ML043640247

Ltr. to Eric W. Weiss from Darrell Hammons, FEMA - Final Report for Beaver Valley Power Station, March 30-31, 2004, May 11-13, 2004

ML043640247
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/13/2004
From:	Hammons D US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Weiss E NRC/NRR/DIPM
Schneck D, NSIR/DPR/EPD 415-3079
References
Download: ML043640247 (200)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Region III One Independence Mall, Sixth Floor 615 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404

-FEMA SEP 13 2004 Mr. Eric W. Weiss Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics Section Operator Licensing, Human Performance, and Plant Support Branch Division of Inspection Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Weiss:

Enclosed is a copy of the final report for the March 30-31, 2004, out-of-sequence demonstrations and May I 1 & 13, 2004, plume exposure pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific for the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the 1 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), and the 50-mile EPZ. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and risk county of Beaver and 27 risk jurisdictions fully participated in the BVPS exercise. The State of West Virginia and risk county of Hancock also participated in the BVPS plume exercise. BVPS ingestion exercise participants included the State of West Virginia and the counties of Brooke, Hancock, Marshall and Ohio.

One Deficiency and eight Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified during this exercise. The Deficiency was resolved during a remedial exercise, and three of the ARCAs were resolved during re-demonstrations. FEMA Region III staff will monitor the status of the corrective actions.

Based on the results of the 2004 BVPS exercise, FEMA finds that the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of West Virginia and the affected local jurisdictions are adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

wvwwie.fema.gov

Mr. Eric WV. Weiss Page 2 The final exercise report was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Region III staff. A copy of the report has been provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of West Virginia. If you have any questions, please contact me at (215) 931-5546.

Sincerely, Darrell Hammons, Chairperson Regional Assistance Committee Enclosure

Final Exercise Report Beaver Valley Power Station Licensee:

Exercise Date:

Report Date:

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company March 30-31, 2004 May 11 and 13,2004 September 2, 2004 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REGION III - FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ONE INDEPENDENCE MALL SIXTH FLOOR, 615 CHESTNUT STREET PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19115-4404

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1 II.

INTRODUCTION......................................

2 III.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW.......................................

5 A.

Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description....................................

5 B.

Exercise Participants.......................................

6 C.

Exercise Timeline.....................................

14 IV.

EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS 19 A.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.

9 B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 20

1.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 28 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center..........................................

28 1.2 Public Information Activities (CENIC)......................................... 28 1.3 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) - Pennsylvania and West Virginia.................................

29 1.4 Accident Assessment Center (BRP).................................

30 1.5 Emergency Operations Facility (BRP and RHP)........................... 30 1.6 State Field Air Monitoring Team A.................................

31 1.7 State Field Air Monitoring Team B.................................

31 1.8 State Traffic/Access Control.................................

32

2.

Risk Jurisdictions 32 2.1 Beaver County 32 2.1.1 Beaver County Emergency Operations Center.................. 32 2.1.2 City of Aliquippa Emergency Opertions Center................ 36 2.1.3 Beaver Borough Emergency Operations Center................ 36 2.1.4 Bridgewater/Fallston Borough Emergency Operations Center..........................................

37 2.1.5 Brighton Township Emergency Operations Center........... 37 2.1.6 Center Township Emergency Operations Center.............. 38 2.1.7 Chippewa Township Emergency Operations Center......... 38 2.1.8 Frankfort Springs Borough/Hanover Township Emergency Operations Center.......................................... 38 2.1.9 Georgetown Borough/Greene Township/Hookstown Borough Emergency Operations Center............................ 39 2.1.10 Hopewell Township Emergency Operations Center.......... 39 i

2.1.11 Independence Township Emergency Operations Center...............................................

40 2.1.12 Industry Borough Emergency Operations Center.............. 40 2.1.13 Midland Borough Emergency Operations Center.............. 40 2.1.14 Monaca Borough Emergency Operations Center.............. 41 2.1.15 Patterson Township Emergency Operations Center.......... 42 2.1.16 Patterson Heights Borough Emergency Operations Center...............................................

42 2.1.17 Potter Township Emergency Operations Center................ 43 2.1.18 Raccoon Township Emergency Operations Center........... 43 2.1.19 Shippingport Borough Emergency Operations Center...............................................

44 2.1.20 South Beaver Township/Glasgow Borough/

Ohioville Borough Emergency Operations Center............ 44 2.1.21 South Heights Borough Emergency Operations Center...............................................

45 2.1.22 Vanport Township Emergency Operations Center............ 45 2.1.23 Beaver County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station A (Crescent Township Fire Department)...............................................

46 2.1.24 Beaver County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station B (Hanover Fire Department)...............................................

46

3.

Support Counties................................................

47 3.1 Allegheny County 47 3.1.1 Allegheny County Emergency Operations Center............. 47 3.1.2 Allegheny County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (South Park High School).........................................

48 3.1.3 Allegheny County Reception Center (South Park Museum Building).........................................

48 3.2 Butler County.........................................

48 3.2.1 Butler County Emergency Operations Center................... 48 3.2.2 Butler County Reception Center (Slippery Rock University Parking Lot).........................................

49 3.2.3 Butler County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Slippery Rock High School).........................................

49 ii

3.3 Lawrence County 49 3.3.1 Lawrence County Emergency Operations Center.............. 49 3.3.2 Lawrence County Reception Center (Mohawk Area High School)..........................................

50 3.3.3 Lawrence County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Union High School)..........................................

50 3.4 Washington County..........................................

51 3.4.1 Washington County Emergency Operations Center.......... 51 3.4.2 Washington County Reception Center (Washington County Fairgrounds)..........................................

53 3.4.3 Washington County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (McGuffy High School)..........................................

53 4

State of West Virginia

...................... 54 4.1 Emergency Operations Center....................

54 4.2 Public Information Center....................

54 4.3 Accident Assessment....................

54 4.4 Field Air Monitoring Team....................

55 4.5 Field Sampling Team A....................

55 4.6 Field Sampling Team B....................

57 5

Risk Jurisdictions...........

59 5.1 Hancock County 59 5.1.1 Hancock County Emergency Operations Center............... 59 5.1.2 Hancock County Traffic and Access Control Points (New Cumberland Police)..........................................

60 5.1.3 Hancock County Route Alerting (Chester Fire Department)..........................................

61 5.1.4 Hancock County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Weir High School Complex)..........................................

61 5.1.5 Hancock County Reception Center (Weir High School Complex)..........................................

61 5.1.6 Hancock County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station (New Cumberland Fire Department) 62 6

School Districts 62 6.1 Pennsylvania School Districts..........................

62 iii

6.1.1 Aliquippa School District (Aliquippa Middle School)........................................

62 6.1.2 Ambridge School District (Superintendent's Office)........ 63 6.1.3 Beaver Area School District (Brighton Township Elementary)........................................

63 6.1.4 Blackhawk School District (Blackhawk Intermediate School).....................

64 6.1.5 Center Area School District (Todd Lane Elementary School).64 6.1.6 Hopewell Area School District (Raccoon Elementary School).64 6.1.7 Midland Borough School District (Midland Elementary School).65 6.1.8 Monaca School District (Fifth Ward Elementary School).65 6.1.9 New Brighton Area School District (Superintendent's Office).65 6.1.10 South Side Area School District (South Side High School).66 6.1.11 Western Beaver School District (Snyder Elementary School).66 6.2 West Virginia School District

.66 6.2.1 Hancock County School District (New Manchester Elementary School).66 Ingestion Jurisdictions.67 7

7.1 State of West Virginia.67 7.1.1 Brooke County Emergency Operations Center (co-located at Hancock County EOC).67 7.1.2 Marshall County Emergency Operations Center (co-located at Ohio County EOC).68 7.1.3 Ohio County Emergency Operations Center (co-located with Marshall County EOC).68 List of Appendices Appendix I Acronyms and Abbreviations.74 Appendix 2 Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders.77 Appendix 3 Exercise Evaluation Areas and Extent-of-Play Agreement.82 Appendix 4 Exercise Scenario.183 Appendix 5 Planning Issues.193 Appendix 6 Additional Prior Issues.196 List of Tables Table I Exercise Timeline.15 Table 2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.20 iv

I.

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On March 30-31 and May 1 1 and 13, 2004, the U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Region III - Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted an exercise in the plume and ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zones (EPZ) around the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). The purpose of the exercises was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on June 18, 2002.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of West Virginia; the risk counties of Beaver in Pennsylvania and Hancock in West Virginia; the support counties of Allegheny, Butler, Lawrence, and Washington in Pennsylvania; the ingestion counties of Brook, Ohio, and Marshall in West Virginia; and 27 municipalities in Pennsylvania.

FEMA also wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals that participated in the March 30-31, 2004, out-of-sequence demonstrations which included activities at 11 Pennsylvania school districts and one West Virginia school district; traffic and access control points in both Pennsylvania and West Virginia; reception centers in Hancock County, West Virginia, and Butler, Lawrence, and Washington counties in Pennsylvania; mass care centers and monitoring/decontamination stations in Hancock County, West Virginia, and Allegheny, Butler, Lawrence, and Washington counties in Pennsylvania; route alerting in Hancock County, West Virginia; and Emergency Worker monitoring/decontamination in Hancock County, West Virginia, and Beaver County, Pennsylvania.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. One Deficiency, eight Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), and one Planning Issue were identified as a result of this exercise. The Deficiency was resolved through successfully remedial exercise and three of the ARCAs were successfully resolved through redemonstration. In addition, 16 prior ARCAs and two prior Planning Issues were successfully resolved during this exercise.

1

II.

INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA's rule contained in 44 CFR Part 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of Tribal, State, and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (44 CFR Part 354, Appendix A, September 14, 1993); and

• Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; U.S. Department of Transportation; U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S. Department of the Interior; and U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region III Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

2

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and involved local jurisdictions have not formally submitted the RERPs for the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) to FEMA Region III.

On May 11, and 13, 2004, FEMA Region III evaluated a full-scale REP exercise in the plume and ingestion pathway zones to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the BVPS. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings regarding the performance of the off-site response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region III RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

• FEMA Guidance Memoranda MS-I, "Medical Services," November 1986;

• FEMA-REP-14, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual," September 1991;

• 66 Federal Register (FR) 47525, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," September 12, 2001; and

• 66 FR 47546, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Alert and Notification," September 12, 2001.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise evaluation areas at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-3

only format. This section also contains descriptions of the one Deficiency and each of the Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue.

4

III.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW This section contains data and basic information relevant to the May I 1 and 13, 2004, plume and ingestion pathway exercise to test the off-site emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A.

Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description BVPS is located in western Pennsylvania on the southern bank of the Ohio River in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The site is located near Shippingport Borough, about 1 mile from Midland, Pennsylvania, on 501 acres of fairly level terrace owned by the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company. The latitude for the site is 40°37'1 8" north; the longitude is 80°26'02" west. Two pressurized water reactors are located on the 17 acres of the parcel occupied by the power station. The operating licenses for the facility were granted in July 1976 (Unit 1) and August 1987 (Unit 2); commercial operations began at the site during October 1976 (Unit 1) and November 1987 (Unit 2). Unit I generates an output of 810 megawatts (MW); the Unit 2 output is 833 MW. One hundred and ten sirens cover the plume EPZ; 85 of the sirens are in Pennsylvania.

Approximately 1,200 personal home alerting devices have been installed for customers residing outside the audio range of the sirens.

Steep slopes that contributed to the development of river mill towns, where most of the industry and residences are located, characterize the general topography of the region. The region is part of the large industrial complex centered around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The terrain rises from the Ohio River to a maximum elevation of 1,160 feet above mean sea level (MSL). Drainage is predominantly toward the river.

The soils in the area are made up of alluvial sands and gravel. The bedrock geology consists of sedimentary formations composed of shales and sandstones. No faults are located under or near the facility. The Ohio River is about 664 feet above MSL, and the plant grade is 735 feet above MSL.

The climate is a humid continental type. The average annual temperature for the area is about 50 'F. Annual precipitation is approximately 36 inches.

The area ar6und the plant is mostly agricultural or undeveloped. The nearest community is Shippingport Borough, Pennsylvania, which is the 5

parent borough for the site and has a population of 237. The nearest major population center of more than 25,000 people is Pittsburgh, which has a population of 334,563 and lies 22 miles to the southeast. The maximum population distribution, including residents and transients, is 94,023 in the 10-mile EPZ.

Four major industries employ a total of 8,000 persons within 10 miles of the plant. Two small airfields (Beaver County and Herron Airport) are also in the 10-mile EPZ. Runways at both airports are oriented so that the extensions do not pass over the plant. No major thoroughfares exist in the immediate vicinity. The main line of the Conrail Railroad runs parallel to the plant along the north bank of the Ohio River.

B.

Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the BVPS exercise on May 11 and 13, 2004.

COMMONWVEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Health Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania State Police RISK JURISDICTIONS - PENNSYLVANIA BEAVER COUNTY Beaver County Agricultural Services Beaver County Board of Commissioners Beaver County Communications Director Beaver County Emergency Management Agency Beaver County Emergency Services Center Beaver County Financial Administrator Beaver County Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Team 700 Beaver County Health Department Beaver County Radiological Office Beaver County Sheriff's Office Beaver County Solicitor Crescent Township Fire Department FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Hanover Township Volunteer Fire Department Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania National Guard Rochester Township Fire Department 6

CITY OF ALIQUIPPA City of Aliquippa City Council City of Aliquippa Fire and Rescue Department City of Aliquippa Police Department City of Aliquippa Street Department Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (Observer)

BEAVER BOROUGH Beaver Borough Council Beaver Borough Emergency Management Beaver Borough Police Beaver Borough Public Works Beaver Borough Volunteer Fire Department BRIDGEWATER BOROUGH/FALLSTON BOROUGH Bridgewater and Fallston Fire Departments Bridgewater/Fallston Borough Emergency Management Agency Bridgewater Police Department BRIGHTON TOWNSHIP Brighton Township Emergency Management Agency Brighton Township Fire Department Brighton Township Police Department Brighton Township Public Works CENTER TOWNSHIP Center Township Fire and Rescue CHIPPEWA TOWNSHIP Chippewa Township Board of Supervisors Chippewa Township Emergency Management Chippewa Township Police Department Chippewa Township Public Works Chippewa Township Town Manager's Office Chippewa Township Volunteer Fire Department 7

FRANKFORT SPRINGS BOROUGH/IANOV'ER TOWNSHIP Frankfort Springs Emergency Management Agency Hanover Township Council Hanover Township Emergency Management Agency Hanover Township Emergency Medical Services Hanover Township Fire Department GEORGETOWN BOROUGH/GREENE TOWNSHIP/ IHOOKSTOWN BOROUGH Greene Township Supervisors Hookstown Fire Department Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency IJOPEWELL TOWNSHIP Hopewell Township Emergency Management INDEPENDENCE TOWNSHIP Independence Township Emergency Management Independence Township Emergency Medical Services Independence Township Police Department Independence Township Road Department Independence Township Supervisors Independence Township Volunteer Fire Department Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency INDUSTRY BOROUGH Industry Borough City Council Industry Borough Emergency Management Industry Borough Fire Industry Borough Police Industry Borough Water Authority Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency MIDLAND BOROUGH Midland Borough Council Midland Fire Department Midland Police Department Midland Public Works 8

MONACA BOROUGH Monaca Borough Department of Public Works Monaca Borough Emergency Management Agency Monaca Borough Mayor's Office Monaca Borough Police Department Monaca Borough Volunteer Fire Department PATTERSON HEIGHTS BOROUGH/PATTERSON TOWNSHIP Patterson Township Board of Commissioners Patterson Township Fire Department Patterson Township Police Department Patterson Township Public Works Patterson Township Secretary's Office Patterson Heights Borough Council Radio Emergency Associated Citizens Team (REACT) - (GMRS Radio Communications)

POTTER TOWNSHIP Potter Township Emergency Management Agency Potter Township Volunteer Fire Department RACCOON TOWNSHIP Raccoon Township Administrative Support Personnel Raccoon Township Communications Officer Raccoon Township Emergency Management Coordinator Raccoon Township Emergency Medical Services Officer Raccoon Township Fire Services Officer Raccoon Township Police Services Officer Raccoon Township Radiological Protection Officer Raccoon Township Public Works Officer Raccoon Township Town Supervisors (Chairman and two others)

Raccoon Township Transportation Officer SHIPPINGPORT BOROUGH Shippingport Borough Police Department 9

SOUTH BEAVER TOWNSIIIP/GLASGOWNI BOROUGH/ OH1IOVILLE BOROUGH Glasgow Borough Council President Ohioville Emergency Management Coordinator Ohioville Fire Department Ohioville Medical Officer Ohioville Medical Services Ohioville Police Chief-South Beaver Ohioville Radiological Officer Ohioville Township Secretary Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency South Beaver Board of Supervisors South Beaver Emergency Management Coordinator South Beaver Police Chief South Beaver Township Secretary SOUTH HEIGHTS BOROUGH South Heights Borough Council South Heights Police Department VANPORT TOWNSHIP Vanport Health and Safety Coordinators (Nurses)

Vanport Township Commissioners Vanport Township Emergency Services Vanport Township Fire Department Vanport Township Public Works SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS - PENNSYLVANIA ALLEGHENY COUNTY Allegheny County Administrative Services Allegheny County Airport Authority Allegheny County Chief Executive Allegheny County Computer/GIS Services Allegheny County Council Allegheny County Department of Emergency Services Allegheny County Department of Human Services Allegheny County Fire Advisory Board Allegheny County Hazardous Materials Unit Allegheny County Health Department Allegheny County Law Department Allegheny County Manager's Office 10

Allegheny County Parks Department Allegheny County Port Authority Allegheny County Public Works Allegheny County Police Department Allegheny County Radiological Officer Allegheny County Sheriff's Department Allegheny County WMD/NBC Officer Allegheny Intermediate Unit (Schools)

BUTLER COUNTY Butler County 911 Center Butler County Chapter of the American Red Cross Butler County - Departmental (Medical/Health, Agriculture)

Butler County Emergency Management Agency Butler County HAZMAT Butler County Public Information Office Butler County Radiological Officer Slippery Rock Ambulance Company Slippery Rock Emergency Management Agency Slippery Rock Police Department Slippery Rock School Board LAWRENCE COUNTY Lawrence County Emergency Management Agency Lawrence County Emergency Medical Services Pennsylvania National Guard Pennsylvania State Police Pulaski Townvship Fire Department Shenago Fire Department WASHINGTON COUNTY Washington County Department of Public Safety Washington County HAZMAT Team SCHOOLS - PENNSYLVANIA BEAVER COUNTY Aliquippa School District Aliquippa Middle School Ambridge School District Superintendent's Office 11

Beaver Area School District Brighton Township Elementary School Blackhawk School District Blackhawk Intermediate School Center Area School District Todd Lane Elementary School Hopewell Area School District Raccoon Elementary School Midland Borough School District Midland Elementary School Monaca School District.

