ML052910482
| ML052910482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/2005 |
| From: | Julio Lara Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-05-006 | |
| Download: ML052910482 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000373/2005006
Text
October 12, 2005
Mr. Christopher M. Crane
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
FIRE PROTECTION TRIENNIAL BASELINE INSPECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2005006(DRS); 05000374/2005006(DRS)
Dear Mr. Crane:
On September 2, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the
inspection findings which were discussed on September 2, 2005, at the LaSalle County Station,
with Ms. Susan Landahl and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety
significance, which involved a violation of NRC requirements, was identified. However,
because the violation was of very low safety significance and because the issue was entered
into the licensee's corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a Non-Cited
Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response
within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the
Resident Inspector Office at the LaSalle County Station facility.
C. Crane -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Julio F. Lara, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2005006(DRS); 05000374/2005006(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
LaSalle County Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalle
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
C. Crane -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Julio F. Lara, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000373/2005006(DRS); 05000374/2005006(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - LaSalle County Station
LaSalle County Station Plant Manager
Regulatory Assurance Manager - LaSalle County Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Manager Licensing - Clinton and LaSalle
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional
Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML052910482.wpd
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII E RIII RIII RIII
NAME GHausman:jb BBurgess JLara
DATE 10/7/05 10/7/05 10/12/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
C. Crane -3-
ADAMS Distribution:
GYS
DMS6
RidsNrrDipmIipb
GEG
KGO
CAA1
C. Pederson, DRS (hard copy - IRs only)
DRPIII
DRSIII
PLB1
JRK1
ROPreports@nrc.gov (inspection reports, final SDP letters, any letter with an IR number)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos: 50-373; 50-374
Report No: 05000373/2005006(DRS); 05000374/2005006(DRS)
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 2601 N. 21st Road
Marseilles, IL 61341
Dates: August 15 through September 2, 2005
Inspectors: G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
A. Dahbur, Reactor Inspector
A. Klett, Reactor Inspector
Approved by: J. Lara, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000373/2005006(DRS); 05000374/2005006(DRS); 08/15/2005 - 09/02/2005; LaSalle
County Station, Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection Triennial Baseline Inspection.
This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection
was conducted by Region III inspectors. One Green finding associated with a Non-Cited
Violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for a
violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(c) requirements. The licensee failed to
establish written procedures that contained direction for ensuring that fire doors
(i.e., fire-rated barriers) were closed and latched. Specifically, the inspectors found an
inoperable fire door in which the latching pins were not extended into the door frame.
The licensees daily fire door surveillance failed to include direction for ensuring that the
latching pins in the inactive door leaf in a set of double doors were extended into the
door frame. Once identified, the licensee entered the finding into their corrective action
program as Issue Report 00363677 to revise the affected procedure.
The finding was more than minor because the potential existed for fire doors to have
been inoperable without established compensatory measures. Also, two instances of
inoperable fire doors were found as a result of the performance deficiency. An
inoperable fire barrier could have allowed the propagation of fire from one fire area to
another that contained redundant safe shutdown equipment. The finding was of very
low safety significance because the two fire areas that were separated by the inoperable
fire doors did not contain redundant equipment important for safe shutdown.
(Section 1R05.9b)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
2 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Units 1 and 2 operated at or near full power throughout the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
The purpose of this inspection was to review the LaSalle County Stations (LSCSs)
Fire Protection Program (FPP) for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was
placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) capability and the fire
protection (FP) features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one
post-fire SSD success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) regulatory oversight process using a
risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The
inspectors used the LSCSs Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) to
choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire areas
chosen for review during this inspection were:
Selected Fire Areas and Zones
Fire Area Fire Zone Description
3 various Unit 2 Reactor Building
4 various Auxiliary Building
5 various Turbine Building
8 various Unit 2 Diesel-Generator Building
For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on selected FP features, the
systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions,
determination of licensee commitments, and changes to the FPP.
.1 Systems Required to Achieve and Maintain Post-Fire SSD
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.1,
required the licensee to provide FP features that were capable of limiting fire damage to
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to SSD. The SSCs that were
necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire SSD were required to be protected by FP
features that were capable of limiting fire damage to the SSCs so that:
- One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions
from either the control room or emergency control station(s) was free of fire
damage; and
- Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the
control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72-hours.
3 Enclosure
Specific design features for ensuring this capability were specified by 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G.2.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire
SSD to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems
necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions for each fire area selected for review
in accordance with the criteria discussed above. Specifically, the review was performed
to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant
makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. This
review included the FP Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA).
The inspectors also reviewed the operators ability to perform the necessary manual
actions for achieving SSD by reviewing procedures, the accessibility of SSD equipment,
and the available time for performing the actions.
The inspectors reviewed the LSCSs Updated Safety Analysis Report and the licensees
engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license
amendments, technical specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and
deviations) to determine the licensing basis.
b. Findings
Introduction: The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the
licensee not establishing the required physical protection or separation of cables to
ensure that one redundant train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown condition was free of fire damage. The licensee instead relied on operator
manual actions for post-fire SSD in the event of a fire in non-alternate shutdown areas.
