ML032870350
| ML032870350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/2003 |
| From: | Jabbour K NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2 |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032870348 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MB8423, TAC MB8424, TAC MB8425 | |
| Download: ML032870350 (49) | |
Text
I 4-TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY rI BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT LICENSE AMENDMENT AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (TS 424) r r
REVISION IN THE NUMBER OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SUBSYSTEMS REQUIRED IN RE LOSS OF COOLAN3
Meeting Objective To facilitate NRC review and approval of the proposed revision in the number of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems available in response to certain Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenarios Tim Abney 2
Agenda
- Introductions
- Summary of Issue
- Plant Layout
- Single Failure Analysis
- Questions and Answers
- Questions and Answers
- Proposed Modifications
- Questions and Answers
- Proposed License Amendment, Technical Specification and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes Tim Abney 3
Summary of Issue
- The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support certain design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power scenarios with both Units 1 and 2 operating
- TVA's proposed modifications to the ECCS logic will satisfy current licensing basis requirements and are consistent with the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 4
Plant Layout ECCS INJECTION FLOW PATHS AFTER AN ECCS INITIATION SIGNAL 9per gpRŽ PDA KtW a NW A Assumed analysis flow rates:
- One Core Spray loop (Two pumps) = 5600 gpm - HPCI = 4500 gpm
- One LPCI pump Inone loop = 9700 gpm - Two LPCI pumps in one loop = 18,000 gpm NOTE: Both Core Spray pumps in a loop must operate for the loop to be considered available.
Bill Crouch 5
Plant Layout (Cont.)
UNITS I AND 2 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM
@ DA @iDt A D/
O}
-- -- I P TKrL 4KV SD DC UNITS 1&2 U1 RHR A U1 RHR C U1 RHR B U1 RHR I U2 RHR A U2 RHR C U2 RHR B U2 RHR U1 CS A U1 C C U1 Cs B U1 CS 0 U2 CS A U2 C C U2 CS B U2 CS D EECW Al EECW C1 EECV 83 EECW 03 Bill Crouch 6
Single Failure Analysis Single Failure Analysis with current ECCS logic (FSAR Table 6.5-3)
- One active failure and the Loss of Offsite Power are assumed to occur with the pipe break
- Several line break sizes and combinations of various single failures were analyzed
- The following five single failures were bounding:
o Battery o Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (also referred to as the Spurious Accident Signal) o LPCI Injection Valve o Diesel Generator o HPCI Bill Crouch 7
Single Failure Analysis (Cont.)
EQUIPMENT ACTUALLY AVAILABLE WITH CURRENT ECCS LOGIC Recirculation Suction Break Recirculation Discharge Break Assumed Failure Systems Remaining Systems Remaining Battery ADS, 1LPCS, 3LPCI ADS, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops) (1 pump into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2) (2 pumps into 2 loops) (1 pump into 1 loop)
LPCI Injection ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS Valve (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Diesel Generator ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops) (1 pump into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps (2 per loop) into 1 loop)
NOTES: Each LPCS means two core spray pumps in operation.
Bill Crouch 8
ECCS Performance During a DBA In 1996, TVA implemented the SAFER / GESTR-LOCA methodology
- More realistic peak cladding temperatures
- Analysis demonstrated that less equipment is needed than that actually available SAFER / GESTR-LOCA analysis
- Revision 2 submitted as part of 5% power uprate on July 24,1998
- BFN current analysis is Revision 5 o Incorporates new GE fuel designs and types o Implements generic updates from GE o Analysis applicable to Units 1, 2 and 3 Bill Crouch 9
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
- FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, which assumes less equipment than is actually available Recirculation Suction Break Recirculation Suction Break Systems Actually Available Systems Credited in Analysis Assumed Failure (Shown on Slide 8) (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)
Battery ADS, 1LPCS, 3LPCI ADS, 1LPCS, 2LPCI*
(3 pumps into 2 loops) (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False ADS, HPCI, LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as actually available)
LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2) (2 pumps into 2 loops)
LPCI Injection ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as actually available)
Valve (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Diesel Generator ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops) (2 pumps into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (Same as actually available)
(2 per 2 loop)
- - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.
Bill Crouch 10
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
Recirculation Discharge Break Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Actually Available Systems Credited in Analysis Assumed Failure (Shown on Slide 8) (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)
Battery ADS, 1LPCS, 1LPCI ADS, 1LPCS*
(1 pump into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 1LPCI (Same as actually available)
LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2) (1 pump into 1 loop)
LPCI Injection ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS (Same as actually available)
Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS (1 pump into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as actually available)
(2 pumps into 1 loop)
- - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.