Fifth Ward Elementary School New Brighton Area School District Superintendent's Office South Side Area School District South Side High School Western Beaver School District Snyder Elementary School STATE OF WVEST VIRGINIA West Virginia Bureau for Public Health West Virginia Department of Agriculture West Virginia Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection West Virginia Division of Natural Resources West Virginia Office of Emergency Services West Virginia Worker Compensation Office FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 12

RISK JURISDICTION - WEST VIRGINIA BROOKE COUNTY Brooke Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Services Brooke Homeland Security, Office of Emergency Services Brooke Threat Preparedness Coordinator HANCOCK COUNTY Hancock County 911 Director Hancock County Department of Health Hancock County Emergency Operations Coordinator Hancock County Public Information Office Hancock County School District Hancock County Sheriffs Department New Cumberland Police Department New Cumberland Volunteer Fire Department Weirton Area Ambulance and Rescue Squad Weirton City Fire Department West Virginia Bureau for Public Health MARSHALL COUNTY Marshall County Agricultural Department Marshall County Office of Emergency Services OHIO COUNTY Ohio County Agricultural Department Ohio County Sheriff Department Wheeling - Ohio County Emergency Management Agency Wheeling Public Works Department SCHOOLS - WEST VIRGINIA Hancock County School District New Manchester Elementary School PRIVATE/VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS Allegheny County South Intervention Team (Green) HAZMAT Team American Red Cross American Red Cross, Butler County American Red Cross, State Emergency Operations Center American Red Cross, SW Pennsylvania 13

American Red Cross, Weirton Chapter Beaver Valley Power Station Beaver Valley Security Services Boy Scouts of America, Troop 31, Weirton, WV Boy Scouts of America, Troop 137 Boy Scouts of America, Troop 414 Broughton Volunteer Fire Department Chester Volunteer Fire Department Claysville Volunteer Fire Department FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Marshall University New Cumberland Volunteer Fire Department North Beaver Township Volunteer Fire Department Pennsylvania State University Cooperative Extension Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service/Amateur Radio Emergency Services (RACES/ARES)

Salvation Army Slippery Rock University Police Department Slippery Rock University Security Slippery Rock Volunteer Fire Department South Park Township Emergency Management Tri-Community South Emergency Medical Services United Valley REACT West Virginia University Agriculture Extension Agency C.

Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the BVPS plume pathway exercise on May I 1, 2004. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

14

(-1 CI TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE C

DATE AND SITE: March 30-31, 2004 and May I I and 13, 2004, Beaver Valley Power Station Time That Notification Was Rcceived or Action WVas Taken Emergency Classification Level or Event Time Pennsylvania r

JC Accident Emergency Beaver Aliquippa Beaver Bridgewater Bord Brighton Center I

Utility State CENIC (PA)

(NVV)

Assessment Operations County City Borough Fallston Bor.

Township Township

[Declaredi EOC JFacility

.EOC EOC JEOC EOC EOC E OC Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert 1624 1631 N/A N/A N/A 1631 N/A 1630 1635 1630 1634 1635 1642 Site Area Emergency 1754 1804 1806 1756 1756 1800 1757 1805 1815 1802 1832 1812 1818 General Emergency 1910 1914 1916 1913 1913 1914 1916 1918 1920 1913 1920 1920 1921 Simulated Radiation Release Started 1945 1957 1953 1953 1957 1953 1958 Simulated Radiation Release Terminated 2110 2124 N/A Facility Declared Operational 1705 1725 1820 1820 1700 l

1751 1703 1659 1651 1705 1735 1702 DeclarationofStateofDisasterEmergency:

1900 County 1914 1914 2019 1938 l 1920 l

1933 l

1915 1940 l 1939 l 1944 1943 l

1947 State of Emergency

_ I I_

I_

I_

I II Exercise Terminated 2120 2120 2130 2130 2120 l

2130 l

2130 2123 2030 l

2125 2050 l

2038 Early Precautionary Actions: Shelter Animals and Place 1815 1900 1845 1859 1811 1910 1910 on Stored Feed& Water 1 st A&N Decision: Evaciuate 10 Miles 360° Kito General 1929 1933 1929 1937 1933 1937 1937 1937 Public, Ell's & Special Population 1 st Siren Activation 1934 1957 2000 1934 1940 1937 1937 lstEASorEBSMessage: Informational-SAE 1937 1957 2000 1937 2nd A&N Decision: Same as 1"A&N Decision 2018 2058 2018 2043 2045 2nd Siren Activation 2025 2028 2025 2045 2045 2nd EAS or EBS Message 2028 2058 2028 2048 2048 3rdA&N Decision: Recommendto Ordered 2035 2037 3rd Siren Activation 2045 2045 3rd EAS or EBS Message 2048 1

l 2048 l

Precautionary Actions: Boat & River Traffic Restrictions -

2035 P A KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers advised 1945 1939 1944 1938 1947 not to take K_

II IIIIIII KI Administration Decision: Emergency lorkers advised 1952 1952 1952 1952 1925 1957 1929 to take K!

I I

I I

II KIAdministration Decision: Public advisedto take lI 1952 1952 l 1952 1952 1925 2028 l

1929 15

c TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE AND SITE: March 30-31, 2004 and May I I and 13, 2004, Beaver Valley Power Station

(:

Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken ITime Emergency ClassiticationLevelorEvent Utility Chippewa Sranifon Gtorgetown l lHopewell Independence Industry MNidland Monaca Pattrson Potter Raccoon Declared Tow hipBorilanovgs Topflorto7nl Township Township Borough Borough Borough Heighs P

or.

Township Township IEOC Tihp. EOC Bor. EOC EOC EOC EOC EOC Foc Townshi on o

O Unusual Event Alert 1638 1634 1634 1638 1630 1634 1740 1634 1634 1645 1633 Site Area Emergency 1802 1806 1850 1810 1819 1804 1830 1902 1808 1821 1812 General Emergency 1926 1918 1910 1920 1920 1920 1919 1918 1919 1926 1919 Simulated Radiation Release Started Simulated Radiation Release Terminated Facility Declared Operational 1720 1713 1648 1725 1714 1708 1743 1705 1708 1707 1716 Declaration of State of Disaster Emergency: 1900 County 2002 2000 2000 1914 l

1914 1945 2000 2005 State of Emergency l

Exercise Terminated 2100 2033 l

2130 2130 2035 2122 2055 2014 2035 2115 2105 Early Precautionary Actions: Shelter Animals and Place on Stored Feed & I'ater Ist A&N Decision: Evacuate 10 Afiles 360, K! to General 1936 1935 1926 1937 1938 1937 1937 1937 2045 Public, Ells & Special Population Ist Siren Activation 1937 1937 l

2045 I st EAS or E13S Message: Informational-SAE 1937 1930 2048 2nd A&N Decision: Same as P", &N Decision 2045 2048 2nd Siren Activation 2045 2048 2nd EAS or EBS Message

_______l_l 2048 2048 3rd A&N Decision: Recommend to Ordered 3rd Siren Activation 3rd EAS or EBS Message li Precautionary Actions: Boat & River Traffic Restrictions -

1937 PA

__l Kl Administration Decision: Emergency Wiorkers advised not to take K!

ll KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers advised 1948 1946 1939 1945 1945 1950 1944 1945 1946 1950 1945 to take K!

KI Administration Decision: Public advised to take KI 16

c CI TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE AND SITE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004, Beaver Valley Power Station c

Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken Emergency Classification Level or Event Time 5hippingBea 1

v.Gve J S. IHeights Vanport Allegheny Butler Lawrence Washington West Virginia I utility Shpigot Tp~agw I

Borough Towvnship County County County County State

__________________[Declared

}Bor.

EOC BorlOhioville lBar.

EoC EOC EFOC EOC EOC EOC EOC

_ _ _E O CII Unusual Event Alert 1634 1635 Not Received 1624 1706 1710 1706 1700 1630 Site Area Emergency 1825 1819 1812 1825 1816 1843 1815 1815 1804 General Emergency 1920 1923 1920 1923 1927 1914 1926 1926 1912 Simulated Radiation Release Started 1958 Simulated Radiation Release Terminated 2100 Facility Declared Operational 1735 1702 1810 1720 1837 1740 1728 l

l 1735 Declaration of State of Disaster Emergency: 1900 County 2000 1949 1952 2010 1932 1932 1933 1815 State of Emergency I

Exercise Terminated 2031 2036 2125 2140 2130 2100 2127 2140 Early Precautionary Actions: Shelter Animals and Place 1834 on Stored Feed& *W'ater 1

st A&N Decision: Evacuate 10 Alfles 360° KIto 1937 1939 1937 1929 General Public, Ells & Special Population I st Siren Activation 1934 IstEASorEBSMessage: Informational-SSAE 1937 2nd A&N Decision: Same as I1A&N Decision 2025 2nd Siren Activation 2028 2nd EAS or EBS Message

_______l 2031 3rdA&,N Decision: Recommendto Ordered 3rd Siren Activation 2045 3rd EAS or EBS Message

______l_2048 Precautionary Actions: Boat & River Traffic Restrictions P.

KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers advised not to take KJ KI Administration Decision: Emergency lorkers advised 1945 1950 1945 1950 2100 to take K__I I

I I

Kl Administration Decision: Public advised to take K!

1950 17

C,

C TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE DATE AND SITE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004, Beaver Valley Power Station Time That Notification Was Received or Action WVas Taken EmergencyClassiricationLevelorEvent Timiety State Public Accident lHancock County Brooke Ohio County Declared Information Assessment (WV) EOC County EOC EOC Unusual Event N/A Alert 1624 1630 1630 1633 Site Area Emergency 1754 1804 1804 1808 General Emergency L

1910 1

1912 1912 1925 Simulated Radiation Release Started 1958 1958 1808 Simulated Radiation Release Terminated 2100 2100 2130 Facility Declared Operational 1735 1735 1749 Declaration of State of Disaster Emergency: 1900 County State 1815 1815 1916 of Emergency Exercise Terminated 2140 2140 2131 Early Precautionary Actions: Shelter Animals and Place on 1834 1834 1858 Stored Feed & WVater Ist A&N Decision: Evacuate 10 Ailes 360° Kil to General 1825 1825 1834 Public, El~s & Special Population l

Ist Siren Activation 1835 1835 1835 Ist EAS or EBS Message: Informational-SAE 1838 1838 1838 2nd A&N Decision: Same as I' A&N Decision 1925 1925 1931 2nd Siren Activation 1935 1935 1934 2nd EAS or EBS Message 1937 1937 1934 3rd A&N Decision: Recommend to Ordered Not Received Not Received Not Received 3rd Siren Activation 2025 2025 2025 3rd EAS or EBS Message 2028 2028 2028 Precautionary Actions: Boat & River Traffic Restrictions - PA KI Administration Decision: Emergency I'Vorkers advised not 1845 to take KJ l

KI Administration Decision: Emergency WVorkers advised to 2100 2100 2110 take K!

KI Administration Decision: Public advised to take KI N/A N/A N/A 4"' A & N Decision Not Received Not Received Not Received 4rh Siren Activation 2045 2045 4th EAS or EBS Message 2048 2048 18 C.

IV.

EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the March 30-31 and May 11 and 13, 2004, exercise. The exercise was held to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10- and 50-mile emergency planning zones (EPZs) surrounding the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS).

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of the exercise evaluation area criteria contained in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A.

Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following pages, presents the status of the exercise evaluation area criteria from the FEMA REP Program Manual that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of the criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M Met (No Deficiency or Area(s) Requiring Corrective Action [ARCA(s)] assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises)

A ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

Al ARCA(s) assessed; corrective action demonstrated D

Deficiency assessed Di Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 19

(

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION C

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004 O l 1. 1. 1.

c.

2. 2ld.

3.

. 3...

1

a.

4 a.4

4.

C 51a.5.

. a6-16. 16. c 6.

JURISDICTION-LOCATION 1c.

1..

2 2c.d.

b.

3d.

13.. 1. j.j

j.

5.

6. 6. 6.

1. COMMONWVEALTII OF PENNSYLVANIA 1.1 STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER l

M MlM M

I l

M I

l M M M

M I

I 1.2 PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES (CENIC) l M

I M

I I 1.3 JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) (PA&WV)

M M M A

1.4 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT CENTER(BRP)

MMM M M M

1.5 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) (BRP AND MlM RIIP)

M 1.6 STATE FIELD AIR MONITORING TEAM A MMM M

lM M

l M

M 1.7 STATE FIELD AIR MONITORING TEAM B MMM M JA M

M I

I 1.8 STATE POLICE TRAFFIC/ACCESS CONTROL M

I MMl MlM I

lMlM M I

I

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 BEAVER COUNTY 2.1.1 COUNTY EMERGENCYOPERATIONSCENTER M_ A A M M MMI MIM MM MM Ml MlD' l l 2.1.2CITYOFALIQUIPPAEOC M

MMMM l

lMM l

lMMMl MlM I

I Ml I

2.1.3 BEAVER BOROUGH EOC M

_ MIMMM__ M M M MIM Ml M

2.1.4 BRIDGEWATER BOR./FALLSTON BOR. EOC**

M lM MlM M I

M lMMM M M Ml I

I 2.1.5 BRIGIITONTOWNSHIPEOC M

TM MIMMM I

M l MMM MTM I

I I IM 2.1.6 CENTERTOWNSHIP EOC MlM M l

M l

MMMl MIMI M

2.1.7 CIIIPPEWA TOWNSHIP EOC Ml mm M

mm MM M

M LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC M1 = Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration A' = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated D' = Deficiency asscssed correction action demonstrated 20

C BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION C

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3.3. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 6. 6. 6.

-RC NL O

• a.

b. c. d. e. a. b. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. C. d. d. e. e. f. a. a. a. b. C. a. a. a. b. a. b. c. d.

-1 I

I I1 1 2 1 1 2

2 1 2 1111111211111121212 1 1231112311111 2.1.8 FRANKFORT SPRINGS BOROUGI In/ IANOVER TOWNSHIP M MMMM M

M M M M

m M

EOC 2.1.9 GEORGETOWN IOR.JGREENE TOWNSHIP/

M M MM M

HOOKSTOWN BOR. EOC **

I I I

I I I 11 2.1.IO11OPEWELLTOWNSHIPEOC M

M MM M I _ M MMM M M

m M

I 2.1.11 INDEPENDENCE TOWNSHIP EOC M

MMMM M MMM _ MM M _

2.1.12 INDUSTRY BOROUGII EOC M

MMMM M

M M M Mm I

I I

M _ _

2.1.13 MIDLAND BOROUGH EOC M

M MMMM M

M

_ MM M

2.1.14 MONACA BOROUGH EOC M

MM_ MM M

MMM _ MM M _

2.1.15PATTERSONTOWNSHIPEOC M

MMMM M I

MMM _ MM M

M 2.1.16PATTERSON HEIGHTSBOR.EOC r

MIM M I

M MMM _ MM M

2.1.17POTTERTOWNSHIPEOC M

MM M

M MMM m M M M

I I

2.1.18 RACCOON TOWNS1IIP EOC M

MMMM_

M MMM _ M M M

2.1.19 SHlPPINGPORT BOROUGH EOC M _ M M MM M

M M M M M

M I I 2.1.20 SOUTH BEAVER TOWNSHIP/GLASGOW MM M

M MM M

M BOROUGH/OHIOVILLE BOROUGH EOC **

I 2.1.21 SOUTH HEIGHTS BOROUGII EOC M

M MMMM M

MMM _ MM M _ _

2.1.22VANPORTTOWNSIIIPEOC m _mmmm M

MMM M

M 2.1.23 EMERGENCY WORKER MON./DECON. STATION A r

M M

M M MM (Crescent Township Fire Department) 2.1.24 EMERGENCY WORKER MON./DECON. STATION B M A'M M M MM (tlanover Fire Department)

LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC MII

= Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration Al = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated D' = Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 21

(

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION C

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May I1I and 13, 2004 1.1.

1. 1. 1. 2. 2. 2. 2.' 2. 2. 3. 3. 3.

3.

3.3.33

. 4.

4. 4. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 6. 6. 6.

l ~

~URSDICTION/LOCATION 1C C222222 hCC CC3aa 56lf iIG1 IUIDCINOCTO.b.

c d.e.a b. b. c' de. a. b.c. c:d.d c

e.

a. a. a. b. c. a. a. a. b. a. b. c. d.

1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2121 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 11 1

3. SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS 3.1 ALLEGHENY COUNTY 3.1.1 COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M M M M I----

M M Ml I 1 3.1.2 MON./DECON. /MASS CARE CENTER (South Park High M M M M MM School)I m

3.1.3 RECEPTION CENTER (South Park Museum Bldg.)

M M I__

M I

3.2 BUTLER COUNTY 3.2.1 COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M M M M

_I M M IM I

3.2.2 RECEPTION CENTER (Slippery Rock University Parking Lot)

M M _I I

I I

3.2.3 MON./DECON. /MASS CARE CENTER (Slippery Rock High M

M M M MMM School)

I 3.3 LAWRENCE COUNTYI 3.3.1 COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

_M M M M I_

M M

3.3.2 RECEPTION CENTER (Mohawk Area High School)

IM M

M I

3.3.3 MON./DECON. (MASS CARE CENTER (Union High Schooli M

M MIM IM 3.4AWASHINGTONCOUNTY 3.4.1 COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MM MM MM M

3.4.2 RECEPTION CENTER (Washington County Fairgrounds)

__M M

I LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC INI = Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration Al = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated Di = Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 22

(

IC BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION

(

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004

1. 1. 1. 1. 12. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 3.3. 3.

3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 6. 6. 6.

a. b. c. d. e. a. b. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. c.

d. e. e. f. a. a. a. b. c. a. a. a. b. a. b. c. d.

1 - 1 1 1 1 1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3.4.3 MON./DECON. /MASS CARE CENTER (McGuffy High M M M M MMM School)

4. STATE OF VEST VIRGINIA 4.1 STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER M

M MMM M _ MMMM _ _ MMM M

M M

4.2 STATE PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER M

I_

MI 4.3 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ML M _ MM M _ _M 4.4 STATE FIELD AIR MONITORING TEAM M

M M M _M M

4.5 STATE FIELD SAMPLING TEAM A M M M

_ M M M

4.6 STATE FIELD SAMPLING TEAM B M

I M M M M m M

5. RISK.IURISDICTIONS 5.1 HANCOCK COUNTY 5.1.1 COUNTY EMERGENCYOPERATIONS CENTER mL _M MM

_ MM _ MMMM _

_ _ M M

I M

MA I 1 5.1.2 TRAFFIC/ACCESS CONTROL (New Cumberland Police)

M M _

M M _ _ M M I

5.1.3 ROUTE ALERTING (Chester Fire Department)

I M __ __

__ M M _M 5.1.4 MON./DECON. /MASS CARE CENTER (Weir I ligh School M M M M MMM Complex) 5.1.5 RECEPTION CENTER (WVeir High School Complex) m m 5.1.6 EMERGENCY WORKER MON./DECON. CENTER (New M M M M M MM Cumberland Fire Department)

L _ _ _

III I MIMI 11 LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC I\\l = Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration Al = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated D' = Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 23

(

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION C

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May 11 and 13, 2004

-JURISDICTION/LOCATION

l. 1.

