND MAINTENAN OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE AND CONTROL AFW FL CCF OF CCW HTXS lA/lB CCF OF ALL CCWS TO START FRACTION OF FRACTION OF CCW MDP 1B1 CCW MDP 1B2 CCW TRAIN B CCF OF UNIT CCF OF UNIT TIME lAl AND 1A2 ARE RUNNING TIME CCW MDP 1B1 AND 1B2 ARE INIT UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M UNAVAILABLE DUE TO T & M (PSA) 1 DIESEL GENERATORS TO RUN 1 DIESEL GENERATORS TO START DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR 1A 1B 1A 1B 1A lB FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS TO TO TO TO RUN RUN START START UNAVAILABLE UNAVAILABLE CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CONVOLUTION CCF OF UNIT FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR FACTOR DIESEL FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR FOR EDG-FR EDG-FR EDG-FR EDG-FR EDG-FR EDG-FR DUE TO DUE TO OPR IN OPR IN OPR IN EDG-FR EDG-FR EDG-FR TEST A TEST A 1 HOUR 2 HOUR 4 HOUR
" OPR
" OPR
" OPR Curr Prob 9.9E-005
- 4. 6E-003 7.OE-003
- 5. OE-003 3.OE-002
- 1. OE-005
- 1. 9E-005
- 5. OE-001
- 5. QE-O0i
- 8. OE-003 8.OE-003 2.1E-002 3.OE-004
- 1. OE-004
- 1. 1E-002
- 1. 1E-002 5.OE-003
- 5. 0E-003 9.OE-003
- 9. OE-003
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
- 1. OE+000
- 1. 7E-004
- 4. 4E-003
- 4. 4E-003 4.4E-003 4.4E-003
- 1. OE-003 7.7E-001 6.5SE-001 4.8E-001 2.OE-002 3.1E-001 2.5E-002 2.5E-002
- 5. 6E-002 2.OE-001
- 1. OE-00l GENERATOR EXHAUST FANS TO FAILURE FAILURE FAILURE FAILUTRE OF OF OF OF DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL
- DIESEL, GENERATOR GENERATOR GENERATOR rGENERATOR 1A FAN 1A1 1A FAN 1A2 lB FAN 1B1 lB FAN 1B2 TO TO TO TO RUN RUN RUN RUN FAILURE OF NSR/EPS MOV RN232A TO OPEN OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR OPERATOR FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS FAILS TO TO TO TO TO TO TO RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN RECOVER EMERGENCY DIESEL IN INITIATE FEED AND BLEED COO RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 1 RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 2 RECOVER OFFSITE POWER IN 4 PORV NC34A FAILS TO RECLOSE AFTER OPENING RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY (BINDING/POPPING 0 OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND ALIGN SSF DURING 2 006/10/1314431pg 7
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