ML033240600

Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions

ML033240600
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	11/10/2003
From:	Bauguess D FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PY-CEI/NRR-2749L
Download: ML033240600 (73)

Text

FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Perry Nuclear Power Plant 10 Center Road PO. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081 November 10, 2003 PY-CEI/NRR-2749L United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440 Submittal of Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, enclosed are changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions (EPls) for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The changes have been reviewed in accordance with 10CFR50.54(q) and it has been determined that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

These changes constitute revisions, temporary changes, or reissued pages. Please follow the updating instructions per the attached Controlled Document Instruction Sheet and return the signed Acknowledgment of Receipt form.

If you have questions or require additional'information, please contact me at (440) 280-5589.

Very truly yours, David Supervisor Emergency Planning Unit DLB:byr Enclosure cc:

NRR Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III, Incident Response Center w/attachments Aoq 6

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT I & 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT Emergency Plan ImDlementing Instructions EPI-Al/ Rev. 7 Title Control No. 60 Letter No./Date PY-CEI/NRR-2749L / November 10. 2003 Signature Date Title Return to:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Attn: B.Y. Richardson, A240 P. 0. Box 97 Perry, Ohio 44081

FIRSTENERGY CORPORATION Perry Nuclear Power Plant Controlled Document Instruction Sheet Manual: Emergency Plan Implementing Instructions EPI-Al/ Rev. 7 Control Number 60 Revision Remove Revision Remove and Replace 6

Reissue Entire Document

'j

.~

EPI-Al Page:

i Rev.:

7 PERRY OPERATIONS MANUAL Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction PNPP I

-M 5,4 -f 3,1,,

1-TITLE:

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EFFECTIVE DATE:

REVISION:

7 PREPARED:

Lawrence W. Burqwald

• 3-28-03

/

Date IN

EPI-Al N,,

8

-Page:

ii Rev.:

7 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Table of Contents Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE,

2.0 REFERENCES

1 3.0 DEFINITIONS 2

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5

4.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/

EOF Emergency Coordinator 5

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/

EOF Plant Operations Advisor 5

4.3 Plant Personnel 5

5.0 ACTIONS 5

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5

5.2 Downgrading Event 8

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 9

~**,

5.4 Classification After the Event.

11 5.5 Staffing-of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events

'11 5.6 Records 12 ATTACHMENTS -

Initiating Condition Index 13 -

EAL Entry Criteria 15 SCOPE OF REVISION:..

'Periodic Review -

Required Rev. 7 -

1.

Incorporate CR 02-02429,-CA Number 1.

2.

Change STA to SE.,

3.

Change Transport of Radioactively Contaminated Person NRC Notification from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification per PAP-1604.'

4.

Deleted'commitment'F00735, this commitment was archived.

5.

Correct typographical errors.

6.

Change Shift Supervisor to Shift Manager.

7..

Improved EAL flowpaths where possible to reflect improved ladder decision making techniques.

8.

Minor format changes.

l X

EPI-Al Page:

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7 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1.0 PURPOSE To provide specific criteria based on <NUMARC/NESP-007> for the classification of an abnormal plant event transient, or external event affecting or having the potential to affect plant operations or personnel safety, into one of the four (4) <NUREG-0654> defined emergency classes.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Source References

1.

Emergency Plan for Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Docket No. 50-440 2;

ODCM:

Appendix C 2.2 Use References

1.

NUREG 0654:

Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in.Support of Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUMARC/NESP-007: Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels (Revision 2)

3.

Title 10, Part 50.47 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Emergency Plans

-4.

Title 10, Part 50.72 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):

Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

5.

Technical-Specifications (TS), Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1

6.

EPI-A2:

Emergency Actions Based on Event Classification

7.

EPI-A10:

Re-Entry/Recovery-

8.

EPI-Bl:

Emergency Notification System

9.

EPI-B4:

First Aid and Medical Care

10.

EPI-B9:

Emergency Records

r 54 EPI-Al Page:

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7

11.

ONI-C61:

Evacuation of the Control Room

12.

ONI-P54:

Fire

13.

ONI-P56-2:

Security Threat

14.

ONI-R10:

Loss of AC Power

15.

PAP-1604:

Reports Management

16.

PAP-1701:

Records Management Program

17.

PAP-1910:

Fire Prdtection Program

18.

PEI-B13:

RPV Control

19.

PEI-T23:

Containment Control

20.

PEI-N11:

Containment Leakage Control

21.

IOI-11:

Shutdown from Outside Control Room

22.

PNPP Physical Security Plan

23.

PSI-0007:

Reporting Emergency Plan Related Communication Equipment Problems

24.

Commitments addressed in this document:

F01626 P00035 P00067 H00037.

P00038 P00089 L00406 P00055 P00091 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Applicable Mode The operating mode existing at the time of event or initiation of transient.

3.2 Challenge Any condition that, in the Emergency Coordinator's judgment, would likely result in a loss of one or more of the fission product barriers-(i.e.,

fuel.cladding, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or Containment) in the' next 1-3 hours.

EPI-Al Page:

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7 3.3 Emergency Action Level (EAL)

A predetermined, site-specific, observable threshold or entry criteria for a given Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class.

An EAL entry criteria can be:

an equipment'status indicator; a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency class.

Refer to EAL Entry Criteria. (Attachment 2).

3.4 Emergency Class One of a minimum set of names or titles, established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under <IOCFR50.47>, for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative.

radiological seriousness, and (2) the time-sensitive onsite and offsite radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions.

The existing radiological emergency classes, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

Unusual Event Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency 3.5 Event Category A collection of similar Initiating Conditions grouped to allow for the prompt recognition of the transient or event and assessment of severity based on the four emergency classes.

3.6 Functional A system, subsystem, train, component or device, though degraded in equipment condition or configuration, is FUNCTIONAL if it is capable of

' maintaining respective system parameters within acceptable design limits.

3.7 Initiating Condition (IC)

One of a predetermined subset of plant conditions defined by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>, where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency or such an emergency has occurred.

Initiating' Conditions are established based on the four emergency classes required under

<10CFR50.47>. Refer to Initiating Condition Index (PNPP No. 8852, ).

3.8 Loss Unless defined by specific EAL indication, LOSS shall be defined as a state of inoperability in 'which FUNCTIONAL and operable status cannot be maintained.

A system, subsystem, train, component or device is not lost if its functionality is assured.

.1 EPI-Al Page:

4 Rev.:

7 3.9 Operating Mode There are six applicable operating modes associated with the Initiating Conditions used in this document:

numbers 1 through 5, and the letter "D".

Numbers 1 -

5 correspond to Modes 1 through 5 defined by

<Technical Specifications> Table 1.1-1; the letter "D" stands for the reactor DEFUEL condition.

3.10 Safe Shutdown Buildings/Areas For event classification purposes, Safe Shutdown Buildings/areas are considered to be the following locations:

Control Complex (all elevations)

Auxiliary Building (all elevations)

Intermediate Building (all elevations)

Fuel Handling Building (all elevations)

Reactor Building (all elevations)

,Emergency Service Water Pump House (all elevations)

Electrical Duct Chase Leading. to ESW Building Diesel Generator Building (all areas except the Unit 2 Division 1, 2, and 3 DG Rooms)

Steam Tunnel (all elevations)

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Area Condensate Storage Tank Intake/Discharge Structure 3.11 Significant Transient Includes response to automatic or manually initialed functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

3.12 Unplanned Any activity which is not previously approved.

If-an EAL entry condition is satisfied due to preplanned maintenance or testing, the emergency classification is NOT declared.

The unplanned designation shall include any activity, including preplanned maintenance or testing, in which the system is inadvertently rendered unavailable.

3.13 Valid An indication or report condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check,.or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's truth is removed.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

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7 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 49.1 Control Room Shift Manager/TSC Operations Manager/EOF Emergency Coordinator

-As the designated Emergency Coordinator, classify an Emergency-Plan event per this instruction when actual or potential plant conditions dictate and ensure required actions are implemented per <EPI-A2>.

4.2 Shift Engineer/TSC Operations Advisor/EOF Plant Operations Advisor Advise the designated Emergency Coordinator of any Initiating Conditions; which are being approached or EAL entry criteria met upon initiation of an abnormal or inadvertent plant event.

4.3 Plant Personnel Inform the Control Room of any conditions or symptoms indicated by instrument readings or direct observations that could indicate a real or potential emergency.

