ML053080298
| ML053080298 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/2005 |
| From: | Clay Johnson NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A |
| To: | Sheppard J South Texas |
| References | |
| IR-05-004 | |
| Download: ML053080298 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000498/2005004
Text
November 3, 2005
James J. Sheppard, President and
Chief Executive Officer
STP Nuclear Operating Company
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, Texas 77483
SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2005004 AND
Dear Mr. Sheppard:
On September 26, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. The
enclosed integrated report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on
October 6, 2005, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your
licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Claude E. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects
STP Nuclear Operating Company -2-
Dockets: 50-498
50-499
Licenses: NPF-76
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2005004 and 05000499/2005004
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/Enclosure: INPO
E. D. Halpin Records Center
Vice President, Oversight 700 Galleria Parkway
STP Nuclear Operating Company Atlanta, GA 30339-3064
P.O. Box 289
Wadsworth, TX 77483 Director, Division of Compliance &
Inspection
S. M. Head, Manager, Licensing Bureau of Radiation Control
STP Nuclear Operating Company Texas Department of State Health Services
P.O. Box 289, Mail Code: N5014 1100 West 49th Street
Wadsworth, TX 77483 Austin, TX 78756
C. Kirksey/C. M. Canady Brian Almon
City of Austin Public Utility Commission
Electric Utility Department William B. Travis Building
721 Barton Springs Road P.O. Box 13326
Austin, TX 78704 1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78701-3326
J. J. Nesrsta/R. K. Temple
City Public Service Board Environmental and Natural
P.O. Box 1771 Resources Policy Director
San Antonio, TX 78296 P.O. Box 12428
Austin, TX 78711-3189
Jack A. Fusco/Michael A. Reed
Texas Genco, LP Judge, Matagorda County
12301 Kurland Drive Matagorda County Courthouse
Houston, TX 77034 1700 Seventh Street
Bay City, TX 77414
Jon C. Wood
Cox Smith Matthews Terry Parks, Chief Inspector
112 E. Pecan, Suite 1800 Texas Department of Licensing
San Antonio, TX 78205 and Regulation
Boiler Program
A. H. Gutterman, Esq. P.O. Box 12157
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Austin, TX 78711
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004
STP Nuclear Operating Company -3-
Susan M. Jablonski
Office of Permitting, Remediation and
Registration
Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality
MC-122, P.O. Box 13087
Austin, TX 78711-3087
Ted Enos
4200 South Hulen
Suite 630
Fort Worth, TX 76109
STP Nuclear Operating Company -4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (JXC2)
Branch Chief, DRP/A (CEJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (TRF)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
ROPreports
SISP Review Completed:__CEJ_ ADAMS: Yes G No Initials: __CEJ
Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive Non-Sensitive
R:\ STP\2005\ST2005-04RP-JC.wpd
RIV:RI:DRP/A SRI:DRP/A PE:DRP/A SPE:DRP/A C:DRS/PSB C:DRS/PEB
JLTaylor JCruz TBrown TRFarnholtz MPShannon LJSmith
E- CEJ E-CEJ NA /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
10/26/05 10/26/05 10/ /05 10/25/05 10/21/05 10/26/05
C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/OB C:DRP/A
NFO'Keefe ATGody CEJohnson
/RA/ /RA/ /RA/
10/25/05 10/23/05 11/3/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Dockets: 50-498, 50-499
Licenses: NPF-76
Report No: 05000498/2005004
Licensee: STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth
Wadsworth, Texas 77483
Dates: June 27 through September 26, 2005
Inspectors: J. Cruz, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Taylor, Resident Inspector
T. Brown, Project Engineer
D. Carter, Health Physicist
B. Tindell, Reactor Inspector
Approved By: C. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000498/2005004, 05000499/2005004; 06/27/05 - 09/26/05; South Texas Project Electric
Generating Station; Units 1 & 2; Integrated Resident Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection completed by the resident inspectors and
project engineers and announced inspections by regional inspectors. violations were
identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power
reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated
July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power throughout the inspection
period. On September 19, 2005, Unit 2 commenced a scheduled coastdown for Refueling
Outage 2RE11.
