ML032870350
| ML032870350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/2003 |
| From: | Jabbour K NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2 |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032870348 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MB8423, TAC MB8424, TAC MB8425 | |
| Download: ML032870350 (49) | |
Text
I 4-TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT LICENSE AMENDMENT AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (TS 424)
Ir r
r REVISION IN EMERGENCY CORE REQUIRED IN RE LOSS OF COOLAN3 THE NUMBER OF COOLING SUBSYSTEMS
Meeting Objective To facilitate NRC review and approval of the proposed revision in the number of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems available in response to certain Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenarios Tim Abney 2
Agenda
Introductions
Summary of Issue Plant Layout Single Failure Analysis ECCS Performance during a Design Basis Accident (DBA)
Questions and Answers ECCS Performance during a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal Questions and Answers Proposed Modifications Questions and Answers Proposed License Amendment, Technical Specification and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes Tim Abney 3
Summary of Issue TVA's current ECCS logic is adequate to support operation of BFN Units 2 and 3 The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support certain design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power scenarios with both Units 1 and 2 operating TVA's proposed modifications to the ECCS logic will satisfy current licensing basis requirements and are consistent with the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 4
Plant Layout ECCS INJECTION FLOW PATHS AFTER AN ECCS INITIATION SIGNAL 9per PDA gpRŽ KtW a NW A Assumed analysis flow rates:
- One Core Spray loop (Two pumps) = 5600 gpm
- HPCI = 4500 gpm
- One LPCI pump In one loop = 9700 gpm
- Two LPCI pumps in one loop = 18,000 gpm NOTE: Both Core Spray pumps in a loop must operate for the loop to be considered available.
Bill Crouch 5
Plant Layout (Cont.)
UNITS I AND 2 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM A
@iDt 4KV SD D C TKrL U1 RHR B U2 RHR B U1 Cs B U2 CS B EECV 83 D/
O}
U1 RHR A U2 RHR A U1 U2 CS A CS A EECW Al
--
I
P U1 RHR C U2 RHR C U1 U2 UNITS 1&2 C
C C
U2 RHR U1 CS 0 U2 CS D EECW 03 Bill Crouch 6
Single Failure Analysis Single Failure Analysis with current ECCS logic (FSAR Table 6.5-3)
One active failure and the Loss of Offsite Power are assumed to occur with the pipe break Several line break sizes and combinations of various single failures were analyzed The following five single failures were bounding:
o Battery o Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (also referred to as the Spurious Accident Signal) o LPCI Injection Valve o Diesel Generator o HPCI Bill Crouch 7
Single Failure Analysis (Cont.)
EQUIPMENT ACTUALLY AVAILABLE WITH CURRENT ECCS LOGIC Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1LPCS, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)
ADS, 1 LPCS, 1 LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)
LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)
ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)
ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per loop)
ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
NOTES: Each LPCS means two core spray pumps in operation.
Bill Crouch 8
ECCS Performance During a DBA In 1996, TVA implemented the SAFER / GESTR-LOCA methodology More realistic peak cladding temperatures Analysis demonstrated that less equipment is needed than that actually available SAFER / GESTR-LOCA analysis Revision 2 submitted as part of 5% power uprate on July 24,1998 BFN current analysis is Revision 5 o Incorporates new GE fuel designs and types o Implements generic updates from GE o Analysis applicable to Units 1, 2 and 3 Bill Crouch 9
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, which assumes less equipment than is actually available Recirculation Suction Break Systems Actually Available (Shown on Slide 8)
Recirculation Suction Break Systems Credited in Analysis (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)
Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)
(2 pumps into 1 loop)
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)
ADS, HPCI, LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)
LPCI Injection Valve ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
(Same as actually available)
(Same as actually available)
ADS, 1 LPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
Diesel Generator ADS, 1 LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per 2 loop)
(Same as actually available)
- - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.
Bill Crouch 10
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Actually Available (Shown on Slide 8)
Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Credited in Analysis (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)
Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 1 LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
ADS, 1 LPCS*
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)
ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
(Same as actually available)
(Same as actually available)
LPCI Injection Valve ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
(Same as actually available)
- - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.
