ML033420408
| ML033420408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/2003 |
| From: | Curran D Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| 50-413-OLA, 50-414-OLA, ASLBP 03-815-03-OLA, RAS 7119 | |
| Download: ML033420408 (51) | |
Text
1?As t11ii i December 2, 2003 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKETED BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD USNRC December 5, 2003 (11:25AM)
In the Matter of Docket No's. 50-413-OLA, OFFICE OF SECRETARY DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION 50-414-OLA RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2)
BLUE RIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE LEAGUE'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION TO INTERVENE I. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.714, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League ("BREDL")
hereby amends its Supplemental Petition to Intervene to set forth late-filed Contentions 10, 11, 12, regarding Duke Energy Corporation's ("Duke's) application for a license amendment to allow the use of plutonium Mixed Oxide ("MOX") Lead Test Assemblies
("LTAs") at the Catawba nuclear power plant. Letter from M.S. Tuckman, Duke Power, to U.S. NRC, re: Proposed Amendments to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications to Allow Insertion of Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Lead Assemblies and Request for Exemption from Certain Regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 (February 27, 2003)
(hereinafter "License Amendment Application").
This Second Supplemental Petition to Intervene amends Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League's Supplemental Petition to Intervene (October 21, 2003)
(hereinafter "First Supplemental Petition to Intervene").
Contentions 10 and 11 assert that Duke has failed to address the implications of plutonium MOX fuel characteristics on its analyses of design basis accidents and severe Ieplate =S'EC-037 5ecy7O
accidents. Contention 12 asserts that the implications of plutonium MOX fuel characteristics should be considered in the Environmental Report. Contention 13 asserts that environmental analyses prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") with respect to the impacts of shipping plutonium to France and back are inadequate because they fail to consider the new information and significantly changed circumstances in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The contentions are supported by the attached Declaration of Dr. Edwin S. Lyman In Support of BREDL Contentions 10 Through 13 (December 1, 2003).
As discussed below in Section m, these contentions satisfy a balancing of the NRC's late-filing criteria.
- 11. CONTENTIONS The late-filed contentions fall into two categories: safety issues under the Atomic Energy Act and its implementing regulations, and environmental issues under the National Environmental Policy Act. The numbering of the contentions follows consecutively on the numbering of the contentions submitted by BREDL in its initial hearing request.
A. Safety Issues Under Atomic Energy Act And Implementing Regulations Contention 10: Failure to account for uncertainties in MOX fuel assembly behavior during Loss of Coolant Accidents.
Duke's safety analysis for design-basis loss-of-coolant accidents ("LOCAs') in Section 3.7 of the LTA license amendment application is inadequate, because it fails to account for uncertainties in the technical understanding of the behavior of MOX fuel 2
during LOCAs that may lead to significant deviations from low-enriched uranium
("LEU") fuel behavior.
Basis: In Section 3.7.1, Duke presents a deterministic analysis of the impacts of MOX fuel lead assemblies on LOCA analyses. According to Section 3.7.1, "MOX fuel phenomena that have the potential to affect LOCA results are addressed in Section 3.7.1.1." Id. at 3-20. The discussion in Section 3.7.1.1, however, does not include consideration of the fact that the experimental database for MOX fuel performance during LOCAs is woefully inadequate. As a result, there are uncertainties in aspects of MOX fuel behavior that may have a significant impact on Duke's LOCA analysis for the Catawba core with four plutonium MOX LTAs.
In a recent presentation to NRC staff, officials from the French safety authority Institut de Radioprotection et de Sfirete Nucleaire ("IRSN") proposed a series of tests at the Phebus experimental reactor to close gaps in the experimental database for both MOX fuel and high-burnup LEU. See slides presented by A. Mailliat and J.C. M6lis, IRSN, at "PHEBUS STLOC Meeting" with NRC Staff (October 23, 2003).1 A copy of a printout of the slides is attached. The fact that French safety authorities believe that these tests are necessary is highly significant, given NRC's dependence on foreign MOX data (or lack thereof) in evaluating MOX-related submittals.
The IRSN presentation points out that plutonium MOX fuel relocation has been observed at a lower temperature than LEU fuel relocation (stated at the meeting to be 200'C -300'C lower), i.e., that during a LOCA, the MOX fuel pellet column collapses into the lower part of the fuel rod sooner than LEU fuel. Id. at 6. This would increase l These slides are available on NRC's ADAMS system. The Accession Number is ML032970642.
3
power and negatively affect heat transfer, with a deleterious impact on important LOCA parameters. These parameters include increases in peak clad temperature (PCT) (stated at the meeting to be 100C higher), clad oxidation (stated at the meeting to be a 5%-10%
increase in the oxide layer) and clad hydrogen uptake. IRSN further pointed out that "this question is particularly important for end-of-life MOX fuel where power generation is not reduced, unlike for U02 fuel." Id. at 21.