5.0 ACTIONS The following actions are intended as guidance.

Knowledge of plant conditions and/or the extent of the emergency may require additional response actions.

In all cases, this instruction should be combined with the sound judgment of the Emergency Coordinator to arrive at the proper classification for a particular set of circumstances.

<H00037, P00038>

5.1 Event Assessment and Event Classification 5.1.1 Ensure appropriate Off-Normal Instructions (ONIs), Plant Emergency Instructions (PEIs) or other applicable plant instructions and procedures are being implemented to stabilize plant conditions.

The classification shall -be of high priority following the performance of the required immediate operator actions and must be made promptly if a radioactive release to the public is probable so that offsite agencies can mobilize and implement the necessary precautions to protect the health and safety of the publib.

A EPI-Al Page:

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7 5.1.2 Implement <EPI-B4> if the event involves personnel injuries.

1.

Upon being notified that the victim(s) being transported to an offsite medical facility is suspected or known to be radiologically contaminated,'perform the following per

<EPI-B4>:

a.

Contact an Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) Representative using the Integrated On-Call Report found on the Perry Web under Emergency Response Organization, and direct the individual to notify the State of Ohio and Lake County Emergency management Agencies (EMAs) of the incident.

NOTE:

If the injury(ies) occur during evening hours, this notification can be deferred until the next day.

b.

Perform an eight (8) hour notification to the NRC per

<PAP-1604> in accordance with <10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii)?.

5.1.3 Implement <ONI-P54> and/or <PAP-1910> if the event involves a confirmed, probable or possible fire.

<L00406>

5.1.4 Determine the affected areas of the plant and implement an evacuation of the building or localized plant area.

<F01626>

5.1.5 For an abnormal event or evolution, which is not classifiable per this instruction, use the Integrated On-Call Report to contact additional plant expertise or manpower if desired for assessment and

'mitigation purposes.

1. 'For situations in which the event requires a prompt, coordinated response, refer to Section 5.5 to initiate staffing of the Technical'Support Center (TSC)j'or Operations Support Center (OSC), if warranted.

5.1.6 Classify the emergency as follows:

NOTE:

The designated Emergency Coordinator may not'delegate the decision to initially classify, reclassify, or terminate an emergency event per <EPI-Al>.

<P00035>

1.

Using PNPP No. 8852, Attachment 1, identify the emergency by event 'category and determine the most appropriate Initiating Condition (IC) based on the operating mode at the time of event initiation, plant conditions, and severity levels.

NOTE:

Initiating Condition Index operator aid(s) are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room, Technical Support Cente'r (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Backup EOF.

EPI-Al Page:

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2.

Refer to Attachment 2 for the applicable Initiating Condition(s) to determine whether the criteria are met for the operating mode(s) listed.

NOTE 1:

For those EALs with a permitted out of service time or duration (e.g.,-15 minutes during electrical transients), the following shall apply:

The clock should start at the time of discovery unless there is firm evidence to believe otherwise in which case the clock start time is retroactive.

• .. The declaration should be made as soon as it is determined that the transient will last longer than the allotted time.

In this case, the declaration shall not be postponed until the permitted time has expired.

NOTE 2:

Fission Product Barrier Matrix operator aids are located in the Control Room, Simulator Room,-TSC, EOF and at the Backup EOF.

3.

Declare an emergency class when all the conditions listed in at least one EAL column have been met, and implement <EPI-A2>.

<H00037>

a.

When several Initiating Conditions are met, declare the most severe emergency class.

A 15-minute goal has been established for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available to Control Room operators that an EAL has been exceeded.

b.

For TRANSITORY EVENTS, in which an event is classifiable in accordance with this instruction but becomes a lower classifiable event before being declared (i.e., Alert vs.

Site Area Emergency), perform the following:

1)

Declare only the lower classification and implement

-<EPI-A2>.

2)

Provide a brief description of the transitory event using Block 3c on the PNPP Initial Notification Form.

EPI-Al Page:

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7

c.

For an Unusual Event or Alert, which was classifiable in accordance with <EPI-Al> but no longer meets the criteria for any event at time of declaration, perfbrm the following:

Events which have met the criteria for either a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency can not be simultaneously classified and terminated.

These events must be handled in accordance with Sections 5.2 or 5.3.

1)

Implement <EPI-A2>, and complete the required actions for a simultaneous classification and termination of an event.

2)

Complete Blocks 3.a & 3.b on the PNPP Initial Notification Form to notify the NRC, State of Ohio, and local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

4.

Periodically re-evaluate emergency class and applicable Initiating Conditions per Steps 2 and 3 above, and escalate the classification, or downgrade/terminate from the event per, Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

<P00055>

a.

Due to the severity of a General Emergency and its impact on Federal,State and local county emergency management agencies, a General Emergency shall 'n6t be downgraded.

Instead, the event shall be terminated and a predetermined Recovery phase entered from a General Emergency when the criteria in Section 5.3 are met.

5.2 Downgrading Event <P00089>

5.2.1 Consider downgrading from a Site Area Emergency only to'either an Alert or an Unusual Event'when the following conditions are met:

Due to the marginal benefit for the plant and State and local county response agencies, the event shall be terminated from an Alert in lieu of downgrading from an Alert to an Unusual Event.

1.

The EAL entry criteria for a Site Area Emergency are no longer met; however, the entry criteria for an'Alert or an Unusual Event are still applicable.

The EALs have been written towards the initial classification and upgrading of an emergency event.

As a result, their logic may not be applicable to downgrading the event.

Therefore, the EALs should be evaluated with respect to the intent of the criteria established for each emergency classification.

EPI-Al Page:

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2.

Downgrading the event would preclude an unnecessary activation or mobilization of plant, Federal, State, and local county.

response facilities and personnel.

3.

Plant conditions are stable, and the prognosis for improvement is good.

4.

Any fire, natural event or hazard to plant operations is under control or has ceased, and a preliminary assessment of the extent of damage has been. completed.

5.

Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

6.'

No protective actions for the general public are in effect, such as a precautionary shelter order.

7.

Discussions have been held with :the NRC, and State and local county officials, and an agreement has been reached to downgrade the event.

The concern is that downgrading the event may affect the plant's ability to support on-going State and local county emergency response activities which were initiated as a result of the classification of a Site Area Emergency.

5.3 Event Termination/Recovery 5.3.1 Terminate from any emergency class and enter into Recovery, if warranted. or required, when the following criteria are met:

Entry into a Recovery phase and the establishment of a Recovery Organization is mandatory when terminating from a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification.

Entry into Recovery from an Alert is optional.

1.

The EAL entry criteria are no longer met for the event and for lower classifications.

-___________-------OR---------------

Plant long-term corrective action and/or clean-up activities:

resulting from the event, preclude exiting the EALs.

2.

The reactor is in a stable condition, with a reliable means of long-term decay heat removal available, if required.

3.

Containment integrity, if required, is maintained and not threatened.

EPI-Al Page:

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4.

Any fire, natural event (e.g., earthquake, high groundwater level), or hazard to plant operations (i.e., toxic gas, unusual aircraft activity) is under control or has ceased.

5.

A preliminary-assessment of the cause, extent of damage, and impact has been completed.

6.

Radiation levels in affected plant areas are controllable or hav~e decreased to within acceptable levels.

7.

Areas of the plant affected by the emergency have been defined.

8.

Non-routine or abnormal releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.

AND No further potential for a significant uncontrolled release exists.

9.

No further surveillances relative to offsite protective actions are needed (except for the control of food stuffs, water, and offsite contamination or environmental assessment activities).

AND Terminating the emergency will not impact any offsite

-protective actions which may be in progress.

10.

Offsite radiological conditions do not prohibit or seriously restrict access of personnel'and material to the Perry Plant site.

11.

All pre-Recovery phase actions required by <EPI-A10> have been completed.

12.

Consult with NRC, State of Ohio, and local county officials regarding the decision to terminate the emergency.

The intent of this action is to involve the NRC, State and local counties in event decision-making; however, this action is not intended to delay or hinder the Perry Plant's ability to'simultaneously classify and terminate from an Unusual Event or Alert.

EPI-Al Page: 11 Rev.:

7 5.4 Classification After the Event' 5.4.1 Perform the following actions when it has been discovered that an Emergency Plan' classification has been missed (during shift turnover, paperwork review, etc.), and the plant no longer meets the conditions of any EAL:

-1. Classify the event, but do not implement the actions outlined in <EPI-A2>.

2.

Notify the NRC within l hour of classification and initiate event notification/reportability actions in accordance with

<PAP-1604>.

