Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction, Revision 9
	ML041070432
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/07/2004
From:	Henderson T; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	PY-CEI/NRR-2784L
	Download: ML041070432 (73)
	v • d • e

FENOC Perry Nuclear Power Plant 10 Center Road PO. Box 97 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Perry Ohio 44081 April 7, 2004 PY-CEI/NRR-2784L United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, enclosed are changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions (EPIs) for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. These changes constitute revisions, temporary changes, or reissued pages. Please follow the updating instructions per the attached Controlled Document Instruction Sheet and return the signed Acknowledgment of Receipt form.

If you have questions or require additional information, please contact me at (440) 280-5889.

Very truly yours, Todd A. Henderson, Acting Supervisor Emergency Planning Unit TAH:byr Enclosure cc: NRR Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III, Incident Response Center w/enclosures

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT Title Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions (EPI). EPI-A I / Rev 9 Control No. 60 Letter No./Date PY-CEIINRR-2784L / April 7. 2004 Signature Date Title Return to:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Attn: Beverly Richardson, A240 P. 0. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION Perry Nuclear Power Plant Controlled Document Instruction Sheet Manual: Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions EPI-AII Rev. 9 Control Number 60 Insert Remove and Replace EPI-Al / Rev 9 Reissue Entire Document

EPI-Al Page: i Rev.: 9 PERRY OPERATIONS MANUAL PNPP Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction

.NoI~EnEg A12&On1 Ik TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REVISION: 9 EFFECTIVE DATE: 3-11-04 PREPARED: Lawrence W. Burqwald 3-10-04

/ Date

EPI-Al Page: ii Rev.: 9 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Table of Contents Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE 1

2.0 REFERENCES

1 3.0 DEFINITIONS 2 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5 4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/

EOF Emergency Coordinator 5 4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/

EOF Plant Operations Advisor 5 4.3 Plant Personnel 5 5.0 ACTIONS 5 5.1 Event Assessment and Event.Classification 5 5.2 Downgrading Event 8 5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 9 5.4 Classification After the Event - 11 5.5 Staffing of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events 11 5.6 Records 12 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Initiating Condition Index 13 Attachment 2 - EAt Entry Criteria 15 SCOPE OF REVISION:

Periodic Review - Required Rev. 9 - 1. EALs KU2 "Significant degradation of offsite communications capabilities" and MU1, -"Release of toxic OR flarmmdable gases affecting the Protected .Area boundary deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant" were revised on 6/15/98. NRC approval for the changes to EALs KU2 and MUl should have been requested prior to implementation, but were not. Both changes should have .been identified as a decrease in effectiveness prior to implementation, but were not. (CR04-01244) EALs KU2 and MUl are being restored to their NUMARC conversion level, which went effective on 7/10/97.

EPI-Al

- lPage: 1 Rev.: 9 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1.0 PURPOSE To provide specific criteria based on <NUMARC/NESP-007> for the classification of an abnormal plant event transient, or external event affecting or having the potential to affect plant operations or personnel safety, into one of the four (4) <NUREG-0654> defined emergency classes.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source References

1. Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Docket No. 50-440

2. ODCM: Appendix C 2.2 Use References

1. NUREG 0654: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

2. NUMARC/NESP-007: Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels (Revision 2)

3. Title 10, Part 50.47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Emergency Plans

4. Title 10, Part 50.72 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

5. Technical Specifications (TS), Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. .1

6. EPI-A2: Emergency Actions Based on Event Classification

7. EPI-A10: Re-Entry/Recovery

8. EPI-Bl: Emergency Notification System

9. EPI-B4: First Aid and Medical Care

10. EPI-B9: Emergency Records

EPI-Al Page: 2 Rev.: 9

11. ONI-C61: Evacuation of the Control Room

12. ONI-P54: Fire

13. ONI-P56-2: Security Threat

14. ONI-R10: Loss of AC Power

15. PAP-1604: Reports Management

16. PAP-1701: Records Management Program

17. PAP-1910: Fire Protection Program

18. PEI-B13: RPV Control -

19. PEI-T23: Containment Control

20. PEI-Nil: Containment Leakage Control

21. IOI-11: Shutdown from Outside Control Room

22. PNPP Physical Security Plan

23. PSI-0007: Reporting Emergency Plan Related Communication Equipment Problems

24. Commitments addressed in this document:

F01626 P00035 P00067 H00037 P00038 P00089-L00406 P00055 P00091 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Applicable Mode The operating mode existing at the time of event or initiation of transient.

3.2 Challenge Any condition that, in the Emergency Coordinator's judgment, would likely result in a loss of one or more of the fission product barriers (i.e.,

fuel cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or Containment) in the next 1-3 hours.

EPI-Al Page: 3 Rev.: 9 3.3 Emergency Action Level (EAL)

A predetermined, site-specific, observable threshold or entry criteria for a given Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL entry criteria can be: an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency-class. Refer to EAL Entry Criteria (Attachment 2).

3.4 Emergency Class One of a minimum set of names or titles, established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under <10CFR50.47>, for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative radiological seriousness, and (2) the time-sensitive onsite and offsite radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions. The existing radiological emergency classes, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

Unusual Eventi

Alert

Site Area Emergency

General Emergency 3.5 Event Category A collection of similar Initiating Conditions grouped to allow for the prompt recognition of the transient or event and assessment of severity based on the four emergency classes.

3.6 Functional A system, subsystem, train, component or device, though degraded in equipment condition or configuration, is FUNCTIONAL if it is capable of maintaining respective system parameters within acceptable design limits.

3.7 Initiating Condition (IC)

One of a predetermined subset of plant conditions defined by

.<NUMARC/NESP-007>, where either the potential exists for a'radiological

'emergency or such an emergency has occurred. Initiating Conditions are established based on the four emergency classes required under

<10CFR50.47>. Refer to Initiating Condition Index (PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1).

.3.8 Loss Unless defined by specific EAL indication, LOSS shall be defined as a state of inoperability in which FUNCTIONAL and operable status cannot be maintained. A system, subsystem, train, component or device is not lost if its functionality is assured.

EPI-Al Page: 4 Rev.: 9 3.9 Operating Mode There are six applicable operating modes associated with the Initiating Conditions used in this document: numbers 1 through 5, and the letter "D". Numbers 1 - 5 correspond to Modes 1 through 5 defined by

<Technical Specifications> Table 1.1-1; the letter "D" stands for the reactor DEFUEL condition.

3.10 Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas, For event classification purposes, Safe Shutdown Buildings/areas are considered to be the following locations:

Control Complex (all elevations)

Auxiliary Building (all elevations)

Intermediate Building (all elevations)

Fuel Handling Building (all elevations)

Reactor Building (all elevations)

Emergency Service Water Pump House (all elevations)

Electrical Duct Chase Leading to ESW Building Diesel Generator Building (all areas except the Unit 2 Division 1, 2, and 3 DG Rooms)

Steam Tunnel (all elevations)

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Area Condensate Storage Tank Intake/Discharge Structure 3.11 Significant Transient Includes response to automatic or manually initialed functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

3.12 Unplanned Any activity which is not previously approved. If an EAL entry condition is satisfied due to preplanned maintenance or testing, the emergency classification is NOT declared. The unplanned designation shall include any activity, including preplanned maintenance or testing, in which the system. is inadvertently rendered unavailable.

3.13 Valid An indication or report condition is considered to be VALID when it is.

conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's truth is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

EPI-Al Page: 5 Rev.: 9 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/EOF Emergency Coordinator ;

As the designated Emergency Coordinator, classify an Emergency-Plan event per this instruction when actual or potential plant conditions dictate and ensure required actions are implemented per <EPI-A2>.

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/EOF Plant Operations Advisor Advise the designated Emergency Coordinator of any Initiating Conditions, which are being approached or EAL entry criteria met upon initiation of an abnormal or inadvertent plant event.

4.3 Plant Personnel Inform the Control Room of any conditions or. symptoms indicated by instrument readings or direct observations that could indicate a real or potential emergency.