Description: The inspectors noted that the SSA of the LSCSs Fire Protection Report
(FPR), Sections H.4.2.11.1 and H.4.2.12.1, relied on operator manual actions to achieve
and maintain SSD. In the event of a severe fire in Fire Zone 2F or in Fire Zone 3F, the
licensee relied upon operator manual actions instead of meeting the physical protection
or separation guidance contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP),
ASB 9.5-1 and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The
operator manual actions were to be accomplished outside the main control room (MCR)
and were relied upon for achieving and maintaining SSD from the MCR. The licensee
did not receive NRC approval for a deviation from these requirements. The inspectors
also noted that these operator manual actions were not specifically identified in
procedures. Instead, the licensee depended on operator training to respond to
component failures. Specifically, Procedure HU-LA-104-101, Procedure Use and
Adherence, Step 4.9.1, indicated that, Actions required to manually duplicate an
automatic action that has failed to automatically occur may be performed from memory,
and Section 4.9.2, indicated that, Manual initiation of automatic actions that failed to
occur may be performed from memory without procedure.
4 Enclosure
The LSCSs SSA described two methods credited for SSD in the event of a fire, the
Basic method used from the control room and the Alternate method used from the
remote shutdown panel. The Basic method utilized the high pressure core spray
(HPCS) system and the Alternate method utilized the reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC) system for reactor water makeup. The SSA, Section H.4.2.11.1 indicated that a
fire in Fire Zone 2F-1 could affect the cabling for the Unit 1, HPCS injection
valve 1E22-F004 and the Unit 1, RCIC isolation valve 1E51-F063. If the RCIC isolation
valve was to spuriously close, the HPCS injection valve could be manually opened. The
SSA, Section H.4.2.12.1 indicated a similar action for the Unit 2, HPCS injection valve
2E22-F004 and the RCIC isolation valve 2E51-F063 in the event of a fire in Fire
Zone 3F-1.
Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-0519 supplement No. 7, Section 9.5.8,
indicated that the licensee provided a commitment, in a letter dated November 28, 1983,
to meet the requirements of Appendix R with the deviations identified and was accepted
by the NRC staff. During this inspection, the inspectors found two deviations for lack of
separation between redundant cables, located in the Unit 2 reactor building, listed in
SSER supplement 5. However, the inspectors couldnt find a deviation for the above
manual operator actions. The SSER supplement 5 also indicated that based on the
NRC evaluation, the staff concluded that the FPP for the LSCS, Units 1 and 2, with the
accepted deviations for FP for SSD met the guidelines contained in Appendix A to
Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, the technical requirements of Appendix R to
10 CFR Part 50, and Criterion 3 of the General Design Criteria, and were therefore
acceptable.
The FPP, SSA, Section H.4.1.3, stated Where local operator action was feasible,
credit was taken for manual valve operation, local control of pump, and visual local
monitoring of essential instrumentation. The licensee indicated that based on the
content of this section, the above operator manual actions were permitted and justified.
The licensee planned no further actions in response to this issue.
The inspectors walked down the operator manual actions discussed above, reviewed
them against the feasibility criteria identified in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Enclosure 2, Inspection Criteria for Fire Protection Manual Actions, and
concluded that although the operator manual actions were not specifically listed in the
licensees procedure(s), which may have resulted in a delay in preforming the required
actions, they were feasible and could reasonably be accomplished. Per Nuclear Design
Information Transmittal LAS-ENDIT-H035, Appendix R Evaluation for Task #22," and
Procedure LOA-FX-101/201, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safe Shutdown with a Loss of Offsite
Power and a Fire in the Control Room or AEER, the HPCS or RCIC systems were
required to provide reactor water makeup within 20-minutes.
Therefore, pending a review of the licensees commitment to 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G, and a review to determine if the use of the above described
operator manual actions instead of providing physical protection or separation to meet
the LSCSs license condition, this issue is a URI (URI 05000373/2005006-01(DRS);05000374/2005006-01(DRS)).
5 Enclosure
.2 Fire Protection of SSD Capability
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, required separation of cables
and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a
3-hour rating. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, required that, if the
guidelines cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its
associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or
zone under consideration should be provided.
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire zones, the inspectors reviewed the licensees SSA to
ensure that at least one post-fire SSD success path was available in the event of a fire
in accordance with the criteria discussed above. This included a review of manual
actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions and to make the
necessary repairs to reach cold shutdown within 72-hours. The inspectors also
reviewed procedures to determine whether or not adequate direction was provided to
operators to perform these manual actions. Factors such as timing, access to the
equipment, and the availability of procedures, were considered in the review.