_1.. 2..

2. 2. 2. 2. 3.3. 3. 3. 3.3.3. 3. 3. 4. 4. 4. 4. 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 6. 6. 6.

a. b. c. d. e. a. b. b. c. de.a.b.c.c.d.d..c.f.

a.

a. b. c. a. a. a. b.a. b.c..

11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1

6. SCHOOL DISTRICTS 6.1 PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS 6.1.1 ALIQUIPPA SCI IOOL DISTRICT (Aliquippa Middle School)

M __

6.1.2 AMBRIDGE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Superintendent's M

Office) 6.1.3 BEAVER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Brighton Twp. Elem.)

M 6.1.4 BLACKHAWK SCHOOL DISTRICT (Blackhawk Intermediate M

School) 6.1.5 CENTER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Todd Lane Elem.

M School)

Im 6.1.6 HOPEWELL AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT (Raccoon Elem.

M School) m 6.1.7 MIDLAND BOROUGH SCHOOL DISTRICT (Midland M

Elementary School) 6.1.8 MONACA SC11OOL DISTRICT (Fiflh Ward Elementary M

School) 6.1.9 NEW BRIGHTON AREA SCIIOOL DISTRICT M

(Superintendent's Office) 6.1.10 SOUTH SIDE AREA SCI TOOL DISTRICT (South Side High M

School) 6.1.11 WESTERN BEAVER SCI IOOL DISTRICT (Snyder Elem.

M School)

____I LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC IN = Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration Al = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated D' = Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 24

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 EXERCISE EVALUATION C.

DATE: March 30-31, 2004 and May I I and 13, 2004 1 1. 1. 1.. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 3.3.3. 3.3. 3. 3.3.3.

4. 4. 4. 4 4. 5. 5. 5. 5. 6. 6. 6. 6.

lNO

a. 1 c.

e. ab. b. c. d. e. a. b. c. c. I. 2.

e. f.

a. a. a. b. ca. a

b..

c. d.

1i 11 1 12 1.111I112 12 12 1 12 31 112 311 11 1 6.2 WEST VIRGINIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 6.2.1 HANCOCK COUNTY SCI OOL DISTRICT (New Manchester M

Elementary School)

7. INGESTION JURISDICTIONS 7.1 STATE OF VEST VIRGINIA 7.1.1 BROOKE COUNTY EOC (co-located with I hancock County M

M M

M M

M EOC) 7.1.2 MARSHALL COUNTY EOC (co-located with Ohio County M M M

M M

EOC) 7.1.3 OHIO COUNTY EOC (co-located with Marshall County EOC)

_M M M I I LEGEND:

• • = Joint EOC

'NI = Met A = ARCA(s) assessed (not affecting health and safety of public)

D = Deficiency(ies) assessed Blank = Not scheduled for demonstration Al = ARCA assessed; corrective action demonstrated Dt = Deficiency assessed correction action demonstrated 25

B.

Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to criteria demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

• Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

• Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more ARCAs was assessed during the current exercise, or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise evaluation area criteria which were not scheduled to be demonstrated during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise.

Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Prior Planning Issue - Resolved - Descriptions of Planning Issues assessed during previous exercises that were resolved during this exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.

26

• A Deficiency is defined in the FEMA REP Program Manual as

"...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

• An ARCA is defined in the FEMA REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

• Plant Site Identifier-A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

• Exercise Ycar - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Evaluation Area Criterion - A letter and number corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Program Manual.

• Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency; A = ARCA)

Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

• Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

27

1.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1.1 State Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.b.2 3.b.1 5.a.1 I.c.I 3.d.1 5.b.1 L.d. 1 3.d.2 1.e.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRE CTIV'E ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: None 1.2 Public Information Activities (Commonwealth Emergency News and Information Center [CENIC])

a.

MET:

I.e.1 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE, ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 2 Issue No.: 46-96-13-A-01 (5.b.1)

==

Description:==

Information did not flow from the Rumor Control Center, located in another State building, to the State Media Center in the EOC.

The staff in the media center had no knowledge of the types of inquiries received in the Rumor Control Center. There was no system to notify media center personnel of significant issues or developing trends. This could impede efforts to control the spread of rumors that could have an adverse effect on the public. (NUREG-0654, G.4.a, c)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The State Rumor Control Center (SRCC) was relocated to the third floor of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) Headquarters building. Being located in the same facility as the Commonwealth Emergency News and Information Center (CENIC) and the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the 28

SRCC was able to hear public address messages made in the State EOC, and view news briefings given at the Joint Information Center (JIC) and PEMA. A CENIC liaison visited the SRCC at least every 30 minutes to share press releases and check to see if any rumor trends had been observed.

Issue No.: 03-00-12-A-02 (5.b.1)

==

Description:==

Media briefings conducted after the evacuation order (10-mile radius within the EPZ) had been issued did not include instructions for transients without shelter and transportation-dependent individuals, as required by the FEMA memorandum dated February 2, 1999. (NUREG-0654, E.7; G.4.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The media briefing conducted after the evacuation order included instructions for transients without shelter and transportation-dependent individuals.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.3 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) - Pennsylvania and Wcst Virginia

a.

MET:

L.a. I I.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I Issue No.: 03-04-5.b.1-A-01 Condition: At the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC), during the second media briefing, the West Virginia Public Information Officer (PIO) erroneously directed the evacuating general public to ingest potassium iodide (KI) in accordance with the State plan. This action is contrary to the fact that West Virginia does not currently have a KI policy or KI stocks for the general public. This information was based on a Hancock County Office of Emergency Services (OES) news release received by facsimile at the JPIC at 0626.

Possible Cause: The West Virginia OES PIO should have contacted either Hancock County or the State for clarification prior to including the information in her briefing.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c 29

Effect: The evacuating general public in West Virginia could have erroneously thought that they were supposed to take KI, therefore causing confusion and inundating rumor control with inquiries at State, county, and local emergency management agencies.

Recommendation: Prior to release, the P10 should verify information for accuracy with the West Virginia OES and Hancock County. Additional personnel should be provided to support the JPIC P1O.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: Communication paths and procedures between the JPIC, Hancock County and the State EOC are being re-drafted to reinforce the need for oversight and approvals before press releases are issued and/or information is disseminated in briefings.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.4 Accident Assessment Center (BRP)

a.

MET:

l.a.1 2.a.1 4.a.2 1.c.I 2.b.I L.d.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.5 Emergency Operations Facility (BRP and RHP)

a.

MET:

I.c. I I.d.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 30

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 1.6 State Field Air Monitoring Team A

a.

MET:

1.d.1 L.e.I 2.a.I 3.a.1 3.b.1 4.a.1 4.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

g.

PRIOR PLANNING ISSUES - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-02-3.b.1-P-01

==

Description:==

Field Teams A & B did not use the "Dosimetry - KI Report Form," PEMA-BOP-REP-3, to record ingestion of potassium iodide (KI) as required by the Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Plan, Annex E, Page E-5-45. (NUREG 0654, J. 1 O.e)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Field Monitoring Team received instructions that they were advised to ingest KI at 1926. At that time, all members of the team simulated taking KI. This was recorded on, as required. Therefore, Issue No. 03-02-3.b.1-P-01 was demonstrated to have been satisfactorily corrected.

1.7 State Field Air Monitoring Team B

a.

MET:

1.d.l L.e.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 3.b.I 4.a.I 4.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None 31

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

g.

PRIOR PLANNING ISSUES - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-02-3.b.1-P-01

==

Description:==

Field Teams A & B did not use the "Dosimetry - KI Report Form," PEMA-BOP-REP-3 to record ingestion of potassium iodide (KI) as required by the Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Plan, Annex E, Page E-5-45. (NUREG 0654, J.10.e)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Field Monitoring Team received instructions that they were advised to ingest KI at 1926. At that time, all members of the team simulated taking KI. This was recorded on, as required. Therefore, Issue No. 03-02-3.b.1-P-01 was demonstrated to have been satisfactorily corrected.

1.8 State Police Traffic/Access Control

a.

MET:

I.d.I 1.e.l 3.a.1 3.b. 1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs-RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

2.

Risk Jurisdictions 2.1 Beaver County 2.1.1 Beaver County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I L.e.I 2.a.1 2.b.2 2.c.1 3.a.1I 3.b.1I 3.c.lI 3.c.2 3.d.lI 3.d.2 5.a.1 5.a.3 32

b.

DEFICIENCY: I Issue No.: 03-04-5.b.1-D-01 Condition: The Beaver County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff did not advise the general population living within the Beaver County 1 0-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ), either in emergency alert system (EAS) Message No. I or EAS Message No. 2, to take potassium iodide (KI) following the first alert and notification (A&N) sequence. This sequence advised the public to evacuate the 10-mile EPZ and advised emergency workers, special populations, and the general population to take KI.

Possible Cause: The prescripted EAS messages have not been updated to reflect that KI can be issued to and taken by the general population.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c Effect: The general population may not be protected from radioiodine should they pass through the plume while evacuating.

Recommendation: Update prescripted EAS messages to reflect that the general population may be required to ingest (take) KI. In addition, develop procedures so that all local EOCs will be notified of this decision.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: At 0925 during a remedial exercise on June 16, 2004, Beaver County EOC received a call and fax from the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) that the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) had been escalated to a General Emergency due to a loss of Critical Safety Function and an airborne release that was in progress. At 0930 a call and fax was received from the BVPS of a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to evacuate 0-5 miles, 360 degrees and shelter the remainder of the 1 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), and advise the general public to administer KI in accordance with the State Plan. At 0940 the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) advised Beaver County that the Governor had ordered the evacuation of all persons within the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the facility, the simulation of sounding the sirens at 0950, and the simulation of activating of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) at 0953. The Beaver County EOC sent an updated prescripted EAS message (#6) to EAS Radio Station KDKA via an encoder, who in turn retransmitted the EAS message to WBVP in Beaver Falls and WMBA in Amridge. The EAS message transmitted the Governor's order to evacuate the 1 0-mile EPZ surrounding BVPS, which included 25 named municipalities in Beaver County and identified portions of South Beaver Township and Chippewa Township. KI was also 33

recommended for the general public in this updated pre-scripted EAS message.

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 2 Issue No.: 03-04-l.c.1-A-04 Condition: The Beaver County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff did not furnish all pertinent and updated information to their local EOCs (weather information, potassium iodide [KI] for the general population and special populations, response to unmet transportation needs, early precautionary actions, siren activation, and release).

Possible Cause: The e-mail system being used to receive and pass information became overloaded and many requests were not responded to in a timely manner. Also, the information being furnished over the radio system was not clear and was confusing to the local population.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, A.L.d; A.2.a, b Effect: The local jurisdictions may not be able to respond to actions that needed to be taken in a timely manner.

Recommendation: Additional staff and communication systems may be needed so that all pertinent and updated information can be transmitted to the local EOCs in a timely manner.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: A new Communications Plan has been developed by Beaver County to address the various aspects of information and message flow between the County EOC, the risk municipalities and other outside support agencies. The Plan will provide guidance for all agencies on how the information and message flow process should occur to ensure this vital function is completed accurately and in a timely manner.

Applicable aspects of the Plan will be included in the Municipal EOPs and training will be provided for the County and Municipal staffs.

Issue No.: 03-04-1.d.1-A-05 Condition: The Beaver County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Communications Operations area was not sufficiently staffed with equipment or personnel to respond to the large magnitude of e-mail received from the municipalities. With approximately 20 municipalities sending messages, the one Communications Operator at the e-mail work station in the Beaver EOC was overloaded. The message traffic tasks of 34

receiving, logging, analyzing, disseminating, and responding back to the senders was more than one Communications Operator could handle.

Possible Cause: By memorandum from Beaver County to Municipal Coordinators dated April 27, 2004, regarding drill communications, e-mail, and telephone, the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)/Radio Emergency Associated Citizen Teams (REACT) and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Response System (PEMARS) were listed as "the means of communication that will be used and available." The municipalities predominately selected e-mail as their primary communications and also used e-mail to request verification of receipt of their messages.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, F.1, 2 Beaver County Emergency Operations Plan, Appendix 2, Annex E, Communications.

Effect: The e-mail system was backed up and some messages were not responded to in a timely manner. Local jurisdictions may not be able to respond to actions that need to be taken.

Recommendation: The Beaver County and municipal plans should be modified to designate the equipment and primary communications system to be utilized. Personnel must then be trained and adequate equipment provided to ensure the accomplishment of the total communications task for Beaver County.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: The method to receive incoming messages and the method to respond to those messages will be revised. A Communications Officer position will be created to oversee the entire information flow process. This individual will ensure that changing conditions and significant events are provided to all the appropriate EOC staff members and that the information is relayed to the Municipal EOCs.

Three (3) new computers will be added to the County EOC. These computers will provide the Transportation Officer, the Health/Medical Officer and the Radiological Officer email capabilities. These positions will then be able to respond to direct requests in a timely manner and ensure that all pertinent information is provided.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 35

2.1.2 City of Aliquippa Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.l I.c.I I.d.I 2.a.I 2.c.1 3.a.I 3.b.1 3.c.1 3.d.I 3.d.2 5.a.I I.e. I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.3 Beaver Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I I.c.1 I.d.I I.e.I 2.a.I 2.c.I 3.a.I 3.b.I 3.c.1 3.d.l 3.d.2 5.a.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

d.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-02-3.a.1-A-01

==

Description:==

The Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) did not record the permanent record dosimeter (PRD) serial numbers on the appropriate forms (receipt and dosimetry). The briefing did not adequately define radiological requirements in the plan checklists, including dose limits and the concerns for the administration of KI (i.e., allergy to iodine).

(NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b; EOC Plan 1-16, 1-17)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Radiological Officer (RO) for this exercise was an experienced RO and correctly followed procedures.

He properly filled out all forms with the appropriate information so that all dosimetry issued (i.e., 0-20R direct-reading dosimeter [DRD],

36

thermoluminescent dosimeter [TLD], and potassium iodide [KI]) could be associated with a specific Emergency Worker and properly tracked and accounted for at the end of the mission. All emergency workers received a full and complete briefing on when to read DRDs, log the information, and report readings to their supervisor; information on KI and its side effects; and instructions to wear the DRDs and TLDs on the outside of their clothing.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.4 Bridgewater Borough/Fallston Borough Emergency Operations Centcr

a.

MET:

I.a.I 1.c.I I.d.I L.e.I 2.a.1 2.c.1 3.a.1 3.b.1 3.c. 1 3.d.1 3.d.2 5.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVEi ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIORARCAs-UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.5 Brighton Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I 2.a.1 1.c.1I l.d.1 L.e. I 3.a.1 2.c.1 5.a.1I 3.b.1I 3.c. I 3.d.lI 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 37

2.1.6 Center Township Emergency Operations Centcr

a.

MET:

L.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 I.c.l 2.c.I 3.b.1 I.d.l 3.c.1 I.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.7 Chippewa Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 I.c.l 2.c.1 3.b.I 5.a.3 I.d.1 3.c.1 I.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.8 Frankfort Springs Borough/lhanover Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.I 5.a.1 I.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 I.d.1 3.c.1 I.e.l 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None 38

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.9 Georgetown Borough/Grcnc Township/llookstown Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

l.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 l.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.1 3.c.1 l.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.10 Hlopewell Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 l.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.l 3.c.1 l.e.l 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 39

2.1.11 Independence Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 l.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.1 3.c.1 l.e.l 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.12 Industry Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

L.a.I 2.a.I 3.a.1 5.a.l l.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.l 3.c.1 I.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.13 Midland Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

1.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 l.c.l 2.c.1 3.b.1 I.d.1 3.c.1 l.e.l 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 40

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-02-2.a.1-A-02

==

Description:==

The Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) was unable to articulate the procedures for assessing and controlling radiation exposure for emergency workers. The RPO was also unfamiliar with the procedures for the distribution, control, and record keeping for potassium iodide (KI) and dosimetry. There was no briefing for emergency workers during the exercise, no emergency workers were available for interview and there was no simulated distribution of dosimetry. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J. 1 O.e, f)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: Early in this exercise, the Emergency Management Coordinator (EMC) recognized the need for additional radiological expertise. He identified this as an unmet need to the Beaver County EOC. Shortly thereafter, an experienced Beaver County Radiological Officer (RO) arrived at the Midland EOC. Upon arrival, he received a briefing from the EMC. The RO received additional RAD equipment from Beaver County and conducted an inventory of supplies.

He verified weather conditions and set a requirement that all emergency workers leaving the facility or going outside needed to meet with him prior to going outside. He gave a briefing to the emergency workers on what the existing emergency was and what to expect if conditions worsened. He gave appropriate additional briefings on the categories of Emergency Worker, types of dosimetry they would carry and where, when and how to read it (he used a timer to track the intervals), turnback values, forms that were required, and the potassium iodide (KI) decision. He ensured that each Emergency Worker knew where the decontamination facilities were located and to report when required.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.14 Monaca Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 l.c.I 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.1 3.c.1 l.e.1 3.d.I 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 41

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 1 IssueNo.: 03-02-2.a.I-A-03

==

Description:==

The Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) personnel at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) did not know how to use dosimetry; did not know Emergency Worker protective action guides; and did not receive a briefing on radiological exposure control.

(NUREG 0654, K.4; 0.1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The RACES operator participated in the RO's briefing on dosimetry and radiation control procedures.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.15 Patterson Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

1.a.1 l.c.I 1.d.1 1.e.1 2.a.1 2.c.1 3.a.1 3.b.1 3.c.1 3.d.1 3.d.2 5.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None C.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.16 Patterson Heights Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I 1.c.I 1.d.I 1.e.1 2.a.1 2.c.1 3.a.1 3.b. I 3.c.1 3.d.1 3.d.2 5.a.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None 42

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.17 Potter Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 I.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.1 3.c.1 I.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.18 Raccoon Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

1.a. 1 2.a. I 3.a.1 5.a. 1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 l.d.1 3.c.1 1.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 43

2.1.19 Shippingport Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 I.c.1 2.c.I 3.b.I 1.d.1 3.c.1 1.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.20 South Beaver Township/Glasgow Borough/Ohioville Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

L.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 1.c.1 2.c.1 3.b.1 i.d.i 3.c.1 l.e.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

g.

PRIOR PLANNING ISSUES - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-02-3.d.1-P-02

==

Description:==

Traffic Control Point SB I was not manned by the South Beaver Township Police Department as called for in the Plan on page D-4.

(NUREG-0654, J. 1 0.g, j)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: This issue has been resolved on Page E-I 0 of the Plan, which states that the Pennsylvania State Police will have 44

the responsibility for staffing all Traffic Control Points (TCPs) and all Access Control Points (ACPs). The South Beaver Township and the Ohioville and Glasgow Boroughs will have standby personnel available to assist the State Police or to fill in for the State Police at the ACPs and TCPs if needed. This infonnation was provided by the South Beaver Township's Chief of Police.

