ML053000051
| ML053000051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/2005 |
| From: | Boska J Plant Licensing Branch III-2 |
| To: | Kansler M Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Boska J, NRR, 301-415-2901 | |
| References | |
| TAC MC5036, FOIA/PA-2016-0148 | |
| Download: ML053000051 (15) | |
Text
November 21, 2005 Mr. Michael R. Kansler President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: APPROVING THE USE OF A NEW GANTRY CRANE IN THE FUEL STORAGE BUILDING (TAC NO. MC5036)
Dear Mr. Kansler:
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 244 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment is in response to your application dated November 1, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005.
The amendment authorizes the use of a single-failure-proof gantry crane for spent fuel cask handling operations up to 110 tons in weight.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-247
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 244 to DPR-26
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page
November 21, 2005 Mr. Michael R. Kansler President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: APPROVING THE USE OF A NEW GANTRY CRANE IN THE FUEL STORAGE BUILDING (TAC NO. MC5036)
Dear Mr. Kansler:
The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 244 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26 for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2. The amendment is in response to your application dated November 1, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005.
The amendment authorizes the use of a single-failure-proof gantry crane for spent fuel cask handling operations up to 110 tons in weight.
A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-247
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 244 to DPR-26
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page Accession Number: ML053000051
- See SE dated 10/10/05
- KManoly **
SHamrick RLaufer DATE 11/18/05 11/7/05 10/10/05 8/25/05 11/16/05 11/18/05 Official Record Copy
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 cc:
Mr. Gary J. Taylor Chief Executive Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
1340 Echelon Parkway Jackson, MS 39213 Mr. John T. Herron Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Mr. Fred R. Dacimo Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 295 Broadway, Suite 1 P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Mr. Paul Rubin General Manager, Plant Operations Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 295 Broadway, Suite 2 P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Mr. Oscar Limpias Vice President Engineering Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Mr. Brian OGrady Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Mr. John F. McCann Director, Licensing Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Ms. Charlene D. Faison Manager, Licensing Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Mr. Michael J. Columb Director of Oversight Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Mr. James Comiotes Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 295 Broadway, Suite 1 P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Mr. Patric Conroy Manager, Licensing Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 295 Broadway, Suite 1 P. O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Mr. Travis C. McCullough Assistant General Counsel Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior Resident Inspectors Office Indian Point 2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 59 Buchanan, NY 10511-0038
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 & 3 cc:
Mr. Peter R. Smith, President New York State Energy, Research, and Development Authority 17 Columbia Circle Albany, NY 12203-6399 Mr. Paul Eddy Electric Division New York State Department of Public Service 3 Empire State Plaza, 10th Floor Albany, NY 12223 Mr. Charles Donaldson, Esquire Assistant Attorney General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 Mayor, Village of Buchanan 236 Tate Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511 Mr. Ray Albanese Executive Chair Four County Nuclear Safety Committee Westchester County Fire Training Center 4 Dana Road Valhalla, NY 10592 Ms. Stacey Lousteau Treasury Department Entergy Services, Inc.
639 Loyola Avenue Mail Stop: L-ENT-15E New Orleans, LA 70113 Mr. William DiProfio PWR SRC Consultant 139 Depot Road East Kingston, NH 03827 Mr. Daniel C. Poole PWR SRC Consultant P.O. Box 579 Inglis, FL 34449 Mr. William T. Russell PWR SRC Consultant 400 Plantation Lane Stevensville, MD 21666-3232 Mr. Jim Riccio Greenpeace 702 H Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20001 Mr. Philip Musegaas Riverkeeper, Inc 828 South Broadway Tarrytown, NY 10591
DATED: November 21, 2005 AMENDMENT NO. 244 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26 INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 PUBLIC LPL1-1 R/F OGC RLaufer GHill (2)
TBoyce ACRS SLittle JBoska SRJones JHernandez KManoly JMa BMcDermott, RI cc: Plant Service list
ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 2, LLC ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-247 INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 244 License No. DPR-26
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated November 1, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended to authorize the licensee to use the single-failure-proof gantry crane for moving spent fuel casks, up to 110 tons in weight, into and out of the spent fuel pit, as set forth in the license amendment application dated November 1, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005, and evaluated in the associated safety evaluation by the Commissions Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Richard J. Laufer, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance: November 21, 2005
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 244 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-26 ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-247
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated November 1, 2005, (Agencywide Document Access and Management System
[ADAMS] accession number ML043140282) as supplemented by letters dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005, (ADAMS accession numbers ML051150099, ML052140477, and ML052900408) Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a license amendment for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2). The supplements dated April 12, July 22, and September 26, 2005, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration. The proposed changes would allow the use of a new single-failure-proof crane for moving spent fuel casks up to 110 tons in weight (when fully loaded with fuel) into and out of the spent fuel pit. Entergy is constructing an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) as allowed under 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K. Once in place, spent fuel from the IP2 spent fuel pit will be transferred to this storage facility. The Holtec HI-STORM 100 cask system has been selected for use at the IP2 ISFSI. The HI-STORM cask system utilizes the HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask for transporting a multi-purpose canister (MPC) from the spent fuel pit, and for inter-cask MPC transfers required for on-site storage.