5.0 ACTIONS The following actions are intended as guidance. Knowledge of plant conditions and/or the extent of the emergency may require additional response actions. In all cases, this instruction should be combined with the sound judgment of the Emergency Coordinator to arrive at the proper classification for a particular set of circumstances. <H00037, P00038>

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5.1.1 Ensure appropriate Off-Normal Instructions (ONIs), Plant Emergency Instructions (PEIs) or other applicable plant instructions and procedures are being implemented to stabilize plant conditions.

The classification shall be of high priority following the performance of the required immediate operator actions and must be made promptly if a radioactive release to the public is probable so that offsite agencies can mobilize and implement the necessary precautions to protect the health and safety of the public. --

EPI-Al Page: 6 Rev.: 9 5.1.2 -Implement <EPI-B4> if the event involves personnel injuries.

1. Upon being notified that the victim(s) being transported to an offsite medical facility is suspected or known to be -

-radiologically contaminated, perform the following per

<EPI-B4>:

a. Contact an Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) Representative using the Integrated On-Call Report found on the Perry Web under Emergency Response Organization, and direct the individual to notify the State of Ohio and Lake County Emergency management Agencies (EMAs) of the incident.

NOTE: If the injury(ies) occur during evening hours, this notification can be deferred until the next day.

b. Perform an eight (8) hour notification to the NRC per

<PAP-1604> in accordance with <10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii)>.

5.1.3 Implement <ONI-P54> and/or. <PAP-1910> if the event involves a confirmed, probable or possible fire. <L00406>

5.1.4 Determine the affected areas of the plant and implement an evacuation of the building or localized plant area. <F01626>

5.1.5 For an abnormal event or evolution, which is not classifiable per this instruction, use the Integrated On-Call Report to contact additional plant expertise or manpower if desired for assessment and mitigation purposes.

1. For situations in which the event requires a prompt, coordinated response, refer to Section 5.5 to initiate staffing of the Technical Support Center (TSC) or Operations Support Center (OSC), if warranted.

5.1.6 Classify the emergency as follows:

NOTE: The designated Emergency Coordinator may not delegate the decision to initially classify, reclassify, or terminate an emergency event per <EPI-Al>. <P00035>

1. Using PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1, identify the emergency by event category and determine the most appropriate Initiating Condition (IC) based on the operating mode at the time of event initiation, plant conditions, and severity levels.

NOTE: Initiating Condition Index operator aid(s) are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Backup EOF.

EPI-Al Page: 7 Rev.: 9

2. Refer to Attachment 2 for the applicable Initiating Condition(s) to determine .whether the criteria are met for the operating mode(s) listed.

NOTE 1: For those EALs with a permitted out of service time or duration (e.g., 15 minutes during electrical transients), the following shall apply:

The clock should start at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise in which case the clock start time is retroactive.

The declaration should be made as soon as it is determined that the transient will last longer than the allotted-time. In this case, the declaration shall not be postponed until the permitted time has expired.

NOTE 2: Fission Product Barrier Matrix operator aids are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, TSC, EOF and at the Backup EOF.

3. Declare an emergency class when all the conditions listed in at least one EAL column have been met, and implement <EPI-A2>.

a. When several Initiating Conditions are met, declare the most severeemergency class.

A 15-minute goal has been established for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available to Control Room operators that an EAL has been exceeded..

b. For TRANSITORY EVENTS, in which an event is classifiable in accordance with this instruction but becomes a lower classifiable event before being declared (i.e., Alert vs.

Site Area Emergency), perform the following:

1) Declare only the lower classification and implement

<EPI-A2>.

2) Provide a brief description of the transitory event using Block 3c on the PNPP Initial Notification Form.

EPI-Al Page: 8 Rev.: 9

c. For an Unusual Event or Alert, which was classifiable in accordance with <EPI-Al> but no longer meets the criteria for any event at time of declaration, perform the following:

Events which have met the criteria for either a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency can not be-simultaneously classified and terminated. These events must be handled in accordance with Sections 5.2 or 5.3.

1) Implement <EPI-A2>, and complete the required actions for a simultaneous classification and termination of an event.

2) Complete Blocks 3.a & 3.b on the PNPP Initial Notification'Form to notify the NRC, State of Ohio, and local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

4. Periodically re-evaluate emergency class and applicable Initiating Conditions per Steps 2 and 3 above, and escalate the classification, or downgrade/terminate from the event per Sections 5.2 and 5.3. <P00055>

a. Due to the severity of a General Emergency and its impact on Federal, State and local county emergency management agencies, a General Emergency shall not be downgraded.

Instead, the event shall be terminated and a predetermined Recovery phase entered from a General Emergency when the criteria in Section 5.3 are met.

5.2 Downgrading Event <P00089>

5.2.1 Consider downgrading from a Site Area Emergency only to either an Alert or an Unusual Event when the following conditions are met:

Due to the marginal bene~fit for the plant and State and local county response agencies, the event shall be terminated from an Alert in lieu of downgrading from an Alert to an Unusual Event.

1. The EAL entry criteria for a Site Area Emergency are no longer met; however, the entry criteria for an Alert or an Unusual Event are still applicable.

The EALs have been written towards the initial classification and upgrading of an emergency event. As a result, their logic may not be applicable to downgrading the event. Therefore, the EALs should be-evaluated with respect to the intent of the criteria established for each emergency classification.

EPI-Al Page: 9 Rev.: 9

2. Downgrading the event would preclude an unnecessary activation or mobilization of plant,.Federal, State, and local county response facilities and personnel.

.3. Plant conditions are stable, and the prognosis for improvement is good.

4. Any fire, natural event or hazard to plant operations is under control or has ceased, and a preliminary assessment of the extent of damage has been completed.

'5. Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

6. No protective actions for the general public are in effect, such as a precautionary shelter order.

7. Discussions have been held with the NRC, and State and local county officials, and an agreement has been reached to downgrade the event.

The concern is that downgrading the event may affect the plant's ability to support on-going State and local county emergency response activities which were initiated as a result of the classification of a Site Area

. Emergency.

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 5.3.1 Terminate 'from any emergency class and enter into Recovery, if warranted or required,'when the following criteria'are met:

Entry into a Recovery phase and the establishment of a Recovery Organization is mandatory when terminating from a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification.

Entry into Recovery from an Alert is optional.

1.The EAL entry criteria are no longer met for the event and'for lower classifications.

OR-------------------

Plant long-term'corrective action and/or clean-up activities resulting from the event, preclude exiting the EALs.

2. The reactor is in a stable condition, with a reliable means of long-term decay heat removal available, if required.

3. Containment integrity, if required, is maintained and not threatened.

EPI-Al Page: 10 Rev.: 9

) 4. Any fire, natural event (e.g., earthquake, high groundwater level), or hazard to plant operations (i.e., toxic gas, unusual aircraft activity) is under control or has ceased.

5. A preliminary assessment of the cause, extent of damage, and impact has been completed.

6. Radiation levels in-affected plant areas are controllable or have decreased to within acceptable levels.

7. Areas of the plant 'affected by the emergency have been defined.

8. Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

AND-No further potential for a significant uncontrolled release exists.

9. No further surveillances relative to 'offsite protective actions are needed (except for the control of'food stuffs, water, and offsite contamination or environmental assessment activities).

AND Terminating the emergency will not impact any offsite protective actions which may be in progress.

10. Offsite radiological conditions do not prohibit or seriously restrict access of personnel and material to the Perry Plant site.

11. All pre-Recovery phase actions required by <EPI-A10> have been completed.

12. Consult with NRC, State of Ohio, and local county officials regarding the decision to terminate the emergency.

The intent of this action is to involve the NRC, State and local counties in event decision-making; however, this action is not intended to delay or hinder the Perry Plant's ability to simultaneously classify and terminate from an Unusual Event or Alert.

EPI-Al Page: 11 Rev.: 9 5.4 Classification After the Event 5.4.1 Perform the 'following actions when it has been discovered that an Emergency Plan classification has been missed (during shift turnover, paperwork review,-etc.), and the plant no longer meets the conditions of any EAL:

1. Classify the event, but do not implement the actions outlined in <EPI-A2>.

2. Notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of classification and initiate event notification/reportability actions in accordance with

<PAP-1604>.

