ML040640748

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Ignition Source Frequency
ML040640748
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/20/2004
From:
Entergy Operations
To:
NRC Region 4
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358
Download: ML040640748 (37)
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Text

IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCY From field inspection the components tabulated below were identified by the NRC as potential ignition sources in zones 98-J and 99-M. The total ignition source frequency for each zone would also evaluate transients and welding fires. Included in the tabulation is the generic ignition source frequency number that reflects the EPRI Fire Risk Analysis Implementation Guide.

GENERIC IGNITION SOURCE FIRE FREQUENCY 98-J Fire 99-M Fire (Auxiliary Building)

Frequency (Switchgear Room)

Frequency Electrical Cabinets 1.9 x 10 Electrical cabinets 1.5 x 10 Battery Chargers 4.0 x 10'3 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10' Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10'3 Fire Protection panels 2.4 x 10' Transformers 7.9 x 10-3 Welding-Cables 5.1 x 103 Welding-Cables 5.1 x 103 Welding-Transients 3.1 x 102 Welding-Transients 3.1 x 10F Transients 1.3 x 10'3 Transients 1.3 x 103 The generic fire frequency is adjusted by a location weighting factor (WFL) and by an ignition source weighting factor (WFE). In addition, the EPRI guidance specifies that a severity factor can be applied to the fire frequency. The severity factor adjusts the fire frequency number to reflect the number of fires that are of sufficient magnitude to potentially cause cable damage to components/cables other than the component of fire origination.

With the exception of the electrical cabinets, all the items listed above are considered "Plant Wide" components and thus are assigned a WFL = 2 (number of units per site).

The electrical cabinets are assigned a value according to the room location. For 98-J (i.e.

auxiliary building), WFL = I (number of units per site divided by the number of auxiliary buildings). For 99-M (i.e. switchgear room) WFL = 0.25 (number of units per site divided by the number of switchgear rooms or 2/8).

Note: Although ANO has only 6 distinct switchgear areas, the EPRI guidelines indicates that "weight" of a switchgear room should be assigned according to the amount of electrical equipment located in the location. Each of the two switchgear areas located in the turbine building have approximately twice the electrical equipment located in the individual auxiliary building switchgear rooms.

Consequently, the number of switchgear rooms was increased from six (i.e. based on physical areas) to eight (i.e. based on amount of electrical equipment).

I

In the switchgear room, WF1 = I for electrical cabinets. In corridor 98 (i.e. auxiliary building), WF, is calculated by dividing the number of cabinets in the corridor by the total number of cabinets in the auxiliary building (i.e. 147/1452 or.101).

WF1 for the plant wide components was obtained by dividing the number of components in the specified room by the total number of components in the plant. In 98-J, there are four ventilation subsystems, whereas in 99-M there are two. In 98-J, there are two fire protection panels, whereas there are none in 99-M. In 98-J, there are no transformers whereas there are two transformers in 99-M. In 98-J, there are two battery chargers, whereas there are none in 99-M. From Calculation 85-E-0053-47, the total number of ventilation sub-systems is 357, total number of fire protection panels is 86 and the total number of transformers is 98. The calculation lists the total number of battery chargers as 19. However, the calculation does not reflect recent modifications that added a battery charger in Zone 98-J and Zone 11 0-L. Therefore, the plant wide total has been increased to 21.

EPRI's Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR-105928) Appendix D provides severity factors (SF) for various ignition sources. For switchgear room electrical cabinet fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.12. For indoor transformer fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.10. For ventilation subsystem fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.08. The two fire protection panels located in 98-J are completely enclosed with a minimal amount of combustible material located inside. Consequently, these panels were not deemed as credible ignition sources and were assigned a severity factor of zero.

There are other electrical panels in 98-J that are totally enclosed and thus are not credible ignition sources, but were left in the total number of cabinets for conservatism. Likewise, one of the transformers in 99-M is an instrument transformer, while the other is cooled with a non-combustible gas. Neither is deemed to be a credible ignition source, but both were conservatively included in the ignition source frequency calculation.

ANO complies with the NFPA requirements for the establishment of a fire watch in conjunction with welding activities. In essence, this equates to readily available manual suppression system. A pre-action suppression system is assigned an unavailability of 0.05. It is reasonable to assume that an established fire watch would be able to prevent a welding related fire from developing into a 'severe' fire at least on par with the unavailability of a pre-action suppression system. Consequently, the severity factor of welding related fires was set to 0.05.

The EPRI guidance did not provide specific severity factor values for electrical cabinets located in the Auxiliary building, for battery chargers or for transients. The highest severity factor provided for specific ignition sources was for Control Room electrical cabinets and pumps, both of which were assigned a value of 0.2. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assign a severity factor of.75 to those ignition sources that were not assigned a severity factor in the EPRI guidance. Practical plant experience indicates that assuming 3 out of every 4 fires involving these types of ignition sources will develop into a 'severe' fire is an extremely conservative assumption.

2

Combining all these factors yields the following ignition source frequencies associated with fires that may damage target cables/components (i.e. external to the ignition source).

Generic WFL WFI SF Total 98-J Electrical Cabinets 1.9 x 10-2 1

1.01 x 10 0.75 1.44 x 10'3 Battery Charger 4.0 x 10'3 2

9.52 x 10-7 0.75 5.71 x 104 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10e 2

1.12 x 10-2 0.08 1.70 x 10'5 Fire Protection panels 2.4 x 10 2

2.33 x 10 0 0

0 Welding - Cables 5.1 x 10'3 2

1.75 x 10.2 0.05 8.95 x 106 Welding - Transients 3.1 x 10 2 2

1.75 x 102 0.05 5.44 x 10-5 Transients 1.3 x 10' 2

1.75 x 10.2 0.75 3.42 x 10'5 TOTAL 2.13 x 10'3 99-M Electrical cabinets 1.S x i 2

0.25 1

0.12 4.50 x 104 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10'3 2

5.6 x 10'3 0.08 8.52 x 106 Transformers 7.9 x 10'3 2

2.04 x 10o2 0.10 3.22 x 10 Welding - Cables 5.1 x 10'3 2

1.75 x 10.2 0.05 8.95 x 106 Welding - Transients 3.1 x 10 2 2

1.75 x 10.2 0.05 5.44 x 10'5 Transients 1.3 x 10 2

1.75 x 10.2 0.75 3.42 x 10; TOTAL 5.88 x 10-4 3.