The proposed amendment would allow the use of the 110-ton design rated gantry crane to move spent fuel casks up to 110 tons into and out of the spent fuel pit by lifting a fully loaded Holtec HI-TRAC 100 spent fuel transfer cask and its associated components. The existing 40-ton non-single-failure-proof overhead crane, located in the IP2 fuel storage building (FSB),
does not have the capacity to handle the HI-TRAC 100 transfer cask and its associated components, but will remain in place after the installation of the new crane. However, this crane is restricted from handling casks over spent fuel in the spent fuel pit and will only be utilized for other loading activities in the FSB.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 specifies, in part, that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, that may result from equipment failures. GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena, specifies, in part, that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes. Section 9.1.5, Overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems, of NUREG-0800, NRC Standard Review Plan, references the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, and NUREG-0554, Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants, for implementation of these criteria in the design of overhead heavy load handling systems.
The basis for the guidelines in NUREG-0612 was to minimize the occurrence of the principal causes of load handling accidents and to provide an adequate level of defense-in-depth for handling of heavy loads near spent fuel and safe shutdown systems. Defense-in-depth is generally defined as a set of successive measures that reduce the probability of accidents and/or the consequences of such accidents. In the area of control of heavy loads, the emphasis is on measures that prevent load drops or other load handling accidents.
In NUREG-0612, the NRC staff provided regulatory guidelines for control of heavy load lifts to assure safe handling of heavy loads in areas where a load drop could impact on stored spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or equipment that may be required to achieve safe shutdown or permit continued decay heat removal. In an unnumbered letter dated December 22, 1980, as supplemented by Generic Letter (GL) 81- 07, Control of Heavy Loads, dated February 3, 1981, the NRC requested that all licensees describe the extent to which the guidelines of NUREG-0612 were satisfied at their facility and what additional modifications would be necessary to fully satisfy the guidelines. This request was divided into two phases (Phase I and Phase II) for implementation by licensees. Phase I guidelines address measures for reducing the likelihood of dropping heavy loads and provide criteria for establishing safe load paths; procedures for load handling operations; training of crane operators; design, testing, inspection, and maintenance of cranes and lifting devices; and analyses of the impact of heavy load drops. Phase II guidelines address alternatives to either further reduce the probability of a load handling accident or mitigate the consequences of heavy load drops. These alternatives include using a single-failure-proof crane for increased handling system reliability, employing electrical interlocks and mechanical stops for restricting crane travel to safe areas, or performing load drops and consequence analyses for assessing the impact of dropped loads on plant safety and operations. Criteria for design of single-failure-proof cranes were included in NUREG-0554. Appendix C to NUREG-0612 provided alternative criteria for upgrading the reliability of existing cranes to single-failure-proof standards.
In a letter dated August 26, 1983, the NRC staff approved Ederers Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR-1 (P)-A, Ederers Nuclear Safety Related eXtra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM)
Cranes, Revision 3, dated October 8, 1982, as an acceptable method of meeting the guidelines of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612. Appendix B of EDR-1 (P)-A identifies the plant-specific information that is needed to verify a cranes conformance with NUREG-0554 guidelines. Appendix B summarizes the plant-specific crane data supplied by Ederer.
Licensees who incorporated the use of Ederers hoist and trolley into the design of a crane must submit Appendix B to address how plant-specific application of the Ederer system satisfies the guidelines of NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554.