The inspectors also evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems,
fire area barriers, penetration seals, and fire doors to ensure that at least one train of
SSD equipment was free of fire damage. To accomplish this, the inspectors observed
the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression
systems, fire barriers, construction details, and supporting fire tests for the installed fire
barriers. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee documentation, such as
deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings, carbon dioxide
pre-operational test reports, smoke removal plans, Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) reports,
SSA, and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes to verify that the fire
barrier installations met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Post-Fire SSD Circuit Analysis
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that SSCs important to SSD
be provided with FP features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of
fire damage. Options for providing this level of FP were delineated in 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R,Section III.G.2. Where the protection of systems whose function was
required for hot shutdown did not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2,
an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, were required
to be provided that was independent of the cables, systems, and components in the
area. For such areas, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3, specifically required
the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to be physically and electrically
independent of the specific fire areas and capable of accommodating post-fire
6 Enclosure
conditions where offsite power was available and where offsite power was not available
for 72-hours.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees SSA and Safe Shutdown
Equipment List (SSEL) to determine whether the licensee had appropriately identified
and analyzed the safety related and non-safety related cables associated with SSD
equipment located in the selected plant fire zones in accordance with the criteria
discussed above. The inspectors review included the assessment of the licensee's
electrical systems and electrical circuit analyses.
The inspectors evaluated a sample of safety and non-safety related cables for
equipment in the selected fire zones to determine if the design requirements of
Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 were being met. This included
determining that hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground would not prevent
implementation of SSD.
b. Findings
Introduction: The inspectors identified that the licensee evaluated their post-fire SSD
circuit analysis using a method that was not consistent with the methodology described
in the NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2004-003, Revision 1, Risk-Informed
Approach for Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections, issued on December 29,
2004. The licensees position was that the RIS guidance was outside LSCSs licensing
basis.
Description: During the inspectors review of the licensees FPP, specifically the review
of Issue Report (IR) IR00369313, Multiple Spurious ADS Valve Actuations URI (Q70),
dated September 1, 2005, the licensee stated that the LSCSs licensing basis was in
conflict with the recent NRC inspection guidance discussed in RIS 2004-003,
Revision 1. The LSCS methodology assumed a single spurious operation (except for
high/low pressure interfaces) and was limited to valves. The licensee stated that the
RIS 2004-003, Revision 1, guidance and/or methodology was not within the LSCSs
licensing basis.
Further discussions between the licensee and the NRC concluded that a thorough
review of LSCSs licensing basis was necessary and additional inspection effort
warranted to evaluate the licensees FPP. Therefore, pending review and completion of
additional inspection activities concerning the LSCSs FPP, this issue is an URI.
(URI 05000373/2005006-02(DRS);05000374/2005006-02(DRS))
.4 Alternative Shutdown Capability
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.1, required the licensee to
provide FP features that were capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of
systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remained free of
fire damage. Specific design features for ensuring this capability were provided in
7 Enclosure
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where compliance with the separation
criteria of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, could not be met, an alternative
or dedicated shutdown capability be provided that was independent of the specific fire
area under consideration. Additionally, alternative or dedicated shutdown capability
must be able to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions and achieve cold shutdown
conditions within 72-hours and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the
post-fire SSD, the reactor coolant process variables must remain within those predicted
for a loss of normal alternating current power, and the fission product boundary integrity
must not be affected (i.e., no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant
boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary).
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve SSD to determine if
the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve
and maintain SSD conditions in accordance with the criteria discussed above. The
inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure
control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process
monitoring, and support system functions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Operational Implementation of Alternate Shutdown Capability
The LSCSs FPP described the means by which SSD could be achieved to meet the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L. The LSCSs
SSA identified the minimum number of components and plant systems necessary for
achieving Appendix R SSD performance goals.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees operating procedures, which
augmented the post-fire SSD procedures to determine if the licensee complied with the
criteria discussed above. The review focused on ensuring that all required functions for
post-fire SSD and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions
were included in the procedures. The review also looked at operator training, as well as
consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated
administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
8 Enclosure
.6 Communications
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.H, required that a portable
communications system be provided for use by the fire brigade and other operations
personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown. This system should not interfere
with the communications capabilities of other plant personnel. Fixed repeaters installed
to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure
to fire damage.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the communication systems to support plant
personnel in the performance of alternative SSD functions and fire brigade duties to
determine compliance. The inspectors conducted a review to determine that adequate
communications were available to support SSD implementation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.J., required that fixed self-contained
lighting consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual 8-hour minimum
battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for SSD and
for access and egress routes to and from all fire zones.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the fire zones and the access/egress routes to
determine that adequate emergency lighting existed in accordance with the criteria
discussed above.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Cold Shutdown Repairs
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.L.5, required that equipment and
systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions
should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems
should be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown
achieved within 72-hours. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available onsite,
and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.
9 Enclosure
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine if any repairs were
required to achieve cold shutdown. The inspectors determined that the licensee did
require repair of some equipment to reach cold shutdown based on the SSD methods
used. The inspectors reviewed the procedures for adequacy.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Fire Barriers and Fire Zone/Room Penetration Seals
Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.M, required that penetration seal
designs be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed test reports for 3-hour rated barriers installed in the plant,
performed visual inspections of selected barriers to determine if the barrier installations
were consistent with tested configuration, and reviewed drawings and penetration seal
schedules.
b. Findings
Introduction: The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Technical
Specification 5.4.1(c) having very low safety significance (Green) for the licensees
failure to establish written procedures that contained direction for ensuring that fire
doors (i.e., fire-rated barriers) were closed, latched, and operable.