FIRE MODELING PROGRAM - FIVE Due to the simplicity and conservative results, the FIVE program was utilized to perform fire models of the zones analyzed by this SDP. To facilitate the compilation of results, an Excel spreadsheet was developed that utilized the formulas specified in EPRI TR-100443, Methods of Quantitative Fire Hazards Analysis and mirrored the worksheets specified in the FIVE methodology. As the results were compared, it was noted that the FIVE program was predicting results that differed from the Excel spreadsheet calculations. By analyzing the data, it was determined that the FIVE program failed to properly convert a temperature (i.e. AT) from Fahrenheit to Rankine.

The error involved the calculation of "Net energy addition per unit volume to achieve critical temperature rise." The equation (in English units) is specified as:

QndN = 9.54 In (AT/T. + 1), where both temperature values are given in Rankine.

With the use of a lower value (i.e. Fahrenheit temperature) in the numerator, conservative results were produced by the FIVE program as the program predicted a smaller quantity of energy required to produce a temperature rise to 'damage' levels. Consequently, the spreadsheet was revised to reflect the proper temperature conversion and generate more realistic results. (Note: to verify the validity of the spreadsheet, the "metric" equation was utilized and results identical to the 'corrected' English formula were obtained).

As more results were compiled, it was noted that for those targets that reached critical damage temperatures, the FIVE program was predicting failures in the hot gas layer prior to failures in the ceiling jet. Therefore, the equations utilized to calculate the time to failure were examined. It was discovered that rather than utilizing the equations for calculating total heat flux, the FIVE program divides the number of the total energy release needed to raise the average layer temperature to the critical value (i.e. Qait in BTUs) by the peak fire intensity (i.e. heat release rate in BTU/sec). This simplistic equation does not reflect the methodology specified in the FIVE user's guide nor in the previously referenced EPRI report. Rather than attempting to reproduce the equations for evaluating the hot gas layer on the Excel spreadsheet, any target located in the hot gas layer that could be damaged was "relocated" into the ceiling jet. This was accomplished by redefining the height of the target to a value that simulate a location in the ceiling jet portion of the room. Obviously, the calculated damage time for a target in the ceiling jet is a conservative bound of the damage time for a target located in the hot gas layer.

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A third conservative error of the FIVE program was noted in the calculation of time to damage for a plume scenario. TR-100443 specifies that the convective heat flux for the plume is calculated as:

qcpi = 0.3 * (kinQ) / I2 (reference equation 12, p. A4).

H is defined as the fire source to ceiling height. However, the FIVE program utilizes the distance from the fire source to the target, when computing this value for a plume scenario (Note: the program correctly utilizes H (i.e. fire source to ceiling height) when calculating the convective heat flux in the ceiling jet). Obviously, the distance from the source to the target is always less than the distance from the source to the ceiling.

Therefore, the calculated denominator is smaller than it should be. A smaller denominator in the equation yields a larger value for qcpi. The larger the value of qcp the less time there is until damage temperatures are reached. Consequently, the spreadsheet was revised to reflect the proper utilization of H such that more realistic results would be generated.

When calculating the time to damage, it was noted that in a ceiling jet scenario, the shortest time to damage occurred when the target was placed at the ceiling jet/hot gas layer transition (i.e. 85% of the target height to ceiling height ratio). To ensure conservative results, those targets located within the ceiling jet were assigned a target height that equates to the 85% value of the ratio.

Per the supplemental guidance contained in EPRI report SU-105928, since the Heat Loss Factor was conservatively assigned a value of 0.7, the virtual surface of the fire (for electrical cabinets) was placed at the floor.

When considering the combustible loading associated with an individual cabinet, the Plant Data Management System (PDMS) was used to determine the type of cables located in the cabinet and the associated BTU value. Attachment xx indicates combustible loading for various cabinets that were considered as ignition sources. For an MCC, the length of each cable inside the cubicle was conservatively estimated to be four feet. The BTU value associated with each cable is based on vendor information.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING The combustible loading in 98-J consists almost entirely of cables in the cable trays.

There is less than one gallon of lubricating oil in an emergency chiller unit (C5 1) located in the eastern part of the corridor. In comparison to the loading associated with the cabling, the oil is a minor factor in the total loading value. Considering all available in-situ combustibles and over 100 pounds of transients, the fire duration in 98-J is estimated to be 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.

The combustible loading in 99-M is similar to 98-J, in that it primarily consists of cable insulation in open cable trays. Considering all available in-situ combustibles and over 100 pounds of transients the fire duration in 99-M is estimated to be 30 minutes.

5

Procedure 1000.047 (Control of Combustibles) limits the amount bf ordinary combustibles that may be leff unattended to 100 pounds.

Transient combustibles in excess of 100 pounds and flammable liquids require the attendance of a continuous firewatch.

HEAT RELEASE RATES Electrical cabinets in Zone 99-M consist of 4160V switchgear, 480V MCCs, Inverters and a 480V load center.