2.1.21 South Hcights Borough Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.a.1 I.c.I 2.c.1 3.b.1 I.d.l 3.c. 1 L.e.I 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.22 Vanport Township Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.I 2.a.I 3.a.1 5.a.I I.C.I 2.c.1 3.b.1 1.d.I 3.c. 1 I.e.l 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 45

2.1.23 Beaver County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station A (Crescent Township Fire Department)

a.

MET:

I.d. 1 2.a. 1 3.a. 1 6.a. 1 L.e.1 3.b.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 2.1.24 Beaver County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station B (Hanover Fire Department)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 3.b.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I Issue No.: 03-04-I.e.1-A-06 Condition: The BICRON TPM-0903 portal monitor could not be response checked due to the fact that a 1.0 pCi check source was not provided to Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel.

Possible Cause: Check source was not available to ensure proper operation of the portal monitor as stated in the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e; J.1 1; K.3.a Effect: Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel could not adequately complete the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist and ensure proper operation of the portal monitor. There was adequate CDV-700 survey meters to ensure that emergency workers could be monitored.

46

Recommendation: Provide a 1.0 ptCi check source so that Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel can perform the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The following corrective action was demonstrated at the full scale exercise. On May 11, 2004, a Beaver County hazardous material (HAZMAT) response team brought a portal monitor to the Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station at the Hanover Volunteer Fire Department. The team set up the portal monitor using batteries for power. They then went through the BICRON TPM -0903 Performance Verification Checklist using a 1.0 pCi check source. The monitor did not register sufficient radiation for the alarm light. The team next plugged the monitor into the electric system and retested. This time the monitor performed a successful check, alarming when the check source was placed at the head, torso, and foot level.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

3.

Support Jurisdictions 3.1 Allegheny County 3.1.1 Allegheny County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.l 2.a.1 3.a.l 5.b.1 l.c.1 3.b.1 1.d.l L.e.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 47

3.1.2 Allegheny County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (South Park H1igh School)

a.

MET:

1.d. 1 3.a. 1 6.a. 1 L.e.1 3.b.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None C.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.1.3 Allegheny County Reception Center (South Park Museum Building)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 6.c.1 I.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.2 Butler County 3.2.1 Butler County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

1.a.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.b.i I.c.I 3.b.1 I.d.1 I.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 48

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.2.2 Butler County Reception Center (Slippery Rock University Parking Lot)

a.

MET:

I.d.1 I.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.2.3 Butler County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Slippery Rock High School)

a.

MET:

I.d.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 I.e.I 3.b.1 6.b.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None 3.3 3.3.1

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None Lawrence County Lawrence County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

I.a.1 2.a.1 1.c. I I.d.I I.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None 3.a.1 3.b.1 5.b.1 49

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2 Lawrence Count) Reception Center (Mohawk Area High School)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 6.c.1 I.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3 Lawrence County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Union High School)

a.

MET:

I.d.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 3.b.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I Issue No.: 03-04-1.e.1-A-06 Condition: The BICRON TPM-0903 portal monitor could not be response checked due to the fact that a 1.0 pCi check source was not provided to Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel. Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel could not perform Steps 4B-D of the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist due to the fact that a 1.0 PiCi check source was not available.

Possible Cause: Check source was not available to ensure proper operation of the portal monitor as stated in the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist.

50

Reference:

NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e; J.I 1; K.3.a Effect: Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel could not adequately complete the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist and ensure proper operation of the portal monitor. There were adequate CDV-700 survey meters to ensure that emergency workers could be monitored.

Recommendation: Provide a 1.0 pCi check source so that Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station personnel can perform the BICRON TPM-0903 Performance Verification Checklist.

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The following corrective action was demonstrated at the full-scale exercise. The Lawrence County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station TPM-903 portal monitor was set up at the Lawrence County Emergency Operations Center for this demonstration. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Radiological Officer satisfactorily performed the Step 4 Performance Verification Checklist demonstration. The Step 4A walkthrough was demonstrated without the source. A background count was displayed with no alarm. A 1.0,tCi Cs-137 source was used for the demonstration of Steps 4B, 4C, and 4D. The Performance Verification Checklist was performed correctly and the portal monitor operated properly.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.4 Washington County 3.4.1 Washington Count), Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

1.c.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 5.b.1 L.d.1 3.b.1 l.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I Issue No.: 03-04-I.a.1-A-07 Condition: The Washington County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not fully activated for this exercise and was only minimally staffed. An actual call-out demonstration did not occur. During the 51

exercise, the EOC was staffed by the Washington County Director of Public Safety, a designated communications officer/warning officer, and a designated Radiological Officer. A Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) liaison was also present. However, the following positions were not staffed: Public Information Office, Police Services Officer, Fire-Rescue Officer, Health/Medical Services Officer, Mass Care Officer, Transportation Officer, Public Works/Engineering Officer, Agriculture Officer, School Services Officer, Pennsylvania State Police Liaison Officer, and Pennsylvania Army National Guard Liaison Officer.

Possible Cause: The Washington County Director of Public Safety (DPS) indicated that he chose not to call out personnel who would normally staff the EOC and would only simulate the activities that normally would be performed by the absent EOC personnel. The DPS indicated that the County had fully mobilized its EOC staffing for past exercises and that participants had commented that the exercise was not helpful due to the lack of activity at the support county level. The DPS chose not to call out all individuals for this exercise and to staff the EOC with only three department personnel. However, this decision was not communicated to the State and no exception for Washington County was included in the Extent of Play.

Reference:

NUREG-0654 H.4 Beaver Valley Power Station 2004 REP Exercise Extent of Play, Criterion l.a.1 Effect: While the participants in the exercise simulated (and communicated through interview) the activities that would be occurring in the EOC during an emergency at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), the lack of actual participation in the exercise by the individuals who would staff the EOC could lead to confusion and failure to follow proper procedures in an actual emergency. While it is true that exercise activity for a support county is often limited for periods of time, simulation cannot replace the actual participation of individuals who would normally respond to an emergency.

Recommendation: The Washington County EOC should be fully mobilized, staffed, and operational during exercises at the BVPS.

Schedule for Corrective Action: In future training and exercises the Washington County EOC will be fully mobilized, staffed, and operational during exercises at the BVPS.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 52

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 3.4.2 Washington County, Reception Center (Washington County Fairgrounds)

a.

MET:

I.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None 3.4.3 Washington County Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (McGuffy High School)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 I.e.1 3.b.1 6.b.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 53

4.

4.1 State of West Virginia Emergency Operations Centcr

a.

MET:

l.a.I I.c.I I.d.I L.e.I 2.a.I 2.b.1 2.b.2 2.d.1 2.e.1 3.a.1 3.b. 1 3.d.1 3.d.2 3.e. 1 3.e.2 3.f. 1 5.a.1 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: None 4.2 Public Information Center

a.

MET:

I.d.l 5.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.3 Accident Assessment

a.

MET:

1.c.1 2.a.1 4.a.2 I.d.1 2.b.1 4.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 54

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-00-07-A-14 (2.b.1)

==

Description:==

The computer program used for dose projections is not adequately documented, and information concerning possible release pathways was not readily available. (NUREG-0654, 1.10)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The computer program used to develop dose projections was RASCAL 3.0. Documents used to run the program were NUREG-1741, "RASCAL 3.0, Description of Models and Methods," published in March 2001; Response Technical Manual (RTM) 96, Volume 1, Revision 4; and Response Coordination Manual (RCM) 96.

Information concerning possible release pathways was readily available.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.4 Field Air Monitoring Team

a.

MET:

l.d.l 2.a.1 3.a.1 4.a.l I.e.1 3.b.1 4.a.3

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None C.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 4.5 Field Sampling Team A

a.

MET:

1.d.1 2.a.1 3.a.I 4.b.1 1.e.1 3.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 55

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 4 Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-35 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

Written sample collection procedures do not adequately describe the necessary aspects of sample collection. The Field Sampling Team collected a soil sample at a depth of 1/2 inch rather than the 3-cm depth required in their procedures. The soil collection procedure demonstrated consisted of scraping away all surface material (and probably all fallout) and then collecting the soil. Procedures for collection of water, vegetation, and other sample materials were similar. The collection procedures for milk (which is difficult to sample properly) and for 13 other sample types were not adequately described in the written procedures. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: Written sample collection procedures have been developed for several environmental media including, but not limited to, water, soil, vegetation, meat, milk, and honey. These procedures were prepared in coordination with the State of Ohio. Training of field sampling team members in sample collection was conducted in Ohio. Field sampling team members have also been selected from various agencies, such as the West Virginia Department of Agriculture, West Virginia Division of Natural Resources, West Virginia University, and West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, to provide sampling expertise for several environmental media. Water, soil, and vegetation samples were collected properly, consistent with the extent of play and in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Field Sampling Team Standard Operating Procedures.

Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-36 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

The Field Sampling Team did not take precautions to minimize cross-contamination during the sample collection process. The soil collection bag was laid on the ground, not on the "clean sheet" plastic bag; dirty water samples were placed on the "clean sheet" then rinsed and placed back on the now-contaminated "clean sheet"; all samples and all contaminated gear were placed in identical black plastic garbage bags; monitoring of the collected samples by the sample reception team member with a Micro-R meter would not indicate whether the sample collection bags were contaminated on the outside. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Field Sampling Team demonstrated proper soil sampling techniques and took necessary precautions to avoid cross-contamination. To avoid cross-contamination, a plastic bag was placed on the ground to serve as a clean surface for the soil collection bag.

56

Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-37 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

The Sample Reception Center was located outside in quite inclement weather where samples, forms, and people were wet and wvindblown. The weather made it difficult to mark sample bags and prevent possible cross-contamination. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Sample Reception Center is now located in the Wheeling Airport hangar to avoid problems potentially caused by inclement weather. There is ample space in the Sample Reception Center to support receipt and control of environmental samples.

Issue No.: BVX92-31R (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

There was no procedure in the plan for the FMT to obtain a surface water sample. (Objective 24; NUREG-0654, I.8)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: A written sample collection procedure has been developed for surface water in coordination with the State of Ohio. Surface water samples were collected properly from a stream consistent with the extent of play and in accordance with step-by-step procedures contained in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Field Sampling Team Standard Operating Procedure, Annex I.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs-UNRESOLVED: None 4.6 Field Sampling Team B

a.

MET:

l.d.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 4.b.1 L.e.1 3.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 4 Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-35 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

Written sample collection procedures do not adequately describe the necessary aspects of sample collection. The Field Sampling Team collected a soil sample at a depth of 1/2 inch rather than the 3-cm depth required in their procedures. The soil collection procedure demonstrated consisted of scraping away all surface material (and probably all fallout) and then collecting the soil. Procedures for collection 57

of water, vegetation, and other sample materials were similar. The collection procedures for milk (which is difficult to sample properly) and for 13 other sample types were not adequately described in the written procedures. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: Written sample collection procedures have been developed for several environmental media including, but not limited to, water, soil, vegetation, meat, milk, and honey. These procedures were prepared in coordination with the State of Ohio. Training of field sampling team members in sample collection was conducted in Ohio. Field sampling team members have also been selected from various agencies, such as the West Virginia Department of Agriculture, West Virginia Division of Natural Resources, West Virginia University, and West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, to provide sampling expertise for several environmental media. Water, soil, and vegetation samples were collected properly, consistent with the extent of play and in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Field Sampling Team Standard Operating Procedures.

Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-36 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

The Field Sampling Team did not take precautions to minimize cross-contamination during the sample collection process. The soil collection bag wvas laid on the ground, not on the "clean sheet" plastic bag; dirty water samples were placed on the "clean sheet" then rinsed and placed back on the now-contaminated "clean sheet"; all samples and all contaminated gear were placed in identical black plastic garbage bags; monitoring of the collected samples by the sample reception team member with a Micro-R meter would not indicate whether the sample collection bags were contaminated on the outside. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Field Sampling Team demonstrated proper soil sampling techniques and took necessary precautions to avoid cross-contamination. To avoid cross-contamination, a plastic bag was placed on the ground to serve as a clean surface for the soil collection bag.

Issue No.: 03-98-24-A-37 (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

The Sample Reception Center was located outside in quite inclement weather where samples, formns, and people were wet and windblown. The weather made it difficult to mark sample bags and prevent possible cross-contamination. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.1 1)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Sample Reception Center is now located in the Wheeling Airport hangar to avoid problems potentially 58

caused by inclement weather. There is ample space in the Sample Reception Center to support receipt and control of environmental samples.

Issue No.: BVX92-31R (4.b.1)

==

Description:==

There was no procedure in the plan for the FMT to obtain a surface water sample. (Objective 24; NUREG-0654, 1.8)

Correctivc Action Demonstrated: A written sample collection procedure has been developed for surface water in coordination with the State of Ohio. Surface water samples were collected properly from a stream consistent with the extent of play and in accordance with step-by-step procedures contained in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Field Sampling Team Standard Operating Procedure, Annex I.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

5.

Risk Jurisdictions 5.1 Hancock County 5.1.1 Hancock County Emergency Operations Center

a.

MET:

l.a.l 2.a.I 3.a.I 5.a.1 1.c. I 2.b.2 3.b. 1 5.a.3 1.d.1 2.c.1 3.c.l l.e.l 2.e.1 3.e.I 3.f.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: I Issue No.: 03-04-5.b.1-A-08 Condition: The Hancock County Emergency Director authorized a news release during the General Emergency erroneously advising the general public to take potassium iodide (KI), in accordance with the State plan.

This action is contrary to the fact that the State of West Virginia currently does not have a policy or KI stocks for the general public.

Possible Cause: This information was authorized based on the utility's protection action recommendation (PAR) initial notification form that stated, "AND advise the general public to administer KI in accordance with the state plan."

59

Reference:

NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c Effect: The evacuating general public in West Virginia could have erroneously thought that they were supposed to take KI, causing confusion and inundating rumor control hotlines with inquiries at state, county, and local emergency management agencies.

Recommendation: Provide training for the public information staff to ensure that accurate information is released to the public and media. In addition, prior to releasing any type of emergency information, the Public Information Officer should verify such information with appropriate sources.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: A communication procedure and general-population protective action guideline package will be prepared and disseminated to PlOs for reference.

For General Interest, the State has received its allotment of KI from the NRC and a Hancock County distribution plan is being prepared.

Distribution of KI to the general public should occur sometime late this year.

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-98-29-A-38 (2.e.1)

==

Description:==

Hancock County did not demonstrate the implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return. (NUR.EG-0654, M.1, 3; N. L.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Hancock County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) successfully demonstrated the implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return during the ingestion exercise on May 13, 2004.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 5.1.2 Hancock County Traffic and Access Control Points (New Cumberland Police)

a.

MET:

L.d. 1 3.a. I L.e.I 3.b.1 3.d.1 3.d.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None 60

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 5.1.3 Hancock County Route Alerting (Chester Fire Department)

a.

MET:

1.d.1 3.a.1 5.a.3 3.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 5.1.4 Hancock Count) Mass Care Center and Monitoring and Decontamination Station (Weir High School Complex)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 I.e.1 3.b.1 6.b.1 6.c.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs -UNRESOLVED: None 5.1.5 Hancock County Reception Center (Wcir High School Complex)

a.

MET:

l.d.1 1.e.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None 61

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 5.1.6 Hancock County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station (New Cumberland Fire Department)

a.

MET:

1.d.1 2.a.1 3.a.1 6.a.1 1.e.1 3.b.1 6.b.1

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None

6.

School Districts 6.1 Pennsylvania School Districts 6.1.1 Aliquippa School District (Aliquippa Middle School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 62

6.1.2 Ambridgc School District (Superintendent's Office)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.3 Beaver Area School District (Brighton Towvnship Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-98-16-A-49 (3.e.2)

==

Description:==

A bus route was not run at the Beaver Area School District (College Square Elementary School), as required by the extent-of-play agreement. (NUREG-0654, N.1.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Beaver Area School District Emergency Operations Plan (Annex C, Appendix 2) has detailed evacuation routes and maps from all Beaver Valley Area schools to the host schools (Slippery Rock Schools). There are also maps and school evacuation descriptions in the Beaver Valley Emergency Calendar and in the telephone book.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 63

6.1.4 Blackhawk School District (Blackhawvk Intermediate School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.5 Center Area School District (Todd Lane Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.6 Hopewell Area School District (Raccoon Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 64

6.1.7 Midland Borough School District (Midland Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.8 Monaca School District (Fifth Ward Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

c.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.9 Nevw Brighton Area School District (Superintendent's Office)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 65

6.1.10 South Side Area School District (South Side 11igh School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2 b.'

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None C.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.1.11 Western Beaver School District (Snyder Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 6.2 6.2.1 West Virginia School District Hancock Count) School District (New Manchester Elementary School)

a.

MET:

3.c.2

b.

DEFICIENCY: None

e.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: None

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 66

7.

Ingestion Jurisdictions 7.1 State of West Virginia 7.1.1 Brooke County Emergency Operations Center (co-located at Hancock County EOC)

a.

MET:

I.b.I 2.e.1 3.f.1 1.c.I 1.d.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 2 Issue No.: BVX92-33R (1.b.1)

==

Description:==

Access to the facility was not controlled. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Brooke County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is now located on the second floor of the municipal building of the city of Follansbee, West Virginia. This building is at 872 Main Street (WV Route 2). The location is currently just beginning renovation and has not been used as an EOC prior to this renovation. In prior exercises (ingestion), Brooke County has cooperated with other counties, using their EOCs in joint programs.

The current Brooke County Office of Emergency Services (OES) Director described the plans, layout, and operational functions of the upcoming facility to the evaluator. The plans and discussions also included security requirements and details of staffing, operation, and complete control of all entrances and personnel entering this new facility. The security at the facility would be manned and operated by Follansbee City Police or County law enforcement personnel. A County EOC sign-in sheet was submitted and details discussed. When completed, the facility will be very adequate with strong and complete security established and maintained.

The creation of this new facility resolves prior Issue No. BVX92-33R regarding access control to the Brooke County EOC.

67

Issue No.: 03-98-29-A-46 (2.e.1)

==

Description:==

Brooke County did not demonstrate implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return. (NUREG-0654, M. 1, 3; N. 1.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Brooke County Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return during the ingestion exercise on May 13, 2004.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 7.1.2 Marshall County Emergency Operations Center (co-located at Ohio County EOC)

a.

MET:

1.c.1 2.e.1 3.f.1 5.b.1 1.d.l

b.

DEFICIENCY: None C.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: I Issue No.: 03-98-29-A-47 (2.e.1)

==

Description:==

Marshall County did not demonstrate implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3; N.1.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Marshall County Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return during the ingestion exercise on May 13, 2004.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 7.1.3 Ohio County Emergency Operations Center (co-located with Marshall County EOC)

a.

MET:

l.b.1 2.e.1 3.f.1 5.b.1 1.c.1 1.d.I

b.

DEFICIENCY: None 68

c.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

d.

NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

e.

PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: 2 Issue No.: BVX92-33R (I.b.1)

==

Description:==

Access to the facility was not controlled. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Ohio County Emergency Operations Center's excellent security set-up and demonstration (at the Ohio/Marshall Counties Combined EOC) resolves a prior Issue No.