The IRSN presentation further points out that modem, low-tin, high ductility cladding materials, such as the M5 cladding that will be used in the MOX LTAs, will form bigger "balloons" than conventional Zircaloy and are likely to have higher blockage ratios. Id. at 24-25. This effect, combined with MOX-specific behavior, cannot be fully assessed in the absence of the integral LOCA MOX fuel-bundle tests that IRSN is proposing. Thus there is insufficient information to provide confidence that the MOX LTAs will not cause coolant blockage during a LOCA that could lead to an unacceptable loss of core coolable geometry and an uncontrolled core melt.
Because of these unknowns regarding the behavior of MOX fuel during a LOCA, Duke lacks a factual basis for assuring that the existing emergency core cooling systems at Catawba will meet the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.46. Accordingly, the application should be denied.
Contention 11: Failure to consider uncertainties in MOX fuel assembly behavior on the probabilities and consequences of severe accidents.
Duke's analysis of the impact of the plutonium MOX LTAs on the probabilities and consequences of severe accidents is inadequate, because it fails to account for uncertainties in the technical understanding of the behavior of MOX fuel during severe 4
accidents that may lead to significant deviations from low-enriched uranium ("LEU")
fuel behavior.
Basis: In Section 3.8 of the license amendment application, Duke asserts the following:
Duke uses probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analyses to evaluate the risk to public health and safety due to operation of its nuclear plants. PRA analyses quantify the probability and consequences of severe accidents that involve core melt and containment failure events. Key considerations in PRA analyses are equipment requirements to prevent core melt (success criteria); ice melt times, containment pressurization rates, and potential containment failures (containment performance); and doses to the public (offsite consequences). The attributes of MOX fuel that impact these areas are fundamentally similar to uranium fuel ...
Id. at 3-36. The discussion in Section 3.8, however, does not include consideration of the fact that the experimental database for MOX fuel performance during severe accidents is woefully inadequate. As a result, there are uncertainties in aspects of MOX fuel behavior that may have a significant impact on Duke's risk analysis for the Catawba core with four plutonium MOX LTAs.
Another part of the IRSN Ph6bus proposal presented to NRC at the October 23 meeting was a plan to address uncertainties in the behavior of MOX fuel during severe accidents. Id. at 6. Phenomena that could affect the probabilities of severe accidents include the poorer performance of MOX fuel during a LOCA compared to LEU fuel, which could increase the chance that the accident cannot be mitigated, as discussed in the basis of Contention 10.2 Phenomena that could affect the consequences of severe accidents include both higher release rates and higher release fractions for both fission 2 The basis of Contention 10 is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference into this contention.
5
products and actinides compared to LEU, as a result of the MOX fuel microstructure and different oxidation potential. Id. at 6.
As discussed above, the use of plutonium MOX fuel at the Catawba nuclear plant appears to pose a risk that plant safety systems will not be adequate to stop a LOCA from progressing to a core melt. At a minimum, the different characteristics of MOX fuel and LEU raise substantial uncertainties with respect to the probabilities and consequences of severe accidents for the MOX LTA core. Because of the potential for a significant increase in severe accident risk, these uncertainties should be fully analyzed in Duke's MOX LTA license amendment request.
B. Issues Under National Environmental Policy Act Contention 12: Failure to consider effects of plutonium MOX fuel characteristics on severe accident potential.
Basis: As discussed above in Contentions 10 and 11, plutonium MOX fuel has characteristics that may affect the potential for and consequences of a LOCA or severe accident. The bases of these contentions are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference into this contention.
In Section 5.6.3.1 of its Environmental Report, Duke addresses the environmental impacts of design basis accidents. License Amendment Application at 5-8. In Section 5.6.3.2, Duke addresses the environmental impacts of severe accidents. Id. at 5 5-9.
Neither section discusses the susceptibility of plutonium MOX fuel to slumping during a LOCA or the adverse effect that slumped fuel may have on the ability of the safety injection system to cool the entire core. The Environmental Report should address the 6
significance of these characteristics with respect to the potential for and consequences of a design basis accident or severe accident.
Contention 13: Failure to adequately address environmental impacts of plutonium shipments 3 Duke's license amendment application must be rejected because it is not supported by an adequate analysis of the security-related environmental impacts of shipping plutonium oxide to France, or the security-related impacts of shipping the LTAs from France back to the United States. 4 Basis: In Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.4 of the license amendment application, Duke concedes that shipment of polished PuO2 powder to France, and the return shipment of MOX fuel lead assemblies to the United States, are related actions whose environmental impacts must be considered. Id. at 5-3. Rather than providing such an analysis, Duke states that the analysis will be prepared by the DOE. Id. at 5-3. BREDL's Contention 8 challenged Duke's failure to address these impacts. See Petition to Intervene at 15.
In its November 11, 2003, response to Contention 8, Duke asserted that the DOE has "addressed the transportation question" in two documents: the 1996 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (DOE/ES-229) (hereinafter "Storage and Disposition PEIS"); and DOE's 3 This contention is presented as a substitute for Contention 8, which is hereby withdrawn. See First Supplemental Petition to Intervene at 15.