A heat release rate (HRR) of 190 BTU/s was assigned to electrical cabinets that contained cable that was not known to be IEE-383 rated. Newer electrical cabinets (i.e. those that contained IEEE-383 rated cable) were assigned a heat release rate of 65 BTU/s. These values are based on the guidance provided in EPRI report SU-105928.

Many of these cabinets are totally enclosed with no vents or openings. Consequently, fire propagation is not credible. However, all cabinets were considered in the calculation of the fire frequency.

Zone 98-J contains 480V MCCs, DC distribution panels, battery chargers and small, totally enclosed cabinets. Cabinets considered as credible ignition sources were assigned a HIRR of either 65 or 190 BTU/s, dependent on the known type of cable installed.

In 98-J there are two emergency ventilation units (VUC14A and VUC14C) that provide cooling to the battery rooms. These units have a very limited run time, as they are only relied upon when normal ventilation is lost. Like the corridor cooler (i.e. VUC13B),

these units consists of a small motor. Likewise, Zone 99-M contains two ventilation units, each with a small motor. There is a minimal amount of combustible material associated with the windings of these motors. However, for conservatism, these units were included in the fire frequency calculation and assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s.

VUC4A/C5l is an emergency chiller for the A4 switchgear room. Other than surveillance runs, this unit is only operated during emergency conditions. The oil is contained within the compressor and does not pose a fire hazard. The chiller is mounted on a skid assembly that would confine any leaking oil to the area directly under the chiller unit.

Due to the small amount of oil available, is was assumed that the footprint of an oil fire would be 1.5 square feet or less. Assuming the compressor oil has a HRR of 135 BTU/s/ft2, the HRR associated with oil leaking from the compressor was set to 203 BTU/s. Although slightly larger than the other ventilation units, the motor associated with the chiller has a limited amount of combustible material and was assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s.

The transformer associated with the 480V load center (B6) is a dry type transformer. The EPRI guidance indicates that this type of transformer has a minimal amount of combustible material and was consequently assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s. The instrument transformer (X62) is not considered a credible ignition source and was excluded from fire modeling.

6

CABLE DAMAGE THRESHOLD Research on the qualification status of individual cables in mild environments has not been performed. Consequently, all target cabling was assumed to be non-383 rated cable and assigned a damage temperature of 4250F. In order for certain components to fail in an unwanted condition, a hot short has to occur that results in the spurious operation of the component. Recent testing performed by Sandia, the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute confirmed that hot shorts do not occur instantaneously when 'damage' temperatures are reached. However, for the purposes of this evaluation, it was conservatively assumed that when the gas temperature reaches the damage threshold (i.e.

4250F), the hot short is subject to occur.

MANUAL SUPPRESSION CAPABILITIES Both Zone 98-J and Zone 99-M are readily accessible from the Turbine building, elevation 372'. The central fire brigade locker is located one elevation above, thus minimizing the travel time of the brigade from the locker to the fire scene. Both zones are equipped with ionization detection systems that will detect fires in the incipient stages. Due to it's close proximity to the control room, Operations personnel can promptly respond to verify fire conditions. Although no recent fire brigade drills have been performed on these zones, recent drills were performed on Zone 100-N, which is adjacent to Zone 99-M. Response times of the entire brigade for these drills averaged less than 10 minutes. Due to the favorable conditions with respect access and response, it is conservatively estimated that any fire scenario requiring greater than 20 minutes to sustain cable damage will be suppressed by the fire brigade.

99-M SPECIFIC ANALYSIS Attachment I provides a summary of the various fire models that were completed for Zones 99-M. Due to the number of raceways present in 99-M and the presence of green train electrical cabinets that serve as ignition sources, most fire models were developed toward accessing damage to the closest red train raceway. If the closest red train raceway was undamaged by the ignition source, it was assumed that all red train components would be unaffected by the ignition source. In certain cases, the red train raceway could sustain damage, if the fire was not suppressed and/or if enough combustible material was available to generate the necessary heat.

For those raceways that required more than 20 minutes to reach the critical temperature, credit was taken for the ability to provide manual suppression. The related cables were considered undamaged and the associated components were assigned the 'normal' failure probability.

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Notes:

I) Conductors 3G and 3R are for the indication circuit and are separately fused. Loss of these conductors does not effect operation of switch. Conductors X I and 21 could cause spurious transfer switch operation. Operation of switch to "local" precludes spurious operations. Refer to E-214 sh. lB.

2) A 'hot-short' between conductors 4 and 5 would result in a false low oil pressure signal that would prevent operation from the Control room. Open circuits or shorts-to-ground would not prevent control room operation.

Pump could be started by manually closing breaker at the A3 switchgear. Refer to E-211 sh. 1.

3) Hot short between conductors I IR and IR (or any energized conductor and IR) will cause -valve to close (as desired). Failures of 22F and 12F cannot prevent valve closure or cause spurious opening (i.e. upstream handswitch must be in 'open' position). If I IR shorts to ground, fuse could blow and remote control of valve would be lost. Refer to E-278 sh. 1.
4) XI shorting to U, 3R, 3G (assuming pump is not running) or ground blows FU2. However, remote control can still be accomplished by starting P36A (i.e. closing A306 breaker, which is essentially the same as an 'ES' start). Xl to 5 and Xl to 21 will result in a pump start (via spurious 'start' signal or low oil pressure signal, respectively).

5 shorting to U, 3R, 3 G or ground would prevent manually starting the pump via the remote (i.e. control room handswitch) and would blow FU2 when HS1291 is operated. Again, pump will start when A306 breaker is closed.

5 to 21 will not effect pump operation. If A306 is closed and low oil pressure is sensed, then 21 to U, 3R, 3G (pump not running) or ground iill cause FU3/FU4 to blow. With proper fuse coordination, FUI will be intact allowing pump to be started via local handswitch. Combinations of U, 3R and 3G will only affect indication.