Description: During a plant walkdown, the inspector traversed through Fire Door 393
which was a double door separating the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. When
verifying that the fire door was latched closed, the inspector identified that both doors
opened with negligible resistance. As a result, operations staff declared the fire door
inoperable, and the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as
IR 00363677, NRC 2005 FP Inspection-Door 393 Inactive Leaf Not Pinned, dated
August 16, 2005. The licensees staff found that the pins in the inactive door leaf (the
stationary door without a handle) of the set of double doors were not extended into the
door frame. Although the doors were latched to each other, both doors opened easily
without the inactive leaf door pins extended into the door frame. The licensees staff
re-latched the pins and the door was declared operable. The licensee performed an
extent of condition review on fire doors of similar construction and found that one of two
pins on Fire Door 406, which also separated the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings,
was not extended into the door frame. The licensee declared this door inoperable until
the pin was re-latched.
The licensee's Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), which contained the
administrative controls for the fire protection program as specified by the UFSAR, stated
10 Enclosure
that fire barriers are used to prevent the spread of a fire and to limit the damage from a
fire. The TRM also defined a fire resistant door as a fire rated assembly which shall be
operable at all times and specified a daily surveillance requirement to verify the position
of each closed fire door. The licensees daily fire door surveillance procedure,
LOS-FP-D1, instructed operators to verify the position of each closed fire door listed in
an attachment of the procedure. However, the procedure did not instruct operators to
verify that fire doors were closed and latched (i.e., the stationary pins were extended
into the door frame) by challenging the door. As written, the procedure allowed a visual
verification of a closed fire door position without challenging the door. The licensee
representatives informed the inspectors that challenging the fire doors was a common
practice during the implementation of this procedure.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish written procedures that
contained direction for ensuring that fire doors were closed and latched was a
performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The inspectors concluded
that the finding was greater than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor
Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, issued on May 19, 2005. The
finding involved the attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and affected the
mitigating systems objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The lack of instructions within
procedure LOS-FP-D1 for ensuring that the stationary pins were extended into the door
frame fire doors resulted in inoperable fire doors without established compensatory
measures. This performance deficiency affected 24 sets of double fire doors, 2 of which
were identified as inoperable. The inoperable fire barriers could have allowed the
propagation of a fire from one unit to the other, which was an unanalyzed condition, or
from one fire area to another that contained redundant SSD equipment.
In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, the inspectors performed an SDP Phase 1
screening and determined that the finding degraded the FP portion of the Mitigation
Systems Cornerstone. Therefore, screening under IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire
Protection Significance Determination Process, dated May 28, 2005, was required.
Based on Table 1.1-1 in Appendix F, the finding was determined to affect the element of
fire confinement. The finding was assigned a Moderate B degradation rating in
accordance with Table A2.2 in Attachment 2 of Appendix F because the door latches
(leaf pins) would not have functioned in their as-found condition. Since the finding was
related to fire confinement and assigned a Moderate B degradation rating, Step 1.3,
Task 1.3.2 of Appendix F was performed. The inspectors determined that the as-found
condition of Fire Door 406 with one of two pins not latched would have provided at least
a 2-hour fire endurance rating based on the doors ability to not open, buckle, or move
out of the frame with one pin latched into the frame. The inspectors also determined
that because Fire Door 393 did not separate fire zones containing redundant equipment
important to SSD and because the immediate area on the Unit 1 side of Fire Door 393
was protected with a sprinkler system (the door swings open in the direction from Unit 2
to Unit 1), the exposed area (Unit 1 Rx Bldg) did not contain potential damage targets
that were unique from those in the exposing fire area (Unit 2 Rx Bldg). Therefore, this
finding was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green).
11 Enclosure
Enforcement: Technical Specification 5.4.1(c) required that written procedures for the
stations FPP be established, implemented, and maintained. Contrary to this
requirement, the licensee's daily fire door surveillance procedure failed to establish
directions for ensuring that fire doors (i.e., fire rated assemblies) are latched, closed,
and operable. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
IR 00363677 and revised the daily fire door surveillance procedure by adding direction
to challenge the fire doors to ensure that the door latches and pins are engaged.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the
licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent
with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000373/2005006-03(DRS);05000374/2005006-03(DRS)).
.10 Fire Protection Systems, Features and Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the material condition, operations lineup, operational
effectiveness, and design of fire detection systems, fire suppression systems, manual
fire fighting equipment, fire brigade capability, and passive fire protection features. The
inspectors reviewed deviations, detector placement drawings, fire hose station drawings,
and fire hazard analysis reports to ensure that selected fire detection systems, sprinkler
systems, portable fire extinguishers, and hose stations were installed in accordance with
their design, and that their design was adequate given the current equipment layout and
plant configuration.
b. Findings
Introduction: The inspectors identified a URI associated with the licensees analysis for
deviating from the LSCSs National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code of record
(72E-1974 Automatic Fire Detectors) for the installation of automatic smoke detectors.