BVX92-33R) relating to the security at the Ohio County EOC.

Issue No.: 03-98-29-A-48 (2.e.1)

==

Description:==

Ohio County did not demonstrate implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3; N.1.a)

Corrective Action Demonstrated: The Ohio County Emergency Operations Center successfully demonstrated the implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return during the ingestion exercise on May 13, 2004.

f.

PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: None 69

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations which were used in this report.

A&N Alert and Notification ACP Access Control Point ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services ATL Assistant Team Leader BRP Bureau of Radiation Protection BVPS Beaver Valley Power Station CDE Committed Dose Equivalent CENIC Commonwealth Emergency News and Information Center CETC Core Exit Thermocouples CFR Code of Federal Regulations CIB Containment Isolation Phase "B" DEP Department of Environmental Protection DPS Director of Public Safety DRD Direct-Reading Dosimeter EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operations Plan EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company FMT Field Monitoring Team FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FR Federal Register FTC Field Team Center 74

GE GEC GIS gpm General Emergency Gold Executive Conference Geographic Information System gallons per minute HAZMAT HCEOC HCOES Hazardous Materials Hancock County Emergency Operations Center Hancock County Office of Emergency Services IC ICF Ingestion County ICF Consulting, Inc.

JIC JPIC Joint Information Center Joint Public Information Center KI kV Potassium Iodide kilovolt LEPC LHSI LOCA Local Emergency Planning Committee Low-Head Safety Injection Loss-of-Coolant Accident pCi mR mR/h MSL MW microCurie milliRoentgen MilliRoentgen(s) per Hour mean sea level megawatts NRC NUREG-0654 NWS OCEOC OES ORO OSC PA PAD PAG PAR PEMA PEMARS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Pouter Plants, November 1980 National Weather Service Ohio County Emergency Operations Center Office of Emergency Services Off-site Response Organization Operations Support Center Pennsylvania Protective Action Decision Protective Action Guide Protective Action Recommendation Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Response System 75

PRD Permanent Record Dosimeter PSP Pennsylvania State Police Rfh Roentgen per hour RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RCP Response Coordination Manual RCS Reactor Coolant System REACT Radio Emergency Associated Citizen Teams REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RO Radiological Officer ROC Regional Operations Center RPO Radiation Protection Officer RTL Response Team Leader RTM Response Technical Manual RVLIS Reactor Vessel Level Indication System SAE Site Area Emergency SCP Sample Collection Point SCT Sample Collection Team SIP Standard Implementing Procedure SLCRS Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRCC State Rumor Control Center TAT Threat Assessment Team TCP Traffic Control Point TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TL Team Leader TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WV West Virginia WVEOC West Virginia Emergency Operations Center WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 76

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Beaver Valley Power Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Biennial Plume Exercise on May 11, 2004, the Ingestion Tabletop Exercise on May 13, 2004, and the out-of-sequence drill on March 30-31, 2004. Team Leaders are indicated by (TL) after the name of their organization, and the Assistant Team Leaders are indicated by (ATL) after the name of their organization. The organization each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

FEMA NRC ICF Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ICF Consulting, Inc.

OBSERVERS-AT-LARGE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION RAC Chairman Darrell Hammons ICF Project Officer John Price FEMA ICF Regional Coordinator Roy Smith ICF I.

BIENNIAL PLUME EXERCISE, May 11, 2004 L.A COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION State Emergency Operations Center Angela Hough FEMA (TL)

Henry Christiansen ICF (ATL)

Deborah Blunt ICF Rosemary Samsel ICF Public Information Activities (CENIC)

Rosemary Samsel ICF Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) -

Paul Nied ICF (TL)

PA and WV Accident Assessment (State EOC-BRP)

Deborah Blunt ICF (TL)

Emergency Operations Facility (BRP and Richard Barkley NRC RHP)

State Field Air Monitoring Team A Gary Goldberg ICF State Field Air Monitoring Team B Rowena Argall ICF 77

I.B COMMON WEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, RISK JURISDICTIONS, BEAVER COUNTY EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Beaver County Emergency Operations Yvette Porter FEMA (TL)

Center Al Lookabaugh ICF (ATL)

Carol Herzenberg ICF Roy Smith ICF Aliquippa City EOC Robert Black ICF Beaver Borough EOC Ernest Boaze ICF Bridgewater Borough/Fallston Borough Thomas Deaner ICF EOC Brighton Township EOC Wendy Swygert ICF Center Township EOC Wanda Gaudet FEMA Chippewa Towvnship EOC, also Hearing Kevin Flynn ICF Impaired Notification and Route Alerting Bart Freeman FEMA Hanover Township/Frankfort Springs Samuel Nelson ICF Borough EOC Georgetown Borough/Greene Lawrence Visniesky JCF Township/Hookstown Borough EOC Hopewell Township EOC Joshua Moore ICF Independence Township EOC William Edmonson ICF Industry Borough EOC Steve Lowery ICF Midland Borough EOC Paul Ringheiser ICF Monaca Borough EOC Walter Gawlak ICF Patterson Township EOC and Patterson David Moffet ICF Heights Borough EOC Potter Township EOC Patrick Taylor ICF Raccoon Township EOC William McCance ICF Shippingport Borough EOC Janice Jackson ICF S. Beaver Township/Glasgow Quirino lannazzo ICF Borough/Ohioville Borough EOC II South Heights Borough EOC Nancy Johnson ICF Vanport Township EOC Robert Fernandez ICF I.C COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Allegheny County EOC Landton Malone FEMA Butler County EOC Patricia Tenorio FEMA (TL)

Lawrence County EOC Tracey Green ICF Washington County EOC Seth Kelly ICF 78

I. D STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION State Emergency Operations Center Al Henryson FEMA (TL)

Carl McCoy ICF (ATL)

John Flynn ICF State Public Information John Flynn ICF State Accident Assessment Edward Wojnas ICF (TL)

State Field Air Monitoring Team - Plume Keith Earnshaw ICF (ATL)

May 1 1 State Field Sampling Team A - Ingestion Keith Earnshaw ICF (ATL)

May 13 State Field Sampling Team B - Ingestion Carol Herzenberg ICF May 13 I.E STATE OF WIEST VIRGINIA, RISK JURISDICTIONS, HANCOCK COUNTY EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Hancock County EOC, Accident Roman Helo FEMA (TL)

Assessment, and Public Information.

Don Cray ICF (ATL)

William Neidermeyer ICF II.

INGESTION TABLETOP EXERCISE, May 13, 2004

[I.A.

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, INGESTION JURISDICTIONS EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Hancock County EOC with Brooke Roman Helo FEMA (TL)

County EOC (co-located at Hancock Don Cray ICF (ATL)

County EOC)

Ohio County EOC with Marshall County Jerry Staroba ICF EOC (co-located at Ohio County EOC)

William Neidermeyer ICF 79

111.

OUT-OF-SEQUENCE DRILL, March 30 and 31, 2004 III.A COM MONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Bcavcr Count), Schools EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Aliquippa School District, Aliquippa Marcy Campbell ICF Middle School Ambridge School District, Roy Smith ICF Superintendent's Office Beaver Area School District, Brighton Ken Wierman FEMA Township Elementary School Blackhawk School District, Blackhawk Roman Helo FEMA Intermediate School Center Area School District, Todd Lane Al Henryson FEMA Elementary School Hopewell Area School District, Raccoon Yvette Porter FEMA Elementary School Midland Borough School District, Cedric Cherry FEMA Midland Elementary School Monaca School District, Fifth Ward Edward Wojnas ICF Elementary School New Brighton School District, Angela Hough FEMA Superintendent's Office South Side Area School District, South Deborah Blunt ICF Side High School Western Beaver School District, Snyder Carol Herzenberg ICF Elementary School III.B COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION State Police Traffic/Access Control Gary Goldberg ICF Points, PSP Beaver Barracks, 1400 Brighton Rd., Beaver, PA Allegheny County Reception Center, Marcy Campbell ICF South Park Museum Building Allegheny County Mass Care Center and Marcy Campbell ICF Monitoring/Decontamination Station, South Park High School Butler County Reception Center, Deborah Blunt ICF Slippery Rock University Parking Lot Butler County Mass Care Center and Deborah Blunt ICF Monitoring/Decontamination Station, Slippery Rock High School Lawrence County Reception Center, Al Henryson FEMA 80

EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Mohawk Area High School L

Lawrence County Mass Care Center and Carol Herzenberg ICF Monitoring/Decontamination Station, Union High School Washington County Reception Center, Roy Smith ICF Washington County Fair Grounds Washington County Mass Care Center Gary Goldberg ICF and Monitoring/Decontamination Station, McGuffy High School Beaver County Emergency Worker Edward Wojnas ICF Monitoring/Decontamination Station A, Crescent Township Fire Department Beaver County Emergency Worker Ken Wierman FEMA Monitoring/Decontamination Station B, Hanover Fire Department III.C STATE OF WVEST VIRGINIA, March 31,2004 EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Hancock County School District, New Yvette Porter FEMA Manchester Elementary School l

Hancock County Traffic/Access Control Angela Hough FEMA Points, New Cumberland Police Hancock County Mass Care Center, Gary Goldberg ICF Monitoring/Decontamination Station, Weir High School Complex Hancock County Reception Center, Weir Gary Goldberg ICF High School Complex Hancock County Route Alerting, Chester Roman Helo FEMA Fire Department Hancock County Emergency Worker Edward Wojnas ICF Monitoring/Decontamination, New Cumberland Fire Department 81

APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix contains the extent-of-play agreements (EOPs) approved by FEMA Region III for the plume and post-plume exercise activities and out-of-sequence demonstrations related to the 10- and 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) surrounding the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). The plume and post-plume exercises were conducted on May 11 and 13, 2004, respectively. Out-of-sequence demonstrations were conducted on March 30-31, 2004. The EOPs are arranged by State, according to the exercise evaluation area criteria.

The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise New Methodology" represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

Because the exercise evaluation area criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among off-site plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the evaluation area criteria.

A.

Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria Listed below are the specific radiological emergency preparedness evaluation area criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element l.a - Mobilization Criterion I.a. 1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Sub-element L.b - Facilities Criterion l.b.l: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, H.3) 82

Sub-element L.c - Direction and Control Criterion l.c.l: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

Sub-element L.d - Communications Equipment Criterion L.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F. 1, 2)

Sub-element L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion I.e.l: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),

and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e; J.I 1; K.3.a)

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)

Sub-element 2.b - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10; Supplement 3)

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9; J.10.f, m) 83

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.I0.d, e)

Sub-element 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)

Sub-element 2.e - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.l)

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG-0654, J. I 0.c, d, g)

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g) 84

Sub-element 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.I0.gj)

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.I: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11)

Sub-element 3.f - Implementation of Relocation, Re-Entry, and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3)

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a. 1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 11; J.I0.a; H.12)

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9) 85

Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J. I 1)

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.1 1)

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

(10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D; NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c) 86

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers.

(NUREG-0654, J.l0.h; J.12; K.5.a)

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE -

Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12)

B.

Extent-of-Play Agreements The extent-of-play agreements on the following pages were developed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of West Virginia and submitted to FEMA Region III for approval. The agreements include any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each exercise evaluation area criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix. Below are the dates on which the extent-of-play agreements were approved by FEMA Region III:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania-March 4, 2004 State of West Virginia-January 27, 2004 87

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2002 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE METHOD OF OPERATION March 4, 2004 I.

Beaver Valley Power Station The facility normally uses off-watch section personnel to participate in the exercise. The plant's simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classifications will trigger offsite exercise actions.

2.

Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP)

Personnel will be present at the State EOC, the nuclear facility EOF, and at field locations and will be evaluated.

3.

PEMA Operations at State EOC PEMA Bureau of Operations and Training staff augmented by designated PEMA personnel from the Fire Commissioner's Office; the Bureau of Administration, Technical Services, and Plans; plus Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) with accompanying response team members from designated state departments/agencies, including representatives from the USDA State Emergency Board, will comprise initial operations at the State EOC and wvill be evaluated.

4.

PEMA Regional Office Operations The State Regional Office at Indiana will not be activated and will staff a control cell only.

5.

Counties Designated to Participate Beaver County, in coordination with PEMA, wvill demonstrate the capability to implement emergency response operations to include sheltering and/or evacuation. County government will provide direction and coordination to risk municipalities. Allegheny, Butler, Lawrence, and Washington Counties will participate in their assigned support roles.

6.

PEMA Liaison Officers Liaison officers will be present at the participating risk county EOC, the BVPS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Joint Information Center (JIC), and the 88

Ohio and West Virginia EOCs to provide assistance, guidance, and support.

These liaison officers will participate as players in the exercise.

7.

Controllers FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) will provide controllers at the monitoring/decontaminating stations, monitoring/decontamination centers and BRP field team locations.

8.

PEMA Obserners PEMA staff, qualified county emergency management personnel, and/or nuclear power plant personnel will be assigned if required to key locations for the purpose of observing, noting response actions and conditions, and recording observations for future use. Observers will not take an active part in the proceedings, but will interact with staff members to the extent necessary to fulfill their observer responsibilities. Coaching of players by observers is not permitted except to provide training to participants awaiting a re-demonstration (Refer to paragraph 13).

9.

FEMA Evaluators Federal evaluators will be present at the state EOC, risk and support county EOCs, risk municipal EOCs, and at field locations to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. FEMA will evaluate all of the risk municipalities in Beaver County.

10.

Demonstration Windows The demonstration windows are those periods of time designated in the exercise during which specified demonstrations will be accomplished out of sequence.

The purpose of the windows is to provide for more effective demonstrations as well as permitting the release of volunteers from the exercise play at a reasonable hour. There will be out-of-sequence demonstrations during the exercise. The out-of-sequence MS-I hospital demonstration was evaluated at Ellwood City Hospital on November 12, 2003. The window for school demonstrations will be conducted out of sequence from 9:00-1 1:00 a.m. on March 30, 2004. Evaluation of County and municipal EOC operations was conducted on May 11, 2004. The demonstration for reception centers, mass care centers, monitoring/

decontamination centers and stations was conducted out of sequence from 7:00-9:30 p.m. on March 30, 2004. The out-of-sequence demonstration of Pennsylvania State Police traffic control/access control points was from 9:00 a.m.-1 1:30 a.m. on March 30, 2004. All demonstrations commence promptly and, barring any complications, do not continue past the end of the windows (Refer to Extent-of-Play Demonstration Tables).

89

11.

Stand-down All jurisdictions will request approval on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis prior to stand-down.

a.

Upon completion of all requirements and after having informed the FEMA evaluator that all evaluation areas have been demonstrated and/or completed, the risk municipality EOCs may request approval from their county EOC to terminate the exercise.

b.

Support counties may likewise request approval to terminate the exercise upon completion of all evaluated objectives from the state EOC.

c.

The risk county EOC will remain operational until the exercise is officially terminated by the State.

12.

General Concepts An emergency plan is drafted to address the generally expected conditions of an emergency. Not everything in the emergency plan may be applicable for a given scenario. The main purpose of an emergency plan is to assemble sufficient expertise and officials so as to properly react to the events as they occur. The responders should not be so tied to a plan that they cannot take actions that are more protective of the public. Therefore, if by not following the plan, the responders protect the public equally as well as provided in the plan, it should be noted for possible modification of the plan, but not classified as a negative incident. Furthermore, if by following the plan there is a failure to protect the public health and safety, it should be noted so that the plan can be modified and the appropriate negative assessment applied.

13.

Re-demonstrations During the out-of-sequence demonstrations on March 30, 2004, or the plume phase demonstrations on May 11, 2004, any activity that is not satisfactorily demonstrated may be re-demonstrated by the participants during the exercise provided it does not negatively interfere with the exercise. Refresher training can be provided by the players, observers, and/or controllers. Evaluators are not permitted to provide refresher training. Re-demonstrations will be negotiated between the players, observers, controllers, and evaluators. The RAC Chair will be advised prior to initiating any re-demonstrations. It is permissible to extend the evaluation time to accommodate the re-demonstration. Activities corrected from a re-demonstration will be so noted.

90

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT EVALUATION AREA 1 - Emergency Operations Management Sub-element l.a - Mobilization INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion L.a.l: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

State agencies, risk and support counties, and risk municipalities EOCs will demonstrate call-outs. All out-of-sequence players and equipment wlill be pre-positioned.

91

Sub-element Lb - Facilities INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion I.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, H.3)

EXTENT OF PLAY Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations.

Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEMIA N'egotiated Extent of Play:

None Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.L.d; A.2.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

92

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Exte,,t of Play:

None Sub-clement 1.d - Communications Equipment INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems arc available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

93

PEMIA Negotiated Extent of Plau:

None Sub-element L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.c.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654, H.7,10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation should be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument, or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of reading sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c. l for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment; reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d. 1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if 94

necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise through documentation.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (for example, vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAMA Negotiated Extent of Playt:

In Pennsylvania, CDV-700s are calibrated every 4years. Support counties do not have DRDs, PRDs, or Kl.

Leakage testing verification and KI extension letters lt'ill be available to the evaluator upon request.

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EVALUATION AREA 2 - Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-clement 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans and procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10.e, )

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

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PEMA Negotiated E2rtent of Play:

Alone Sub-clement 2.b - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to use all available data to independently project integrated dose and compare the estimated dose savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the ORO's plans and procedures or EPA 400-R-92-001 and other criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination of protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (for example, other affected OROs), availability of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations that create higher than normal risk from evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as wenl as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

EXTENT OF PLAY During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PARs) for decision makers based on available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available.

When the licensee provides release and meteorological data, the ORO also considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario.

In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAGs to which they will be compared.

PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision makers in a prearranged format.

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The 97

ORO should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEA I Negotiated Extent of Play:

None Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff.

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under off-site plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement shelter and evacuation. This decision should be based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, OROs should communicate and coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

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PEAIA Nlegotiated Exttent of Plaj):

None Sub-clement 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for special population groups (for example, hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.c.l: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, c)

EXTENT OF PLAY Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be considered by the OROs.

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision-making process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

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All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

None Sub-element 2.d. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathwvay This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-clement 2.c. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-cntry, and Return This sub-elemient will not be evaluated during this exercise.

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EVALUATION AREA 3 - Protective Action Implementation Sub-clement 3.a - Implemcntation of Emergency Vorker Exposure Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; and establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions.

If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed 101

and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (for example, written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, for example, at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAMIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Radiological briefings Hill be provided to address exposure limits andprocedures to replace those approaching limits and houw permission to exceed limits is obtainedfrom the municipality and county. Emergency workers it'ill also be briefed on when to take Ki and on tihose authority. Distribution ofK wtill be simulated The completion of a KI reportform Will be demonstrated OROs should also demonstrate the use of all dosimetryforms to emergency workers.

At any time, players may ask other players or supervisors to clarify radiological information.

In Pennsylvania, emergency workers outside of the EPZ do not have turnback values.

