ML032760279

Transmittal of 10/02/03 Meeting Handout Material Regarding the Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Browns Ferry, Units 1, 2, and 3

ML032760279
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/02/2003
From:	Jabbour K NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
References
TAC MB8423, TAC MB8424, TAC MB8425
Download: ML032760279 (50)

Text

NRC FORM 658 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

• 1999)

TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING HANDOUT MATERIALS FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN This form is to be filled out (typed or hand-printed) by the person who announced the meeting (i.e., the person who issued the meeting notice). The completed form, and the attached copy of meeting handout materials, will be sent to the Document Control Desk on the same day of the meeting; under no circumstances will this be done later than the working day after the meeting.

Do not Include proprietary materials.

DATE OF MEETING 1l of Jo3 The attached document(s), which was/were handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed

/~t2003 in the public domain as soon as possible. The minutes of the meeting will be issued in the near future. Following are administrative details regarding this meeting:

Docket Number(s) 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Plant/Facility Name Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 TAC Number(s) (if available)

MB8423, MB8424, and MB8425 Reference Meeting Notice 09/10t2003 Purpose of Meeting (copy from meeting notice)

To discuss the Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Browns Ferry Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 NAME OF PERSON WHO ISSUED MEETING NOTICE TIT Kahtan N. Jabbour Senior Project Manager OFFICE Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DIVISION Division of Licensing Project Management BRANCH Project Directorate II, Section 2 Distribution of this form and attachments:

Docket File/Central File PUBLIC NRC FORM S58 (9-1999)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER TNs form was designed using InFonns

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l LICENSE AMENDMENT AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (TS 424)

REVISION IN THE NUMBER OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SUBSYSTEMS REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO CERTAIN LOSS OF COOLA f

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Meeting Objective To facilitate NRC review and approval of the proposed revision in the number of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems available in response to certain Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) scenarios Tim Abney 2

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Introductions

Summary of Issue Plant Layout Single Failure Analysis ECCS Performance during a Design Basis Accident (DBA)

Questions and Answers ECCS Performance during a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal Questions and Answers Proposed Modifications Questions and Answers Proposed License Amendment, Technical Specification and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes Tim Abney 3

Summary of Issue TVA's current ECCS logic is adequate to support operation of BFN Units 2 and 3 The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support certain design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power scenarios with both Units 1 and 2 operating TVA's proposed modifications to the ECCS logic will satisfy current licensing basis requirements and are consistent with the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 4

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I Plant Layout ECCS INJECTION FLOW PATHS AFTER AN ECCS INITIATION SIGNAL P or PorD Pop DiO LPO DIM2M1~

VALVE RCINO RECIRO Mp B PtW A Assumed analysis flow rates:

- One Core Spray loop (Two pumps) = 5600 gpm

- HPCI = 4500 gpm

- One LPCI pump in one loop = 9700 gpm

- Two LPCI pumps in one loop = 18,000 gpm NOTE: Both Core Spray pumps in a loop must operate for the loop to be considered available.

Bill Crouch 5

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- Plant Layout (Cont.)

UNITS I AND 2 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM (iE)D/C (iR)D/CG D/CrQ D/C 4KV SDBDA I

4KV SD BDO 4KV SBDCI 4KV SD BDD _

UNITS U1 IR I U

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I U1 RH D UI RH1R A I U2 RHR A Ul CS A U2 CS A EECW Al U I RHR C I U2 RHR C Ul cs C U2 CS C EECW Cl UI RHR B I U2 RHR B Ul CS B U2 CS B EECW B3 UI RHR D I U2 RHR D Ul CS D U2 CS D EECW D3 Bill Crouch 6

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Single Failure Analysis Single Failure Analysis with current ECCS logic (FSAR Table 6.5-3)

One active failure and the Loss of Offsite Power are assumed to occur with the pipe break Several line break sizes and combinations of various single failures were analyzed The following five single failures were bounding:

o Battery o Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (also referred to as the Spurious Accident Signal) o LPCI Injection Valve o Diesel Generator o HPCI Bill Crouch 7

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EQUIPMENT ACTUALLY AVAILABLE WITH CURRENT ECCS LOGIC Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)

LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

ADS, 1LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per loop)

ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI into 1 loop)

(2 pumps NOTES: Each LPCS means two core spray pumps in operation.