3. Direct the on-call EPU Representative to inform the State of Ohio and local county Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs) using a commercial telephone; record the names and date/times of individuals contacted in the Plant Log.

a. When a classification occurs during evening hours, calls to State and local EMAs can be deferred until the next day at the discretion of the Shift Manager and on-call EPU' Representative.

5.5 Staffing of Emerqenev Facilities for Non-Emerqency Plan Events The Shift Manager, based on his assessment of the situation can use the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to mobilize and coordinate support for the Control Room staff. However, augmentation of staff shall be achieved using the Integrated On-Call Report whenever possible.

5.5.1 Announce the activation of the TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC, and/or OSC over the Plant Public Announcing (PA) System.

5.5.2 Mobilize required TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC and/or OSC staff by performing the following:.

1. Select the appropriate message (#17 thru #23) on the.ERO Pager Messages form (PNPP No. 9100) contained in <EPI-B1>.

2. Specify in the narrative summary block on the form: 1) that the facility activation is in response to a non-emergency plan event', and 2) brief summary of event conditions and support required.

3. Forward the completed form to the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and direct them to activate the Emergency Paging System

("beepers").

EPI-Al Page: 12 Rev.: 9 5.5.3 DO NOT perform any formal notifications to the NRC, State of Ohio, or local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

NOTE: An informal notification to the State of Ohio and local counties may be performed by the On-Call Emergency Planning Representative after first consulting with the Shift Manager.

5.5.4 Upon the arrival of facility staff, coordinate activities in support of the Control Room's assessment and mitigation of the event; DO NOT ENTER <EPI-A2>, OR TRANSFER THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN SECTION 4.1 TO THE TSC.

5.5.5 Assess possible entry into the Emergency Plan per Section 5.1.6, and enter <EPI-A2> as applicable if the EAL criteria outlined in this instruction are met.

5.6 Records 5.6.1 Records Handling

1. The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) pursuant to <EPI-B9>. The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records Management pursuant to <PAP-1701>.

5.6.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this document:

Quality Assurance Records None Non-Quality Records None

c C{ C-f EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 1 Sheet 1 of 2 Page: 13 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX EPI-Al PNPP No 8852 Ppv. 11I/30/00 EVENT CATEGORY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT oSITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY Fuel dad degradation Anysor challenge to the Fuel Clad Loss ofRPV water levelthat has or wil Loss of two barriers,AND a oss orchallenge to the ban l ae.. un eover fue l. I third barrier.

A: FISSION PRODUCT Page 15AU _ Pae 1 r8(FPB MatrIx) AAI Page 17- ASI Page 1S (FPO Matrix). AG BARRIER Either a challenge or los of~f the DEGRADATION Reactor Coolant System leakage. los, orchallenge to the Reactor Fuel Clad banter AND Reactor Coolant CoolanIt S-yseme bantier. System bantier.

Page 1SAU2

- Page 18 (FPB MatrX) .AA2 Page 18 (FPB Matrix).AS2

_Anylss or dialenge to the Containment Chalenge OR ReactortoCoolant uelCa eithe thSystem *errg bartderane

_ b anler. the loss of any additional b anter.

_ Page 15 (FPB MatrIx). AU3 Pagell FPBMatrtx) AS3 B: LOSS OF DECAY Inability to maintain plant In COLD Complete loss of functions needed to HEAT REMOVAL NOT APPUCABLE SHUTDOWN achieve COLD SHUTDOWN NOT APPLICABLE FUNCTIONS Page 15- BA1 Page 20 -BSI C: LOSS OF SHUDO Inabtltty to reach required shutdown withIp to inmate or com plete a Failure to Initiate or complete a successful shutdown FU C IO S O F I U E Technical SpecIficatIon limits autom atic Reactor Scram once an' RIS Rea tor kea tnoncr n R Sf nto aA D I dc to fate te e c al n et h blt TOSUDW ae2.Ctfunction Is requIred. requitred. AND a manual Scram was NOT to cool the core PAg a g e 2 2. C uj2 3easCSi S Loss ofall offaste powerto Disi¶n I an2 Powge rapability to Dhtds2on I and 2 EH ' LossdIet dea oerAND onsite _ Prolonged loss e nosite powerAD onstt powe DE AC POWERLOS Essential Busses for greater than 15 Essential Busses reduced to a singel toivson a and2pEHEssentir u

fr toPDhisiong t nd 2 EHoEssentiwBus esND N

. P minutes. powersource for greeterthan 15 greatertOm t5 minutes. continuing degradation or ore cooing capability.

Page 27 -Dui minutes. such that any additional single Page 31.001~

fallure would result n aStation PPge3 DDSI BiaekoutL Page 285 DAI Loss of all offsite power AND onsite powerto Division I and 2 EH Essential Busses for greaterthan 15 minutes.

Page 21 DA2 Degradationof Division1 and 2 essential E: D.C. POWER DCpwer for greater than 15 minutes. Degradation of Divison I and 2 essential DEGRADATION Pae3.EINOTAPPLICABLE DC powoforgreastertan'15minutes. - NOTAPPLICABLE

_ _ Pag* 34 ES1 Fire within a Safe ShutdownBuildinNOTQ Fire OR explosion affecting the F: FIRE OR . extinguIshed within 15 minutes. operability of plant safety systems NOTAPPUCABLE NOTAPPUCABLE EXPLOSION g z reuired toestablish or maintainsafe Pae 35 FU1 nshutdown.

Explosionaffecting a Safe Shutdown Buiding. Page 37* FAI Page 36 . FU2 Unexpected Increase In plant radiation Increases In radiation eveiswithin Safe G: INCREASED PLANT levels. Shutdown Buildings thatimpede RADIATION LEVELS operation of systems required to Page 39-.U1I_ maintain safe operations OR to

_ Uncontrolled fuel pool water level SHUeDOWN. NO APPLICABLE decrease with Irradiated fuel outsidethe NOT APPUCABLE RPV remaining covered. Page 41 OA1

_ 40.OU2 Pg Major damagto inradiated fuel.

sPogo 42O A2

Cj- C l EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 1 Sheet 2 of 2 Page: 14 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX' PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 11130/00 EVENTCATEGORYl.

H: INCREASED UNUSUALEVENT Any unplanned release of gaseous ALERT Any unplanned release of gaseous

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Site Boundary dose resutinng from an l GENERAL EMERGENCY EPI-Al Site Boundary dose resulting from an actual or RADIATION RELEASE TO radioactivity to the environent that radioactivity to the environment that adual or Iimminent release of gaseous imnrrinent release of gaseous radIactiivity that THE ENVIRONMENT exceeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control, radioactivity that exceeds 100 mRem exceeds 1000 rmRem TEDE OR 5000 mRem CDE lI=i for 60 minutes or greater. limiitforiS minutes or greater. TEDE dose OR 500 mRem COE Child Child Thyroid dose for the edtual or projeted durati aca OR projected of the release.

Page 43 - HUI Pg 3 UIThyroid durationdose of thefrthe release.

Page 46- HAI Page47--HS1 Pag*4t.HGI Any unplannned release of liquid Any unplanned release of riquid 1 radioactIvity to the environment that T radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 tires the ODCM Controd rmit for 60 minutes or greater. limit for 15 minutes or greater.

Page U-HU2 Page 46 HA2 Control Room Evacuation has been Control Room evacuation has been 1: CONTROL ROOM NOT APPLICABLE Initiated. initiated, AND plant controlCANNOT be NOTAPPLICABLE EVACUATION Page 49 iA estabshed withi 15minutes.

Page Page 50

191 J: LOSS OF Loss d most annunciators or indication Los of mnost annunciators or indication T ihabllty to monitor a sitgncant trnsient in ANUCAOS OR Inthe Control Room for greaterthn 5 In the Control Room wttheflthe (t) a ANUCAO R minutes. significant transIent in progress; OR (2) Pors NOT APPLICABLE INDICATIONS Page 61

Jul copensa*ory lnd ret= Pageon63 Page 62 -JAI Loss of onsite OR in-ptant K: LOSS OF communications cepabilities.