3.

Direct the on-call EPU Representative to inform the State of Ohio and local county Emergency.Management Agencies (EMAs) using a commercial telephone; record the names and date/times of individuals contacted in the Plant Log.

a.

When a classification occurs during evening hours, calls to State and local EMAs can be deferred until the next day at the discretion of the Shift Manager and on-call EPU Representative.

5.5 Staffing of Emergency Facilities for Non-Emergency Plan Events The Shift Manager, based on his assessment of the situation can use the Emergency Response Organization.(ERO) to mobilize and coordinate support for the Control Room staff.

However, augmentation of staff shall be achieved using the Integrated On-Call Report whenever possible.

5.5.1 Announce the activation of the TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC, and/or OSC over.

the Plant Public Announcing (PA) System.

5.5.2 Mobilize required TSC, EOF, PIRT, JPIC and/or OSC staff by performing the following:

1.

Select the appropriate message (#17 thru #23) on the ERO Pager.

Messages form (PNPP No. 9100) contained in <EPI-Bl>.

2.

Specify in the narrative summary block on the form:

1) that the facility activation is-in response to a non-emergency plan event, and 2) brief summary of event conditions and support required.

3.

Forward the completed form to the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and direct them to activate the Emergency Paging System

("beepers").

EPI-Al Page:

12 Rev.:

7 5.5.3 DO NOT perform any formal notifications to the NRC, State of Ohio, or local counties per <EPI-Bl>.

NOTE:

An informal notification to the State of Ohio and local counties'may be performed by the On-Call Emergency Planning Representative after first consulting with the Shift Manager.

5.5.4 Upon the arrival of facility staff, coordinate activities in support of the Control Room's assessment and mitigation of the event; DO NOT ENTER <EPI-A2>, OR TRANSFER THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES OUTLINED IN SECTION 4.1 TO THE TSC.

5.5.5 Assess possible entry into the Emergency Plan per Section 5.1.6, and enter <EPI-A2> as applicable if the EAL criteria outlined in this instruction are met.

5.6 Records 5.6.1 Records Handling

1.

The records generated by emergency response personnel will be collected and maintained by Emergency Planning Unit (EPU) pursuant to <EPI-B9>. The Emergency Records Package will be transferred to Records Management pursuant to <PAP-1701>.

5.6.2 Records Capture The following records are generated by this document:

Quality Assurance Records None Non-Quality Records None

C>

C-4 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 I Sheet 1 of 2 INIT IATING CONDITION INDEX'

.Page:

13 t

PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 111303/0 EPI-AI EVENTCATEGORYo°,

UNUSUALEV EVT NT ALERT

° SITE AREASEMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Fuel dlad degradation Any loss or calenge to the Fuel Clad L oss of R PtV wateor level that as or LO U Losn of two barriers. AND a.ls or challenge to the s ban~er X unxwe third banierbarrier.

A: FISSION PRODUT Page 1t-U Page j

(FPB MtttIx)AAI Page 17.ASI Page IS (FPO Matrix)- A1 I DERRADA eeO d

Reator Coolant Sy stem leakage.

Any b

ss or chateng e

to the R.

Fuel Clad barrier AND Reactor Coob lant C o o la n t S y ste m b a n t e r.e b a r ier Pa 916-.A2 page 18 (PP M1trtx).AA2 Pagetx (FPO Maix). AM2 loss or challenge to te Containment O RChallenge tor Cothe t Syste m baniler battler.

w (PPD Matrex) AU3 the lonss of any additional bafler.

P

_Pa geI__

_ _ _ _ _ _M a t r i x A U1_

pa s s 1 8 [ P B M a t r ixS A S3 B: LOSS OF DECAY Inability to maintain plant h

I COLD Complete loss of functions needed to HEAT REMOVAL NOT APPLICABLE SlIUTDOVM.

achieve COLD SHUTDOWN NOT APPLtCABLE FUNCTIONS Page 11 B

BAI Patt 20 B't C : L O S S O F S H U T D WNOnaNl t pr e ci fir etio Omhu tdow n

s F a ilure to nate or co m plete an P S Ftt e

to In f tlate Or cmm plete en utom atic F a ilure to Initiate or com plnte a au cc eSS f shutdow n FUNCTIONS OR F

FAIILURE T

automatic Reactor Scrr o

ne n

RPS Readtor Sm aa orm an RPS fiWudon Is AND Indication of an exhanme chalenge to the ability TO SHUTDOWN Page 21 CU1 o Is rqctned.

required_

AND a ma rusl So wa w eash to co ol the core.

- Page22CPag122eCAJ PeSp etC Page 23.-CSI a

2 CG Loss of alt offalte powe to Division I and Powe capability to Division I and 2 EH

.e f

~

poe N

Prol 1ned los of ali offilte power AND onalepwe D : A.C. P O W E R L O S S E E ssentIal B u ss Os for greater tha n

15 E ssentIal B u sses rd uced to a single o

D M 510.

p 1 and 2 EH Esse n ia Pa w l to D ivis on 1 and 2 E H E ss e t lial B usso s. A N D n a2D power source for greater than 15 g

e Owns I

contininuIng degradatIon of cort cooling capablty.

Page 27-DUI

~~~minutes.

audi that any additional sbinle fallure would resultInaStation Pag Page 30

• rpage3O.D Page 28 -DAI LosS of all ofite power AND onsite power to DMslon I and 2 EN Essential BUSes for greater than 1 5 minutes.

Page 2 DA2 Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential E: D.C. POWER DC power for greater thanr 5 minutes.

Dadion nd2eni DEGRADATION NOT APPLICABLE pW r for greater am15 isnik NOT APPLICABLE Pag*

34. ES1 Fire within a Safe Shutdown Buffdknxl Fire OR explosion affecting the F., FIRE OR extinguhed wIthin 15 miIutes.

operability of plant safety System NOTAPPLICABLE NOT APPLCABLE EXPLOSION required to establish or maintain safe NOAPIAL

_P age 3t.-FU1 sh utdown.

Exploion affecting a Safe Shutdown Page 37-FAI F

~~~~~~~~Page tt

• FU2 Unexpected inrease in plant radiation Increases in radiation levels wIthin Safe G: INCREASED PLANT leveas.

Shutdown Buildings that Impede RADIATON LEVELS operation of system requed to Page 3 -GUI maintain ads operations OR to jncontroed het pool water Wm estabtlsh or maintain COLD decrease with Irradiated fuel outside the NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPUCABLE RPV remdining covered.

Pog 41 -GAt Pge 40- GU2 Mapor damage to Irradiated f-ue.

iI Page 42

• OA2 A-,

I I

I i

I

y oi C

C) 6 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 2 of 2 Page:

14 INITIATING CONDITION INDEX PNPP No. 8852 Rev. 11130100 EPI-AI EVENT CATEGORY i UNUSUALEVENT 0

ALERT OSITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY a

Or~~~~~~~~

HI: INCREASED

_Any unplanned release od gaseou Any unplanned release of gaseous Ste Boundary dose resulting from an Site Boundary dose resulting from an actual or RADIATION RELEASE TO

-rdloadty to the envronment tha radioactivity to the emlronrment that adual or Immient release of gaseous Imminent release of gaseous radioactivty that THE ENVIRONMENT xcaeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control radloacivlty that exceeds 100 mRem exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE OR 5000 mRern CDE

_ lmit for 60 minutes or greater.

lsmit for 15 minutes or greater.

TEDE dose OR S0 mRsmr CDE Child Child Thyroid dose for the actual or projected duratk Page 43

• HUI Thrvrold dose for the actual OR Pr"ected of the release.

dNration of the release.

Page 45 -HAI Page 41-HS1 Page 48 -Hai Any unplannned release of iquid Any unplanned release of liquid 1

radioactivity to the environment that radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control imit for So minutes or greater.

lit for 1s minutes or greater.

Page 44 -HU2 Page 45 -HA2 Control Roon Evacuation has been Control Room evacuation has been 1: CONTROL ROOM NOT APPLICABLE Initiated.

Initiated. AND pdn B

o°N be NOT APPLICABLE EVACUATION Page 9 6-UAI

• established within 15 mInutes.

Page 80.1SI J: LOSS OF Loss of rmot annunciators or Indication Loss of most annunciators or Indication hatry to monior a rint annt h ANNUNCIATORS OR theContro Roomforgreaterthan 15 Ithe Control Room wth (1).