Additionally, on September 22, 2005, both Units entered storm crew operations in response to
Hurricane Rita. After the hurricane made landfall there was no effect on the South Texas
Project site and the site returned to normal operations on September 25, 2005.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed a review of the licensee's readiness of seasonal
susceptibilities involving hurricanes. The inspectors performed the following in response
to the projected adverse weather conditions of Hurricane Rita: (1) reviewed plant
procedures, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specifications to ensure
that operator actions defined in adverse weather procedures maintained the readiness
of essential systems; (2) walked down portions of the below listed system to ensure that
adverse weather protection features (heat tracing, space heaters, weatherized
enclosures, temporary chillers) were sufficient to support operability, including the ability
to perform safe shutdown functions; (3) evaluated operator staffing levels to ensure the
licensee could maintain the readiness of essential systems required by plant
procedures; and (4) reviewed the corrective action program to determine if the licensee
identified and corrected problems related to adverse weather conditions.
C (Common) Hurricane Rita preparations, September 19-25
The inspectors completed one sample.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed two partial risk important system: (1) walkdowns listed below,
and reviewed plant procedures and documents to verify that critical portions of the
-2-
selected systems were correctly aligned; and (2) compared deficiencies identified during
the walk down to the licensee's corrective action program to ensure problems were
being identified and corrected.
- (Unit 1) The inspectors verified the alignment and condition of Safety Injection
System Train A . The inspectors verified that the system equipment and control
board were aligned in accordance with Plant Operating Procedure
0POP02-SI-0002, Safety Injection System Lineup, Revision 17, August 31 and
September 2
The inspectors completed two samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following: (1) plant procedures, drawings, the Updated
Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and vendor manuals to determine the
correct alignment of the system; (2) reviewed outstanding design issues, operator work
arounds, and corrective action program documents to determine if open issues affected
the functionality of the system; and (3) verified that the licensee was identifying and
resolving equipment alignment problems.
- (Unit 1) The inspectors verified the alignment and condition of the accessible
portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The inspectors verified that the
system equipment and control board were aligned in accordance with Plant
Operating Procedure 0POP02-AF-0001, Auxiliary Feedwater, Revision 21,
August 3
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-3-
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down seven plant areas to assess the material condition of active
and passive fire protection features and their operational lineup and readiness. The
inspectors: (1) verified that transient combustibles and hot work activities were
controlled in accordance with plant procedures; (2) observed the condition of fire
detection devices to verify they remained functional; (3) observed fire suppression
systems to verify they remained functional; (4) verified that fire extinguishers and hose
stations were provided at their designated locations and that they were in a satisfactory
condition; (5) verified that passive fire protection features (electrical raceway barriers,
fire doors, fire dampers, steel fire proofing, penetration seals, and oil collection systems)
were in a satisfactory material condition; (6) verified that adequate compensatory
measures were established for degraded or inoperable fire protection features; and (7)
reviewed the corrective action program to determine if the licensee identified and
corrected fire protection problems. Plant areas inspected are listed below:
- (Unit 1) Component Cooling Water heat exchanger and valve rooms (Fire
Zones Z111, 129), July 8, 2005
- (Unit 2) Component Cooling Water heat exchanger and valve rooms (Fire
Zones Z111, 129), July 14, 2005
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel, Train A, B, and C Sequencer rooms and
Halon Storage rooms (Fire Zones Z071-073, 016,017, and 037), July 20, 2005
, 2005
, 2005
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-4-
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed testing and training of senior reactor operators and reactor
operators on to identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the training, to
assess operator performance, and to assess the evaluator's critique. The training
scenario involved leak
in containment and additional equipment failures.
The inspectors completed sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Implementation (71111.12)
.1 Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to: (1) verify the
appropriate handling of structure, system, and component (SSC) performance or
condition problems; (2) verify the appropriate handling of degraded SSC functional
performance; (3) evaluate the role of work practices and common cause problems; and
(4) evaluate the handling of SSC issues reviewed under the requirements of the
maintenance rule, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, and the Technical Specifications.