4 BREDL recognizes that it is NRC policy not to address the environmental impacts of terrorist attacks, sabotage, or other acts or malice or insanity in its Environmental Impact Statements. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-01, 57 NRC 1 (2003). BREDL submits that the instant circumstances are distinct, in that the DOE and not NRC is responsible for the EIS for disposition of plutonium, and DOE has affirmatively decided to address the environmental impacts of terrorist attacks. Having undertaken to evaluate these impacts, DOE is subject to review for the reasonableness of its analysis.
7
November 2003 Supplemental Analysis, Fabrication of Mixed Oxide Fuel Lead Assemblies in Europe (DOE/EIS-0229-SA3) (hereinafter "Supplemental Analysis"). 5 For a number of reasons, the 1996 Storage and the Supplemental Analysis are completely inadequate to support the shipment of plutonium to and from France. First, the Supplemental Analysis does not address the existence of significantly changed circumstances since 1996, which cast grave doubt on the wisdom of overseas plutonium shipments. The 1996 Storage and Disposition PEIS predates the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The September 11, 2001, attacks graphically demonstrated that the potential for terrorist attacks on U.S.
facilities is far greater and more lethal than previously thought. Moreover, the measures that have been taken in response represent a sea change in the way the U.S. government views the threat of terrorist attacks and the importance of measures to address it. The federal government has reorganized and devoted enormous amounts of resources to identifying vulnerabilities in nuclear facilities and protecting against the terrorist threat.
The NRC has also upgraded the licenses of every operating nuclear power plant and Category I facility in the United States to provide improved security measures. 6 As summarized by then-Chairman Richard Meserve, security has become a "central concern" in the aftermath of these attacks, posing a significant challenge to the federal 5 Duke served the Supplemental Analysis on the ASLB and parties by Federal Express on November 10, 2003. Duke also included a copy of DOE's Amended Record of Decision, also issued in November 2003. The Amended Record of Decision was published in the Federal Register on November 14, 2003, at 68 Fed. Reg. 64,611.
6 See Orders for Modification of Licenses of All Operating Power Reactor Licensees, EA-03-086, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,517 (May 7, 2003); Order Modifying License to Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Docket No.70-143, License No. SNM-124, EA 02-087, 68 Fed. Reg.
26,676 (May 16, 2003).
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government. Speech by Dr. Richard A. Meserve at INFOCASE Conference (September 11, 2002).7 Without any doubt, the events of September 11, 2001, the lessons learned from them, and the federal government's response to those events, constitute the type of "significant new circumstances or information" that warrant revision and republication of the 1996 and 1999 draft EISs for public comment. Marsh v. Oregon NaturalResources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). See also }Farm Springs Darn Task Forcev. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 ( 9 th Cir. 1980); Friendsof the Cleanvaterv. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 558 (9 th Cir. 2000).
There are a number of alternatives and mitigative measures that demand serious consideration in a newly issued EIS regarding disposition of weapons-grade materials.
First, should the risk be mitigated by upgrading the outdated international standard for protection of plutonium under export licenses? Second, how can the potential for terrorist attacks be re-evaluated in light of what we now know about the motives and practices of terrorists? Third, how might the consequences of such attacks be affected by deliberate attempts to exacerbate the adverse effects of a plutonium release, for instance by causing a fire or explosion sufficient to reduce plutonium particles to an extremely fine size? It is woefully insufficient to merely cross-reference the DOE's discussion of accident impacts in the 1996 Storage and Disposition PEIS and 1999 SPDEIS.
Finally, the new information and changed circumstances that have come about since September 11, 2001, unequivocally call for reconsideration of the option of postponing fabrication of the plutonium MOX LTAs until the proposed MOX fabrication 7 The speech is available on the NRC's website.
9
facility at the Savannah River Site is built. At the time the 1996 Storage and Disposition PEIS was prepared, the DOE did not give serious consideration to this alternative because it would delay the use of plutonium MOX fuel in nuclear plants. See Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, 65 Fed.
Reg. 1,608, 1,612 (January 11, 2000) (explaining that LTA fabrication at Los Alamos National Laboratory is the "preferred alterative" because infrastructure already exists).
DOE's concerns about timeliness must now be balanced against the new concerns that have arisen since September 11, 2001, over the risks of (a) sending plutonium across the ocean in vessels with questionable security measures, (b) to a country whose measures for safeguarding the plutonium are shrouded in secrecy, (c) under international security standards that are grossly outdated. Moreover, anticipated delays in carrying out the parallel U.S.-Russian MOX programs reduce any pressure on DOE to have the MOX LTAs manufactured in Europe on a rapid timeline. 8 Accordingly, these issues must be addressed in a new EIS for the disposition of weapons grade fissile material. Moreover, the EIS must be published in draft form, so that members of the public can be involved in the decision-making process.
II. THESE CONTENTIONS SATISFY A BALANCING OF THE NRC'S LATE-FILING CRITERIA.
These contentions satisfy a balancing of the NRC's late-filing criteria in 10 C.F.R.
