ML040640748

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Ignition Source Frequency
ML040640748
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/20/2004
From:
Entergy Operations
To:
NRC Region 4
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358
Download: ML040640748 (37)
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Text

IGNITION SOURCE FREQUENCY From field inspection the components tabulated below were identified by the NRC as potential ignition sources in zones 98-J and 99-M. The total ignition source frequency for each zone would also evaluate transients and welding fires. Included in the tabulation is the generic ignition source frequency number that reflects the EPRI Fire Risk Analysis Implementation Guide.

GENERIC IGNITION SOURCE FIRE FREQUENCY 98-J Fire 99-M Fire (Auxiliary Building) Frequency (Switchgear Room) Frequency Electrical Cabinets 1.9 x 10 Electrical cabinets 1.5 x 10 Battery Chargers 4.0 x 10'3 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10' Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10'3 Fire Protection panels 2.4 x 10' Transformers 7.9 x 10-3 Welding- Cables 5.1 x 103 Welding- Cables 5.1 x 103 Welding-Transients 3.1 x 102 Welding-Transients 3.1 x 10F Transients 1.3 x 10'3 Transients 1.3 x 103 The generic fire frequency is adjusted by a location weighting factor (WFL) and by an ignition source weighting factor (WFE). In addition, the EPRI guidance specifies that a severity factor can be applied to the fire frequency. The severity factor adjusts the fire frequency number to reflect the number of fires that are of sufficient magnitude to potentially cause cable damage to components/cables other than the component of fire origination.

With the exception of the electrical cabinets, all the items listed above are considered "Plant Wide" components and thus are assigned a WFL = 2 (number of units per site).

The electrical cabinets are assigned a value according to the room location. For 98-J (i.e.

auxiliary building), WFL = I (number of units per site divided by the number of auxiliary buildings). For 99-M (i.e. switchgear room) WFL = 0.25 (number of units per site divided by the number of switchgear rooms or 2/8).

Note: Although ANO has only 6 distinct switchgear areas, the EPRI guidelines indicates that "weight" of a switchgear room should be assigned according to the amount of electrical equipment located in the location. Each of the two switchgear areas located in the turbine building have approximately twice the electrical equipment located in the individual auxiliary building switchgear rooms.

Consequently, the number of switchgear rooms was increased from six (i.e. based on physical areas) to eight (i.e. based on amount of electrical equipment).

I

In the switchgear room, WF1 = I for electrical cabinets. In corridor 98 (i.e. auxiliary building), WF, is calculated by dividing the number of cabinets in the corridor by the total number of cabinets in the auxiliary building (i.e. 147/1452 or .101).

WF1 for the plant wide components was obtained by dividing the number of components in the specified room by the total number of components in the plant. In 98-J, there are four ventilation subsystems, whereas in 99-M there are two. In 98-J, there are two fire protection panels, whereas there are none in 99-M. In 98-J, there are no transformers whereas there are two transformers in 99-M. In 98-J, there are two battery chargers, whereas there are none in 99-M. From Calculation 85-E-0053-47, the total number of ventilation sub-systems is 357, total number of fire protection panels is 86 and the total number of transformers is 98. The calculation lists the total number of battery chargers as 19. However, the calculation does not reflect recent modifications that added a battery charger in Zone 98-J and Zone 11 0-L. Therefore, the plant wide total has been increased to 21.

EPRI's Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR-105928) Appendix D provides severity factors (SF) for various ignition sources. For switchgear room electrical cabinet fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.12. For indoor transformer fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.10. For ventilation subsystem fires, the suggested severity factor is 0.08. The two fire protection panels located in 98-J are completely enclosed with a minimal amount of combustible material located inside. Consequently, these panels were not deemed as credible ignition sources and were assigned a severity factor of zero.

There are other electrical panels in 98-J that are totally enclosed and thus are not credible ignition sources, but were left in the total number of cabinets for conservatism. Likewise, one of the transformers in 99-M is an instrument transformer, while the other is cooled with a non-combustible gas. Neither is deemed to be a credible ignition source, but both were conservatively included in the ignition source frequency calculation.

ANO complies with the NFPA requirements for the establishment of a fire watch in conjunction with welding activities. In essence, this equates to readily available manual suppression system. A pre-action suppression system is assigned an unavailability of 0.05. It is reasonable to assume that an established fire watch would be able to prevent a welding related fire from developing into a 'severe' fire at least on par with the unavailability of a pre-action suppression system. Consequently, the severity factor of welding related fires was set to 0.05.

The EPRI guidance did not provide specific severity factor values for electrical cabinets located in the Auxiliary building, for battery chargers or for transients. The highest severity factor provided for specific ignition sources was for Control Room electrical cabinets and pumps, both of which were assigned a value of 0.2. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assign a severity factor of .75 to those ignition sources that were not assigned a severity factor in the EPRI guidance. Practical plant experience indicates that assuming 3 out of every 4 fires involving these types of ignition sources will develop into a 'severe' fire is an extremely conservative assumption.

2

Combining all these factors yields the following ignition source frequencies associated with fires that may damage target cables/components (i.e. external to the ignition source).

Generic WFL WFI SF Total 98-J Electrical Cabinets 1.9 x 10-2 1 1.01 x 10 0.75 1.44 x 10'3 Battery Charger 4.0 x 10'3 2 9.52 x 10-7 0.75 5.71 x 104 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10e 2 1.12 x 10-2 0.08 1.70 x 10'5 Fire Protection panels 2.4 x 10 2 2.33 x 100 0 0 Welding - Cables 5.1 x 10'3 2 1.75 x 10.2 0.05 8.95 x 106 Welding - Transients 3.1 x 10 2 2 1.75 x 102 0.05 5.44 x 10-5 Transients 1.3 x 10' 2 1.75 x 10.2 0.75 3.42 x 10'5 TOTAL 2.13 x 10'3 99-M Electrical cabinets 1.S xi 2 0.25 1 0.12 4.50 x 104 Ventilation subsystems 9.5 x 10'3 2 5.6 x 10'3 0.08 8.52 x 106 Transformers 7.9 x 10'3 2 2.04 x 10o2 0.10 3.22 x 10 Welding - Cables 5.1 x 10'3 2 1.75 x 10.2 0.05 8.95 x 106 Welding - Transients 3.1 x 10 2 2 1.75 x 10.2 0.05 5.44 x 10'5 Transients 1.3 x 10 2 1.75 x 10.2 0.75 3.42 x 10; TOTAL 5.88 x 10-4 3.