COMMUNICATIONS Page 66- KUI NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE Significant degradation of offeste

communications capablities.

_ 'Pa o*66-KU2 L NATURAL OR Natural OR deatructive phenomena Natural OR destructive phenomena DESTRUCTIVE aaffecting the Pronected Area boundary. affecting Safe Shutdown Buildings.

PHENOMENA o NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE Page 57-LUI -page 56

LAI M: RELEASE OF Release of toxic OR flarnmable gasses Release of toxic OR flannmable gases TOXIC OR affecting the Protected Area boundary within a Safe Shutdown Building which NOT APPLICABLE FLAMMABL deemed detrimental to the safe leopiardizes operation of systems NOT APPLICABLE F operation of the plant, required to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD Page 69. MUI SHUTDOWN.

Page 60 -MAI N: SECURITY EVENTS Cindiaes ae l degt nin the ery event in the plant Protected Security event i plantvtatArea Security event resulting In loss of ability to reach level of safety of the plant. ' *a d mitin C L H T O N Page 11- NUI Page 62 - NA1 Page 88 NS1 Page 64- NGI 0: EMERGENCY Other conditions exististing wtkhcth i Other conditiona existing. which in the Other conditions existring which in theJudgement of in to eO er dithe ex gwh Coordinator.

inator Judgement of the Emergency Coocrnator, Ithe Emergency Coordinator, warrant derdaratlon of COO RDINATOR'S COORDINATOR'S jdmnthe ofth Judgement O Emergency Coordinator. Judgement ofth Emergency warrant declaration orfa Site Area Generat Emergency.

JUDGEMENT warrant declaration of an Unusual Event. warrantdratinoanAlrt Emergentd I J

_Page Page *6 - OU1 w decAarati66 -ae OAI Page 67- 091Pa Po e lE6 -0Oe11

(-* A 2C (

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment .2 Sheet 1 of 54 Page: 15 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category A: Fission Product Barrier Degradation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AU1 AUl U

N U

Fuel clad degradation High Offgas pretreatment air activity Reactor Coolant System sample indicates S.

greater than the Technical Specification activity greater than Technical U 3.7.5. Specification 3.4.8 limits A L

E V

E N

Applicable Modes: T 1 12 1 3 1-4 15 I NOTE Fuel clad degradation is NOT an issue when the Reactor is defueled. Damage to fuel in spent fuel pools is addressed in GUL.

(:: *0 C( -

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 2 of 54 Page: 16 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria

.AU2 Greater than 10 gpm Greater than 30 gpm total Greater than 30 gpm total unidentified leakage in leakage in Drywell leakage in Drywell.

Drywell. averaged over the previous Reactor Coolant System 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

. leakage Greater than 2 gpm

. 4 increase in unidentified leakage within the previous

.4' 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

Applicable Modes:

1 2131 1 1. .

.Ci C(7--

(-'

Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 3 of 54 Page: 17 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AS1 S

I T

E ASi RPV water level CANNOT be maintained greater than 0". A R

E Loss of RPV water level A that has or will uncover Reactor is "shutdown under all conditions without boron" fuel E M

E R

G E

N.

C Y

Applicable Modes:

1 *-2 13. 4 15 NOTE ASI is applicable only to non-ATWS situations in which RPV level was NOT intentionally lowered per

<PEI-B 13> as a means of power control. Refer to Event Category "C" for classification under ATWS conditions in which RPV water level is intentionally lowered.

EPI-Al C-Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 C. Sheet 4 of 54 Page: 18 C-EAL ENTRY CRITERIA PFPPNo.U)55R. 1ZF30 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX NITATIN CONDITIONS REACTOR COOLANT EMERGENCY COORDINATOR UNUSUALEVENT DRYWELL RADIATION SYSTEM ACTIVITY JUDGMENT INSTRUCfIONS AfL Anpho*O.dt qloSW Ir ruer nno I so,~l ed"Iis"" 10 or 001t ny condifto fuskint t 1 . ulofS.11, aneS greet.' then300UCVgrn do$* of thEEmognc7Coordhy`I 1 For otIho I bnd.

I eqLAtn1bo~r dbe-I3l bobrat. bhe d the Fuel Clod dolorro IF 1 LOSSor CHALLENGE COited lew been me. ALERT bhr.1.I AA1 A" Its"or dftwl 1to

2. Co p. the berliN Loss(" end res Ced beS. r Antyodationb, Iho1,. menw CKALLENOE.) lo the hOsn" NOT ' of theE encyCoortor co.01-s listed. end mobk the A ,- soP.

I bIdoeS I dr.Snge to tne Fuel wopoe ewrhi dederlobn. Roed. Codent Syag ben1 1.

Clodb~ntr!

fRECO_ RSUEIIYELRDAINEEGNYCODNTRRECO r

RSUECNRL IDYELPESR ECO OLN EMNROENCY COORDtNATOR SITEAREAEMERGENCY AS) Elbdeoooo IOlo1op. -

REt.C=FLE ,L3URN IDRYWELLRADIATION REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROL I DRYWELLPRFSSURE -1 REACTOR - COOLANT

.-- FC_

os Cd br.. AN Ree. Code.'SystmbWM ARPV Woollose o.t.RVeuee svtuck AnSRV Is Etnergorncy DryoI peme U br-eak- pulat ofntabMvnt Arty* cofdb goI Emrgtenc 4".:j tenr ooSreadinggreete cOon bebtgcyded 10Dopseoutreffo gresert, 'tart1 T.OCeoe. 6160-b5Vales. Coudistor,I kofh Emossertf Ta. OCe~~lS oNttrbdoS10 AUS 10-- "aeS. F.r Cd Stwo135Ronvhr,. ControlFt" is requined. Po-g. borCR Ro. Codet Pns'"U". CoO.pottaondo.,t the ACE be"h.'. Syss- n. NAN So losof any.601-lon-lert..

OnpoadiveyIs equalIc Indiceillmci ACEloakse of grestor then 300 uCIgm bInsit.theDrfw. th. Co, Roo - NOT GENERAL EMERGENCY 131.' _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ps.telsthot _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ Al1 t. 0 bhoS. Am a hoe f_l o tuhbt.M.

rrr-rn .

CONTARMENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EMERGENCY COORDINATOR JADOOA PRESSURE _______________COORDINATOR_______EMET Ibonrloa vothig of Conlatmsno t.bthoteb.o mty lyslont Conl0. d req*d Per po.'etiot doe . rddWht oAsh. Any Ili Sta. hIn St dgot* ofIWeE.gncy PEI.T23. m10Istolaeoa Contbenlper PEt-NIlt Coordbatorl.ibondles bhe 0Sts Coolotom

-Id d- signst !enier.'

bhsnetal Operator d1U ofthe Cootaunot banter mtroy Ide a repid arhon In the Control unexpaihedde.. ImContbntd presauao Room - t. b W Menhrl hkweaoo) sonftirooful in oht atlododpenbotoon.

Paun,"troy0f oniornn *stsd vim Penerton. ..

Conditon that.1 Orudgwnteh nNtY _ tboEmergency Igi how lonWIs IgreatermtCoriao kcoa wn ogmoes"i heNM0 Ibefi emdd*

I3iPoh.ndW 10oreeS.

NOTAPPLICABLE bent.'.

FOOTNOTES: 1.Those thresholds for which a LOSS or CHALLENGE Isdetermined to be IMMINENT (i.e., within the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ), classify as though the threshold(s) has been exceeded.

2. RPV level Is less than 0 is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

3. Entry Into SAG-1, Primary Containment Flooding Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

4. Unisolable primary system discharging outside containment per PEI-NI I Is both a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

5. Sample activity is equal to or greater than 300 uCVgm dose equivalent Iodine-131 is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a contributor to a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

6. HCL figure limits have been exceeded Is defined as follows:

1. SuppressionPoolTemperature>185°F or

2. Suppression Pool Level <14.25 Ft.

C: C.-

Rev.: 9* Attachment 2 Sheet 5 of 54 Page: 19 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category B: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Functions Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop A.

BAI BAI Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop B.