In NRC Bulletin 96-02, Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment, dated April 11, 1996, the NRC staff addressed specific instances of heavy load handling concerns and requested licensees to provide specific information detailing their extent of compliance with the guidelines and their licensing basis. In a letter dated July 12, 1996, IP2 responded to NRC Bulletin 96-02. The letter reiterated that at that moment IP2 did not have the need to handle spent fuel casks over the spent fuel pit in the FSB. In addition, the letter noted that Technical Specification 3.8.C.1 prohibited the handling of a spent fuel cask without prior NRC review and approval. This commitment was subsequently transferred to the Technical Requirements Manual when IP2 converted to the Improved Technical Specifications.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's regulatory and technical analysis in support of its proposed license amendment. The application proposed use of a new crane which will utilize a single-failure-proof Ederer X-SAM hoist which has the capacity necessary to lift the Holtec HI-TRAC transfer cask planned for use at IP2, having a maximum weight of approximately 110 tons. With a single-failure-proof crane, the guidelines of NUREG-0612 for control of heavy loads are satisfied without additional actions (e.g. load drop analyses) beyond implementation of the general measures specified in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612.
In order to meet the single-failure-proof requirements of NUREG-0554 and the guidelines of NUREG-0612, the design acceptance criteria were consistent with IP2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 1.11.1 for Seismic Class I components and structures as applied to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The standards and guides used for determining allowable stress limits and other acceptance criteria are consistent with industry practice for similar applications. These include the Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) Specification No. 70 (2000), the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1-2002, Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes, the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual 9th Edition, the American Concrete Institute (ACI)
Standard 318-02, and the American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1 Standard.
The licensee stated that the Ederer quality assurance (QA) program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ASME NQA-1. The program encompasses the procurement of basic components from approved suppliers and the dedication of commercial-grade items by Ederer for use in safety-related applications. This dedication was done in accordance with Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NP-5652, Guideline for Utilization of Commercial Grade Items in Nuclear Safety Related Applications (NCIG-07). Upon arrival onsite, the Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual will be invoked for the installation process using the engineering design change process. The gantry crane and trolley meet the non-destructive examination (NDE) requirements as reflected in EDR-TOP-1 Appendix A, as applicable.
In Attachment 2 to the application dated November 1, 2004, Entergy summarized how the objectives and general guidelines of NUREG-0612 would be satisfied following installation of the new crane. Attachment 2 described implementation of the general guidelines with regard to: (1) establishment of safe load paths; (2) development of procedures; (3) training and qualification of crane operators; (4) selection of special lifting devices; (5) lifting devices that are not specifically designed; (6) inspection, testing and maintenance of cranes; and (7) application of standards to crane design. Administrative controls will continue to ensure that unauthorized movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pit will be prevented for the existing 40-ton overhead crane.
In evaluating EDR-1 (P)-A for reference in plant-specific licensing actions, the NRC staff noted that the acceptance applied only to the features described in the topical report, and did not constitute acceptance of the total overhead crane handling system or the requirements which may be necessary to assure the safe application of the crane system within the nuclear power plant. The plant-specific information required, as identified in Appendices B and C of EDR-1 (P)-A, was included in Appendix 3 to the November 1, 2004, application. The NRC staff reviewed the plant-specific information, which was presented in table form, and compared the information to the guidelines of NUREG-0554, NUREG-0612, and the exceptions to those guidelines approved in the safety evaluation of EDR-1 (P)-A.
The NRC staff reviewed the plant-specific information related to the design of the hoist, the adequacy of specific components, the response of the crane to potential component failures, and the test information demonstrating satisfactory performance of the overall crane. The NRC staff found that the plant-specific information provided adequate assurance that performance of the crane would satisfy the objectives of NUREG-0612 and the intent of NUREG-0554 with regard to maintaining the potential for a load drop extremely small. The NRC staff found that the information was complete and, thus, demonstrated conformance to EDR-1 (P)-A.
The new gantry crane will be installed on a new crane rail system. The crane rail system for the new gantry crane consists of crane rail, rail pad, rail clip, sole plate assembly, and sole plate anchor embedments. The sole plate assembly consists of 2" thick steel plate which is held to the concrete slab with 1" diameter rod anchor embedments. The crane rail is attached to the sole plate assembly by rail clips with a rail pad between the crane rail and the sole plate assembly. The crane rail and the concrete slab of the reconstructed truck bay are designed and built to withstand seismic loads, as well as the static loads.
The licensee stated that the new gantry crane was designed with a telescopic tower and automated folding cantilever arms to avoid interference with either the existing overhead crane or the refueling bridge crane. During dry cask loading operations the gantry crane will be in its raised position and the existing overhead crane will remain in the south position and de-energized to prevent accidental movement. Once the cask loading operation is completed, the new gantry crane will be stored in its far west position, with the tower lowered and the arms folded. This will allow unobstructed use of both the existing overhead and refueling bridge cranes.