FIRE MODELING PROGRAM - FIVE Due to the simplicity and conservative results, the FIVE program was utilized to perform fire models of the zones analyzed by this SDP. To facilitate the compilation of results, an Excel spreadsheet was developed that utilized the formulas specified in EPRI TR-100443, Methods of QuantitativeFireHazardsAnalysis and mirrored the worksheets specified in the FIVE methodology. As the results were compared, it was noted that the FIVE program was predicting results that differed from the Excel spreadsheet calculations. By analyzing the data, it was determined that the FIVE program failed to properly convert a temperature (i.e. AT) from Fahrenheit to Rankine.

The error involved the calculation of "Net energy addition per unit volume to achieve critical temperature rise." The equation (in English units) is specified as:

QndN = 9.54 In (AT/T. + 1), where both temperature values are given in Rankine.

With the use of a lower value (i.e. Fahrenheit temperature) in the numerator, conservative results were produced by the FIVE program as the program predicted a smaller quantity of energy required to produce a temperature rise to 'damage' levels. Consequently, the spreadsheet was revised to reflect the proper temperature conversion and generate more realistic results. (Note: to verify the validity of the spreadsheet, the "metric" equation was utilized and results identical to the 'corrected' English formula were obtained).

As more results were compiled, it was noted that for those targets that reached critical damage temperatures, the FIVE program was predicting failures in the hot gas layer prior to failures in the ceiling jet. Therefore, the equations utilized to calculate the time to failure were examined. It was discovered that rather than utilizing the equations for calculating total heat flux, the FIVE program divides the number of the total energy release needed to raise the average layer temperature to the critical value (i.e. Qait in BTUs) by the peak fire intensity (i.e. heat release rate in BTU/sec). This simplistic equation does not reflect the methodology specified in the FIVE user's guide nor in the previously referenced EPRI report. Rather than attempting to reproduce the equations for evaluating the hot gas layer on the Excel spreadsheet, any target located in the hot gas layer that could be damaged was "relocated" into the ceiling jet. This was accomplished by redefining the height of the target to a value that simulate a location in the ceiling jet portion of the room. Obviously, the calculated damage time for a target in the ceiling jet is a conservative bound of the damage time for a target located in the hot gas layer.

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A third conservative error of the FIVE program was noted in the calculation of time to damage for a plume scenario. TR-100443 specifies that the convective heat flux for the plume is calculated as:

qcpi = 0.3 * (kinQ) / I2 (reference equation 12, p. A4).

H is defined as the fire source to ceiling height. However, the FIVE program utilizes the distance from the fire source to the target, when computing this value for a plume scenario (Note: the program correctly utilizes H (i.e. fire source to ceiling height) when calculating the convective heat flux in the ceiling jet). Obviously, the distance from the source to the target is always less than the distance from the source to the ceiling.

Therefore, the calculated denominator is smaller than it should be. A smaller denominator in the equation yields a larger value for qcpi. The larger the value of qcp the less time there is until damage temperatures are reached. Consequently, the spreadsheet was revised to reflect the proper utilization of H such that more realistic results would be generated.

When calculating the time to damage, it was noted that in a ceiling jet scenario, the shortest time to damage occurred when the target was placed at the ceiling jet/hot gas layer transition (i.e. 85% of the target height to ceiling height ratio). To ensure conservative results, those targets located within the ceiling jet were assigned a target height that equates to the 85% value of the ratio.

Per the supplemental guidance contained in EPRI report SU-105928, since the Heat Loss Factor was conservatively assigned a value of 0.7, the virtual surface of the fire (for electrical cabinets) was placed at the floor.

When considering the combustible loading associated with an individual cabinet, the Plant Data Management System (PDMS) was used to determine the type of cables located in the cabinet and the associated BTU value. Attachment xx indicates combustible loading for various cabinets that were considered as ignition sources. For an MCC, the length of each cable inside the cubicle was conservatively estimated to be four feet. The BTU value associated with each cable is based on vendor information.

COMBUSTIBLE LOADING The combustible loading in 98-J consists almost entirely of cables in the cable trays.

There is less than one gallon of lubricating oil in an emergency chiller unit (C5 1) located in the eastern part of the corridor. In comparison to the loading associated with the cabling, the oil is a minor factor in the total loading value. Considering all available in-situ combustibles and over 100 pounds of transients, the fire duration in 98-J is estimated to be 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.

The combustible loading in 99-M is similar to 98-J, in that it primarily consists of cable insulation in open cable trays. Considering all available in-situ combustibles and over 100 pounds of transients the fire duration in 99-M is estimated to be 30 minutes.

5

Procedure 1000.047 (Control of Combustibles) limits the amount bf ordinary combustibles that may be leff unattended to 100 pounds. Transient combustibles in excess of 100 pounds and flammable liquids require the attendance of a continuous firewatch.

HEAT RELEASE RATES Electrical cabinets in Zone 99-M consist of 4160V switchgear, 480V MCCs, Inverters and a 480V load center. A heat release rate (HRR) of 190 BTU/s was assigned to electrical cabinets that contained cable that was not known to be IEE-383 rated. Newer electrical cabinets (i.e. those that contained IEEE-383 rated cable) were assigned a heat release rate of 65 BTU/s. These values are based on the guidance provided in EPRI report SU-105928. Many of these cabinets are totally enclosed with no vents or openings. Consequently, fire propagation is not credible. However, all cabinets were considered in the calculation of the fire frequency.

Zone 98-J contains 480V MCCs, DC distribution panels, battery chargers and small, totally enclosed cabinets. Cabinets considered as credible ignition sources were assigned a HIRR of either 65 or 190 BTU/s, dependent on the known type of cable installed.

In 98-J there are two emergency ventilation units (VUC14A and VUC14C) that provide cooling to the battery rooms. These units have a very limited run time, as they are only relied upon when normal ventilation is lost. Like the corridor cooler (i.e. VUC13B),

these units consists of a small motor. Likewise, Zone 99-M contains two ventilation units, each with a small motor. There is a minimal amount of combustible material associated with the windings of these motors. However, for conservatism, these units were included in the fire frequency calculation and assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s.

