ML033240600

Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions

ML033240600
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	11/10/2003
From:	Bauguess D FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PY-CEI/NRR-2749L
Download: ML033240600 (73)

Text

FENOC Perry Nuclear Power Plant 10 Center Road FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company PO. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081 November 10, 2003 PY-CEI/NRR-2749L United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, enclosed are changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions (EPls) for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The changes have been reviewed in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q) and it has been determined that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

These changes constitute revisions, temporary changes, or reissued pages. Please follow the updating instructions per the attached Controlled Document Instruction Sheet and return the signed Acknowledgment of Receipt form.

If you have questions or require additional'information, please contact me at (440) 280-5589.

Very truly yours, David Supervisor Emergency Planning Unit DLB:byr Enclosure cc: NRR Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III, Incident Response Center w/attachments Aoq 6

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT I & 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT Title Emergency Plan ImDlementing Instructions EPI-Al/ Rev. 7 Control No. 60 Letter No./Date PY-CEI/NRR-2749L / November 10. 2003 Signature Date Title Return to:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Attn: B.Y. Richardson, A240 P. 0. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION Perry Nuclear Power Plant Controlled Document Instruction Sheet Manual: Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions EPI-Al/ Rev. 7 Control Number 60 Revision Remove Revision Remove and Replace 6 Reissue Entire Document

'j .~

EPI-Al Page: i Rev.: 7 PERRY OPERATIONS MANUAL PNPP . ,

Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction I

, -M 5,4 -f3,1,1- ,

TITLE: EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

- REVISION: 7 EFFECTIVE DATE:

PREPARED: Lawrence W. Burqwald *3-28-03

. - / Date IN

EPI-Al N,, ' 8 -Page: ii Rev.: 7 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Table of Contents Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE ,

2.0 REFERENCES

1 3.0 DEFINITIONS 2 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5 4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/

EOF Emergency Coordinator 5 4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/

EOF Plant Operations Advisor 5 4.3 Plant Personnel 5 5.0 ACTIONS 5 5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5 5.2 Downgrading Event 8 5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 9

~**, 5.4 Classification After the Event. 11

• 5.5 Staffing-of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events '11 5.6 Records 12 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Initiating Condition Index 13 Attachment 2 - EAL Entry Criteria 15 SCOPE OF REVISION:..

'Periodic Review - Required Rev. 7 - 1. Incorporate CR 02-02429,-CA Number 1.

2. Change STA to SE.,

3. Change Transport of Radioactively Contaminated Person NRC Notification from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification per PAP-1604.'

4. Deleted'commitment'F00735, this commitment was archived.

5. Correct typographical errors.

6. Change Shift Supervisor to Shift Manager.

7.. Improved EAL flowpaths where possible to reflect improved ladder decision making techniques.

8. Minor format changes.

l X EPI-Al Page: 1 Rev.: 7 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1.0 PURPOSE To provide specific criteria based on <NUMARC/NESP-007> for the classification of an abnormal plant event transient, or external event affecting or having the potential to affect plant operations or personnel safety, into one of the four (4) <NUREG-0654> defined emergency classes.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source References

1. Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Docket No. 50-440 2; ODCM: Appendix C 2.2 Use References

1. NUREG 0654: Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in.Support of Nuclear Power Plants

2. NUMARC/NESP-007: Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels (Revision 2)

3. Title 10, Part 50.47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Emergency Plans

-4. Title 10, Part 50.72 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

5. Technical-Specifications (TS), Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1

6. EPI-A2: Emergency Actions Based on Event Classification

7. EPI-A10: Re-Entry/Recovery-

8. EPI-Bl: Emergency Notification System

9. EPI-B4: First Aid and Medical Care

10. EPI-B9: Emergency Records

r 54 EPI-Al Page: 2 Rev.: 7

11. ONI-C61: Evacuation of the Control Room

12. ONI-P54: Fire

13. ONI-P56-2: Security Threat

14. ONI-R10: Loss of AC Power

15. PAP-1604: Reports Management

16. PAP-1701: Records Management Program

17. PAP-1910: Fire Prdtection Program

18. PEI-B13: RPV Control

19. PEI-T23: Containment Control

20. PEI-N11: Containment Leakage Control

21. IOI-11: Shutdown from Outside Control Room

22. PNPP Physical Security Plan

23. PSI-0007: Reporting Emergency Plan Related Communication Equipment Problems

24. Commitments addressed in this document:

F01626 P00035 P00067 H00037. P00038 P00089 ,

L00406 P00055 P00091 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Applicable Mode The operating mode existing at the time of event or initiation of transient.

3.2 Challenge Any condition that, in the Emergency Coordinator's judgment, would likely result in a loss of one or more of the fission product barriers-(i.e.,

fuel.cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or Containment) in the' next 1-3 hours.

EPI-Al Page: 3 Rev.: 7 3.3 Emergency Action Level (EAL)

A predetermined, site-specific, observable threshold or entry criteria for a given Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL entry criteria can be: an equipment'status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class. Refer to EAL Entry Criteria. (Attachment 2).

3.4 Emergency Class One of a minimum set of names or titles, established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under <IOCFR50.47>, for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative.

radiological seriousness, and (2) the time-sensitive onsite and offsite radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions. The existing radiological emergency classes, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

• Unusual Event

• Alert

• Site Area Emergency

• General Emergency 3.5 Event Category A collection of similar Initiating Conditions grouped to allow for the prompt recognition of the transient or event and assessment of severity '

based on the four emergency classes.

3.6 Functional A system, subsystem, train, component or device, though degraded in equipment condition or configuration, is FUNCTIONAL if it is capable of

' maintaining respective system parameters within acceptable design limits.

3.7 Initiating Condition (IC)

One of a predetermined subset of plant conditions defined by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>, where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency or such an emergency has occurred. Initiating' Conditions are established based on the four emergency classes required under

<10CFR50.47>. Refer to Initiating Condition Index (PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1).

3.8 Loss Unless defined by specific EAL indication, LOSS shall be defined as a state of inoperability in 'which FUNCTIONAL and operable status cannot be maintained. A system, subsystem, train, component or device is not lost if its functionality is assured.

.1 EPI-Al Page: 4 Rev.: 7 3.9 Operating Mode There are six applicable operating modes associated with the Initiating Conditions used in this document: numbers 1 through 5, and the letter "D". Numbers 1 - 5 correspond to Modes 1 through 5 defined by

<Technical Specifications> Table 1.1-1; the letter "D" stands for the reactor DEFUEL condition.

3.10 Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas For event classification purposes, Safe Shutdown Buildings/areas are considered to be the following locations:

Control Complex (all elevations)

Auxiliary Building (all elevations)

Intermediate Building (all elevations)

Fuel Handling Building (all elevations)

Reactor Building (all elevations)

,Emergency Service Water Pump House (all elevations)

Electrical Duct Chase Leading. to ESW Building Diesel Generator Building (all areas except the Unit 2 Division 1, 2, and 3 DG Rooms)

Steam Tunnel (all elevations)

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Area Condensate Storage Tank Intake/Discharge Structure 3.11 Significant Transient Includes response to automatic or manually initialed functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

3.12 Unplanned Any activity which is not previously approved. If-an EAL entry condition is satisfied due to preplanned maintenance or testing, the emergency classification is NOT declared. The unplanned designation shall include any activity, including preplanned maintenance or testing, in which the system is inadvertently rendered unavailable.

3.13 Valid An indication or report condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, .or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's truth is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

A4 EPI-Al Page: 5 Rev.: 7 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 49.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/EOF Emergency Coordinator

-As the designated Emergency Coordinator, classify an Emergency-Plan event per this instruction when actual or potential plant conditions dictate and ensure required actions are implemented per <EPI-A2>.

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/EOF Plant Operations Advisor Advise the designated Emergency Coordinator of any Initiating Conditions; which are being approached or EAL entry criteria met upon initiation of an abnormal or inadvertent plant event.

4.3 Plant Personnel -

Inform the Control Room of any conditions or symptoms indicated by instrument readings or direct observations that could indicate a real or potential emergency.

