IR 05000250/2005013

Exercise of Enforcement Discretion - Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (NRC IR 05000250-05-013 and IR 05000251-05-013)

ML060390026
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	02/06/2006
From:	Travers W Region 2 Administrator
To:	Stall J Florida Power & Light Co
References
EA-05-195, IR-05-013
Download: ML060390026 (22)

Text

ary 6, 2006

SUBJECT:

EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION - TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000250,251/2005013)

Dear Mr. Stall:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the results of our review of findings involving certain fire response procedures at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant that would not be effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of Units 3 and 4 should a severe fire develop in certain fire zones.

This issue was discussed at a regulatory conference held in the NRCs Region II Office on November 16, 2005.

To summarize our review of this matter, the NRC has concluded that the significance of the findings was very low for Unit 3 and low to moderate for Unit 4. In addition, the NRC has concluded that the exercise of enforcement discretion is appropriate for these findings in accordance with the NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48). The NRC will also refrain from including the findings in the Agency Action Matrix in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program. The bases for our conclusions regarding the significance of the findings is described below and in Enclosure 1.

As background, NRC Inspection Report No. 05000250,251/2005010, was issued on October 7, 2005, and it documented a finding (one apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R) based on the NRCs review of three separate unresolved items (URIs 05000250,251/2004007-001, -006, and -007). The collective significance of the finding was assessed under the significance determination process as a preliminary greater than Green issue (i.e., an issue of at least low to moderate safety significance which may require additional NRC inspection). The cover letter to NRC Inspection Report No. 05000250,251/2005010 informed Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) of the NRCs preliminary conclusion, provided FPL an opportunity to request a regulatory conference on this matter, and forwarded the details of the NRCs preliminary estimate of the change in core damage frequency (CDF) for the finding.

On November 15, 2005, FPL submitted a letter to the NRC documenting its intent to adopt the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program under 10 CFR 50.48(c), which includes approaches in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating

Florida Power and Light Company 2 Plants, 2001 Edition. In accordance with the NRCs Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48), FPL requested enforcement discretion for existing identified noncompliances, noncompliances identified during its NFPA 805 transition process, and the noncompliance that was the subject of the November 16, 2005, regulatory conference.

At FPLs request, an open regulatory conference was conducted on November 16, 2005, to discuss FPLs position on this issue. The enclosures to this letter include the list of attendees at the regulatory conference and material presented by FPL and NRC.

During the conference, FPL presented the results of its estimate of the increase in CDF including influential assumptions and risk analysis methodology. FPLs presentation addressed the three aspects of the finding separately (i.e., URI 05000250,251/2004007-001, -006, and-007), and provided the following conclusions on the matter. In summary, FPL agreed with the NRCs view that URI 05000250,251/2004007-001 was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, but concluded that the significance of this issue was very low. FPL disagreed with that portion of the finding consisting of URIs 05000250,251/2004007-006 and -007, concluding that procedural requirements were acceptable, a performance deficiency did not exist, and thus this finding did not represent a violation. Furthermore, FPL concluded that the significance of URIs 05000250,251/2004007-006 and -007, even if considered to be a finding, was very low.

At the conference, the NRC requested that FPL provide additional information to support its risk analysis. This information was subsequently submitted by letter dated November 23, 2005.

FPLs presentation and subsequent correspondence provided 15 inputs on the safety significance of the finding. The following three of the inputs were incorporated into the NRCs final significance determination: (1) reducing the main control room fire ignition frequency, (2) modifying the time at which the operating charging pump would be stopped during a main control room fire, and (3) reducing the time that reactor coolant pump (RCP) leakage could have created conditions for a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). A detailed discussion of the NRCs basis for acceptance or rejection of all inputs is provided in Enclosure 1.

After considering the information developed during the inspection, the information presented at the conference, and the supplemental information provided by FPL after the conference, the NRC has concluded that the final inspection findings are appropriately characterized as very low for Unit 3 and low to moderate for Unit 4.

The NRC also concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 50.48(b)(1) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3, occurred. In particular, Appendix R,Section III.G.2 states, in part, that where cables or equipment (including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground) of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of three means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided.

Section III.G.3 states that alternative shutdown capability should be provided where the protection of systems (whose function is required for hot shutdown) does not satisfy the requirements of Section III.G.2.

Florida Power and Light Company 3 In this case, the following three instances were identified where FPL failed to satisfy the above Appendix R requirements: (1) FPL failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of motor-operated valve (MOV) MOV-4-626, RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling Water System Return Isolation Valve, in fire zone (FZ) 67. This condition existed since at least September 9, 2003, when it was first identified by FPL. (2) FPL failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of necessary RCP thermal barrier component cooling system valves MOV-3-716B and MOV-3-626 in FZ 63 and MOV-4-716B valve in FZ 67. This condition existed since at least February 9, 2001, when the applicable procedure page was last revised FPL. (3) FPL failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of necessary RCP thermal barrier component cooling system valves in FZ 106 and did not meet the alternative shutdown capability requirements. Specifically, under certain scenarios, FPLs procedure may not have mitigated a spurious closure of valves MOV-3-716A and MOV-4-716A in a timely manner, possibly resulting in an RCP seal LOCA and pressurizer level dropping below the indicating range. This condition existed since at least April 24, 2002, when the applicable procedure pages were last revised.

