ML040980510

Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions

ML040980510
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/30/2004
From:	Henderson T FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PY-CE/NRR-2779L
Download: ML040980510 (114)

Text

FENOC Perry Nuclear Power Plant FENO 10 Center Road FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Perry, Ohio 44081 March 30, 2004 PY-CEI/NRR-2779L United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, enclosed are changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions (EPls) for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. These changes constitute revisions, temporary changes, or reissued pages. Please follow the updating instructions per the attached Controlled Document Instruction Sheet and return the signed Acknowledgment of Receipt form.

If you have questions or require additional information, please contact me at (440) 280-5889.

Very truly yours, Todd A. Henderson, Acting Supervisor Emergency Planning Unit TAH:byr Enclosure cc: NRR Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region 1II, Incident Response Center w/enclosures Aq

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT I ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT Title Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions EPI-AII Rev. 8 and EPI-AD0 / Rev. 5 and EPI-8 / Rev. 8 Control No. 60 Letter No./Date PY-CEI/NRR-2779L / March 30, 2004 Signature Date Title Return to:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Attn: B.Y. Richardson, A240 P. 0. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION Perry Nuclear Power Plant Controlled Document Instruction Sheet Manual:

Emergency Plan Implementina Instructions EPI-Al/ Rev. 8 and EPI-A10 / Rev. 5 and EPI-B-5 / Rev. 8 Control Number 60 Insert EPI-AI / Rev 8 EPI-A10/ Rev 5 EPI-B5 / Rev 8 Remove and Replace Reissue Entire Document Reissue Entire Document Reissue Entire Document

1-I/-.

EPI-Al Page:

Rev.:

i 8

PERRY OPERATIONS MANUAL PNPP

. CONTROL D COPY Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction No &WIIA E

-INFORMATON.

_.EY TITLE:

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS j

REVISION:

8:

EFFECTIVE DATE:

3-s-cy PREPARED:

Lawrence W. Burawald 12-4-03

/

Date

EPI-Al Page:

ii Rev.:

8 2

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Table of Contents Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE 1

2.0 REFERENCES

3.0 DEFINITIONS 2

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5

4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/

EOF Emergency Coordinator 5

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/

EOF Plant Operations Advisor 5

4.3 Plant Personnel 5

5.0 ACTIONS 5

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5

5.2 Downgrading Event 8.

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 9

5.4 Classification After the Event 11 5.5 Staffing of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events 11 5.6 Records 12 ATTACHMENTS -

Initiating Condition Index 13 -

EAL Entry Criteria 15 SCOPE OF REVISION:

Periodic Review -

Required Rev. 8 -

1.

Define HCL figure limits have been exceeded.

(CA 03-04182-02)

2.

Insert Fission Product Barrier Matrix, PNPP No. 9855, Rev 12/02/03.

-'(CA 03-04182-01)

EPI-Al Page:

1 Rev.:

8 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1.0 PURPOSE To provide specific criteria based on <NUMARC/NESP-007> for the classification of an abnormal plant event transient, or external event affecting or having the potential to affect plant operations or personnel safety, into one.of the four (4) <NUREG-0654> defined emergency classes.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source References

1.

Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Docket No. 50-440

2.

ODCM:

Appendix C 2.2 Use References

1.

NUREG 0654:

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUMARC/NESP-007:

Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels (Revision 2)

3.

Title 10, Part 50.47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Emergency Plans

4.

Title 10, Part 50.72 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

5.

Technical Specifications (TS), Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1

6.

EPI-A2:

Emergency Actions Based on Event Classification

7.

EPI-A10:

Re-Entry/Recovery

8.

EPI-Bl:

Emergency Notification System

9.

EPI-B4:

First Aid and Medical Care

10.

EPI-B9:

Emergency Records.

EPI-Al Page:

2 Rev.:

8 11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

-20.

ONI-C61:

Evacuation of the Control Room ONI-P54:

Fire ONI-P56-2:

Security Threat ONI-R10:

Loss of AC Power PAP-1604:

Reports Management PAP-1701:

Records Management Program PAP-1910:

Fire Protection Program PEI-B13:

RPV Control PEI-T23:

Containment Control PEI-Nll:

Containment Leakage Control

21.

IOI-l:

Shutdown from Outside Control Room

22.

PNPP Physical Security Plan

23.

PSI-0007:

Reporting Emergency Plan Related Communication Equipment Problems

24.

Commitments addressed in this document:

F01626 P00035 P00067 H00037 P00038 P00089.

L00406 P00055 P00091 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Applicable Mode-The operating mode existing at the time of event or initiation of transient.

3.2 Challenge Any condition that, in the Emergency Coordinator's judgment, would likely result in a loss of one or more of the fission product barriers (i.e.,

fuel cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or Containment) in the next 1-3 hours.

EPI-Al Page:

3 Rev.: 8 3.3 Emergency Action Level (EAL)

A predetermined, site-specific, observable threshold or entry criteria for a given Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL entry criteria can be:

an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event;.results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class.

Refer to EAL Entry Criteria (Attachment 2).

3.4 Emergency Class One of a minimum set of names or titles, established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under <10CFR50.47>, for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative radiological seriousness, and (2) the time-sensitive onsite and offsite radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions.

The existing radiological emergency classes, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency 3.5 Event Category A collection of similar Initiating Conditions grouped to allow for the prompt recognition of the transient or event and assessment of severity based on the four emergency classes.

3.6 Functional A system, subsystem, train, component or device, though degraded in equipment condition-or configuration, is FUNCTIONAL if it is capable of maintaining respective system.parameters within acceptable design limits.

3.7 Initiating Condition (IC)

One of a predetermined subset of plant conditions defined by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>, where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency or such an emergency has occurred.

Initiating Conditions are established based on the four emergency classes required under

<10CFR50.47>.

Refer to Initiating Condition Index (PNPP No. 8852, ).

3.8 Loss Unless defined by specific EAL indication, LOSS shall be defined as a state of inoperability in which FUNCTIONAL and operable status cannot be maintained. A system, subsystem, train, component or device is not lost if its functionality is assured.

EPI-Al Page:

4 Rev.:

8 3.9 Operating Mode There are six applicable operating modes associated with the Initiating Conditions used in this document:

numbers 1 through 5, and the '

letter "D".

Numbers 1 -

5 correspond to Modes 1 through 5 defined by

<Technical Specifications> Table 1.1-1; the letter "D" stands for the reactor DEFUEL condition.

3.10 Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas For event classification purposes,.Safe Shutdown Buildings/areas are considered to be the following locations:

Control Complex '(all elevations)

Auxiliary'Building (all elevations)

Intermediate Building (all elevations)

Fuel Handling Building (all elevations)

Reactor Building (all elevations)

Emergency Service Water Pump House (all elevations)

Electrical Duct Chase Leading to ESW Building.

Diesel Generator Building (all areas except the Unit 2 Division 1, 2, and 3 DG Rooms)

Steam Tunnel (all elevations)

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Area Condensate Storage Tank Intake/Discharge Structure 3.11 Significant Transient Includes response to automatic or manually initialed functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

3.12 Unplanned Any activity which is not previously approved.

If an EAL entry condition is satisfied due'to preplanned maintenance or testing, the emergency classification is NOT declared.

The unplanned designation shall include any activity, including preplanned maintenance or testing, in which the system is inadvertently rendered unavailable.

3.13 Valid An indication or report condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by'direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's truth is removed.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

EPI-Al Page:

5 Rev.:

8 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/EOF Emergency Coordinator As the designated Emergency Coordinator, classify an Emergency-Plan event per this instruction when actual or potential plant conditions dictate and ensure required actions are implemented per <EPI-A2>.

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/EOF Plant Operations Advisor Advise the designated Emergency Coordinator of any Initiating Conditions, which are being approached or EAL entry criteria met upon initiation of an abnormal or inadvertent plant event.

-4.3 Plant Personnel Inform the Control Room of any conditions or symptoms indicated by instrument readings or direct observations that could indicate a real or potential emergency.

'5.0 -ACTIONS The following actions are intended as guidance.

Knowledge of plant conditions and/or the extent of the emergency may require additional response actions.

In all cases, this instruction should be combined with the sound judgment of the Emergency Coordinator to arrive at the proper classification for a particular set of circumstances.

<H00037, P00038>

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5.1.1 Ensure appropriate Off-Normal Instructions (ONIs), Plant Emergency Instructions'(PEIs) or other applicable plant instructions and procedures'are-being implemented to stabilize plant conditions.

The classification shall be of high priority following the performance of the required immediate operator actions and' must'be made promptly if a radioactive release to the public is probable so that offsite agencies can mobilize and implement the necessary precautions to protect the health and safety of the public.

EPI-Al Page:

6 Rev.:. 8 5.1.2 Implement <EPI-B4> if the event involves personnel injuries.

1.

Upon being notified that the victim(s) being transported to an offsite medical facility is suspected or known to be radiologically contaminated, perform the following per

<EPI-B4>:

a.

Contact an Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) Representative using the Integrated On-Call Report found on the Perry Web under Emergency Response Organization, and direct the individual to notify the State of Ohio and Lake County Emergency management Agencies (EMAs) of the incident.

NOTE:

If the injury(ies) occur during evening hours, this notification can be deferred until the next day.

b.

Perform an eight (8) hour notification to the NRC per

<PAP-1604>.in accordance with <10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii)>.

5.1.3 Implement <ONI-P54> and/or <PAP-1910> if the event-involves a confirmed, probable or possible fire.

<L00406>

5.1.4 Determine the affected areas of the plant and implement an evacuation of the building or localized plant area.

<F01626>

5.1.5 For an abnormal event or evolution, which is not classifiable per this instruction, use the Integrated On-Call Report to contact additional plant expertise or manpower if desired for assessment and mitigation purposes.

1.

For situations in which the event requires a prompt, coordinated response, refer to Section 5.5 to initiate staffing of the Technical Support Center (TSC) or Operations Support Center (OSC), if warranted.

5.1.6 Classify the emergency as follows:

NOTE:

The designated Emergency Coordinator may not delegate the decision to initially classify, reclassify, or terminate an emergency event per <EPI-Al>.

<P00035>

1.

Using PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1, identify the emergency by event category and determine the most appropriate Initiating Condition (IC) based on the operating mode at the time of event initiation, plant conditions,-and severity levels.

NOTE:

Initiating Condition Index operator aid(s) are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Backup EOF.

I EPI-Al Page:

7 Rev.:

8

2.

Refer to Attachment 2 for the applicable Initiating Condition(s) to determine whether the criteria are met for the operating mode(s) listed.

NOTE 1:

For those EALs with a permitted out of service time or duration (e.g., 15 minutes during electrical transients), the following shall apply:

The clock should start at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise in which case the clock start time is retroactive.

The declaration should be made as soon as.it is determined that the transient will last longer than the allotted time.

In this case, the declaration shall not be postponed until the permitted time has expired.

NOTE 2:

Fission Product Barrier Matrix operator aids are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, TSC, EOF and at the Backup EOF.

3.

Declare an emergency class when all the conditions listed in at least one EAL column have been met, and implement <EPI-A2>.

<H00037>

a.

When several Initiating Conditions are met, declare the most severe emergency class.

A 15-minute goal has been established for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available to Control Room operators that an EAL has been exceeded.

b.

For TRANSITORY EVENTS, in which an event is classifiable in accordance with this instruction but becomes a lower classifiable event before being declared (i.e., Alert vs.

Site Area Emergency), perform the following:

1)

Declare only the lower classification and implement

<EPI-A2>.

2)

Provide a brief description of the transitory event using Block 3c on the PNPP Initial Notification Form.

-X-EPI-Al Page:

8 Rev.:

8

c.

For an Unusual Event or Alert, which was classifiable in accordance with <EPI-Al> but no longer meets the criteria for any event at time of declaration, perform.the following:

Events which have met the criteria for either a Site Area Eme'rgency or General Emergency can not be simultaneously classified and terminated.

These events must be handled in accordance with Sections 5.2 or 5.3.

1)

Implement <EPI-A2>, and complete the required actions for a simultaneous classification and termination of an event.

2)

Complete Blocks 3.a & 3.b on the PNPP Initial Notification Form to notify the NRC, State of Ohio, and local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

4.

Periodically re-evaluate emergency class and applicable Initiating Conditions per Steps 2 and 3 above, and escalate the classification, or downgrade/terminate from the event per Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

<P00055>

a.

Due to the severity of a General Emergency and its impact on Federal, State and local county emergency management agencies, a General Emergency-shall not be downgraded.

Instead, the event shall be terminated and a predetermined Recovery phase entered from a General Emergency when the criteria in Section 5.3 are met.

5.2 Downgrading Event <P00089>

5.2.1 Consider downgrading from a Site Area Emergency only to either an Alert or an Unusual Event when the following conditions are met:

Due to the marginal benefit for the plant and State and local county response agencies, the event shall be terminated from an Alert in lieu of downgrading from an Alert toan Unusual Event.

1.

The EAL entry criteria for a Site Area Emergency are no longer met; however, the entry criteria for an Alert or-an Unusual Event are still applicable.

The EALs have been written towards the initial' classification and upgrading of an emergency event.

As a result, their logic may not be applicable to downgrading the event.

Therefore, the EALs should be evaluated with respect to the intent of the criteria established for each emergency classification.

EPI-Al Page:

9 Rev.:

8

2.

Downgrading the event would preclude an unnecessary activation or mobilization of plant, Federal, State, and local county response facilities and personnel.

3.

Plant conditions are stable, and the prognosis for improvement is good.

4.

Any fire, natural event or hazard to plant operations is under control or has ceased, and a preliminary assessment of the extent of-damage has been completed.

5.

Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

6.

No protective actions for the general public are in effect, such as a precautionary shelter order.

7.