Bill Crouch 11
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER I GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is 1LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)._
PUMS PW A Bill Crouch EJ- MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS. 12
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into I loop). '
U onCI PtWB PtW A
° -EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT CREDITED IN THE EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.
X- LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.
M - MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS.
Bill Crouch 13
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER I GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 11, -W 9 7 the minimum equipment required by 4 the ECCS analysis is r-ILPCS.
K r-____-IL___--_
PC VALVE "C VALVEALE VALVE Pu KW w n l - wsC~rMEM LMT Cue TO E CAUMTION.
Bill CroudEh 14
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 1, ip the minimum I-----------
equipment required by + --------
the ECCS analysis is I -
ILPCS. ! I A..
P1W a NW A 0 -EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT CREDITED IN THE EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.
X -LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.
a -COMPONENTS LOST DUE TO BREAK LOCATION.
Bill Crouch El-MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS. 15
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
- Summary
- The bounding case design basis accident in terms of equipment availability is a LOCA, with the Loss of Offsite Power, and the loss of a Battery as the postulated single failure Bill Crouch 16
Questions and Answers Tim Abney 17
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal
- Only one unit is in a LOCA or post-accident recovery mode at any point in time
- During LOCA accident scenarios that assume the Loss of Offsite Power, the BFN licensing basis also postulates that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units
- This spurious accident signal is considered to be the postulated single failure
- No other single failures are assumed to occur
- The spurious accident signal could occur before, during or after the real signal Dave Burrell 18
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Current site status (Operation of Units 2 and 3)
- Fuel has been removed from the Unit 1 vessel and temporary logic modifications made during the extended shutdown to prevent a Spurious Accident Signal from being generated by Unit 1
- An accident signal in either Unit 2 or 3 starts all 8 diesel generators (DGs)
- The second unit to receive an accident signal clears that unit's 4KV shutdown boards and re-sequences the loads to the DG's. The other unit is unaffected by this 2nd signal and sequences its loads as planned.
Dave Burrell 19
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
UNITS 2 AND 3 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS AND ECCS LOADS ol 111?
4KV 4 4X UD3!A we SDD eSD 03 A 03~cNMm EI NO e U M DE S CS A CaC DCS T
5 021 M l
U A
A l
I 5D5 I
U2 mIe .
I _
ST2 t
non I I ID U 2 1o D
I 52 U2 IU D3 Dave Burrell 20
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
UNITS 1 AND 2 OPERATION IF THE CURRENT ECCS Page E1-19 of PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC WAS RE-ENABLED the submittal Unit 1 Unit 2 Core Spray Pump A Core Spray Pump 1B Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump IC Core Spray Pump 1D Core Spray Pump 2C Core Spray Pum 2D RER Pump 1A (LPCX) RIR PM 1B (LPCI) RER Pump 2A (LPCI) RIR Pump 2B (LPCI)
RR Pump 1C (LPCI) RHR Pump 1D (LPCI) RHR Pump 2C (LPCI) R}R Pump 2D (LPCI)
Bold and underline Indicates pump assignments In response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit.
Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.
Dave Burrell 21
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with ECCS logic re-enabled, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2
- LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1
- After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 seconds, starts RHR pumps 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D o At 7 seconds, starts CS pumps 1A, 1B, i C and 1D o At 14 seconds, starts EECW pumps DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRIA RHR 1C RHI RHRD]
CS1A lCS ic CS1B_ CS1D I EECW AlS1 lEECW C IEECW B3 EECW D31 Dave Burrell 22
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
- Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2
- The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks:
o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1C and 1D o Unit 1 Core Spray pumps 1B and 1D Q DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KVSDBDA 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRI1A]
<- -r RHR1C -~ - RHR B m- RHR D CSI1A CSIC [CSI1B CSI1D EECW Al FEECW Cl EWB EEC D3 Dave Burrell 23
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
- The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2B, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C
- The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2C and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D
- Results is an unacceptable start sequence on DGs B, C and D
- Remaining available systems do not satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCI (1 pump in 1 loop)
DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4 SD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRI1A RHR2CI RHR IBE RHR2D
[-CS IA I CS ic [CSI2B CS 2D I EECW EECW Al IEECWECCI EECWBEECW D Dave Burrell 24
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Summary
- The BFN licensing basis requires TVA to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident
- The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support the design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and spurious accident signal scenario with both Units 1 and 2 operating
- Modifications required to correct ECCS logic design Dave Burrell 25
Questions and Answers Tim Abney 26
Proposed Modifications Revisions to Preferred Pump Logic
- Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2
- Only functions with both a LOCA and spurious accident signal in Units 1 and 2
- Logic to be modified so that it functions in a similar manner with or without offsite power
- Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals
- Modifications on Units 1 and 2 will be made to support the changes to the ECCS Preferred Pump Logic Dave Burrell 27
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 6 ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Page E1-20 of the submittal Unit I Unit 2 Core Spray Pump IA Core Spray Pump I B Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump IC Core Spray Pump I D Core Spray Pump 2C Core Spray Pump 2D RHR Pump IA (LPCI) RHR Pump B (LPCI) RHR Pump 2A (LPCI) RHR Pump 2B (LPCI) lHR Pump IC LPCQ RHR Pump 1D (LPCi) RHR Pump 2C (LPCI) RHR Pump 2D (LPCI)
Bold and underline indicates pump assignments In response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.