Refer to E-213 sh. A.

5) Loss of cable cannot cause breaker to close. Breaker could trip (via hot short), but only if other normally open breakers are closed (or also receive spurious signals). Short-to-ground does not effect breaker operation, without simultaneous failure of other cables. Refer to E-106 sh. lB.
6) Loss of DC control power causes the loss of remote control for Load center feeder breaker. However, this breaker is normally closed. Loss of DC will not cause breaker to change state. Therefore, the loss of this cable (by itself) does not result in the need to perform any actions. Refer to E-8 sh. I and E-17 sh. l.
7)

A single short to ground does not impact DC power to breaker controls (i.e. fuse will not blow). Conductors 2 and 3 are isolated from circuit until remote handswitch is utilized to manually stop pump. If an open circuit occurs on these conductors, the fault would prevent a manual stop (from control room) unless the switch is placed in "pull to lock". Conductors 5 and 6 could cause a spurious start by simulating an EFIC signal. However, the pump can still be controlled (i.e. stopped) from the remote location (i.e. control room). Refer to E-294 sh. I

8)

Cable only provides valve position indication to the control room. No control features are effected. Refer to E-331 sh. 39.

9)

This cable, which provides an.interlock to CV3640, has no effect on the pump circuit unless an ESF signal is present. Assuming an ESF signal is present the following failure modes are applicable. A hot short between conductors simulates the normal condition of the circuit and has no effect. An open circuit could prevent the automatic opening of the valve. However, in an Appendix R scenario with P4A operating, the preferred position of CV3640 is closed, since this would eliminate the necessity of isolation the ACW line. Since the neutral of the DC power system is floating, a short to ground will not impact pump operation. Refer to E-276 sh. IA and E-279 sh IA.

NO: Normally open USC: Underspecific condition

      • Did not check schematic. Assumed indicator failed.

f.

EJ3004 1019AA2 1019AB2 I019AC2 1019BA2 1019BB2 1019BC2 1442A 1443A 1555G YJI421A Y31421B YJI421C YJI421D YJI421E YJI421F EJ3015 YJCA301A YJCA302A YJI480A YJI480C YJI480E Y31480G YJI480K YJR212C EJ3016 YJ1480B YJI480D YJI48OF YJI480H YJ1480L YJR210C Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated CV2618 CV2668 Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated TE6580 TE6581 TE6582 TE6583 TE6584 TE6585 No detrimental effect - See Note 8 No detrimental effect - See Note 8 Communication cable LT2668 LT2670 PT2668A LT2617 LT2619 m617A TE1151, TE1153,7TE1155,7TE1157,7TE1159 & TE1161 TE1163, TE1165,7TE1167, TE1169, TE1171 & TE1173 LT1189 LT1l91 LT1193 LTI 195 LT1197 PY1042D TE1189 TE 1191 TE1 193 TE1 195 TE1197 UE1187

f EC1530 RCB5134C RCB5 173E RCB5193E RCB5194E RCD1512C RCDl512F EC1589 RPDO121AI RPD0121A2 RPD1522AI RPD1522A2 RPD1522A3 RPD1522A4 RPDI522A5 CV2869 CV2800 CV2803 CV3850 CV2663 CV2663 Hot short to IF causes valve to open Hot short to IR causes valve to close Hot short to IR causes valve to close Hot short to 1R causes valve to close Loss of remote control Loss of remote control D15 D15 CV2627 CV2627 CV2627 CV2627 CV2627 EC1615 RCA302K P4A-Control EJ1004 RCM075A RCM075B1 RCM075B2 RCM075C RCM075DI RCM075D2 RCM075D3 RCM075E RCM07SF RCM075G RCM075H RCM075J RJI3S7DI RJI357EI RJI419A RfI419B R3I419D R1I419E RPI419F RJ1423A1 RJ1423B I RJ1423C RJSPARE2092 E11027 R208G R208H RlB5333AX RJB5333AY R1OI IAB RP1423DI RJ1423D2 RPJ452B RJP0727C RJR196E Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated L12618 L12620 L12667 L12669 PR2667A CV2646 CV2648 CV2668 Associated N1501 Associated Associated Associated LRSIOOI CV2646 CV2648 LRS4204 PRI042 Tlllll Power feed from D01 Power feed from D01 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation No detrimental effect - See Note ?

CS13 CS13 CS13 CS13 CS13 CS13 CS13 CS11 CS11 CS11 CS11 CS11 FT2646 FT2648 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

Loss of Control Room indicator/EFIC input Valve may fail closed Valve may fail closed Valve not required to reach hot shutdown No effect Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator NYS01 M55A M55A Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator Valve may fail closed Valve may fail closed Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator

EC1237 RCA03F RCA03H RCA03J RCAl1C RCAlID RCA308G RCB512C RCB513E RCEIlC EC1257 RCB512C RCB513E RCB612D RCB613E RCB613H EC1258 RCA302J RCA303M RCA306D RCB5 12C RCBS13E RCB56S3H RCElIC SPARE1360 EC1275 RCA302J RCA303M RCA306D Associated Associated Associated K4A K4A A308 B5 feeder B5B6 X-tie K4A B5 feeder B5/B6 X-tie B6 B5/B6 X-tie B5/B6 X-tie P4A-Control P4B(R)

P36A B5 feeder BS/B6 X-tie CV3643 K4A Associated P4A - Control P4B(R)