Discussions have been held with the NRC, and State and local county officials, and an agreement has been reached to downgrade the event.

The concern is that downgrading the event may affect the plant's ability to support on-going State and local county emergency response.activities which were initiated as a result of the classification of a Site Area Emergency.

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 5.3.1 Terminate from any emergency class and enter into Recovery, if warranted or required, when the following criteria are met:

Entry into a RecoverV phase and the establishment of a Recovery Organization is mandatory when terminating from a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification.

Entry into Recovery from an Alert is optional.

1.

The EAL entry criteria are no longer met for the event and for lower classifications.

---

OR-------------------

Plant long-term corrective action and/or clean-up activities resulting from the event, preclude exiting the EALs.

2.

The reactor is in a stable condition, with a reliable means of long-term decay heat removal available, if required.

3.

Containment integrity, if required, is maintained-and not threatened.

EPI-Al Page:

10 Rev.:

8

4.

Any fire, natural event (e.g., earthquake, high groundwater level), or hazard to plant operations (i.e., toxic gas, unusual aircraft activity) is under control or has ceased.

5.

A preliminary assessment of the cause, extent of damage, and impact has been completed.

6.

Radiation levels'in affected plant areas are controllable or.

have decreased to within acceptable levels.

7.

Areas of the plant affected by the emergency have been defined.

8.

Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

AND No further potential for a significant uncontrolled release exists.

9.

No further surveillances relative to offsite protective actions are needed (except for the control of food stuffs, water, and offsite contamination or environmental assessment activities).

AND Terminating the emergency will not-impact any offsite protective actions which may be in progress.

10.

Offsite radiological conditions do not prohibit or seriously restrict access of personnel arid material to the Perry Plant site.

11.

All pre-Recovery phase actions required by <EPI-AlO> have been completed.

12.

Consult with NRC, State of Ohio, and local county officials regarding the decision to terminate the emergency.

The intent of this action is to involve the NRC, State and local counties in event.decision-making; however, this action is not intended to delay or hinder the Perry Plant's ability to simultaneously classify and terminate from an Unusual Event or Alert.

A -

s EPI-Al Page:

11 Rev.:

8 5.4 Classification After the Event 5.4.1 Perform the following actions when it has been discovered that an Emergency Plan classification has been missed (during shift turnover, paperwork review, etc.), and the plant no longer meets the conditions of any EAL:

1.

Classify the event, but do not implement the actions. outlined in <EPI-A2>.

2.

Notify the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of classification and initiate event notification/reportability actions in accordance with

<PAP-1604>.

3.

Direct the on-call EPU Representative to inform the State of Ohio and local county Emergency Management Agencies'(EMAs) using a commercial telephone; record the names and date/times of individuals contacted in the Plant Log.

a.

When a classification occurs during evening hours, calls to State and local EMAs can be'deferred until the next day at the discretion of the.Shift Manager and on-call EPU Representative.

5.5 Staffing of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emerqency Plan Events The Shift Manager, based on his assessment of the situation can use the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to mobilize and coordinate support for the Control Room staff.

However, augmentation of staff shall'be achieved using the Integrated On-Call Report whenever possible.

5.5.1 Announce the activation of the TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC, and/or OSC over the Plant Public Announcing (PA) System.

5.5.2 Mobilize required TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC and/or OSC staff by performing the following:

1.

Select the appropriate message (#17 thru #23) on the ERO Pager Messages form (PNPP No. 9100) contained in <EPI-Bl>.

2?

Specify in the narrative summary block on the form:

1) that the facility activation is in response to a non-emergency plan event, and 2).brief summary of event conditions and support required.

3.

Forward the completed form to the.'Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and direct them to activate the Emergency Paging System

("beepers").

EPI-Al Page:

12 Rev.:

8 5.5.3 DO NOT perform any formal notifications to the NRC, State of Ohio, or local counties per <EPI-B1>.

NOTE:

An informal notification to the State of Ohio and local counties may be performed by the On-Call Emergency Planning Representative after first consulting with the Shift Manager.

5.5.4 Upon the arrival of facility staff, coordinate activities in support of the Control Room's assessment and mitigation of the event; DO NOT ENTER <EPI-A2>, OR TRANSFER THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN SECTION 4.1 TO THE TSC.

5.5.5 Assess possible entry into the Emergency Plan per Section 5.1.6, and enter <EPI-A2> as applicable if the EAL criteria outlined in this instruction are met.

5.6 Records 5.6.1 Records Handling

1.

The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) pursuant to <EPI-B9>.

The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records-Management pursuant to <PAP-1701>.

5.6.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this document:

Quality Assurance Records None Non-Quality Records None

C

(

{7 EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 1 of 2 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX Page:

13 PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 11/30/00 EPI-AI EVENTCATEGORY UNUSUAL EVENT.

ALERT

° SITE AREA EMERGENCY e

GENERAL EMERGENCY Fueldaddegradation ArAnylossordiallengetotheFuelClad LosdofRPVwaterlevelthathasorwillr Lossoftwobariers. ANDalossorchallengelothe b harder.

uncover fuel.

third barier.

A: FISSION PRODUCT Pge t16 -AUI Page 13 (FPB Matrtx) AA1 Page 17 AS1 Pxge 1il (FFP MaMtrx)

-AGl BARRIER a challenge or loss ofboh the DEGRADATION Reactor Coolant System leakage.

Anty loss or dhallenge to the Reactor Fuel Clad barlebAND Reelos Coo ant Coolrd Sste barer.System barrier.

Page16-AU2 Psge 18(FPM*trix) AA2 Page 18 (F9 Matrix)mbASr Any loss or challenge to the Consinrent Challenge tor2M the Fuel Clad bardier banter.

OR Reactor Coolant System banter. ANE

_ bse

_the loss of any additional baffrer.

Page 11 (FPB Matrix)

• AU1 Page 1i (FPB Mtixts). ASS B: LOSS OF DECAY Inability to rnaintain plant hI COLD Corplete loss o functions needed to HEAT REMOVAL NOTAPPUCABLEI SHUTOOVM achieve COLD SHUrDOWN NOT APPUCABUE FUNCTIONS Page19 BAI Pje20 OBS1 C: LOSSlOFSHUTDOWN i bty to reach required shutdownwithi n Failure to inMate or complete an Failu to ate or complete naut c

Faiure to Inate or complete a successfut shutdown C:

iOSSOF SH UTO Technical Speciication limits 3

eutomaicReactor Screm once on RPS Reactor aonce an RPfl f n b AND indication of an extrme chafenge to the bty FUNCTIONS OR FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN Page 21. CU1 hfnction Is required.

required.

AND a manual S aS to cool the core.

Page 22

• CAI

_2 C

sU2fLE

______________Psgo23.C51 Pagoe25.COI LOSS Of aOl offsite Power' to Division 1 Slid Power capability to D~vsloril and 2 EH Loae of c1 of7fete powe AND ana a Pptng loss of all ofstite powe AND onsiftepoe 0: AC. POWER LOSS El Essential Busses f grteter than I5 Essenti i Busses reduced to a single to Divsn ant 2 i Eastal t i to DfibSi tnr d 2 EH Essential Busses. AND minutes.

ge27 power source for greater than 1I5 greate thn c1minut continuing degradation of core cooling capability.

Page 27

• DIJI

~minutes. auch that any additonal singlePae1.0 failure would result hI a Station Pag 3S0

• tX11 Blsadout.

Page 28 - DA1

_ Loss Of an olfslte powerAND onsite

_power to Dhidison I and 2 EH Essential lrBusesii fo gntater gmlr I15 minutes.

_Page 295 DA2 Degradation of Division I and 2 essential E: D.C. POWER DC power for greater then 15 minues.

S Degradation of DMskon I and 2 essentia DEGRAD NOTAPPUCABLE DC power for grester tOn 15 mNutes NOTAPPUCABLE D

RAA ONPage 33

• EBlit Fire within a Safe Shutdown BulldingUJQ]

Fire OR explosion affecting the F: FIRE OR e extinguished within 15 minutes.

operabiitly of plant safety systems NOTAPPUCABLE NoTAPPucABLe EXPLOSION required to establish or maintain saee Page

- FUI shutdown.

Explosion affect a Safe Shutdown bBuildingi Page S7-FA1 Pg e.

F3AU2.

Unexpected In7aese in plant radiation Incress In radiation levels within Sate G: INCREASED PLANT levels.

Shutdown Buidings that Impede RADIATION LEVELS operation of systems required to Page 35

• GUI malntsin sae operations OR to Uncontrotled fuel pool water or i

establis maintinCOLD decrease with irradiated fuel outside the NOT APPUCABLE NOT APPUCABLE RPV remaining covered.

Pogo 41 OA1

_ Pg 40 GU2T Mor damnage to Irwdia t d fuel.

Page 42 -OGA2

(n c

C.(.

I EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 2 of 2 Page:

14 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX I PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 11/30100 EPI-Al EVENT CATEGORY UNUSUALEVENT o

ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY H: INCREASED Any unplanned release of gaseous Any unplanned release of gseous Site Boundary dose resulting from an S

Sie Boundary dose resulting from an actual or RADIATION RELEASE TO rio iy to the en nent th doatIvity to the envronment that actual or Immient release o gases im nt reease o gaseous radioactivity that THE ENVIRONMENT

• xceeds t* times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control radiactivity Va exceeds 100 mRam exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE OR 500 mRerm COE limit for 60 mInutes or greater.

Dnit for 15 mInutes or great.r.

TEDE dose OR SW mRem COE Child Child Thyroid dose for the etual or projected durtki Pag*43.1UW Thyroid dose for the actual OR projected of th release.

Psg

• U1dur ation of t he r eleas e PagePage-HSI Page 48 H

H01 Any unplannred release of liquid Any unplanned release or lquid readboactvly to the envinment that radioity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control limt for 60 minutes or greater, lmt for 15 minutes or greater.

Page 44 -HU2 page 4t -HA2 Control Room Evacuation has boee Control Room evacuation has been 1 : CONTROL ROOM NOT APPLICABLE i nitiated.

Initiated AND plant a onol CA NOT beN P

E V A C U A T I O N P a*.

t T

e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n I5 m i n u t e s.

N T P P U C AB L E 9

Pageg 50 IS -1 J: LOSS OF Loss of momt annunciators or Indcain

' Loss of mot annunciators or Indication t t

r tansient In ANNUNCIATORS OR Ih the Contro Roomlorgreaterthan 15 hI the Control RoomwnthetW (1) a Pog rrn mINaIesA O _

significant transient h

progress OR (2)

NOT APPLCABLE IPage o1 - Jul compensatory dndiations ar I

Page 63 J81 availble.

Pg 3-S Page 52 -JAI LOSS of onste OR Inh-plant V. LOSS OF coxmnmnlcations capabilities.

C NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPUCABLE NOT APPLICABLE Signifiatnt degradation of odbrile communications capabilities.

D Page S -KU2 L NATURAL OR Natural OR destructive phenomena Natural OR destructive phenomena DESTRUCTIVE affedting the Protected Area bouary.

affecting Safe Shutdo Buildings.

PHENOMENA g

P.

NO NOT APPCABLE NOT APPLICABLE Pg Psg 67 -

Page

_8 Psg 68ALA M: RELEASE OF Release of toxic OR flabmmabe gasses Release of toxic OR flammable gases TOXIC OR atlecting the Protected Area boundary w ithin a Safe Shutdown Building wiich deemed detrimental to the safe Jeopardizes operation of systems NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE r

E A operation of e plant.

requIred to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD Page 69 MUI SHUTDOWN.

Pag 60 -MAI F

Cot esn a p dgatinIth Security event resulting I loss of ability to reach N: SECURITY EVENTS h

Indicates l d egradatio S

ecuit event Arte de pln Poy evetnt IntaedlaS his al A a

maintain COLD SHUTDOWN.

level of safety, of the plant.

P Page 1

• N NUI Page 62 6

NAI Page9t D

.o Page NS D

NP 4

0: EM ERGENCY on at e conditi ons ex isting. w hi h In the Oth er co nstain s existing. w hic h In Om O lthe x

coit ntin existing. which In the Other condItions existing. which hI the udgement of COORDINATOR S j

en tE gy CoordInat.

judgement of te Emergency Coordihator.

l udgement of the Emergency Coordinator, Tr the Emergency Coordinator. warrant declaration of J UGM EMENT warrant declartion of an Unusual Event.

warrant declaration of an A wt de c

of a Sit e Are a

General Emergency.

Pagess-OU6 Page1 RS-OAI Pago-7.0I OSIeB-O'

(

C..

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA

(

I.

Rev.:

8 Sheet 1 of 54 Page:

15

. Categorv A: Fission Product Barrier Degradation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria 4

r AUI Fuel clad-degradation Applicable Modes:

1121314151 High Offgas pretreatment air activity greater than the Technical Specification 3.7.5.

Reactor Coolant System sample indicates activity greater than Technical Specification 3.4.8 limits U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T NOTE Fuel clad degradation is NOT an issue when the Reactor is defueled. Damage to fuel in spent fuel pools is addressed in GUi;

(_

Rev.:

8 C

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA

'C I

Sheet 2 of 54 Page:

16 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AU2 Greater than 10 gpm Greater than 30 gpm total Greater than 30 gpm total unidentified leakage in leakage in Drywell leakage in lprywell.

Drywell.

averaged over the previous Reactor Coolant System 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

leakage Greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

Applicable Modes:

1123 1-AU2 U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T

EPI-Al C.

.C, A

Rev.:

8 Sheet 3 of 54 II Page:.17 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AS1 RPV water level CANNOT be maintained greater than 0".

Loss of RPV water level that has or will uncover Reactor is "shutdown under all conditions without boron" fuel Applicable Modes:

I1 2 13 14 1 ASI

'S I

T E

A R

E

• A E

M E

R G

E N

C y

NOTE ASI is applicable only to non-ATWS situations in which RPV level was NOT intentionally lowered per

<PEI-B 13> as a means of power control. Refer to Event Category "C" for classification under ATWS conditions in which RPV water level is intentionally lowered.