5.0 ACTIONS The following actions are intended as guidance. Knowledge of plant conditions and/or the extent of the emergency may require additional response actions. In all cases, this instruction should be combined with the sound judgment of the Emergency Coordinator to arrive at the proper classification for a particular set of circumstances. <H00037, P00038>

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5.1.1 Ensure appropriate Off-Normal Instructions (ONIs), Plant Emergency Instructions (PEIs) or other applicable plant instructions and procedures are being implemented to stabilize plant conditions.

The classification shall -be of high priority following the performance of the required immediate operator actions and must be made promptly if a radioactive release to the public is probable so that offsite agencies can mobilize and implement the necessary precautions to protect the health and safety of the publib.

A EPI-Al Page: 6 Rev.: 7 5.1.2 Implement <EPI-B4> if the event involves personnel injuries.

1. Upon being notified that the victim(s) being transported to an offsite medical facility is suspected or known to be radiologically contaminated,'perform the following per

<EPI-B4>:

a. Contact an Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) Representative using the Integrated On-Call Report found on the Perry Web under Emergency Response Organization, and direct the individual to notify the State of Ohio and Lake County Emergency management Agencies (EMAs) of the incident.

NOTE: If the injury(ies) occur during evening hours, this notification can be deferred until the next day.

b. Perform an eight (8) hour notification to the NRC per

<PAP-1604> in accordance with <10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii)?.

5.1.3 Implement <ONI-P54> and/or <PAP-1910> if the event involves a confirmed, probable or possible fire. <L00406>

5.1.4 Determine the affected areas of the plant and implement an evacuation of the building or localized plant area. <F01626>

5.1.5 For an abnormal event or evolution, which is not classifiable per this instruction, use the Integrated On-Call Report to contact additional plant expertise or manpower if desired for assessment and

'mitigation purposes.

1. 'For situations in which the event requires a prompt, coordinated response, refer to Section 5.5 to initiate staffing of the Technical'Support Center (TSC)j'or Operations Support Center (OSC), if warranted.

5.1.6 Classify the emergency as follows:

NOTE: The designated Emergency Coordinator may not'delegate the decision to initially classify, reclassify, or terminate an emergency event per <EPI-Al>. <P00035>

1. Using PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1, identify the emergency by event 'category and determine the most appropriate Initiating Condition (IC) based on the operating mode at the time of event initiation, plant conditions, and severity levels.

NOTE: Initiating Condition Index operator aid(s) are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, Technical Support Cente'r (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Backup EOF.

EPI-Al Page: 7 Rev.: 7

2. Refer to Attachment 2 for the applicable Initiating Condition(s) to determine whether the criteria are met for the operating mode(s) listed.

NOTE 1: For those EALs with a permitted out of service time or duration (e.g.,-15 minutes during electrical transients), the following shall apply:

• The clock should start at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise in which case the clock start time is retroactive.

• .. The declaration should be made as soon as it is determined that the transient will last longer than the allotted time. In this case, the declaration shall not be postponed until the permitted time has expired.

NOTE 2: Fission Product Barrier Matrix operator aids are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room,-TSC, EOF and at the Backup EOF.

3. Declare an emergency class when all the conditions listed in at least one EAL column have been met, and implement <EPI-A2>.

<H00037>

a. When several Initiating Conditions are met, declare the most severe emergency class.

A 15-minute goal has been established for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available to Control Room operators that an EAL has been exceeded.

b. For TRANSITORY EVENTS, in which an event is classifiable in accordance with this instruction but becomes a lower classifiable event before being declared (i.e., Alert vs.

Site Area Emergency), perform the following:

1) Declare only the lower classification and implement

-<EPI-A2>.

2) Provide a brief description of the transitory event using Block 3c on the PNPP Initial Notification Form.

EPI-Al Page: 8 Rev.: 7

c. For an Unusual Event or Alert, which was classifiable in accordance with <EPI-Al> but no longer meets the criteria for any event at time of declaration, perfbrm the following:

Events which have met the criteria for either a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency can not be simultaneously classified and terminated. These events must be handled in accordance with

Sections 5.2 or 5.3.

1) Implement <EPI-A2>, and complete the required actions for a simultaneous classification and termination of an event.

2) Complete Blocks 3.a & 3.b on the PNPP Initial Notification Form to notify the NRC, State of Ohio, and local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

4. Periodically re-evaluate emergency class and applicable Initiating Conditions per Steps 2 and 3 above, and escalate the classification, or downgrade/terminate from the event per, Sections 5.2 and 5.3. <P00055>

a. Due to the severity of a General Emergency and its impact on Federal,State and local county emergency management agencies, a General Emergency shall 'n6t be downgraded.

Instead, the event shall be terminated and a predetermined Recovery phase entered from a General Emergency when the criteria in Section 5.3 are met.

5.2 Downgrading Event <P00089>

5.2.1 Consider downgrading from a Site Area Emergency only to'either an Alert or an Unusual Event'when the following conditions are met:

Due to the marginal benefit for the plant and State and local county response agencies, the event shall be terminated from an Alert in lieu of downgrading from an Alert to an Unusual Event.

1. The EAL entry criteria for a Site Area Emergency are no longer met; however, the entry criteria for an'Alert or an Unusual Event are still applicable.

The EALs have been written towards the initial classification and upgrading of an emergency event. As a result, their logic may not be applicable to downgrading the event. Therefore, the EALs should be evaluated with respect to the intent of the criteria established for each emergency classification.

EPI-Al Page: 9 Rev.: 7

2. Downgrading the event would preclude an unnecessary activation or mobilization of plant, Federal, State, and local county.

response facilities and personnel.

3. Plant conditions are stable, and the prognosis for improvement is good.

4. Any fire, natural event or hazard to plant operations is under control or has ceased, and a preliminary assessment of the extent of damage has been. completed.

5. Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

6.' No protective actions for the general public are in effect, such as a precautionary shelter order.

7. Discussions have been held with :the NRC, and State and local county officials, and an agreement has been reached to downgrade the event.

The concern is that downgrading the event may affect the plant's ability to support on-going State and local county emergency response activities which were initiated as a result of the classification of a Site Area Emergency.

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 5.3.1 Terminate from any emergency class and enter into Recovery, if warranted. or required, when the following criteria are met:

Entry into a Recovery phase and the establishment of a Recovery Organization is mandatory when terminating from a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification.

Entry into Recovery from an Alert is optional.

1. The EAL entry criteria are no longer met for the event and for lower classifications.

-___________-------OR---------------

Plant long-term corrective action and/or clean-up activities:

resulting from the event, preclude exiting the EALs.

2. The reactor is in a stable condition, with a reliable means of long-term decay heat removal available, if required.

3. Containment integrity, if required, is maintained and not threatened.

EPI-Al Page: 10 Rev.: 7

4. Any fire, natural event (e.g., earthquake, high groundwater level), or hazard to plant operations (i.e., toxic gas, unusual aircraft activity) is under control or has ceased.

5. A preliminary-assessment of the cause, extent of damage, and impact has been completed.

6. Radiation levels in affected plant areas are controllable or hav~e decreased to within acceptable levels.

7. Areas of the plant affected by the emergency have been defined.

8. Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

AND No further potential for a significant uncontrolled release exists.

9. No further surveillances relative to offsite protective actions are needed (except for the control of food stuffs, water, and offsite contamination or environmental assessment activities).

AND Terminating the emergency will not impact any offsite

-protective actions which may be in progress.

10. Offsite radiological conditions do not prohibit or seriously restrict access of personnel'and material to the Perry Plant site.

11. All pre-Recovery phase actions required by <EPI-A10> have been completed.

12. Consult with NRC, State of Ohio, and local county officials regarding the decision to terminate the emergency.

The intent of this action is to involve the NRC, State and local counties in event decision-making; however, this action is not intended to delay or hinder the Perry Plant's ability to'simultaneously classify and terminate from an Unusual Event or Alert.