Bill Crouch 11
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER I GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is 1 LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)._
PUMS PW A EJ-MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS.
Bill Crouch 12
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into I loop). '
onCI U
PtWB PtW A
° -EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.
X-LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.
M -
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED CREDITED IN THE BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS.
Bill Crouch 13
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER I GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A DISCHARGE (CURRENT LOGIC)
LINE BREAK As shown on Slide 11,
-W 9
7 the minimum equipment required by 4
the ECCS analysis is r-ILPCS.
K r-____-IL___--_
PC VALVE "C
VALVEALE VALVE w n l
wsC~rMEM LMT Cue TO E CAUMTION.
Pu KW Bill CroudEh 14
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 1, ip the minimum I-----------
equipment required by
+
the ECCS analysis is I
ILPCS.
A..
I P1W a NW A 0
-EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT CREDITED IN X -LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.
a
-COMPONENTS LOST DUE TO BREAK LOCATION.
El-MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS THE EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.
ANALYSIS.
Bill Crouch 15
ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)
Summary The bounding case design basis accident in terms of equipment availability is a LOCA, with the Loss of Offsite Power, and the loss of a Battery as the postulated single failure Bill Crouch 16
Questions and Answers Tim Abney 17
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal Only one unit is in a LOCA or post-accident recovery mode at any point in time During LOCA accident scenarios that assume the Loss of Offsite Power, the BFN licensing basis also postulates that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units This spurious accident signal is considered to be the postulated single failure No other single failures are assumed to occur The spurious accident signal could occur before, during or after the real signal Dave Burrell 18
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Current site status (Operation of Units 2 and 3)
Fuel has been removed from the Unit 1 vessel and temporary logic modifications made during the extended shutdown to prevent a Spurious Accident Signal from being generated by Unit 1 An accident signal in either Unit 2 or 3 starts all 8 diesel generators (DGs)
The second unit to receive an accident signal clears that unit's 4KV shutdown boards and re-sequences the loads to the DG's. The other unit is unaffected by this 2nd signal and sequences its loads as planned.
Dave Burrell 19
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
UNITS 2 AND 3 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS AND ECCS LOADS ol 1 11?
4KV 4
4X UD3!A we SDD eSD 03 A
03~c NMm EI NO e U M E
l A
l t
5D5 ID D T ST2 U
I I I _
I I
I 021 M A
U2 mIe.
non U 2 1o 52 U2 IU D3 Dave Burrell 20
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
UNITS 1 AND 2 OPERATION IF THE CURRENT ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC WAS RE-ENABLED Page E1-19 of the submittal Unit 1 Unit 2 Core Spray Pump A Core Spray Pump IC RER Pump 1A (LPCX)
Core Spray Pump 1B Core Spray Pump 1D RIR PM 1B (LPCI)
Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2C RER Pump 2A (LPCI)
Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pum 2D RIR Pump 2B (LPCI)
R}R Pump 2D (LPCI)
Bold and underline Indicates pump assignments In response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit.
Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.
Dave Burrell 21
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with ECCS logic re-enabled, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2 LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1 After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 seconds, starts RHR pumps 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D o At 7 seconds, starts CS pumps 1 A, 1 B, i C and 1 D o At 14 seconds, starts EECW pumps DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRIA RHR 1C RHI RHRD]
CS1A lCS ic CS1B_
CS1D I
EECW AlS1 l EECW C IEECW B3 EECW D31 Dave Burrell 22
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2 The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks:
o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1C and 1D o Unit 1 Core Spray pumps 1 B and 1 D Q DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KVSDBDA 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D
-r
-~
m-RHRI1A]
[CSI1B CSI1D EECW Al FEECW Cl EWB EEC D3 Dave Burrell 23
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2B, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2C and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D Results is an unacceptable start sequence on DGs B, C and D Remaining available systems do not satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCI (1 pump in 1 loop)
DGA DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4
SD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D RHRI1A RHR2CI RHR IBE RHR2D
[CSI2B CS 2D I EECW EECW Al I EECWECCI EECWBEECW D
Dave Burrell 24
ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)
Summary The BFN licensing basis requires TVA to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support the design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and spurious accident signal scenario with both Units 1 and 2 operating Modifications required to correct ECCS logic design Dave Burrell 25
Questions and Answers Tim Abney 26
Proposed Modifications Revisions to Preferred Pump Logic Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2 Only functions with both a LOCA and spurious accident signal in Units 1 and 2 Logic to be modified so that it functions in a similar manner with or without offsite power Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals Modifications on Units 1 and 2 will be made to support the changes to the ECCS Preferred Pump Logic Dave Burrell 27
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 6 ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Page E1-20 of the submittal Unit I Unit 2 Core Spray Pump IA Core Spray Pump IC RHR Pump IA (LPCI) lHR Pump IC LPCQ Core Spray Pump I B Core Spray Pump I D RHR Pump B (LPCI)
RHR Pump 1D (LPCi)
Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2C RHR Pump 2A (LPCI)
Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump 2D RHR Pump 2B (LPCI)
Bold and underline indicates pump assignments In response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.