§ (a)(l)(i)-(v). First, BREDL has good cause for filing late. Contentions 10, 11, and 12 8 "Obstacles" that threaten to impede the international MOX program include inadequacy of funding for the Russiann program, expiration of the 1998 U.S. Russian agreement on technical cooperation for the plutonium disposition (including liability protection programs), and U.S. concerns over possible Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program. See Answer of Duke Energy Corporation to the "Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League's Supplemental Petition to Intervene" Etc. at 32-33 (November 11, 2003).
10
are based on a slide presentation that was made at a meeting between IRSN and the NRC Staff on October 23, 2003. The slides were not available at the meeting, and were not placed in the NRC's CITRIX system until November 4, 2003.9 Contention 13 is based on the DOE's Supplemental Analysis, which was not provided to BREDL until November 11, 2003. Therefore, all the contentions are being filed within 30 days of receipt of the documents on which they are based.
BREDL also satisfies the other four elements of the late-filing standard. Aside from this proceeding, BREDL has no means ofr protecting its interest in ensuring that the testing of plutonium MOX lead test assemblies is conducted in a manner that adequately protects health and safety and complies with the environmental safeguards of NEPA. In addition, BREDL's participation in the proceeding may reasonably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record. BREDL will be presenting the views of Dr.
Lyman, a highly qualified expert who has extensive experience regarding nuclear power plant safety, environmental and security analyses. Moreover, there are no other parties who can represent BREDL's interests in this proceeding. Finally, while granting a hearing on BREDL's supplemental contentions may broaden the proceeding somewhat, these effects will not be unreasonable, given that the contentions are being filed early in the proceeding. Accordingly, a balancing of the late-filing factors favors the admission of the contentions.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the ASLB should admit Contentions 10 through 13.
9 Undersigned counsel for BREDL recently discovered that the slides were not put on NRC's ADAMS document retrieval system at all. At our request, the slides have been put on ADAMS. The Accession Number is ML032970642.
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Respectfully submitted, And_,-i-Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1726 M Street N.W., Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036 202/328-3500 e-mail: dcurran(a)harnoncurran.com December 2, 2003 12
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No's. 50-413-OLA, DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION 50-414-OLA (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units and 2, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1and 2)
DECLARATION OF DR. EDWIN S. LYMAN IN SUPPORT OF BREDL CONTENTIONS 10 THROUGH 13 Under penalty of perjury, Edwin S. Lyman declares as follows:
I. My name is Edwvin S. Lyman. I am a Senior Staff Scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists.
- 2. On October 21, 2003, I submitted a declaration in this proceeding which set forth my professional qualifications in this matter.
- 3. I am familiar with the licensing-related filings and correspondence that have been submitted by Duke Energy Corporation in support of its application for a license amendment to use lead test assemblies of mixed oxide fuel at the Catawba nuclear power plant. I am also familiar with the environmental impact statements and other analyses prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") with respect to disposition of plutonium and other weapons-grade fissile materials. In addition, I am familiar with regulations and guidance of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and the DOE governing plutonium processing facilities. I am also familiar with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act.
- 4. I assisted BREDL with the preparation of Contentions 10 through 13, regarding deficiencies in Duke's license amendment application and the DOE's environmental analyses. The factual assertions in those contentions are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and the opinions expressed therein are based on my best professional judgment.
- 5. If any of BREDL's contentions, including 10 through 13, are admitted, I plan to tet iny regarding those contentions.
Edwin S. Liman,Phb. V December 2, 2003
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- SECOND SAMLNJ OAOITW ASO NDN Als T13 REQUIRED XEIET DELAYAND- COTS
- AREDUCEDT'EGJ
- AREDUCE_)LVE~r~U ~3 PHEBUS STLOC MEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. MAILLIA Tet al1
r, p"7z;N2
- 4 fr ;2 t
,.I P ' I., :'.=
'4 _ - ._! P' !v i ," M _.' Mm rV DE RANSFERT INTERNSS OES Exit to DEDA T
E~~r~ttoC~cIIP i>-/ lint CSpcctronmvter :
501.
?elease Line MEF-ASqURi4ET COMPARTMENT \ /N. Z specro
~ SA1 i iMIOICAL 10M3ONAIMENT WITH
-~ INEGRALFILTERS N ~~ ~~~~~~~~TA ONDENSER DRIVER CORE -
-- in;
. 11111._1-11 s S A. 3
I I 1, SriXt. . 2<
ll.-ll-__
.!i . .:r t.w.L Je I_' ;.e. ,i':B>.: is ..
A,--' 4-.Jj 64' 1-1 1,1-11111 mm PHEB USSTLOCMEETING, October 23th,2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. MAILLIATet al 12
CAISSON EQUIPM,..M.; E-NT0 2,g0 000 .. E MAIN ASPECTS OF THE MEASUREMEN COMARTMENT The measuremet ament:(MCn in aithe experimental measurements.
The MC is included in a 1509C fuoa^ . i ..
The MC includes16 sampling i stt connectorsremovble through remote operationsi Each samplinginstrument' is equidto CrI e low polLIi a 13M After sampling ,~r'emo~'valsg, ,,~sleevesmpa&h yi~~~~ t he ecotamnto perform ed~~~~~~~. .....
.. 7 The MC cajn ~be'ltrnfrewtout ~a`eupetlg~
The STIL-SueempgraimmeicJds C, ttppwflukn airi while theboteneJisundrprti cj aesI..
PHEBUS STLO0CMAEE TING, October 23 tit, 2003, Wash ington, D.C USA A. MA ILLIA Tet at 13
MEASUREMENT STRATEGY -"
Highlights on the measurem~entlJ staeyfrteSLSuc~r ests Fuel degr ti'on~me'asurements.will be basicall tesame afothPhus-FP El A nuImber of on-line sensors`FA~
1] Sohistcate in-ituhond estructivletechnibme a SO emission computed Aomograppctoer, bopto n LDeailed destructive exmnto'dil~sib LiA pecial attention wlbepitomauetrnsienthdoe asta production s&duigth oe el Realeases measuremens&wil be0frn1.~~ n La -Thermal grdentftuhes'ab--t~fel ~~~o h deemntino s products depositn and, ~ W&eita g.,
Mas~em~i
~Li The Cmparrn J- A"" wi of stqueiitnially fpmrted.
flers i order i'to esire bbtlh a a &r aerosolparticle-szig.1.
Th asic technique wil*Vse"6't.o.tesu~e tI~'
transfe ote~CL o 5f; For non-?. emitters, hni4a~fs mpe~t~epdioa database -;..
PHEBUSSTLOCMIEETING, October 23tlt, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A.MIAILLIATetal 14
= ~
'=,- ',, ' :<
M-EASUREMENT STRTEGY MEASUREMENT COMM MENT
't1 d (i ,G ' -t '-, ,VOLINE l-i* GAMMA SPECTROMETRY RELEASERPATE SEQUENTIAL.- RESUSPENTION RATE
~4 GAMA SPECTROMETRY
~4 bESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATIONS POST TEST
--- -J4 CHEMICAL ANALYSES
.-Z BUNDLE AND UPPER PLEN . -
I~~ TEMPERATURES I0 -i ='eMASS FLOW RATES CONVENTIONAL fi POWER
' HYDROGEN, STEAM CONTENTS '
I ij > f 1l
- $M< 0z - ................
iSEQUENTIAL DE RA TE OSIT RU EXAMINATIONS ......................... l - -; i . ;X =
44~~ . ~RESUSPENSION RATE I, POSTC, ',,.' HTES Spec, TOMOGRAPHY~
~~~~~~~~~~GAMMA CHEMICAL ANALYSES PHEBUSSTLOCMEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. MAILLIATetal 15
L .~ 1I - -
5 I
) *, I Part 3 -
fa, G.LJA"'CHE .
~.RANJEAN fl~L~ANT.
L L jI,-- -.,I F:- 1 1_1 F' - -,:, o I
w L.A - ,:SAfe -
Wait=
WLoCA-Ramces ibe P'rogramme" mm PHEBUS STLOC AEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D. C USA A. AIAILLIA T et al 16
Design BasisAccident: BASIC REQUIREMENT After any LOCA transient a core geometry which preserve ltst coolability must be guaranteed It means:
- Shattering of the fuel rods has to be avoided Core coolability has to be maintained -
- . : C : that Criteria are not
,,-heck To derive Criteria , . .:-. violated PHEBUSS.LOC.Gr O3 Ueator LQCAs1 PHEBUS STLO0C MEETING, October 231h, 2 003, Wash ington, D.C USA A. MIAILLIA T et al 17
Gamy ~ .> ' ;' i I' 1]TO DERIVE CRITERIA . -
It means: to know the quantities which control the cladding residual ductility back to cold conditions and core coolability, the values not to exceed.
Such ino atoeg.ithfaosciei1 pd 2 QP Pea CldTmertu (PCT) and Equivalent CladReacted ECR-TO CHECK THA T CRITERIA ARE NOT VIOLATED FOR REACTOR LOCAs E~~.- _-. i -;.
It means: To demonstrate, through calculations tools, that whatever is the kind offs LOCA transient,-nowhere in the core, the criteria values are exceeded models V
- +,.. -
4
-Models: fo thraf .:-W ,-i .-
4,4
,transientsy,.;
PHEBUS STLOCAMETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D. C USA A. AIA ILLIA T et al 18
/-'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7 In the context of a. permanent need to reassess reactoresafety studies imposes by reactor evolution, .new types of fuel and claddg, increase of burnup IRSN is revisiting L CA Xstdies to h
, the aequacy of itera - 1 A That are =~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
criteria nof vi~~~~~~~~~~~otate4I~~~~w ~ ~is Theavailablemargius XV.,~~~
PHEBUS STLOC MEETING, October23th, 2003, Washington, D. C. USA A. MILLIA Tet a! 19
i: -
Z , -, ,fi,._ ;.i~~~~~~~it;?,4' <~~
On the next slides we will explore the main pending issues which affect both criteria derivation and_
calculations correctness Then , from ',a comparisonbetween -the pedgsesand te existing rsarch progirams T needs for additionalresearcheswill be deduced Fin ally, 7i
-r IRSN STLOC programproposalregardingLOCA will be summarized j
.-. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
t:ji. - C MeD C PHEBUSSTLOCMEETING, October 23th,2003, Washington, D.C USA A. AIAILLIA T et al 20
i U
77 ik-,
- -; M -=-
2; I-
-1,-9 r, t -1!