EPI-Al POM NM s M$a.

Rev.:

8 Sheet 4 of 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA

_FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

_____REACTOR lOCKANT DRYWELLADIAnON EMERGENCY COORDINATOR DRYWEipow~wi

.s Reuesnrosnm

_CTIVIT JUOCEMZNT STUI N

_E~dry WsoSAG-1. Pd -,I Uotsw B.iiVn Odwr I eql to or An men-t

- InZ r-NIhww Fbodft.-

ia~srien 300 uC&~n dose*

ofteEmqprwno Coordinator

.F*&hIw bvi 4.0.,C0 R.Wh.

wA*1*Mbdw3.

W s

b of the FeCld d.1-yLOU or CKALLA E

afte hew been oWL.

RIFV h~ s18 RPVeWI Any DWihN-O511. hiMi Ndi-dsin 2 Cotipa Mis bwnl LOSS(es) NW ff r.2 CNNteof fth Enoency C@or&War CNALLEN0E4.W VW' Ni hiin delniwd.k NOTPLCANE NOTAPEVCABE kidhets a dwelwng to the Fud

-p.db51NW.@

d de thi

.1.

IK-

-. 1 Page:

.18 UNUSUAL EVENT MU Aiyhwdhiglei AM AM~ bw M w10 W V.~

P"dCM b~.

AU,.,.,W.,

I 1W NM! AREA EMERGENCY

^22 LMifts' garlY~ffleSN i.0 Fedie b~d AND osyadtbd bet, C__

b W AOt b..

GE MEME ENCY A

_I LeWhbe.. AO.lss er ge R boe.4 C

II, flORIWELL AMAT1o.4I REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROL I ORYWEL PRESSURE I R

I EMERENCY COORDINATOR APO/hi.I les LSW Ank An SW le Eiwg.iy v,

. MtYi Mi wn F. 12 i

behiV 4yded to Oq,..sa.Gn e

,"s I

%" I." 158 tV ow orEEMB KV d e St V* Ebl 1iOh Ih

.35 ohinoI ret peoslrenI oer lo Ca"I w

re S

ro d

btnoeeV r.'

M S

n 1r JtiM Me 30 RPV MiO,

T.

Ro om NOT ft sq.e-MA Wics In b~ob"AWd-W.,NW.

Any opr b

M oln OWLn hin M NOT APPLICALEA NOTAPPUCA" E NOTAPCeFlE Coakjomos Pat PEIN l, Coso~Iwse.I hidmas a o

r 1

C a

OO9ETAJNMENT ISOLATiON EMERGENCY COWOR JUOGEMENT cRot'-MRE2-E'I RADIATON I M_

CONTAINET C:ONTAINMENT 1SOIATION DMRENCf C:OCRI3TOR 0GMT piy Cwtaeid Cwnnt u

W 0

-m W

l PE'.0 PEI-'

l tndile Miso, hiMdoksgna Cwdf1.W MW IEnis gen_

C i

EI4NOTAP

.OICAR osofi w.r b il lsesdbs

.nwyCdkmi edoo hI Mi CoWo1

-j.Sf hd dlsts.

lC 4 Pi Rool ;tm i__n l

onshM ebn hile hun dbsn esobfoded peMeW id Or~tl-ol esss o4

.osoe~ieedeMueete

,.NOT APlCAE h

n 21.

JN O

modlE Mspet MM Coordh o

r W E ghentakaroIn MW

'Ot.

ISPC ad N T

.P E

b s

.h Spot.,ds ba3obig FOOTNOTES: i. Those thresholds for which a LOSS or CHALLENGE Is determined to be IMMINENT (I.e., within the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />), classify as though the threshold(s) has been exceeded.

.2. RPV level Is less than 0 Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

3. Entry Into SAG-1. Primary Containment Flooding Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

4. Unisolable primary system discharging outside containment per PEI-N1 1 Is both a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER.CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

5. Sample activity Is equal to or greater than 300 uClgm dose equivalent Iodine-131 Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a contributor to a REACTOR COOLANT.

SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

6. HCL figure limits have been exceeded Is defined as follows:

1. Suppression Pool Temperature >185 MF or

2. Suppresslon Pool Level c1 4.25 Ft.

C_

(

z C

A EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 5 of 54 Page:

19 t

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category B: Loss of Decav Heat Removal Functions InitiatinL7 Conditions Entrv Criteria

_I_

,ta__i_

Cdin Entr Crte_

Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop A.

f B.

Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop B.

.BA1 Inability to maintain plant in COLD SHUTDOWN BA1-A L

E R

T RCS temperature exceeds COLD SHUTDOWN limit of 200'F per Technical Specification Table 1.1-1.

Uncontrolled temperature rise approaching 2000F RCS temperature.

Applicable Modes:

I K NOTE The IC remains applicable for situations in which an increase in RCS temperature greater than 2006F results in a change to Mode 3.

The above criteria is met as soon as it becomes known that sufficient cooling CANNOT be restored to maintain temperature below 200'F regardless of the current temperature. The intent of BAI is NOT to classify based on an unplanned excursion above 200'F when heat removal capability is available.

"Uncontrolled" means that RCS temperature increase is NOT the result of planned actions by plant staff.

C-i1

(.

C 4

Rev.:

8 Sheet 6 of 54 Page:

20 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria RHR Loops A and B are NOT capable of lowering RPV temperature.

BS1 Complete loss of functions needed to achieve COLD

.SHUTDOWN The plant is operating in the UNSAFE Suppression Pool Suppression Pool Region on the HCL figure.

temperature greater level less than than 185TF 14.25 f.

Applicable Modes:

1231 I

C A, 2 C-EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 7 of 54 Page:

21 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv C: Loss of Shutdown Functions or Failure to Shutdown Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria CUl Plant is NOT brought to the required operating mode within the Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time following entry into an LCO.

Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical Specification limits Applicable Modes:

12 3 NOTE Declaration should be made because of equipment failures that prevent the performance of an orderly shutdown or failure to meet the shutdown completion time from the time discovered and a required action being entered.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the specified completion time period elapses and is NOT related to how long a condition may have existed before it was discovered.

C:

C.

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 8 of 54 Page:

22 I.

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria

• 9 I

CAl Failure to initiate or complete an automatic Reactor Scram once an RPS function is required Applicable Modes:

Actuation of RPS has occurred or should have occurred.

Actuation of RRCS has occurred or should have occurred.

The reactor is, NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

1 2

l l

I NOTE.

CAI is applicable if either Mode 1 or 2 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

l

(7 C,

a EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 9 of 54 Page:

23 EAL.ENTRY CRITERIA.

. Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred.

should have occurred.

The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

CS1 Failure to initiate or Manual operator actions Reactor power CANNOT Suppression Pool complete an automatic taken at 1H13-P680 to be determined.

temperature is greater than Reactor Scram once an insert control rods were 11 00F.

RPS function is NOT successful in required, AND a lowering Reactor power to manual Scram was less than 4%.

NOT successful Applicable Modes:

1 6S1 S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E,

R G

E N

C Y

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 10 of 54 Page:

24 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE CS1 is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

"Manual Operator actions" are defined as any set of actions by the Reactor Operator at 1H13-P680 which results in a scram signal. These actions include placing the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, arming and depressing the RPS Manual Scram push buttons, and arming and depressing the RRCS Manual ARI push buttons.

Injection of boron is NOT considered in reducing reactor power below 4%.

A concurrent challenge to the ability to cool the core would escalate this event to General Emergency per CG1.

EPI-A1 Cr C.

Rev.:

8 Sheet 11 of 54 Page:

25 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria.

Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred.

should have occurred.

CG1 The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

Failure to initiate or complete a successful Manual operator actions taken at Reactor power Suppression Pool shutdown, AND 1H13-P680 to insert control rods CANNOT be temperature is greater indication of an extreme were NOT successful in lowering determined.

than 1 0F.

challenge to the ability Reactor power to less than 4%.

to cool the core Any of the following conditions exist:

• Entry into <SAG-I>, Primary Containment Flooding.

• In the UNSAFE region on the HCL figure.

Applicable Modes:

• Suppression Pool temperature greater than 1850F.

• Suppression Pool level less than 14.25 R.

NOTE CG1 is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAl for Mode 2 applicability.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

CG1 G

E N

E R

A L

E M

E R

G E

N C

.y

' C(

EPI-Al C

Rev.:

8 Sheet 12 of 54 E

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA '

I Page:

26 I

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C C

C -i EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 13 of 54 Page:

27 k.

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Cateiory D: A. C. Power Loss Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria ONI-R10 entered for a Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP).

DUI Loss of all offsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes Essential Busses for for energizing bus EHI1: r greater than 15 minutes Normal Preferred

.Alternate Preferred Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes for energizing bus EH12:

Applicable Modes:

Normal Preferred Alternate Preferred 1

2 1.3 l 4 l 5 l D DU1 U

N U

S U

A

-L E

V E

N T

NOTE Failure of either bus EHi1 or EH12 to be supplied from its respective diesel generator is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DAI for Modes 1, 2 and 3. Failure of both busses EHI I and EH12 to be supplied from their respective diesel generators (Station Black Out) is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DA2 for Modes 4 and 5 and to a Site Area Emergency under DS 1 for Modes 1, 2 and 3.

(-f -

c I-EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 14 of 54 Page:

28 A,

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Essential AC power reduced to onily one of the following power sources for greater DA.

than 15 minutes:

Power capability to

• Normal Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH

• Alternate Preferred Essential Busses

• Division 1.Diesel Generator reduced to a single

• Division 2 Diesel Generator power source for greater than 15 minutes, such that any additional single failure would result in Station Loss of the single remaining power source will result in a loss of AC power to both Blackout busses EHI 1 and EH12.

A licable Modes:

1 2 3

.DAI A

L E

R T

NOTE Escalation to a Site Area Emergency is evaluated under DS1, for Operating Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a total loss of AC power to both busses EHl 1 and EH12.

A total loss of AC power to busses EHI I and EH12 while in Operating Modes 4 and 5 is classified as.an Alert under DA2. No escalation path exists to a Site Area Emergency for Operating Modes 4 and 5.

C

.C C(

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 15 of 54 I

Page:

29 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred DA2 source within 15 minutes.

Loss of all offsite power AND onsite power to Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH source within. 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes.

Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

I I I 4 1 5 1D

C c.r (C

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 16 of 54

. Page:

30 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source within 15 minutes.

DS1 Loss of all offsIte power AND onsite power to Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH source within 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes Both busses EH.1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Ap licable Modes:

1 12 13'1 1 1.'.

NOTE Escalation to a General Emergency is evaluated under DGi for Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a continuing degradation of core cooling capability.

DS1 S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E

R G

E N

C.

Y

C C

C-EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 17 of 54 Page:

31 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source.

Both busses EH 1I and EHI2 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred source.

'DG1 Prolonged loss of all Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel offsite power AND Generator source.

onsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH Busses, AND continuing Restoration of power to either of the RPV water level RPV water level degradation of core following busses is NOT likely in less less than 0".

CANNOT be cooling capability than four hours:

determined.

EHII

• EH12 Applicable Modes:

I1 2

3 1

__I DG1 G

E N

E R

A L

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y

C C

C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 18 of 54 Page:

32 I

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

(::C

(.....

(

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 19 of 54 Page:

33.

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv E: D. C. Power Degradation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria EUl Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for.

greater than 15 minutes Voltage on ED-1-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

EUl U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T NOTE The same set of conditions as described in this EAL would be classified as Site Area Emergency under ESI if they occurred during Modes 1, 2, or 3.

EPI-Al C.

t Rev.:

8 Sheet 20 of 54 Page:

34 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Voltage on ED-I-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

ES1 Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Applicable Modes:

ES1 S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E

R E

N G

C Y

Voltage on ED-i-B buss is less thani105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

1 2 1[3 1 I

(=

C:

C; EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 21 of 54 Page:

35 EAL ENTRY.CRITERIA Category F: Fire or Explosion Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Fire within any Safe Shutdown Building.

Fire CANNOT be extinguished within Fire CANNOT be extinguished within FU1.

15 minutes of the verification of alarm.

15 minutes of the notification received in the Control Room from plant personnel Fire within a Safe that a fire exists.

Shutdown Building NOT extinguished within 15 minutes 2I 1 I 3 14 1

_D II FUI U

N U

S

'U A

L E

.V E

N T

NOTE Verification in this context means those actions taken in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) to determine that the alarm is NOT spurious. Verification includes the receipt of multiple or independent alarms or confirmation of a single detector by visual inspection of the affected area by a first responder. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C (7

CP 3

Page:

36 EPI-Al.

Rev.:

8 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 22 of 54 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria FU2 Report by plant personnel confirming the occurrence of an explosion within the Protected Area resulting in visible damage to a Safe Shutdown Building.

Explosion affecting a Safe Shutdown Building Aplicable Modes:

1 1 2 1 3 1 1 5D I NOTE No attempt is made to assess the magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of damage (deformation/scorching) is sufficient for declaration. Actual damage to safe shutdown equipment is covered under Alert FAL. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C CZ, C,

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 23 of 54 Page.

37 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Either of the following has been confirrned:

FAI Fire in a Safe Shutdown Building.

Fire OR explosion Explosion in a Safe Shutdown Building.

affecting the operability of plant safety systems Plant personnel at the scene report visible Affected safe shutdown system indicates' required to establish or damage to safe shutdown equipment or degraded performance.

maintain safe shutdown components.

Applicable Modes:

1 2

3 4

5 D

NOTE The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should NOT be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. NO attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of damage beyond the immediate area. The occurrence of the explosion or fire with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C -

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 24 of 54 Page:

38 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE Safe Shutdown System/Equipment refers to equipment identified in the Safe Shutdown Capability Report.