VUC4A/C5l is an emergency chiller for the A4 switchgear room. Other than surveillance runs, this unit is only operated during emergency conditions. The oil is contained within the compressor and does not pose a fire hazard. The chiller is mounted on a skid assembly that would confine any leaking oil to the area directly under the chiller unit.

Due to the small amount of oil available, is was assumed that the footprint of an oil fire would be 1.5 square feet or less. Assuming the compressor oil has a HRR of 135 BTU/s/ft 2 , the HRR associated with oil leaking from the compressor was set to 203 BTU/s. Although slightly larger than the other ventilation units, the motor associated with the chiller has a limited amount of combustible material and was assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s.

The transformer associated with the 480V load center (B6) is a dry type transformer. The EPRI guidance indicates that this type of transformer has a minimal amount of combustible material and was consequently assigned a HRR of 65 BTU/s. The instrument transformer (X62) is not considered a credible ignition source and was excluded from fire modeling.

6

CABLE DAMAGE THRESHOLD Research on the qualification status of individual cables in mild environments has not been performed. Consequently, all target cabling was assumed to be non-383 rated cable and assigned a damage temperature of 4250 F. In order for certain components to fail in an unwanted condition, a hot short has to occur that results in the spurious operation of the component. Recent testing performed by Sandia, the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute confirmed that hot shorts do not occur instantaneously when 'damage' temperatures are reached. However, for the purposes of this evaluation, it was conservatively assumed that when the gas temperature reaches the damage threshold (i.e.

4250 F), the hot short is subject to occur.

MANUAL SUPPRESSION CAPABILITIES Both Zone 98-J and Zone 99-M are readily accessible from the Turbine building, elevation 372'. The central fire brigade locker is located one elevation above, thus minimizing the travel time of the brigade from the locker to the fire scene. Both zones are equipped with ionization detection systems that will detect fires in the incipient stages. Due to it's close proximity to the control room, Operations personnel can promptly respond to verify fire conditions. Although no recent fire brigade drills have been performed on these zones, recent drills were performed on Zone 100-N, which is adjacent to Zone 99-M. Response times of the entire brigade for these drills averaged less than 10 minutes. Due to the favorable conditions with respect access and response, it is conservatively estimated that any fire scenario requiring greater than 20 minutes to sustain cable damage will be suppressed by the fire brigade.

99-M SPECIFIC ANALYSIS Attachment I provides a summary of the various fire models that were completed for Zones 99-M. Due to the number of raceways present in 99-M and the presence of green train electrical cabinets that serve as ignition sources, most fire models were developed toward accessing damage to the closest red train raceway. If the closest red train raceway was undamaged by the ignition source, it was assumed that all red train components would be unaffected by the ignition source. In certain cases, the red train raceway could sustain damage, if the fire was not suppressed and/or if enough combustible material was available to generate the necessary heat.

For those raceways that required more than 20 minutes to reach the critical temperature, credit was taken for the ability to provide manual suppression. The related cables were considered undamaged and the associated components were assigned the 'normal' failure probability.

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Notes:

I) Conductors 3G and 3R are for the indication circuit and are separately fused. Loss of these conductors does not effect operation of switch. Conductors X I and 21 could cause spurious transfer switch operation. Operation of switch to "local" precludes spurious operations. Refer to E-214 sh. lB.

2) A 'hot-short' between conductors 4 and 5 would result in a false low oil pressure signal that would prevent operation from the Control room. Open circuits or shorts-to-ground would not prevent control room operation.

Pump could be started by manually closing breaker at the A3 switchgear. Refer to E-211 sh. 1.

3) Hot short between conductors I IR and IR (or any energized conductor and IR) will cause -valve to close (as desired). Failures of 22F and 12F cannot prevent valve closure or cause spurious opening (i.e. upstream handswitch must be in 'open' position). If I IR shorts to ground, fuse could blow and remote control of valve would be lost. Refer to E-278 sh. 1.
4) XI shorting to U, 3R, 3G (assuming pump is not running) or ground blows FU2. However, remote control can still be accomplished by starting P36A (i.e. closing A306 breaker, which is essentially the same as an 'ES' start). Xl to 5 and Xl to 21 will result in a pump start (via spurious 'start' signal or low oil pressure signal, respectively).

5 shorting to U, 3R, 3 G or ground would prevent manually starting the pump via the remote (i.e. control room handswitch) and would blow FU2 when HS1291 is operated. Again, pump will start when A306 breaker is closed.

5 to 21 will not effect pump operation. If A306 is closed and low oil pressure is sensed, then 21 to U, 3R, 3G (pump not running) or ground iill cause FU3/FU4 to blow. With proper fuse coordination, FUI will be intact allowing pump to be started via local handswitch. Combinations of U, 3R and 3G will only affect indication.

Refer to E-213 sh. A.

5) Loss of cable cannot cause breaker to close. Breaker could trip (via hot short), but only if other normally open breakers are closed (or also receive spurious signals). Short-to-ground does not effect breaker operation, without simultaneous failure of other cables. Refer to E-106 sh. lB.
6) Loss of DC control power causes the loss of remote control for Load center feeder breaker. However, this breaker is normally closed. Loss of DC will not cause breaker to change state. Therefore, the loss of this cable (by itself) does not result in the need to perform any actions. Refer to E-8 sh. I and E-17 sh. l.
7) A single short to ground does not impact DC power to breaker controls (i.e. fuse will not blow). Conductors 2 and 3 are isolated from circuit until remote handswitch is utilized to manually stop pump. If an open circuit occurs on these conductors, the fault would prevent a manual stop (from control room) unless the switch is placed in "pull to lock". Conductors 5 and 6 could cause a spurious start by simulating an EFIC signal. However, the pump can still be controlled (i.e. stopped) from the remote location (i.e. control room). Refer to E-294 sh. I
8) Cable only provides valve position indication to the control room. No control features are effected. Refer to E-331 sh. 39.
9) This cable, which provides an.interlock to CV3640, has no effect on the pump circuit unless an ESF signal is present. Assuming an ESF signal is present the following failure modes are applicable. A hot short between conductors simulates the normal condition of the circuit and has no effect. An open circuit could prevent the automatic opening of the valve. However, in an Appendix R scenario with P4A operating, the preferred position of CV3640 is closed, since this would eliminate the necessity of isolation the ACW line. Since the neutral of the DC power system is floating, a short to ground will not impact pump operation. Refer to E-276 sh. IA and E-279 sh IA.
  • NO: Normally open
    • USC: Underspecific condition
      • Did not check schematic. Assumed indicator failed.