P36A A308 A308 A309 Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout Spurious signal results in EDG lockout Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker No detrimental effects - see Note S USC**, could cause EDG lockout Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker No detrimental effects - see Note 5 Assumed unavailable Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO Cable does not affect Control Rm operation Conductors are spare; no effect Lose remote control - see Note 2 Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker No detrimental effects - see Note 5 Lose remote control - see Note 3 USC, could cause EDG lockout No effect Cable does not affect Control Rm operation Conductors are spare; no effect Lose remote control - see Note 2 EC1410 RCD1135A Associated RCD1135C Associated C154 C154 EC1S04 M084E1 RCA3IH RCB51114G RCB5124F RCB5124G RCB5241H RCBS24IJ RCDl512X RCD1514D RCD1514E RCD1514F RCD1522D RCD1522E RCD1522F RCM021M RCM02IN RCM021P RCM067A RCM071A RCM071B RCM071C RCM071D RCRS11SA SPAREl 152 Associated P7B Associated CV2680 CV2680 CV2667 CV2667 Associated CV2620 CV2620 CV2620 CV2627 CV2627 CV2627 Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Associated Spare No detrimental affect - See Note 7 CV1401 MFW block valves are not required MFW block valves are not required Could spuriously close (P7A not credited)

Lose remote control? (P7A not credited)

CV2663/SV2663 Hot short to IR causes valve to close Hot short to IR causes valve to close No detrimental affect Hot short to IR causes valve to close Hot short to IR causes valve to close No detrimental affect Spare Spare Spare SV1433 C511, CS13 C511, C513 C511, C513 C511, C513 C511, C513

EC1175 BS01B RCA03F RCA03H RCA03J RCA11C RCAllD RCA308G RCB5524E RCB5654D RCB5654E RCB5721D RCB612D RCB613E RCB613H RCD1104A RCD1104B RCD1109A SPARE1359 SPARE1422 EC1176 A303B K02Z6 RCD1104A RCD 1104B RCDI109A SPARE1221 ECI 190 RCA302J RCA303M RCA306D RCB612D RCB613E RCB613H RCD1104A RCDI 104B RCD1109A SPARE1221 SPARE1359 SPARE1360 P64B Associaied Associated Associated K4A K4A A308 Associated Associated Associated P64A B6 B5/B6 X-tie B5fB6 X-tie A3 cntrl pwrfromDIl A3 cntrl pwr from D1I B5 cntri pwrfrom DII Associated Associated Associated Associated A3 cntrl pwr from D II A3 cntrl pwr from DII B5 cntrl pwr from DI I Associated P4A-Control P4B(R)

P36A B6 B51B6 X-tie B51B6 X-tie A3 cntrl pUT from DI I A3 cntrl pwr from D1I B5 cntrl pYT from DI I Associated Associated Associated Spurious transfer - see Note 1 A308 A308 A309 Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout Spurious signal results in EDG lockout Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip CV1206 CV2235 CV2235 Lose remote control - see Note 4 Assumed unavailable Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO*

Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO Lose remote control of A3 breakers Lose remote control of A3 breakers See Note 6 Space heater cable - no effect B5 loss of power annunciator cable - no effect Lose remote control of A3 breakers Lose remote control of A3 breakers See Note 6 No effect Cable does not affect Control Rm operation Conductors are spare; no effect Lose remote control - see Note 2 Assumed unavailable Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO Lose remote control of A3 breakers Lose remote control of A3 breakers See Note 6 No effect No effect No effect EC1236 RCA03F RCA03H RCA03J RCAI lC RCAI ID RCA308G RCE1 IC SPARE1359 SPARE1360 Associated Associated Associated K4A K4A A308 K4A Associated Associated A308 A308 A309 Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout Spurious signal results in EDG lockout Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip USC**, could cause EDG lockout No effect No effect

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Arkansas Nuclear One Plant Data Management System Red train raceways in 99-M Base Info Requested By: jvwLke2 Requested On: Tuesday, November 13,2001-14:33:29 This list contains all red train raceways routed through Zone 99-M Thc listing also includes the cables located in each raceway as well as the related Appendix R safe shutdown component Cables that are denoted as "Associated" are cables that do not affect the operation of a safe shutdown component Raceway Included Cables Related Component EB1040 RPB522AI B56 RPB522BI B56 RPB522CI B56 EB1041 RPB522A2 RPB522B2 RPB522C2 RPBS22D EB1186 RPB51102BA RPBS1102BB RPB51102BC B56 B56 B56 B56 Associated Associated Associated Power feed from BS Power feed from BS Power feed from BS Power feed from B5 Power feed from BS Power feed from BS Power feed from B5 VCH4B VCH4B VCH4B EC1088 B801BI RCB5653D RCBS721DI SPARE1706 P64B - Control CV3643 P64A Associated Spurious transfer - see Note I Spare - No effect Lose remote control - see Note 4 No effect EC1092 RCB5653D CV3643 Spare - No effect EC1093 B801BI RCB5721DI SPARE1706 P64B - Control P64A Associated Spurious transfer - see Note I Lose remote control - see Note 4 No effect EC1163 RCB5721D SPARE1221 SPARE1422 P64A Associated Associated Lose remote control - see Note 4 No effect No effect EC1164 B801B RCB5524E RCB5653H RCB5654D RCB5654E P64B - Control Associated CV3643 Associated Associated Spurious transfer - see Note I CV1206 Lose remote control - see Note 3 CV2235 CV2235 EC1165 B801B P64B - Control RCB5524E Associated Spurious transfer - see Note I CV1206 Lose remote control - see Note 3 CV2235 CV2235 EC1166 RCB5653H RCB5654D RCB5654E CV3643 Associated Associated

Zone 99-M Combustibl Loading V lues for Cable Trays No.