Bill Crouch 8

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I ECCS Performance During a DBA In 1996, TVA implemented the SAFER / GESTR-LOCA methodology More realistic peak cladding temperatures Analysis demonstrated that less equipment is needed than that actually available SAFER / GESTR-LOCA analysis Revision 2 submitted as part of 5% power uprate on July 24,1998 BFN current analysis is Revision 5 o Incorporates new GE fuel designs and types o Implements generic updates from GE o Analysis applicable to Units 1, 2 and 3 Bill Crouch 9

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ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, which assumes less equipment than is actually available Recirculation Suction Break Systems Actually Available (Shown on Slide 8)

Recirculation Suction Break Systems Credited in Analysis (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)

Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI*

(2 pumps into 1 loop)

Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)

LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

ADS, 1 LPCS, HPCI, 3LPCI (3 pumps into 2 loops)

(Same as actually available)

(Same as actually available)

ADS, 1 LPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per 2 loop)

(Same as actually available)

• - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.

Bill Crouch 10

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Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Actually Available (Shown on Slide 8)

Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Credited in Analysis (Shown in FSAR Table 6.5-3)

Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 1 LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

ADS, 1 LPCS*

Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)

LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 1 LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1 LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

(Same as actually available)

(Same as actually available)

ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

(Same as actually available)

• - Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis.

Bill Crouch 11

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ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK (CURRENT LOGIC)

As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into I loop).>

INJEOTIC" VALVE RZOit WMit PIMPS PIMP A E:- MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS.

Bill Crouch 12

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ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)

As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS and 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop). '

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-EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.

X-LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.

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MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED CREDITED IN THE BY THE ECCS ANALYSIS.

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ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER I GESTR ANALYSIS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK (CURRENT LOGIC)

As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS.

LPCI INJECTIC VALVE LCATIO-(
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LPCI INJECTION VALVE NECIUC ECINC PUMP P1MW A EJa-MINI" EPUIN&I REWIEDT I

T EMCS ANALYSIS.

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- CWONENTS LOST DUE TO BREAK LOCATION.

Bill Crouch 14 C0-0Z

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ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (CURRENT LOGIC)

As shown on Slidel1, I

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equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I

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° -EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE BUT NOT CREDITED IN X -LOST DUE TO SINGLE FAILURE.

3 1-COMPONENTS LOST DUE TO BREAK LOCATION.

El-MINIMUM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY THE ECCS THE EXISTING FSAR TABLE 6.5-3.

ANALYSIS.

Bill Crouch 15 CO)

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1-ECCS Performance During a DBA (Cont.)

0 Summary The bounding case design basis accident in terms of equipment availability is a LOCA, with the Loss of Offsite Power, and the loss of a Battery as the postulated single failure Bill Crouch 16

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El Questions and Answers Tim Abney 17

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ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal Only one unit is in a LOCA or post-accident recovery mode at any point in time During LOCA accident scenarios that assume the Loss of Offsite Power, the BFN licensing basis also postulates that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units This spurious accident signal is considered to be the postulated single failure No other single failures are assumed to occur The spurious accident signal could occur before, during or after the real signal Dave Burrell 18

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I ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)

Current site status (Operation of Units 2 and 3)

Fuel has been removed from the Unit 1 vessel and temporary logic modifications made during the extended shutdown to prevent a Spurious Accident Signal from being generated by Unit 1 An accident signal in either Unit 2 or 3 starts all 8 diesel generators (DGs)

The second unit to receive an accident signal clears that unit's 4KV shutdown boards and re-sequences the loads to the DG's. The other unit is unaffected by this 2nd signal and sequences its loads as planned.