EPI-Al Page: 11 Rev.: 7 5.4 Classification After the Event' 5.4.1 Perform the following actions when it has been discovered that an Emergency Plan' classification has been missed (during shift turnover, paperwork review, etc.), and the plant no longer meets the conditions of any EAL:

-1. Classify the event, but do not implement the actions outlined in <EPI-A2>.

2. Notify the NRC within l hour of classification and initiate event notification/reportability actions in accordance with

<PAP-1604>.

3. Direct the on-call EPU Representative to inform the State of Ohio and local county Emergency.Management Agencies (EMAs) .

using a commercial telephone; record the names and date/times of individuals contacted in the Plant Log.

a. When a classification occurs during evening hours, calls to State and local EMAs can be deferred until the next day at the discretion of the Shift Manager and on-call EPU Representative.

5.5 Staffing of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events The Shift Manager, based on his assessment of the situation can use the Emergency Response Organization .(ERO) to mobilize and coordinate support for the Control Room staff. However, augmentation of staff shall be achieved using the Integrated On-Call Report whenever possible.

5.5.1 Announce the activation of the TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC, and/or OSC over.

the Plant Public Announcing (PA) System.

5.5.2 Mobilize required TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC and/or OSC staff by performing the following:

1. Select the appropriate message (#17 thru #23) on the ERO Pager.

Messages form (PNPP No. 9100) contained in <EPI-Bl>.

2. Specify in the narrative summary block on the form: 1) that the facility activation is-in response to a non-emergency plan event, and 2) brief summary of event conditions and support required.

3. Forward the completed form to the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and direct them to activate the Emergency Paging System

("beepers").

EPI-Al Page: 12 Rev.: 7 5.5.3 DO NOT perform any formal notifications to the NRC, State of Ohio, or local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

NOTE: An informal notification to the State of Ohio and local counties'may be performed by the On-Call Emergency Planning Representative after first consulting with the Shift Manager.

5.5.4 Upon the arrival of facility staff, coordinate activities in support of the Control Room's assessment and mitigation of the event; DO NOT ENTER <EPI-A2>, OR TRANSFER THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN SECTION 4.1 TO THE TSC.

5.5.5 Assess possible entry into the Emergency Plan per Section 5.1.6, and enter <EPI-A2> as applicable if the EAL criteria outlined in this instruction are met.

5.6 Records 5.6.1 Records Handling

1. The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) pursuant to <EPI-B9>. The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records Management pursuant to <PAP-1701>.

5.6.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this document:

Quality Assurance Records None Non-Quality Records None

C> C-4 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 1I Sheet 1 of 2 .Page: 13 t PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 111303/0 INIT IATING CONDITION INDEX' EPI-AI EVT NT ALERT - ° SITE AREASEMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY UNUSUALEV EVENTCATEGORYo°,

L oss of RPtV wateor level that as or LOU Losn of two barriers. AND a.ls or challenge to the Fuel degradation dlad Any loss or calenge to the Fuel Clad s ban~er X unxwe third banierbarrier.

• Page 17.ASI Page IS (FPO Matrix)- A1 I A: FISSION PRODUT Page 1t-U - _ j Page (FPB MtttIx)AAI DERRADA eeOd Coolant Sy Reator stemleakage. b Any orss chateng to ethe R. Fuel Clad barrier AND Reactor Coob lant Coomlabna t nS yr.e te ste ba r ier Pa916-.A2 page 18(PP .M1trtx) .AA2 Pagetx (FPO Maix) . AM2 loss or challenge to te Containment tor Cothet Systembaniler O RChallenge battler. w (PPD Matrex) AU3 the lonss of any additional bafler.

__ pas s 18 [ PB M atrixS A S3 P _PageI__ Aa_U1_

_ _ _ __ tri_x _M Inability to maintainh plant I COLD Complete lossof functionsneeded to B: LOSS OF DECAY achieve COLD SHUTDOWN NOT APPLtCABLE NOT APPLICABLE SlIUTDOVM. A-,

HEAT REMOVAL PattB't20 B 11 BAI Page FUNCTIONS toInf tlate e atic Orcmm pleteen utom F ailure to Initiate or com plnte a au cc eSS f shutdown e ci fir etioOmhu t pr s n tdow F a ilure to nateor co mplete an P S Ftt C : L OS S O F S HUT D WNOnaNl o n ne RPS Readtor Smaa orm an RPS fiWudon Is AND Indication of an exhanme chalenge to the ability automatic Reactor Scrr FUNCTIONSF OR FAIILURE T required_ AND a ma ruslSo wa w eash to co ol the core.

. 21 CU1 Page o Is rqctned.

TO SHUTDOWN etCPeSp CG

- Page22CPag122eCAJ a 2 Page 23.-CSI 1 Loss of altoffalte powe to Division I and Powe capability to Division I and 2 EH .e f o DM510.

~ poe 1and 2p EH Esse N

n ia Pawl Prol ned los of2aliEHoffilte to Divis on 1 and power AND onalepwe E sse t lialB usso s. A ND for greater tha 15 n EssentIal Bu sses rd uced to a single D : A .C . P OW E R L OS S E EssentIal Bu ss Os greater than 15 sbinle g e Owns I contininuIng degradatIon of cort cooling capablty.

power source for

.. . n. a2D Page DUI27- ~~~minutes. audithat anyadditional Pag

• fallure would resultInaStation

. . , Page 30

• rpage3O.D Page 28 -DAI LosS of all ofite power AND onsite power to DMslon I and 2 EN Essential BUSes for greater than 15 minutes.

Page* 2 DA2 Degradation of Division1 and 2 essential Dadion nd2eni E: D.C. POWER DC power for greater thanr 5 minutes. NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE _ pW r for greater am15 isnik DEGRADATION Pag* 34. ES1 Fire within a Safe Shutdown Buffdknxl Fire OR explosion affecting the extinguhed wIthin 15 miIutes. operability of plant safety System NOTAPPLICABLE NOT APPLCABLE F., FIRE OR NOAPIAL shrequired utdown to .establish or maintain safe EXPLOSION _P age 3t.-FU1 Exploion affecting a Safe Shutdown Page 37- FAI

. , F ~~~~~~~~Page tt

• FU2 Unexpectedinreasein plant radiation Increasesin radiation levels wIthin Safe G: INCREASED PLANT leveas. Shutdown Buildings that Impede RADIATON LEVELS . operation of system requed to Page 3 -GUI maintain ads operations OR to jncontroedhet poolwater Wm estabtlsh or maintain COLD NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPUCABLE decrease with Irradiated fuel outside the RPV remdining covered. Pog 41 -GAt Pge 40-GU2 Mapor damage to Irradiated f-ue. I iI Page 42*OA2 I

I i

I

oi y

. 6 C C)

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 1 Sheet 2 of 2 Page: 14 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX EPI-AI PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 11130100 EVENT CATEGORY i UNUSUALEVENT 0 ALERT OSITE AREA EMERGENCY Or~~~~~~~~

GENERALEMERGENCY a

HI: INCREASED _Any unplanned release odgaseou Any unplanned release of gaseous Ste Boundary dose resulting from an Site Boundary dose resulting from an actual or RADIATION RELEASE TO to the envronment tha

-rdloadty radioactivity to the emlronrment that adual or Immient release of gaseous Imminent release of gaseous radioactivty that THE ENVIRONMENT xcaeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control radloacivlty that exceeds 100mRem exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE OR 5000 mRern CDE

_lmit for 60 minutes or greater. lsmit for 15minutes or greater. TEDE dose OR S0 mRsmrCDE Child Child Thyroid dose for the actual or projected duratk the actual OR Pr"ected of the release.

Page 43 *HUI dNration of theforrelease.

Thrvrold dose Page 45 -HAI Page 41- HS1 Page 48 -Hai Any unplannned release of iquid Any unplanned release of liquid 1 radioactivity to the environment that radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control imit for So minutes or greater. lit for 1s minutes or greater.

Page 44 -HU2 Page 45 -HA2 11-Control Roon Evacuation has been Control Room evacuation has been 1: CONTROL ROOM NOT APPLICABLE Initiated. Initiated. AND B pdn o°N be NOT APPLICABLE EVACUATION Page 96-UAI *established within 15mInutes.