Tray Length Allowed Btu

> Allowed Btu Remarks 1 DA008 47 150,000 7,050.000 2 EA201 9

150,000 1,350,000

=

3 EB201 10 250,000 2,500,000 4 EB202 12 300,000 3,600,000 5 EB203 15 175,000 2.625.000 6

EC201 9

250,000 2,250,000 7

EC202 6

250,000 1,500,000 8 EC203 5

275.000 1.375,000 9 EC204 121 300.000 3,600,000 10 EC205 10 200,000 2,000,000 11 EC221 8

150,000 1,200,000 12 EC222 9

150,000 1,350,000 13 EC223 6

275,000 1,650,000 14 EC236 10 150,000 1.500,000 15 EC237 5

150,000 750,000 16 EC238 6

175,000 1,050,000 17 EC239 5

150,000 750,000 18 EC240 10 150,000 1,500,000 Subtotal 15,450,000

=

22,150,000 T ota _ _ _ _ _

3 7,6 0 0,0 0 0 Note: All trays are conservatively assumed to have 150,000 BTU/ft. Only those trays that exceed the threshold have the actual loading value listed.

Raceways Locate. in Zone 99-M Subjected to Fire Modeling 4

North I

EC1175 ll10 S

2 4-EC1258 98-J

]

<4-EC1237 EC1190 EC1504, EJ1004 & EJ10274+

40 EC1530 -t-n

D

2. JB344
9. JB459
10. TB1054 EC1236 I _ _

4-EC1275

-EC1176

-EC1257 4d 99-M

Red Train R-aways Located in Zone 99-M T

North MemI EC1175 Il0 U

EC1589 lI

. <-EC1258 98-t 2

IrT to to to H

r4 U

U W

ld J

.4 EC1504, EJ1004 & EJ1027-I-- EJ3004

-EC1093

-EC1165

-EC1088

-EC1237

-EC1190 Notes

1. EB1186, EC1092, EC1410, EJ3015 and EJ3016 are not shown since no SSD cables are included in these raceways.
2. EB1040 and EB1041 are not shown since the included cables supply power to B5(

(B56 is located within Zone 99-M).

.5 EC1530 -#*4 0---

__m

2. JB344
9. JB459
10. TB1054 EC1236 --_

EC1 615 --_

-EC1176 EC1257

-4 99-M

Fixed Ignition I snrces Located in Zones 98 _ and 99-M t

North ED04B RA2 [F D21 C51 T iLi IC155 V'JO-I C192 C457 X62 5

5 i

l1<

l 3B S.._...

110 86 99-M

Target Must Be Higher Than Source In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target. Btu/sl/t2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage. sec 1

99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 TRF X6 EC1275 11.42 0.00 425 11.42 12.00 65 1

65 95 345 250.04 8.01 1

10,538 84,386 0.7 281,286 281.286 0.4 0.016 1

0.135 0.15 24 19,765 lTarget Must Be Higher Than Source Cannot be > Ceiling Height 329 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

Out Of Plume Fire Model Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area I

Fire Zone 99-M

_ Ref. #

_Room Width

_25.33

_ Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height l

12

_ Sq Ft

_878 Ambient Temperature 80

,Fire Source VUC2D

_ Target I_

ECI 190 Height of Target 10.25 E

Height of Ignition source 8.83 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 1.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 1.67 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.85

.1 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2

6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, UH 1.20 7 Enclosure Width, W 1 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.07 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 65 10 Fire Location Factor I1I 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 65 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 2338 LUW I

__l 0.08 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target

_0.27 0.09 1

1 13a If L/W < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3.2/3) 1 1

13 If L/V> 1/2 use!.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1

)*(exp(-.16 (Box 6/Box 1')power(Box 5/Box 13.1/3))]

If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 622 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target

-277

  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V FF 19 Calculated Critical Qnet. Btu l

20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction I

21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu l

22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu

= If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time I

Target Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-1 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, BtulsIfto1 0.344 l

l 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/fft 0.856 l

l 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/stftl 1.200 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/i)s l

24 l

5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec l

314 5.231

=

l I

Page l

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height' of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target. Btuls/ft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slR2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/M2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec I I 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 1

878 l

80 1

VUC2CI EC1236 10 8.83 425 1.17 3.17 65 1

65 4,251 345=

-3906.18 0.4 1.520 1.945 3.46 24 38 Target Must Be Higher Cannot be > Ceiling He 1

Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension DetectorActuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

Out Of Plume Fire Model

= ______

Out of Plume/Ceiling jet l

_l Fire Area l

Fire Zone 98-J.

= Ref. #

,Room Width 9.1 l

_ Room Length 60 Ceiling Height 12

= Sq Ft l

546

= Ambient Temperature 80

,Fire Source VUC2C

_ Target IJB459 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 8.83 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 2.58 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 3.05 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.85 11 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 3

6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, LIH 0.98 7 Enclosure Width, W l l

9.1 8 Height to Width Ratio, HAN l_

0.34 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls l

65 10 Fire Location Factor l l

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btuls, Qeff 65 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 857 L/W I

II_

0.33 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.30 0.20 13a If L/W < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 1 13 If L/W > 1/2 use!.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*'(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13).1/3))]

If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 j

14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 260 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345

_l 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 85 l

_ If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue i lll 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 l

6.6575

_ l l

18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft l

1,665 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu l

l 11,087

__ll 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction l

0.7

__ll 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 36956 22 Estimate of Actual Otot, Btu l

l 39,000 l

_ If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur lll

_ If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time

__<X1 l

I T

I_

=Target Critical Damage Time l

l lll Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l

0.132 l

l l

2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l

0.274 l

l l

3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ttl 0.406 l6 ll 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuis/F)-s 24 l

l 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec I

l 2,744 45.737 l

I I

I I

Page m

I I

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target. Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Bu/s/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 1

99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 Y22 EJ1027 7.17 0

425 7.17 12 65 4

260 520 345

-174.92 0.4 0.040 0.542 l 0.58 l

24 1,336 Target Must Be Higher Than S Cannot be > Ceiling Height 22.26 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

Target Must Be Higher In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target.