This is the minimum list of equipment required to achieve and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN (including all auxiliary equipment such as AC/DC power, cooling water and instrumentation).

A detailed list is provided in the <Appendix R Evaluation -

Safe Shutdown Capability Report>.

Safe Shutdown System/Equipment list:

(Division 1 and 2 only)

Reactor Protection System Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Automatic Depressurization System/SRV Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Low Pressure Coie Spray Low Pressure Coolant Injection -

A/B/C Suppression Pool Cooling Shutdown Cooling Safety-Related Instrument Air Emergency Service Water -'

Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Emergency Service Water Pump House Ventilation ECCS Pump Room Cooling Systems Diesel-Generator Building Ventilation Stand-by Diesel Generator (DG)

DG Fuel Oil Storage/Transfer Electrical Power Distribution Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling Emergency Closed Cooling Control Complex Chilled Water MCC, Switchgear and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Battery Room Exhaust Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System Areas HVAC System

(

Reference:

<NUMARC/NESP-007> (Rev. 2), Unusual Event HA2)

(

r-C.

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 25 of 54 Page:. 39 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category G: Increased Plant Radiation Levels Initiating Conditions Eniuy Criteria Area radiation monitor (D21) reading Health Physics surveys indicate an increase by increases by a factor of 1000 over a factor of 1000 times over normally expected normal levels.

area radiation levels.

GUI Unexpected increase in plant radiation levels In-plant radiation level increase CANNOT be attributed to MY of the following:

• the start-up and operation of plant equipment or systems within design parameters.

• the planned movement of radioactive materials.

• the planned movement of shielding (i.e., plugs, lead shot, etc.)

Applicable Modes:

1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 _D NOTE "Normal" area radiation levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past 24-hour period, excluding the current peak value.

EPI-Al C-(,j Rev.:

8 Sheet 26 of 54 I

Page:

40 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Uncontrolled decrease in one or more of the following fuel pools containing irradiated fuel:

6 0

FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool FHB Fuel Transfer Pool FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool FHB Cask Pit CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool GU2 Uncontrolled fuel pool water level decrease with irradiated fuel outside the RPV remaining covered.

Applicable Modes:

U N

U S

U A

L E

V E

N T

2 1 4 1

C(

• C C(-

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 27 of 54 Page:

41 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Area radiation levels of greater than 15 mRem/hr in any of the following areas:

Area radiation levels of greater than 6000 mRem/hr in a Safe Shutdown Building, as determined by eilth:

• area radiation surveys I

• installed or portable radiation monitors 0

• Control Room Central Alarm Station*

GAI Increases in radiation levels within Safe Shutdown Buildings that impede operation

-of systems required to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

Access is required to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown, as determined by the Shift Manager.

GAl A

L E

R T

I1 2

3 4 5 1D NOTE This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

(AN EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 28 of'54 Page:

42 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria HIGH alarm on one or more of the Water level observed to be below top of following radiation monitors resulting the gate sill separating any of the GA2 from damage to irradiated fuel:

following containing irradiated fuel:

Major damage to SPENT FUEL POOL

• FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation irradiated fuel

• UPPER POOL Pool

• FUEL PREP POOL

• FHB Fuel Transfer Pool

• FHB VENT GAS

• FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool

• CNTMT ATMOS GAS

• FHB Cask-Pit

• CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool

• CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool Appicable Modes:

1 2l 3

4 5 D r

GA2 A

L E

R T

NOTE The intent of this EAL is to allow observations from plant personnel to be factored into the declhration decision and is not intended to direct an entry into an area solely to observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installed.

0

(-

Ci

(

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 29 of 54 Page:

43 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category H: Increased Radiation Release to the Environment Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than TWO times the Routine or as required sample analysis HIGH alarm setpoint on one or more of indicates arelease rate greater than two the following plant gaseous effluent times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.

monitors lasting greater than or equal to 60 minutes:

HUi

• PLANT VENT GAS ID17-K786

• OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D17-K836 The release lasts for greater than or equal Any unplanned release TB/HB VENT GAS ID17-K856 to 60 minutes.

of gaseous radioactivity

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786 to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control limit Chemistry sample analysis methods for 60 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 60 minutes of greater.

receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one or more of the plant gaseous effluent monitors, that effluent levels are less than two times ODCM3.11.2.1 limits.

Aplicable Modes:

1 l 2 l 3 l 4 lS r.

HUt U

N

.U S

U A

L E

V E

N T

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further,.the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

C c J EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 30 of 54 Page:

44 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than Reading greater than 20 Routine or as required 1.2E3 cpm above background times the HIGH-HIGH sample analysis indicates for one or more of the alarm setpoint on a release rate greater than HU2 following liquid process RADWASTE TO ESW two times.ODCM monitors lasting greater than or monitor OD17-K606.

Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

equal to 60 minutes:

EMERGENCY Any unplanned release SERVICE WATER' of liquid radioactivity LOOP A ID17-K604 to the environment that

• EMERGENCY exceeds two times the SERVICE WATER ODCM Control limit LOOP B 1D17-K605 for 60 minutes or greater.

Chemistry sample analysis Release CANNOT be The release lasts for methods CANNOT confirm terminated within greater than or equal to within 60 minutes of receipt of 60 minutes of exceeding 60 minutes.

the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on RADWASTE TO ESW either ESW Loop A or B HIGH-HIGH alarm radiation monitors, that liquid setpoints.

Applicable Modes:

release levels are less than two I

I I

.I times the ODCM 1 l 2 l3 1 4 l 5 D Control 3.11.1.1 limits..

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

c C

C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 31 of 54 Page:. 45 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than 200 times the Routine or as Portable survey HIGH alarm setpoint OR offscale required sample instruments indicate high on one or more of the following analysis indicates a radiation levels of plant gaseous effluent monitors:*

release rate greater greater than HAI than 200 times 10 mRem/hr at the Site

• PLANT VENT GAS ID17-K786 ODCM Boundary for greater Any unplanned release

• OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D19-K836 Control 3.11.2.1 than or equal to of gaseous radioactivity a TB/JB VENT GAS ID17-K856 limits.

15 minutes.

to the

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786 environment that exceeds 200 times -

the ODCM Control Chemistry sample analysis methods The release lasts for limit for 15 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes greater than or greater of receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one equal to.

or more of the plant gaseous effluent 15 minutes.

monitors, that effluent levels are less than 200 times ODCM App licable Modes:

Control 3.11.2.1 limits.

1 2 13 4

S 1D NOTE

• These Alert thresholds may exceed the Site Area Emergency thresholds (since the Site Area Emergency thresholds were established using a clad damage source term versus the ODCM [coolant activity] methodology used to determine Alert classification thresholds). Therefore, an emergency dose assessment (CADAP) run using the appropriate source term, determined at the time of event, must be performed within 15 minutes concurrently with ODCM calculations to determine if a Site Area Emergency entry criteria has been met.

It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

CI EPI-Al Rev.:

8 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 32 of 54 Page:

46 Initiating Conditions

• Entry Criteria HA2 Any unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control limit for 15 minutes or greater Applicable Modes:

Reading greater than 1.2E5 cpm above background for one or more of the following liquid process monitors lasting greater than or equal to 15 minutes:

• EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP A 1D17-K604

• EMERGENCYSERVICE.

WATER LOOP B 1D17-K605 Reading greater than 2000 times the HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoint on RADWASTE TO ESW monitor OD17-K606.

Release CANNOT be terminated within 15 minutes of exceeding RADWASTE TO ESW HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoints.

Routine or as required sample analysis indicates a release rate greater than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

The release lasts for greater than or equal to 15 minutes.

HA2 A

L E

.R T

Chemistry sample analysis methods CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes of receipt of-the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on either '

ESW Loop A or B radiation monitors, that liquid release levels are less than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

1 i 2 13 T4 5 1D NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C C

(C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 33 of 54 Page:

47 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Greater than the listed reading for one or Emergency dose Field survey more of the following plant gaseous calculations, using results indicate effluent monitors:

actual meteorology that one or more of indicate that one or the following have

• PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E-1 piCi/cc more of the been met at the HS1

• OG VENT PIPE GASID19-N400 2.2E0 iCilcc following are met at Site Boundary.

• TB/HR VENT GAS ID17-K856 1.6E4 cpm the Site Boundary.

Site Boundary dose

. PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 6.OE-1 pCi/cc Greater than resulting from an actual

• Greater than 100 mRem/hr or imminent release of 100 mRem Whole Body gaseous radioactivity TEDE

• Greater than that exceeds 100 mRem

• Greater than 500 mRem TEDE dose OR 500 mnRem CDE Child 500 mRem CDE Child CDE Child Thyroid Thyroid dose for the Thyroid actual or projected duration of the release Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to limit, that levels at the Site Boundary are continue for less than 100 mRem TEDE and 500 mRem greater than or CDE Child Thyroid dose using actual equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

meteorology.

Applicable Modes:

1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5

__D

Cf'

(.

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 34 of 54 Page:

48 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Greater than the reading listed for one or more of the following plant gaseous effluent monitors:

HG1 Site Boundary dose.

resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE dose OR 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose for the actual or projected duration of the release

• PLANT VENT GAS 1D19-N300

• OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D19-N400

• TB/HB VENT, GAS ID17-K856

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 3.8E0 xCikcc 2.2E1 pCilcc 1.6E5 cpm 6.OEO pCi/cc Emergency dose calculations, using actual meteorology indicate that one or more of the following are met at the Site Boundary:

• Greater than 1000 mRem TEDE

• Greater than 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid Field survey results indicate that one or more of the following have been met at the Site Boundary:

• Greater than.

1000 mRem/hr Whole Body

• Greater than 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid Dose rates are expected to

'continue for greater than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

HG1 G

E N

E R

A L

E M

E R

G.

E N

C Y

Emergency dose calculations CANNOT confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding above limit, that levels at the Site Boundary are less than 1000 mRem TEDE and 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose using actual meteorology.

Applicable Modes:

I 1 2 1 3 4

5 SD NOTE Exceeding the entry criteria for HG1 may require the initiation of an RPV emergency depressurization per

<PEI-D17>. Ensure Shift Manager is notified immediately whenever the above entry criteria for a General Emergency is met.

C

.C.

(.

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 35 of 54 Page:

49 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category I: Control Room Evacuation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria IAI.

Control Room Entry into <ONI-C61>.

evacuation has been initiated Applicable Modes:

1 2

3 4

5 D.

NOTE An inability to establish plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency per IS 1.

TAI A

L E

R T

C C.

EPI-A1 Rev.:

8 Sheet 36 of 54 Page:

50 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria IS1 Entry into <ONI-C61>.

Control Room.

evacuation has been Within-15 minutes of entry into <ONI-C61>, Operator(s) located at the remote initiated, AND plant shutdown controls CANNOT establish control of one or more of the following control CANNOT be parameters per <OI-1>:

established within 15 minutes.

• RPV level

• RPV pressure

• Suppression Pool temperature

• Reactor power

• Decay heat removal, if required A licable Modes:

1 2 13 14 15 ID IS1 S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E

R G

E N

C Y

NOTE A maximum 15 minute time frame for the physical transfer of control of "required" systems was established by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>. Control at the Remote Shutdown Areas is accomplished by the repositioning of control transfer switches per <101-1 >. Control is assumed unless indication of the absence of control is present.

(=

C C

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 37 of 54 Page:

51 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv J: Loss of Annunciators or Indication Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

indication for greater than 15 minutes.

Jul Loss of most annunciators or indication In the Control Room for greater than 15 minutes In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the plant.

ApplicableModes:

I1213 NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make ajudgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

C-(I (JK Page:

52 EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 38 of 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria JA1 Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room Loss of most annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

indication for greater than 15 minutes.

annunciators or indication in the Control Room with either: (1) a significant transient in progress, OR In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the (2) compensatory plant.

indicators are NOT available.

A significant plant transient is in progress.

Compensatory indications i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

Applicable Modes:

JAI A

L E

R X

NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of ihe instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

A "significant transient" includes response to automatic OR manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

C00 C

(.

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 39 of 54 Page:

53.

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of most Control Room annunciators.

Loss of most Control Room indication.

Js1 Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress Aplicable Modes:

123 Compensatory indicators, i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

A significant transient is in progress.

MS S

I T.

E.

A R

E A

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y Sufficient indication is NOT available to directly monitor plant critical safety parameters for PEIs entered due to the transient.

C

(:>r EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 40 of 54 Page:

54 EAL-ENTRY CRITERIA

. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C, C -

(...

C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 41 of 54 Page:

55

-EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category K: Loss of Communications Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of all five Plant Public Address System channels.

Loss of all of the following Plant Radio System channels:

KUl

• Channel I Loss of onsite OR In-

• Channel 2 plant communications

• Channel 3 capabilities App licable Modes:

1234 5 D KU 1 U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T

C C

(

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 42 of 54 Page:

56 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of the State and County Notification Circuit (5-way) reported to the Control Room.

Loss of offsite long distance calling capability on all of the following systems circuits for greater than 15 minutes:

KU2 Significant degradation of offsite communications capabilities.

Applicable Modes:

0 S

Control Room private (259-) lines Private Branch Exchange, Service Building ("5000') Switch Private Branch Exchange, Warehouse Building ("6000") Switch Company Off-Premise Exchange

• 1 1 2 1314 15 D 9 -

NOTE This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible. The radio link between the SAS/CAS and the Lake County Sheriff's Department, and use of cellular phones are considered extraordinary means and can be utilized outside the Control Room to provide notification capability upon the loss of dedicated and normal plant telephone lines.

A loss of the "5 Way" Circuit refers to the inability to contact one or more of the four offsite contacts: the State of Ohio, and the counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake.