INDICATIONS

-significant transient In progress; OR (2)

NOT APPLICABLE-Page 51 *JUl compen saory ndicatons aret=

Page 53 -JSI available.

Page 62-JAI Loss or ondte OR hplamt K: LOSS OF communkatIons capabilities.

COMMUNICATIONS T

Paeg 66 -KUl NOTAPPLICABLE NOTAPPUCABLE NOT APPUCABLE SIgnificant degradation of offsite communicatlons capabilities.

Page 66.KU2 L, NATURAL OR Naturea OR destructive phenomena Natural OR destructive phenomena DESTRUCTIVE effectig the Protected Area boundary.

affecting Safe Shutdown Buildings.

PHENOMENA NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE Page 57-LUi Page 58. LA M: RELEASE OF Relem of toxic OR flammable gasses Release of toxic OR flarnnable gases TOXIC OR effecting the Proteded Area boundary wIthIn a Safe Shutdown Building which FLAMMABLE GAS deemed detrinental to the sae jeopardizes operation of systems NOT APPLICABLE NOT APPLICABLE operation o the plantL reqred to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD Page 59-MUI SHUIJDOWN Page 60 - MAI Confrmed security event wthch r

N: SECURIT rY EVENS indicates a potential degradation h the DSecurity event In the plant Protected secueity event reu ing I ls of ability to reach N: SECURITY EVNTS

• " Of safety of th

• aL Area.

'Secalty event In a plant Vital Area.

and manti COwD SHUTDiOw.

Page 61

• NU1t_

Page 62 - NA1 Page 63 - NSI Page 64 - NG1 0: EMERGENCY Other condiltons existing. wtrlch In,-

Other nditi exbsting. whichht he Otindt q

hkhthe Oerconditions exIsting. wich In the Judgeent or COORDINATORS judgement of the Emergency Coordinator.

Oudgeront do the Emergency Cwdhich r f P ed d the Emergency Coordinator, rthe Emergency Coordinator warnt deraion o JUDGEMENT dedwbnadsnrUnuraEverLnt declaration dn Alert.

Emgarency i

a General Emerency.

Page aS - OU1 Page 66 - OAI Page *7 OS1 Page 6as OG1 11-

Cr.

Ct C;

EPI-Al Rev. : 7 Sheet 1 of 54 Page:

15 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv A: Fission Product Barrier Degradation Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria t

AU1 Fuel clad degradation Applicable Modes:

l1 1213 14 1 I

High Offgas pretreatment air activity greater than the Technical Specification.

3.7.5..

Reactor Coolant System sample indicates activity greater than Technical Specification 3.4.8 limits AU1 U

N

'U S

U A

L

• E V

E N

T NOTE Fuel clad degradation is NOT an issue when the Reactor is defueled. Damage to fuel in spent fuel pools is addressed in GUL.

C I

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 2 of 54 Page:

16 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria AU2 Greater than 10 gpm Greater than 30 gpm total Greater than 30 gpm total unidentified leakage in leakage in Drywell leakage in Drywell.

Drywell.

averaged over the previous Reactor Coolant System 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

leakage Greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3 3

c0 EPI-Al C;

Rev.:

7 Sheet 3 of 54 Page:

17 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria ASI RPV water level CANNOT be maintained greater than0" Loss of RPV water level that has or will uncover Reactor is "shutdown under all'conditions without boron" fuel Applicable Modes:

1 2 NOTE ASi is applicable only to non-ATWS situations in which RPV level was NOT intentionally lowered per

<PEI-B13> as a means of power control. Refer to Event Category "C" for classification under ATWS conditions in which RPV water level is intentionally lowered.

0 /

C,

(-9 I.

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 4 of 54 Page:

18 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

_I T

T~

~

~~~se"o" lT~n.~

DLL I>DtA"TIO g

un w-.

l g~~~~~~VWt Lt eoo t.e.

=tr...

At sEw

-i

... 'A I 2~~~~~~~

~

~

~

oqsd41Mh.tl*..31A

'A"

"- M' o m V o bwe-~~~*

X

-f I

.WIs ho RPViI A "

1. Io-LN~V.d NOTAPULCABLE NO TA PULCABLE I

dtN.06,k0 S0.Po

_ I _

_ _ _ _ _ I _ _ _

__W.'

INSTRUC-In NS

1. PKA.od..f V..W.b 2.C...emNWvelor LO Lf.)s

.ndWon ad..% Oni Rh Im

_~pd.tot.. d d.NWm.

LUNUUAL E"Wr AL8 Ay

.. d..

ALERT AA, Alyto..

0.6.0 c04low bvI..

AZ PAyb-.

I.0 SrT AR"A tEMRGENCY NW Pm Cft b.

AND A',

_kx

_t "M.

NW00,OR ft..,COW

_O_.000.00 GENERAL EMERGEN""

AG 1.M1%A 1.1 A

NQAI CYZ

-f C0.

0 WN 0AI to_ br.

d~

REACTOR PRESSURE utAGIxnoqe REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROL I DRYWELL PRESSURE I REACTOR COOLANT EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

• UACT= 's!su I.,'wEL RXxAm IW3a.^

° l 1

sewCONTROL l1D.-YWEI_ RnEssuRE lR-C OAK E1MERGE-NCY CCORDtkATOft UT.

fPV_

W_.__M"_VP-Any

_ __d_

_W._1_

W_.__

RPV bod boo OW

-dog-SRV k

PA. SVW BO.5n.y Om_.

~*

~

MI

..koO...~o.NP~

.dW 0,,

NWR ~~

-Onmorrdng greENw OPen.

beong syde lo Depteminft1n g..t-Wn IES aw SmSSI nw E0..gmny l..

135 R..Vhr.

%.I RPv I

W..

polo.

T b..

C.-.6d.

kool.

b-of P-

~~~~~~~~~~~C-ROOOO.ipORNWS V00 d-RCS b-eto,'

p 4

l bq d

to IW of b0S.

-9.wo.30.Clm" w"$M y*W.C-.*M R-n -. NOT d-

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~.Min ot0.**.ff~dd NOTAPPUCABLE NTAPPUCA"L N(TAPPUCAML WMOTAPPUCA"L A. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

d~~~~~~~~~~~~~olon o W.

Md CE REACTOR PRESSURE IORYWELLRADIAiION CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT CONWOLAmON

-_amnrtt I

• - MLMRX^rCM CC"TAffnMT CONTAINTAENT CC vNfA1M1MN 180LATION 000005. Laots.

NYRfOCEN o r nneSr

!.PagU

.ionioS~i

.oo40TA~,.

h n

IW 00&-O Cn.-pm Lnbft pr.a C

A" oo Wnn Cont.N-W q

pw Ctk--d t

~

~

~

onidd.p....

'loL honto PO"IA i:P;S-T23 N

.- o C.. 80ooV p.d P-c boNWC NOTAPPLWANA b~~~~~~~~~~~~~nenodfto Op...6.0001.

oo.ntwhb

~lkdd

.~

4w

• .o~

b.;N'., C.

. iol

.~~~d~

VOS to-e~

C.._

_ blo.

-~

Room o..

.Ob I

bd-InCE r

_t aAy--60d

P, C006 0

=.Unr C-Id~P S

1 cs

_haSoo W NW CoV

.t NOT APUCAUS O~ 2000 ftoo0.

p APP

.53.E P-O.pt 1SWW TAPPUJCASL bnt.

O o n.o-M_

FOOTNOTES: 1. Those thresholds for which a LOSS or CHALLENGE Is determined to be IMMINENT (I.e., within the next 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />), classify as though the threshold(s) has been exceeded.

2. RPV level Is less than Ols both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

3. Entry Into SAG-I. Primary Containment Flooding Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

4. Unisolable primary system discharging outside containment per PEI-N1 IIs both a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER CHALLENGE CRITERIA and a CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

5. Sample activity Is equal to or greater than 300 uCigm dose equivalent Iodine-131 Is both a FUEL CLAD BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA and a contributor to a REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BARRIER LOSS CRITERIA.

0i EPI-Al-Rev. : 7 6

AC Attachzient 2 7 X)

Sheet 5 of 54 Page:

19 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv B: Loss of Decay Heat Removal Functions Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop A.

BAI Loss of Shutdown Cooling Mode function for RHR loop B.

Inability to maintain plant in COLD RCS temperature exceeds COLD Uncontrolled temperature rise SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN limit of 2000F per approaching 200'F RCS temperature.