Page 80 .1SI J: LOSS OF Loss of rmot annunciators or Indication Loss of most annunciators or Indication _ hatry to monior a rint annt h ANNUNCIATORS OR theContro Roomforgreaterthan 15 Ithe Control Room wth (1) .

INDICATIONS _ -significant transient In progress; OR (2) NOT APPLICABLE-Page 51 *JUl compen saory ndicatons aret= Page 53 -JSI available.

Page 62-JAI Loss or ondte OR hplamt K: LOSS OF communkatIons capabilities.

COMMUNICATIONS T Paeg 66 -KUl NOTAPPLICABLE NOTAPPUCABLE NOT APPUCABLE SIgnificant degradation of offsite communicatlons capabilities.

Page 66 .KU2 L, NATURAL OR NatureaOR destructive phenomena Natural OR destructive phenomena DESTRUCTIVE effectig the Protected Area boundary. affecting Safe Shutdown Buildings.

PHENOMENA NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE Page 57- LUi Page 58. LA .

M: RELEASE OF Relem of toxic OR flammable gasses Release of toxic OR flarnnable gases TOXIC OR effecting the Proteded Area boundary wIthIn a Safe Shutdown Building which FLAMMABLE GAS deemed detrinental to the sae jeopardizes operation of systems NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE operation o the plantL reqred to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD Page 59- MUI SHUIJDOWN Page 60 - MAI Confrmed security event wthch r N: SECURITrY EVENS indicates a potential degradation h the DSecurity event Inthe plant Protected secueity event reu ingI ls of ability to reach EVNTS N: SECURITY *" Of safety of th *aLArea. 'Secalty event Ina plant Vital Area. and manti COwD SHUTDiOw.

Page 61 *NU1t_ Page 62 - NA1 _ Page 63 - NSI Page 64 - NG1 0: EMERGENCY Other condiltons existing. wtrlchIn,- Other nditi exbsting. whichht he Otindt q hkhthe Oerconditions exIsting. wich Inthe Judgeent or COORDINATORS judgement of the Emergency Coordinator. Oudgeront do the Emergency Cwdhich r f P ed d the Emergency Coordinator, rthe Emergency Coordinator warnt deraion o JUDGEMENT dedwbnadsnrUnuraEverLnt declaration dn Alert. Emgarency i a General Emerency.

Page aS - OU1 Page 66 - OAI Page *7 OS1 Page 6as OG1

Cr. Ct C; .

EPI-Al Rev. : 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 1 of 54 Page: 15 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv A: Fission Product Barrier Degradation Initiating Conditions t Entry Criteria AU1 AU1 U

N

'U Fuel clad degradation High Offgas pretreatment air activity Reactor Coolant System sample indicates S greater than the Technical Specification. activity greater than Technical U 3.7.5.. Specification 3.4.8 limits A L

• E V

E N

Applicable Modes: T l1 1213 14 1 I NOTE Fuel clad degradation is NOT an issue when the Reactor is defueled. Damage to fuel in spent fuel pools is addressed in GUL.

I C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 2 of 54 Page: 16 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AU2 Greater than 10 gpm Greater than 30 gpm total Greater than 30 gpm total unidentified leakage in leakage in Drywell leakage in Drywell.

Drywell. averaged over the previous Reactor Coolant System 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

leakage Greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

Applicable Modes:

12 3 3 . ._.

c0 C; Sheet 3 of 54 Page: 17 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria ASI RPV water level CANNOT be maintained greater than0" Loss of RPV water level that has or will uncover Reactor is "shutdown under all'conditions without boron" fuel Applicable Modes:

1 2 NOTE ASi is applicable only to non-ATWS situations in which RPV level was NOT intentionally lowered per

<PEI-B13> as a means of power control. Refer to Event Category "C" for classification under ATWS conditions in which RPV water level is intentionally lowered.

0/ C, (-9 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 4 of 54 Page: 18 I .

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

-- - ---- lT~n.~

- . . .T _I T~ g

~

un w-.

~~~se"o" l LUNUUAL E"Wr DLL I>DtA"TIO INSTRUC-In NS AL8 Ay .. d.. .

g~~~~~~VWt eoo Lt t.e. ..- =tr... At sEw -i 1. PKA.od..f V..W.b bwe-~~~*

... 'A~ I 2~~~~~~~~ ~ oqsd41Mh.tl*..31A 'A" "-M' o m V o 2.C...emNWvelorLO Lf.)s AA, ALERT Alyto. . 0.6.0 "

bvI..

c04low

• X I-f .WIs ho RPViI . . A" 1. Io-LN~V.d NOTAPULCABLE I

NO TA PULCABLE I

I dtN.06,k0 S0.Po

__W.'

.ndWon ad..%Oni Rh Im

_~pd.tot .. d d.NWm .

AZ PAyb-. I.0 .

DRYWELL PRESSURE I SrT AR"A tEMRGENCY REACTOR 's!su

• UACT= PRESSURE I .,'wEL utAGIxnoqe RXxAm° lIW3a.^

REACTOR 1 PRESSURE CONTROL sewCONTROL Il1D.-YWEI_ RnEssuRE lR-REACTOR COOLANT C OAK EMERGENCY COORDINATOR E1MERGE-NCY CCORDtkATOft NWPm Cft b. AND A' , _kx _t "M.

- - W_.__M"_VP-RPVboo bod OW -dog- SRV k PA.SVW BO.5n.y Om_. ~* ~ MI UT.

..koO...~o.NP~fPV_ Any .dW _ __d_0,, _W._1_

W_.__

NWR

• ~~ -Onmorrdng greENw OPen. beongsyde lo Depteminft1n g..t- Wn IES SmSSI nw aw E0..gmny l.. 135 R..Vhr.  %.I RPv P-I W.. polo.

~~~~~~~~~~~C-ROOOO.ipORNWS T . b..

V00 d-C.-.6d. kool.

RCS b-eto,'

b- of NW00,OR ft..,COW

_O_ .000.00 AG 1.M1%A 1.1 4

p l , _bq d to IW of b0S.

-9.wo.30.Clm" w"$M y*W.C-.*M R-n -. NOT d- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~.Min ot0.** .ff~dd GENERAL EMERGEN""

A 0 -fNQAI WN CYZ 0AI C0.to_br .

-_ d~

NOTAPPUCABLE A.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

NTAPPUCA"L N(TAPPUCAML WMOTAPPUCA"L oW.

Md CE d~~~~~~~~~~~~~olon CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT CONWOLAmON REACTOR PRESSURE IORYWELLRADIAiION CC"TAffnMT CONTAINTAENT

-_amnrtt I *- MLMRX^rCM CCvNfA1M1MN 180LATION 000005. Laots. NYRfOCEN o r nneSr . __

!.PagU

-. .ionioS~i

-'. .oo40TA~,. IW 00&-O Cn.-pm h n Lnbft pr.a oo A" Wnn C _

• Cont.N-W pw Ctk--d qt ~ ~ ~ onidd.p.... 'loL honto PO"IA . i:P;S-T23 N .- o C.. 80ooV p.d P-c boNWC NOTAPPLWANA Op...6.0001.

b~~~~~~~~~~~~~nenodfto oo.ntwhb ~lkdd .~

4w

• .o~

-~ . iol .~~~d~ . Room o b.;N'.,

.. C. .Ob _ _I _ bd-blo.

VOS InCE C.._

to-e~

• .,.. . _t aAy--60d r ,,,. :P, C006 0 =.Unr S 1 .-.-. C-Id~P cs - _haSoo W NW CoV .t NOT APUCAUS O~ 2000 ftoo0. p APP .53.E P-O.pt 1SWW TAPPUJCASL bnt.

_ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . O _o n.o-

- M_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

FOOTNOTES: 1. Those thresholds for which a LOSS or CHALLENGE Isdetermined to be IMMINENT (I.e., within the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />), classify as though the threshold(s) has been exceeded.