Dave Burrell 28
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 1 CURRENT UNIT I ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-15 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC I dl Actuation I Actuation Signals Actuation Signals H
Core Spray Pump 1A
-OCore Spray Pump 1C
-ORHR Pump 1A (LPCI)
-PRHR Pump C (LPCI)
Core Spray Pump 1B Core Spray Pump 1D RHR Pump B (LPCI)
-* Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 1B Div I RHR (LPCI)
-- Open inboard injection valve
Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 1A Div II RHR (LPCI)
Open inboard injection 4-valve Dave Burrell 29
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 2 CURRENT UNIT 2 ECCS INmATION LOGIC Page E1-16 of the submittal DIVISION II LOGIC DIVISION I LOGIC Actuation
/
emAppy i-Actuation Signals Actuation Signals
-PCore Spray Pump 2A
-11 Core Spray Pump 2C RHR Pump 2A (LPCI)
IRHR Pump 2C (LPCI)
-o Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 2B Div I RHR (LPCI)
-* Open inboard injection valve Core Spray Pump 2B
+
Core Spray Pump 2D
+-
RHR Pump 2B (LPCI) 4 RHR Pump 2D (LPCI) 4 Div II RHR (LPCI)
Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 2A Div II RHR (LPCI)
Open inboard injection -
valve Dave Burrell 30
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 3 CURRENT UNIT 3 ECCS INmATION LOGIC Page E1-17 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC of Actuation Signals
- O Core Spray Pump 3A
-OCore Spray Pump 3C
-RHR Pump 3A (LPCI)
-_ Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 3B Div I RHR (LPCI)
--oOpen inboard injection valve
'2' Actuation Signals Core Spray Pump 3B Core Spray Pump 3D RHR Pump 3B (LPCI)
Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 3A Div II RHR (LPCI)
Open inboard injection 4-valve Dave Burrell 31
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
FIGURE 4 PROPOSED ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-18 of the submittal DIvISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC i-Deleted Redundant Actuation I/
Actuation Signals
-_-Core Spray Pump A
-_-Core Spray Pump C RHR Pump A (LPCI)
-_-RHR Pump C (LPCI)
Actuation Signals Core Spray Pump B Core Spray Pump D RHR Pump B (LPCI)
-d*-
-_ Isolate recirculation
/
pump discharge valve B /
-- Open inboard injection valve Isolate recirculation o.
\\ pump discharge valve A
Open inboard injection-valve Dave Burrell 32
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Is I LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop).
M11m MM1~o P1W 0
PW A 0
Equipment lost due to modified logic X -
Equipment lost due to single failure ED-Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 33
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)
As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is ILPCS.
PMW U Pt A
0 -
Equipment lost due to modified logic X -
Equipment lost due to single failure 6
Components lost due to break location
[: -
Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 34
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
UNIT I LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (SUCTION LINE BREAK)
WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)
DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Is I LPCS and 2LPCt v
(2 pumps into I loop). -
RED - Component not available GREEN - Component available r
Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 35
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (DISCHARGE LINE BREAK)
WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)
DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is /
ILPCS.