The cantilevered girder for the main hoist trolley will extend over the spent fuel pit cask laydown area. The girders are equipped with a retraction mechanism, accomplished via lead screw actuators, that allow them to be folded back in order to permit unobstructed use of the existing overhead and refueling bridge cranes. Because of the cantilevered design, the gantry crane requires provisions to ensure stability against overturning. This is accomplished via a new floor anchorage system with fixed-in-place hold down features that oppose crane uplift forces. To provide a foundation system capable of resisting these uplift forces, the design includes a steel ballast box filled with steel plates that will act as a counterbalance. The ballast box foundation consists of a 2-foot thick reinforced concrete slab founded on bedrock, and its primary function is to transmit all bearing loads from the weight of the ballast box directly to the underlying bedrock.
There are two support systems that will prevent overturning by uplifting forces: (1) turnbuckles that act as tie down points between the ballast box and the crane structure whenever the crane is performing any operation in the cantilever section and (2) tie down supports welded to the crane sole plates along the entire length of the north rail system to prevent overturning when the crane is moving in the east-west direction along the rails. The analysis results indicate that the maximum axial load in any turnbuckle is 177.7 kips (1 kips equals 1000 pounds-force) while the turnbuckle has a proof load of 187.5 kips and an ultimate load of 375 kips. The weight of the ballast box is designed to resist the uplift force. The required weight of the box is determined by the maximum uplift force obtained from different load combinations of the crane, including SSE. The analysis results indicate that the maximum uplift force is 254 kips, which occurs from a load combination of Dead Load + Lifted load (LL) + SSE. The LL is the weight of the fully loaded HI-TRAC 100 spent fuel transfer cask and MPC. The box measures 6 feet in width by 16.33 feet in length by 8 feet in height and is constructed with 2-inch thick A36 steel plates for the base and walls, and 2.5-inch thick center plates. The box is filled with A36 steel plates, and weighs about 274.4 kips. Stresses in the box during lifting are based on an analysis using the ANSYS computer code. The entire box was load tested up to 399 kips. The ballast box is designed to support the maximum crane wheel reactions transmitted through the crane rail as well as the uplift forces from the turnbuckles.
The entire new crane is seismically qualified by response spectrum analysis in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, as referenced in Section 2.5 of NUREG-0554, to assure that the crane structure and trolley will maintain their structural integrity, remain in place on their rails, retain control of and hold the rated load, and generate no missiles when subjected to the seismic forces equivalent to the specified SSE. A seismically qualified accelerometer and shutdown switch are provided to shut off power to the crane system in the event of an SSE. This ensures that the controls will not cause uncommanded crane motions.
In its application letter, dated November 1, 2004, Entergy stated that the gantry crane main hoist has a capacity of 110 tons maximum critical load (MCL) to handle the HI-TRAC100 transfer cask, while an auxiliary hoist rated at 45 tons MCL would be used to handle ancillary components associated with the HI-STORM 100 cask system. In Question 2 of its request for additional information dated February 25, 2005, the NRC staff requested a description of the controls used to ensure that the crane will not be inadvertently used for unintended purposes (e.g. lifting fuel elements from the spent fuel racks.) In Attachment 1 of its April 12, 2005, supplemental letter, the licensee stated that the new gantry crane was specifically designed to handle the Holtec HI-TRAC 100D and MPC-32, and that both the 110-ton and the 45-ton hoists were designed to mate only with the HI-TRAC trunnions and MPC lift cleats, respectively. The licensee also stated that both hoists contain air-powered paddled ears that open and close for latching and unlatching; therefore, they are not suitable for general purpose lifts without the use of a specially designed adapter.
The licensee stated that the new gantry crane movements are governed by a series of limit and proximity switches that are controlled by a programmable logic controller (PLC) which ensures that: (1) movement of the trolley towards the spent fuel pit is only permitted if turnbuckles are attached to the crane tie down points, cantilever arms are extended and locked in place, and the main transfer hoist is operating at an elevation that allows the HI-TRAC to clear the south wall of the spent fuel pit; (2) limit switches on the trolley rails limit excessive movement of the trolley to the north and prohibit lowering of the load until a minimum northward travel is reached; and (3) main transfer hoist operation is prohibited until the new gantry crane tower is in its raised position and pinned in place.
In Attachment 1 of its supplemental letter dated July 22, 2005, the licensee clarified that limit switches verify that the east, west, and end-tie girder actuators are extended and locked in place. In addition, a redundant mechanical limit switch is actuated when the end tie is fully closed. Trolley motion will not occur until all these hard-wired interlocks are satisfied.
