ML052010404
| ML052010404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/2005 |
| From: | O'Keefe C, Troy Pruett NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Ray H Southern California Edison Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML052010404 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000361/2005003
Text
July 20, 2005
Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President
San Onofre, Units 2 and 3
Southern California Edison Co.
P.O. Box 128, Mail Stop D-3-F
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
SUBJECT: ERRATA FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2
AND 3, NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000361/2005003;
Dear Mr. Ray:
Please replace the first page of the Summary of Findings and pages 9 through 12 of NRC
Inspection Report 05000361/2005003; 05000362/2005003 dated July 15, 2005, with the
enclosed revised pages. The purpose of this change is to correct typographical errors.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them
with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/ by CFO'Keefe acting for
Troy W. Pruett, Chief
Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
As stated
Dockets: 50-361
50-362
Licenses: NPF-10
Southern California Edison Co. -2-
cc w/enclosure:
Chairman, Board of Supervisors
County of San Diego
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
San Diego, CA 92101
Gary L. Nolff
Power Projects/Contracts Manager
Riverside Public Utilities
2911 Adams Street
Riverside, CA 92504
Eileen M. Teichert, Esq.
Supervising Deputy City Attorney
City of Riverside
3900 Main Street
Riverside, CA 92522
Raymond Waldo, Vice President,
Nuclear Generation
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
David Spath, Chief
Division of Drinking Water and
Environmental Management
California Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, CA 94234-7320
Michael R. Olson
San Onofre Liaison
San Diego Gas & Electric Company
P.O. Box 1831
San Diego, CA 92112-4150
Ed Bailey, Chief
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Southern California Edison Co. -3-
Mayor
City of San Clemente
100 Avenida Presidio
San Clemente, CA 92672
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, CA 95814
Douglas K. Porter, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, CA 91770
Dwight E. Nunn, Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Daniel P. Breig, Station Manager
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
A. Edward Scherer
Southern California Edison
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Brian Katz, Vice President, Nuclear
Oversight and Regulatory Affairs
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, CA 92674-0128
Adolfo Bailon
Field Representative
United States Senator Barbara Boxer
312 N. Spring Street, Suite 1748
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Southern California Edison Co. -4-
Chief, Technological Services Branch
FEMA Region IX
Department of Homeland Security
1111 Broadway, Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94607-4052
Southern California Edison Co. -5-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (KMK)
Senior Resident Inspector (CCO1)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (TWP)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (NFO)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
RidsNrrDipmIipb
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
SISP Review Completed: _cfo__ ADAMS: : Yes G No Initials: __cfo_
- Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive : Non-Sensitive
R:\_SO23\2005\SO2005-03RP Errata.wpd
RIV:SPE:DRP/D C:DRP/D
NFOKeefe;df TWPruett
/RA/ CFO'Keefe for
7/20/05 7/20/05
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000361/2005003, 05000362/2005003; 04/08/05 - 06/26/05; San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 & 3; Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Maintenance
Effectiveness and Temporary Plant Modifications
This report covered a 3-month period of inspection by three resident inspectors, two regional
office inspectors, and one headquarters inspector. The inspection identified one noncited
violation and one finding. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination
Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be
Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management's review. The NRCs program
for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green. The inspectors identified a finding for the failure to develop an adequate
plan to identify hydraulic leakage on Main Feedwater Block Valve 3HV4051.
This issue involved human performance crosscutting aspects associated with
operators failing to identify the leak on normal shift rounds. This issue was
entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Requests
050401214 and 050401222.
The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated
with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and
affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that
upset plant stability. Furthermore, if left uncorrected, the finding would have
become a more significant safety concern in that continued hydraulic fluid
leakage from Valve 3HV4051 could result in a plant transient. Using Manual
Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the
finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the
hydraulic fluid leakage had not increased to the point where it would contribute to
both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or
functions would not be available (Section 1R23).