The NRC also reviewed FPLs request that the violation be considered for enforcement discretion. On June 16, 2004, the NRC published a final rule revising its regulations in 10 CFR 50.48, which governs fire protection at operating nuclear power plants. This revision became effective on July 16, 2004, and it added a new paragraph (c) to 10 CFR 50.48 that allows reactor licensees to voluntary comply with the risk-informed, performance-based fire protection approaches in NFPA 805 (with limited exceptions stated in the rule language) as an alternative to complying with 10 CFR 50.48(b) or the requirements in their fire protection license conditions. As part of the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), licensees will establish the fundamental fire protection program identified in NFPA 805 and will perform a plant-wide assessment to identify fire areas and fire hazards and to evaluate compliance with their existing fire protection licensing basis. This fire protection assessment is beyond the normal licensee review of their fire protection program. With regard to applicable noncompliances, licensees are required to adopt compensatory measures until compliance is either restored to 10 CFR 50.48(b) or achieved per 10 CFR 50.48(c).

In order to provide incentives for licensees initiating efforts to identify and correct subtle violations that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts, the NRC issued Enforcement Policy Statement revisions on June 16, 2004, and January 14, 2005, allowing enforcement discretion for certain fire protection noncompliances identified as part of the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) as well as existing identified compliances which could reasonably be corrected under 10 CFR 50.48(c). This interim enforcement discretion policy is consistent with the long-standing policy included in Section VII.B.3, Violations Involving Old Design Issues, of the Enforcement Policy, which addresses discretion when licensee undertake a comprehensive review and assessment. This exercise of discretion provides appropriate incentives for licensees to initiate efforts to identify and correct subtle violations that are not likely to be identified by routine efforts. As such, the NRC Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) provides enforcement discretion for licensees who wish to take advantage of the new rule to resolve existing noncompliances (i.e., implement corrective actions until the licensee has transitioned to 10 CFR 50.48(c)) provided that certain criteria are met.

In this case, the NRC concluded that (1) the noncompliance was not associated with a finding that the reactor oversight process significance determination process would evaluate as Red, or

Florida Power and Light Company 4 it would not be categorized at Severity Level I; (2) FPL submitted a letter of intent before December 31, 2005, stating its intent to transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), which includes approaches in NFPA 805; and (3) the licensee entered the noncompliance into its corrective action program and implemented appropriate compensatory measures (including an operability evaluation to demonstrate that safety will be maintained during operation and shutdown).

Regarding compensatory measures, FPL incorporated acceptable manual operator actions into applicable procedures to address the finding at the time of the original inspection. Based on the above, in accordance with the NRCs Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48), and in consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement; I have been authorized to exercise enforcement discretion such that the above violation will not be cited. In addition, based on the above corrective actions and in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, the NRC will also refrain from including the finding in the Agency Action Matrix.

You are not required to respond to this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's

"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (should you choose to provide one) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, classified, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. D. Charles Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, at (404)562-4669.

Sincerely,

/RA/ BY LOREN PLISCO ACTING FOR/

William D. Travers Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 License Nos. DPR-31, DPR-41

Enclosures:

1. NRC Evaluation of Licensees Risk Significance Inputs 2. List of Attendees 3. Material Presented by Licensee 4. Material Presented by NRC

Florida Power and Light Company 5

REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GA.

I. OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS AND MEETING INTENT Mr. H. Christensen, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

II. NRC REGULATORY CONFERENCE POLICY Mr. C. Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, DRS III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE WITH RISK PERSPECTIVES Mr. C. Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, DRS IV. SUMMARY OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS Mr. C. Payne, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, DRS V. LICENSEE RISK PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION VI. LICENSEE RESPONSE TO APPARENT VIOLATIONS VII. BREAK / NRC CAUCUS Mr. H. Christensen, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

VIII. CLOSING REMARKS Mr. H. Christensen, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

Enclosure 4

Material Presented by NRC -2-Draft Apparent Violation 10 CFR 50.48 (b)(1) requires, in part, that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G.Section III.G.2 states, in part, that where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of three means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided.Section III.G.3 states that alternative shutdown capability should be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown, does not satisfy the requirements of III.G.2.Section III.L of Appendix R provides requirements to be met by alternative shutdown methods.Section III.L.2.b states, in part, that The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level...within the level indication in the pressurizer in PWRs.

Contrary to the above, on February 13, 2004, the inspectors identified three examples where 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements were not met:

a. The licensee failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of MOV-4-626, RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling Water System Return Isolation Valve in FZ 67. This condition existed since at least September 9, 2003, when it was first identified by the licensee.

b. The licensee failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of necessary RCP thermal barrier component cooling system valves MOV-3-716B and MOV-3-626 in FZ 63; and MOV-4-716B valve in FZ 67. This condition has existed since at least February 9, 2001, when the applicable procedure page was last revised.

c. The licensee failed to protect control circuits and cables that could cause maloperation of necessary RCP thermal barrier component cooling system valves in FZ 106; and did not meet the alternative shutdown capability requirements. Specifically, the licensees procedure may not mitigate a spurious closure of valves MOV-3-716A and MOV-4-716A in a timely manner, possibly resulting in an RCP seal LOCA, and pressurizer level dropping below the indicating range. This condition has existed since at least April 24, 2002, when the applicable procedure pages were last revised.

Note: The apparent violation discussed at this Regulatory Conference is subject to further review and subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action.