A Inability to maintain L plant in COLD RCS temperature exceeds COLD Uncontrolled temperature rise E SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN limit of 200'F per approaching 200'F RCS temperature. R Technical Specification Table 1.1-1. T Applicable Modes: _ -_-

415 NOTE The IC remains applicable for situations in which an increase in RCS temperature greater than 200'F results in a change to Mode 3.

The above criteria is met as soon as it becomes known that sufficient cooling CANNOT be restored to maintain temperature below 2001F regardless of the current temperature. The intent of BAI is NOT to classify based on an unplanned excursion above 2007F when heat removal capability is available.

"Uncontrolled" means that RCS temperature increase is NOT the result of planned actions by plant staff.

Attc C-EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 6 of 54 Page: 20 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatiniy Conditions A-Entry Criteria.

BS1 RHR Loops A and B are NOT capable of lowering RPV temperature.

S I

T E

BS1 A R

Complete loss of E' functions needed to A achieve COLD SHUTDOWN E M

The plant is operating in the UNSAFE Suppression Pool Suppression Pool E Region on the HCL figure. temperature greater level less than R than 185 0F 14.25 ft. G E

.N C

Applicable Modes: Y

1I 2 1 3 . . . .

(PI (1; C(

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 7 of 54 Page: 21 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category C: Loss of Shutdown Functions or Failure to Shutdown Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria CUl tU CUl Plant is NOT brought to the required operating mode within the Technical N Specification Required Action Completion Time following entry into an LCO. U Inability to reach S required shutdown U within Technical A Specification limits L E

V E

N Applicable Modes: T 1I2 - - -

31 -

I- -

NOTE Declaration should be made because of equipment failures that prevent the performance of an orderly shutdown or failure to meet the shutdown completion time from the time discovered and a required action being entered.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the specified completion time period elapses and is NOT related to how long a condition may have existed before it was discovered.

EI C C Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 8 of 54 Page: 22 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria CAl CAI Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred. should have occurred.

Failure to initiate or A complete an automatic L Reactor Scram once an The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." E RPS function is R required T Applicable Modes:

NOTE CAI is applicable if either Mode 1 or 2 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification.

Entry. criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

C:-- C.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 9 of 54 Page: 23.

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions +

Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or CS1 have occurred. should have occurred.

The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." S CS1 I T

Failure to initiate or Manual operator actions Reactor power CANNOT Suppression Pool E complete an automatic taken at IH13-P680 to be determined. temperature is greater than Reactor Scram once an insert control rods were - 110F. A RPS function is NOT successful in R required, AND a lowering Reactor power to E manual Scram was less than 4%. A NOT successful E

M E

R G

N C

.y Applicable Modes:

1 NOTE Refer to next page.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 10 of 54 Page: 24 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA, NOTE CS1 is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

"Manual Operator actions" are defined as any set of actions by the Reactor Operator at Il 1H3-P680 which results in a scram signal. These actions include placing the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, arming and depressing the RPS Manual Scram push buttons, and arming and depressing the RRCS Manual ARI push buttons.

Injection of boron is NOT considered in reducing reactor power below 4%.

A concurrent challenge to the ability to cool the core would escalate this event to General Emergency per CG1.

('IA1 Cr, C-.'

Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 11 of 54 Page: 25 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or CG1 have occurred. should have occurred.

G E

CGI N The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." E Failure to initiate or R complete a successful Manual operator actions taken at Reactor power Suppression Pool A shutdown, AND 1H13-P680 to insert control rods CANNOT be temperature is greater L indication of an extreme were NOT successful in lowering determined. than 1I10F.

challenge to the ability Reactor power to less than 4%. E to cool the core M E

R Any of the following conditions exist: G E

Entry into <SAG-1>, Primary Containment Flooding. N

In the UNSAFE region on the HCL figure. C Applicable Modes:

Suppression Pool temperature greater than 185 0F. Y

Suppression Pool level less than 14.25 ft.

11I I I l. .

NOTE CGI is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 C

Sheet 12 of 54 Page: 26 C

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C-- Q- C EPI-A1 Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 13 of 54 Page: 27 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category D: A. C. Power Loss Initiating Conditions I . Entry Criteria DU1 ONI-R10 entered for a Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP). U.

N DUI U S

Loss of all offsite power U to Division 1 and 2 EH Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within IS minutes .A Essential Busses for for energizing bus EHI 1: L greater than 15 minutes 0 *Normal Preferred E 0 Alternate Preferred V E

N Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes T for energizing bus EH12:

Applicable Modes: S Normal Preferred 0 Alternate Preferred.

2 l. 3 .

4 1.

5 lD NOTE Failure of either bus EH 1I or EH12 to be supplied from its respective diesel generator is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DAI for Modes 1, 2 and 3. Failure of both busses EH 1I and EH12 to be supplied from their respective diesel generators (Station Black Out) is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DA2 for Modes 4 and 5 and to a Site Area Emergency under DS I for Modes 1, 2 and 3.

C C - Cat EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 14 of 54 Page: 28 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions +

Entry Criteria Essential AC power reduced to only one of the following power sources for greater DAl DAI than 15 minutes:

Power capability to

Normal Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH

Alternate Preferred Essential Busses

Division 1 Diesel Generator A reduced to a single

Division 2 Diesel Generator L power source for E greater than 15 minutes, R such that any additional T single failure would result in Station Loss of the single remaining power source will result in a loss of AC power to both Blackout busses EHII and EH12.

Applicable Modes:

I1 2 3 11 NOTE Escalation to a Site Area Emergency is evaluated under DS1, for Operating Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a total loss of AC power to both busses EHI 1 and EH12.

A total loss of AC power to busses EH 1I and EH12 while in Operating Modes 4 and 5 is classified as an Alert under DA2. No escalation path exists to a Site Area Emergency for Operating Modes 4 and 5.

C C (C; EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 15 of 54 Page: 29 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH II and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred DA2 DA2 source within 15 minutes.

Loss of all offsite power A AND onsite power to Both busses EH 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred L Division 1 and 2 EH source within 15 minutes. E Essential Busses for R greater than 15 minutes. T Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

4 5 D

cE C c.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 *Sheet 16 of 54 Page: 30 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria DS1 Both busses EHI1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source within 15 minutes. S I

DS1 T E

Loss of all offsite power AND onsite power to Both busses EH II and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred A Division 1 and 2 EH source within 15 minutes. R Essential Busses for E greater than 15 minutes A E

Both busses EH 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel M Generator source within 15 minutes. E R

G E

App licable Modes: N

'C 123 Y NOTE Escalation to a General Emergency is evaluated under DG1 for Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a continuing degradation of core cooling capability.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 17 of 54 Page: 31 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria Both busses EH II and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred DG1 source.

G Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred E source. N DG1 E R

Prolonged loss of all Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel A offsite power AND Generator source. L onsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH E Busses, AND continuing Restoration of power to either of the RPV water level RPV water level M degradation of core following busses is NOT likely in less less than, 0". CANNOT be E cooling capability than four hours: determined. R G

EHil E a EH12 N C

Applicable Modes: Y I I12 2 1 .

it I

( ii Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 18 of 54 Page: 32 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C(o Ac - (;

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 19 of 54 Page: 33 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv E: D. C. Power Degradation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria EUI

' U EUI Voltage on ED-1-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes. N U

Degradation of S Division 1 and 2 'U essential DC power for A greater than 15 minutes - L E

Voltage on ED-1-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes. V E

N Applicable Modes: T 4 15 NOTE The same set of conditions as described in this EAL would be classified as Site Area Emergency under ES I if they occurred during Modes 1, 2, or 3.

C; EPI-Al Rev.: 9 A e Attachment 2 C

Sheet 20 of 54 Page: 34 C=

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

ESI Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Voltage on ED-i-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

I121311 1

C (f' EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 21 of 54 Page: 35 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv F: Fire or Explosion Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Fire within any Safe Shutdown Building. FUI U

Fire CANNOT be extinguished within Fire CANNOT be extinguished within N FUI 15 minutes of the verification of alarm. 15 minutes of the notification received in U the Control Room from plant personnel S Fire within a Safe that a fire exists. U.