Dave Burrell 19

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I ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)

UNITS 2 AND 3 STANDBY AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS AND ECCS LOADS 4V4KV 4KV 4EV

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I ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)

UNITS I AND 2 OPERATION IF THE CURRENT ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC WAS RE-ENABLED Page E1-19 of the submittal Unit I Unit 2 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 Core Spray Pump 1A Core SpraV Pump 1C RHR Pump 1A (LPCI)

RHR Pump 1C (LPCI)

Core Spray Pump 1B Core Spray Pump 1D RHR Pump 1B (LPCI)

RHR Pump iD (LPCI)

Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2C RHR Pump 2A (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2C (LPCI)

Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump 2D RHR Pump 2B (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2D (LPCI)

Bold and underline indicates pump assignments in response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit.

Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.

Dave Burrell 21 C0i:L

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Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with ECCS logic re-enabled, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2 LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1 After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 seconds, starts RHR pumps 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D o At 7 seconds, starts CS pumps 1 A, 1 B, 1 C and 1 D o At 14 seconds, starts EECW pumps A

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Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)

Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2 The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks:

o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1C and 1 D o Unit 1 Core Spray pumps 1 B and 1 D A

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Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)

The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2B, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2C and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D Results is an unacceptable start sequence on DGs B, C and D Remaining available systems do not satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCI (1 pump in 1 loop)

A Dave Burrell 24

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I ECCS Performance During a DBA with a Spurious Accident Signal (Cont.)

Summary The BFN licensing basis requires TVA to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident The current logic, electrical boards, and diesel generators do not support the design basis LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and spurious accident signal scenario with both Units 1 and 2 operating Modifications required to correct ECCS logic design Dave Burrell 25

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f Questions and Answers Tim Abney 26

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UI Proposed Modifications Revisions to Preferred Pump Logic Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2 Only functions with both a LOCA and spurious accident signal in Units 1 and 2 Logic to be modified so that it functions in a similar manner with or without offsite power Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals Modifications on Units 1 and 2 will be made to support the changes to the ECCS Preferred Pump Logic Dave Burrell 27

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Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

FIGURE 6 ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC FOLLOWING APPROVAL OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT Page E1-20 of the submittal Unit 1 Unit 2 DIVISION I Core Spray Pump 1A Core Spray Pump IC RHR Pump 1A (LPCI)

RHR Pump 1 C (LPCI)

DIVISION 2 Core Spray Pump 1 B Core Spray Pump 1 D RHR Pump I B (LPCI)

RHR Pump 1 D (LPCI)

DIVISION 1 Core Spray Pump 2A Core Spray Pump 2C RHR Pump 2A (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2C (LPCI)

DIVISION 2 Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump 21 RHR Pump 2B (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2D (LPCI)

Bold and underline indicates pump assignments in response to a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident combined with a spurious accident signal in the adjacent unit.

Pumps shown in red are tripped and blocked from starting by the Preferred Pump Logic.

Dave Burrell 28 co;

Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

U, FIGURE 1 CURRENT UNIT I ECCS INITIATION LOGIC I

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Page E1-15 of the submittal l DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC 4'f Actuation Signals Actuation Signals

-OCore Spray Pump 1A

-* Core Spray Pump 1C

-PRHR Pump 1A (LPCI)

-ORHR Pump 1C (LPCI)

Div I RHR (LPCI)

-o Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 1B Div I RHR (LPCI)

-o Open inboard injection valve Core Spray Pump 1B Core Spray Pump iD RHR Pump 1B (LPCI)

RHR Pump iD (LPCI)

Div II RHR (LPCI)

Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 1A Div II RHR (LPCI)

Open inboard injection valve Dave Burrell 29

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I Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

FIGURE 2 CURRENT UNIT 2 ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-16 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC i Actuation

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Actuation Signals

-PCore Spray Pump 2A

-OCore Spray Pump 2C

-IRHR Pump 2A (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2C (LPCI)

Actuation Signals Core Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump 2D RHR Pump 2B (LPCI)

RHR Pump 2D (LPCI) 4-41-4-

4-Div I RHR (LPCI) 1(

-_ Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 2B Div I RHR (LPCI)

-_Open inboard injection valve

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'Div II RHR (LPCI)

Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 2A Div II RHR (LPCI)

Open inboard injection 4-valve Dave Burrell 30

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FIGURE 3 CURRENT UNIT 3 ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-17 of the submittal DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC I-Actuation Actuation Signals Actuation Signal s