Technical Specification Table 1.1-1.

A licable Modes:

l5 l.

4 15 BAl A

L E

R T

NOTE The IC remains applicable for situations in which an increase in RCS temperature greater than 200'F results in a change to Mode 3.

The above criteria is met as soon as it becomes known that sufficient cooling CANNOT be restored to maintain temperature below 200'F regardless of the current temperature. The intent of BAI is NOT to classify based on an unplanned excursion above 200'F when heat removal capability is available.

"Uncontrolled" means that RCS temperature increase is NOT the result of planned actions by plant staff.

0' c

c)

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 6 of 54 Page:

20 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria RHR Loops A and B are NOT capable of lowering RPV temperature.

BSI Complete loss of functions needed to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN The plant is operating in the UNSAFE HCL figure limits have been exceeded per Region on the HCL figure.

the PEI Bases Document.

Applicable Modes:

.1 -2 13 1 1

1_._.__

Ctr C--

t
=
11 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 7 of 54 Page:

21 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv C: Loss of Shutdown Functions or Failure to Shutdown Initiating Conditions I

Entry Criteria I

s~~~~

CUt Plant is NOT brought to the required operating mode within the Technical' Specification Required Action Completion Time following entry into an LCO.

Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical Specification limits Aplicable Modes:

1 2

3 Cul U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T NOTE Declaration should be made because of equipment failures that prevent the performance of an orderly shutdown or failure to meet the shutdown completion time from the time discovered and a required action being entered.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the specified completion time period elapses and is NOT related to how long a condition may have existed before it was discovered.

C,

,C)

C EPI-Al Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 8 of 54 Page:

22 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria CAl Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred.

should have occurred.

Failure to initiate or complete an automatic Reactor Scram once an The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

RPS function is required PlIcable Modes:

CAl A

L E

R T

NOTE CAI is applicable if either Mode 1 or 2 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

C-EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 9 of 54 Page:

23 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions' Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred.,

should have occurred.

The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

CS1 Failure to initiate or Manual operator actions Reactor power CANNOT Suppression Pool complete an automatic taken at IH13-P680 to be determined.

temperature is greater than Reactor Scram once an insert control rods were 11 0F.

RPS function is NOT successful in required, AND a lowering Reactor power to manual Scram was less than 4%.

NOT successful Applicable Modes:

.1l~ ~

~

~~_________________

1________________

1 1-1 Cs1.-

S I

T E

A R

E A

E M

E R

IG E

N C

y

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 10 of 54 Page:

24 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE CSI is applicable if Mode I existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

"Manual Operator actions" are defined as any set of actions by the Reactor Operator at IH13-P680 which results in a scram signal. These actions include placing the Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position, arming and depressing the RPS Manual Scram push buttons, and arming and depressing the RRCS Manual ARI push buttons.

Injection of boron is NOT considered in reducing reactor power below 4%.

A concurrent challenge to the ability to cool the core would escalate this event to General Emergency per CG1.

C-)

.1 C

C(

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 11,of 54 Page:

25 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating.Conditions Entry Criteria Actuation of RPS has occurred or should Actuation of RRCS has occurred or have occurred.

should have occurred.

CG1 The reactor is NOT "shutdown under all conditions without boron."

Failure to initiate or complete a successful Manual operator actions taken at Reactor power.

Suppression Pool shutdown, AND IH13-P680 to insert control rods CANNOT be temperature is greater indication of an extreme were NOT successful in lowering determined.

than 11 00F.

challenge to the ability Reactor power to less than 4%.

to cool the core Any of the following conditions exist:

• Entry into <SAG-l>, Primary Containment Flooding.

• In the UNSAFE region on the HCL figure.

Applicable Modes:

• HCL figure limits have been exceeded per the PEI Bases Document.

NOTE CG1 is applicable if Mode 1 existed when the transient started and NOT the mode which exists at the time of classification. Refer to CAI for Mode 2 applicability.

Entry criteria is applicable for actions taken by an Operator to manually initiate either RPS or RRCS prior to or after exceeding an automatic actuation setpoint.

CG1 G

E N

E R

-A L

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y 1.

Ci EPI-Al C.

C rr)

Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 12 of 54 Page:

26 (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C; Cl' Rev.:

7 Sheet 13 of 54 Page:

27 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA CategoryvD: A. C. Power Loss Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria ONI-R10 entered for a Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP).

DU_

Loss of all offsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH.

Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes Essential Busses for for energizing bus EH I1:

greater than 15 minutes

..Normal Preferred Alternate Preferred Either of the following power sources CANNOT be made available within 15 minutes for energizing bus EH12:

Applicable Modes:

Normal Preferred Alternate Preferred

.1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l D I DUI U.

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T NOTA Failure of either bus EHi1 or EH12 to be supplied from its respective diesel generator is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DAl for Modes 1, 2 and 3. Failure of both busses EH 1I and EH12 to be supplied from their respective diesel generators (Station Black Out) is evaluated for escalation to an Alert under DA2 for Modes 4 and 5 and to a Site Area Emergency under DS1 for Modes 1, 2 and 3.

4 C_;

C-cj

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 14 of 54 Page:

28 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatine Conditions Entry Criteria I

DAI Power capability to Division 1 and 2 EH Essential Busses, reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes, such that any additional single failure would result in Station Blackout Applicable Modes:

Essential AC power reduced to only one of the following power sources for greater than 15 minutes:

• Normal Preferred

• Alternate Preferred

• Division 1 Diesel Generator

• Division 2 Diesel Generator DA1 A

L E

R T

Loss of the single remaining power source will result in a loss of AC power to both busses EHI 1 and EH12.

1t 21 3 l

l NOTE Escalation to a Site Area Emergency is evaluated under DS1, for Operating Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a total loss of AC power to both busses EH1i1 and EH12.

A total loss of AC power to busses EH1 1 and EH12 while in Operating Modes 4 and 5 is classified as an Alert under DA2. No escalation path exists to a Site Area Emergency for Operating Modes 4 and 5.

c 2-2 EPI-Al C

Rev.:

7 Sheet 15 of 54 Page:

29 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busies EH1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred DA2 source within 15 minutes.

Loss of all offsite power AND onsite power to Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 EH source within 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes.

Both busses EH 1f and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

4 5 D or

C-EPI-Al C

i Rev.:

7 Sheet 16 of 54 Page:

30 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source within 15 minutes.

DS1 Loss of all offsite power.

AND onsite power to Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred Division 1 and 2 ER source within 15 minutes.

Essential Busses for.

greater than 15 minutes Both busses EH 1I and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel Generator source within 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

NOTE Escalation to a General Emergency is evaluated under DG1 for Modes 1, 2 and 3, based on a continuing degradation of core cooling capability.

C-o EPI-Al Rev.:

7.

Sheet 17 of 54 Page:

31 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Both busses EHi1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Normal Preferred source.

Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Alternate Preferred source.

DG1 Prolonged loss of all Both busses EHI 1 and EH12 CANNOT be energized from the Associated Diesel offsite power AND Generator source.

onsite power to Division 1 and 2 EH Busses, AND continuing Restoration of power to either of the RPV water level RPV water level degradation of core following busses is NOT likely in less less than 0".

CANNOT be cooling capability than four hours:

determined.

• EH11

• EH12 Applicable Modes:

1 23

EPI-Al C

--"i Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 18 of 54 Page:

32 (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I.

(

EPI-Al C.

CH Rev.:

7 Sheet 19 of 54 Page:

33 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv E: D. C. Power Degradation Initiating Conditions I

Entry Criteria EUI Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Voltage on ED-I-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

Applicable Modes:

4I1 5 1 NOTE The same set of conditions as described in this EAL would be classified as Site Area Emergency under ESI if they occurred during Modes 1, 2, or 3.

c J q

0)

EPI-Al

. Rev.:

7 Sheet 20 of 54 Page:

34 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria i

Voltage on ED-i-A buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

ES1 Degradation of Division 1 and 2 essential DC power for greater than 15 minutes Applicable Modes:

Voltage on ED-i-B buss is less than 105 VDC for greater than 15 minutes.

I I 21

§2_

CI

?_-

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 21 of 54 Page:

35 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category F: Fire or Explosion Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Fire within any Safe Shutdown Building.

Fire CANNOT be extinguished within 15 minutes of the verification of alarm.

FU1 Fire within a Safe Shutdown Building NOT extinguished within 15 minutes Fire CANNOT be extinguished within 15 minutes of the notification received in the Control Room from plant personnel that a fire exists.