- (Unit 1) Engineered safety feature load sequencer input/output module
replacement (
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-5-
.2 Biennial Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12B)
a. Inspection Scope
Periodic Evaluation Reviews
The inspectors reviewed the licensees overall implementation of the Maintenance Rule,
10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Maintenance Rule
periodic assessments for 2003 and 2005. The resulting adjustments to the balance of
equipment reliability and availability were also evaluated.
The inspectors reviewed systems and structures that had suffered some degraded
performance or condition to assess the licensees periodic evaluation activities. The
inspectors selected the following five systems for a detailed review:
- Safety Injection
- 120 Volt AC Vital Power
- Electrical Auxiliary Building
- Diesel Generator Building
For these systems, the inspectors reviewed the use of performance history and
operating experience in adjusting preventive maintenance, (a)(1) goals, and (a)(2)
performance criteria. For structures, the inspectors reviewed the Maintenance Rule
Structures Inspection Summary Report. The inspectors also reviewed adjustments to
the scope of the Maintenance Rule Program and adjustments to the definitions of
availability hours and required available hours.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the use of the Corrective Action Program within the
Maintenance Rule Program. The review was accomplished by the examination of a
sample of corrective action documents and work orders. The purpose of the review was
to determine that the identification of problems and implementation of corrective actions
were acceptable.
b. Findings
Introduction. An unresolved item was identified for untimely corrective actions related to
a potential for essential cooling water cables to be submerged in water. This is an
unresolved item pending the discovery of the current condition of these cables.
-6-
Description. South Texas Project personnel wrote a Maintenance Rule Structures
Inspection Summary Report, which identified that the grade around
Manhole B0XYABKEM52 had been raised. This allowed rainwater to enter the manhole
as a catch basin for the area. This was also documented in CR 03-18389.
The inspectors and the licensee walked down the manholes in the yard and noted that
there were more manholes that were affected by the grade around them. Some of the
manholes lead to cable vaults which contained power cables for the Unit 1 essential
cooling water pumps. These cables were rated for wet/dry service, but were not rated
for continuous submergence in water. At the time of the onsite inspection, there had
been no corrective actions taken for the 2003 condition report.
When questioned by the inspectors, licensee personnel lowered an instrument through
a small opening in one of the manholes and discovered approximately four feet of water
in Manhole B0XYABKEM51. According to design drawings, the as-found water level
was below the cables. The licensee had not measured the water level in the other
potentially affected manholes at the time of the inspection.
However, the licensee periodically tests the insulation resistance of the affected cables,
and the recent test results were satisfactory. During a phone call on September 29,
2005, the licensee stated that they had added a silicone bead around some of the
potentially affected manholes, preventing further water intrusion. The licensee also
stated that they plan further inspection on the cable vaults. The licensee is tracking this
concern in CR 05-11548 and CR 05-11558.
Analysis. The results of an inspection on the affected cable vaults will be used to
determine if this unresolved item is a performance deficiency. NRC Manual
Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, will be used to process this item
when more information is received.
Enforcement. More information is needed to determine if the licensees corrective
actions are adequate from the 2003 condition report. This item remains unresolved
pending the results of the licensees investigation of the affected cable vaults
(URI 05000498;499/2005004-01, Potential for Submerged Cables).
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
Risk Assessment and Management of Risk
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four assessment activities listed below to verify:
(1) performance of risk assessments when required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) licensee
procedures prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities, and plant
operations; (2) the accuracy, adequacy, and completeness of the information
considered in the risk assessment; (3) that the licensee recognizes, and/or enters as
applicable, the appropriate licensee-established risk category according to the risk
-7-
assessment results and licensee procedures, and (4) the licensee identified and
corrected problems related to maintenance risk assessments.