=
- 2
- I Eat TYTmprtuePICAL LOCA TRAN5IENT 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
P~~- sp,~q Co se uele Impact on~~~~~~~~~0 oato Fina oxdaton ati an th~qiiii~S~ bi: bi~J~n(M~Ballooing iib~t Hyroenutae ndte cjsqecsfr jicip 0 'Note that this qaesIouif~d pIicdry~ lweepowe genraio isno rdua~,unik Lb 0d~e)
PHEBUSSTLOCMEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. ILLIA T et at 21
-- = , , r W , ,' -- -
77 I Pending Issues : i11 4, Intn of fue moem V t~~.
FUEL Rto
'FQELret 4 V Are te :anydelay duzetf c bd
/ F.-'illing ratio hoIcwl h bmir with fragmentatn Wor UQ4,
.'.'agglomerates?.
Vt F ragment sizes? ..
PHEBUSSTLOCAEETING, October23th, 2003, Washington,D.C USA A. AAILLIA Tet al 22
I: I ~~;~<&
IL ~'.K I E t- I'll r I
E5-11,
- <S Pending:: Issues:I. See references 4 to 6-,,
'-LOC -__ _ 15ft Tempe.rot ur e Rod 61iO6-ll, What is the bundle blockage geory ,._......................... Rod 6 C16-12 for irradiated bund d .
, irradipied rrstlocations I *,,
II X Burst Hot and cold points are less likely due to the fuel stack I To 1070 K 0
_ < <AFresh 0.2 . 0.6 C
reraisto duin th irradiation.t - '60 0 emera ur Rod 603-3
. iRod . ....... 603-4
... - f-- # C.)
X Burst tarstlocations T - 1115 K
- r H iheC irradiated 4'\=
02 CIA vS 0.3 Higher th symtry ige ,bibr stance from bottom of fuel sck PHEBUSSTLOC MEETING, October23th, 2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. MAILLIA T et at 23
4, LI vi 1;mt r__4 t7l, k
.. -= - -
i = %.,
. tl.E E - sit
-. I
_ Pending Issues-: I.r - t_,; -.1 - I_ 1--
Corrosion and hydrogen u Res are lo, m;=~ ~~~~~~ 'w'e-A'"' ~ -ii better kept. Lower :the corl Dn lowerJIhe as-ciated; thbetterducili upe bigger the balloonis rg<,,~ratio- willbe li,key for modern alloys 200
-w150 -
- See references 7 to 9 -, .;
0
. ._ .~~
C 100 -
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 $0000 Fuel rod average burnup (MWd/T)
~ ~ ~
-1 I. . .
.1~7,
= . _
', ". f, =I-
- I I- , - , I .II .-- 1- - --.; ---- _- tl--- -1 ,-]-,-!-7,-
PHEBUS STLOC MEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MSAILLIA T et al 24
rF E1,E 0-
- SI E, Ea I
PL ,-, il q-11 ;;: = - =-- A. - .-
Pending Issues:z Sam e Tendency x) observed >is wih ow tiiZ alo : ow r heti4cnt nt
- .-=- . 180 EDGAR creep tests 160 upper bound ,B. .-- i-. ;t }
bigge o 40-all 0 K
-- <~~8 0-
~~~~60* *
- - 5;-
L ; -z 40 *1,5 %/Sn Zr4 -
- .- . 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 P H EShBnU S S C 160Temperatures T LU.O C M E E T I N G1 t
° 2t 2 , AI A e 2 54 PHEB US STLOCAIEETING, October 23th,2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. AfAILLIA T et al 25
Pending Is'sues: M 5MM A BUNDLE ry o get rei l l~~~~ : ~ ~~~ fi s 5, ~ ~ L : . lt -;,
It provides rrcto uthl ,a, . r temperature field. around the tested . ,t fuel rod - A -
l-.. -. . - a*constant internal overpressure: 65 ba time of burst :482 512 s o burst temperature 827 . 845IC E 0 Temperature. 'field. icorrectns is >6O .-BEKk-dta crucial to produce IsI b _
- 0 ; -: f r 0 y w5 100 azimuthal cladding temperature difference ATaz[K]
PHEBUSSTLOCMEETING, October23tk, Washington, D.C. USA A. AILLIA T et al 26
- " 4 14,
- i A V , I- E Z
-Z
=- R 'a - - - . A 5IrI : t'I:Vy>:(:*( .r. - -
I
.1Pending Issues:. /.77v; ,
i , .-.-.- e4- ,
A BUNDLE g~leometry -,',is neIicessaryto et ealistic undlebokg emty The blockage ratio is not 1- linear.additio fhied 3the ob ser tions:
N times the single_ rod bt t
3 o .. .e-lb-r--uc~ -1 a e~- J
-~~~~ 100~ ] __________-S -
_ 801 _
A BUNDLE-', m.y _ - , location of bursts 60 4 provides t he correc t n oj6r I' balloons d strbutio ni-w nd a r 4 O02 Ste m distance from too of heated zone [cm]
,, ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ -i ~-- .C ~
......... ~ 3. -- - -....