Emergency workers who are assigned to lowe exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual permanent record dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the iW'ork area. In Pennsylvania this it'ill be accomplished through the use of an area kit.

Standard issue of dosimetry and potassium iodide for each category of emergency worker is as follows:

Category A: I PRD, I DRD, and l unit of K]

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Category B: I PRD and 1 unit of Kl Category C. I PRD Sample kits hill be pre-distributed to the municipalities for demonstration purposes.

These sample kits Hill consist of2-DRDs, charger, simulated PRDs and Kl, and instructions. Leakage test verification and KI extension letters it'ill be available upon request.

Sub-clement 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to provide radioprotective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general public is an ORO option and is reflected in ORO's plans and procedures.

Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of radioprotective drugs.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e)

EXTENT OF PLAY Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary.

For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished through an interview by the evaluator.

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All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Pennsylvania plans callfor issuance of KI to the general public.

Evaluation of emergency worker K! quantities it'ill be verified uising inventory sheets and no KI Will be removed from the storage location. Boxes will not be opened. KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

AMonitoring/decontamination centers and stations personnel are not issued DRDs/K!

since the centers/stations are located outside the EPZ.

Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

EXTENT OF PLAY Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be 104

in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Plan:

Lists ofpeople wt'ith special needs are maintained at the municipal EOCs. Copies of these lists will not be provided to the evaluators holuvever; evaluators it'ill be able to inspect these lists during the exercise.

Initial contact with special populations and reception facilities 'ill be actual (hospitals, nursing homes and correctionalfacilities). All subsequent calls will be simulated. Actual contacts (itp to theo) will be made with transportation providers as per plan. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

EXTENT OF PLAY Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

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PEMAA Nlegotiated Extent of Play:

Evacuation of students is'ill be conducted through an interview process.

Role of the bus driver may be conducted through an interview Wvith school or transportation officials if a buts driver is not available. Actual demonstration of the buts route is not required and will not be demonstrated.

Risk Count' school plans do not require communications betwveen the school and vehicles. Bus drivers are not considered emergency rworkers.

Private schools, private kindergartens, and day care centers do not participate in REP exercises.

Sub-clement 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions arc provided to traffic and access control personnel.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent of play.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

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All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEMIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Traffic and access control will be demonstrated by interview - no deployment. A radiological briefing will be provided Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

EXTENT OF PLAY OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wTeckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Upon request municipal and county staffs will be prepared to brief the evaluator on actions to be taken should there be an impediment to evacuation on a designated route.

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions This sub-element icill not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 3.f-Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions This sub-element uH'ill not be evaluated during this exercise.

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EVALUATION AREA 4 - Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-clement 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume emergency planning zone to measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 1.7, 8, 9)

EXTENT OF PLAY Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than I R/hr) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othervise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

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PEAIA Negotiated Evtent of Play:

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) field teams are equipped writh the necessary instrumentation and supplies.

Evaluators *ill meet the field teams at the Southirest Regional Office at 2:00p.m. on May 11, 2004, to observe instrumentation checks and equipment inventory verification.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume.

The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Field Team control is expected to initially be out of sequence it'ith the plume timeline.

During the exercise the field teams wrill be directed to take measurements in locations to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

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Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9)

EXTENT OF PLAY Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO plan and/or procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated EVtent of Play:

Measurements it'll be made by Department of Environmental Protection (DEP),

Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), in accordance wvith the State Annex E, Appendix 6, and BRP Standard Implementing Procedures (SIPs). Twvo mobile monitoring teams from BRP (South Western Regional Office) vill demonstrate ambient radiation monitoring and radioiodine andparticulate sampling. Field teams witl be equipped with appropriate dosimetty and K1. Both teams Hi'l be evaluated by FEMA. Each team it'll be directed to pre-determined monitoring points and perform actual radiation measurements at the first three locations and simulated measurements at the remaining locations. An actual air sample it'ill be taken at the first pre-determined location. Teams it'll then take additional simulated air samnples, as directed, at additional locations, if conditions are appropriate for radioiodine sampling and relay information to the State EOC. In place ofsilver zeolite cartridges, charcoal cartridges vill be usedfor the exercise. All measurements Hit!

beforwarded to the State EOC immediately upon obtaining data. Evaluators will meet the field teams at the Southwvest Region Office at 2:00 p.m. on May 11, 2004.

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Sub-clement 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations This sub-element Hill not be evaluated during this exercise.

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EVALUATION AREA 5 - Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.), and FEMA-REP-l 0, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear Power Plants."

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

EXTENT OF PLAY Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

112

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/

representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/

instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The alert signal activation may be simulated.

However, the procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEA IA Negotiated Extent of Play:

All actions to broadcast stations it'ill be simulated Systems that use automatic sending technology may be demonstrated by interview.

One municipality per risk county will demonstrate route alertingfor hearing impaired residents within their jurisdiction.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin wvhen the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific 113

emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated.

The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

There are no exception areas in the B VPS EPZ.

Sub-clement 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions. In addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency.

NUREG-0654 also provides that a system should be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry hotline.

114

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements).

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/

representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and 115

pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g.,

EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media.

OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Alone 116

EVALUATION AREA 6 - Support Operation/Facilities Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Dccontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency w orker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency

,workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/

emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be meet. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and 117

appropriate means (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAMA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Expected demonstration should include a roster of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility iWithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored (or one person six times).

Water from decontamination activities may go directly to a storm drain or other sewer or drain system or area normally designatedfor wtastewater that has been used for bathing or itashing of vehicles and or equipment.

At each reception center, a minimum of three volunteer evacuees will be processed, briefed, issued the appropriate strip map or directions, and instructed to proceed to a mass care center designatedfor demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration. A sample oftthe appropriate strip maps or directions will be made available for the demonstration.

One mass care center and one monitoring/decontamination center per support county will be demonstrated during the out-of-sequence ivindoiv. All monitoring and decontamination teams will demonstrate monitoring, decontamination and 118

r egistration procedures at one mass care center per conlty. The support counties uw'ill provide space at designated mass care centers for operation of monitoring/decontamination centers. Schematics of these monitoring!

decontamination centers it-ill be available to show organization lwlithin the facility and space management for monitoring andfor decontamination of the evacuating public.

Procedures wi'ill be demonstrated to show minimizing contamination of the facility and separation of contaminated and non-contaminated (clean) individuals.

At the evacuee monitoring/decontamination centers each team, consisting of a minimum of two persons (monitor and recorder), wi'ill monitor a minimum of six (6) volunteer evacuees or one (1) volunteer evacuee six times, complete the Monitoring/Decontamination Report Form (either by demonstration or explanation),

and instruct the evacuees to proceed to the mass care registration points for firther processing. The teams will demonstrate: radiological monitoring of at least one vehicle and the simulated decontamination of at least twio evacuees, one unable to be decontaminated based on controller inject data. Discussions concerning processing of contaminatedpersonnel will include capabilities and written proceduresfor shouw'eringfemales separatefrom males. A CD V-700, or other survey meter, will be issued to each team. For Portal Monitor Use refer to paragraph below. PRDs ivill be simulated At the emergency worker monitoring/decontamination stations each team, consisting of a minimum of two persons (monitor and recorder), will monitor one emergency worker, complete the Monitoring/Decontamination Repoit Form (either by demonstration or explanation). Discussions concerning processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and Written procedures for showering females separate from males. A CD V-700, or other survey mete,; uw'ill be issued to each team. For Portal Monitor Use refer to next paragraph. PRDs will be simulated.

Portal Monitor Use: Risk and Support counties may, during this exercise, utilize portal monitors to monitor simulated evacuees, emergency workers and/or vehicles.

In the instances where a portal monitor is used a draft/interim procedure/guidelines may be usedfor this evaluation. The monitoring decontamination team requirements will be based on the portal monitor capabilities as applicable based on the draft/interim procedure/guiidelines, and manufacturers ' recommendations.

Monitoring/decontamination centers and station personnel are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers and stations are outside the EPZ.

Radiation contamination data for the evacuees and vehicles will be provided by the controller and must be included in the scenario package. Set-up of the facility Will be performed the same as for an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place including step-offpads; with the exception of long runs ofplastic covered with paper which will not be demonstrated, but the materials will be available and explained. Positioning of afire apparatus on-site may be simulated if otherwise required 119

Sub-elemcnt 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency wvorker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

EXTENT OF PLAY The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated.

Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures, and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othenvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAIA Negotiated Extent of Play:

Emergency iWorker station personnel will consist of a minimum of one monitor and one recorder and sufficient personnel to demonstrate monitoring of at least one vehicle. Schematics of these monitoring/decontamination stations ivill be available to showts organization and space management within the facility. The evaluator will request that decontamination procedures be explained after the vehicle wthich has simulated contamination has been monitored One CD V-700, or other survey meter, 120

itill be issued to each monitoring/decontamination team. One vehicle and/or piece of equipment will not be able to be decontaminated. Simulated radiation contamination data will be included in the scenario package, and injected by a controller. Set-rip of the facility will be performed as closely as possible to that for an actual emergency with all route markings in place including step-offpads; with the exception of long runs ofplastic covered with paper which will not be demonstrated, but the materials will be available and explained Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, will be simulated and conducted by interviewer Sub-clement 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element derives from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. The American Red Cross (ARC) normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE -

Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12)

EXTENT OF PLAY Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

121

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (for example, cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othervise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

PEAM Negotiated Extent of Play!:

Capabilities Hill be demonstrated through an interview process. Personnel, at a minimumn, will consist of one manager and assistantfor each mass care center opened.

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals This sub-element was evaluated at Ellwood City Hospital on November 12, 2003.

122

Beaver Valley Powver Station 2004 Extent-of-play Demonstration Tables DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION COUNTY FOR COUNTIES Date Time Beaver May 11, 2004 TBD Allegheny May 11, 2004 TBD Butler May 11, 2004 TBD Lawrence May 11, 2004 TBD Washington May 11, 2004 TBD RISK COUNTY DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES Beaver Municipality Date City of Aliquippa May 11, 2004 Beaver Borough May 11, 2004 Bridgewater/Fallston Borough*

May 11, 2004 Brighton Township May 11, 2004 Center Township May 11, 2004 Chippewa Township May 11, 2004 Frankfort Springs/Hanover*

May 11, 2004 Georgetown/Greene/Hookstown*

May 11, 2004 Glasgow/Ohioville/S. Beaver*

May 11, 2004 Hopewell Township May 11, 2004 Independence Township May 11, 2004 Industry Borough May 11, 2004 Midland Borough May 11, 2004 Monaca Borough May 11, 2004 Patterson Township May 11, 2004 Patterson Heights Borough May 11, 2004 Potter Township May 11, 2004 Raccoon Township May 11, 2004 Shippingport Borough May 11, 2004 South Heights Borough May 11, 2004 Vanport Township May 11, 2004

• Joint EOC 123

1. One reception center in each county.

COUNTY DEMONSTRATION OF RECEPTION CENTERS Date Time Allegheny March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Butler March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Lawrence March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Washington March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

COUNTY RECEPTION CENTER LOCATIONS Quantity Allegheny South Park Museum Building I

Butler Slippery Rock University Parking Lot I

Lawrence Mohawk Area High School 1

Washington Washington County Fairgrounds 1

2. One mass care center and monitoring/decontamination center in each county will be evaluated.

COUNTY DEMONSTRATION OF MASS CARE CENTERS/HOST SCHOOL Date Time Allegheny March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Butler March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Lawrence March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Washington March 30, 2004 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

COUNTY MASS CARE CENTER LOCATIONS Quantity Allegheny South Park High School 1

Butler Slippery Rock High School I

Lawrence Union High School I

Washington McGuffey High School I

American Red Cross Chapters and POCs are as follows:

Allegheny and Washington Counties - Southwest PA Chapter 225 Blvd. of the Allies Pittsburgh, PA 15230 POC: Rob Skertich 412-263-3100 124

Butler County 312 Mercer St.

Butler, PA 16001 POC: Cathy Pearce 724-283-2810 Lawrence County 222 N. Mercer St.

New Castle, PA 16101 POC: Tom Ford 724-652-7724

3. Emergency worker monitoring/decontamination station for the risk county.

l Beaver l

Hanover FD l

March 30, 2004 Beaver Crescent Township FD March 30, 2004

4. One hearing impaired notification and one route alerting demonstration by one municipality in each risk county.

I Beaver I

Chippewa Township May 11,2004

5. Risk School Districts with schools in the EPZ and those districts outside the EPZ but with students living within the EPZ will participate and will be evaluated by FEMA.

These include (all schools within EPZ):

COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT SCHOOL Beaver Aliquippa Middle School Beaver Area Brighton Twp Elem Blackhawk Intermediate School Center Area Todd Lane Elem l

Hopewell Raccoon Elemr Midland Borough Midland Elem Monaca 5th Ward Elem South Side Area High School Western Beaver Snyder Elem New Brighton See Note below Ambridge See Note below NOTE: Neui' Brighton and Ambridge School Districts do not have schools within the EPZ. They do have students attending their schools who reside in the EPZ.

Procedures for holding those students at their respective schools until picked Up by parents or guardians will be explained by the district superintendent or 125

representative. As procedures are the same district li'ide, there will be no need to visit individual schools for evaluation.

6. Traffic and Access Control Points

a. The Pennsylvania State Police will brief at the PSP Beaver Barracks, 1400 Brighton Road, Beaver PA 15009, Beaver County. Members attending the briefing will not actually deploy to the TCP/ACP specified below.

b. The PSP briefing will be performed out of sequence in a demonstration window of 9:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on March 30, 2004.

7. Each municipal/regional police force with a TCP assigned in its plan will demonstrate all preparation duties including TCP responsibilities and radiological briefing. Dispatch of persons to the TCP site will not occur during the exercise.

a. Municipal and county staffs will be prepared to brief the FEMA evaluator on actions to be taken should there be an impediment to evacuation on a designated route. This will be demonstrated between 7:00 p.m.-9:30 p.m. on May 11, 2004.

These municipal/regional police forces are:

Beaver Shippingport Monaca Bridgewater/Fallston Raccoon Patterson Center South Beaver Heights/Patterson PREVIOUS ISSUES Facility Evaluated Number 03-00-12 (5.b.1)-A-02 03-02-3.a.1-A-01 03-02-2.a.1 -A-02 03-02-2.a.1 -A-03 BVX92-25R (3.e.1)

BVX92-27R (l.c.l)

BVX92-28R (1.b.1) 03-98-16 (3.c.2)-A-49 JPIC (PA) (Prior unresolved)

Beaver Borough Midland Borough Monaca Borough State EOC Armstrong County Greene County Beaver Area SD (Prior unresolved) 126

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE METHOD OF OPERATION January 27, 2004 Rev. 4 I.

Beavcr Valley Power Station The facility normally uses off-watch section personnel to participate in the exercise. The plant's simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classifications will trigger offsite exercise actions.

2.

Offsitc Response Functions State:

West Virginia Emergency Operations Center

• Direction & Control

• Accident Assessment

• Public Information

• Communications Hancock County Emergency Operations Center

• Accident Assessment Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Response Facility

• Accident Assessment Beaver Valley Power Station Joint Public Information Center

• Public Information The Ohio Labs, utilized by the State of West Virginia, were demonstrated in the State of Ohio Ingestion Exercise at the May 2001, Davis Besse Exercise. They will not be demonstrated during this Exercise.

County:

Hancock County Emergency Operations Center

• Direction & Control

• Public Information 127

• Alert & Notification

• Communications

2.

Offsite Rcsponse Functions: (Continued)

County:

Brooke County

• Direction & Control

• Public Information

• Communications Ohio County

• Direction & Control

• Public Information

• Communications Marshall County

• Direction & Control

• Public Information

• Communications Field Play:

(See 5. Demonstration Windows)

3.

Controllers FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) will provide controllers at the Hancock County EOC and at Hancock County field locations. Controllers for Brooke County, Marshall County, Ohio County will be provided as needed. Controllers will not take an active part in the proceedings, but will interact with staff members to the extent necessary to fulfill their observer responsibilities. Coaching of players by Controllers is not permitted except to provide training to participants awaiting a re-demonstration.

4.

FEMA Evaluators Federal evaluators will be present at the State EOC, Hancock County EOC, Brooke County, Marshall County, Ohio County, and at field locations to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario.

128

5.

Demonstration Windows The demonstration windows are those periods of time designated in the exercise during which specified demonstrations will be accomplished.

The purpose of the window is to provide for more effective demonstrations as well as permitting the release of volunteers from the exercise play at a reasonable hour.

The State & Hancock County EOC Operations will be conducted on May II, 2004.

The State and Ingestion Pathway Counties will be conducted on May 13, 2004.

The Ingestion Exercises, State and Counties will be conducted independently from each other.

For the Ingestion Exercise, the West Virginia EOC will be demonstrated in the Charleston, WV area. Exact location To Be Determined.

For the Ingestion Exercise, the West Virginia Field Demonstration will be demonstrated in the 50 Mile EPZ. Exact location To Be Determined.

For the Ingestion Exercise, the West Virginia EOC and the West Virginia Field Demonstrations will be conducted independently from each other.

For the Ingestion Exercise, Hancock County/Brooke County will co-locate and Ohio County/Marshall County will co-locate. Exact locations To Be Determined.

For the Ingestion Exercise, Hancock County/Brooke County and Ohio County/Marshall County will be conducted independently from each other.

The State will be represented at the BVPS Emergency Response Facility during the May 11, 2004, exercise.

The State will be represented at the BVPS Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) during the May I1, 2004, exercise.

Out-of-Sequence Demonstrations will be run independently of each other.

129

Out-of-Sequence Demonstrations will be managed by the Lead Controller at each field location.

MS-1 Hospital Exercise was conducted on May 15, 2003, and Federal Evaluated at the Weirton Medical Center.

School demonstration 9:00 - 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, at New Manchester Elementary School.

Reception Center will be conducted from 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, at the Weir High School.

Mass Care Center, Monitoring/Decontamination Center will be conducted from 7:00 - 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, at the Weir High School Complex.

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be conducted from 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, at the New Cumberland Fire Department.

Traffic Control/Access Control points will be at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, in the Hancock County EOC.

Route Alerting will be demonstrated from 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, at Chester Fire Department.

All demonstrations will commence promptly and, barring any complications, not continue past the end of the windows.

6.

Termination

• The Lead Controller in the Hancock County EOC will coordinate the Exercise Termination with the West Virginia EOC, the BVPS EOF, and the EOCs in Beaver and Columbiana County for the May 11, 2004, Exercise. The State and Ingestion Counties will run independent scenarios on May 13, 2004.

• Field Locations/Out-of-Sequence Demonstrations will be terminated by the Lead Controller at each location. The termination will be based on the completion of the objectives. The termination can happen sooner than the identified end time.

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7.