2. RPV level Isless than Ols both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

3. Entry Into SAG-I. Primary Containment Flooding Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

4. Unisolable primary system discharging outside containment per PEI-N1 IIs both a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

5. Sample activity Isequal to or greater than 300 uCigm dose equivalent Iodine-131 Isboth a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a contributor to a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

6 0i AC 7X)

EPI-Al- Rev. : 7 Attachzient 2 Sheet 5 of 54 Page: 19 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv B: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Functions Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop A.

BAl BAI Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop B.

A Inability to maintain L plant in COLD RCS temperature exceeds COLD Uncontrolled temperature rise E SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN limit of 200 0F per approaching 200'F RCS temperature. R Technical Specification Table 1.1-1. T A licable Modes:

l5 l.

4 15 NOTE The IC remains applicable for situations in which an increase in RCS temperature greater than 200'F results in a change to Mode 3.

The above criteria is met as soon as it becomes known that sufficient cooling CANNOT be restored to maintain temperature below 200'F regardless of the current temperature. The intent of BAI is NOT to classify based on an unplanned excursion above 200'F when heat removal capability is available.

"Uncontrolled" means that RCS temperature increase is NOT the result of planned actions by plant staff.

0' c . c)

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 6 of 54 Page: 20 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions - Entry Criteria RHR Loops A and B are NOT capable of lowering RPV temperature.

BSI Complete loss of

- functions needed to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN The plant is operating in the UNSAFE HCL figure limits have been exceeded per Region on the HCL figure. the PEI Bases Document.

Applicable Modes:

.1 -2 13 1 1 1_._.__ _

Ctr C-- t=11 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 7 of 54 Page: 21 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv C: Loss of Shutdown Functions or Failure to Shutdown Initiating Conditions I

I s~~~~

Entry Criteria Cul U

CUt Plant is NOT brought to the required operating mode within the Technical' N Specification Required Action Completion Time following entry into an LCO. U Inability to reach S required shutdown U within Technical A Specification limits L E

V E

N Aplicable Modes: T 1 2 3 NOTE Declaration should be made because of equipment failures that prevent the performance of an orderly shutdown or failure to meet the shutdown completion time from the time discovered and a required action being entered.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the specified completion time period elapses and is NOT related to how long a condition may have existed before it was discovered.

C, ,C) C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 8 of 54 Page: 22 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria CAl CAl Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred. should have occurred.

Failure to initiate or A complete an automatic L Reactor Scram once an The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." E .,

RPS function is R required T PlIcable Modes:

NOTE CAI is applicable if either Mode 1 or 2 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

C-EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 9 of 54 Page: 23 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions' Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or Cs1.-

have occurred., should have occurred.

The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." S CS1 I T

Failure to initiate or Manual operator actions Reactor power CANNOT Suppression Pool E

complete an automatic taken at IH13-P680 to be determined. temperature is greater than Reactor Scram once an insert control rods were 11 0F. A RPS function is NOT successful in R required, AND a lowering Reactor power to E manual Scram was less than 4%. A NOT successful E

M E

R IG E

N C

y Applicable Modes:

.1l~

1________________ ..

~ 1 ~1-1~~_________________ . . ,,,,., . ,____

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 10 of 54 Page: 24 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE CSI is applicable if Mode I existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

"Manual Operator actions" are defined as any set of actions by the Reactor Operator at IH13-P680 which results in a scram signal. These actions include placing the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, arming and depressing the RPS Manual Scram push buttons, and arming and depressing the RRCS Manual ARI push buttons.

Injection of boron is NOT considered in reducing reactor power below 4%.

A concurrent challenge to the ability to cool the core would escalate this event to General Emergency per CG1.

C-) .1 C C(

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 11,of 54 Page: 25 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating.Conditions Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or CG1 have occurred. should have occurred.

G E

CG1 . N The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron." E 1.

Failure to initiate or R complete a successful Manual operator actions taken at Reactor power. Suppression Pool -A shutdown, AND IH13-P680 to insert control rods CANNOT be temperature is greater L indication of an extreme were NOT successful in lowering determined. than 11 00F.

challenge to the ability Reactor power to less than 4%. E to cool the core M E

R Any of the following conditions exist: G E

• Entry into <SAG-l>, Primary Containment Flooding. N

• In the UNSAFE region on the HCL figure. C Applicable Modes:

• HCL figure limits have been exceeded per the PEI Bases Document. Y NOTE CG1 is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

Ci C. Crr)

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 12 of 54 Page: 26 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C; Cl' Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 13 of 54 Page: 27 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA CategoryvD: A. C. Power Loss Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria I DUI ONI-R10 entered for a Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP). U.

N DU_ U S

Loss of all offsite power U to Division 1 and 2 EH. Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes A Essential Busses for for energizing bus EH I1: L greater than 15 minutes

. ..Normal Preferred E

.* Alternate Preferred V E

N Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes T for energizing bus EH12:

Applicable Modes:

• Normal Preferred

• __ ___ Alternate Preferred

.1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l D NOTA Failure of either bus EHi1 or EH12 to be supplied from its respective diesel generator is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DAl for Modes 1, 2 and 3. Failure of both busses EH 1I and EH12 to be supplied from their respective diesel generators (Station Black Out) is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DA2 for Modes 4 and 5 and to a Site Area Emergency under DS1 for Modes 1,2 and 3.

4 C_; C- cj EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 14 of 54 Page: 28 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatine Conditions

- I Entry Criteria Essential AC power reduced to only one of the following power sources for greater DA1 DAI than 15 minutes:

Power capability to

• Normal Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH

• Alternate Preferred Essential Busses,

• Division 1 Diesel Generator A reduced to a single

• Division 2 Diesel Generator L power source for E greater than 15 minutes, R such that any additional T single failure would result in Station Loss of the single remaining power source will result in a loss of AC power to both Blackout busses EHI 1 and EH12.

Applicable Modes: l l

1t 21 3 . . .

NOTE Escalation to a Site Area Emergency is evaluated under DS1, for Operating Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a total loss of AC power to both busses EH1i1 and EH12.

A total loss of AC power to busses EH1 1 and EH12 while in Operating Modes 4 and 5 is classified as an Alert under DA2. No escalation path exists to a Site Area Emergency for Operating Modes 4 and 5.

c 2 -2 C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 15 of 54 Page: 29 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busies EH1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred DA2 source within 15 minutes.

Loss of all offsite power AND onsite power to Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH source within 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes.

Both busses EH 1f and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

or 4 5 D

C- Ci EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 16 of 54 Page: 30 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source within 15 minutes.

DS1 Loss of all offsite power.

AND onsite power to Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 ER source within 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for .

greater than 15 minutes Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

NOTE Escalation to a General Emergency is evaluated under DG1 for Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a continuing degradation of core cooling capability.

C-o EPI-Al Rev.: 7. Attachment 2 Sheet 17 of 54 Page: 31 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EHi1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source.

Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred source.

DG1 Prolonged loss of all Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel offsite power AND Generator source.

onsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH Busses, AND continuing Restoration of power to either of the RPV water level RPV water level degradation of core following busses is NOT likely in less less than 0". CANNOT be cooling capability than four hours: determined.

• EH11

• EH12 Applicable Modes:

1 23 _ _ __-_-_.

C --"i EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 18 of 54 Page: 32 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I.

CH

( C.

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 19 of 54 Page: 33 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv E: D. C. Power Degradation Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria EUI Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Voltage on ED-I-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

4I1 5 1 . .

- - NOTE The same set of conditions as described in this EAL would be classified as Site Area Emergency under ESI if they occurred during Modes 1, 2, or 3.

c J Attachment 2 q

Sheet 20 of 54 Page: 34 0)

EPI-Al . Rev.: 7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria i

Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

ES1 Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Voltage on ED-i-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

I I 21 . .