-'Core Spray Pump 3A

-1Core Spray Pump 3C

-lRHR Pump 3A (LPCI)

-ORHR Pump 3C (LPCI)

Div I RHR (LPCI)

-_ Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve 3B/

Div I RHR (LPCI)

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-_ Open inboard injection valve Core Spray Pump 3B

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Core Spray Pump 3D RHR Pump 3B (LPCI)

RHR Pump 3D (LPCI)

Div II RHR (LPCI)

Isolate recirculation 4-pump discharge valve 3A Div II RHR (LPCI)

Open inboard injection.-

valve Dave Burrell 31

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Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

FIGURE 4 PROPOSED ECCS INITIATION LOGIC Page E1-18 of the submittal

-jl DIVISION I LOGIC DIVISION II LOGIC I-Deleted Redundant X

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Actuation

/7 Actuation Signals

-_-Core Spray Pump A

-_-Core Spray Pump C

-*RHR Pump A (LPCI)

-4_ RHR Pump C (LPCI)

Div I RHR (LPCI)

Actuation Signals Core Spray Pump B Core Spray Pump D RHR Pump B RHR Pump D (LPCI)

(LPCI)

-d4-Div II RHR (LPCI)

-4 Isolate recirculation pump discharge valve B /

Div I RHR (LPCI)

P

-w-Open inboard injection valve

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Isolate recirculation 4.

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pump discharge valve A

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Open inboard injections--

valve Dave Burrell 32

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I Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCTION LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)

As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is 1 LPCS and 2LPCI N

(2 pumps into 1 loop).

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Equipment lost due to modified logic X -

Equipment lost due to single failure M -

Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 33 COb

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Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

ECCS SAFER / GESTR ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCHARGE LINE BREAK WITH A BATTERY FAILURE (PROPOSED LOGIC)

As shown on Slide 11, the minimum I

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Equipment lost due to modified logic Equipment lost due to single failure Components lost due to break location Minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 34 Q-Q7

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Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (SUCTION LINE BREAK)

WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)

DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 10, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is v 1 LPCS and 2LPCI l (2 pumps into I loop). -

'LPCI INJECTION

'VALVE RECIRC B RECIRC A RECIRC B RECIRC A RED - Component not available GREEN - Component available E

Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 35

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UNIT 1 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER / LOCA (DISCHARGE LINE BREAK)

WITH A SPURIOUS ACCIDENT SIGNAL FROM UNIT 2 (PROPOSED ECCS PREFERRED PUMP LOGIC)

DIV I DIV II As shown on Slide 11, the minimum equipment required by the ECCS analysis is I LPCS.

LPCI INJ VALVE RECIRC B RECIRC A RECIRC E RECIRC A RED - Component not available 3-Equipment lost due to break location GREEN - Component available z-Minimum equipment required by ECCS analysis Dave Burrell 36

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( -II I-Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

Timeline of Design Basis Accident in Unit 1, with modified ECCS logic, followed by a spurious accident signal from Unit 2 LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power occurs in Unit 1 After diesel generator breakers close and Unit 1 ECCS logic has initiated o At 0.1 sec., starts RHR pumps 1A, By 10 Cand 1D o At 7 sec., starts CS pumps 1 A, B 10B 1 C and 1 D o At 14 sec., starts EECW pumps

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I Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)

Spurious accident signal received from Unit 2 The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic opens DG C and D breakers, which trips and blocks:

o Unit 1 RHR pumps 1 Band 1 D o Unit 1 Core Spray pumps 1 B and 1 D o EECW pumps B3 and D3 (if aligned for service)

A D

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Timeline of Design Basis Accident (Cont.)

The ECCS Preferred Pump Logic trips and blocks the start of Unit 2 RHR pumps 2A and 2C, and Core Spray pumps 2A and 2C The Unit 2 ECCS logic starts RHR pumps 2B and 2D, and Core Spray pumps 2B and 2D Results in an acceptable start sequence on DGs A, B, C and D Remaining available systems satisfy ECCS requirements o Discharge line break - ADS, HPCI and 1 LPCS o Suction line break - ADS, HPCI, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps in 1 loop)

A C

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Proposed Modifications (Cont.)