EJ3004 1019AA2 Associated TE6580

f. 1019AB2 Associated TE6581 I019AC2 Associated TE6582 1019BA2 Associated TE6583 1019BB2 Associated TE6584 1019BC2 Associated TE6585 1442A CV2618 No detrimental effect - See Note 8 1443A CV2668 No detrimental effect - See Note 8 1555G Associated Communication cable YJI421A Associated LT2668 Y31421B Associated LT2670 YJI421C Associated PT2668A YJI421D Associated LT2617 YJI421E Associated LT2619 YJI421F Associated m617A EJ3015 YJCA301A Associated TE1151, TE1153,7TE1155,7TE1157,7TE1159 & TE1161 YJCA302A Associated TE1163, TE1165,7TE1167, TE1169, TE1171 &TE1173 YJI480A Associated LT1189 YJI480C Associated LT1l91 YJI480E Associated LT1193 Y31480G Associated LTI 195 YJI480K Associated LT1197 YJR212C Associated PY1042D EJ3016 YJ1480B Associated TE1189 YJI480D Associated TE 1191 YJI48OF Associated TE1 193 YJI480H Associated TE1 195 YJ1480L Associated TE1197 YJR210C Associated UE1187

f EC1530 RCB5134C RCB5 173E CV2869 CV2800 Hot short to IF causes valve to open Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCB5193E CV2803 Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCB5194E CV3850 Hot short to 1R causes valve to close RCD1512C CV2663 Loss of remote control RCDl512F CV2663 Loss of remote control EC1589 RPDO121AI D15 Power feed from D01 RPD0121A2 D15 Power feed from D01 RPD1522AI CV2627 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation RPD1522A2 CV2627 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation RPD1522A3 CV2627 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation RPD1522A4 CV2627 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation RPDI522A5 CV2627 Power to valve - cannot cause spurious operation EC1615 RCA302K P4A- Control No detrimental effect - See Note ?

EJ1004 RCM075A Associated CS13 RCM075B1 Associated CS13 RCM075B2 Associated CS13 RCM075C Associated CS13 RCM075DI Associated CS13 RCM075D2 Associated CS13 RCM075D3 Associated CS13 RCM075E Associated CS11 RCM07SF Associated CS11 RCM075G Associated CS11 RCM075H Associated CS11 RCM075J Associated CS11 RJI3S7DI Associated FT2646 RJI357EI Associated FT2648 RJI419A L12618 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

RfI419B L12620 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

R3I419D L12667 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

R1I419E L12669 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

RPI419F PR2667A Loss of Control Room indicator/EFIC input RJ1423A1 CV2646 Valve may fail closed RJ1423B I CV2648 Valve may fail closed RJ1423C CV2668 Valve not required to reach hot shutdown RJSPARE2092 Associated No effect E11027 R208G N1501 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator R208H Associated NYS01 RlB5333AX Associated M55A RJB5333AY Associated M55A R1OI IAB LRSIOOI Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator RP1423DI CV2646 Valve may fail closed RJ1423D2 CV2648 Valve may fail closed RPJ452B LRS4204 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator RJP0727C PRI042 Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator***

RJR196E Tlllll Loss of Control Room cabinet indicator

EC1237 RCA03F Associated A308 RCA03H Associated A308 RCA03J Associated A309 RCAl1C K4A Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout RCAlID K4A Spurious signal results in EDG lockout RCA308G A308 Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip RCB512C B5 feeder Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker RCB513E B5B6 X-tie No detrimental effects - see Note S RCEIlC K4A USC**, could cause EDG lockout EC1257 RCB512C B5 feeder Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker RCB513E B5/B6 X-tie No detrimental effects - see Note 5 RCB612D B6 Assumed unavailable RCB613E B5/B6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO RCB613H B5/B6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO EC1258 RCA302J P4A- Control Cable does not affect Control Rm operation RCA303M P4B(R) Conductors are spare; no effect RCA306D P36A Lose remote control - see Note 2 RCB5 12C B5 feeder Short from P2 to 2 trips breaker RCBS13E BS/B6 X-tie No detrimental effects - see Note 5 RCB56S3H CV3643 Lose remote control - see Note 3 RCElIC K4A USC, could cause EDG lockout SPARE1360 Associated No effect EC1275 RCA302J P4A - Control Cable does not affect Control Rm operation RCA303M P4B(R) Conductors are spare; no effect RCA306D P36A Lose remote control - see Note 2 EC1410 RCD1135A Associated C154 RCD1135C Associated C154 EC1S04 M084E1 Associated Spare RCA3IH P7B No detrimental affect - See Note 7 RCB51114G Associated CV1401 RCB5124F CV2680 MFW block valves are not required RCB5124G CV2680 MFW block valves are not required RCB5241H CV2667 Could spuriously close (P7A not credited)

RCBS24IJ CV2667 Lose remote control? (P7A not credited)

RCDl512X Associated CV2663/SV2663 RCD1514D CV2620 Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCD1514E CV2620 Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCD1514F CV2620 No detrimental affect RCD1522D CV2627 Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCD1522E CV2627 Hot short to IR causes valve to close RCD1522F CV2627 No detrimental affect RCM021M Associated Spare RCM02IN Associated Spare RCM021P Associated Spare RCM067A Associated SV1433 RCM071A Associated C511, CS13 RCM071B Associated C511, C513 RCM071C Associated C511, C513 RCM071D Associated C511, C513 RCRS11SA Associated C511, C513 SPAREl 152 Associated

EC1175 BS01B P64B Spurious transfer - see Note 1 RCA03F Associaied A308 RCA03H Associated A308 RCA03J Associated A309 RCA11C K4A Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout RCAllD K4A Spurious signal results in EDG lockout RCA308G A308 Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip RCB5524E Associated CV1206 RCB5654D Associated CV2235 RCB5654E Associated CV2235 RCB5721D P64A Lose remote control - see Note 4 RCB612D B6 Assumed unavailable RCB613E B5/B6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO*