Specifically, the inspectors were concerned that the analysis did not adequately justify
the quantity and location of smoke detectors in several safety-related fire zones.
Description: During a walkdown of Unit 2 safety related Fire Zones 4E2 (i.e., Auxiliary
Electrical Equipment Room), 4E4 (i.e., Division 2 Switchgear and 125Vdc Battery
Room), 4F2 (i.e., Division 1 Switchgear and 250/125Vdc Battery Room), and
5D2 (i.e., Division 3 HPCS Switchgear and 125Vdc Battery Room), the inspectors noted
several concerns regarding the spacing and installation of smoke detectors.
Specifically, the smoke detectors were located below beams that were 18-inches and
larger in depth and several smoke detectors were located below the cable trays in the
fire zone. Also, the inspectors noted that an aisle located in Fire Zone 4E4 did not have
smoke detectors installed in the beam pocket as required per NFPA code 72E-1974.
The aisle lacking smoke detection was approximately 24-feet long by 5-feet wide; it had
24-inch construction beams, which ran across the west and south ends of the area, and
contained several cable trays that ran in the overhead of the area. The nearest smoke
detectors were located approximately 7-feet from the west beam and 6-feet from the
south beam.
12 Enclosure
The inspectors noted that NRC inspection reports 50-373/83-44(DE); 50-374/83-48(DE)
had also identified the same concerns during the facility licensing process. On
December 12, 1983, the NRC issued a severity Level IV violation for inadequate design
and installation of the fire detection system throughout all areas of the plant at LSCS.
Specifically, the inspectors found that the detections system did not meet the provisions
of the NFPA 72E, in that, the number of smoke detectors installed were inadequate and
those detectors installed were improperly positioned on suspended conduit 4-feet
beneath the ceiling and approximately 18-inches beneath the beams instead of being
located at the ceiling as required by NFPA 72E. The above inspection reports also
included open items 50-373/83-44-10 and 50-374/83-48-16 to resolve the NRC concern
regarding the actuation of smoke detectors in the SSD areas where there was
continuous high ventilation air flow.
In response to the previously identified NRC violation described above, the licensee
performed an analysis which included justification for the smoke detectors installation
and recommended modifications. The modifications included the addition of two
detectors and the relocation of other six detectors for the safety related fire zones which
were reviewed for both units, the above fire zones were among these fire zones. The
analysis was submitted from the licensee to the NRC by a letter dated March 9, 1984,
where the licensee requested that open items 50-373/83-44-10 and 50-374/83-48-16 to
be closed based on the analysis. Moreover, the concern for Unit 2 over the design
adequacy of the licensees smoke detectors installation (open item 50-374/83-48-16)
was incorporated as a condition in the Unit 2 license. This license condition was tracked
by open item 374/81-00-56(DPRP) which was closed in NRC Region III Inspection
Reports 50-373/84-05 (DPRP); 50-374/84-05 (DPRP), where the inspectors at that time
verified that all items which were tracked by this open item were completed.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the above analysis which justified the
installation of the smoke detectors, and concluded that the analysis was inadequate.
The analysis stated that ceiling heights in the rooms surveyed were a minimum of
16-feet and therefore, were considered high ceilings (i.e., subject to stratification) as
described in NFPA 72E. The depths of beams in the rooms varied between 8- and
36-inches. However, because of the effects of stratification, ventilation, and the nature
of the combustibles (e.g., cables qualified to IEEE 383), the beams in these rooms were
not considered a factor in the location of detectors per the analysis. The inspectors did
not find the height of the ceilings, the ventilation and the nature of combustibles at LSCS
unique and different from other nuclear power plants. The analysis also included a
stratification effect section which was based on section 4-3.1.2 of NFPA 72E-1982. This
section of the licensees analysis indicated that the installation of detectors at least
3-feet below the ceiling, alternating with ceiling mounted detectors, is suggested as a
means of improving detector response time in high ceiling rooms where stratification is
expected. The inspectors found that this is contrary to section 4-4.5.2 of the licensees
code of record, NFPA code 72E-1974, which stated that for proper protection of
buildings with high ceilings, detectors shall be installed alternately at two levels; one half
at ceiling level, and the other half at least 3-feet below the ceiling. The inspectors
reviewed section 4-3.1.2 of NFPA 72E-1982 and concluded that the conditions
described in this section, which are known to accentuate stratification did not apply to
the types of ceiling in these safety-related rooms at LSCS. The inspectors also
13 Enclosure
concluded that the analysis inadequately interpreted the requirements of the NFPA 72E
by not installing detectors at the ceiling in several beam pockets, specifically in the aisle
located in fire zone 4E4. In addition, the inspectors walkdown of Fire Zone 3F showed
that all detectors were mounted on the ceiling, and the ceiling height was higher than
the other safety related rooms which shows inconsistency in how the licensee installed
detectors.
