ML060750831
| ML060750831 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2006 |
| From: | Clay Johnson NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A |
| To: | Blevins M TXU Power |
| References | |
| IR-05-005 | |
| Download: ML060750831 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000445/2005005
Text
March 14, 2006
Mike Blevins, Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
TXU Power
ATTN: Regulatory Affairs
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
SUBJECT: ERRATA FOR COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2005005 AND
Dear Mr. Blevins:
Please replace the Summary of Findings and page 11 of the Report Details in NRC Inspection
Report 05000445/2005005 and 05000446/2005005, dated February 13, 2006, with the attached
revised pages. The following changes are necessary to (1) delete the sentence in the
Summary of Findings for the first finding "This finding has a problem identification and
resolution crosscutting aspect because it was caused by lack of effective corrective actions";
(2) delete several phrases and words located in the Summary of Findings (fourth finding, both
paragraphs) and (3) delete several phrases and words in Section 1R08.1, (Description and
Enforcement paragraphs) to clarify the issues.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them
with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Claude Johnson, Chief
Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-445, 50-446
TXU Power
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Enclosure:
Errata pages for NRC Inspection Report 05000445/2005005 and 05000446/2005005
cc w/enclosure:
Fred W. Madden, Director
Regulatory Affairs
TXU Power
P.O. Box 1002
Glen Rose, TX 76043
George L. Edgar, Esq.
Morgan Lewis
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004
Terry Parks, Chief Inspector
Texas Department of Licensing
and Regulation
Boiler Program
P.O. Box 12157
Austin, TX 78711
The Honorable Walter Maynard
Somervell County Judge
P.O. Box 851
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Richard A. Ratliff, Chief
Bureau of Radiation Control
Texas Department of Health
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756-3189
Environmental and Natural
Resources Policy Director
Office of the Governor
P.O. Box 12428
Austin, TX 78711-3189
Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
Austin, TX 78711-3326
TXU Power
3
-3-
Susan M. Jablonski
Office of Permitting, Remediation and Registration
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
MC-122
P.O. Box 13087
Austin, TX 78711-3087
Technological Services Branch
Chief
FEMA Region VI
800 North Loop 288
Federal Regional Center
Denton, Texas 76201-3698
TXU Power
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Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (DBA)
Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ1)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
Regional State Liaison Officer (WAM)
NSIR/DIPM/EPHP (REK)
Only inspection reports to the following:
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
ROPreports
CP Site Secretary (ESS)
SUNSI Review Completed: __CEJ ADAMS: / Yes
G No Initials: CEJ___
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive
/ Non-Sensitive
R:\\_REACTORS\\_CPSES\\2005\\CP2005-05 errata.wpd
RIV:C:DRP/A
CEJohnson
/RA/
3/14/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
Revised Pages for NRC Integrated Inspection
Report 05000445/2005005 AND 05000446/2005005
Enclosure
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000445/2005005, 05000446/2005005; 09/24/2005-12/31/2005; Comanche Peak Steam
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Inservice Inspection Activities, Event Follow-up, and Other
Activities
This report covered a 3-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors, two reactor
inspectors, one operations engineer, one emergency preparedness inspector, one regional
project engineer, and one consultant. Four Green noncited violations were identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for
which the SDP does not apply may be Green or may be assigned a severity level after NRC
management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, ?Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3,
dated July 2000.
A.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
C
Green. A Green self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to implement the maintenance procedure to
properly install a check valve in the Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 lubrication
system. On October 20, 2005, the diesel generator shutdown for lack of lube oil
to the turbo-chargers after 60 seconds during a post maintenance test. The lube
oil strainer check valve had been installed backwards during the previous
refueling outage but the opposite strainer had been in service for the ensuing 18
months. The check valve was reinstalled properly, the flow direction of similar
check valves verified, and the damaged turbo-chargers replaced.
The violation was more than minor because one of two lube oil strainers for the
turbo-chargers was incapable of flow, thus affecting the reliability of the diesel
generator. The finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect because
the failure to follow the procedure caused the diesel generator failure. However,
the error was committed in April 2004. The violation is of very low safety
significance because CPSES operating experience indicated that the lube oil
strainers had never been swapped outside of an outage, and then only to
balance run time on the equipment. The significance determination process
screened this out as Green because it only affected the mitigating systems
cornerstone and it did not cause an actual loss of safety function of a single train
nor a loss of safety function that contributed to external event initiated core
damage sequences. This event was entered into the corrective action program
as Smart Form 2005-004233 (Section 4OA3.1).
Enclosure
-4-
C
Green. A Green self-revealing noncited violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVI
was identified for failure to implement effective corrective actions for a significant
condition adverse to quality. Specifically, station service water Pump 1-01 was
returned to service on October 20, 2005, and after two hours of operation tripped
on an electrical fault on Phase C of the motor leads. The degraded electrical
condition of the motor lead had been identified during restoration from the pump
maintenance, but the actions taken to ensure the pump was reliable failed.
Phase C of the motor leads was replaced prior to returning the pump to service.