(

EPI-Al C

C Rev.:

8 Sheet 43 of 54 Page:

57 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv L: Natural or Destructive Phenomena

<P00067>

Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria 4

Control Room receives report from plant personnel who felt an earthquake.

LUI Natural OR destructive phenomena affecting the Protected Area boundary Applicable Modes:

Report by plant personnel confirming either of the following within the Protected Area boundary:

• tornado strike

• plane or train crash High sustained winds greater than 70 mph for equal to*

or greater than 15 minutes.

Indications in the Control Room of a Main Turbine Trip or failure LUI U

N U.

S U

A L

E V

E N

T WHITE event indicator light on local Seismic Monitoring Panel OHS1-P021.

AMBER light(s) on Seismic Monitor-ing Panel OH13-P969.

Turbine casing penetration.

Catastrophic damage to generator seals.

I I 2 1 3 1 4
11 1 2 ! ! 4 !

S D

(

C,

/

d EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 44 of 54 Page:

58 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Control Room receives Report of Sustained Greater Report by report from plant visible damage high winds than plant personnel who felt an to any Safe' with a

<PEI-Nl1>

personnel earthquake.

Shutdown velocity Maximum confirming a Building caused greater than Safe turbine by My of the 90 mph for Operating failure which following:

15 minutes Value for results in LAl Either of the following or longer.

Area Water penetration indications present:

v tornado Level of the turbine Natural OR destructive

• aircraft, (internal casing.

phenomena affecting

• YELLOW seismic barge or flooding)

Safe Shutdown switch indicator train crash Missile gen-Buildings light on local other natural erated from Seismic Monitoring, or destruc-the turbine Panel OH51-P021.

tive failure result-phenomena ing in either:

RED light on Seismic Monitoring

. damage to Panel OH13-P969.

Safe Shut-down equipment.

• penetration of a Safe Shutdown Bldg.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 l 3 1 4 1 5 lD_

C-(7

.C=

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 45 of 54 Page:

59 4}

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category M: Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Report or detection of potentially toxic or Report by local, county, or State flammable gases from an offsite source that officials for a potential evacuation of could enter the Site's Owner Controlled site personnel based on an offsite event.

MUI Area.

Release of toxic OR flammable gases affecting the Protected Area boundary deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by Control Room within the Protected Area.

Applicable.Modes:

1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5

__D MU1 U

N U

S

. U A

L E

V E

N T

NOTE A gas release is considered to be impeding normal operations if it is of sufficient magnitude that access to areas required to support continued plant power operation is prohibited or is possible only through the use of protective equipment, such as respirators.

MU1 is based on releases, in concentrations within the Protected Area, that will affect the health of plant personnel or affecting the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e.

'tanker truck accident releasing potentially toxic gases, etc.).

(C C

C(

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 46 of 54 Page:

60 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria MAI Entry of toxic or flammable gases into Safe Shutdown Buildings or Areas.

Release of toxic OR flammable gases within Toxic gas in concentrations Flammable gas estimated or Plant personnel NOT a Safe Shutdown considered life-threatening determined to be in explosive able to perform actions Building which concentrations necessary to establish jeopardizes operation of and maintain Mode 4 systems required to while utilizing maintain safe-appropriate protective operations OR to equipment.

establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

I 4

5 D

NOTE This IC addresses increased toxic or flammable gas levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

C C.

C 4?

EPI-A1 Rev.:

8 Sheet 47 of 54.

Page:

61 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv N: Security Events Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NUI Confirmed security Bomb device discovered within Protected Any security event resulting in the event which indicates to Area.

declaration of a SECURITY ALERT in potential degradation in accordance with the <PNPP Physical the level of safety of the Security Plan>.

plant Applicable Modes:.

1 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l D NUI UI N

U S

U A

L E

V E

N T

c&,

C C

i, EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 48 of 54 Page:

62 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entrv Criteria NA1 Intrusion into Protected Area by hostile Any security event resulting in a force.

declaration of a SECURITY Security event in the EMERGENCY in accordance with the plant Protected Area

<PNPP Physical Security Plan>.

Applicable Modes:

1 2

3 1 4 1_5

_D NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary; can be considered a hostile force.

NA1 A

L E

R T

(7r (I.'.t C

EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 49 of 54 Page:

63 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Intrusion into a plant Vital Explosive device Confirmed act of sabotage Area by a hostile force.

discovered in a plant Vital within a plant Vital Area.

Area.

NS.

Security event in a plant Vital Area Aplicable Modes:

1 2

3 4 5 D NS1 S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E

R G

E N

C Y

NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force. However, this hostile force must occupy or gain control of a vital area to meet the criteria for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

If there is conclusive evidence that a vital area has been entered by a hostile force, even though he is no longer present, the intrusion had been made and a Site Area Emergency is therefore warranted.

(ii EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 50 of 54 Page:

64 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NG1 Loss of physical control of the Control Loss of physical control of the Division 1 Room due to a hostile force or act.

and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas due to a Security event resulting hostile force or act.-

in loss of ability to reach and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 D

NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, is considered a hostile force. This hostile force must occupy or gain control of either the Control Room or Division 1 and 2 Remote Shutdown:Areas to meet the criteria for the declaration of a General Emergency..

X C

.1.. II EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 51 of 54 Page:

65 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv 0: Emergency Coordinator's Judgment Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OUl Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Other conditions existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Unusual Event Applicable Mddes:

12 3 1 4 1 5 D Oul

'U N

-U S

U A

L E

V E

N T

NOTE For those cases where the degradation in the level of safety of the plant is tied to equipment or system malfunctions, the decision that the component is degraded should be based upon its functionality and NOT its operability.

C C

C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 52 of 54 Page:

66 rI EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OA

. Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential degradation of systems needed for the protection of the public and which warrant Other conditions increased monitoring of plant functions.

existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Alert Applicable Modes:

1234 5D OA1 A

L E

R T

NOTE This IC is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class. This includes a determination by the Emergency Coordinator that additional assistance similar to that provided by the TSC and OSC staffs, including a transfer of the Emergency Coordinator responsibilities to the TSC, is necessary for the event to be effectively mitigated. Transfer of Emergency Coordinator duties for classification, offsite notifications and PAR decisions, is used as an initiator since an event significant enough to warrant transfer of command and control is a substantial reduction in the level of safety of the plant.

C-C EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 53 of 54 Page:

67 e

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OSI Other conditions exist which indicate an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Other conditions existing, which In the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency Applicable Modes:

1 2 3 4 5

D

'OS' S

I T

E.

A R

E A

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y

C-EPI-Al Rev.:

8 Sheet 54 of 54 Page:

68 -

LAST EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entr Criteria OGI Other conditions exist which indicate an Potential for an Potential for an actual or imminent substantial core uncontrolled release uncontrolled release Other conditions degradation with the potential loss of which can which can existing, which in the Containment integrity.

reasonably be reasonably be judgment of the expected to be expected to be Emergency greater than 1 Rem greater than 5 Rem Coordinator, warrant TEDE at thie Site CDE Child Thyroid declaration of a General Boundary.

at the Site Emergency Boundary.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3

4 5D5

_D OG1 G

E N

E R

A L

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y

EPI-A10 Page:

i Rev.:

5 L

I PERRY'OPERATIONS MANUAL.

PNPP CONTROLLED COPY.

Emergency Plan!Implementing InstructioNo ODQi

[I I C~gos 4l TITLE:

RE-ENTRY/RECOVERY

.I REVISION:

5 EFFECTIVE -DATE:

3_

_° PREPARED:

Lawrence W. Burqwald 12-30-03

/

Date

EPI-AIO Page:

ii Rev.:

5 RE-ENTRY/RECOVERY Table of Contents Section Title Paqe 1.0 PURPOSE 1

2.0 REFERENCES

1 3.0 DEFINITIONS 2

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3

4.1 Emergency Coordinator

.3 4.2 Recovery Director 3

4.3 Engineering Manager 4

4.4 Plant Recovery Manager 4

4.5 Operations Coordinator 4

4.6 Maintenance Coordinator 4

4.7 Radiation Protection Coordinator 4

4.8 Chemistry and Environmental Coordinator 4

4.9 Security Coordinator 4

4.10 OSC Coordinator or Re-entry Team Coordinator 4

4.11 Planning and Logistics-Manager 4

4.12 Offsite Recovery Assistant 4

5.0 ACTIONS 5

5.1 Emergency Coordinator 5

5.2 Recovery Director 5

5.3 Engineering Manager 7

5.4 Plant Recovery Manager 7

5.5 Operations Coordinator 8

5.6 Maintenance Coordinator 8

5.7 Radiation Protection.Coordinator 9

5.8 Chemistry and Environmental Coordinator

.9 5.9 Security Coordinator 10 5.10 OSC Coordinator or Appointed Re-entry Team Coordinator 10 5.11 Planning and Logistics Coordinator 11 5.12 Offsite Recovery Assistant 11 5.13 Records 12 ATTACHMENTS - Recovery Organization Guidelines 13 -

NRC Response Modes 14 -

NRC Site Team Organization, ERO Counterparts, and Suggested Seating 15 -

Preliminary Recovery Plan Guidelines 19 -

DOE Response Assets and Arrival Times 20

EPI-A10 Page:

iii

-Rev.:. 5 SCOPE OF REVISION:

Rev. '5 -

1.

2.

3.

Corrected source references.

Corrected page numbering due to no longer using "a" pages.

Corrected formatting and typographical errors.

EPI-AIO Page:

1 Rev.:

5 RE-ENTRY/RECOVERY 1.0 PURPOSE This instruction provides guidance for the establishment of a Recovery Organization and transition from the initial emergency response mode to a longer term recovery mode, and the planned re-entry during the Recovery phase into evacuated in-plant and site areas in support of recovery efforts.

Guidance is also provided on Federal response actions and facilities.

Entry into the Recovery phase and the'establishment of a Recovery Organization is required when terminating from a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

The Emergency Coordinator's judgment shall be used in determining whether entry into the Recovery phase is beneficial when terminating from an Alert classification.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source

References:

1.

Emergency Plan for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Docket Nos. 50-4401 2.2 Use

References:

1.

EPI-Al:

Emergency Action Levels'

2.

EPI-A7:

Operations Support Center Activation'

3.

EPI-Bl:

Emergency Notification System

4.

EPI-B7a:

Automated Offsite Dose Calculations

5.

EPI-B7b:

Manual Offsite Dose Calculations

6.

EPI-B8:

Protective Actions and Guides

7.

EPI-B9:

Emergency Records

8.

EPI-BlO:

Emergency Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program'

9.

HPI-B0003:

Processing of Personnel Dosimetry

10.

PAP-1701:

Records Management'Program

11.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Response Coordination Manual, 1996 (RCM-96).

EPI-A10 Page:

2 Rev.:.5

12.

Commitments addressed in this document:

P00028 P00030 P00031 P00058 P00090 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Recovery That phase of the response which occurs after the plant conditions have stabilized and are under control, and a decision has been reached to terminate from the emergency phase.

Recovery consists of those actions required to either restore the plant as closely as possible to pre-accident status or to a safe; long-term shutdown condition.

3.2 Re-entry The planned return during the Recovery phase to an evacuated area, either in-plant or onsite, to perform a specific operation, assessment or repair in support of Recovery efforts, i.e., manipulation or repair of critical equipment and systems.

'3.3 Federal Radiological Response Plan

)

Describes the coordination of Federal response activities, with the NRC serving as Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC.

LFA will coordinate Federal response from the Federal Response Center (FRC), established locally in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the State of Ohio.

3.4 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Provides operational framework for coordinating all offsite Federal radiological monitoring efforts to provide the following radiological information to the State of Ohio and the LFA:

(1) plume and deposition predictions; (2) air and ground concentrations, and (3) isotopic concentrations in environmental media.

The U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) is responsible for establishing and the initial management of the FRMAC.

3.5 Lead Federal Agency The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will serve as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for an emergency at the Perry Plant in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).

NRC responsibilities as the LFA include the following:

• 6 Coordinating all Federal on scene actions;

--a Overseeing the onsite response, monitoring and supporting the owner-or operator's activities,' and providing Federal information about onsite conditions;

EPI-A10 Page:

3 Rev.:

5 Assisting the State and local governments in determining measures to protect life, property, and the environment.by providing technical information and protective action recommendations, if possible, in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), theU.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),

and other Federal agencies, as necessary; Coordinating Federal information to the public, 'the media, the White

• House, and Congress; and' Coordinating the overall activity of Federal agencies involved in the recovery process.

As the LFA, additional assistance can be requested by the Perry Plant through the NRC for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or other Federal support.

A detailed listing of Federal agency'response missions, capabilities, and authorities is contained in the.FRERP.

'Section Q (Concept of Operations -

NRC Incident Response) of the

<Response Coordination Manual (RCM) 1996> describes the NRC concept, purposes, and organization for performing essential functions during a Federal response to a severe radiological accident, with an emphasis on State and Federal coordination.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Emergency Coordinator

1.

Coordinate the completion of pre-recovery actions, and direct-the entry into the Recovery phase.

<P00028>

2.

Ensure Nuclear Regulatory Commission'(NRC) is briefed on significant changes in event/plant status and priorities, and support the development of NRC Site Team personnel.

4.2 Recovery Director

1.

Direct the activities of the Recovery Organization.

2.

Support Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) oversight.

3.

Serve as a point'of contact for the Company Spokesperson.

4.3 Engineering Manager

1.

Coordinate engineering activities in support of plant recovery efforts.

2.

Interface with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and other Industry and owners groups.

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5 4.4 Plant Recovery Manager-

1.

Coordinate the development of a recovery plan and establishment of short and long-term priorities.'

2.

Manage onsite activities, including" fthe re-entry into evacuated site areas, in support of plant'recovery efforts.