LPCI INJ VALVE RED - Component not available GREEN - Component available M3-Equipment lost due to break location
_J -
Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 36
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with modified ECCS logic, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2 LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1 After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 sec., starts RHR pumps 1A, 1 1 C and 1 D o At 7 sec., starts CS pumps 1 A, 13B 1 C and 1 D o At 14 sec., starts EECW pumps
}
No changes due to proposed modifications A
DGC 4KV SD BD C l RHR 1B1 CSEBB lEECW B3i Dave Burrell 37
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2 The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic opens DG C and D breakers, which trips and blocks:
o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1 Band 1 D o Unit 1 Core Spray pumps 1 B and 1 D o EECW pumps B3 and D3 (if aligned for service)
DG A DG B DG C DG D 4KV SD BD A 4KVSD BD B 4KV SD BD C 4KV SD BD D X
I
-t X
CSIB ~~~~~~~~~~~ICSI1D EECW Al JEECW Il EECW B31 EEW31 Dave Burrell 38
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)
The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2C, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2B and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D Results in an acceptable start sequence on DGs A, B, C and Remaining available systems satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI and 1 LPCS o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps in 1 loop) 3 A
DGC 4KV SD BD I RR 2B CS2B WECWB3 C
DGD 4KV SD BD D I RHR 2D CSC2D_3 EECWDE3i Dave Burrell 39
Proposed Modifications (Cont.)
Summary Proposed modifications comply with current Licensing Basis o Meet requirement to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident Proposed modifications comply with current LOCA analysis o Modified logic will assure ECCS requirements are met with or without a Loss of Offsite Power Dave Burrell 40
Answers Questions and Tim Abney 41
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes Proposed License Amendments Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2 (Preferred Pump Logic) o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 Proposed Technical Specification changes Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Deletion of time delay relay in redundant start circuit requires a revision in Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1-1 Joe Valente 42
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPUCABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A. I FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start - lime Delay Relay Pump A,B,CD (with diesel power)
Pump A (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a). 5(a) 1,2,3.
4(a), 5(a) 4 2
I C
C SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.35.1.6 SR 3.35.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 0 seconds and S I second 2 0 seconds and S I second Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)
~2
-I
-i-IJHta C
SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3-5.1.6 2 6 seconds and S 8 seconds Joe Valente 43
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 2 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPUCABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.l FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALVE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start -Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,C.D (with diesel power)
Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)
-6(e)-
4 2
I s1i C
C SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 0 seconds and S I second 2 12 seconds and 16 second Pump D (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)
I C
SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 18 seconds and 5 24 seconds Joe Valente 44
Proposed License Amendments, Technical i Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
Unit 3 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPUCABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIIIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTlON A. I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUJE
- 2. LPCI System (continued)
- f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,CD (with diesel power) 1.2.3.
4(a), 5(a) 4 C
SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 20 seconds and T Isecond Pump A (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)
Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) p
-ip s m 1
1 r'pr ;rt eye*-m 2
1 pe M hipytem-1 I
C C
C C
SR 3.3.5.15 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.35.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 20 seconds and S I second 2 6 seconds and 8 seconds 2 12seconds and S16 seconds 2 18 seconds and S 24 seconds 45 Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)
Pump D (with normal power) 1,3.
4(a), 5(a)
Joe Valente
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case CURRENT FSAR Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
(Same as current FSAR)
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)
LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)
ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
ADS, 1 LPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
(Same as current FSAR)
(Same as current FSAR)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per loop)
(Same as current FSAR)
Joe Valente 46
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case (Cont.)
CURRENT FSAR Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1LPCS (Same as current FSAR)
Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)
ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)
ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS (Same as current FSAR)
LPCI Injection Valve ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS (1 pump into 1 loop)
(Same as current FSAR)
HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)
(Same as current FSAR)
Joe Valente 47
Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)
The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for these LOCA scenarios is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis results and conforms to 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K The current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis is conservative with respect to the current plant's actual equipment availability The reduction in the number of ECCS subsystems that are actually available in response to a LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power with a spurious accident signal will now be the same as the number of ECCS subsystems evaluated in the current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis for the bounding case (LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and battery failure)
Joe Valente 48
Summary and Conclusion The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for certain LOCA scenarios Satisfies the current Licensing Basis Is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 49