The licensee initiated IR 00368883, Fire Detector Location in Fire Zone 4E4 U2 Div 2
SWGR Room (Q94), dated August 31, 2005, to document the inspectors concerns and
evaluate the lack of smoke detectors in the switchgear room aisle and the location of
several detectors below the cable trays. The evaluation indicated that the smoke
detectors located near both ends of the aisle were located approximately 34-feet apart
and that the NFPA code 72E-1974 allowed spacing of up to 41-feet in corridors that are
10-feet wide or less. The evaluation also indicated that the cable trays located in the
aisle, which have solid metal bottoms and sides, would have provided significant
obstructions to smoke flow towards the ceiling and would tended to divert smoke
towards the smoke detectors located on both ends of the aisle. However, the inspectors
determined that the evaluation failed to properly evaluate the affect of the beam pockets
and the mounting of the smoke detectors 3-feet below the ceiling.
The inspectors were concerned that the licensees technical basis for the design and
installation of the fire detection systems throughout all safety related areas of the plant
was inadequate. Specifically, the smoke from a fire in those areas could accumulate in
the ceiling areas in the beam pockets and delay detection of the fire. This delay in
detection would also delay any subsequent manual fire suppression activities.
Therefore, pending a review of the adequacy of the smoke detectors installation and
review of NRCs prior evaluation and acceptance of the licensees analysis, this issue is
an URI. (URI 05000373/2005006-04(DRS);05000374/2005006-04(DRS))
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to determine that adequate compensatory measures
were put in place by the licensee for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable FP and
post-fire SSD equipment, systems, or features. The inspectors also reviewed the
adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function
or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
14 Enclosure
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program procedures and samples of
corrective action documents to assess whether or not the licensee was identifying
issues related to FP at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective
action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, work
orders, design packages, and FP system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Susan Landahl and other
members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on
September 2, 2005. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
No interim exits were conducted.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
15 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
E. Ballou, Mechanical Design Engineer
B. Collins, Fire Marshall
L. Coyle, Operations Director
D. Czufin, Engineering Director
B. Dudley, Senior Reactor Operator
D. Enright, Plant Manager
F. Gogliotti, Plant Engineering Manager
B. Hilton, Mechanical and Structural Supervisor
P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance
K. Ihnen, Nuclear Oversight
S. Landahl, Site Vice President
M. Murskyj, Plant Electrical System Supervisor
J. Rappeport, Nuclear Oversight Manager
J. Rommel, Design Engineering Manager
T. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Vickers, Fire Protection System Engineer
J. Washko, Operations
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. Lara, Engineering Branch 3 Chief
D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Eskins, Resident Inspector
A1 Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000373/2005006-01(DRS); URI Licensee Relied on Operator Manual Actions for
05000374/2005006-01(DRS) Post-fire SSD (Section 1R05.1b)05000373/2005006-02(DRS); URI Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analysis Not
05000374/2005006-02(DRS) Consistent with RIS 2004-003 (Section 1R05.3b)05000373/2005006-03(DRS); NCV Procedures Fail to Ensure Fire Doors Are Operable
05000374/2005006-03(DRS) (Section 1R05.9b)05000373/2005006-04(DRS); URI Justification Inadequate for Detection System Not
05000374/2005006-04(DRS) Meeting NFPA 72E Requirements (Section 1R05.10b)
Closed
05000373/2005006-03(DRS); NCV Procedures Fail to Ensure Fire Doors Are Operable
05000374/2005006-03(DRS) (Section 1R05.9b)
Discussed
None.
A2 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
CALCULATIONS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
LSCS-FPR LaSalle County Station FPR 1
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
IR00360530 Emerg Light Lid Not Closed & Latched August 5, 2005
IR00363677 Door 393 Inactive Leaf Not Pinned (Q61) August 16, 2005
IR00363683 Door 268 Closure Degraded (Q60) August 16, 2005