Shutdown Building A NOT extinguished L within 15 minutes E

V E

N T

1 2 3 4 D5 l D_-

NOTE Verification in this context means those actions taken in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) to determine that the alarm is NOT spurious. Verification includes the receipt of multiple or independent alarms or confirmation of a single detector by visual inspection of the affected area by a first responder. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

CZ) Attachment 2 AC Sheet 22 of 54 Page: 36 Rev.: 9 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria FU2 U.

N FU2. Report by plant personnel confirming the occurrence of an explosion within the. U Protected Area resulting in visible damage to a Safe Shutdown Building. S Explosion affecting a U Safe Shutdown Building A L

E V

E N

Applicable Modes: T 1 l 2 1 3 1 4 15 1- D -

NOTE No attempt is made to assess the magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of damage (deformation/scorching) is sufficient for declaration. Actual damage to safe shutdown equipment is covered under Alert FAL. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step, 3.10.

C C C'I EPI-Al .Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 23 of 54 Page: 37 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatinig Conditions I Entry Criteria Either of the following has been confirmed:

FAI 0 Fire in a Safe Shutdown Building.

-Fire OR explosion 0 Explosion in a Safe Shutdown Building.

affecting the operability of plant safety systems Plant personnel at the scene report visible Affected safe shutdown system indicates required to establish or damage to safe shutdown equipment or degraded performance.

maintain safe shutdown components.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3 4 . 5 1D NOTE The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should NOT be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. NO attempt is' made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of damage beyond the immediate area. The occurrence of the explosion or fire with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 24 of 54 Page: 38 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE Safe Shutdown System/Equipment refers to equipment identified in the Safe Shutdown Capability Report. This is the minimum list of equipment required to achieve and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN (including all auxiliary equipment such as AC/DC power, cooling water and instrumentation). A detailed list is provided in the,<Appendix R Evaluation - Safe Shutdown Capability Report>.

Safe Shutdown System/Equipment list: (Division 1 and 2 only)

Reactor Protection System Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Automatic Depressurization System/SRV Reactor Core Isolation Cooling --

Low Pressure Core Spray-Low Pressure Coolant Injection - A/B/C Suppression Pool Cooling Shutdown Cooling Safety-Related Instrument Air Emergency Service Water Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Emergency Service Water Pump House Ventilation ECCS Pump Room Cooling Systems Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Stand-by Diesel Generator (DG)

DG Fuel Oil Storage/Transfer Electrical Power Distribution Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling Emergency Closed Cooling Control Complex Chilled Water MCC, Switchgear and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Areas HVAC System Battery Room Exhaust Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System

(

Reference:

<NUMARC/NESP-007> (Rev. 2), Unusual Event HA2)

CE C-Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 25 of 54 Page: 39 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Cateiorv G: Increased Plant Radiation Levels Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria q F Area radiation monitor (D21) reading Health Physics surveys indicate an increase by GU.

increases by a factor of 1000 over a factor of 1000 times over normally expected normal levels. area radiation levels. U N

U I S GUi U A

Unexpected increase in L plant radiation levels E

In-plant radiation level increase CANNOT be attributed to any of the following: V E

the start-up and operation of plant equipment or systems within design parameters. N

the planned movement of radioactive materials.. T

the planned movement of shielding (i.e., plugs, lead shot, etc.)

Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 4 1 5 lD NOTE "Normal" area radiation levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past 24-hour period, excluding the current peak value.

IA Attachment 2 Sheet 26 of 54 Page: 40 C.

Rev.: 9 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Uncontrolled decrease in one or more of the following fuel pools containing irradiated GU2 fuel:

FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool U

FHB Fuel Transfer Pool N

FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool U GU2 . FHB Cask Pit S.

CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool U Uncontrolled fuel pool

CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool A water level decrease L with irradiated fuel outside the RPV E remaining covered. V E

N T

Applicable Modes:

I 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 lD

C- Page: 41 C.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 27 of 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Tnititincr Cnnditinns

- -- i---

Entry Criteria Area radiation levels of Area radiation levels of greater than 6000.mRem/hr in a GAl greater than 15 mRemlhr in Safe Shutdown Building, as determined by either:

any of the following areas:

S area radiation surveys 0 Control Room installed or portable radiation monitors GAl 0 Central Alarm Station Increases in radiation levels within Safe Shutdown Buildings Access is required to maintain safe operation or perform A that impede operation a safe shutdown, as determined by the Shift Manager. L of systems required to E maintain safe R operations OR to T establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

I I 21 3' 4 5ID NOTE This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be.operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

C C-EPI-A( Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 28 of 54 Page:. 42 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions . Entry Criteria HIGH alarm on one or more of the' Water level observed to be below top of GA2 following radiation monitors resulting the gate sill separating ay of the GA2 from damage to irradiated fuel: following containing irradiated fuel:

Major damage to

SPENT FUEL POOL

FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation A .

irradiated fuel

UPPER POOL Pool L I

FUEL PREP POOL

FHB Fuel Transfer Pool E

FHB VENT GAS

FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool R FHB Cask Pit T

CNTMT ATMOS GAS- *

CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool b M e:

CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool App1icable Modes:

1l2 l3 l4 l5 ID NOTE The intent of this EAL is to allow observations from plant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is not intended to direct an entry into an area solely to observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installed.

cif Attachment 2 CI Sheet 29 of 54 Page: 43 C~

EPI-Al Rev.: 9

. EAL ENTRY CRITERIA I Category H: Increased Radiation Release to the Environment Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than TWO times the Routine or as required sample analysis HUl HIGH alarm setpoint on one or more of indicates a release rate greater than two the following plant gaseous effluent times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.

monitors lasting greater than or equal to 60 minutes:

HUI PLANT VENT GAS ID17-K786 U 0 OG VENT PIPE GAS- ID17-K836 The release lasts for greater than or equal N 0

Any unplanned release TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 to 60 minutes. U 0

of gaseous radioactivity PLANT VENT GAS 2D1 7-K786 S to the environment that U exceeds hvo times the A ODCM Control limit Chemistry sample analysis methods L for 60 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 60 minutes of greater. receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one or more E of the plant gaseous effluent monitors, V that effluent levels are less than two times E ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits. N T

Applicable Modes:

1I 2 3 4 1 5 1D .-

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

cJ C EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 30 of 54 Page: 44 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than Reading greater than 20 Routine or as required 1.2E3 cpm above background times the HIGH-HIGH sample analysis indicates for one or more of the alarm setpoint on a release rate greater than HU2 following liquid process RADWASTE TO ESW two times ODCM monitors lasting greater than or monitor OD17-K606. Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

equal to 60 minutes:

EMERGENCY Any unplanned release SERVICE WATER of liquid radioactivity LOOP A 1D17-K604 to the environment that

EMERGENCY exceeds twvo times the SERVICE WATER ODCM Control limit LOOP B 1D17-K605 for 60 minutes or greater.

Chemistry sample analysis Release CANNOT be The release lasts for methods CANNOT confirm terminated within greater than or equal to within 60 minutes of receipt of 60 minutes of exceeding 60 minutes.

the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on RADWASTE TO ESW either ESW Loop A or B HIGH-HIGH alarm radiation monitors, that liquid setpoints.

A licable Modes: release levels are less than two times the ODCM 1 2 3 l 4 1.5 l D Control3.11.1.Ilimits.

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

Sheet 31 of'54 Page: 45 C(

Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than 200 times the Routine or as Portable survey HAI HIGH alarm setpoint OR offscale required sample instruments indicate high on one or more of the following analysis indicates a radiation levels of plant gaseous effluent monitors:* release rate greater greater than HAI than 200 times 10 mRem/hr at the Site

PLANT VENT GAS ID17-K786 ODCM Boundary for greater Any unplanned release . OG VENT PIPE GAS ID19-K836 Control 3.11.2.1 than or equal to A of gaseous radioactivity

TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 limits. 15 minutes. L to the

PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786 E environment that R exceeds 200 times -_: T the ODCM Control Chemistry sample analysis methods The release lasts for.

limit for 15 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes greater than or greater of receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one equal to or more of the plant gaseous effluent 15 minutes.

monitors, that effluent levels are less than 200 times ODCM Applicable Modes: Control 3.11.2.1 limits.