RCB613H B5fB6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO RCD1104A A3 cntrl pwrfromDIl Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCD1104B A3 cntrl pwr from D1I Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCD1109A B5 cntri pwrfrom DII See Note 6 SPARE1359 Associated SPARE1422 Associated EC1176 A303B Associated Space heater cable - no effect K02Z6 Associated B5 loss of power annunciator cable - no effect RCD1104A A3 cntrl pwr from D II Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCD 1104B A3 cntrl pwr from DII Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCDI109A B5 cntrl pwr from DI I See Note 6 SPARE1221 Associated No effect ECI 190 RCA302J P4A- Control Cable does not affect Control Rm operation RCA303M P4B(R) Conductors are spare; no effect RCA306D P36A Lose remote control - see Note 2 RCB612D B6 Assumed unavailable RCB613E B51B6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO RCB613H B51B6 X-tie Could prevent auto-trip but breaker is NO RCD1104A A3 cntrl pUT from DI I Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCDI 104B A3 cntrl pwr from D1I Lose remote control of A3 breakers RCD1109A B5 cntrl pYT from DII See Note 6 SPARE1221 Associated No effect SPARE1359 Associated No effect SPARE1360 Associated No effect EC1236 RCA03F Associated A308 RCA03H Associated A308 RCA03J Associated A309 RCAI lC K4A Spurious engine trip signal causes lockout RCAI ID K4A Spurious signal results in EDG lockout RCA308G A308 Short from 27 to 29 causes breaker to trip RCE1 IC K4A USC**, could cause EDG lockout SPARE1359 Associated No effect SPARE1360 Associated No effect

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Arkansas Nuclear One Plant Data Management System Red train raceways in 99-M Base Info Requested By: jvwLke2 Requested On: Tuesday, November 13,2001-14:33:29 This list contains all red train raceways routed through Zone 99-M Thc listing also includes the cables located in each raceway as well as the related Appendix R safe shutdown component Cables that are denoted as "Associated" are cables that do not affect the operation of a safe shutdown component Raceway Included Cables Related Component EB1040 RPB522AI B56 Power feed from BS RPB522BI B56 Power feed from BS RPB522CI B56 Power feed from BS EB1041 RPB522A2 B56 Power feed from B5 RPB522B2 B56 Power feed from BS RPB522C2 B56 Power feed from BS RPBS22D B56 Power feed from B5 EB1186 RPB51102BA Associated VCH4B RPBS1102BB Associated VCH4B RPB51102BC Associated VCH4B EC1088 B801BI P64B - Control Spurious transfer - see Note I RCB5653D CV3643 Spare - No effect RCBS721DI P64A Lose remote control - see Note 4 SPARE1706 Associated No effect EC1092 RCB5653D CV3643 Spare - No effect EC1093 B801BI P64B - Control Spurious transfer - see Note I RCB5721DI P64A Lose remote control - see Note 4 SPARE1706 Associated No effect EC1163 RCB5721D P64A Lose remote control - see Note 4 SPARE1221 Associated No effect SPARE1422 Associated No effect EC1164 B801B P64B - Control Spurious transfer - see Note I RCB5524E Associated CV1206 RCB5653H CV3643 Lose remote control - see Note 3 RCB5654D Associated CV2235 RCB5654E Associated CV2235 EC1165 B801B P64B - Control Spurious transfer - see Note I RCB5524E Associated CV1206 EC1166 RCB5653H CV3643 Lose remote control - see Note 3 RCB5654D Associated CV2235 RCB5654E Associated CV2235

Zone 99-M Combustibl Loading V lues for Cable Trays No. Tray Length Allowed Btu > Allowed Btu Remarks 1 DA008 47 150,000 7,050.000 .

2 EA201 9 150,000 1,350,000 =

3 EB201 10 250,000 2,500,000 4 EB202 12 . 300,000 3,600,000 5 EB203 15 175,000 2.625.000 6 EC201 9 250,000 2,250,000 7 EC202 6 250,000 1,500,000 8 EC203 5 275.000 1.375,000 9 EC204 121 300.000 3,600,000 10 EC205 10 200,000 2,000,000 11 EC221 8 150,000 1,200,000 12 EC222 9 150,000 1,350,000 13 EC223 6 275,000 1,650,000 14 EC236 10 150,000 1.500,000 15 EC237 5 150,000 750,000 16 EC238 6 . 175,000 1,050,000 17 EC239 5 150,000 750,000 18 EC240 10 150,000 1,500,000 Subtotal 15,450,000 = 22,150,000 Tota

_ ____ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 7,6 00 ,0 0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Note: All trays are conservatively assumed to have 150,000 BTU/ft. Only those trays that exceed the threshold have the actual loading value listed.

Raceways Locate. in Zone 99-M Subjected to Fire Modeling 4 North I

EC1175 ll10 4- EC1258 98-J S

2

]

<4- EC1237 EC1504, EJ1004 & EJ10274+ 40 EC1190 EC1530 -t-n

2. JB344 ---- D
9. JB459 EC1236 I _ _ 4- EC1275
10. TB1054 -EC1176 4d -EC1257 99-M

Red Train R- aways Located in Zone 99-M T North Mem I

EC1175 Il0. <-EC1258 98-tJ U

EC1589 lI I-- EJ3004 2

-EC1093

-EC1165 IrT to to to H r4 .4 -EC1088 U U W ld EC1504, EJ1004 & EJ1027-

< _ .5-EC1237 EC1530 -#*4 -EC1190

- 0---

Notes

2. JB344

- __m 1. EB1186, EC1092, EC1410, EJ3015 and EJ3016 are not shown since no SSD

9. JB459 EC1236 --_ *- EC1275 cables are included in these raceways.
10. TB1054 EC1 615 --_ -EC1176 2. EB1040 and EB1041 are not shown since EC1257 the included cables supply power to B5(

(B56 is located within Zone 99-M).