Dave Burrell 28
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 1 CURRENT UNIT I ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-15 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC I Actuation dl I Actuation Signals Actuation Signals HCore Spray Pump 1A Core Spray Pump 1B 4-
-OCore Spray Pump 1C Core Spray Pump 1D 4-
-ORHR Pump 1A (LPCI) RHR Pump B (LPCI)
-PRHR Pump C (LPCI) RHR Pump D (LPCI)
Div I RHR (LPCI) 0' '4Div II RHR (LPCI)
-* Isolate recirculation Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 1B pump discharge valve 1A Div I RHR (LPCI) Div II RHR (LPCI)
-- Open inboard injection Open inboard injection 4-valve valve Dave Burrell 29
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 2 CURRENT UNIT 2 ECCS INmATION LOGIC Page E1-16 of the submittal
- DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC Actuation emAppy i-
/
Actuation Signals Actuation Signals
-PCore Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2B +
-11 Core Spray Pump 2C Core Spray Pump 2D +-
- RHR Pump 2A (LPCI) RHR Pump 2B (LPCI) 4 IRHR Pump 2C (LPCI) RHR Pump 2D (LPCI) 4 Div I RHR (LPCI) Div II RHR (LPCI)
-o Isolate recirculation Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 2B pump discharge valve 2A Div I RHR (LPCI) Div II RHR (LPCI)
-* Open inboard injection Open inboard injection -
valve valve Dave Burrell 30
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 3 CURRENT UNIT 3 ECCS INmATION LOGIC Page E1-17 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC -
of Actuation Signals '2' Actuation Signals
- O Core Spray Pump 3A Core Spray Pump 3B '
-OCore Spray Pump 3C Core Spray Pump 3D -
-RHR Pump 3A (LPCI) RHR Pump 3B (LPCI)
RHR Pump 3C (LPCI) RHR Pump 3D (LPCI)
Isolate recirculation
Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 3B pump discharge valve 3A Div I RHR (LPCI) Div II RHR (LPCI)
--oOpen inboard injection Open inboard injection 4-valve valve Dave Burrell 31
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 4 PROPOSED ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-18 of the submittal DIvISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC i-Deleted Redundant Actuation I/
Actuation Signals Actuation Signals
-_-Core Spray Pump A Core Spray Pump B
-_-Core Spray Pump C Core Spray Pump D
-- RHR Pump A (LPCI) RHR Pump B (LPCI)
-d*-
-_-RHR Pump C (LPCI) RHR Pump D (LPCI)
Div I RHR (LPCI) Div II RHR (LPCI)
/ Isolate recirculation o.
-_ Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve B / \ pump discharge valve A Div I RHR (LPCI) \ Div II RHR (LPCI)
-- Open inboard injection Open inboard injection-valve valve Dave Burrell 32
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Is I LPCS and 2LPCI >
(2 pumps into 1 loop).
M11m MM1~o P1W 0 PW A 0 - Equipment lost due to modified logic X - Equipment lost due to single failure ED- Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 33
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is ILPCS.
PMWU Pt A 0 - Equipment lost due to modified logic X - Equipment lost due to single failure 6 - Components lost due to break location
[: - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 34
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
UNIT I LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (SUCTION LINE BREAK)
WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)
DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Is I LPCS and 2LPCt v (2 pumps into I loop). -
RED - Component not available GREEN - Component available r - Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 35
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (DISCHARGE LINE BREAK)
WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)
DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is /
ILPCS.