- (Unit 1) Evaluation of planned risk profiles for essential cooling water Train A
extended allowed outage, July 5, 2005
- (Unit 2) Evaluation of planned risk profiles for essential cooling water Train A
extended allowed outage, July 13, 2005
- (Unit 2) Evaluation of risk for installation of Temporary Modification 05-8241-1 to
jumper 125 VDC switchboard 2A battery cell #23 (Evaluation 1397),
July 20, 2005
- (Unit 1) Evaluation of risk for installation of Design Change Package 05-4876-2
to eliminate nuisance alarms associated with Class 1E 10 kV Inverter 1202
(Evaluation 1382), July 27, 2005
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors: (1) reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and/or strip charts for
the below listed evolutions to evaluate operator performance in coping with non-routine
events and transients; (2) verified that the operator response was in accordance with the
response required by plant procedures and training, and (3) verified that the licensee
has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with personnel
performance problems that occurred during the non-routine evolutions sampled.
- (Unit 2) Unplanned power reduction and recovery due to spurious momentary
excursion of Loop 1 Average Temperature instrumentation, July 27, 2005
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-8-
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors: (1) reviewed plants status documents such as operator shift logs,
emergent work documentation, deferred modifications, and standing orders to
determine if an operability evaluation was warranted for degraded components;
(2) referred to the Updated Safety Analysis Report and design basis documents to
review the technical adequacy of licensee operability evaluations; (3) evaluated
compensatory measures associated with operability evaluations; (4) determined
degraded component impact on any Technical Specifications; (5) used the Significance
Determination Process to evaluate the risk significance of degraded or inoperable
equipment; and who (6) verified that the licensee has identified and implemented
appropriate corrective actions associated with degraded components.
- (Unit 2) Engineering evaluation of through wall leakage in essential cooling water
Train A piping on discharge side of the component cooling water Train A heat
exchanger (CR 05-8601-1), July 6, 2005
- (Unit 1) Engineering evaluation of Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range NI-44
meter reading low (CR 05-8987-2), July 14, 2005
- (Unit 2) Engineering evaluation of piping damage in essential cooling water
Train B piping on discharge side of the component cooling water Train B heat
exchanger (CR 05-10323-1), August 22, 2005
- (Unit 2) Engineering evaluation of essential cooling water Train B following code
repairs after the discovery of a missing segment of piping and the indeterminate
location of the broken pieces of pipe within the system (CR 05-10323-2),
August 23, 2005
- (Unit 1) Engineering evaluation of through wall de-alloying indication on a flange
installed on essential cooling water Train B return line from the 150 ton Essential
Chiller 11B (CR 05-9622-2), August 24, 2005
- (Unit 1) Engineering evaluation of essential cooling water screen wash booster
Pump 1C following the failure to develop minimum required flow rate during a
surveillance procedure (CR 05-11400), September 16, 2005
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-9-
1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)
Cumulative Review of the Effects of Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of operator workarounds in Unit 2, on
July 22, 2005, to determine: (1) the reliability, availability, and potential for mis-
operation of a system; (2) if multiple mitigating systems could be affected; (3) the ability
of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents;
and (4) if the licensee has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions
associated with operator workarounds.
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected six postmaintenance test activities of risk significant systems or
components listed below. For each item, the inspectors: (1) reviewed the applicable
licensing basis and/or design-basis documents to determine the safety functions; (2)
evaluated the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity;
and (3) reviewed the test procedure to ensure it adequately tested the safety function
that may have been affected. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to
verify that acceptance criteria were met, plant impacts were evaluated, test equipment
was calibrated, procedures were followed, jumpers were properly controlled, the test
data results were complete and accurate, the test equipment was removed, the system
was properly re-aligned, and deficiencies during testing were documented. The
inspectors also reviewed the corrective action program to determine if the licensee
identified and corrected problems related to post-maintenance testing.
- (Unit 1) Preventative Maintenance Work Order PM:MV-1-CC-86015277,
Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Train A Chilled Water Supply Outboard
Reactor Containment Isolation Valve Operator A1CCMOV0059," July 5, 2005.
- (Unit 2) Preventative Maintenance Work Order PM:EM-2-98000716, High Head
Safety Injection Pump 2A, Revision 05.0 and PM:MV-2-90001492, High Head
Safety Injection Pump 2A Miniflow First Isolation MOV Operator, Revision 06.0,
review of documentation and observation of pump run and miniflow first isolation
valve post-maintenance testing, July 12, 2005.
-10-
- (Unit 2) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-DG-0003, Standby Diesel
Generator 13(23) Operability Test, Revision 28, post-maintenance testing
associated with planned maintenance, July 30, 2005.