1 12 1 3 14 15 1D .

NOTE

These Alert thresholds may exceed the Site Area Emergency thresholds (since the Site Area Emergency thresholds were established using a clad damage source term versus the ODCM [coolant activity] methodology used to determine Alert classification thresholds). Therefore, an emergency dose assessment (CADAP) run using the appropriate source term, determined at the time of event, must be performed within 15 minutes concurrently with ODCM calculations to determine if a Site Area Emergency entry criteria has been met.

It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C-- C (A.

EPI-A1 Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 32 of 54 Page: 46 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l Reading greater than 1.2E5 cpm Reading greater than Routine or as required above background for one or 2000 times the sample analysis indicates more of the following liquid HIGH-HIGH alarm a release rate greater than process monitors lasting greater setpoint on 200 times ODCM HA2 than or equal to 15 minutes: RADWASTE TO Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

ESW monitor Any unplanned release a EMERGENCY SERVICE OD17-K606.

of liquid radioactivity to WATER the environment that LOOP A ID17-K604 exceeds 200 times the

EMERGENCYSERVICE ODCM Control limit WATER The release lasts for for 15 minutes or LOOP B ID17-K605 Release CANNOT be greater than or equal to greater terminated within 15 minutes.

15 minutes of Chemistry sample analysis exceeding methods CANNOT confirm RADWASTE TO within 15 minutes of receipt of ESW HIGH-HIGH the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on either alarm setpoints.

Applicable Modes: ESW Loop A or B radiation monitors, that liquid release levels are less than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

1 2 3 ~4 1 5 ,1D _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C I c2 ,,=C EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 33 of 54 Page: 47 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Greater than the listed reading for one or Emergency dose Field survey HS1 more of the following plant gaseous calculations, using results indicate effluent monitors: actual meteorology that one or more of indicate that one or the following have S

.

PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E-I pCi/cc more of the been met at the I

.HS1

OG VENT PIPE GAS IDI9-N400 2.2E0 pCi/cc following are met at Site Boundary: T

TB/HBVENTGAS ID17-K856 1.6E4 cpm the Site Boundary: E Site Boundary dose

PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 6.0E-1 pCi/cc . *Greaterthan resulting from an actual -.

Greater than foo mRem/hr A or imminent release of 100 mRem Whole Body R gaseous radioactivity. TEDE

Greater than E that exceeds 100 mRem

Greater than 500 mRem A TEDE dose OR 500 mRem CDE Child 500 mRem CDE Child CDE Child Thyroid E Thyroid dose for the Thyroid M actual or projected E duration of the release ._ . _ - _. R G

Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are E confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to N limit, that levels at the Site Boundary are continue for C less than 100 mRem TEDE and 500 mRem greater than or y CDE Child Thyroid dose using actual equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

meteorology.

App icable Modes:

12 13 4 1 S1D _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _

C:4 C* Cj Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 34 of 54 Page: 48 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Greater than the reading listed for one or Emergency dose Field survey results more of the following.plant gaseous calculations, using indicate that one or HG1 effluent monitors: actual meteorology more of the indicate that one or following have been HG1 0 PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E0 pCUcc more of the met at the Site OG VENT PIPE GAS IDI9-N400 2.2E1 pCi/cc following are met Boundary:

0 Site Boundary dose' TB/HB VENT GAS ID17-K856 1.6E5 cpm at the Site G 0

resulting from an actual PLANT VENT GAS 2DI9-N300 6.OEO tiCicc Boundary:

Greater than E or imminent release of 1000 mRem/hr N gaseous radioactivity . Greater than Whole Body E that exceeds 1000 mRem e Greater than R 1000 mRem TEDE dose TEDE 5000 mRem A OR 5000 mRem CDE

Greater than CDE Child L Child Thyroid dose for 5000 mRem Thyroid the actual or projected CDE Child E duration of the release Thyroid M E

Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are R confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to G above limit, that levels at the Site continue for greater E Boundary are less than 1000 mRem TEDE than or equal to N and 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . C.

Applicable Modes: using actual meteorology. Y I 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 lD NOTE Exceeding the entry criteria for HG1 may require the initiation of an RPV emergency depressurization per

<PEI-D 17>. Ensure Shift Manager is notified immediately whenever the above entry criteria for a General Emergency is met.

(j (

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 35 of 54 Page: 49 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category I: Control Room Evacuation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria IAI TA1 Control Room Entry into <ONI-C61>. A evacuation has been L initiated E R

Applicable Modes: T 1 2 3 4 5 D:

NOTE An inability to establish plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency per IS 1.

C2 C I EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 36 of 54 Page: 50 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatinig Conditions I

+

Entry Criteria

'Si S

I T

E ISi Entry into <ONI-C61>. A R

Control Room E evacuation has been Within 15 minutes of entry into <ONI-C6 1>, Operator(s) located at the remote A

initiated, AND plant shutdown controls CANNOT establish control of one or more of the following control CANNOT be parameters per <101- 1>: E established within M 15 minutes. 0 RPV level E 0 RPV pressure R 0 Suppression Pool temperature G 0 Reactor power E 0 Decay heat removal, if required N C

Y Applicable Modes:

I I 2 13 4 5 ID 1.

NOTE A maximum 15 minute time frame for the physical transfer of control of "required" systems was established by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>. Control at the Remote Shutdown Areas is accomplished by the repositioning of control transfer switches per <01-11>. Control is assumed unless indication of the absence of control is present.

(I,*

2 (-2 EPI-AC Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 37 of 54 Page:. 51 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category J: Loss of Annunciators or Indication Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room Jul annunciators for greater than 15 minutes. indication' for greater than 15 minutes.

U Jul N U

Loss of most S annunciators or U indication in the A Control Room for L greater than 15 minutes In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the E plant. V E

N Applicable Modes: T I123 1 NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make ajudgnent call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

C> Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 AChm Sheet 38 of 54 Page: 52 C

EAL ENTRY.CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria

- JAI Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room.

Loss of most annunciators for greater than 15 minutes. indication for greater than 15 minutes.

annunciators or indication in the Control Room with either: (1) a significant transient in progress, OR In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the (2) compensatory plant.

indicators are NOT available.

A significant plant transient is in progress. Compensatory indications i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

Applicable Modes:

I .

I1 2 l 3 NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

A "significant transient" includes response to automatic OR manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

E -Al EPI-A1 Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 39 of 54 Page: 53 C

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA' Initiating Conditions 4 Entry Criteria

'V Loss of most Control Room Loss of most Control Room indication. Js1 annunciators.

S Compensatory indicators, i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available. I1 JS1 T E

Inability to monitor a A.

significant transient in A significant transient is in progress. R progress A

E M

E R.

G E

N Sufficient indication is NOT available to directly monitor plant critical safety C parameters for PEIs entered due to the transient. Y Applicable Modes:

I1 2 1 '3 1

- - I - I .3.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9

. C/

Attachment 2 Sheet 40 of 54 - Page: 54

'C EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C C EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 41 of 54 Page: 55 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv K: Loss of Communications Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria

'Loss of all five Plant Public Address System channels. KUl U

Loss of all of the following Plant Radio System channels: N KU* U I

L Channel I 'S Loss of onsite OR in-

Channel 2 U plant communications o Channel 3 A capabilities L E

V E

N

.T Applicable Modes:

I1 l2 l 3 1'4 l 5 l D

( ./

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 42 of 54 Page: 56 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA*

I Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria Loss of the State and County Notification Circuit (5-way) reported to the Control . KU2 Room.

U Loss of offsite long distance calling capability on three or more of the following .N.

KU2 systems circuits for greater than 15 minutes: U S

Significant degradation

Control Room private (259-) lines U of offsite

Private Branch Exchange, Service Building ("5000") Switch -A communications

Private Branch Exchange,.Warehouse Building ("6000") Switch L capabilities

Company Off-Premise Exchange E

V

- E N

T Applicable Modes:

L 11213-1415lD

- .L 2 NOTE A loss of the "5 Way" Circuit refers to the inability to contact one or more of the four offsite contacts: the State of Ohio, and the counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake. Testing to determine "5-Way" operability or to initiate circuit restoration actions'are governed under <PSI-0007>.