99-M

Fixed Ignition I snrces Located in Zones 98 _ and 99-M t

........ North ED04B

........ RA2 [F D21 TiLi IC155 C51 V'JO-I C192 C457 i l1< l 3B S.._... .. ._

X62 5 5 110 86 99-M

Target Must Be Higher Than Source In Plume Fire Model Fire Area 1 Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source TRF X6 Target EC1275 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 lTarget Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 65 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 95 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise 250.04 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 8.01 1 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 10,538 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 84,386 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 281,286 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot 281.286 Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 0.016 1 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 0.135 3 Total Heat Flux at Target. Btu/sl/t 2 0.15 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft2)s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage. sec 19,765 329 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

Out Of Plume Fire Model

__ Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area I Fire Zone 99-M

_ Ref. #

_Room Width _25.33

_ Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height l 12

_ Sq Ft _878 Ambient Temperature 80

,Fire Source VUC2D

_ Target I_ ECI 190 Height of Target 10.25 E Height of Ignition source 8.83 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 1.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 1.67 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height _ 0.85 .1 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, UH 1.20 7 Enclosure Width, W 1 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.07 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 65 10 Fire Location Factor I1I 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 65 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 2338 LUW I __l 0.08 _ _

13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target _0.27 0.09 1 1 13a If L/W < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3.2/3) _ _ 1 1 13 If L/V> 1/2 use! .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1 )*(exp(-.16(Box 6/Box 1')power(Box 5/Box 13.1/3))]

. If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 622 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target -277

  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V FF 19 Calculated Critical Qnet. Btu l 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction I 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu l 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu _

= If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time I Target Critical Damage Time ____ ________

Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-1 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, BtulsIfto1 0.344 l l 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/fft 0.856 l l 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/stftl 1.200 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/i)s l 24 l 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec l 314 5.231

= l I Page l __

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M I I Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 1 Sg Ft 878 l Ambient Temperature 80 1 Fire Source VUC2CI Target EC1236 Height' of Target 10 Height of Ignition source 8.83 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 1.17 Target Must Be Higher 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 3.17 Cannot be > Ceiling He 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 65 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 65 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 4,251 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345=

9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise -3906.18 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target. Btuls/ft2 1.520 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slR 2 1.945 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3.46 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/M2)s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 38 1 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension DetectorActuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

Out Of Plume Fire Model

=______ Out of Plume/Ceiling jet l _l Fire Area l Fire Zone 98-J.

= Ref. #

,Room Width 9.1 l

_ Room Length 60 Ceiling Height 12

= Sq Ft l 546

= Ambient Temperature 80

,Fire Source VUC2C

_ Target IJB459 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 8.83 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 2.58 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 3.05 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.85 11 __

If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 3 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, LIH 0.98 7 Enclosure Width, W l l 9.1 8 Height to Width Ratio, HAN l_ _ 0.34 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls l 65 10 Fire Location Factor l l 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btuls, Qeff 65 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 857 L/W I II_ 0.33 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target _ 0.30 0.20 13a If L/W < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 1 _

13 If L/W > 1/2 use! .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*'(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13).1/3))]

14 If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target j 260 _ _ _

15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 _ _ _l 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 85 l

_ If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continuei lll 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 l 6.6575 l_ l 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft l 1,665 _ _

19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu l l 11,087 __ll 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction l 0.7 __ll 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 36956 22 Estimate of Actual Otot, Btu l l 39,000 _ l

_ If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur lll

_ If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time __<X1 _ l I T I_ _ _ __ _

=Target Critical Damage Time l l lll Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l 0.132 l l l 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l 0.274 l l l 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ttl 0.406 l6 ll 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuis/F)-s 24 _ l l 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec I l 2,744 45.737 __ l I I I I Page _ m I I

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone Ref. #

1 99-M Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y22 Target EJ1027 Height of Target 7.17 Height of Ignition source 0 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 7.17 Target Must Be Higher Than S 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 65 5 Fire Location Factor 4 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 260 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 520 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise -174.92 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.040 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 0.542 3 Total Heat Flux at Target. Btu/s/ft2 l 0.58 l 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Bu/s/ft2 )s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 1,336 22.26 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

Target Must Be Higher In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y22 Target. EJ 1004 Height of Target 8.42 Height of Ignition source 0 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 8.42 Target Must Be Higher 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling He 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 5 Fire Location Factor 4 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 260 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 398 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target ;345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise -52.70 If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet I 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction I 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/f 2 0.029 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.542 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btulsifi2 0.57 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2 )s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 1,388 23.14 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y24 Target EC1530 Height of Target 9 Height of Ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 9 Target Must Be Higher 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling He 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 5 Fire Location Factor 2 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 130 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 224 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 3450 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise 120.94 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise In Box 9 6.97 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 10,538 12 Calculated Critical Onet 73,426 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 244,754 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot 121,994 Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/sMf2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R 2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2 )s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec

Out Of Plume Fire Model Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area l_________

Fire Zone l _ 99-M Ref. # Xl___l Room Width l 25.33 _

,Room Length _ l 34.67 l Ceiling Height 12

_ Sq Ft l 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source I Y24

= Target _ ECI 175 Height of Target 10.25 Height of Ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature _ 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.85 1 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 7 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H 0.58 _

7 Enclosure Width, W _ 25.33 _

8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 10 Fire Location Factor _ 2 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btuts, Qeff 130 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 139

_ I I l 0.28 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.43 0.26 13 If L/W < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) _

13t If IW> 1/2 usel .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/ )(exp(-.16 (Box 6/Box 1*)power(Box 5/Box 13) 1/3))]

_ If Box 4 c 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target _ 60 _ _ _ _

15 Critical Temp Rise at Target j 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 285

  • If Box 16 is c 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 8.2736 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft" 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu l 87,189 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction J0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu l 290,630 22 Estimate of Actual Qiot, Btu 121,994 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time Page 1

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M I Ref. # l Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y24 Target EC1 504 Height of Target 9 Height of Ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 9 Target Must Be Higher 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling He 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 5 Fire Location Factor 2 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 130 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 224 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise 120.94 If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. if not, proceed.