- (Unit1) Condition Report 05-2965-1 post-maintenance testing on residual heat
removal Pump 1B discharge flow Transmitter FT-0868 following discovery of a
root valve leak, August 11, 2005.
- (Unit 2) Preventative Maintenance Work Order PM:EM-2-96000643, Train B
Essential Chilled Water Chiller Unit 22B, Revision 02.0 (3V112VCH0005) and
Plant Maintenance Procedure 0PMP05-CH-0001, Revision 26, York Chiller
Inspection and Maintenance 300-550 Tons, review of documentation and
observation of chiller run following oil pump shaft keyway inspection and seal
replacement post-maintenance testing, August 19, 2005.
- (Unit 2) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-MS-0001, Main Steam Valve
Operability Test Revision 25, post-maintenance testing associated with planned
maintenance, August 23, 2005.
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure
requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that surveillance activities
listed below demonstrated that the SSCs tested were capable of performing their
intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to
verify that the following significant surveillance test attributes were adequate:
(1) preconditioning; (2) evaluation of testing impact on the plant; (3) acceptance criteria;
(4) test equipment; (5) procedures; (6) jumper/lifted lead controls; (7) test data; (8)
testing frequency and method demonstrated Technical Specification operability; (9) test
equipment removal; (10) restoration of plant systems; (11) fulfillment of ASME Code
requirements; (12) updating of performance indicator data; (13) engineering evaluations,
root causes, and bases for returning tested SSCs not meeting the test acceptance
criteria were correct; (14) reference setting data; and (15) annunciators and alarms
setpoints. The inspectors also verified that the licensee identified and implemented any
needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
- (Unit 1) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-CC-0047, Component Cooling
Water Train 1A (2A) Valve Operability Test, Revision 11, July 5, 2005.
-11-
ZE-00
, 2005.
- (Unit 1) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-RS-0001, Monthly Control Rod
Operability, Revision 18, July 19, 2005.
- (Unit 1) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-RC-0006, Reactor Coolant
Inventory, Revision 15, to determine Reactor Coolant System leakage,
July 26, 2005.
, 2005.
.
- (Unit 1) Plant Surveillance Procedure 0PSP03-RA-0001, Containment Radiation
Monitoring System Valve Operability Test, Revision 6, August 2, 2005.
The inspectors completed samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
One drill and simulator-based training evolution contributing to Drill/Exercise
Performance (DEP) and Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Performance
Indicators, the inspectors for the listed below : (1) observed the training evolution to
identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and Protective
Action Requirements (PAR) development activities; (2) compared the identified
weaknesses and deficiencies against licensee identified findings to determine whether
the licensee is properly identifying failures; and (3) determined whether licensee
performance is in accordance with the guidance of the NEI 99-02 documents
acceptance criteria.
- On July 26, the inspectors observed a drill and simulator-based training evolution
in which the scenario consisted of a main turbine trip with the failure of the
reactor protection system to automatically trip the reactor. The manual trip of the
reactor was followed by a large break loss of coolant accident. The scenario
progressed in a manner which required the emergency response organization to
declare and respond to a General Emergency.
-12-
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining individual and
collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The
inspector used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures
required by Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The
inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:
Site specific ALARA procedures
Seven work activities of highest exposure significance completed during the last outage
Exposure tracking system
Workers use of the low dose waiting areas
Source-term control strategy for exposure reduction initiatives
Specific sources identified by the licensee for exposure reduction actions and priorities
established for these actions, and results achieved since the last refueling cycle
Radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during work activities
in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas
Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program since the
last inspection
Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up activities such
as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking
The inspector completed 7 of the required of the required 29 samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
-13-
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Daily CR Review
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for followup, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing hard
copy or electronic summaries of each CR, attending various daily screening meetings,
and accessing the licensees computerized corrective action program database.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
Section 2OS2 evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's problem identification and
resolution processes regarding exposure tracking, higher than planned exposure levels,
and radiation worker practices. The inspector reviewed the corrective action documents
listed in the attachment against the licensees problem identification and resolution
program requirements. No findings of significance were identified.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The results of the ALARA inspection were presented to Mr. G. Parkey and other
members of his staff on June 30, 2005.