FU1 U

N U

'S U

A L

-E V

E N

T I

I I 2 13 4 1 5-1 D a

a J.

NOTE Verification in this context means those actions taken in the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) to determine that the alarm is NOT spurious. Verification includes the receipt of multiple or independent alarms or confirmation of a single detector by visual inspection of the affected area by a first responder. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

C 9 C',

Cur EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 22 of 54 Page:

36 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria FU2 Report by plant personnel confirming the occurrence of an explosion within the Protected Area resulting in visible damage to a Safe Shutdown Building.

Explosion affecting a Safe Shutdown Building Applicable Modes:

NOTE No attempt is made to assess the magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of damage (deformation/scorching) is sufficient for declaration. Actual damage to safe shutdown equipment is covered under Alert PAL. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

FU2 U

N U

S U

A L

E V

E N

T

C J C

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 23 of 54 Page:

37 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Either of the following has been confirmed:

FAI Fire in a Safe Shutdown Building.

Fire OR explosion Explosion in a Safe Shutdown Build ing.

affecting the operability of plant safety systems Plant personnel at the scene report visible Affected safe shutdown system indicates required to establish or damage to safe shutdown equipment or degraded performance.

maintain safe shutdown components.

Aplicable Modes:

1 2

3 4 5D NOTE The inclusion of a "report of visible damage" should NOT be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. NO attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of damage beyond the immediate area. The occurrence of the explosion or fire with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. List of Safe Shutdown Buildings is found in Section 3 "Definitions", sub-step 3.10.

FAt A

L E

R T

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 24 of 54 Page:

38 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA NOTE Safe Shutdown System/Equipment refers to equipment identified in the Safe Shutdown Capability Report.

This is the minimum list of equipment required to achieve and maintain COLD SHUTDOWN (including all auxiliary equipment-such as AC/DC power, cooling water and instrumentation).

A detailed list is provided in the <Appendix R Evaluation -

Safe Shutdown Capability Report>.

Safe Shutdown System/Equipment list:

(Division 1 and 2 only)

Reactor Protection System Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Automatic Depressurization System/SRV.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Low Pressure Core Spray Low Pressure Cbolant Injection - A/B/C Suppression Pool Cooling Shutdown Cooling Safety-Related Instrument Air Emergency Service Water Emergency Service Water Screen Wash Emergency Service Water Pump House Ventilation ECCS Pump Room Cooling Systems Diesel Generator Building, Ventilation Stand-by Diesel Generator (DG)

DG Fuel Oil Storage/Transfer Electrical Power Distribution Emergency Closed Cooling Pump Area Cooling Emergency Closed Cooling Control Complex Chilled Water MCC, Switchgear and Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Areas HVAC System Battery Room Exhaust Control Room HVAC and Emergency Recirculation System

(

Reference:

<NUMARC/NESP-007> (Rev. 2), Unusual Event HA2)

O C -

EPI-Al Rev.:. 7 Sheet.25 of 54 Page:

39 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category G: Increased Plant Radiation Levels Initiating Conditions Ent Criteria Area radiation monitor (D21) reading Health Physics surveys indicate an increase by increases by a factor of 1000 over a factor of 1000 times over normally expected normal levels.

area radiation levels.

GUI Unexpected increase in.

plant radiation levels In-plant radiation level increase CANNOT be attributed to My of the following:

• the start-up and operation of plant equipment or systems within design parameters.

• the planned movement of radioactive materials.

• the planned movement of shielding (i.e., plugs, lead shot, etc.)

Applicable Modes:

I 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 D

GUI U

N U

S U

A L

E V

,E

• N T

NOTE "Normal" area radiation levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past 24-hour period, excluding the current peak value.

C, Cal EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 26 of 54 Page:

40 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Uncontrolled decrease in one or more of the following fuel pools containing irradiated fuel:

FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation Pool FHB Fuel Transfer Pool 2

• FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool GU2

• FHB Cask Pit CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool Uncontrolled fuel pool.

CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool water level decrease with irradiated fuel outside the RPV remaining covered.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 3 41 D

C";

C' CL EPI-Al Rev.:

7

. Sheet 27 of 54 Page:

41 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiatinsy Conditions Entry Criteria Area radiation levels of greater than 15 mRemlhr in any of the following areas:

Area radiation levels of greater than 6000 mRem/hr in a Safe Shutdown Building, as determined by either:

area radiation surveys installed or portable radiation monitors I

GA Increases in radiation levels within Safe Shutdown Buildings that impede operation.

of systems required to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

S 0

Control Room Central Alarm Station Access is required to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown, as determined by the Shift Manager.

GAI A

L E

R T

112 1 3 4 1 5 ID NOTE This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

c-EPI-Al C-Rev.:

7 Sheet 28 of 54 Page:

42 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions I

Entry Criteria HIGH alarm on one or more of the

.following radiation monitors resulting from damage to irradiated fuel:

GA2 Major damage to irradiated fuel Applicable Modes:

Water level observed to be below top of the gate sill separating My of the.

following containing irradiated fuel:

• FHB Fuel Storage and Preparation GA2 A

L E

R T

0 0

0 0

0 SPENT FUEL POOL UPPER POOL

FUEL PREP POOL FHB VENT GAS CNTINT ATMOS GAS.

0 0

0 0

Pool FHB Fuel Transfer Pool FHB Spent Fuel Storage Pool FHB Cask Pit CNTMT Fuel Storage Pool CNTMT Fuel Transfer Pool 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1D NOTE The intent of this EAL is to allow observations fromrplant personnel to be factored into the declaration decision and is not intended to direct an entry into an area solely to observe pool level. The gate sill is the lip between the pools where the bottom of the gate would sit if installed.

. - I 0.C-~

C EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 29 of 54 Page:

43 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category H: Increased Radiation Release to the Environment Initiating Conditions l

Entry Criteria Reading greater than TWO times the HIGH alarm setpoint on one or more of the following plant gaseous:effluent monitors lasting greater than or equal to 60 minutes:

Routine or as required sample analysis indicates a release rate greater than two times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.

HUt Any unplanned release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control limit for 60 minutes or greater.

S S

S PLANT VENT GAS OG VENT PIPE GAS TB/MB VENT GAS PLANT VENT GAS lD17-K786 1D17-K836 ID17-K856 2D17-K786 The release lasts for greater than or equal to 60 minutes.

Chemistry sample analysis methods CANNOT confirm within 60 minutes of receipt of the HIGH alarm, on one or more of the plant gaseous effluent monitors, that effluent levels are less than two times ODCM 3.11.2.1 limits.--

r.

Applicable Modes:

11'2 1 3 I 4 I 5 1D

.2.

1 NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

C*0 EPI-Al CE Rev.:

7 Sheet 30 of 54 Page: '44 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria 4

HU2 Any unplanned release

-of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM Control limit for 60 minutes or greater.

Applicable Modes:

Reading greater than 1.2E3 cpm above background for one or more of the following'liquid process monitors lasting greater than or equal to 60 minutes:

• EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP A' 1D17-K604 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP B 1D17-K605 Reading greater than 20 times the HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoint on RADWASTE TO ESW monitor OD17-K606.

Routine or as required sample analysis indicates a release rate greater than two'times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

I.

1-Chemistry sample analysis methods CANNOT confirm within 60 minutes of receipt of the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on either ESW Loop A or B radiation monitors, that liquid release levels are less than two times the ODCM' Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

Release CANNOT be terminated within 60 minutes of exceeding RADWASTE TO ESW HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoints.

The release lasts for greater than or equal to 60 minutes.

2 1 3 4 1 NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed TWO times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 60 minutes.

. C --WI, C,

EPI-Al Rev.:

7*

Sheet 31 of 54 Page:

45 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Reading greater than 200 times the Routine or as Portable survey HIGH alarm setpoint OR offscale required sample instruments indicate high on one or more of the following analysis indicates a radiation levels of plant gaseous effluent monitors:*

release rate greater greater than HAl than 200 times 10 mRem/hr at the Site

• PLANT VENT GAS 1D17-K786 ODCM Boundary for greater Any unplanned release

• OG VENT PIPE GAS 1D19-K836 Control 3.11.2.1 than or equal to of gaseous radioactivity

• TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856 limits.

15 minutes.

to the

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D17-K786.

environment that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control Chemistry sample analysis methods The release lasts for limit for 15 minutes or CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes greater than or greater of receipt of the HIGH alarn, on one equal to or more of the plant gaseous effluent 15 minutes:

monitors, that effluent levels are less than 200 times ODCM Applicable Modes:

Control 3.11.2.1 limits.