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) for
the failure to include component deficiencies of a system important to safety in
the maintenance rule program. Specifically, the licensee did not incorporate
piping header failures of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 steam bypass control system into
the maintenance rule program to ensure appropriate monitoring and goal setting
activities were established. This issue was entered into the corrective action
program as AR 050200923.
ENCLOSURE
-9-
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20)
a. Inspection Scope
For the listed outage, the inspectors reviewed the following risk significant outage
activities to verify defense in depth commensurate with the outage risk control plan and
compliance with the Technical Specifications: (1) the risk control plan;
(2) tagging/clearance activities; (3) reactor coolant system instrumentation; (4) electrical
power; (5) decay heat removal; (6) reactivity control; (7) containment closure; (8) heatup
and cooldown activities; and (9) licensee identification and implementation of
appropriate corrective actions associated with outage activities.
- May 4, 2005, Unit 3 planned outage to repair cracks in the steam bypass header
piping and to repair an external hydraulic leak from main feedwater block
Valve 3HV4051
The inspectors completed one sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure
requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that the six below listed
surveillance activities demonstrated that the SSCs tested were capable of performing
their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to
verify that the following significant surveillance test attributes were adequate:
(1) preconditioning; (2) evaluation of testing impact on the plant; (3) acceptance criteria;
(4) test equipment; (5) procedures; (6) jumper/lifted lead controls; (7) test data;
(8) testing frequency and method demonstrated Technical Specification operability;
(9) test equipment removal; (10) restoration of plant systems; (11) fulfillment of ASME
Code requirements; (12) updating of performance indicator data; (13) engineering
evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested SSCs not meeting the test
acceptance criteria were correct; (14) reference setting data; and (15) annunciators and
alarms setpoints. The inspectors also verified that the licensee identified and
implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
- April 12, 2005, Unit 2 safety injection Tank 2T-009 surveillance per
Procedure SO123-III-1.1.23, Units 2 and 3 Chemical Control of Primary Plant
and Related Systems, Revision 43
ENCLOSURE
-10-
- May 5-6, 2005, Unit 3 pressurizer spray Valves 3PV100A and 3PV100B
performance tests per Procedure SO23-I-6.300, Air Operated Valve Diagnostic
Testing, Revision 7
- May 13, 2005, Unit 3 CCW Pump 3P026 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.3, Component Cooling Water and Seismic Makeup Pump Test, Revision 5
- May 26, 2005, Unit 2 AFW Pump 2P140 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Testing, Revision 10
- June 1, 2005, Unit 3 AFW Pump 3P504 inservice test per Procedure SO23-3-
3.60.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Valve Testing, Revision 10
- June 16, 2005, Units 2 and 3 sound powered phone system check per
Procedure SO23-6-31, Communication System Operation, Revision 4
The inspectors completed six samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, plant drawings,
procedure requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that the one listed
temporary modification was properly implemented. The inspectors: (1) verified that the
modification did not have an effect on system operability and availability; (2) verified that
the installation was consistent with the modification documents; (3) ensured that the
postinstallation test results were satisfactory and that the impact of the temporary
modification on permanently installed SSCs was supported by the test; (4) verified that
the modification was identified on control room drawings and that appropriate
identification tags were placed on the affected drawings; and (5) verified that appropriate
safety evaluations were completed. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified
and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the temporary
modification.
C April 20, 2005, Unit 3 main feedwater block Valve 3HV4051 to Steam
Generator E089 Fermanite repair
The inspectors completed one sample.
ENCLOSURE
-11-
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green finding for the failure to develop an
adequate monitoring plan to identify a hydraulic fluid leak on main feedwater block
Valve 3HV4051.
Description. On January 20, 2005, the licensee identified that Unit 3 main feedwater
block Valve 3HV4051 had an approximate one drop per second hydraulic fluid leak. On
January 27 the licensee successfully stopped the leak by installing a Furmanite rig
around a leaking fitting on the hydraulic supply piping to the valve.
On April 20 the inspectors walked down portions of the Unit 3 main feedwater system in
order to evaluate the condition of the Furmanite rig that had been installed on
Valve 3HV4051. The inspectors observed that the Furmanite rig was leaking hydraulic
fluid at the rate of approximately 10 drops per minute. Furthermore, the inspectors
observed that the leak collection system revealed enough hydraulic fluid to demonstrate
that the leak had been active for more than one operations shift. Specifically, the catch
basin was full of hydraulic fluid and the tygon tubing that was leading into the 55-gallon
drum had an approximate 8-inch section that was full of hydraulic fluid. The inspectors
informed the Unit 3 control room supervisor of the degraded condition of Valve 3HV4051
and the licensee reinjected additional Furmanite the following day to stop the leak.
Valve 3HV4051 serves as a backup to main feedwater isolation Valve 3HV4052, but it is
not credited in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as a containment isolation
valve. The hydraulic system of Valve 3HV4051 serves to keep the valve open against
high pressure nitrogen, and its subsequent loss would result in the valve closing. The
closing of the valve would likely result in the loss of main feedwater and a reactor trip.
The inspectors interviewed operations personnel that were on shift the 3 days prior to
the Furmanite rig leaking on April 20, 2005. The interviews consisted of three field
operators that performed rounds on Valve 3HV4051 and their shift manager. The
inspectors determined that all three operators and the shift manager had a different
understanding of the status of the valve and were either provided incomplete or no
instructions on how to monitor the status of the Furmanite rig on the valve. The
inspectors determined that a monitoring plan had not been established despite the
licensees assessment that the Furmanite rig was susceptible to leakage. The licensee
indicated that operators were expected to monitor the condition of the valve as part of
their normal shift rounds, which included checking equipment for fluid leakage as
described in Procedure OSM-5, Operator Rounds. The licensee subsequently
developed a monitoring plan to ensure that Valve 3HV4051 would be inspected twice
per shift. The value of the monitoring plan was demonstrated when a three to four drop
per minute leak through the Fermanite rig was identified by the licensee on May 2. The
licensee elected not to reinject the valve, but instead permanently repaired it during a
planned shutdown on May 4.
ENCLOSURE
-12-
Analysis. The performance deficiency associated with this finding was the failure to
develop an adequate monitoring plan to identify a hydraulic fluid leak from
Valve 3HV4051. This finding was associated with the initiating events cornerstone. The
finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the
human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affects the
cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability.
Furthermore, if left uncorrected, the finding would have become a more significant
safety concern in that continued hydraulic fluid leakage on Valve 3HV4051 could result
in a plant transient. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process,
Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance
because the hydraulic fluid leak had not increased to the point where it contributed to
both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or
functions were not available. This issue involved human performance crosscutting
aspects associated with the failure to identify the hydraulic leak during operator rounds.
Enforcement. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred. The inspectors
determined that the finding did not represent a noncompliance because Valve 3HV4051
is not subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. While
Valve 3HV4051 serves as a backup to a containment isolation valve, it is not credited in
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as a containment isolation valve. This finding
had been entered into the licensees corrective action program as ARs 050401214 and
050401222. This finding is identified as FIN 05000362/2005003-02, Failure to Identify
Hydraulic Leak on Main Feedwater Block Valve 3HV4051.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2005 Biennial Emergency
Preparedness Exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major
elements of the emergency plan. The scenario included a loss of electrical power to all
of the main control room alarms, a seized reactor coolant pump, a main steam line
break into the primary containment, and a helicopter crash into the main switchyard
which resulted in a loss of offsite power. The scenario continued with a station blackout
due to failures of the emergency diesel generators, and a steam generator tube rupture
and fuel cladding failure, resulting in an ongoing radioactive steam release to the
environment. The licensee activated all of their emergency facilities to demonstrate
their capability to implement the emergency plan.
The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant
activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and
assessment of offsite dose consequences in the simulator control room and the
following emergency response facilities:
ENCLOSURE