IR00363967 Reference Errors in LOS-FX-A1 (Q58) August 17, 2005
IR00363998 Outdated Procedure Revisions in Repair Locker (Q16) August 17, 2005
IR00364029 Shift Managers Key Locker Required Lighting (Q45) August 17, 2005
IR00364226 Suppression Equip for Fire Zone 4E4 (Q53) August 18, 2005
IR00364228 HPCS Injection Valve Manual Action (Q09) August 18, 2005
IR00364287 Review LOA-FX-101/201 for Key Storage (Q55) August 18, 2005
IR00364803 Enhance Procedure - Provide Added Guidance (Q63) August 19, 2005
IR00364937 Potential Actions Not Found in SSD Procedure (Q70) August 19, 2005
IR00365588 LOA-FX Procedure References Incorrect Key (Q95) August 22, 2005
IR00366234 Incorrect Dwg X-Referenced for Continuation (Q77) August 24, 2005
IR00366864 LOA-FX-101/201 RCIC Initiation Timeline (Q84) August 25, 2005
IR00367033 UFSAR & P&ID Revisions Needed (Q92) August 26, 2005
IR00367969 Cables Not Listed in Fire Zones (Q77-1) August 29, 2005
IR00368247 NFPA Code Deviation Summary Att 1 Omitted August 30, 2005
IR00368711 Results of IRs Generated on Fire Doors (Q60) August 31, 2005
IR00368883 Fire Detector Locations in Fire Zone 4E4 (Q94) August 31, 2005
IR00369313 Multiple Spurious ADS Valve Actuations URI (Q70) September 1, 2005
IR00369631 Commitment to App R & Manual Actions URI (Q09) September 2, 2005
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED PRIOR TO INSPECTION
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
IR00046979 Sill Found in Degraded Condition During Walkdown March 8, 2001
IR00189513 FP Drawing Discrepancies December 8, 2003
IR00194752 Failure to Challenge Door after Egress January 12, 2004
IR00214202 Fire Door Found Unlatched April 9, 2004
IR00268176 Trickle Charge Light Out On App R Battery Pack Light October 28, 2004
IR00269976 Fire Door Found Ajar in U2 Div II SWGR Room November 3, 2004
A3 Attachment
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED PRIOR TO INSPECTION
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
IR00310187 Fire Door D120 Found Held Open by d/p March 13, 2005
IR00357766 HP Cables Not Identified in FP Plan July 28, 2005
IR00357898 Revise FPR Table H.4-111 Sheet 4 July 28, 2005
DRAWINGS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
1E-0-3073 Elect Installation Fire Stop & Fire-Barriers Details F
1E-0-3932 FP System Floor EL 677'-0", 749'-0" & 843'-6" H&J
1E-0-3933B Fire Detection System Floor EL 731'-0" C
1E-0-3933M Fire Detection System Floor EL 731'-0" C
1E-0-3934M FP System Floor EL 710-6" A&B
1E-1-3518 Elect Install Rx Bldg EL 740'-0" Cols 8.9-12 & A-E AW
1E-2-3124 Cable Pans Aux Bldg EL 687'-0" Cols 18-21 & J-N D
1E-2-3124A Parts/Covers-Aux Bldg EL 687'-0" Cols 18-21 & J-N E
1E-2-3516, Sheet 1 Elect Installation Rx Bldg EL 740'-0" Cols 15-18 & E-J BA
1E-2-3518, Sheet 1 Elect Installation Rx Bldg EL 740'-0" Cols 15-18 & A-E AR
1E-2-3645 Fire-Barrier Seal Tabulation Aux Bldg Y
1E-2-3664 Cable Pan Routing Aux Bldg EL 731'-0" Cols 18-24 J
1E-2-4000DB Station K/D 125Vdc Distribution System H
1E-2-4000DC Station K/D 250Vdc Distribution System C
1E-2-4000EC K/D 250Vdc MCC 221Y S
1E-2-4000FB K/D 125Vdc Distribution-ESS Div 1 N
1E-2-4000FC K/D 125Vdc Distribution-ESS Div 2 N
1E-2-4226AX S/D RCIC System RI (E51) Pt 22 R
1E-2-4392AC Internal/External W/D Rx Bldg 480V MCC 236Y-2 Pt 3 N
M-141 P&ID High Pressure Core Spray AP
M-142, Sheet 1 P&ID Residual Heat Removal System AP
M-142, Sheet 2 P&ID Residual Heat Removal System AT
M-142, Sheet 3 P&ID Residual Heat Removal System AX
M-142, Sheet 4 P&ID Residual Heat Removal System AA
M-142, Sheet 5 P&ID Residual Heat Removal System K
M-147, Sheet 1 P&ID Reactor Core Isolation Coolant System BF
M-147, Sheet 2 P&ID Reactor Core Isolation Coolant System AK
M-1389 Aux Bay Ventilation & Air Conditioning EL 731'-0" AD
S-1073 Aux Bldg Floor Framing EL 749'-0" South Area AJ
S-1074 Aux Bldg Floor Framing EL 749'-0" North Area AN
FIRE PROTECTION IMPAIRMENT PERMITS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
1-05-128-TRM Detection Zone 1-35 Inoperable - Detector Alarming July 12, 2005
2-04-202-TRM LES-FP-06 U2 DG Corridor Pre-Action System Att A.3 March 13, 2005
2-05-036-TRM 2A DG CO2 System Inoperable With Door 505 Opened April 4, 2005
A4 Attachment
PRE-FIRE PLANS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
Fire Zone 2F Rx Bldg EL 740'-0" U1 February 2005
Fire Zone 2G Rx Bldg EL 710'-6" U1 February 2005
Fire Zone 3F Rx Bldg EL 740'-0" Drywell Entrance Floor U2 February 2005
Fire Zone 3G Rx Bldg EL 710'-6" Suppression Pool Entrance U2 February 2005
Fire Zone 5D2 Aux Bldg EL 687'-0" HPCS SWGR Area Div 3 U2 February 2005
PROCEDURES
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
EP-AA-1005 Radiological Emerg Plan Annex For LSCS 18
LMS-ZZ-03 Inspect Fire Doors Separating SR Fire Areas 8