1 1 2 13 5

1_4 1

__D HA1 A

L E

-R T

NOTE

• These Alert thresholds may exceed the Site Area Emergency thresholds (since the Site Area Emergency thresholds were established using a clad damage source term versus the ODCM [coolant activity] methodology used to determine Alert classification thresholds). Therefore, an emergency dose assessment (CADAP) run using the appropriate source term, determined at the time of event, must be performed within 15 minutes concurrently with ODCM calculations to determine if a Site Area Emergency entry criteria has been met.

It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C EPI-Al C-I Rev.:

7 Sheet 32 of 54 Page:

46 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria 4

HA2 Any unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Control limit for 15 minutes or greater Applicable Modes:

Reading greater than 1.2E5 cpm above background for one or more of the following liquid process monitors lasting greater than or equal to 15 minutes:

• EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER LOOP A lD17-K604

• EMERGENCYSERVICE WATER LOOP B 1D17-K605 Reading greater than 2000 times the HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoint on RADWASTE TO ESW monitor OD17-K606.

Routine or as required sample analysis indicates a release rate greater than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

HA2 A

L E

R T

Chemistry sample analysis methods CANNOT confirm within 15 minutes of receipt of the HIGH-HIGH alarm, on either ESW Loop A or B radiation monitors, that liquid release levels are less than 200 times ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limits.

Release CANNOT be terminated within 15 minutes of.

exceeding' RADWASTE TO.

ESW HIGH-HIGH alarm setpoints.

The release lasts for.

greater than or equal to 15 minutes.