4,5 Operations Coordinator

1.

Coordinate operations activities in support of plant recovery efforts.

4.6 Maintenance Coordinator

1.

Coordinate in-plant maintenance and instrumentation and control (I&C) activities, including the coordination and briefing of re-entry teams, in support'of plant recovery efforts.

4.7 Radiation Protection Coordinator

1.

Coordinate health physics, in-plant radiological assessment, and dosimetry activities in support of plant recovery efforts, including re-entry team activities.

4.8 Chemistry and Environmental Coordinator

)

1. 'Coordinate offsite dose assessment and environmental monitoring, in-plant chemistry, and radwaste activities in coordination with the State of Ohio and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).

4.9. Security Coordinator

1.

Coordinate site protection activities, including interfaces with Federal, State of Ohio and local law enforcement agencies, in support of plant recovery efforts.

4.10 OSC Coordinator or Re-entry Team Coordinator

1.

Brief and ensure adequate health physics and material/equipment support for re-entry' team personnel.

4.11 Planning and Logistics Manager 1..

Plan and schedule plant'recover'y activities, including the coordination of logistics in support of the Recovery Organization.

4.12 Offsite Recovery Assistant-

1.

Ensure that Federal, State of Ohio and local officials are kept advised of plant and recovery status.

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5

2.

Coordinate Federal and State resources in support of plant recovery efforts.

5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 Emergency Coordinator 5.1.1 Direct the formation of a Recovery Organization using the staffing guidelines contained in the Recovery Organization Guidelines (Attachment 1) to develop a'preliminary Recovery Plan.

5.1.2 Ensure NRC Site Team staff dispatched to site is briefed on significant changes in event/plant status and priorities, and facilitate communication between Site Team members and plant-counterparts (Attachment 3).

.5.1.3 Coordinate plant assessment and preliminary recovery actions with FRC and FRMAC when established for a significant offsite release prior to entering'the Recovery Phase.

5.1.4 Direct the quarantine of damaged or failed equipment/components when restoration is no longer possible or need to support emergency efforts.

5.1.5 Prior to the termination of the emergency phase andentry into recovery; direct re-entry into evacuated in-plant and site areas through the Operations Support Center (OSC) per <EPI-A7>.

5.1.6 Terminate from the emergency phase and enter into Recovery once the following has been met:

The criteria in <EPI-Al> has been met for termination of the event.

A Recovery Organization has been established.

A A preliminary Recovery Plan has been.developed and approved by the Vice President -

Nuclear, or his alternate.

5.1.7 Notify the State of Ohio and local counties within 15 minutes and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per <EPI-Bl> of the terminationof event and entry into the Recovery phase.

<P00031>

5.2 Recovery Director (Vice President - Nuclear or designated alternate) 5.2.1 Establish a Recovery Organization using the guidelines contained in.

NOTE: serves as a guide in establishing a Recovery Organization.. The Recovery Director must use appropriate judgment in modifying or expanding the Recovery Organization to meet specific recovery and other post accident requirements.

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5 j

5.2.2 Approve a preliminary Recovery Plan and direct the implementation, and revision if required, of the Recovery Plan.

5.2.3 Continue to coordinate plant recovery and radiological monitoring/assessment actions with the FRC and FRMAC, when activated.

5.2.4 Direct the deactivation of emergency facilities, when no longer required, and the reassignment of facility staff to support recovery efforts.

NOTE:

The OSC should be maintained operational and staffing adjusted as appropriate to support Recovery efforts and re-entry into evacuated site and in-plant areas.

5.2.5 Approve Company news statement regarding the plant status and recovery activities to be released by the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC), if operational, or the Company Spokesperson.

5.2.6 Direct the Recovery Organization to evaluate all recovery operations to identify activities which may result in the release of radioactivity to the environment; ensure that Federal, State and local officials are informed of events associated with the release, including the magnitude, through the Offsite Recovery Assistant.

<P00030>

[

5.2.7 Coordinate appropriate independent review and audit activities with CNRB members.

5.2.8 Interface with offsite agencies and officials through the Recovery Advisor on the status of plant recovery efforts, and on Federal and State assistance needed to support recovery efforts.

5.2.9 Ensure Corporate management are kept apprised of recovery efforts, and that sufficient resources are made available to support Recovery Plan activities.

5.2.10 Evaluate the effectiveness of the Recovery Organization and direct the appropriate staff reorganization or revision of the Recovery Plan to address changing needs and priorities.

5.2.11 Direct the demobilization of Recovery Organization facilities and staffing when appropriate.

5.2.12 Upon completion of recovery operations, perform the following:

1.

Apprise onsite and offsite organizations involved in the recovery of the termination of the Recovery phase.

2.

Ensure that the news media receives notice of the termination of recovery and a briefing on recovery activities.

X

EPI-A10 Page:

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5

3.

De-activate any remaining emergency response facilities, and release Recovery Organization personnel no longer needed to support continued plant'activities.

4.

Review and approve the final log of Recovery Organization activities; forward the log and recovery documentation to Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) for records retention purposes.

5.

Direct that a thorough review be conducted of plant/event conditions and actions taken in response to these events'during both the emergency and recovery phases.'

5.3 Engineering Manager (Director, Perry Nuclear Engineering.Department or designated alternate) 5.3.1 Coordinate design, system and reactor engineering activities in support of the Recovery Plan and the Plant Recovery Manager.

5.3.2 Coordinate'the systematic investigation to determine what plant equipment has failed and the extent of damage.

<P0058>

5.3.3 Analyze problems, determine alternatives, and develop options for the recovery of plant systems, structures and components.

5.3.4 Serve as the central point of contact with INPO, General Electric,.

and other Industry support organizations.

NOTE:

Technical and material support is available through General Electric Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Emergency Support Program and INPO-sponsored mutual assistance agreement between utilities.

5.3.5 Provide a central point for the collection, retention, retrieval, and transmission of plant system and component operational data.

5.3.6 Designate engineering personnel to assist in re-entry team activities to support the assessment and restoration of plant systems and components.

5.4 Plant Recovery Manager (General Manager, Perry Nuclear Power Department (PNPPD) or designated alternate) 5.4.1 Coordinate the development and revision of the Recovery Plan,

' including the established on plant priorities, using the Preliminary Recovery Plan Guidelines-(Attachment 4).

5.4.2 Oversee onsite assessment, repair and clean-up activities in support of the plant recovery and restoration based on priorities established in the Recovery Plan, which involves:

1.

Direct the actions of PNPPD personnel under the responsibility of the various discipline coordinators.

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5

2.

Coordinate with the Planning and Logistics Manager in the planning and scheduling of activities and resources needed to support Recovery Plan priorities.

3.

Coordinate with the Engineering Manager in the effective use of engineering resources to support the assessment and restoration of plant systems and components.

54.3.

Prioritize re-entry team tasks based on Recovery Plan goals and manpower/equipment resources available, and authorize re-entry into an evacuated'area after considering both existing'and potential conditions and hazards to re-entry team personnel.

5.4.4 Authorize personnel dose extensions per <HPI-B0003> and the use of potassium iodide (KI) per <EPI-B8> in support of re-entry team assessment, repair and clean-up activities.

5.4.5 Direct that a chronological log of recovery actions.be kept.

5.4.6 Direct the revision'and Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) review, if applicable, of manual, procedure and instruction changes required to support Recovery Plan efforts.

.5.4.7 Periodically apprise the Recovery Director of the status of recovery activities.

5.5 Operations Coordinator (Manager, Perry.Operations Section (POS) or designated alternate) 5.-5.1 Coordinate recovery activities conducted by POS personnel in support of the Recovery Plan with the Control'Room.

5.5.2 Ensure in-plant Perry Plant Operator (PPO) activities performed at the direction of the Control Room have required'health physics support.

5.5.3 Provide recommendations to the Plant Recovery Manager'regarding plant operations concerns and priorities associated with the restoration of plant systemi structures and components.

5.5.4 Designate POS personnel to support authorized re-entry team activities.

5.6. Maintenance Coordinator (Director, Perry Nuclear Maintenance Department (PNMD) or designated alternate)

NOTE:

Prior to the termination of the emergency phase and entry into recovery, a re-entry into an evacuated area will be directed and coordinated per <EPI-A7>.

5.6.1 Recommend the continued operation of the OSC, based on plant status and radiological concerns, to support re-entry team assessment, repair, and clean-up activities.

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'5 5.6.2 Direbt the OSC Coordinator, or appoint a Re-entry Team Coordinator if the OSC is no longer operational, to brief and dispatch re-entry teams based on priorities established by the Plant Recovery Supervisor.

5.6.3' Ensure adequate health physics coverage is provided for re-entry team activities, including consideration for the use of protective

-clothing, respiratory protection, and dose extensions.

5.6.4 Ensure adequate Maintenance and I&C personnel are available to support re-entry and'other recovery activities.

5.6.5 Keep the Plant Recovery Manager apprised of re-entry team activities.

5.6.6 Provide recommendations to the Plant'Recovery Manager regarding maintenance and I&C activities.

5.7 Radiation Protection Coordinator (Manager, Radiation Protection

• Section (RPS) or designated alternate)

.5.7.1 Ensure re-entry team personnel are adequately briefed on radiological conditions in the evacuated area to be re-entered, and that adequate protective equipment (i.e., protective clothing, respirator, etc;) is provided f6r both existing and potential conditions which might be encountered.

1..

Coordinate the-review and approval for a dose extension or use of KI, if required, per <HPI-B0003> and <EPI-B8> respectively.

5.7.2 Develop plans for plant radiation surveys in support of recovery assessment, repair, and clean-up activities.

5.7.3 Provide required health physics support to the Chemistry and Environmental Coordinator in Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) collection and analysis.

5.7.4 Ensure adequate numbers and types of personnel dosimetry and support equipment is available'to support the accurate and timely assessment-of personal radiological exposure.

5.7.5 Provide recommendations to the Plant Recovery Manager regarding onsite and in-plant health physics aspects of recovery.

5.8 Chemistry and Environmental Coordinator (Manager, Radwaste, Environmental and Chemistry Section (RECS) or designated alternate) 5.8.1 Coordinate offsite environmental monitoring activities with the State of Ohio Emergency Operations Center (Assessment Room), and FRMAC 'when activated, including:

Collection and processing of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) TLDs and air samples.

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5 Collection and analysis of ingestion pathway samples (i.e.,

water, vegetation, milk, foodstuffs, etc.) per <EPI-BIO>

Estimation of offsite accumulated'dose per <EPI-B7a> or

<EPI-B7b>.

NOTE:

USDOE Response Assets and Arrival Times, requested through the State of Ohio, are outlined in'Attachment 5.

5.8.2 Direct the collection and analysis of a PASS sample to determine extent of potential core.damage or a Containment air sample-to determine activity available for release.

5.8.3 Develop plans and procedures to process and control both solid and liquid radioactive waste generated as a result of emergency and recovery' phase activities..

5.8.4 Provide recommendations to the Plant Recovery Manager regarding plant chemistry, environmental'monitoring and radwaste activities.

5.9 Security Coordinator (Manager, Site Protection Section (SPS) or designated alternate) 5.9.1

'Coordinate the augmentation of the plant's security force in support of recovery activities.

5.9.2 Serve as the interface with Federal, State of Ohio, and local law enforcement agencies in regards to security contingency issues.

5.9.3 Provide recommendations to the Plant Recovery Manager regarding security related aspects of recovery.

5.10 OSC Coordinator or Appointed Re-entry Team Coordinator NOTE:

Prior to the termination of the emergency phase and entry into recovery, a re-entry into an evacuated area will be directed and coordinated per <EPI-A7>.

5.10.1 Coordinate the briefing of re-entry team personnel, as directed by the Maintenance Coordinator, using an OSC Briefing/Debriefing Sheet (PNPP No. 79931 or equivalent method to ensure the following:

Task description and required personnel Location of the task and, if required, recommended routes to the area Communications methods and frequencies Precautions against known or potential safety hazards Current and available dose and, if required, authorization for a dose extension or-use of Ki per <HPI-B0003> and <EPI-B8>

respectively Protective clothing; dosimetry, and respiratory protection requirements.

EPI-AIO Page:

11 Rev.:

5 5.10.2 Maintain communications with re-entry teams, and provide additional assistance or direct the withdrawal of a re-entry team if necessary.

5.10.3 Ensure that the re-entry team is adequately debriefed upon return, and their findings/observations documented.

5.10.4 Keep the Maintenance Coordinator apprised of re-entry team status and possible concerns.

5.11 Planning and Logistics Manager (Director, Perry Nuclear Services Department (PNSD) or designated alternate) 5.11.1 Direct work activity planning and force outage activities in support of the Recovery Plan priorities, including the procurement of additional or specialty equipment and resources.

5.11.2 Coordinate additional training and processing for company, utility and contractor personnel in support of Recovery Plan activities.

5.11.3 Coordinate obtaining required logistical support for Recovery Organization personnel, i.e., food/lodging, administrative supplies and equipment, etc.

5.11.4 Assist the Plant Recovery Supervisor in the development and. revision of the Recovery Plan, as needed, to support existing and anticipated priorities.

5.11.5 Keep the Recovery Director and Plant Recovery Manager apprised of planning and logistical activities.

5.12 Offsite Recovery Assistant (Manager, Regulatory Affairs Section (RAS) or designated alternate) 5.12.1 Brief Federal, State of Ohio, and local county officials on plant status and recovery efforts.

5.12.2 Coordinate requests both for and by Federal, State of Ohio, or local officials in support of onsite and offsite recovery activities.

5.12.3 Keep the Recovery Director apprised of Federal, State and local response activities.

5.12.4 Provide input to recovery discussions regarding issues or decisions having a regulatory impact or proposed changes to technical specifications, Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), or other requests for regulatory relief.