§2_ CI ?_-

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 21 of 54 Page: 35 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category F: Fire or Explosion Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Fire within any Safe Shutdown Building. FU1 U

Fire CANNOT be extinguished within Fire CANNOT be extinguished within N FU1 15 minutes of the verification of alarm. 15 minutes of the notification received in U the Control Room from plant personnel 'S Fire within a Safe that a fire exists. U Shutdown Building A NOT extinguished L within 15 minutes

-E V

E N

T I

I I 2 13 4 1 5-1 D J. a _______________________________ a

-- NOTE Verification in this context means those actions taken in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) to determine that the alarm is NOT spurious. Verification includes the receipt of multiple or independent alarms or confirmation of a single detector by visual inspection of the affected area by a first responder. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C9 C', Cur EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 22 of 54 Page: 36 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria FU2 U

N FU2 Report by plant personnel confirming the occurrence of an explosion within the U Protected Area resulting in visible damage to a Safe Shutdown Building. S Explosion affecting a U Safe Shutdown Building A L

E V

E N

Applicable Modes: T NOTE No attempt is made to assess the magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of damage (deformation/scorching) is sufficient for declaration. Actual damage to safe shutdown equipment is covered under Alert PAL. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C J C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 23 of 54 Page: 37 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Either of the following has been confirmed: FAt FAI Fire in a Safe Shutdown Building. A Fire OR explosion

• Explosion in a Safe Shutdown Build ing. L affecting the operability E of plant safety systems Plant personnel at the scene report visible Affected safe shutdown system indicates R required to establish or damage to safe shutdown equipment or degraded performance. T maintain safe shutdown components.

Aplicable Modes:

1 2 3 4 5D . -

NOTE The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should NOT be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. NO attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of damage beyond the immediate area. The occurrence of the explosion or fire with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 24 of 54 Page: 38 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE Safe Shutdown System/Equipment refers to equipment identified in the Safe Shutdown Capability Report. This is the minimum list of equipment required to achieve and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN (including all auxiliary equipment-such as AC/DC power, cooling water and instrumentation). A detailed list is provided in the <Appendix R Evaluation - Safe Shutdown Capability Report>.

Safe Shutdown System/Equipment list: (Division 1 and 2 only)

Reactor Protection System Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Automatic Depressurization System/SRV.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling -

Low Pressure Core Spray Low Pressure Cbolant Injection - A/B/C Suppression Pool Cooling Shutdown Cooling Safety-Related Instrument Air Emergency Service Water Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Emergency Service Water Pump House Ventilation ECCS Pump Room Cooling Systems Diesel Generator Building, Ventilation Stand-by Diesel Generator (DG)

DG Fuel Oil Storage/Transfer Electrical Power Distribution Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling Emergency Closed Cooling Control Complex Chilled Water MCC, Switchgear and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Areas HVAC System Battery Room Exhaust Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System

(

Reference:

<NUMARC/NESP-007> (Rev. 2), Unusual Event HA2)

O C -

EPI-Al Rev.:. 7 Attachment 2 Sheet.25 of 54 Page: 39 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category G: Increased Plant Radiation Levels Initiating Conditions Ent Criteria Area radiation monitor (D21) reading Health Physics surveys indicate an increase by GUI increases by a factor of 1000 over a factor of 1000 times over normally expected normal levels. area radiation levels. U N

U S

GUI U A

Unexpected increase in. L plant radiation levels E

In-plant radiation level increase CANNOT be attributed to My of the following: V

,E

• the start-up and operation of plant equipment or systems within design parameters. *N

• the planned movement of radioactive materials. T

• the planned movement of shielding (i.e., plugs, lead shot, etc.)

Applicable Modes:

I 1 2 1 3 14 1 5 D NOTE "Normal" area radiation levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past 24-hour period, excluding the current peak value.

C, Cal EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 26 of 54 Page: 40 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Uncontrolled decrease in one or more of the following fuel pools containing irradiated fuel:

• FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool

• FHB Fuel Transfer Pool 2 ..

• FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool GU2

• FHB Cask Pit

• CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool Uncontrolled fuel pool.

• CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool water level decrease with irradiated fuel outside the RPV remaining covered.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 13 41 D

C"; C' CL EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 . Sheet 27 of 54 Page: 41 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatinsy Conditions . Entry Criteria Area radiation levels of Area radiation levels of greater than 6000 mRem/hr in a GAI greater than 15 mRemlhr in Safe Shutdown Building, as determined by either:

any of the following areas:

• area radiation surveys S Control Room

• installed or portable radiation monitors GA - 0 Central Alarm Station Increases in radiation levels within Safe Shutdown Buildings Access is required to maintain safe operation or perform A that impede operation. a safe shutdown, as determined by the Shift Manager. L I of systems required to E maintain safe R operations OR to T establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

112 1 3 41 5 ID NOTE This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

c- C-EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 28 of 54 Page: 42 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria HIGH alarm on one or more of the Water level observed to be below top of GA2

.following radiation monitors resulting the gate sill separating My of the.

GA2 from damage to irradiated fuel: following containing irradiated fuel:

Major damage to 0 SPENT FUEL POOL

• FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation A irradiated fuel 0 UPPER POOL Pool L 0 FUEL PREP POOL FHB Fuel Transfer Pool E 0

0 FHB VENT GAS FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool R 0

0 CNTINT ATMOS GAS. FHB Cask Pit T 0

0 CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 3 1 4 1.

51D. .

NOTE The intent of this EAL is to allow observations fromrplant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is not intended to direct an entry into an area solely to observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installed.

.- I 0.C-~ C-EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 29 of 54 Page: 43 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category H: Increased Radiation Release to the Environment Initiating Conditions l Entry Criteria Reading greater than TWO times the Routine or as required sample analysis HIGH alarm setpoint on one or more of indicates a release rate greater than two the following plant gaseous:effluent times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.

monitors lasting greater than or equal to 60 minutes: -

HUt S PLANT VENT GAS lD17-K786 OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D17-K836 The release lasts for greater than or equal S

Any unplanned release TB/MB VENT GAS ID17-K856 to 60 minutes.

S of gaseous radioactivity PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786 to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control limit Chemistry sample analysis methods r.

for 60 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 60 minutes of greater. receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one or more of the plant gaseous effluent monitors, that effluent levels are less than two times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.--

Applicable Modes:

11'2 1 3 I 4 I5 1D .2. 1 NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

C*0 CE EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 30 of 54 Page: '44 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions 4 -

Entry Criteria Reading greater than Reading greater than 20 Routine or as required 1.2E3 cpm above background times the HIGH-HIGH sample analysis indicates for one or more of the alarm setpoint on a release rate greater than HU2 following'liquid process RADWASTE TO ESW two'times ODCM monitors lasting greater than or monitor OD17-K606. Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

equal to 60 minutes:

• EMERGENCY Any unplanned release SERVICE WATER

- of liquid radioactivity LOOP A' 1D17-K604 to the environment that . EMERGENCY exceeds two times the SERVICE WATER ODCM Control limit LOOP B 1D17-K605 for 60 minutes or greater. I. 1-Chemistry sample analysis Release CANNOT be The release lasts for methods CANNOT confirm terminated within greater than or equal to within 60 minutes of receipt of 60 minutes of exceeding 60 minutes.

the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on RADWASTE TO ESW either ESW Loop A or B HIGH-HIGH alarm radiation monitors, that liquid setpoints.

Applicable Modes: release levels are less than two times the ODCM' 2 13 4 1

. . . Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

. C --WI, EPI-Al Rev.: 7* Attachment 2 Sheet 31 of 54 Page: 45 C,

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than 200 times the Routine or as Portable survey HA1 HIGH alarm setpoint OR offscale required sample instruments indicate high on one or more of the following analysis indicates a radiation levels of plant gaseous effluent monitors:* release rate greater greater than HAl than 200 times 10 mRem/hr at the Site

• PLANT VENT GAS 1D17-K786 ODCM Boundary for greater Any unplanned release

• OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D19-K836 Control 3.11.2.1 than or equal to A of gaseous radioactivity

• TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 limits. 15 minutes. L to the

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786. E environment that -R exceeds 200 times ._._- T the ODCM Control Chemistry sample analysis methods The release lasts for limit for 15 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes greater than or greater of receipt of the HIGH alarn, on one equal to or more of the plant gaseous effluent 15 minutes:

monitors, that effluent levels are less than 200 times ODCM Applicable Modes: Control 3.11.2.1 limits.