PHEBUSSTLOC AEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A-MAILLIATetal 27
il Pending Issues A BUNDLE geomeiitfryv"is n~;ecessar toget elsi Bundl Blcg gemty t A BUNK~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 Radial interaction; ewe ad:acen fue rod bimpc'hdalo izxdtebnl Blockage geometry armd~ for r4w~s) of guard an ractians wi 4Iiwtr-rod as e,9 mchanL 4# (IIW), t~z ~n~id~rtj~n gf~ Q~
AX
~B BSB3 X
~~peruneJ421
~~~~~J-~~~~~~~~
PHEBUSSTLOCAIEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA T et al 28
r mb l e i :
51N I
.; . , > , w.e -; vi >. u a .s.
v @ @ , AC
. -_ X, ,t ' '
.
- i . -
- r / r _ . <
rods bundle? .... . - . - ....... i, . - .. - , . ;, : ... if E: Li P , i s
- v -
, ,.,., . ,,,8 ,, ., :. d ,,.t, ................. , ..... f . :., ... g >,: -.,.wi;;
- ; *- 5i S j+ k * - - f- 4 /
,,; ,, . i, ....... ,.,, :z., ....... , ), . .... ; ,0
- ,; A,,, ,.i ,,.,, A ;o - f ;} i - i -;;
, ', ' , ',, -- , ', ? C - - ', - " 0 ',: -, D , ; 4
-, . a ....... ,i.- ; .- - - ..... ; , , -,, f
_ae .
v~~~~-. i t' _; ' - . _ i -' ' : 7
' ,. . ... ;, 'z' ', - .................. r s' '. ' '.' ' ' ='-
}; _'. . ^ ^
_.: ) ,' .A ] ' w L ., . S 1 S , ' *; a i Ti
- r R>.f The 90% valu"~derlvedfrMI 4 LA
.?U
-hetai)on unirradximum se Of an fuel relocationada r1i4ggp 71 reducion) . f J A A PHEBUS STLOC MEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA T et al 29
I
- - .. r -, .. - .. A, ,,>,?..A .AAt'A.rA4'A. A-.
'U .,t .2,.A, N
iiPending Issues:
CLA TEMPERATUPES PCT 1200 -
N EA S 400 Tie(seconds)
EASY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reflooding requiresto Aui'
~~J4J PHEBUSSTLOCAfEETING, October 23th,2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA Tel al 30
6--,
N UPending Issues:
Are they any needs to modify, Ha lated to, lup,'ost q+ench ductil f, quenching, additional mchanical stresses are induce e rods blo e in the-r assembly? Seerenceli4 Which is the esi dla q hlbu o w PHEBUS STLOC EETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA T eta! 31
I ' - V-S a d'S, A flU ;r e -,'.; -
TO DERIVE CRITERIA Post Oxidation duct ity AN UnconstraintQuenching - -l TAG RZIRC G Quenching with Corained:rods JAERI TO CHECK THA T CRITERIA ARE NOT VIOLA TED FOR REACTOR LOCAs CladdingBurst-0 ;e <,4{;^^; 'r~a 'EDGAR ANLJAERI HADEN L Relocation -TIALDEN in pile ANL out of pile Bundle Blockage Geometry And HeatSource Accumulation STLOC CladdingOxidation: -TAGCIR HYD--RAZIR CINOG ANL JAERI
-Bundle: oolabili^t If- ecessary according to STLOC results PHEBUSSTLOCAEETING, October 23t1h, 2003, Washington, D.C. USA A. MAILLIA T et at 32
Eai E f Movie producedfrom transmission tomogi at s E -i)
STLOC 1 ghAD_
-X: And He~~~~~~~~~~~~at
< -Bun~~~~~~~~~~dle Blockage Geometry-Source Acculmulation-C PHEBUS STLOC MEETING, October23th, 2003, Washington, D C USA A. MAILLIAT et al 33
-0 . IS. c1 STLOC STLOC will be an unique source of data-for bundleb.eetryandte heat source addition i test which inles phenomena of the LOCA transiet '.:r3/4.Y~
TWO TESTS IN THE PHEBUS -FACILIT 9 High. burn up rd a ring of- f rods
- Temperature ramp frolowpower unde eam 'odI j~i AFIST TES
.Cladding for whietb. jg'mg'in';m
- bc' age ' et Low tin) 02EOct V STLO FuelUS B , I> ing tof.C US icr r u 6O G dtU A local)
A SECOND. OWEN `,TEST td dflAIb .