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5 5.13 Records 5.13.1 Records Handling The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by EPU pursuant to <EPI-B9>.

The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records Management pursuant to <PAP-1701>.

5.13.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this document:

Quality Assurance Records Recovery Plan Recovery Organization Log OSC Team Briefing/Debriefing Sheet (PNPP No. 7993)

Non-Quality Records None

EPI-AIO Rev.:

5 Sheet 1 of 1 Page:

13 NF1014 EPI-AlO RECOVERY ORGANIZATION GUIDELINES LI

EPI-A10

.Rev.

5 Sheet 1 of 1 Page:

14 NRC Response Modes

)

1.

Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode:'

The situation may be complex but well understood with no likely safety consequences projected given existing conditions.

The region remains in charge, staffing a small team in its Incident Response Center (IRC).

Headquarters would provide some assistance and support.

State and local officials would be notified.

2.

Standby:

The situation is sufficiently complex or uncertain to require additional monitoring and preparations to increase the NRC response quickly should it prove to be necessary.

The NRC Operations Center at headquarters (White Flint, MD) will fully staff and direct the NRC response activities.

The regional office will initiate the necessary preparations to send a team to the site.

Other Federal organizations are notified but are not directly involved.

State and local authorities are notified by NRC.

They will have been notified by the licensee and may-call the NRC for an interpretation of the event and response.

The following modes, which indicate that an event with clear safety concerns is under way, usually involve direct participation by other Federal organizations.

3.

• Initial Activation:

The event calls for the NRC to dispatch a management and analysis team to the site (refer to Attachment 3).

During this mode,

• the response to an event is directed by the NRC Executive Team fronm the NRC Headquarters Operations Center, while an NRC team is on the way to K

the site.

4.

Expanded Activation:

The NRC management and analysis team, now called the Site Team, is operational at the site.

During this mode, the entire NRC response is directed from the site by the Director of Site Operations with operational authority delegated by the Director of the Executive Team.

Other'NRC teams act in support of the Director of Site Operations.

5.

Deactivation:

A plan forfollow-up activities, including reentry and recovery, is in effect and the NRC is reducing its role consistent with that plan with the concurrence of the Federal Coordinating Officer and the State Coordinating Officer.

'Not an official NRC response mode; used for lesser events of some potential interest.

C-GC Page:

15 EPI-A10 Rev.:

5 Sheet 1 of 4 NRC Site Team-Orqanization, ERO Counterparts, and Suqqested Seatinq NRC Site Organization - Initial Site Team F

j Da Cro tol fur aC

-~

1.

, EOF Emergency I

Response

I Coordinator (ERC)

EOF shed bordered boxes Indicate rtical Positions. Critical positions ristitute the minimum staff necessary perform the critical NRC response ctions preparatory to designation of

)irector of Site Operations (DSO).

• Director of Site IOperations (DOS)

EOF a

L.. --

'U1-alson Coordinator EOF SaeEOC Sta te EOC IIJ Publc Affairs I

!coordinator (PAC).

JIC j

public Affairs Asst Coordinator JIAC Location of all positions is driven by the State/Licensee's Emergency Response Organization. The facilities listed with these positions represent the probable locations.

Note 1: Either the PMCL Communicator or the HPN Communicator will be a critical position, not both.

Note 2: Either the ENS Communicator or the RSCL Communicator will be a critical position, not both.

Note 3: Safeguards/Security Assistant Coordinator is part of the Initial Site Team only in safeguards/

security type events.

IProtectie Measures Coordinator (PMC)

EOF

'RadiatlonSafety Coordinator (RASC)

EOF/TSC HP Specialist TSC/OSC PMCL Communicato EOF/TSC See Note 1 l

HPN-I

'Communicator EOF LSee Note I EnFvronmental Dose' Assessment Coordinator I

EOF Reactor Safety l Coordinator (RSC)'.

EOF t

Reactor Safety Opeatlons Coordinato;

-i (RSOC) l EOFITSC l

Senbor

_Resident TSCI Resident Control Rm L

1. ..L -

Safeguardst l

Security.

jCoordinator (SSC) I

- EOFJTSC' SafeguardsfSecurity Assistant Coordinator (See Note 3)

EOF/TSC Reactor Systemt H

Operations Specialist EOFlTSC ENSnCommunicaLtor l4 EOFITSC L.

(See Note 2)

RSCL Commnunicatorl

_OEOFITSC (See Note 2)

L EPI-A10 Rev.:

5 Sheet 2 of 4 Page:

16 NRC Site Team Organization, ERO Counterparts, and Suggested Seating B.

NRC 1.'

2.

2-.

Site Team/Plant ERO Counterparts:

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

NRC Director of Site Operations (DSO)

NRC Reactor Safety Coordinator (RSC) e NRC Protective Measures Coordinator (PMC).

NRC-Environmental Dose Assessment Coordinator NRC Government Liaison Coordinator (GLC)

NRC Public Affairs Coordinator (PAC)

Technical Support Center (TSC).

NRC Reactor Safety Operations Coordinator (RSOC)

NRC Radiation Safety Coordinator (RASC)

.NRC Safeguards/Security Coordinator (SSC)

EOF Emergency Coordinator EOF Plant Operations EOF Offsite Radiation Advisor EOF Lead Dose Assessor EOF Regulatory Affairs Coordinator EOF Information Liaison

-TSC Operations Advisor/

PlantiTechnical Engineer TSC Radiation Protection Coordinator TSC Security Coordinator l

As, j

i ink 1

I ii, r

l I:1

.1;

EPI-A10 Rev. :.5 Sheet 3 of 4 Page:

17 NRC Site Team Organization,-ERO Counterparts, and Suggested Seating C.

NRC Site Team Suggested Seating:

TSC DISPLAY ROOM NRC REACTOR SAFETY OPERATIONS COORD. -

RAD PROTECTION COORD.

. i EPI-A10 Rev.:

5 Sheet 4 of 4 Page:

18 NRC Site Team Organization, ERO Counterparts, and Suggested Seating

• TRAINING CENTER (TEC)

(EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY),.

FIRST FLOOR.

p p

LIZ1 BoI Key Box

.Fit Ri stoner DoOM U

F-E

i NRC Environmental Dose Assessment Coordinator NRC Public Affairs.

Coordinator Information Liaison

-BRC Director of Site Operations

-Emergency Coordinator Plant Operations Advisor

\\NRC Governmental Liaison Coord.

Sul CONFERENCE:

.ROOM (TEC 110/111).

Engineering Staff

.1

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5 Sheet 1 of 1 Page:

19 Preliminary.Recovery Plan Guidelines

1.

Identify short and long term priorities.

First, focus on the tasks or big picture needs!

A "short-term priority" refers to those actions needed to be completed prior to transitioning from the Emergency (Plume) Phase to a Recovery Phase.

Restoration of Containment integrity (i.e., isolation of penetration). or actions taken to ensure continued integrity (i.e., double isolation, methods of reducing Containment pressure, evaluation of the impact of a severe pressure transient on Containment, etc.).

Systems or equipment required to ensure adequate core cooling and long-term decay heat removal, etc.

Direct the quarantining of damaged or out of service systems and components not required to meet short-term priorities until a formal root cause evaluation with NRC concurrence can be initiated.

A detailed record of all OSC repair and TSC engineering assessment actions on affected plant systems and components must be compiled to provide historical record.

A "long-term" priority refers to those'actions needed to assess the overall impact on plant systems and structures and coordinate the systematic restoration of plant systems and clean-up of plant areas once the Recovery Phase is entered..

2.

Identify manpower, equipment, and other resources (both Company and contractor support) needed to address established priorities.. This will include support needed for the training, food/lodging, and security clearances for contractor personnel, etc.

3.

Continued staffing requirements needed to support continued emergency response efforts and immediate "short-term" priorities.

4.

Identify required Federal and State of Ohio assistance required to support continued radiological and environment monitoring.

5.

Identify actions needed to support continued site access and staffing of recovery activities, including personnel logistical needs (food, lodging, etc.) and employee personal concerns and family needs.

Sheet 1 of EPI-A10 -

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Bs C.

1 IQ 20 -

LAST DOE Response Assets and Arrival Time STATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE RAP TEAM DOE RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (RAP)

[WITHIN 2-6 HOURS AFTER REQUEST]

ARAC PLOTS ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY (ARAC)

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

[WITHIN 2-4 HOURS AFTER REQUEST]

DOE AERIAL MEASURING'SYSTEM (AMS)'

[WITHIN 4-8 HOURS AFTER AUTHORITY GIVEN TO DEPLOY]

FRMAC ADVANCE PARTY, FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER

[WITHIN 4-8 HOURS AFTER ACTIVATION]

FULL FRMAC (i)

[

[24-36 HOURS AFTER REQUEST]

1 FRMAC may deploy as few as 20, or as many as 300 or more people to the site of an emergency.

.t

w I,

I, i1 EPI-B5 Page:

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i 8

PERRY OPERATIONS MANUAL PNPP-CONTROLLE COPY Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction No ad s PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY/SITE EVACUATION TITLE:

REVISION:

8 EFFECTIVE DATE:

.15-
, 0 If

'PREPARED: Lawrence Burgwald 11-21-03

/

Date

EPI-B5 Page:

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ii 8

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY/SITE EVACUATION Table of Contents Section,, _

1.0 PURPOSE Title Page 1

2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8

5.9 REFERENCES

DEFINITIONS RESPONSIBILITIES ACTIONS TSC Operations Manager Shift Manager Radiation Protection Coordinator TSC Security Coordinator OSC Coordinator Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Personnel Response Non-ERO Personnel Response Regulatory Affairs Coordinator Records 1

2 2

3 3

4 4

5 6

7 8

8 9

ATTACHMENTS Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment 1 -

Pre-Recorded "Emergency" (Accountability)

Message 2 -

Personnel Accountability Checklist 3

Control Room/Shift Staff- & General Site Accountability Guidelines 4 -

TSC Staff Accountability Actions 5 -

OSC Staff Accountability Actions 6 -

EOF Staff Accountability-Actions 7 -

Offsite Monitoring & Decontamination Center Locations 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 SCOPE OF REVISION:

Rev.

8 -

I.

2.

3.

4.

Cleanup and add area codes for telephone numbers.

Deleted reference to Unit 2 docket number.

Change Health Physics to Radiation Protection.

Add Use References.

EPI-B5 Page:

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8 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY/SITE EVACUATION 1.0 PURPOSE This instruction outlines actions to be taken during an emergency at the Perry Plant for the accountability of all FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors within the site boundary, including those involved in Control Room activities or members of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO).

Personnel accountability will be implemented upon declaration of a Site Area Emergency, or based on the discretion of the Emergency Coordinator,.

with all personnel within the Protected Area being accounted for within 30 minutes.

If the emergency escalates to a General Emergency without having been previously classified as a Site Area Emergency, accountability shall be initiated upon declaring the General Emergency.

Once implemented, accountability is to be maintained continuously thereafter until the emergency is terminated or until otherwise directed by the Operations Manager.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source

References:

1.

Emergency Plan for PNPP Docket Nos. 50-440

2.

Nuclear Regulation (NUREG) 0654:

"Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" 2.2 Use

References:

1.

EPI-A7:

Operations Support Center Activation

2.

EPI-Bl:

Emergency Notification System

3.

EPI-B9:

Emergency Records

4.

SPI-0023:

Instructions for Personnel Accountability and Site Evacuation

5.

PAP-1701:

Records Management Program

6.

Commitments addressed in this document:

L00406 P00006 P00073

EPI-B5 Page:

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8 X

3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Accountability Actions taken to ascertain the whereabouts of persons within the Site Boundary either by means of evacuation or assembly.

3.2 Protected Area The area encompassing the Vital Areas, all areas inside the double perimeter barrier fence and the Primary Access Control Point (PACP).

3.3 Site Boundary The area within the Owner-Controlled Area, encompassed by a security fence surrounding the.Perry Plant.

3.4 Owner-Controlled Area Areas owned by the FirstEnergy Corporation which are located within or adjacent to the Site Boundary security fence.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 TSC Operations Manager

1.

As acting Emergency Coordinator, ensure the initiation of accountability as required by this instruction.

2.

Assume overall authority for the accountability of personnel within the Site Boundary area.

4.2 Shift Manager

1.

Assume the Technical Support Center (TSC) Operations Manager's duties prior to the TSC being declared operational.

2.

Ensure the prompt accountability of Control Room staff and on-shift personnel.

4.3 TSC Radiation Protection Coordinator:

Assess radiological conditions and recommend the use of the designated offsite monitoring/decontamination centers or other areas on-site.

4.4 TSC Security Coordinator

1.

Coordinate the implementation of accountability measures by the Supervisor, Nuclear Security Operations (SNSO) in support of the TSC Operations Manager.

2.

Oversee accountability of TSC staff members.

EPI-B5 Page:

3 Rev.:

8 4.5 OSC Coordinator:

Direct the accountability of personnel responding to or already staffing.the Operations Support Center (OSC).

4.6 Supervisor, Nuclear Security Operations (SNSO):

Direct the actions of the security force personnel in obtaining the accountability of onsite personnel in accordance with <SPI-0023>.

4.7 Perry Plant Section Managers: Ensure that Company, Contractor, and consultant personnel are trained in their appropriate response to accountability through Plant Access Training (PAT), this instruction, or other periodic training as deemed necessary.

4.8 Perry Plant Personnel:

Follow the requirements of this instruction when personnel accountability is initiated.

4.9 Regulatory Affairs Coordinator:

Notify local county Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) when the activation of offsite monitoring/decontamination centers is required in support of site evacuation.

5.0 ACTIONS 5.1 TSC Operations Manager shall:

5.1.1 Determine, based on the TSC Radiation Protection Coordinator's recommendation, whether the offsite monitoring/decontamination centers should be activated to monitor personnel evacuating the'site due to a significant radiological release or to assemble contractor/vendor support evacuated from the site during outages.