I I 21 3 1 41 5 1D

~~~~._

_ L NOTE It is NOT intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. Rather, the Emergency Coordinator should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release will exceed 200 times the ODCM Control 3.11.1.1 limit for greater than 15 minutes.

C."

C, C)k EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 33 of 54 Page:

47 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria t

I T

Greater than the listed reading for one or more of the following plant gaseous effluent monitors:

HS1 Site Boundary dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mRem TEDE dose OR 500 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose for the actual or projected duration of the release Applicable Modes:

• PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300

• OG VENT PIPE GAS ID19-N400

• TB/HB VENT GAS 1D17-K856

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 3.8E-1,uCi/cc 2.2E0 4lCi/cc 1.6E4 cpm 6.0E-l pCi/cc Emergency dose calculations, using actual meteorology indicate that one or more of the following are met at the Site Boundary:

Greater than 100 mRem TEDE Greater than 500 mRem CDE Child Thyroid Field survey results indicate that one or more of the following have been met at the Site Boundary-Greater than 100 mRem/br Whole Body Greater than 500 mRem.

CDE Child Thyroid HS1 S

I T

E A

R E

A.

E M

E R

G E

N C

Y Emergency dose calculations CANNOT confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding limit, that levels at the Site Boundary are less than 100 mRem TEDE and 500 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose using actual meteorology.

Dose rates are expected to continue for' greater than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

I I 21 31 4 1 5 1D L

.C EPI-Al C.

(7_'

Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA S

Sheet 34 of 54 Page:

48 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l

Greater than the reading listed for one or Emergency dose Field survey results more of the following plant gaseous calculations, using indicate that one or effluent monitors:

actual meteorology more of the indicate that one or following have been HGI

• PLANT VENT GAS ID19-N300 3.8E0 pCi/cc more of the met at the Site

• OG VENT PIPE GASID19-N400 2.2E1 pCi/cc following are met Boundary:

Site Boundary dose

• TB/HB VENT GAS ID17-K856 1.6E5 cpm at the Site resulting from an actual

• PLANT VENT GAS 2D19-N300 6.0Eo pCi/cc Boundary:

Greater than or imminent release of 1000 mRem/hr gaseous radioactivity Greater than Whole Body that exceeds 1000 mRem Greater than 1000 mRem TEDE dose TEDE 5000 mRem OR 5000 mRem CDE Greater than CDE Child Child Thyroid dose for 5000 mRem Thyroid the actual or projected CDE Child duration of the release Thyroid Emergency dose calculations CANNOT Dose rates are confirm, within 15 minutes of exceeding expected to above limit, that levels at the Site continue for greater Boundary are less than 1000 mRem TEDE than or equal to and 5000 mRem CDE Child Thyroid dose 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Applicable Modes:

using actual meteorology.

1 2

3 4 1 5 ID NOTE Exceeding the entry criteria for HG1 may require the initiation of an RPV emergency depressurization per

<PEI-D17>. Ensure Shift Manager is notified immediatelywhenever the above entry criteria for a General Emergency is met.

C; C.

C-)

EPI-Al Rev.:.7 Sheet 35 of 54 Page:

49 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category I: Control Room Evacuation Initiating Conditions I

Entry Criteria

• IA1 Control Room evacuation has been initiated Applicable Modes:

Entry into <ONI-C61>.

TAl A

L E

R T

II1213 l4 51DD NOTE An inability to establish-plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency per !SL.

I -

C C

(L EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 36 of 54 Page:

50 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria IS1 Entry into <ONI-C61>.

Control Room evacuation has been Within 15 minutes of entry into <ONI-C61>, Operator(s) located at the remote initiated, AND plant shutdown controls CANNOT establish control of one or more of the following control CANNOT be parameters per <OI-10>:

established within 15 minutes.

• RPV level

• RPV pressure

• Suppression Pool temperature

• Reactor power

• Decay heat removal, if required Applicable Modes:

1 1 2 1 3 l 4-1 5l D ISi S

I T

E A

R E

A E

M E

R G

E N

C Y

--A, I4 NOTE A maximum 15 minute time frame for the physical transfer of control of "required" systems was established by

<NUMARC/NESP-007>. Control at the Remote Shutdown Areas is accomplished by the repositioning of control transfer switches per <OI-l 1>. Control is assumed unless indication of the absence of control is present.-

0.j C

o f t

EPI-Al Rev.:. 7 Sheet 37 of 54 Page:

51 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv J: Loss of Annunciators or Indication Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

indication for greater than 15 minutes.

Jul Loss of most annunciators or indication in the Control Room for._._.

greater than 15 minutes In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the plant.

Applicable Modes:

NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

Jul U

N U.

S

. U A

L E

V E

N.

T

EPI-Al Rev. -

7 Sheet 38 of 54 Page:

52 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria JAl Unplanned loss of most Control Room Unplanned loss of most Control Room Loss of most annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

indication for greater than 15 minutes.

annunciators or indication in the Control Room with either: (1) a significant transient in progress, OR In the Shift Manager's opinion, increased surveillance is warranted to safely operate the (2) compensatory plant.

indicators are NOT available.

A significant plant transient is in progress.

Compensatory indications i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

Applicable Modes:

12 3

JAI A

L E

R T

NOTE Quantification of "most" is left to the Shift Manager. It is NOT intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost, but rather make a judgment call with approximately 75% being the threshold.

A "significant transient" includes response to automatic OR manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injection, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

0 c

EPI-Al Rev.:

7

-EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 39 of 54 Page:

53 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of most Control Room Loss of most Control Room indication.

annunciators.

Compensatory indicators, i.e., ERIS and process computer, are NOT available.

JR-Inability to monitor a.

significant transient in A significant transient is in progress.

progress Sufficient indication is NOT available to directly monitor plant critical safety parameters for PEIs entered due to the transient.

Applicable Modes:

1 1213 JS I

T E

A R

E A

E.

M E

R G

E N

C Y

CY EPI-Al Rev.:

7 c(9.

Sheet 40 of 54 Page:

54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA (INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

C-I

('11, EPI-Al Rev.:

7*

Sheet 41 of 54 Page:

55 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Category K: Loss of Communications Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of all five Plant Public Address System channels.

Loss of all of the following Plant Radio System channels:

KU.

Channel 1 Loss of onsite OR in-Channel 2 plant communications Channel 3 capabilities Apnlicable Modes:

1 2

3 1 4 1 5 l D KU1 U

N U

S U

A L

E V

- E N

T

C I

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 42 of 54 Page:

56 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Loss of the State and County Notification Circuit (5-way) reported to the Control Room.

Loss of offsite long distance calling capability on all of the following systems circuits KU2 for greater than 15 minutes:

Significant degradation Control Room private (259-) lines of offsite Private Branch Exchange, Service Building ("5000") Switch communications Private Branch Exchange, Warehouse Building ("6000") Switch capabilities Company Off-Premise Exchange Aplicable Modes:

1 2

3 4

5 D

KU2 U

N U

S

,U A

L E

V E

N T

NOTE This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible. The radio link between the SAS/CAS and the Lake County Sheriff's Department, and use of cellular phones are considered extraordinary means and can be utilized outside the Control Room to provide notification capability upon the loss of dedicated and normal plant telephone lines.

A loss of the "5 Way" Circuit refers to the inability to contact one or more of the four offsite contacts: the State of Ohio, and the counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake.

Co.

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 43 of 54 Page:

57 Cate~yorv L: Natural or Destructive Phenomena

• P00067>

Initiating Conditions Ent Criteria Control Room receives Report by High Indications in the Control report from plant plant sustained Room of a Main Turbine personnel who felt an personnel winds greater Trip or failure earthquake.

confirming than 70 mph either of the for equal to following or greater.

within the than LUI Protected 15 minutes.

Area Natural OR destructive boundary-phenomena affecting WHITE AMBER Turbine Catastrophic the Protected Area

event, light(s) on

• tornado casing damage to boundary indicator Seismic strike penetration.

generator light on Monitor-

• plane or seals.

local ing Panel train crash Seismic OH13-Monitoring P969.

Panel OH51-P021.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 3

4 5

D

i C(

IC (9

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 1

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 44 of 54 Page:

58 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria l

Control Room receives Report of Sustained Greater Report by report from plant visible damage high winds than plant personnel who felt an to any Safe with a

<PEI-NI1> personnel earthquake.

Shutdown velocity Maximum confirming a Building caused greater than Safe turbine by any of the 90 mph for Operating failure which following:

15 minutes Value for results in LAI Either of the following or longer.

Area Water penetration indications present:

• tornado Level of the turbine Natural OR destructive

• aircraft, (internal casing.

phenomena affecting e YELLOW seismic barge or flooding)

Safe Shutdown switch indicator train crash Missile gen-Buildings light on local

• other natural erated from' Seismic Monitoring or destruc-the turbine Panel 0H51-P021.

tive failure result-phenomena ing in either:

RED light on Seismic Monitoring

• damage to Panel OH13-P969.

Safe Shut-down equipment.

penetration of a Safe Shutdown Bldg.

Applicable Modes:

1 l 2 3

D 4 l 5 l D LA1 A

L E

R T

.I

C EPI-Al C

( 0t-Rev.:

7 Sheet 45 of 54 Page:

59 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categorv M: Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Initiating Conditions Entry Cri teria Report or detection of potentially toxic or Report by local, county, or State flammable gases from an offsite source that officials for a potential evacuation of could enter the Site's Owner Controlled site personnel based on an offsite event.

MUl Area.

Release of toxic OR flammable gases affecting the Protected Area boundary deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by Control Room within the Protected Area.

Applicable Modes:

1 2

3 4 1 5 I D MUI U

N U

S U

A

'L E

V E

N T

NOTE A gas release is considered to be impeding normal operations if it is of sufficient magnitude that access to areas required to support continued plant power operation is prohibited or is possible only through the use of protective equipment, such as respirators.

MUI is based on releases, in concentrations within the Protected Area, that will affect the health of plant personnel or affecting the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event, (i.e.

tanker truck accident releasing potentially toxic gases, etc.).

0 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 46 of 54 Page:

60 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions I

- Entry Criteria MAI Release of toxic OR flammable gases within a Safe Shutdown Building which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations OR to establish or maintain COLD SHUTDOWN Applicable Modes:

Entry of toxic or flammable gases into Safe Shutdown Buildings or Areas.

Toxic gas in concentrations considered life-threatening Flammable gas estimated or determined to be in explosive concentrations Plant personnel NOT able to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Mode 4 while utilizing appropriate protective equipment.

MAl A

L E

R T

11 2 1 3 1 4 5 1D I.

I I

I J

NOTE This IC addresses increased toxic or flammable gas levels that impede necessary access to operating stations or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in-the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Ct

(_>7 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 47 of 54 Page:

61 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA.

Category N: Security Events

(

InitiatinL Conditions Entry Criteria NUI Confirmed security event which indicates to potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 3 1 4 15 I D Bomb device discovered within Protected Area.

Any security event resulting in the declaration of a SECURITY ALERT in accordance with the <PNPP Physical Security Plan>.

NU1

.IU N

U S

U A

L E

V E

N T

Ca C

(91 EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 48 of 54 Page:. 62 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NAI Intrusion into Protected Area by hostile Any security event resulting in a force.

declaration of a SECURITY Security event in the EMERGENCY in accordance with the plant Protected Area

<PNPP Physical Security Plan>.

Applicable Modes:

11213 1415 lD NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force.

NAI A

L E

R T

C C

C EPI-Al Rev.:

7 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Sheet 49 of 54 Page:

63 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria Intrusion into a plant Vital Explosive device Confirmed act of sabotage Area by a hostile force.

discovered in a plant Vital within a plant Vital Area.

Area.

NS1 Security event in a plant Vital Area A plicable Modes:

I 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 [D NS1 S

I' T

E A

R

- E A

IE M

E R

G E

N C

y NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, can be considered a hostile force. However, this hostile force must occupy or gain control of a vital area to meet the criteria for the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

If there is conclusive evidence that a vital area has been entered by a hostile force, even though he is no longer present, the intrusion had been made and a Site Area Emergency is therefore warranted.

-C-11 C

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 50 of 54 Page:

64 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria NG1 Loss of physical control of the Control Loss of physical control of the Division 1 Room due to a hostile force or act.

and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas due to a Security event resulting hostile force or act.

in loss of ability to reach and maintain COLD

SHUTDOWN, Applicable Modes:

1 2

3 4 4 l_5 l_D_-

NG1 G.

E N

E

.A,

L E

M E

R G

E N

- C y

NOTE An individual or group of individuals with known or suspected malicious intent, which penetrates the Protected Area boundary, is considered a hostile force. This hostile force must occupy or gain control of either the Control Room or Division 1 and 2 Remote Shutdown Areas to meet the criteria for the declaration of a General Emergency.

c C=

C.

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 51 of 54 Page:

65 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Categ~ory 0: Emergency-Coordinator's AidgMent Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OUl Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Other conditions existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Unusual Event APlicablc Modes:

1 2 34 D

Out U

N U

S U

A L

I I E

V E

N T

NOTE For those cases where the degradation in the level of safety of the plant is tied to equipment or system malfunctions, the decision that the component is degraded should be based upon its functionality and NOT its operability.

.:1,

.I. I I I

-- L )

C C

EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 52 of 54 Page:

66 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA I

L.-, ", 0 Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OA1 Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate an actual or potential degradation of systems needed for the protection of the public and which warrant Other conditions increased monitoring of plant functions.

existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Alert'.

Applicable Modes:

1 2 1 3 1-4 1 5 ID OA1 A

L E

R

.T NOTE This IC is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class. This includes a determination by the Emergency Coordinator that additional assistance similar to that provided by the TSC and OSC staffs, including a transfer of the Emergency Coordinator responsibilities to the TSC, is necessary for the event to be effectively mitigated. Transfer of Emergency Coordinator duties for classification, offsite notifications and PAR decisions, is used as an initiator since an event significant enough to warrant transfer of command and control is a substantial reduction in the level of safety of the plant.

I.-

F QCi

.c0-Oil EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 53 of 54 Page:

67 N

EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OS1 Other conditions exist which indicate an actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Other conditions existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency AP icable Modes:

12 34 D

OSi

. S I

T E....

A R

E A

E M

E R

G

'E 'F' N

C Y

CG1 Page:

68 -

LAST EPI-Al Rev.:

7 Sheet 54 of 54 EAL ENTRY CRITERIA Initiating Conditions Entry Criteria OG1 Other conditions exist which indicate an Potential for an Potential for an actual or imminent substantial core uncontrolled release uncontrolled release Other conditions degradation with the potential loss of which can which can existing, which in the Containment integrity.

reasonably be reasonably be judgment of the expected to be expected to be Emergency greater than 1 Rem greater than 5 Rem Coordinator, warrant TEDE at the Site CDE Child Thyroid declaration of a General Boundary.

at the Site Emergency, Boundary.

ApplIcable Modes:

1 2 3 4

5 D

OGI

-G E

N E.

R~r L

E M

E R

G E

N C

.Y