The licensee also stated that the main hoist and canister hoist must be raised to their respective geared upper limit positions before the trolley is allowed to move north or south over the spent fuel pit wall. If the interlocks are not satisfied, a primary cantilever limit switch will stop the trolley motion prior to movement onto the cantilever. If the trolley moves beyond the switch, a secondary cantilever limit switch will remove power to the trolley motor controller and brake.
Removal of power to the brake control results in brake actuation.
To prevent movement of the trolley towards the spent fuel pit when the turnbuckles have not been attached to the crane tie down points, proximity switches are provided. The proximity switches will actuate when all six turnbuckles (4 in the south truck and 2 in the north truck) are mechanically secured. If the interlocks are not satisfied, a primary cantilever limit switch will stop trolley motion prior to movement onto the cantilever. If the trolley moves beyond the switch, a secondary cantilever limit switch will remove power to the trolley motor controller and brake. Removal of power to the brake control results in brake actuation. This system meets the intent of the guidelines of NUREG-0554, Section 5.2, Safety Stops.
In its response to Question 2 of the supplemental request for additional information, dated June 6, 2005, the licensee reiterated its commitment to provide adequate procedures and training to crane operators. Specifically, Entergy stated that gantry crane operating procedures utilized for cask and cask components lifts will be prepared to include: identification of required equipment; inspection and acceptance criteria required before load movement; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; definition of the safe load paths; and other precautions.
Entergy also discussed how training and administrative controls, in addition to the interlocks and design features described above, would provide defense-in-depth, consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
The licensee stated that the cask handling key switch will be removed at all times and administratively protected with the switch in the normal position, except when operation over the spent fuel pit is required, and only trained personnel would be allowed to use the key with authorization of the program manager. The licensee also stated that after the cantilever arms are completely extended and all pins are locked in place, power from the girder mechanization system will be shut off; this removes power to all girder actuators and girder locking pin solenoids. Also, the pressurized air system will be disconnected from the girder mechanization system. These measures ensure that inadvertent operations of any portion of the girder mechanization system are not allowed during crane operations. The licensee also stated that a trolley locking pin will always be installed to ensure movement of the trolley is not allowed when cantilevered arms are not closed and locked in place, and the turnbuckles are in place and secured.
3.1 Summary of commitments To ensure that the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 are satisfied, the licensee has included the following commitments in its amendment request.
Commitment 1 - Safe Load Paths Safe load paths will be determined, analyzed and documented in procedures for control of heavy loads handled by the FSB gantry crane. It should be noted that the FSB gantry crane (by design) is unable to move spent fuel casks over any area of the spent fuel pit where the spent fuel is stored. However, to further minimize the potential for a heavy load impacting irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pit, load paths will be defined in procedures and shown on equipment layout drawings. Deviations from the safe load paths will require written alternative procedures reviewed and approved in accordance with IP2 procedures.
Commitment 2 - Procedures Gantry crane operating procedures utilized for cask and cask component lifts will be prepared to include: identification of required equipment; inspection and acceptance criteria required before load movement; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe load path; and other precautions. A specific cask loading and handling procedure will provide additional details for controlled movement during cask handling operations.
Commitment 3 - Crane operators Crane operators will receive training that includes provisions of Chapter 2-3 of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard B30.2-1976. In addition, completion of a crane-specific on-the-job training qualification card is required.
Commitment 4 - Special lifting devices The HI-TRAC lifting yoke is the only special lifting device that is required to meet the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1993 and the additional guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(a).
Commitment 5 - Lifting devices that are not specifically designed Other lift components utilized with the HI-STORM 100 cask system meet ANSI B30.9-1971 requirements, including the additional guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(1)(b).
Commitment 6 - Crane inspection, test and maintenance The FSB gantry crane will be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976 and the additional guidance contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(6) regarding frequency of inspections and test.
3.2 Conclusion The NRC staff finds that the proposed design and use of the new single-failure-proof gantry crane is in accordance with NUREG-0554 and satisfies the guidelines of NUREG-0612. The NRC staff finds that use of the proposed crane will enable the licensee to handle the HI-TRAC transfer cask and associated components with very low risk to irradiated fuel stored in the spent fuel pit or to redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment during spent fuel transfer activities.
Therefore, the use of the new single-failure-proof gantry crane for cask handling operations for loads up to 110 tons is approved.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (69 FR 70716). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: J. Hernandez, J. Ma Date: November 21, 2005