1 1 2 13 1_4 51 _ __D NOTE

• These Alert thresholds may exceed the Site Area Emergency thresholds (since the Site Area Emergency thresholds were established using a clad damage source term versus the ODCM [coolant activity] methodology used to determine Alert classification thresholds). Therefore, an emergency dose assessment (CADAP) run using the appropriate source term, determined at the time of event, must be performed within 15 minutes concurrently with ODCM calculations to determine if a Site Area Emergency entry criteria has been met.

It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C C- I EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 32 of 54 Page: 46 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions 4 Entry Criteria -

Reading greater than 1.2E5 cpm Reading greater than Routine or as required HA2 above background for one or 2000 times the sample analysis indicates more of the following liquid HIGH-HIGH alarm a release rate greater than process monitors lasting greater setpoint on 200 times ODCM HA2 than or equal to 15 minutes: RADWASTE TO Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

ESW monitor Any unplanned release

• EMERGENCY SERVICE OD17-K606.

of liquid radioactivity to WATER the environment that LOOP A lD17-K604 A exceeds 200 times the

• EMERGENCYSERVICE L ODCM Control limit WATER The release lasts for. E for 15 minutes or LOOP B 1D17-K605 Release CANNOT be greater than or equal to R greater terminated within 15 minutes. T 15 minutes of .

Chemistry sample analysis exceeding' methods CANNOT confirm RADWASTE TO.

within 15 minutes of receipt of ESW HIGH-HIGH the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on either alarm setpoints.

Applicable Modes: ESW Loop A or B radiation monitors, that liquid release levels are less than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

II 21 3 1 41 5 1 D

. .. . . _ ~~~~._

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C." C, C)k EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 33 of 54 Page: 47 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions t Entry Criteria I T Greater than the listed reading for one or Emergency dose Field survey HS1 more of the following plant gaseous calculations, using results indicate effluent monitors: actual meteorology that one or more of indicate that one or the following have S

• PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E-1 ,uCi/cc more of the been met at the I HS1

• OG VENT PIPE GAS ID19-N400 2.2E0 4lCi/cc following are met at Site Boundary- T

• TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 1.6E4 cpm the Site Boundary: E Site Boundary dose

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 6.0E-l pCi/cc

• Greater than resulting from an actual

• Greater than 100 mRem/br A or imminent release of 100 mRem Whole Body R gaseous radioactivity TEDE

• Greater than E that exceeds 100 mRem

• Greater than 500 mRem. A.

TEDE dose OR 500 mRem CDE Child 500 mRem CDE Child CDE Child Thyroid E Thyroid dose for the Thyroid M actual or projected E duration of the release R G

Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are E confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to N limit, that levels at the Site Boundary are continue for' C less than 100 mRem TEDE and 500 mRem greater than or Y CDE Child Thyroid dose using actual equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

meteorology.

Applicable Modes:

II 21 . 31 4 1 5

, 1D L

.C C.

S.

(7_'

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 34 of 54 Page: 48 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l Greater than the reading listed for one or Emergency dose Field survey results more of the following plant gaseous calculations, using indicate that one or effluent monitors: actual meteorology more of the indicate that one or following have been HGI

• PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E0 pCi/cc more of the met at the Site

• OG VENT PIPE GASID19-N400 2.2E1 pCi/cc following are met Boundary:

Site Boundary dose

• TB/HB VENT GAS ID17-K856 1.6E5 cpm at the Site resulting from an actual

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 6.0Eo pCi/cc Boundary:

• Greater than or imminent release of 1000 mRem/hr gaseous radioactivity

• Greater than Whole Body that exceeds . 1000 mRem

• Greater than 1000 mRem TEDE dose TEDE 5000 mRem OR 5000 mRem CDE

• Greater than CDE Child Child Thyroid dose for . 5000 mRem Thyroid the actual or projected CDE Child duration of the release Thyroid Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to above limit, that levels at the Site continue for greater Boundary are less than 1000 mRem TEDE than or equal to and 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Applicable Modes: using actual meteorology.

1 2 3 4 1 5 ID NOTE Exceeding the entry criteria for HG1 may require the initiation of an RPV emergency depressurization per

<PEI-D17>. Ensure Shift Manager is notified immediatelywhenever the above entry criteria for a General Emergency is met.

C; C. C-)

EPI-Al Rev.: .7 Attachment 2 Sheet 35 of 54 Page: 49 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category I: Control Room Evacuation Initiating Conditions I Entry Criteria TAl

• IA1 Control Room Entry into <ONI-C61>. A evacuation has been L initiated E R

Applicable Modes: T II1213 l4 51DD NOTE An inability to establish-plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency per !SL.

I -

C C (L EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 36 of 54 Page: 50 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria ISi S

I T

E IS1 Entry into <ONI-C61>. A R

Control Room E evacuation has been Within 15 minutes of entry into <ONI-C61>, Operator(s) located at the remote A initiated, AND plant shutdown controls CANNOT establish control of one or more of the following --A, control CANNOT be parameters per <OI- 10>: E established within M 15 minutes.

• RPV level E

• RPV pressure R

• Suppression Pool temperature G

• Reactor power E N

• Decay heat removal, if required C

Y I4 Applicable Modes:

1 1 2 1 3 l 4-1 5l D NOTE A maximum 15 minute time frame for the physical transfer of control of "required" systems was established by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>. Control at the Remote Shutdown Areas is accomplished by the repositioning of control transfer switches per <OI-l1>. Control is assumed unless indication of the absence of control is present.-

0.j C of t EPI-Al Rev.:. 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 37 of 54 Page: 51 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv J: Loss of Annunciators or Indication Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room Jul annunciators for greater than 15 minutes. indication for greater than 15 minutes.

U Jul N U.

Loss of most S annunciators or . U indication in the A Control Room for ._._. L greater than 15 minutes In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the E plant. V E

N.

Applicable Modes: T NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

EPI-Al Rev.- 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 38 of 54 Page: 52 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria JAI JAl Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room Loss of most annunciators for greater than 15 minutes. indication for greater than 15 minutes.

annunciators or indication in the Control Room with . A either: (1) a L significant transient in E progress, OR In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the R .. ,

(2) compensatory plant. T indicators are NOT , _;

available.

A significant plant transient is in progress. Compensatory indications i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

Applicable Modes:

12 3 . . .

NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

A "significant transient" includes response to automatic OR manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

0 c EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 39 of 54 Page: 53

-EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of most Control Room Loss of most Control Room indication. JS annunciators.

Compensatory indicators, i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available. I JR- T E

Inability to monitor a. A significant transient in A significant transient is in progress. R progress E A

E.

M E

R G

E N

Sufficient indication is NOT available to directly monitor plant critical safety C parameters for PEIs entered due to the transient. Y Applicable Modes:

1 1213

.. c(9.

CY EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 40 of 54 Page: 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C-I ('11, EPI-Al Rev.: 7* Attachment 2 Sheet 41 of 54 Page: 55 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category K: Loss of Communications Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of all five Plant Public Address System channels. KU1 U

Loss of all of the following Plant Radio System channels: N KU. U

• Channel 1 S Loss of onsite OR in-

• Channel 2 U plant communications

• Channel 3 A capabilities L E

V

-E N

T Apnlicable Modes:

1 2 3 14 1 5 l D

C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 42 of 54 Page: 56 I

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of the State and County Notification Circuit (5-way) reported to the Control KU2 Room.

U Loss of offsite long distance calling capability on all of the following systems circuits N KU2 for greater than 15 minutes: U S

Significant degradation

• Control Room private (259-) lines ,U of offsite

• Private Branch Exchange, Service Building ("5000") Switch A communications

• Private Branch Exchange, Warehouse Building ("6000") Switch L capabilities .

• Company Off-Premise Exchange E

V E

N T

Aplicable Modes:

1 2 3 4 5 D NOTE This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible. The radio link between the SAS/CAS and the Lake County Sheriff's Department, and use of cellular phones are considered extraordinary means and can be utilized outside the Control Room to provide notification capability upon the loss of dedicated and normal plant telephone lines.