10 Qnet/to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 6.97 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 10,538 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 73,426 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 244,754 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot 121,994 Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft2 3

2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ft 2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3I 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft 2 )s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec

Out of PlumeICelling Jet Fire Area I Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source Y24 Target EC1258 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceilling,H 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height.95 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 S Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 4 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, LIH 0.33 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 65 10 Fire Location Factor 2 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 130 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 139 LUW 0.16 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.62 13a If LJW < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 13bIf LAW > 12 use! .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 87 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345[

16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 258

  • If Box 16 is c 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetVto Achieve Temp Rise In Box 16 8.0714 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 85,058 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu 283,528 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 121,994 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source A41 0 Target ECI 504 Height of Target 8 Height of Ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 8 Target Must Be Higher Than S 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 190 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 351 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise -6.15 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Onet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.094 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R2 0.396 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, BtulsMft 2 0.49 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft 2 )s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage. sec 1,882 31.36 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M1 Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source A404 Target EC1236 Height of Target 10 Height of Ignition source 0.00 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.00 Target Must Be Higher T 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Heig 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 190 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 190 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 242 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise 102.91 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 6.81 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 10,538 12 Calculated Critical Onet 71,796 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 14 Estimate of Critical Mtot 239,320 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot 159,166 Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slR2 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft 2)s 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B654 Target EJ1027 Height of Target 7.17 Height of Ignition source 0 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 7.17 Target Must Be Higher Than S 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 190 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 422 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise -76.61 If Box 9 is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 12 Calculated Critical Qnet 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 14 Estimate of Critical Qtot 15 Estimate of Actual Otot Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 0.118 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/lS/ft2 0.396 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btuls/ft 2 0.51 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/s/ft2 )s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 1,715 28.58 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

In Plume Fire Model Fire Area Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Height 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sg Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6 Target EC1275 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 .

Target Must Be Higher 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling He 4 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 5 Fire Location Factor 1 6 Effective Heat Release Rate 190 7 Plume Temperature Rise at Target 194 8 Critical Temperature Rise at Target 345 9 Critical Plume Temperature Rise 150.87-If Box 9 Is < 0, Stop. If not, proceed.

10 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 9 7.22 11 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V 10,538 12 Calculated Critical Onet 76,076 13 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 14 Estimate of Critical Otot 253,586 15 Estimate of Actual Qtot 315,014 Target Critical Damage Time Radiant fraction of heat release 0.4 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/sift2 0.046 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/slft 2 0.396 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.44 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btulsft2)S 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 2,312 39 Detector Actuation Time 6 Detection Device Rated Temp Rise 38 7 Gas Temp Rise at Detector 8 Detector Temp Rise/Gas Temp Rise 9 Dimension Detector Actuation Time 10 Time Constant of Detector Device, sec 10 11 Estimated Time to Detector Actuation, sec 0.00

Out of Plume/Celling jet Fire Area I Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Shorter of 2 Dimensions Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6 Target EC1257 Height of Target 11.42 Height of Ignition source 0.00 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425[

2 Height of Target above Fire Source 11.42 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12.00 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.95 If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-41. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2.58 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H 0.22 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 190 10 Fire Location Factor 1 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179 LIW 0.10 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.84 13a If LUW < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,2/3) 13bIf LW > 12 use[ .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,1/3)*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))J

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 149 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 196
  • If Box 16 Is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 Qnet to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 7.5832 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 79,914 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 266,380 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time Target Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 0.044 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.086 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft 2 0.130 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btu/stf 2 )s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 26,751 446

Out of PlumelHot Gas Layer Fire Area I Fire Zone 99-M Ref. #

Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.67 Ceiling Height 12 Sq Ft 878 Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6 Target EC1237 Height of Target 9.75 Height of Ignition source 0 I Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 9.75 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Ceiling Height 0.81 If Box 4 Is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14, HF R In Box 9 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2.25 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, L/H N/A 7 Enclosure Width, W 25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, H/W N/A 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btuls 190 10 Fire Location Factor N/A 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling N/A L/W N/A 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target N/A

  • If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target E 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 345
  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 8.7060 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft3 10,538 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 91.747 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 305,822 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014 If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Relocate Target into ceiling jet Target Critical Damage Time Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1-18 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.060 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.090 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft2 0.150 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/ft2)s 24 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, sec 20,024 334

Out Of Plume Fire Model l___ _ lOut of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area l .___

Fire Zone 99-M .

_ Ref. #

, Room Width 25.33 Room Length 34.678 Ceiling Height 12

_ Sq Ft l 878

_ Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6

= Target I EC1190

_ Height of Target 10.25

_Height of ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target HeightiCelilng Height 0.85 _ I I If Box 4 Is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 3.5 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, UH 0.29 7 Enclosure Width, W I_25.33 8 Height to Width Ratio, HAN 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 10 Fire Location Factor II_

11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179 1L1W I I l 0.14 _ _

13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.68 0.27 1 L_

13a If L/W < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3.2/3) I I I 13 If LW > 1/2 use[ .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,11 )*(exp(-.16*(Box 6/Box 1)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

.f Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 122 15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345 16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 223

  • If Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 Qnetl to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 7.7999 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Ft" 10,541 19 Calculated Critical Qnet, Btu 82,217 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 21 Estimate of Critical Otot, Btu 274,057 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014

_ If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur

_ If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time

=Target Critical Damage Time l

_Radiative Fraction of Heat Release 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st EditIon pg. 1-1 I Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ftf 0.052 l 2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft_ 0.078 l _

3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/R l 0.129 l l 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( Btuls/lk )s24 l l 5 Estimated Time to Critical Damage, 27,123 4521 _

I I I _ IPage

Out Of Plume Fire Model

-1* I .,. I I Out of Plume/Ceiling jet Fire Area l l___ _ I Fire Zone _ 99-M Ref. #

= Room Width 25.33 ,

_ Room Length 34.67

_ Ceiling Height 12

_ Sq Ft Il_ 878

_ Ambient Temperature 80 Fire Source B6

_ Target l___ EC1176 Height of Target _ 10.25 Height of Ignition source 0 1 Target Damage Threshold Temperature 425 2 Height of Target above Fire Source 10.25 Target Must Be Higher Than Source 3 Height From Fire Source to Ceiling,H 12 Cannot be > Ceiling Height 4 Ratio of Target Height/Celling Height 0.85 l l If Box 4 is >0.85, Complete Boxes 5-11. If not enter 0 in Box 14 and continue with Box 15 5 Long distance from Fire Source to Target, L 2.25 6 Longitudinal Distance to Height Ration, IJH 0.19 7

8 Enclosure Width, W Height to Width Ratio, H/W J 25.33 0.47 9 Peak Fire Intensity, Btu/s 190 10 Fire Location Factor II1 11 Effective Heat Release Rate, Btu/s, Qeff _ 190 12 Plume Temperature Rise at Ceiling 179

_ 1W I1 _lll0.09 13 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise Factor at Target 0.92 0.28 13a If L/W < 1/2 use .3/Power(Box 5/Box 3,213) 13t If L/W> 1/2 use[ .37*power(Box 13/Box 5,11: )(exp(-.16 (Box 6/Box 13)*power(Box 5/Box 13),1/3))]

If Box 4 < 0.85 enter 0 14 Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 164 _ _ _

15 Critical Temp Rise at Target 345_

16 Critical Ceiling Jet Temp Rise at Target 181 IIf Box 16 is < 0, Stop. Otherwise, continue 17 QnetN to Achieve Temp Rise in Box 16 _ 7.4687 18 Calculated Enclosure Volume, V Fe_ 10,538 X 19 Calculated Critical Onet, Btu 78,707 20 Estimated Heat Loss Fraction 0.7 l 21 Estimate of Critical Qtot, Btu 262,357 22 Estimate of Actual Qtot, Btu 315,014

_If Box 22 < Box 21, Stop. Damage Does Not Occur If Box 22 > Box 21, Proceed to Determine Target Damage Time I I I 1 -

ITarget Critical Damage Time ____ _________

Radiative Fraction of Heat Release I 0.4 Polyethylene SFPE 1st Edition pg. 1 1 Radiative Heat Flux at Target, Btusfti l 0.055 l }_

2 Convective Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ft l 0.090 l l 3 Total Heat Flux at Target, Btu/s/ftl 0.145 l l 4 Target Thermal Response Parameter,( BtuisiFt )s 24 l l 5 Estimated rime to Critical Damage, sec l l 21,569 359 l l

_ I I I Page I I

Attachment 1 IB6531B664 _

Type I ~ Btu .9613 Type Btu GCB6541C G54 2.648 GCB512E G34 1.896 GCB6541D G74 2,984 GCB612E G34 1,896 GCB6541E G34 1.896 GCB513G G54 2,648 GCB6541 F 0G54 2,648 GCB513AI G35 6.650 GPC6541A G31 2.409 GCB513A2 G35 6,650 Subtotal 12,585 GCB513A3 G35 6,650 Est 9 ft 4 GCBS13B1 G35 6.650 Subtotal 50,340 GCB513B2 G35 6,650 Margin 10% GCB513B3 G35 6,650 Total 55,374 GCB513C1 G35 6,650 GCB513C2 G35 6,650 GCBS13C3 G35 6,650 GCB512D G25 5,304 Subtotal 71,594 Est ft 4 Subtotal 286,376 Margin 10%

Total 315.014

  • Based on the lack of combustibles in the VWC motors, they were not considered as a credible Ignition source.

Attachment I 99-M SDP Ceiling Ht. 12' 0 Room Dim 34' 8x 25' 4 Failure Temp 425 E-669 sh 2 3/1/02 Fire Horiz Target Failure Actual Model3 I No. Tamet IS I IS Ht I HRR Dist I Helht Fail Time (m) Qtot Qtot' Tamet I EC1176 B8 Floor I9gotu C.1 2-. IOVT N 359 285,264 315,014 EC1176 2 ECl190 Bs Floor 190 Btu CJ 3 6" 100 N 452 266.198 315.014 EC1190 3 EC1237 B6 Floor 190 Btu HGL 73" 9S N 334 305.822 315,014 EC1237 4 EC1257 B6 Floor 190 Btu CJ 27" 11S" N 446 266.380 315,014 EC1257 5 EC1275 B6 Floor 190 Btu P Plume 11'S N 39 253,586 315.014 EC1275 6 EJ1027 B654 Floor 190 Btu P Plume 77 N 28.58 EJ1027 7 EC1236 A404 Floor 190 Btu P Plume 1C N 239,320 159.166 EC1236 8 EC1504 A410 Floor 190 Btu P Plume 8 N 31.36 _ _ _ _ EC1S04 9 ECI 258 Y24 Floor 65 Btu CJ 40 11'S" N 283,528 121,994 EC1258 10 EC1504 Y24 Floor 65 Btu P Plume 9'0 N

  • 244,754 121,994 ECIS04 11 EC1175 Y24 Floor 65 Btu CJ 7%r 1170' N 290.630 121.994 EC1175 12 EC1530 Y24 Floor 65 Btu P Plurme 9O N 244,754 121.994 EC1530 13 EJ1004 Y22 Floor 65 Btu P Plume BIB" N 23.14 EJ1004 14 EJ1027 Y22 Floor 65 Btu P Plume 7T N 22.26 EJ1027 15 JB459 VUC2C- 810 65 Btu CJ 3TX 11r Y 45.74 80,703 39.000 JB459 16 EC1236 VUC2C 810" 65Btu P Plume 10"c Y EC1236 EC1190 VUC2D I 8'10" I 65Btu CJ1 10a0- . y 5.23 EC1 190 EC1275 X6 Floor 1 65 Btu' I P I IV6 I _________________

11S N A.

329 I 281.286 I Note 5I I A.

EC1275 Notes 1 Cable values were derved from values found in PDMS 2 If the horizontal distance is < target height *.2, target Is In plurne.

3 P-Plume. CJ-Ceilirng Jet & HGL-Hod Gas Layer 4 TX Is fire retardant gas filled and treated as an electrical cabinet w/ IEEE rated cable PER EPRI.

S The actual Qtot for X5 is not iaown. The failure time is based on the needed Btu tofail.

Y24 Type Btu B621 Type Btu A404 Type Btu BCY2400A B12 1,630 GPB621AI G35 6.650 A404B 212 1,270 BCY2400B B12 1,630 GPB621A2 G35 6,650 A404H 312 1,694 BCY2500C B12 1,630 GPB621B1 G35 6,650 GCA404C G74 2.984 BCY2500D B12 1,630 GPB621 B2 G35 6,650 GCA404F G74 2,984 C573J2 2P6A 1,824 GPB621C1 G35 6.650 GCJO15D G34 1.896 GCDO222AC G120 1,943 GPB621C2 G35 6.650 GPA404A GA2 24.077 GCDO222AD G120 1,943 GPB621D G25 5,304 KIICU 214 1,269 GPB6145AA GT6 3.716 Subtotal 45,204 Subtotal 36,174 KOIP 214 1,269 4 Est #ft 4 KO P1 214 1,269 Subtotat 180,816 Subtotal 144,696 Subtotal 18,484 Margin 10% Margin 10%

Est #0 6 Total 198,898 Total 159.166 Subtotal 110,904 Margin 10%

Total 121.994

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