Height of Target Height of Ignition source I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/f 2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btulsifi2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 Y22 EJ 1004 8.42 0

425 8.42 12 65 4

260 398

345

-52.70 I

I 0.4 0.029 0.542 0.57 24 1,388 Target Must Be Higher Cannot be > Ceiling He 23.14 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise In Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/sMf2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 Y24 EC1530 9

0 425 9

12 65 2

130 224 3450 120.94 6.97 10,538 73,426 0.7 244,754 121,994 Target Must Be Higher Cannot be > Ceiling He Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec

Out Of Plume Fire Model Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area l_________

Fire Zone l

99-M Ref. # Xl___l Room Width l

25.33

,Room Length l

34.67 l

Ceiling Height 12

_ Sq Ft l

878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source I

Y24

= Target ECI 175 Height of Target 10.25 Height of Ignition source 0

1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.85 1

If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 7

6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H 0.58 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 10 Fire Location Factor 2

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btuts, Qeff 130 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 139 I

I l

0.28 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.43 0.26 13 If L/W < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 13t If IW> 1/2 usel.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/ )(exp(-.16 (Box 6/Box 1*)power(Box 5/Box 13) 1/3))]

_ If Box 4 c 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 60 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target j

345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 285

  • If Box 16 is c 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 8.2736 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft" 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu l

87,189 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction J0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu l

290,630 22 Estimate of Actual Qiot, Btu 121,994 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time Page 1

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. if not, proceed.

10 Qnet/to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M I

l 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 Y24 EC1 504 9

0 425 9

12 65 2

130 224 345 120.94 6.97 10,538 73,426 0.7 244,754 121,994 3

3I Target Must Be Higher Cannot be > Ceiling He Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec

Out of PlumeICelling Jet Fire Area I

Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y24 Target EC1258 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceilling,H 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height.95 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 S Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 4

6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, LIH 0.33 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 10 Fire Location Factor 2

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 130 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 139 LUW 0.16 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.62 13a If LJW < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 13bIf LAW > 12 use!.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 87 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345[

16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 258

  • If Box 16 is c 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetVto Achieve Temp Rise In Box 16 8.0714 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 85,058 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu 283,528 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 121,994 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, BtulsMft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage. sec Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 A41 0 ECI 504 8

0 425 8

12 190 1

190 351 345

-6.15 Target Must Be Higher Than S Cannot be > Ceiling Height 0.4 0.094 0.396 0.49 24 1,882 31.36 38 10 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Mtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slR2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M1 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 A404 EC1236 10 0.00 425 10.00 12.00 190 1

190 242 345 102.91 6.81 10,538 71,796 0.7 239,320 159,166 Target Must Be Higher T Cannot be > Ceiling Heig Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Otot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/lS/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 B654 EJ1027 7.17 0

425 7.17 12 190 1

190 422 345

-76.61 0.4 0.118 0.396 0.51 24 1,715 Target Must Be Higher Than S Cannot be > Ceiling Height 28.58 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Height Ceiling Height Sg Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 5 Fire Location Factor 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/sift2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btulsft2)S 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 B6 EC1275 11.42 0.00 425 11.42 12.00 190 1

190 194 345 150.87-7.22 10,538 76,076 0.7 253,586 315,014 0.4 0.046 0.396 0.44 24 2,312 Target Must Be Higher Cannot be > Ceiling He 39 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 38 10 0.00

Out of Plume/Celling jet Fire Area I

Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Shorter of 2 Dimensions Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6 Target EC1257 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425[

2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.95 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-41. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2.58 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H 0.22 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 190 10 Fire Location Factor 1

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179 LIW 0.10 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.84 13a If LUW < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 13bIf LW > 12 use[.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))J

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 149 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 196
  • If Box 16 Is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 7.5832 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 79,914 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 266,380 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time Target Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/stf 2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 0.4 0.044 0.086 0.130 24 26,751 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 446

Out of PlumelHot Gas Layer Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

Room Width Room Length Ceiling Height Sq Ft Ambient Temperature Fire Source Target Height of Target Height of Ignition source I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height If Box 4 Is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H 7 Enclosure Width, W 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 10 Fire Location Factor 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling L/W 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target I

99-M 25.33 34.67 12 878 80 B6 EC1237 9.75 0

425 9.75 12 0.81 in Box 14, HF 2.25 N/A 25.33 N/A 190 N/A 190 N/A N/A N/A Target Must Be Higher Than Source Cannot be > Ceiling Height R In Box 9 and continue with Box 15 0

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target
  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Relocate Target into ceiling jet E

345 345 8.7060 10,538 91.747 0.7 305,822 315,014 Target Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 0.4 0.060 0.090 0.150 24 20,024 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 334

Out Of Plume Fire Model l___ _

lOut of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area l

Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

, Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.678 Ceiling Height 12

_ Sq Ft l

878

_ Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6

= Target I

EC1190

_ Height of Target 10.25

_Height of ignition source 0

1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target HeightiCelilng Height 0.85 I

I If Box 4 Is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 3.5 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, UH 0.29 7 Enclosure Width, W I_25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, HAN 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 10 Fire Location Factor II_

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179 1 L1W I

I l

0.14 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.68 0.27 1

L_

13a If L/W < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3.2/3)

I I

I 13 If LW > 1/2 use[.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,11 )*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 1)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

.f Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 122 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 223

  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 7.7999 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft" 10,541 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 82,217 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu 274,057 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014

_ If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time

=Target Critical Damage Time l

_Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st EditIon pg. 1-1 I Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ftf 0.052 l

2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft_

0.078 l

3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R l

0.129 l

l 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/lk )s24 l

l 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, 27,123 4521 I

I I

IPage

Out Of Plume Fire Model

-1*

I I

I Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area I

l l___

Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

= Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.67

_ Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft Il_

878

_ Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6

_ Target l___

EC1176 Height of Target 10.25 Height of Ignition source 0

1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Celling Height 0.85 l

l If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2.25 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, IJH 0.19 7 Enclosure Width, W J