A loss of the "5 Way" Circuit refers to the inability to contact one or more of the four offsite contacts: the State of Ohio, and the counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake.

Co.

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 43 of 54 Page: 57 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Cate~yorv L: Natural or Destructive Phenomena

• P00067>

Initiating Conditions Ent Criteria Control Room receives Report by High Indications in the Control report from plant plant sustained Room of a Main Turbine personnel who felt an personnel winds greater Trip or failure earthquake. confirming than 70 mph either of the for equal to following or greater.

within the than LUI

• Protected 15 minutes.

Area Natural OR destructive boundary-phenomena affecting WHITE AMBER Turbine Catastrophic the Protected Area event, light(s) on

• tornado casing damage to boundary indicator Seismic strike penetration. generator light on Monitor-

• plane or seals.

local ing Panel train crash Seismic OH13-Monitoring P969.

Panel OH51-P021.

Applicable Modes:

12 3 4 5 D _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _

i C( IC (9 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 1 Sheet 44 of 54 Page: 58 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l Control Room receives Report of Sustained Greater Report by report from plant visible damage high winds than plant LA1 personnel who felt an to any Safe with a <PEI-NI1> personnel earthquake. Shutdown velocity Maximum confirming a Building caused greater than Safe turbine by any of the 90 mph for Operating failure which following: 15 minutes Value for results in LAI Either of the following or longer. Area Water penetration indications present:

• tornado Level of the turbine Natural OR destructive

• aircraft, (internal casing.

phenomena affecting e YELLOW seismic barge or flooding) A Safe Shutdown switch indicator train crash Missile gen- L Buildings light on local

• other natural erated from' E Seismic Monitoring or destruc- the turbine R Panel 0H51-P021. tive failure result- T phenomena ing in either:

RED light on Seismic Monitoring

• damage to Panel OH13-P969. Safe Shut-down equipment.

penetration of a Safe .I Shutdown Bldg.

Applicable Modes:

1 l 2 3 4 l 5 lD D . . .

C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 C ( 0t-Attachment 2 Sheet 45 of 54 Page: 59 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv M: Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Report or detection of potentially toxic or Report by local, county, or State MUI flammable gases from an offsite source that officials for a potential evacuation of could enter the Site's Owner Controlled site personnel based on an offsite event. U MUl Area. N U

Release of toxic OR S flammable gases U affecting the Protected A Area boundary deemed 'L detrimental to the safe operation of the E

- plant Normal operation of the plant is impeded due V '

to access restrictions implemented by E Control Room within the Protected Area. N Applicable Modes: T 1 2 3 4 15 ID NOTE A gas release is considered to be impeding normal operations if it is of sufficient magnitude that access to areas required to support continued plant power operation is prohibited or is possible only through the use of protective equipment, such as respirators.

MUI is based on releases, in concentrations within the Protected Area, that will affect the health of plant personnel or affecting the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event, (i.e.

tanker truck accident releasing potentially toxic gases, etc.).

0 &

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 46 of 54 Page: 60 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions I - Entry Criteria MAl MAI Entry of toxic or flammable gases into Safe Shutdown Buildings or Areas.

Release of toxic OR flammable gases within Toxic gas in concentrations Flammable gas estimated or Plant personnel NOT a Safe Shutdown considered life-threatening determined to be in explosive able to perform actions A Building which concentrations necessary to establish L jeopardizes operation of and maintain Mode 4 E systems required to while utilizing R maintain safe appropriate protective T operations OR to equipment.

establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

I.

11 2 1 3 14 51D I I I J NOTE This IC addresses increased toxic or flammable gas levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in-the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Ct (_>7 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 47 of 54 Page: 61 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA.

Category N: Security Events

(

InitiatinL Conditions Entry Criteria NU1

.IU NUI N U

Confirmed security Bomb device discovered within Protected Any security event resulting in the S event which indicates to Area. declaration of a SECURITY ALERT in U potential degradation in accordance with the <PNPP Physical A the level of safety of the Security Plan>. L plant E

V E

N Applicable Modes: T 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 ID

Ca C (91 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 48 of 54 Page:. 62 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NAI NAI Intrusion into Protected Area by hostile Any security event resulting in a force. declaration of a SECURITY A Security event in the EMERGENCY in accordance with the L plant Protected Area <PNPP Physical Security Plan>. E R

- Applicable Modes: T 11213 1415 lD NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force.

C C C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 49 of 54 Page: 63 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NS1 Intrusion into a plant Vital Explosive device Confirmed act of sabotage Area by a hostile force. discovered in a plant Vital within a plant Vital Area. S Area. I' T

E NS1 A R

Security event in a plant -E Vital Area A IE M

E R

G E

N C

A plicable Modes: y I 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 [D NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force. However, this hostile force must occupy or gain control of a vital area to meet the criteria for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

If there is conclusive evidence that a vital area has been entered by a hostile force, even though he is no longer present, the intrusion had been made and a Site Area Emergency is therefore warranted.

-C-11 C EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 50 of 54 Page: 64 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NG1 G.

E N

E NG1 Loss of physical control of the Control Loss of physical control of the Division 1 Room due to a hostile force or act. and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas due to a .A ,

Security event resulting hostile force or act. L in loss of ability to reach and maintain COLD E SHUTDOWN, M E

R G

E N

-C y

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3 44 l_5 l_D_-

NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, is considered a hostile force. This hostile force must occupy or gain control of either the Control Room or Division 1 and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas to meet the criteria for the declaration of a General Emergency.

c C= C.

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 51 of 54 Page: 65 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categ~ory 0: Emergency-Coordinator's AidgMent Initiating Conditions - Entry Criteria Out OUl Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the U II level of safety of the plant. N Other conditions U existing, which in the S judgment of the U Emergency - A Coordinator, warrant L declaration of an Unusual Event E V

E N

APlicablc Modes: T 1 2 34 D NOTE For those cases where the degradation in the level of safety of the plant is tied to equipment or system malfunctions, the decision that the component is degraded should be based upon its functionality and NOT its operability.

, . .I..:1,I I I

-- L) C C

EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 52 of 54 Page: 66 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria I

L.-, ", 0 OA1 Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential OA1 degradation of systems needed for the protection of the public and which warrant Other conditions increased monitoring of plant functions.

existing, which in the judgment of the A Emergency L Coordinator, warrant E declaration of an Alert'. R

.T Applicable Modes:

1 2 13 1-4 15 ID NOTE This IC is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall I.-

under the Alert emergency class. This includes a determination by the Emergency Coordinator that additional assistance similar to that provided by the TSC and OSC staffs, including a transfer of the Emergency Coordinator responsibilities to the TSC, is necessary for the event to be effectively mitigated. Transfer of Emergency Coordinator duties for classification, offsite notifications and PAR decisions, is used as an initiator since an event significant enough to warrant transfer of command and control is a substantial reduction in the level of safety of the plant.

. F QCi .c0- Oil EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 53 of 54 Page: 67 N

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OSi

.S I

T E. ...

OS1 Other conditions exist which indicate an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public. A Other conditions R existing, which in the E judgment of the A Emergency Coordinator, warrant E declaration of a Site M Area Emergency E R

G

'E 'F' N

C AP icable Modes: Y 12 34 D

. CG1 EPI-Al Rev.: 7 Attachment 2 Sheet 54 of 54 Page: 68 - LAST EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OGI

-G E

N OG1 Other conditions exist which indicate an Potential for an Potential for an E.

actual or imminent substantial core uncontrolled release uncontrolled release R~r Other conditions degradation with the potential loss of which can which can existing, which in the Containment integrity. reasonably be reasonably be L judgment of the expected to be expected to be Emergency greater than 1 Rem greater than 5 Rem E Coordinator, warrant TEDE at the Site CDE Child Thyroid M declaration of a General Boundary. at the Site E Emergency, Boundary. R G

E N

C

.Y ApplIcable Modes:

12 3 4 5 D _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _