ML051030026

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Email Dpv - D.C. Cook
ML051030026
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 01/29/2004
From: Landsman R
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
To: Diaz N, Mcgaffigan E, Merrifield J
NRC/Chairman, NRC/OCM
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0075
Download: ML051030026 (3)


Text

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.. z From: Ross Landsman To: Edward McGaffigan; Jeffrey Merrifield; Nils Diaz Date: 1/29/04 10:52AM

Subject:

DPV - D.C. Cook I would appreciate it if one of you could take time out of your busy day to read the attached, not one of your staff, because certain members of your staff have chosen to disregard evidence that something is wrong with the containment at D.C. Cook for the sole purpose of first allowing D.C. Cook to startup in 2000 and then allowing them to run for years with a degraded containment, and people wonder how Davis Besse happened. In my opinion, your staff's position raises serious questions on the ability of the D.C.

Cook containment to contain an accident and protect the public from harmful radiation. Regarding this matter, if you read the attached, I've pursued all internal avenues available to a member of your staff and feel this matter has not been adequately addressed.

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v diftview dc cook-wp~d IPage 11 1' MEMORANDUM TO: J. E. Dyer, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Ross Landsman, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region III

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW CONCERNING THE NOVEMBER 12,2003, AMENDMENT REQUEST FROM D.C. COOK TO USE YIELD STRENGTH DETERMINED FROM MEASURED MATERIAL PROPERTIES FOR REINFORCING BAR IN STRUCTURAL CALCULATIONS FOR THE CONTROL ROD DRIVE MISSILE SHIELD WALL On June 6, 2000, I submitted a differing professional view (DPV) on the restart of D.C. Cook, Unit 2. One of my concerns related to the operability evaluation for the containment walls. On August 17, 2000, the DPV panel recommended that nothing be done about my concerns because everything was acceptable. On December 4, 2000, I submitted a differing professional opinion (DPO) on the same subject. On April 2, 2001, Dr. Travers responded to me in response to the DPO, agreeing with my technical concerns, stating that the corrective actions for the 'degraded containment walls* will be corrected 'prior to the next refueling outage.*

THEY ARE STILL NOT CORRECTED. Dr. Travers further stated that the other DPO panel issues noted in Section 2.1.2 of the DPO report, will be resolved. One of these issues was the unacceptable material strengths (concrete and reinforcing steel) used in the evaluation that 1, other members of your NRR staff that were too frightened of their job to speak out, and finally, the DPO panel did not accept.

After the DPO report was issued, NRR Projects (without me or the NRR technical staff that agreed with me) had a final meeting with the licensee on June 11, 2001, that indicated again, that everything was okay, but documented nothing about the material strengths problem as Dr.

Travers requested in the attached memorandum to NRR in the DPO response to me.

I was so upset when I saw the June 11, 2001, meeting summary, that I wrote you and Dr. Travers a personnel E-mail on September 17, 2001, stating my concerns about the containment one more time.

On December 12, 2001, in response to me, Rill requested that NRR Projects please review the licensee calculations to determine if the licensee used appropriate assumptions and inputs in determining that the containment structures comply with design basis requirements.

Dr. Travers' assistant also responded to me in an E-mail dated December 17, 2001, stating that the staff plans to conduct a review of the license basis and the licensee's analysis methods and assumptions.

JURview dc Cookmnd xdilTvlew ac COOkwnd Page 2I PaOA 21 J. Dyer On April 17, 2002, in response to the above request, the Civil Engineering Branch of the Division of Engineering, NRR, responded to NRR Projects, stating that, "The staff did not consider the use of very limited test data to support higher yield strength values for the installed rebars to be an adequate justification for revising the licensing basis, and is, therefore, unacceptable."

On January 13, 2003, NRR Projects finally responded to R111's 2001 request stating that, "The NRR staff does not, In principle, accept the use of material CMTR limits (e.g., yield strength) in lieu of nominal specified code properties." It went on to say that, the NRR staff will again follow-up with the licensee to resolve this unacceptable containment issue.

During the ensuing year, the NRR staff has tried, In vain, to make the containment walls acceptable, but couldn't. For example, in a March 21, 2003, letter to the licensee, NRR gave them 30 days "to restore the original design and licensing basis margins" in the containment walls. Their licensee's response, in 33 days, was that we will submit an amendment request by November 2003.

On November 12, 2003, the licensee submitted an amendment request to use the same measured material yield strengths, from limited data, that 1,the NRR technical staff, the DPO panel, and now, additional NRC technical staff said was unacceptable numerous times. I was so upset again, that I wrote another E-mail to you and Dr. Travers on December 3, 2003, after seeing the amendment request stating my concerns about the containment one more time.

Now, through the grapevine, I hear that the NRR staff is about to issue the amendment and I am filing this DPV in disgust.

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\diffview dc cook.wpd