LOA-FP-201 U2 FP System Abnormal 6
LOA-FX-201 U2 SSD with a LOOP & a Fire in the CR or AEER 7
LOA-RX-201 U2 CR Evacuation Abnormal 4
LOP-RX-08 Startup of SD Cooling from the Remote SD Panel 9
LOS-DC-Q7 SSD App R DC Emerg Light Inspection & Data Sheets 2
LOS-FP-D1 FP Door Daily Surveillance 3&4
LOS-FX-A1 SSD Support Equip Inventory Verification 9
LOS-FX-R1 SSD Support Valve Handwheel Verification 0
LTS-1000-41 Elect Fire Penetration Inspection 9
LTS-1000-42 Fire Assembly Integrity Inspection 9
NSWP-S-04 Fire Stop Installation & Inspection 1
OP-AA-201-009 Control of Transient Combustible Material 4
OP-LA-101-111-1001 On-Shift Staffing Requirements 1
OP-MW-201-007 FP System Impairment Control 3
TRM B 3.7.n Technical Requirements Manual Basis SSD Lighting 1
TRM 3.7.o Fire Rated Assemblies 1
REFERENCES
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
LSCS Archival Ops Narrative Logs August 5, 2005
LSCS-UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 14
LSCS-UFSAR UFSAR Amendment 45 April 1979
LSCS-UFSAR UFSAR Amendment 63 July 1983
LOA-FX-101 Procedure Based Instruction Guide Ops Training April 29, 2003
LOA-FX-101 Review
Module/LP ID 451 Ops Training Program - Initial & Continuing Training June 3, 2003
LGA Support Procedure Overview
LORT Open Items Report 2004/2005 LRTPID 23 August 10, 2005
NUREG 0519 SER Related to Operation of LSCS U1 & 2, Sect 9.5 March 1981
NUREG 0519, Sup 2 SER Related to Operation of LSCS U1 & 2, Sect 9.5 February 1982
A5 Attachment
REFERENCES
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
NUREG 0519, Sup 3 SER Related to Operation of LSCS U1 & 2, Sect 9.5 April 1982
NUREG 0519, Sup 5 SER Related to Operation of LSCS U1 & 2, Sect 9.5 August 1983
NUREG 0519, Sup 7 SER Related to Operation of LSCS U1 & 2, Sect 9.5 December 1983
VENDOR DOCUMENTS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
N/A Emerg Light & Battery Description for Big Beams N/A
TR-149 TRANSCO TR-149 Fire & Hose Stream Tests of May 21, 1984
TCO-001 Cement Used in an Elect Penetration
WORK REQUESTS
Number Description or Title Date or Revision
00133074 Door Latch Is Degraded Needs Fix ASAP February 21, 2004
00579398 Fire Rated Assembly Inspection January 7, 2005
00585741 LOS-FX-R1 SSD Support Vlv Hndwhl Verification U2 February 23, 2005
00666900 LOS-FX-A1 SSD Support Equip Inventory Att U0/1/2 March 17, 2005
00764310 Inspect Fire Doors Separating SR Fire Areas May 19, 2005
00808220 SSD App R DC Emerg Light Inspection August 2, 2005
00839561 OP LOS-FP-D1 Att 1A FP Door Daily Surveillance August 16, 2005
98089736 Hydro All Fire Hoses Per TS 4.7.5.4.D or Replace November 8, 2000
A6 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AC or ac Alternating Current
ADAMS Agency-Wide Document Access and Management System
ADS Automatic Depressurization System
AEER Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room
App Appendix
ASAP As Soon as Possible
Att Attachment
ATTN Attention
Aux Auxiliary
Bldg Building
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Control Room
DC or dc Direct Current
d/p Differential Pressure
Div Division
DG Diesel Generator
Dwg Drawing
DRS Division of Reactor Safety
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
EL Elevation
Elect Electrical
Emerg Emergency
FHA Fire Hazard Analysis
FP Fire Protection
FPI Fire Protection Inspection
FPR Fire Protection Report
gov Goverment
HP High Pressure
html Hypertext Markup Language
http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP Inspection Procedure
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IR Inspection Report or Issue Report
k kilo
K/D Key Diagram
LLC Limited Liability Company
LSCS LaSalle County Station
LOA LaSalle Operating Abnormal
LOOP Loss-of-Offsite-Power
MCC Motor Control Center
A7 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
MCR Main Control Room
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPF Nuclear Power Facility
NRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NUREG NRC Technical Report Designation
OA Other Activities
OPS Operations
PARS Publically Available Records System
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
Pt Part
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RIS Regulatory Issue Summary
Rx Reactor
S/D Schematic Diagram
SD Shutdown
SDP Significance Determination Process
SER Safety Evaluation Report
SR Safety Related
SSA Safe Shutdown Analysis
SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components
SSD Safe Shutdown
SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List
Sup Supplement
SWGR Switchgear
TR Test Report
TRM Technical Requirements Manual
TS Technical Specifications
U Unit
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
V or v Volt
W/D Wiring Diagram
wpd WordPerfect Document
www World Wide Web
A8 Attachment