.* lading,Zr0wt, fne ~2 end.fP 1 ~d
- Cadn ZriI~&0 52 GWdAtIV
~
- Back-!up- Test freoainw udegoer PHEBUS STLOCAMEETING, October 23th, 2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA Tet al 34
~-~
17- tf~- t" I I
%=g~ -C C"; r a
PHEBUS LOCATE Such a programme sould take place tN the PHEBUS Facilit-y By R ithiw I
will take advantage of the know- ow accumulated when -the-previous ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
l TANK AN CCJMJI) programme with fresh fuel wasrun
' X1 1~~~~WR I'
Phebus FP Caisson Ia pir IO u7rs n t$',~b re u u n h ~ 1 d ~ t Jaclfity. g e~ r u , A Reactor 94 PHEBUSSTLOCAIEETING, October 23t1t,2003, Washington, D.C USA A. MAILLIA Tel al 35
1LWR fuel rod behaviour in thefFR2in-pile tsts"simulating the heatupphseoQf&aL0CA E. ARBet at KfK 3346- March 1983 ...
2/Relocation of fuel fragment i ballooned fuel ldsN-memradu, .L ileimr M`arcdh:3O "I 981 31/NRC Generic Safety Issue N0 92;)Fuel Crumffbling during LApril18-41/Behaviour of irradiated fuel ~during ~LOCA, G.-,,Hache, .,Fir~t' mt~g.'OECDINEAICSNITjasFoconfe behaviour, 1 9 -2 0 h jun,97PriFnc - j- --
5// PBF LOCA test LOC-6'fuel behavor eot-J. M.Bogtne uegICR-3184 f pil1 6// PBF LOCA test series, testis LOC-3 and LO-uel e ai urlL ttJ. .ruhtn tat ue(C-Q June 1983 - -
711 Experiment and modefi-ng'of Advanc'd Fuel Rod Cla1dd~igBhv-u n LQCA c ijps :Apla-Bt7 Phase Transformation an DGRMth o et A, ASTVIS ? 5 fyT
,gro aJ -a 8// Influence of Hydroe Cotnto beA 6b~~' ha sed Triansomto Mechanical Behaviour of Zy4,M4."ajd Fist hae.P t9ATr~set Pce~
ASTM/STP-1 423, December 2002, Olp&7" -
9// Behaviour of~ M5,All-oyjunder toj0 36'are t bh~r,
.Z4 eba11~Jprt t OECD/SNI pecial Experits group Qf~s S pi 03.-- --
l~llnpubished IRN Ieut .......
11iCadding: Tube ~Deformai~tion -.,nd.Ct,~ gej~ooignaCLC faPR J" iiir.Ncla Engineering and besig,AgisJ~ -
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~A 4 12/1 Multirods- BurstTest UderLp ~ piios, ~~4t~~ pW~~ ofut§ safety and fison product re as M9tnya~~pdn o~l 13/I LOCAductility-1tests R MwbrJp A
14/I Results' fromn-JAERI ;resear ,abi~~i~ t FSRSM, March 4-5,2002,3T0 I aaf .
PHEBUS STLOCAIEETING, October 23th,2003, Washington, D. C USA A. MAILLIA T et al 36
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on December 1, 2003, copies of Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League's Second Supplemental Petition To Intervene were served on the following by e-mail and/or first-class mail, as indicated below:
Ann Marshall Young, Chair Susan L. Uttal, Esq.
Administrative Judge Antonio Fernandez, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Kathleen A. Kannler, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: T-3F23 Mail Stop 15 D21 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: AMYnrc. gov Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 E-mail: slu~nrc.goy axf2@nrc.gov, Anthony J. Baratta KAK1@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mary Olson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Southeast Office, Nuclear Information and Mail Stop: T-3F23 Resource Service Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O Box 7586 E-mail: AJBS@nrc gov Asheville, NC 28802 E-mail: nirs. semindspring. com Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lisa F. Vaughn, Esq.
Mail Stop: 0-16CI Legal Dept. (PBO5E)
Washington, D.C. 20555 Duke Energy Corporation 526 South Church Street (EC IX)
Thomas S. Elleman Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Administrative Judge E-mail: lfVaughnsduke -energy.con Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 4760 East Country Villa Drive Janet Marsh Zeller, Executive Director Tucson, AZ 85718 Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League E-mail: ellemanieos.ncsu.edu P.O. Box 88 Glendale Springs, NC 28629 Office of the Secretary (original and two copies) E-mail: BREDL(skybest. com ATTN: Docketing and Service U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: 0-16C1 Washington, D.C. 20555 E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET3nrc. go
2 David A. Repka, Esq.
Anne W. Cottingham, Esq.
Winston & Strawn, LLP 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 E-mail: drepka~winston. com acotting~winston.com Diane Curran