LPCI INJ VALVE RED - Component not available M3- Equipment lost due to break location GREEN - Component available _J - Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 36
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
- Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with modified ECCS logic, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2
- LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1
- After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 sec., starts RHR pumps 1A, 1 1C and 1D No changes o At 7 sec., starts CS pumps 1A, 13B o At 14 sec., starts EECW pumps 1C and 1D
} due to proposed modifications DGC A 4KV SD BD C l RHR 1B1 CSEBB lEECW B3i Dave Burrell 37
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
- Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2
- The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic opens DG C and D breakers, which trips and blocks:
o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1Band 1D o Unit 1Core Spray pumps 1B and 1D o EECW pumps B3 and D3 (if aligned for service)
DG A DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRIA X I -
CSIA* CSIB ~~~~~~~~~~~ICSI1D EECW Al JEECW EECW B31 Il EEW31 Dave Burrell 38
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
- Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
- The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2C, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C
- The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2B and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D
- Results in an acceptable start sequence on DGs A, B, C and 3
- Remaining available systems satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI and 1LPCS o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps in 1 loop)
DGC DGD A 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D I RR 2B I RHR 2D CS2B CSC2D_3 WECWB3 EECWDE3i Dave Burrell 39
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Summary
- Proposed modifications comply with current Licensing Basis o Meet requirement to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident
- Proposed modifications comply with current LOCA analysis o Modified logic will assure ECCS requirements are met with or without a Loss of Offsite Power Dave Burrell 40
Questions and Answers Tim Abney 41
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes Proposed License Amendments
- Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59
- Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2 (Preferred Pump Logic) o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59
- Proposed Technical Specification changes
- Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Deletion of time delay relay in redundant start circuit requires a revision in Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1-1 Joe Valente 42
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPUCABLE MODES REQUIRED CONDITIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIED CHANNELS REFERENCED FROM FUNCTION CONDITIONS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION ACTION A. I REQUIREMENTS VALUE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start - lime Delay Relay Pump A,B,CD (with diesel power) 1,2,3, C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 0 seconds 4(a). 5(a) 4 SR 3.35.1.6 and S I second Pump A (with normal power) 1,2,3. 2 C SR 3.35.1.5 2 0 seconds 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and S I second I
Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, ~2 C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 6 seconds 4(a), 5(a) -I -i- SR 3.3-5.1.6 and IJHta S 8 seconds Joe Valente 43
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 2 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPUCABLE MODES REQUIRED CONDITIONS OR OTHER SPECIFIED CHANNELS REFERENCED FROM FUNCTION CONDITIONS PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION ACTION A.l REQUIREMENTS VALVE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start -Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,C.D (with diesel power) 1,2,3, -6(e)- C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 0 seconds 4(a), 5(a) 4 SR 3.3.5.1.6 and S I second Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 12 seconds 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and I s1i 16 second Pump D (with normal power) 1,2,3, C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 18 seconds 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and 5 24 seconds I
Joe Valente 44
Proposed License Amendments, Technical i Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 3 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPUCABLE REQUIRED CONDITIONS MODES CHANNELS PER REFERENCED FROM FUNCTION OR OTHER FUNCTION REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE SPECIIIED ACTlON A. I REQUIREMENTS VALUJE CONDITIONS
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,CD (with diesel power) 1.2.3. C SR 3.3.5.1.5 20 seconds 4(a), 5(a) 4 SR 3.3.5.1.6 and T Isecond 1,2,3, C SR 3.3.5.15 20 seconds Pump A (with normal power) 4(a), 5(a) p -ip s m SR 3.3.5.1.6 and 1 S I second C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 6 seconds Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 1 r'pr ;rt 2 eye*-m SR 3.3.5.1.6 and 8seconds 1 pe Mhipytem-Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, C SR 3.35.1.5 2 12seconds 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and 1 S16 seconds I C SR 3.3.5.1.5 2 18 seconds Pump D (with normal power) 1,3.
4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.6 and S 24 seconds Joe Valente 45
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case CURRENT FSAR PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Suction Break Recirculation Suction Break Assumed Failure Systems Remaining Systems Remaining Battery ADS, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as current FSAR)
(2 pumps into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2) (2 pumps into 2 loops) (2 pumps into 1 loop)
LPCI Injection ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as current FSAR)
Valve (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Diesel Generator ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (Same as current FSAR)
(2 pumps into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (Same as current FSAR)
(2 per loop)
Joe Valente 46
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
- FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case (Cont.)
CURRENT FSAR PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Discharge Break Recirculation Discharge Break Assumed Failure Systems Remaining Systems Remaining Battery ADS, 1LPCS (Same as current FSAR)
Opposite Unit False ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2) (1 pump into 1 loop)
LPCI Injection ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS (Same as current FSAR)
Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS (Same as current FSAR)
(1 pump into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (Same as current FSAR)
(2 pumps into 1 loop)
Joe Valente 47
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for these LOCA scenarios is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis results and conforms to 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K
- The current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis is conservative with respect to the current plant's actual equipment availability
- The reduction in the number of ECCS subsystems that are actually available in response to a LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power with a spurious accident signal will now be the same as the number of ECCS subsystems evaluated in the current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis for the bounding case (LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and battery failure)
Joe Valente 48
Summary and Conclusion
- The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for certain LOCA scenarios
- Satisfies the current Licensing Basis
- Is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 49