NOTE:

It may be prudent to delay implementation of accountability in situations where personnel safety may be jeopardized, such as a security event or severe weather.

5.1.2 birect the Shift Manager to initiate the applicable pre-recorded "Emergency" (Accountability) Message (Attachment 1) on the Exclusion Area'Paging (R53) System.

1.

Provide additional guidan6e, if required, to personnel evacuating the site, using the R53 PA feature, for-the following:

designated evacuation routes due to a security contingency use of offsite monitoring and decontamination centers 5.1.3' If the offsite monitoring/decontamination centers are being activated, direct the Administrative Assistant to notify the NRC, State of Ohio, and local.counties on the next Follow-up Notification form (PNPP No. 7795) per <EPI-Bl>.

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8 5.2 Shift Manager shall:

5.2.1 Perform the actions outlined in Section 5.1 if the TSC is not yet operational, and utilize-TSC staff as they become available to accomplish'the actions listed in Sections 5.2 thru 5.4.

5.2.2 Activate the applicable pre-recorded "Emergency" message (Attachment 1) on the Exclusion Area Paging (R53) System every five (5) minutes until accountability is completed.

1.

Provide additional guidance, if required, to personnel evacuating the site, using the R53 PA feature, for the following:

designated evacuation routes due to a security contingency

@ use of offsite monitoring and decontamination centers 5.2.3 Direct all Control Room staff and Plant Operators (POs) located in the Unit 2 Control Room, to promptly use the designated accountability card readers.

Plant management who are not currently staffing an emergency facility may utilize a Control Room accountability card reader in lieu of evacuation.

5.2.4 If not yet relocated to the.OSC, verify the location and status of POs presently dispatched in-plant.

After the OSC is operational, shift personnel such as the Shift I&C/HP/Chemistry Technicians and Plant Operators (POs) will be accounted for through the OSC.

1.

Complete Personnel Accountability Checklist (PNPP No. 7957, ) to account for on-shift POs outside the Control Room, and forward to the CAS via the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).

<P00073>

5.2.5 Obtain the number of unaccounted for people within the Protected Area from the CAS no later than 30 minutes after accountability was initiated.

5.3 Radiation Protection Coordinator shall:

5.3.1 When radiological conditions onsite pose a hazard to plant personnel evacuating the site, recommend the use of the offsite monitoring/decontamination centers to the Operations Manager.

5.3.2 Dispatch available Radiation Protection support to the Primary Access Control Point (PACP) to aid in the monitoring and potential' decontamination of personnel exiting the Protected Area.

)

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8 5.3.3 Designate and set-up an alternate monitoring area onsite for personnel exiting the Protected Area if radiological conditions in the immediate vicinity of the PACP render the portal monitors useless, and activation of the offsite decontamination centers is not warranted.

5.3.4 Periodically apprise the Operations Manager and Security Coordinator of radiological conditions onsite which may affect accountability actions.

5.4 TSC Security Coordinator shall:

5.4.1 Ensure the SNSO has initiated applicable accountability actions per

<SPI-0023>.

-5.4.2.

Request that the TSC Operations Manager make an announcement over the facility PA directing TSC and OSC personnel, whom have not yet done so, to log into the TSC Hallway "accountability" card reader.

If the TSC "accountability" card reader is not operational, use available TSC staff to complete a Personnel Accountability Checklist using TSC Staffing Board and forward completed form to CAS.

5.4.3 Direct the SNSO to allow immediate access to the Protected Area for on-call ERO responders caught outside the Protected Area upon initiation of accountability.

1.

Relay requests to the PACP from TSC staff and the OSC Coordinator for Protected Area access for craft, technicians, or support staff members caught outside the Protected Area upon

-initiation of accountability.

Protected Area access to all but on-call ERO responders may be restricted until personnel accountability is obtained or adequate security officers are available to man PACP access.

5.4.4 During normal working hours or outage situations, traffic control points should be established at the main traffic arteries leading from the Perry Plant by contacting the Law Enforcement Coordinator at (440) 953-5477/5478, at the Lake County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

1.

If the EOC is not yet in operation, contact the Lake County Sheriff's Department directly.

5.4.5 Notify the Operations Manager of the accountability results once completed, and keep him informed of on-going search and rescue activities.

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8 5.4.6 Coordinate the sheltering and relocation of non-essential personnel without transportation by performing the following:

1.

Direct the SNSO to:

a.

Notify the Security-Officers at the PACP that they should direct any individuals without transportation to Warehouse 1 -

Receiving Area.

b.

Dispatch a Security Officer, when available, to the' Warehouse 1 -

Receiving Area and report back to the TSC the number of people that require offsite transportation.

2.

When only a small number of individuals require assistance, arrange for interim sheltering and monitoring through the Radiation Protection Coordinator until site/company transportation can be arranged.

3.

Perform the following if number of individuals assembled precludes the use of site/company transportation.

a.

Contact the Transportation Officer in the Lake County EOC at (440) 953-5480 or Emergency Management Agency (EMA)

Director at (440) 953-5455, and request bus support in transporting individuals to the monitoring and decontamination center at Mentor High School Football Stadium.

b.

Contact the Fire Coordinator in the Lake County EOC at (440) 953-5489, and request the activation and staffing of the emergency worker monitoring and decontamiriation facility at the Mentor High School Football Stadium.

4.

Notify the Security Officer(s) at the Center Road Traffic Post, if dispatched, to divert buses to Warehouse 1 -

Receiving Area.

5.5 OSC Coordinator shall:

5.5.1 Direct OSC staff to utilize the "accountability" card reader located in the TSC hallway, as part of OSC activation process per <EPI-A7>

upon arrival at the OSC.

5.5.2 Maintain accountability of personnel staffing the OSC utilizing the OSC personnel/repair team status boards and the OSC Team Briefing/Debriefing Sheet (PNPP No. 7793) per <EPI-A7>.

1.

If informed that the "accountability" card readers are NOT operational, a "working copy" of the Personnel Accountability Checklist can be maintained at the OSC Coordinator's discretion in conjunction with the OSC status boards in expediting accountability of OSC personnel.

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8 5.5.3 When the Plant PA announcement initiating accountability is heard, perform the following:

<P00073>

1.

Verify that OSC staff members have logged into the TSC "accountability" card reader.

If-an OSC team member has not used the "accountability" card reader and is located in-plant, complete a Personnel Accountability Checklist and forward to the CAS.

2.

When notified by Security that the "accountability"-card readers are NOT operational, forward a completed Personnel Accoi3ntability Checklist to the CAS.

5.6 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Personnel Response 5.6.1 Control Room/Shift Staffing shall:

1.

Respond as outlined in Control Room Shift Staff and General Site Accountability actions (Attachment 3).

5.6.2 Technical Support Center (TSC),Staff shall:

1.

Use the TSC Hallway "accountability" card reader upon entering the TSC for accountability purposes.

2.

Log into and out of the TSC using the.hallway Staffing Board, indicating location/destination upon leaving facility.

3.

Respond as outlined in TSC Staff Accountability Actions (Attachment 4), when personnel accountability is initiated.

5.6.3 Operations Support Center (OSC) Staff shall:

1.

Use the TSC Hallway "accountability" card reader upon responding-to the OSC.

2.

Respond as outlined in OSC Staff Accountability Actions (Attachment 5), when personnel accountability is initiated.

5.6.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Staff shall:

1.

Respond as outlined in EOF Staff Accountability Actions (Attachment 6).

5.6.5 Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) Staff shall:

1.

Respond as outlined in Attachment 3.

5.6.6 Plant management located within the Protected.Area upon initiation of personnel accountability, who wish to remain onsite and are not required to staff an emergency facility, shall promptly utilize an accountability card reader in the Control Room or TSC to account for their presence onsite.

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8 5.7 Non-ERO Personnel Response 5.7.1 Plant Personnel not assigned to ERO shall:

1.

Exit the Protected Area and Perry Plant Site using normal exiting procedures once accountability announcement is heard over the Plant PA, Exclusion Area Paging System or via another employee.

a.

If directed, report to one of the designated offsite monitoring and decontamination centers listed below, using directions provided in Attachment 7.

(1) LAKE COUNTY - MENTOR HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL STADIUM, located off Civic Center Blvd. on Munson Road behind school (State Route 615).

(2) ASHTABULA COUNTY -

SAYBROOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, located on Depot Road, south of State Route 20 intersection.

(3) GEAUGA COUNTY -

HAMBDEN FIRE DEPARTMENT, located on State Route 608 (old State Road), south of State Route 6.

Copies of the directions to Offsite Monitoring/Decon-tamination Centers are available at the TEC lobby and PACP exit lane.

Postings providing directions to centers are also available throughout the site on Company bulletin boards.

2.

If you do not have offsite transportation, report to the Warehouse 1 -

Receiving Area and await a Security Officers arrival.

Transportation support will be requested from Lake County to relocate these individuals to the Mentor High School Football Stadium, where radiological monitoring/

decontamination can be performed if required and further arrangements made.

5.8 Regulatory Affairs Coordinator shall:

5.8.1 Notify the local county EOCs if radiological conditions warrant the activation of offsite monitoring and decontamination centers listed below to support plant personnel evacuating the Perry Plant site.

(1) LAKE COUNTY. -

MENTOR HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL STADIUM, located off Civic Center Blvd. on Munson Road behind school (State Route 615).

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8 (2) ASHTABULA COUNTY -

SAYBROOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, located on Depbt Road, south of State Route 20 intersection.

(3) GEAUGA COUNTY -

HAMBDEN FIRE DEPARTMENT, located on State Route 608 (old State Road), south of State Route 6.

5.9 Records 5.9.1 Records Handling

1.

The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) pursuant to <EPI-B9>.

The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records Management pursuant to <PAP-1701> under Record Type 9J100.

5.9.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this.document:

Quality Assurance Records Personnel Accountability Checklist (PNPP No. 7957)

Non-Quality Records None

I I

11 1: i.

I EPI-B5 Rev.:

8 Page:

10 PRE-RECORDED "EMERGENCY" (ACCOUNTABILITY) MESSAGE "ATTENTION ALL SITE PERSONNEL.

ACCOUNTABILITY IS NOW IN EFFECT.

PERSONNEL PERFORMING A PLANT OPERATING OR EMERGENCY FUNCTION, REPORT YOUR LOCATION TO THE CONTROL ROOM OR APPROPRIATE EMERGENCY FACILITY.

ALL OTHER PERSONNEL EXIT THE SITE USING NORMAL EXITING PROCEDURES."

EPI-B5 Rev.:

8 Page:

11 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKLIST PNPP No. 7957 Rev. 2188 Facility.

Date:

Time Initiated:

Completed:

EPI-B5 Badge No.

Name Deliver immediately to CAS when completedI Badge No.

Namo

=

=

=

=

A.

Page Of

EPI-B5 Rev.:

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12 CONTROL ROOM/SHIFT STAFF & GENERAL SITE ACCOUNTABILITY GUIDELINES NF972 EPI-B5 ACCOUNTABIUITY l

INITIATED

.l

/°/0 N

O EXIT SITE l

ARE 0

YOUPART OF E

ASSEMBLY N IMMEDIATELY;GO OOM OR HFTSC.

OR EO INSTRUCTIONS lYS.YEl YES lYES READERS IN EITHER YES NTR REFER TO THE THE LOBBY OF REPORT TO UNIT 1 OR 2 CONTROL CONTROL APPROPRIATE THE LAKELAND OFITE G ROOMS FOR ROSTFORFLOW CHART FORCOMNTMNIRNG ACCOUNTABILITY POS YOUR FACIUITY:.

COLLEGE DECON.

PURPOSES (1)

TSC (ATT 4)

PERFORMING E(2)

________OSC (ATT. 5)

ARSCENTER 2

NO EOF (ATT. 6)

CENTRAL ALARM STATION (CAS) WILL YES SECURITY ACCOUNT FOR ALL SUPERVISOR OR SECURITY PERSONNEL OFFICER (PER SPI-0023)

NOTES: (1) Plant Management may utilize accountability card readers in the Control Room & TSC in lieu of NO Evacuating the Protected Area.

(2) Offsite MonitoringlDecon. Centers located at:

\\Mentor High School Football Stadium (Lake County)

REPORT TO OSC FOR YES Saybrook Elementary School (Ashtabula County)

ACCOUNTABILITY O

SC

.Hambden Fire Department (Geauga County)

PURPOSES PERATI NO-SHIFT MANAGER MUST VERIFY STATUS OF POs OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM, & REPORT NAMES & BADGE NO. OF INDMDUALS TO THE SECONDARY ALARM STATION (SAS).

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i

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C EPI-B5 Rev.:

8 Page:

13 NF975 TSC STAFF ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATED Yes NOT Y OARREPORT TO CORBETT INTO TySC, USE CARD sTCURRNT TSC N

0NCALL ERO N

OCATEDW No AUDITORIUM (2ND FLOOR OPE CC Y

RATIONAL?

T o

A PROEA

/

TEC) & AWAIT READER AT TSC TAMBEGRTS Ar-C RA INSTRUCTIONS

EPI-B5 Rev. :

8 Page:

14 NF974 OSC STAFF ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATED.

Yes USE CARD READER AT TSC ACCESS OR REPORT LOCATION TO OSC CONFERENCE ROOM (599' CCB) USING AVAILABLE.

COMMUNICATIONS C(

Ct

C C..

C 4.

EPI-f35 Rev.:

8 Page:

15 NF973

. EOF STAFFACCOUNTABILITY ACTIONS ACCOUNTABILTY INITIATED YeI

'Yes EPI-B5 YES NO ACTION REQUIRED NO YES NO REPORT TO TEC 1101111 (EOF CONFERENCE ROOM) &

AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS

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