Direct (259-) off-site calling capability from the Control Room via private lines refer to: autodialer at the US console, and private (259-) lines on the superphones and line at the SAS console.

CA a..C C.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 43 of 54 Page: 57 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category L: Natural or Destructive Phenomena

<P00067>.

Tnitintinir Conditions 4 TT Entry Criteria T Control Room receives Report by High Indications in the Control LU1 report from plant plant sustained Room of a Main Turbine personnel who felt an personnel winds greater Trip or failure earthquake. confirming than 70 mph either of the for equal to following or greater U lwithin the than N LU1 Protected 15 minutes. U Area S Natural OR destructive boundary: U phenomena affecting WHITE AMBER Turbine Catastrophic A the Protected Area event light(s) on

tornado casing damage to L boundary indicator Seismic strike penetration. generator light on Monitor-

plane or seals. E local ing Panel train crash V Seismic OH13- E Monitoring P969. N Panel T OH 51-P021.

Applicable Modes:

I 12 13 14 15 lD .1 _________ 1 ________ ___________ 1 __________ .L __________ I

C-> Chn Page: 58 C l EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 44 of 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Control Room receives' Report of Sustained Greater Report by report from plant visible damage high winds than plant LAI personnel who felt an to any Safe with a <PEI-N 1> personnel earthquake. Shutdown velocity Maximum confirming a Building caused greater than. Safe turbine by ay of the 90'mph for Operating failure which following: 15 minutes Value for results in LAl Either of the following or longer. Area Water penetration indications present:. tornado Level of the turbine Natural OR destructive . aircraft, . (internal easing.

phenomena affecting

YELLOW seismic barge or flooding) A Safe Shutdown switch indicator train crash Missile gen- L Buildings light on local

other natural erated from E Seismic Monitoring or destruc- the turbine R Panel OH51-P021. tive failure result- T phenomena ing in either:

RED light on Seismic Monitoring

damage to Panel OH13-P969. Safe Shut-down equipment.

penetration of a Safe Shutdown Bldg.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3 ~ ~41 S1D . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I

(-

EPI-A1 E-Rev.: 9 c.h Attachment 2 Sheet 45 of 54 Page: 59 (C,

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category M: Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Initiating Conditions

-- -- I Entry Criteria 1

Toxic or flammable gas concentrations Report by local, county, or State MUl detected within the Protected Area. officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event. U MUI N U

Release of toxic OR S flammable gases U affecting the Protected A Area boundary deemed L detrimental to the safe operation of the E plant Normal operation of the plant is impeded due V to access restrictions. E N

Applicable Modes: T 1 _, .D .

NOTE A toxic or flammable gas release is considered to be impeding normal operations due to access restrictions if it is of sufficient magnitude that access to areas normally accessed to plant operator rounds is restricted. It also includes releases where access to these areas is possible only through the use of protective equipment, such as respirators since this limits the operators visibility and mobility thereby affecting "normal" plant operations.

C- * (77. C,_

Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 46 of 54 Page: 60 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria MAI Entry of toxic or flammable gases into Safe Shutdown Buildings or Areas.

Release of toxic OR flammable gases within Toxic gas in concentrations Flammable gas estimated or Plant personnel NOT a Safe Shutdown considered life-threatening determined to be in explosive able to perform actions Building which concentrations necessary to establish jeopardizes operation of and maintain Mode 4 systems required to . while utilizing maintain safe appropriate protective operations OR to equipment.

establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

2 l3 4 5 D . - .

NOTE This IC addresses increased toxic or flammable gas levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

(:I h C C(.

EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 47 of 54 Page: 61 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Cateyorv N: Securitv Events Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NUI U

NUI N U

Confirmed security Bomb device discovered within Protected Any security event resulting in the S event which indicates to Area. - declaration of a SECURITY ALERT in ' U potential degradation in accordance with the <PNPP Physical A the level of safety of the Security Plan>. L plant E

' V E

N Applicable Modes: T 1 l2 45DI NOTE A bomb device discovered in a plant Vital Area is classified under NS 1 as a Site Area Emergency.

EPI-A1 Rev.: 9 - Attachment 2 C

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 48.of 54 Page: 62 Ci; Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NA1 NAI Intrusion into Protected Area by hostile Any security event resulting in a force. declaration of a SECURITY A Security event in the EMERGENCY in accordance with the L plant Protected Area <PNPP Physical Security Plan>. E R

Applicable Modes: ..T 1 2 3 4 5 l D_.

NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force.

C (. I.

EPI-A( Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 49 of 54 Page: 63 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria '

NS1 Intrusion into a plant Vital Explosive device Confirmed act of sabotage Area by a hostile force. discovered in a plant Vital within a plant Vital Area. S

. .. Area. I T

E NS1. A R

Security event in a plant E Vital Area' A E

M E

R

.G E

N C

App licable Modes: Y 1 1 2 13 14.1 5 D I NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force. However, this hostile force must occupy or gain control of a vital area to meet the criteria for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

If there is conclusive evidence that a vital area has been entered by a hostile force, even though he is no longer present, the intrusion had been made and a Site Area Emergency is therefore warranted.

C! CX, EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 50 of 54 Page: 64 .

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions 4 I Entry Criteria NG1 G

E N

E NG1 Loss of physical control of the Control Loss of physical control of the Division 1 R Room due to a hostile force or act. and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas due to a A Security event resulting hostile force or act. L in loss of ability to reach and maintain COLD E .

SHUTDOWN M E

R G

E N

C Y

Applicable Modes:

I1 2 3 14 5 D NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, is considered a hostile force. This hostile force must occupy or gain control of either the Control Room or Division I and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas to meet the criteria for the declaration of a General Emergency.

C EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 51 of 54 Page: 65 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv 0: Emenzencv Coordinator's Judgment Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OUl Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Other conditions existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an, Unusual Event Applicable Modes: .

1 23 4 5 D NOTE For those cases where the degradation in the level of safety of the plant is tied to equipment or system malfunctions, the decision that the component is degraded should be based upon its functionality and NOT its operability.

EPCl 1 C Page: 66 C.'-

9 Attachment 2 vRev.: Sheet 52 of 54

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OA1 Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential OA1 degradation of systems needed for the protection of the public and which warrant Other conditions increased monitoring of plant functions.

existing, which in the judgment of the A Emergency L Coordinator, warrant *E.

declaration of an Alert R T

Applicable Modes:

11 31 5D - -

NOTE This IC is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency' Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class. This includes a determination by the Emergency Coordinator that additional assistance similar to that provided by the TSC and OSC staffs, including a transfer of the Emeigencv Coordinator responsibilities to the TSC, is necessary for the event to be effectively mitigated. Transfer of Emergency Coordinator duties for classification, offsite notifications and PAR decisions, is used as an initiator since an event significant enough to warrant transfer of command and control is a substantial reduction in-the level of safety of the plant.

CEPI C, EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 53 of 54 Page: 67 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OsI S

I T

E OSI Other conditions exist which indicate an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public. A Other conditions R existing, which in the E judgment of the A Emergency Coordinator, warrant E declaration of a Site M Area Emergency E R

G E'.

No C'

Ap licable Modes: Y 1 2 3 4 5 D

C; EPI-Al Rev.: 9 Attachment 2 Sheet 54 of 54 Page: 68 - LAST EAL- ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l OGI G

E N

OG1 Other conditions exist which indicate an Potential for an Potential for an E actual or imminent substantial core uncontrolled release uncontrolled release R Other conditions degradation with the potential loss of which can which can A existing, which in the Containment integrity. reasonably be reasonably be L judgment of the expected to be expected to be Emergency greater than I Rem greater than 5 Rem E.

Coordinator, warrant TEDE at the Site , CDE Child Thyroid M declaration of a General Boundary. at the Site E Emergency Boundary. R G

E N

C' Y-Ap licable Modes:

I 12 3 l 4 l S ID

ML041070432

Text

2.0 REFERENCES

2.0 REFERENCES

Reference:

Navigation menu

Search