General Concepts

• An emergency plan is drafted to address the generally expected conditions of an emergency. Not everything in the emergency plan may be applicable for a given scenario. The main purpose of an emergency plan is to assemble sufficient expertise and officials so as to properly react to the events as they occur. The responders should not be so tied to a plan that they cannot take actions that are more protective of the public. Therefore, if, by not following the plan, the responders protect the public equally as well as provided in the plan, it should be noted for possible modification of the plan, but not classified as a negative incident. Furthermore, if, by following the plan there is a failure to protect the public health and safety, it should be noted so that the plan can be modified and the appropriate negative assessment applied.

8.

Re-demonstrations

• During the out-of-sequence demonstrations on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, the plume on May I1, 2004, or the Ingestion portion on May 13, 2004 Exercise, any activity that is not satisfactorily demonstrated may be re-demonstrated by the participants during the exercise provided it does not negatively interfere with the exercise. Refresher training can be provided by the players, observers, and/or controllers. Re-demonstrations will be negotiated between the players, observers, controllers, evaluators and RAC Chair, or designee. It is permissible to extend the evaluation time to accommodate the re-demonstration.

Activities corrected from a re-demonstration will be so noted.

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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXTENT OF PLAY EVALUATION AREA 1 - Emergency Operations Management Sub-element l.a - Mobilization INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.l: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee. Contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.

Demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations.

Activation of facilities will not start until an Alert is declared.

Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

Pre-positioning is permitted for all field locations and any out-of-sequence demonstrations. State personnel assigned to field activities (i.e., County EOC, BVPS EOF, BVPS JPIC) will be permitted to pre-position.

EOC Twenty-four (24) Hour Staffing will be demonstrated by roster.

132

County:

Demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee. Contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner.

Demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations.

Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

Activation of facilities will not start until an Alert is declared.

Pre-positioning is permitted for all field locations and any out-of-sequence demonstrations.

EOC Twenty-four (24) Hour Staffing will be demonstrated by roster.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 1.b - Facilities INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion I.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, H.3)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

All facilities identified in the method of operations will be evaluated during this exercise in order to establish a baseline.

County:

All facilities identified in the method of operations will be evaluated during this exercise in order to establish a baseline.

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

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Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate response organizations, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

County:

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate response organizations, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element I.d - Communications Equipment INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2) 134

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

EOC xvill demonstrate telephone and at least one radio communications system.

Field Teams will demonstrate the capability to communicate from the field locations, independent from commercial hard line telephone.

Demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations.

County:

EOC will demonstrate telephone and at least one radio communications system.

Demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations.

Out-of-sequence demonstrations will have communications available and demonstrated (i.e., radio/communications check).

Communications associated with medical support facilities were demonstrated during the May 15, 2003, MS-1 Federal Evaluated Exercise.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.I: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI),

and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a) 135

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Maps and displays will be utilized in the EOC.

Radiological instruments used by the State Field Team wvill be with the team in Hancock County. Instruments will be operationally checked. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or verifiable by other means, such as a letter.

Dosimetry for the State Field Team will be issued by the County.

WV does not issue KI to the General Public.

County:

The dosimetry is exchanged annually and documentation will be verified during the exercise.

The County will demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers.

Adequate quantities of dosimetry and KI are available at the County EOC and will be confirmed by physical inspection. Available supplies of KI will be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs.

Maps and displays will be utilized in the EOC.

Hancock County does not pre-distribute dosimetry.

Dosimetry "Training Kits" will be available at the field locations to demonstrate the use of dosimetry.

WV does not issue KI to the General Public CDV-138s are not used in Hancock County.

A Law Officer in the County EOC will discuss Traffic and Access Control.

Traffic and Access Control will be demonstrated during the out of sequence.

Traffic Control/Access Control Points supplies/equipment will be explained during the March 31, 2004, interview.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

136

EVALUATION AREA 2 - Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-clement 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans and procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10.c, f)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

As appropriate, demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure.

The decision for KI can be not to administer KI.

County:

Demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. This will be done by interview.

Demonstrate through interview with County Director or his designee, how KI would be distributed to EPZ emergency workers.

137

Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to independently project integrated dose from exposure rates or other information and compare the estimated dose savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the ORO's plans and procedures or EPA 400-R-92-001 and other criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination of protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs), availability of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, evacuation time estimates, and situations that create higher than normal risk from evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as avell as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, 10 and Supplement 3)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Protective Action Recommendations will be developed in accordance with Plans and/or Procedures.

As data become available, accident assessment will be performed and PARs developed in accordance with Plans and/or Procedures.

County:

sN/A All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

The State should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs.

Demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner.

138

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these projections, if appropriate.

The PAD should be coordinated between the 3 States. A coordinated PAD does not necessarily mean the same PAD.

The PAD will be coordinated between the State of West Virginia and Hancock County.

At least one PAD/PAR will be demonstrated.

In West Virginia, KI is not issued to the General Public.

County:

• N/A All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to determine protective action recommendations, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for special population groups (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions arc made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

• N/A 139

County:

Schools will be demonstrated out of sequence on March 31, 2004.

Special populations will be demonstrated through interview with appropriate EOC staff.

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 2.d - Radiological Assessment and Dccision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway EXTENT OF PLAY State:

During the May 13, 2004, Table-Top Exercise, lab results will be provided by the Controller. The State will demonstrate the ability to conduct dose projections, assess sample results, and recommend protective actions based on the assessments.

County:

• N/A Sub-element 2.c - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-cntry, and Return State:

Relocation, Re-entry, and Recovery decision making will be made by the West Virginia Task Force through Table-Top Exercise discussions. Discussions will be driven by Controller injects and State provided dose projections and assessments.

This demonstration will take place on May 13, 2004, at a Table-Top Exercise.

County:

Implementation of the West Virginia Task Force Relocation, Re-entry and Recovery decisions will be demonstrated through discussions at the County EOC's. Information regarding Relocation, Re-entry and Recovery will be provided by Controller injects.

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EVALUATION AREA 3 - Protective Action Implementation Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; and establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

s N/A County:

Emergency workers who are assigned dosimetry will demonstrate the procedures to monitor and record dosimetry readings. The workers may be interviewed by the evaluator to determine their knowledge of radiological exposure control, radiation exposure limits, turnback values and whom to contact in the event authorization is needed to exceed their limits.

OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed.

Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Dosimetry "Training Kits" will be available at the field locations to demonstrate the use of dosimetry. Area monitoring kits may be utilized.

141

0 The supply of DRDs, PRDs and KI will be available in the Hancock County EOC.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to provide radioprotective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general public is an ORO option and is reflected in ORO's plans and procedures.

Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of radioprotective drugs.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions arc available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

The State should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it.

A decision not to take KI is an acceptable decision.

County:

The County will demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers. The County will demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

In West Virginia, KI is not issued to the General Public.

142

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to implement protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 3.c.l: Protcctivc action decisions arc implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protcctive actions.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

• N/A County:

a Demonstrate the capability to alert and notify special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility-impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.).

Demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities will be simulated.

Telephone calls will not be made.

One transportation provider will be contacted, all other calls will be simulated.

All simulated contacts should be logged.

Route Alerting will be conducted out of sequence on March 31, 2004.

Notification of special needs people will be simulated by the Route Alerting Fire Department or notification from EOC staff.

Notification of special populations will be procedurally explained.

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 143

actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials decide upon and implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

e N/A County:

Demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the Hancock County School District of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students.

Contact with the public school district will be demonstrated during the out-of-sequence school play on March 31, 2004.

The Hancock County OES and/or officials of the Hancock County School District will demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students.

School Officials will demonstrate the decision-making process for protective actions.

One School in the Hancock County School District will participate Out-of -

Sequence on March 31, 2004.

Transportation of school children, if necessary, will be simulated.

One Bus Driver will be available, at the participating school, for an interview on March 31, 2004.

The bus will not run the route to the Host School, but will explain the procedure.

The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering will be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to the host school will be accomplished through an interview process.

Communications will be verified by the Bus Driver by interview.

Officials of the school will demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to the HCEOC for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

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All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions arc provided to traffic and access control personnel.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

N/A County:

During the May 11, 2004, exercise, HCEOC will demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective actions.

Staffing of Traffic and Access Control Points will be simulated.

The capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff will be demonstrated through an interview with the Law Enforcement Officer in the HCEOC during the May 11, 2004, exercise.

The HCEOC will demonstrate the ability to control access to rail, water and air traffic, under its control by interview.

Traffic Control/Access Control Points will be demonstrated out of sequence on March 31, 2004, by interview in the HCEOC. Communications check will be conducted following the interview.

145

Criterion 3.d.2: Impcdiments to evacuation are identified and resolvcd.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

• N/A County:

The HCEOC will demonstrate the capability by interview, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation.

Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments will be explained during the interview.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions State:

During the May 13, 2004, Table-Top Exercise, the State will demonstrate the ability to implement any Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) made by the West Virginia State Recovery Task Force.

The Ingestion Exercises, State and Counties, will be conducted independently from each other.

County:

During the May 13, 2004, Exercise, the Ingestion Counties will demonstrate the ability to implement any PAR's.

The Ingestion Exercises, State and Counties will be conducted independently from each other.

146

Sub-clemcnt 3.f-Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions State:

Implementation of relocation, re-entry and return will be documented by the West Virginia State Recovery Task Force through Table-Top Exercise discussions.

Discussions will be driven by Controller injects and State provided dose projections and assessments. This demonstration will take place during the Table-Top Exercise conducted on May 13, 2004.

The Ingestion Exercises, State and Counties, will be conducted independently from each other.

County:

During the May 13, 2004, Exercise, the Ingestion Counties will demonstrate the ability to implement State decisions.

The Ingestion Exercises, State and Counties, will be conducted independently from each other.

147

EVALUATION AREA 4 - Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume Emergency Planning Zone to measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume.

In the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to help characterize any radiological release. This does not imply that plume exposure projections should be made from the field data. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, 11.10; 1.7, 8, 9)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Field teams will be equipped with instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission as identified in the plan and/or procedures.

One Field Team will be utilized.

Field Teams will deploy from HCEOC.

Field Team Equipment will be demonstrated at three (3) sample locations.

Equipment use will be simulated at all other locations. A minimum of six (6)-

sampling locations, per team will be demonstrated.

During the May 13, 2004, Tabletop Exercise, lab results will be provided by the Controller. The State will demonstrate the ability to conduct dose projections, assess sample results, and recommend protective actions based on the assessments.

148

In-route readings will be taken.

Field data will be provided to the field team by controller injects.

County:

o N/A All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) will demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment.

The State will contact the FEMA III ROC.

A controller will provide Field team readings.

County:

eN/A All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othervise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.

Teams n ill move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9) 149

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

Field teams will demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator.

Charcoal filters will be utilized instead of Silver Xeolite.

Field data should be shared with Ohio and Pennsylvania in a timely manner.

Labs will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

The request for Federal resources will be simulated by the \\VVEOC.

A controller will provide Field Team readings.

County:

• N/A All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-clement 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling EXTENT OF PLAY State:

On May 13, 2004, the Sample Collection Team will meet at the location of the Ingestion Table-Top Exercise at 9:30 a.m. Field play will be demonstrated in the vicinity. The Field Team Center (FTC) will be available for observation by the evaluator. The Reception Site for sample collection will be established in the vicinity of the FTC. The Reception Site will process three (3) samples (one (1) each of soil, vegetation and water). Transportation of the samples to the Ohio Labs will be explained. No samples will be transported.

One (1) Sample Collection Team will be assembled and equipment/supplies explained. The Radiological Monitor for the Sample Collection Team will also serve as one of the members of the Reception Site. Sample collection supplies will be available.

150

Three (3) samples will be collected for processing (one (1) of each):

Soil Vegetation Surface Water Emergency Worker Decontamination is a Plume Objective (first day). It will not be demonstrated during this field play.

County:

• Will provide the State man power assistance, as requested.

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations EXTENT OF PLAY State:

As identified in the WV State Plan, West Virginia utilizes laboratories in the State of Ohio. This objective will be talked through at the State Table-Top Exercise on May 13, 2004. The Ohio Labs were demonstrated in the State of Ohio Ingestion Exercise at the May 2001, Davis Besse Exercise.

County:

e N/A 151

EVALUATION AREA 5 - Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-clement 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ.

Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D), and FEMA-REP-I 0, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification systems for Nuclear Power Plants."

Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public arc completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

e N/A County:

The County will demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 1 0-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the County plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Siren activation will be explained. Sirens will not be sounded.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages will not be demonstrated. The alert signal activation will be simulated. The procedures will be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

In Hancock County the EAS Station is activated through the National Weather Service.

152

For Exercise purposes the NWS will be contacted, EAS message provided, but the EAS Radio Station will not be activated.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with the HCOES Director or designee.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Criterion 5.a.2: IRESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) arc completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

N/A County:

Route Alerting will be demonstrated from 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. on March 31, 2004, at Chester Fire Department.

One route will be actually run and alert and notification activities along the route will be simulated (that is, the message that wvould actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast).

Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at the Fire Station.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

153

Sub-clemcnt 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) should have the capability to disseminate to the public appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions.

In addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system should be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry hotline.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E.7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

The State will ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The State should be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident.

Public inquiries will be demonstrated at the EOC.

Trends in rumors will be identified, if applicable.

Subsequent emergency information and instructions will be provided to the public and the media through the Joint Public Information Center.

One News Briefing will be conducted at the EOC.

County:

The County will ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The County should be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident.

Public inquiries will be demonstrated at the EOC.

Trends in rumors will be identified, if applicable.

Subsequent emergency information and instructions will be provided to the public and the media through the Joint Public Information Center.

One News Briefing will be conducted at the EOC.

154

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

155

EVALUATION AREA 6 - Support Operation/Facilities Sub-clement 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency WN'orkers and Registration of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

N/A County:

Reception Center will be conducted from 7:00 p.m.-9:30 p.m. on March 31, 2004, at the Weir High School Complex.

Mass Care Center, Monitoring/Decontamination Center will be conducted from 7:00-9:30 p.m. on March 31, 2004, at the Weir High School Complex.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview.

The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained.

The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.

County:

Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities.

Any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination.

156

Monitoring personnel should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up.

Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals will be demonstrated.

The Emergency Worker Decontamination Center will be conducted from 7:00 p.m.-9:30 p.m. March 31, 2004, at the New Cumberland Fire Department.

One monitoring station will be established.

One decontamination area will be established.

A total of six (6) people will be monitored at the Mass Care Center. At least one (1) will be contaminated.

Decontamination of personnel/equipment will be explained at all locations.

Actual decontamination will be simulated.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

• N/A 157

County:

The Emergency Worker Decontamination Center will be conducted from 7:00 p.m.-9:30 p.m. on March 31, 2004, at the New Cumberland Fire Department.

One Emergency Worker will be monitored for contamination. Discussions on the need for decontamination will be made based on Controller injected radiation levels.

Contamination control and record-keeping procedures will be demonstrated.

Decontamination efforts will be procedurally explained, but actual decontamination will be simulated.

The proper sequence for monitoring/decontamination efforts and the decision to refer individuals who cannot be decontaminated to medical facilities will be demonstrated via inquiries.

One vehicle will be monitored and decisions regarding the need for decontamination will be made as radiation levels are presented via Controller injects.

Record-keeping procedures will be demonstrated.

No vehicles will be washed, but decontamination procedures will be explained.

Decontamination of personnel/equipment will be explained at all locations.

Actual decontamination will be simulated.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees INTENT This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. Congregate care is normally provided in support of OROs by the American Red Cross (ARC) under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE -

Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers demonstrate the procedures 158

to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12)

EXTENT OF PLAY State:

e N/A County:

Mass Care Center, Monitoring/Decontamination Center will be conducted from 7:00 p.m.- 9:30 p.m. on March 31, 2004, at the Weir High School Complex.

Mass Care staff will demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability will be determined through an interview process.

Material will not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items will be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Conducted on May 15, 2003, at the Weirton Medical Center MS-1 Evaluated Exercise.

159

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 2004 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE WEST VIRGINIA INGESTION EXTENT OF PLAY 50-MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE

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PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE The purpose of the State of West Virginia 2004 Ingestion Exercise is to demonstrate the ability to protect the health and safety of the general public in the event of an accident at the Beaver Valley Power Station.

During this exercise, the State will examine its readiness to collect samples, make Protective Action Decisions and test it's abilities for Protective Decision Implementation.

The four West Virginia Ingestion Counties will demonstrate their ability to implement the State Protective Action Decision.

GENERAL INFORMATION The West Virginia Ingestion Exercise is divided into four (4) separate segments. All four (4) segments will be conducted independently from each other.

• Threat Assessment Team

• Field Team Center

• Hancock/Brooke Counties

• Ohio/Marshall Counties Threat Assessment Team (TAT)

The Threat Assessment Team is compiled of decision makers from the different State agencies/organizations. The make up of the TAT will vary depending on the emergency, (i.e., personnel on the TAT utilized for a radiological emergency could be different than for flood emergencies). The TAT could also be referred to as the State Recovery Task Force. The TAT will be located in the West Virginia Emergency Operations Center, Charleston, West Virginia.

Field Team Center (FTC)

The West Virginia Office of Emergency Services Communications Van will be utilized as the Field Team Center. It will be located at the Wheeling Airport, Wheeling, WV.

The FTC will serve as the command center for both the Sample Collection Point (SCP) and the Sample Collection Teams.

161

Ingestion Counties (IC)

There are four (4) West Virginia Counties located within the Beaver Valley Power Station 50-mile Ingestion Emergency Planning Zone.

Of these four counties: Hancock County is in both the 1 0-mile EPZ and the 50-mile EPZ; Brooke County and Ohio County are in the 50-mile EPZ and the northern portion of Marshall County is in the 50-mile EPZ.

GENERAL INFORMATION As identified in their plans, Hancock and Brooke Counties co-locate in the Hancock County EOC and Ohio and Marshall Counties co-locate in the Ohio County EOC. This is due to the fact that the counties share Agriculture Agents. The Hancock County Emergency Operations Center is located in New Cumberland, WV. The Ohio County EOC is located in Wheeling, WV.

For the purpose of this Ingestion Exercise, the OES Communications van will be pre-positioned. Personnel at the Field Team Center/Sample Collection Point, the Sample Collection Teams and all of the EOCs will be pre-positioned and in place at the start of the exercise.

While being conducted as separate exercises, the locations will demonstrate the ability to establish communications. That is; the HCEOCIWVEOC will demonstrate communications; the OCEOC/WVEOC will demonstrate communications; the WVEOC and the Field Team Center will demonstrate communications.

Decisions made for the Ingestion Exercise are based on data developed specifically for the Ingestion Exercise.

The radiological information from the May 11, 2004, Plume Exercise is not part of the data for this Ingestion Exercise.

Neither the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nor the State of Ohio is participating in the WV Ingestion Exercise. However, the State of Ohio may provide a liaison to discuss the interface between the States.

Questions for either Pennsylvania or Ohio will be addressed by the Exercise Controllers.