The failure to take effective corrective actions was the performance deficiency.
The violation was more than minor because the pump was returned to service
with a degraded motor lead. At the time of the event, Unit 1 was defueled and
did not require an operable station service water pump. However, Unit 2 was
required by Technical Specifications 3.7.8 to have at least one operable station
service water pump from the opposite unit. With Unit 2 at 100 percent power, a
significance determination was performed using Appendix A of Manual
Chapter 0609. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, was not an
actual loss of safety function for a single Unit 2 train, did not involve equipment
or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe
weather initiating event, and did not involve the total loss of any safety function
that contributed to external event initiated sequences. The cause of this finding
is related to the crosscutting aspects of problem identification and resolution.
The event was entered into the corrective action program as Smart
Form 2005-004220 (Section 4OA3.2).
Green. A Green self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1
was identified, after both the alternate and emergency power supplies to a
6.9 kV safeguards bus failed to provide power to the bus within the time
assumed in the accident analysis. On October 19, 2004, an unplanned loss of
the preferred offsite power caused the Unit 2, Train B, 6.9 kV safeguards bus to
de-energize. A degraded Agastat relay delayed the normal power supply
breaker from opening for 30 seconds, which delayed powering the bus from the
alternate offsite AC power supply or the emergency diesel generator. This issue
had crosscutting aspects in the area of problem identification and resolution
because the licensee previously identified that aged Agastat relays were
unreliable and should be replaced if they were in service greater than 12 years.
The failed relay had been in service for 16 years.
The violation was more than minor because it impacted the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone objective of availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix AProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 0609,</br></br>Appendix A" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for
At-Power Situations, the finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance because the likelihood of a medium or large break loss of coolant
accident coincident with a loss of offsite power, which are the only conditions
where the deficiency would cause a non-negligible change in the baseline risk
Enclosure
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profile, is less than or equal to 1E-6 per year. Therefore the change in core
damage frequency will be less than 1E-6 per year. The licensee captured the
issue in their corrective action program as Smart Form SMF-2004-003528
(Section 4OA5.2).
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
Green. A Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI
(Corrective Action) was identified, in that licensee personnel failed to take
effective corrective action for a condition adverse to quality. Specifically,
licensee welders repaired a body-to-bonnet leak on Valve 1-8702B, Residual
Heat Removal Pump 1-02 hot-leg recirculation isolation valve, in April 2004 by
installing a seal weld. The valve required additional repair in October 2005 for a
body-to-bonnet leak.
The failure to take effective corrective action for a body-to-bonnet leak on
Valve 1-8702 B was a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor
because it is similar to Example 3.g. of Appendix E of Manual Chapter 0612
because the leakage reoccurred. The inspectors found this finding screened out
of the Phase 1 process as Green. The inspectors considered this finding to be
of very low safety significance because the event was leakage and not a line
break. The cause of this finding is related to the crosscutting aspects of problem
identification and resolution. (Section 1R08.1)
B.
Licensee Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
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because of evidence of boron leakage since 1995. The valves were 2-8378B, Reactor
Coolant System Loop 2-04 charging upstream check valve; 2-8379A, and 2-8379B,
Reactor Coolant System Loop 2-01 charging system downstream check valves.
Licensee personnel found all of these welds to subsequently leak within a year in 1996.
In 2005, licensee welders also repaired two valve body-to-bonnet flanged connections
because of evidence of leakage. These valves were numbered 2-8818B and 2-8818C,
residual heat removal loop check valves. In summary, this repair has been done six
times and failed four times. Two of the six times this repair has been done are unknown
at this time in respect to leakage because a refueling outage has not occurred. The
inspectors considered the evidence of boron leakage in these body-to-bonnet flanged
connections to be a condition adverse to quality.
Analysis. The inspectors found this finding to be greater than minor because it is similar
to Example 3.g. of Appendix E of Manual Chapter 0612 because the leakage reccurred.
The inspectors considered this finding as of very low safety significance because the
event was leakage and not a line break. The inspectors found this finding screened out
of the Phase 1 process as Green. The licensee issued a Smart Form (SMF)
SMF-2005-004209 regarding this finding.
Enforcement. Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50
states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to
quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, corrective actions
were inadequate in that leakage of the body-to-bonnet flanged connections on
Valve 1-8702B after previous repair in 2004, and on Valves 2-8378B,
2-8379A/B in 1995, were recurrent. The inspectors identified this finding as an NCV
because of its very low safety significance and because the licensee has entered this
finding in its corrective action program. This is consistent with Section VI.A. of the NRC
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000445/2005005-01, Inadequate Corrective Actions for a
Leaking Valve with a Seal Weld which Subsequently Leaked.
.2
Pressurizer Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities
(Section 02.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspection procedure requires observation or review of upper head inspections after
the completion of Temporary Instruction 2515/150. The procedure requires samples
similar in number to the preceding section.
The licensee plans to replace this head, and thus close the Temporary
Instruction 2515/150. The licensee did not perform upper head inspections other than
visual during this outage. The visual inspection activities are documented in
Section 1R20 of this report.