Summary Proposed modifications comply with current Licensing Basis o Meet requirement to assume that a spurious accident signal could originate from one of the non-accident units coincident with a design basis accident Proposed modifications comply with current LOCA analysis o Modified logic will assure ECCS requirements are met with or without a Loss of Offsite Power Dave Burrell 40

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Answers Questions and Tim Abney 41

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I Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes Proposed License Amendments Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 Assignment of Division I ECCS loads to Unit 1 and Division 11 ECCS loads to Unit 2 (Preferred Pump Logic) o Reduction in redundancy requires a License amendment under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 Proposed Technical Specification changes Deletion of redundant opposite division ECCS initiation signals o Deletion of time delay relay in redundant start circuit requires a revision in Technical Specification Table 3.3.5.1-1 Joe Valente 42

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Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

Unit 1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.l FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

2. LPCI System (continued)

f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start - Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,C,D (with diesel power)

Pump A (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 6(e) 4 1 A_ st 1

C C

SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 0 seconds and S 1 second 2 0 seconds and S 1 second 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 2 C

SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

> 6 seconds and 5 8 seconds Joe Valente 43

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r' Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

Unit 2 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.I FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

2. LPCI System (continued)

f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start - Time Delay Relay Pump A,B,C,D (with diesel power)

Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 6(e) 4

--2--

1 C

C SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.35.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 0 seconds and

• I second

> 12 seconds and

• 16 second 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

Pump D (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

I C

SR 3.35.15 SR 3.3.5.1.6 2 18 seconds and

• 24 seconds Joe Valente 44

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Proposed License Amendments, Technical i Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

Unit 3 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 6)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A. I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE

2. LPCI System (continued)

f. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Start-rime Delay Relay Pump A,B,C,D (with diesel power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

C SR 3.3.5.15 SR 3.3.5.1.6 4

20 seconds and

< Isecond Pump A (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

Pump B (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a) 1 1 pa 'dip sysstaa' 1

I C

C C

C SR 3.3.5.15 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6 SR 3.3.5.1.5 SR 3.3.5.1.6

>0 seconds and 5 I second 2 6 seconds and 5 8 seconds 2 12 seconds and S 16 seconds 2 18 seconds and 5 24 seconds 45 Pump C (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

Pump D (with normal power) 1,2,3, 4(a), 5(a)

Joe Valente

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Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case CURRENT FSAR Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Suction Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

(Same as current FSAR)

Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)

LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 2 loops)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

ADS, iLPCS, HPCI, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

(Same as current FSAR)

(Same as current FSAR)

HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 4LPCI (2 per loop)

(Same as current FSAR)

Joe Valente 46

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Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

FSAR Table 6.5-3, which reflects the current ECCS analysis, will be revised to reflect actual equipment available for the false LOCA signal case (Cont.)

CURRENT FSAR Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining PROPOSED FSAR Recirculation Discharge Break Systems Remaining Assumed Failure Battery ADS, 1 LPCS (Same as current FSAR)

Opposite Unit False LOCA Signal (Units 1 and 2)

LPCI Injection Valve Diesel Generator ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS, 1LPCI (1 pump into 1 loop)

ADS, HPCI, 2LPCS ADS, HPCI, lLPCS (1 pump into 1 loop)

ADS, HPCI, 1LPCS (Same as current FSAR)

(Same as current FSAR)

HPCI ADS, 2LPCS, 2LPCI (2 pumps into 1 loop)

(Same as current FSAR)

Joe Valente 47

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I Proposed License Amendments, Technical Specification and FSAR changes (Cont.)

The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for these LOCA scenarios is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis results and conforms to 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K The current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis is conservative with respect to the current plant's actual equipment availability The reduction in the number of ECCS subsystems that are actually available in response to a LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power with a spurious accident signal will now be the same as the number of ECCS subsystems evaluated in the current BFN SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis for the bounding case (LOCA / Loss of Offsite Power and battery failure)

Joe Valente 48

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Summary and Conclusion The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that The proposed revision in the number of ECCS subsystems that are available for certain LOCA scenarios Satisfies the current Licensing Basis Is consistent with and bounded by the current LOCA analysis Joe Valente 49