162

INITIATING CONDITIONS A release of radioactive material occurred at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Two on Tuesday, May 11, 2004. Beaver Valley is located approximately five (5) miles east of the West Virginia Border in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. The northern section of Hancock County, West Virginia, is in Beaver Valley's Plume Exposure Pathway mile Emergency Planning Zone. The remaining portion (southern section) of Hancock County, along with Brooke County, Ohio County and the northern portion of Marshall County are located within the Beaver Valley Power Station's Ingestion Exposure Pathway mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Governor Wise declared a State of Emergency during the first day of the accident; this State of Emergency is still in effect. Shortly after the Power Station's Declaration of a Site Area Emergency, the West Virginia Department of Agriculture issued precautionary advisories to the Agricultural Community. Farmers were instructed to shelter animals and place animals on stored feed and water from covered sources. This precautionary advisory to the Agricultural Community is still in effect.

During the first day, Governor Wise ordered the evacuation of the West Virginia population residing within the 1 0-mile Plume Exposure Pathway - Emergency Plan Zone, following the Power Plant's escalation to General Emergency. The evacuation of the residing population was completed and is still in effect.

On May I 1, 2004, during the release of radioactive material, there were heavy rains in the Chester/Lawrenceville areas and light rain through out Hancock County. These rains did not impact the evacuation of the general public.

The present status is as follows: The evacuation is complete. The Beaver Valley Power Station's release of radioactive material was successfully terminated, and the plant has been stabilized. No further radioactive releases are expected at this time. Access Control Points have been established around the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone; only authorized personnel are permitted to enter the area.

Shelters have been opened by the American Red Cross and will remain open until further notice. Food and necessary health supplies are being shipped into the area from outside the 1 0-mile Emergency Planning Zone. Nursing home residents were evacuated to Weirton Medical Center during the Plume Phase. The West Virginia Bureau for Public Health has determined that emergency workers and identified personnel do not require potassium iodide, and issued the order not to administer. The Ohio Emergency Management Agency has notified the West Virginia Office of Emergency Services that the Ohio Radiological/Testing Laboratories are operational and prepared to receive samples for testing, per the agreement between the two states.

All Ohio River Traffic, rail traffic, and commercial trucking have been suspended until further notice. The Governors of West Virginia, Ohio and Pennsylvania have established direct lines of communications to ensure those necessary supplies of food, medicine and essential equipment are readily available to support emergency operations.

163

West Virginia has requested through the Federal Emergency Management Agency a fly-over to establish a Deposition Footprint to identify area/s for possible contamination.

This fly-over has been completed and the footprint established. The fly-over has resulted in identification of high readings in northern Hancock County. The State Sampling Teams are in the area for surveying and sample taking, such as: produce, fish, wildlife, soil, water, agricultural products, vegetation, etc. The results of the sampling are forthcoming.

Radiological information from the May 11, 2004, Plume Exercise was not used in developing the WV Ingestion Exercise. Decisions made for the Ingestion Exercise will be based on radiological information provided for the Ingestion Exercise.

The West Virginia Ingestion Exercise will be driven by preexisting conditions, radiological data supplied by the Controller and Controller injects. While the State portion of the Exercise and the Ingestion Counties' portion of the Exercise are scheduled for the same day/time, the supporting information to drive the exercises differs. This was done to facilitate play and drive the flow of each Exercise. In addition, the Field Team Center is being conducted as a separate exercise.

The Controller will take frequent pauses during the Exercise to allow the Evaluators to ask questions of the participants in regards to the Exercise Evaluation Methodology Objective(s) being covered during that particular segment. The Controller asks that only Evaluators ask questions and all other observers hold their questions until after the end of the Exercise.

PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONS - IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW The West Virginia Threat Assessment Team will issue Protective Action Decision/s for the areas of West Virginia including Hancock, Brooke, Ohio, and Marshall Counties following the May 11, 2004, accident at the Beaver Valley Power Station located in Shippingport, PA. The above named counties are located within the nuclear facility's fifty (50)-mile Ingestion Emergency Planning Zone. The recommendations from the State Threat Assessment Team (State Recovery Task Force) will be based on data from the Ohio laboratory analyses. The laboratory analyses are based on field samples taken from the affected area. The laboratory analyzing the samples is located in the State of Ohio. The Ohio labs are not participating in this Exercise.

The incident occurred two days ago. Following the incident at the nuclear facility, the Governor ordered an evacuation of residents in northern Hancock County (the entire 10-mile EPZ). State officials and county emergency workers along with the American Red Cross have opened Mass Care Shelters in Weirton, WV, to shelter the evacuated population. The shelters at present are approximately at fifty (50) percent capacity and reducing in population as evacuees are moving in with relatives and friends, who are located outside the EPZ.

164

All movement into northern Hancock County has been completely restricted except for emergency workers and State officials conducting sampling for analyses. All Ohio River traffic has been halted at the New Cumberland Locks until further notice. Rail traffic has been halted at the northern city limits of Weirton. The Herron Airport in northern Hancock County has been closed. While the areas along State Route 2 between New Cumberland and Weirton have not been affected, officials have closed the road to all but emergency vehicles to expedite the flow of emergency equipment into and out of the area. The Governor has ordered out the National Guard to patrol the evacuated area to prevent any unauthorized access and looting. Pennsylvania and Ohio have issued similar orders for the affected areas in their respective States.

FLY OVER DATA In the event of an accident at a Nuclear Power Plant with a major release of radioactive material, a "fly-over" of the Plume Area would be conducted. This would provide a "Footprint" of the area the Plume covered.

The Plume Footprint data is presented as mr/hr readings at one (1) meter above the ground. Use the Plume Footprint map for readings at the mile increments indicated.

Data to be used with the State/County Plume Footprint Map.

DISTANCE (miles)

EXPOSURE RATE

@ 1METER (mr/hr) 4.0

.92 5.0 north of Rt 30

.82 5.0 south of Rt. 30

.15 6.0

.15 7.0

.13 8.0

.03 9.0

.02 10.0

.02 12.0

.02 15.0

.02 17.0

.02 20.0

.02 25.0

.02 30.0

.02 165

Notes:

• Readings are the same for any area within that increment, (i.e., any reading taken in the 6-mile to 7-mile range w'ill have the 6-mile reading of.15 mr/hr within the Footprint. Outside the Footprint, the reading will be Background).

• Background reading is.02 mr/hr.

• Distances are air miles from BVPS.

DEFINING THE INGESTION ZONE The West Virginia Threat Assessment Team will issue recommendations for the Northern Panhandle of West Virginia. The Ingestion Zone has been established and Protective Actions for the returning population following the accident at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) will be issued. The established Ingestion Zone covers an area in Hancock County starting at a point on the Ohio River where the West Virginia and Pennsylvania State lines meet. The line follows the Ohio River to the southern end of Chester. At this point, the line forms a narrow band south to approximately Hardens Run Road.

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DEFINING THE RESTRICTED ZONE The Restricted Zone is an area starting at a point on the Ohio River where the West Virginia and Pennsylvania borders meet. The line defining the zone continues in a westerly direction following the Ohio River, including the island in the Ohio River known as Babbs Island, to the Jennings Rudolph Bridge (Chester Bridge, Route 30). The defining line follows Route 30 east to the West Virginia/Pennsylvania State line. Then north following the State line to the original point on the Ohio River.

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8 PSIG and less than one full train of spray [POTENTIAL].

Per EPP/I-4 (SITE AREA EMERGENCY), an onsite assembly for station personnel is requested. (This Will be simulated).

187

Real Drill Time Time EVENT CIS Per EPP/IP 3.2, accountability is commenced. (This will be simulated, how ever, paperwork shall be completed)

Non-emergency personnel begin to report to their appropriate assembly areas. (This will be simulated).

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) begins to activate per EPP/IP 1.6, if not already activated. TSC personnel begin offsite notifications. Also, Nuclear Communications begins activation of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC), if not already done.

CETC are decreasing.

RVLIS is decreasing.

NOTE: At the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, Site Assembly andAccountability ltill be simulated.

1803 0203 Containment pressure is slowly decreasing due to less than one full train of Containment Spray being available.

1815 0215 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared by now. The 6X Controller should use the contingency card provided if this action has not been completed, however, if discussions are underway which the Controller feels will lead to the declaration of the emergency classification, this CIS may be held for any additional time period.

1816 0216 2SIS-P21B (LHSI) trips due to 4kV Breaker tripping off. There is now no water being added to the core.

1823 0223 Enter FR.P. 1 Containment radiation levels are increasing.

1827 0227 Core Exit Thermocouples (CETC) indicate 163 degrees F.

1833 0233 Reactor Vessel Level (RVLIS) is decreasing. Operations personnel enter FR-C.2 - Orange Path for core cooling.

188

Real Drill Time Time EVENT CIS Due to the lack of cooling water and low water level in the reactor, CETC are now increasing.

Field Monitoring Teams are assembled, if not done earlier.

1900 0300 RVLIS and CETC's indicates Red Path for Core Cooling. Operations enter FR.C.1.

Containment pressure is slowly decreasing.

Containment radiation levels are increasing.

1915 0315 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based on EPP/I-lb EAL's 1.1.1, 1.2.3 and 1.3.2.

1.1.1 Critical Safety Function Status - Core Cooling CSF Red Path.

(LOSS) 1.2.3 RCS Leak rate - RCS leak results in loss of RCS subcooling.

[LOSS].

1.3.2 Containment Pressure/Hydrogen Concentration - Containment pressure >8 PSIG with less than one full train of containment spray [POTENTIAL].

NOTE:

Other EAL's may also apply.

Also at this time, based on EPP/IP 4.1 "Recommendation of Offsite Protective Actions" operational and meteorological conditions, an offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) of "Evacuate 360 degrees 0 - 5 miles and shelter the remainder of the 10-mile EPZ," is provided to offsite agencies in the EOF and via the Gold Executive Conference (GEC) call. TSC offsite notifications are also conducted.

CETC increasing.

Containment radiation levels are increasing.

Containment pressure is slowly decreasing.

The EOF should be fully activated (unless activated earlier).

189

Real Drill Time Timc EVENT CIS 1924 0324 CETC indicate >1000 degrees F and increasing.

Containment radiation levels are >400 R/hr and increasing.

1925 0325 2SIS-P2lB is returned to service. Water is now being added to the core.

1927 0327 CETC are decreasing.

Containment radiation levels are increasing.

Containment pressure is slowly decreasing.

The Control Room initiates transfer to Cold Leg Recirc with Recirc Spray Pump 2RSS-P21D supplying water to the RCS.

1930 0330 A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared by now. The 7X Controller should use the contingency card provided if this action has not been completed, however, if discussions are underway which the Controller feels will lead to the declaration of the emergency classification, this CIS may be held for any additional time period.

Containment radiation levels are increasing.

RVLIS is increasing. CETCs are 975 and decreasing.

1942 0342 Containment radiation levels are 1000 R/hr and RVLIS indicates >50%.

CETCs are stable.

Containment pressure is 8.03 PSIG and slowly decreasing.

1945 0345 An offsite release begins via the Unit 2 Containment Equipment Hatch, which is ventilated by the Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS). This is a monitored and filtered ventilation path.

Containment pressure and radiation levels continue to decrease. The SLCRS effluent radiation monitors increase indicating a release to the environment has begun.

1950 0350 Dose projections indicate approximately 20 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem CDE at the Site Boundary, and 1.1 Rem TEDE and 0.028 Rem CDE at 5 miles.

190

Real Drill Time Time EVENT CIS NOTE: With I of 2 SLCRS fans unavailable due to the loss of the "AE" Bus, a reduced flowrate should be used for the dose projection calculations. The default flowrate may be used for conservatism, however, this decision must be identified.

2000 0400 Based on EPP/IP 4.1 "Recommendation of Offsite Protective Actions" dose projections, an UPGRADED Offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) of "Evacuate 360 degrees 0 - 10 miles," is provided to offsite agencies in the EOF and via the Gold Executive Conference (GEC) call. TSC offsite notifications are also conducted.

2015 0415 An UPGRADED PAR should be declared by now. The Controller should use the contingency card provided if this action has not been completed, however, if discussions are underway which the Controller feels will lead to the declaration of the emergency classification, this CIS may be held for an additional time period.

The front of the plume reached the Ohio/West Virginia border. With a weather front passing through the area, the plume transit speed slows.

2045 0445 Containment is at atmospheric pressure (0 PSIG) and the release from Containment ends. SLCRS effluent monitors begin to decrease.

Per Maintenance, the "AE" Bus is available to be returned to service.

Operations personnel begin preparations to return the Bus to service.

2054 0454 The effluent radiation monitors return to background readings. The radioactive release to the environment has ended.

2100 0500 The weather front passes through the area and weather conditions improve. Wind speeds begin to increase and the plume begins to disperse.

Termination and Recovery discussions may begin.

2125 0525 The plume has dissipated. Environmental readings have returned to background levels.

2130 0530 The Beaver Valley Power Station 2004 Evaluated Exercise terminates.

191

Real Drill Time Time EVENT CIS Facilitation critiques with the Lead Facility participants shall occur in each Emergency Facility upon termination of the Exercise.

All Controllers/Observers/Evaluators shall complete their notes and obtain the Facility Critique comments (Pluses/Deltas). They shall assure all records generated for the Exercise for their respective areas are gathered (including rosters) and present these records and comments to the Lead Exercise Controller at the scheduled Controller Critique.

192

APPENDIX 5 PLANNING ISSUES This appendix contains the Planning Issues assessed during the March 30-31, and May 11 and 13, 2004, exercise at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS). Planning Issues are issues identified in an exercise or drill that do not involve participant performance, but rather involve inadequacies in the plan or procedures. Planning Issues are required to be corrected through the revision and update of the appropriate State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and/or procedures in accordance with the following schedule:

• Within 120 days of the date of the exercise/drill, when the Planning Issue is directly related to protection of the public health and safety.

• During the annual plan review and update (reported in the Annual Letter of Certification), when the Planning Issue does not directly affect the public health and safety. However, when the date for the annual plan review and update is imminent, and the responsible organization does not have sufficient time to make the necessary revisions in the plans and/or procedures, the revised portion of the plans and/or procedures should be submitted in the subsequent annual plan review and updated and reported in the Annual Letter of Certification.

Any requirement for additional training of responders to radiological emergencies necessitated by the revision and update of the plans and/or procedures must be completed within the timeframes described above in order for the Planning Issue to be considered resolved.

Pennsylvania Ficld Monitoring Tcams A and B Issue No.: 03-04-4.a.3-P-01 Condition: Procedure BRP-ER-6.01 does not address two areas of field operations.

The possibility of cross-contamination was observed when the field monitoring team (FMT) member touched the outside of the bags containing the air filter and cartridge after touching the cartridge. Gloves were not changed (or simulated as being changed) between the two operations.

The sample label was also used to record sample information. Completing this label is not addressed in BRP-ER-6.01, although all of the information on the label, with the exception of the gamma reading I " from the sample, is addressed for entry onto the Air Sample Data Log. The FMT member stated that performing the I " gamma reading was not addressed in the BRP-ER-6.0 1; 193

therefore, the 1 " gamma reading was not entered onto the label with the other sample information.

Possible Cause: Contamination control practices for sample handling are not clearly stated in BRP-ER-6.01. Current practices do not include segregation of tasks for "clean" hands (e.g., touching the outside of sample bags, recording information on sample bags, etc.) and potentially "dirty" hands (e.g., handling sampler assembly, touching cartridges, etc.). Use of gloves and booties is also not specifically addressed and is optional according to the statements of FMT members.

The entry of data onto the label is not addressed in the procedure.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, I.9 Effect: Without the segregation of tasks and the proper use of gloves, a potential for contamination of the hands/gloves during the sampling and counting process exists. Contamination may be spread to the outside of the sample bags and instruments.

Although the team member surveyed items at the conclusion of the task, contamination on instruments and the outside of the sample bags would have presented a delay to further sampling while instruments were being decontaminated or replaced with spare instruments. In addition, if the filter or cartridge contained radioactive material, it would have been impossible to distinguish removable contamination which may have been present on the outside of the bags.

However, BRP-ER-8.05, "Sample Control and Chain of Custody," requires the information on the sample label, including the 1 " gamma reading, to be entered on a form which accompanies the sample to the laboratory. If this reading is not recorded at the time of the sampling, then the information will not be available to the person completing the paper work at the time of the sample transfer to the laboratory. The sample would have to be surveyed at the time of the transfer to provide the dose rate information. The sample control and chain of custody procedure does not address a survey at the time of sample transfer.

Recommendation: Modify BRP-ER-6.01 to include protocol for the segregation of tasks. At a minimum, there should be two members of the team. The driver can be used to perform the "clean" hands tasks, which include holding the sample bag open for receipt of the sample, sealing the bag, and recording information on the labels.

Using and changing gloves during the sample collection and handling procedures should be mandated in the procedure.

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Modify BRP-ER-6.01 to include instructions for completing the sample label and information that will be used to complete the forms required in BRP-ER-6.01 and BRP-ER-8.05. The label should be included in the procedure as an attachment.

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APPENDIX 6 ADDITIONAL PRIOR ISSUES PRIOR ISSUES AT FUNCTIONAL ENTITIES NOT SCHEDULED TO BE DEMONSTRATED PA State Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: BVX92-25R (3.e.1)

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Description:==

General categories of agricultural concerns were well addressed. However, when questioned about agricultural concerns that did not fit under the routine "milk, hay, feed, crop" categories, agriculture personnel were not prepared to address the issues. For example, no consideration had been given to bee hives, orchards, berry farms, and fish farms, or to other issues, such as hunting and gathering of edibles from the wild, that might have been extremely relevant to the small, rural populations of the area. (Objective 27; NUREG-0654, J.I 1)

Reason ARCA Unresolved: The Commonwealth of Pennsyivania did not schedule the demonstration of Objective 27 during the 2000 exercise.

Recommendation: The State should be scheduled to demonstrate Objective 27 during the next ingestion exercise.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: This objective was not scheduled for demonstration.

It will be demonstrated during the next Beaver Valley ingestion pathway exercise.

FEMA Response: Acceptable.

Armstrong County Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: BVX92-27R (l.c.l)

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Description:==

The EOC staff did not implement a formal internal message handling system. (Objective 3; NUREG-0654, A.2.a)

Reason ARCA Unresolved: This location was not scheduled for demonstration at the 2000 exercise.

Recommendation: Emergency communications procedures in the Armstrong County plan, B-3, paragraph 3.A.5, should be reviewed and revised to include a formal message handling system.

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Schedule of Corrective Actions: This objective was not scheduled for demonstration.

It will be demonstrated during the next Beaver Valley ingestion pathway exercise.

Greene County Emergency Operations Center Issue No.: BVX92-28R (1.b.1)

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Description:==

Throughout the exercise, access to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was not controlled. (Objective 2; NUREG-0654, H.3)

Reason ARCA Unresolved: This location was not scheduled for demonstration at the 2000 exercise.

Recommendation: Personnel should be assigned the responsibility of controlling access to the EOC during emergencies.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: This objective was not scheduled for demonstration.

It will be demonstrated during the next Beaver Valley ingestion pathway exercise.

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