The results of the biennial maintenance rule inspection were presented to Mr. James J.
Sheppard, President and CEO and other members of licensee management on
September 15, 2005.
The results of the resident inspection were presented to Mr. James J. Sheppard and
other members of licensee management on October 6, 2005.
During each exit meeting, the inspectors asked the licensee representatives whether
any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No
proprietary information was identified.
-14-
Other Meetings
Mr. Claude Johnson, Branch Chief, Project Branch A, Division of Reactor Projects,
visited the site and toured selected areas of the facility on September 13-16.
40A7 Licensee-identified Violations
None.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
R. Aguilera, Radiological Manager, Radiological Engineering
T. Bowman, Manager, Operations
W. Bullard, Manager, Health Physics
R. Gangluff, Manager, Chemistry
E. Halpin, Vice President, Oversight
J. Jump, Manager, Process Improvement Leadership Team
M. McBurnett, Manager, Quality and Licensing
M. Meier, General Manager, Station Support
W. Mookhoek, Senior Engineer, Quality and Licensing
G. Parkey, Vice President, Generation
J. Pierce, Shift Supervisor
D. Rencurrel, Manager, Plant Engineering
R. Savage, Senior Staff Specialist
J. Sheppard, President and CEO
D. Swett, Radiological Manager, ALARA
D. Towler, Manager, Quality
J. Winters, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
T. Walker, Manager, Quality
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Open
05000498;499/2005004-01 URI Potential For Submerged Cables
A-1 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
In addition to the documents identified in the inspection report, the following documents were
selected and reviewed by the inspectors to accomplish the objectives and scope of the
inspection and to support any findings:
Section 71111.12 Maintenance Implementation
Corrective Action Documents
99-2894 03-8750 03-13957 03-15034 03-16917 03-18389
04-1173 04-1244 04-2545 04-3868 04-5206 04-8412
04-13787 04-15689 05-2092 05-2705
Work Orders
425526
Procedures
Maintenance Rule Basis Document Guideline, Revision 10
Miscellaneous
2003 Annual Summary Report of Maintenance Rule Activities
2005 Annual Summary Report of Maintenance Rule Activities
0PGP04-ZA-0002, Revision 5, Maintenance Rule Structures Inspection Summary Report, 2003
STP UFSAR, 13.7, Risk-Informed Special Treatment Requirements
Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
Corrective Action Documents
04-3635 04-3682 04-3878 04-3885 04-3941 04-3974
04-4171 04-12084 04-12772 04-14021 04-14552 05-53
05-1536 05-3216 05-3371 05-3445 05-3566 05-3698
05-3703 05-4164 05-5209 05-5674 05-7766 05-8179
Audits and Self-Assessments
LO-WLO-2005-0005-01 ALARA Planing and Controls and Access Control to Radiologically
Significant Areas
QA-14-2005-WF-1 Radiation Protection
A-2 Attachment
Work Authorization Number Packages
6414 Steam Generator Secondary FOSAR Inspections
6416 Steam Generator Secondary Scaffolding and Insulation Support
275538 Reactor Head Disassembly and Reassessembly
275755 Steam Generator Secondary Water Lancing
276873 Nuclear Instrumentation Cable Repair
9071 Operations Support
9090 Radiation Protection Job Coverage
Procedures
0PRP07-ZR-0010 Radiation Work Permits, Revision 15
0PRP07-ZR-0011 Radiological Work ALARA Reviews, Revision 5
0PRP04-ZR-0015 Radiological Posting and Warning Devices, Revision 18
0PGP03-ZR-0052 ALARA Program, Revision 8
Conduct of Operations for Radiation Protection, Revision 6
Miscellaneous Documents
Unit 1 Twelfth Refueling Outage, ALARA Report
2F0501 Outage Report, ALARA Report
Formal Self-Assessment of the Radiation Protection Program, September 27-30, 2004
A-3 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ALARA As Low As is Reasonably Achieved
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR condition report
SSC structure, system, and component
A-4 Attachment