25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 10 Fire Location Factor II1 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179

_ 1W I1

_lll0.09 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.92 0.28 13a If L/W < 1/2 use.3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,213) 13t If L/W> 1/2 use[.37*power(Box 13/Box 5,11: )(exp(-.16 (Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 164 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345_

16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 181 I If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 7.4687 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Fe_

10,538 X 19 Calculated Critical Onet, Btu 78,707 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 l

21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 262,357 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014

_If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time I

I I

1 ITarget Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release I

0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btusfti l

0.055 l

} _

2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l

0.090 l

l 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ftl 0.145 l

l 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( BtuisiFt )s 24 l

l 5 Estimated rime to Critical Damage, sec l

l 21,569 359 l

l I

I I Page I

I IB6531B664 Type I Btu

~

GCB6541C G54 2.648 GCB6541D G74 2,984 GCB6541E G34 1.896 GCB6541 F 0G54 2,648 GPC6541A G31 2.409 Subtotal Est 9 ft Subtotal Margin Total 12,585 4

50,340 10%

55,374

.9613 Type Btu GCB512E G34 1.896 GCB612E G34 1,896 GCB513G G54 2,648 GCB513AI G35 6.650 GCB513A2 G35 6,650 GCB513A3 G35 6,650 GCBS13B1 G35 6.650 GCB513B2 G35 6,650 GCB513B3 G35 6,650 GCB513C1 G35 6,650 GCB513C2 G35 6,650 GCBS13C3 G35 6,650 GCB512D Subtotal Est ft Subtotal Margin Total G25 5,304 71,594 4

286,376 10%

315.014

  • Based on the lack of combustibles in the VWC motors, they were not considered as a credible Ignition source.

Attachment I 99-M SDP Ceiling Ht. 12' 0 Room Dim 34' 8x 25' 4 Failure Temp 425 E-669 sh 2 3/1/02 Fire Horiz Target Model3 I Dist I Helht Failure Time (m)

Actual Qtot' No.

Tamet IS I IS Ht I HRR Fail Qtot Tamet I

EC1176 B8 Floor I9gotu C.1 2-.

IOVT N

359 285,264 315,014 EC1176 2

ECl190 Bs Floor 190 Btu CJ 3 6" 100 N

452 266.198 315.014 EC1190 3

EC1237 B6 Floor 190 Btu HGL 73" 9S N

334 305.822 315,014 EC1237 4

EC1257 B6 Floor 190 Btu CJ 27" 11S" N

446 266.380 315,014 EC1257 5

EC1275 B6 Floor 190 Btu P

Plume 11'S N

39 253,586 315.014 EC1275 6

EJ1027 B654 Floor 190 Btu P

Plume 77 N

28.58 EJ1027 7

EC1236 A404 Floor 190 Btu P

Plume 1 C N

239,320 159.166 EC1236 8

EC1504 A410 Floor 190 Btu P

Plume 8

N 31.36 EC1S04 9

ECI 258 Y24 Floor 65 Btu CJ 40 11'S" N

283,528 121,994 EC1258 10 EC1504 Y24 Floor 65 Btu P

Plume 9'0 N

244,754 121,994 ECIS04 11 EC1175 Y24 Floor 65 Btu CJ 7%r 1170' N

290.630 121.994 EC1175 12 EC1530 Y24 Floor 65 Btu P

Plurme 9O N

244,754 121.994 EC1530 13 EJ1004 Y22 Floor 65 Btu P

Plume BIB" N

23.14 EJ1004 14 EJ1027 Y22 Floor 65 Btu P

Plume 7T N

22.26 EJ1027 15 JB459 VUC2C-810 65 Btu CJ 3TX 11r Y

45.74 80,703 39.000 JB459 16 EC1236 VUC2C 810" 65Btu P

Plume 10"c Y

EC1236 EC1190 VUC2D I 8'10" I 65Btu CJ1 10a0-y 5.23 EC1 190 EC1275 X6 Floor 1 65 Btu' P

I IV6 11S N

329 281.286 I Note 5I EC1275 I

I _________________

A.

I I

A.

Notes 1 Cable values were derved from values found in PDMS 2

If the horizontal distance is < target height *.2, target Is In plurne.

3 P-Plume. CJ-Ceilirng Jet & HGL-Hod Gas Layer 4

TX Is fire retardant gas filled and treated as an electrical cabinet w/ IEEE rated cable PER EPRI.

S The actual Qtot for X5 is not iaown. The failure time is based on the needed Btu to fail.

Y24 Type Btu BCY2400A B12 1,630 BCY2400B B12 1,630 BCY2500C B12 1,630 BCY2500D B12 1,630 C573J2 2P6A 1,824 GCDO222AC G120 1,943 GCDO222AD G120 1,943 GPB6145AA GT6 3.716 KOIP 214 1,269 B621 Type Btu GPB621AI G35 6.650 GPB621A2 G35 6,650 GPB621B1 G35 6,650 GPB621 B2 G35 6,650 GPB621C1 G35 6.650 GPB621C2 G35 6.650 GPB621D G25 5,304 A404 Type Btu A404B 212 1,270 A404H 312 1,694 GCA404C G74 2.984 GCA404F G74 2,984 GCJO15D G34 1.896 GPA404A GA2 24.077 KIICU 214 1,269 KO P1 Subtotal Est #0 Subtotal Margin Total 214 1,269 18,484 6

110,904 10%

121.994 Subtotal Subtotat Margin Total 45,204 4

180,816 10%

198,898 Subtotal Est #ft Subtotal Margin Total 36,174 4

144,696 10%

159.166

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