ML031560708

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

GO-10

I

DRAIN AND FILL OPERATIONS

Revision 20

Page 268 of 254

<7

Date

INITIALS

APPENDIX AD

Page 1 of 1

VACUUM vs. RCS TEMPERATURE / RHR FLOWRATE

Allowable Vacuum vs RHR Flow and RCS Temperature

Allowable Region Is Below And To The Left Of The Appliccable RHR Flow Curve

26

25

24

0

L0

4$

C

if

U

23

____

__,,.h__,

i

_

p

N,

_

_.__,

i....~

--

_

210i'

N

11

N

<N

. l

-

+~~

2300_* \\

9 2400

\\>i

+ 2500_.

22

21

20

70

80

90

100

RCS Temperature, F

110

120

130

N.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

on20

DRAIN AND FILL OPERATIONS

Page 269 of 284

APPENDIX AE

Page 1 of 1

EVACUATION TIME

30

20

Time minute

)0

to

.

U

A

-

44

04

.

o 01010200

250

Time, minutes

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING

PROCEDURES

EPIP-1

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART

Revision 21

Unit 0

NON-QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED BY:

James F. Haav

(Type Name)

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:

Emeraencv Plannina

APPROVED BY:

Frank L. Pavlechko

EFFECTIVE DATE:03/03/2003

LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE

.

EPIP-1

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 2 of 49

REVISION LOG

Revision [ Implementation l

Description of Revision

Number I

Date

l

0

04/13/90

New WBN-EPIP. Supersedes lP-1.

02/04/91

Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating

conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS

telephone numbers.

2

11/28/91

Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment I

Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and

Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for

Uncontrolled Shutdown.

3

03/04/92

Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new 'Merit"

Tech S2ecs and ODCM references.

4

02/10/93

Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development

of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3,

1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and

Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.

09/15/93

Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to

EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.

6

01/01/94

Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.

7

05/27/94

Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring)

and establish site perimeter monitoring points.

8

01/10/95

FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate

potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and

wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to

_ rovide Operators additional information.

4/28/98

Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added

to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect

information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document

(WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone

numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their

reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake

corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to

RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description

documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:

System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release

time durations, apd annual meteorological data enhancements.

Revision

Implementation Date

- Pages

Description of Revision

Number

l Affected

ON-i

09/28/95

10,14, 26

The following non-intent enhancements were made:

(CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier

Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),

to enhance description. New Si reference number

for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory

Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified

Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area

code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tomado)

revised to new number.

CN-2

11/10/95

3,6, 34

The following non-intent enhancements were made:

Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were

added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1;

Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability;

an enhanced description for RE-404 was

provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS

Operators Manual was added to the Reference

section.

.EPIP-1

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 3 of 49

REVISION LOG(Continued)

Revision I implementation

Pages

l

Description of Revision

Number

Date

Affected

CN-3

05/24/96

8, 11,16,

The following non-intent enhancements were made: Due

19, 23, 24,

to revisions made to AOl-27, it was added back to the

26, 29, 32,

EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation"; The

34

Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to

correspond with the note at the top of the table. In

addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this

procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements

being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile

was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3

"Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the

EALs within it's classification.

1 0

3/15/99

All

The following non-intent enhancement were made:

Software revised to Microsoft Word which re-formatted

pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical

. - -errors

corrected; two references revised - one added;

SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent

added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent

fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in

Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised

to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500

to ICS.

11

4/15/99

2, 34

Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to >0.1.

11A

7/1/99

3,26

Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of

this procedure are Rev 11 only page 3, and the fold out

page for 26 have been changed.

12

9/30/99

All

Non intent change. Minor editorial\\format changes

made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows

revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695.

(LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible

Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the

resolution to PER 99-009326-000.

13

12/08/99

All

Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of

PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1

step 1 of the Alert classification.

14

04/10/00

All

Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484,

(Pg.4 & 45)

stage 1 which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS

Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE-90-421 B

thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen

4RM1 to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation

monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all

gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate

ICS screen.

15

08/17/00

All

Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors

(Pg. 4, 11A & (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to correspond

B)

with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary

Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference

EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the

EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 11 b. This revision

resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000.

This revision was also determined not to reduce the level

of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

.

EPIP-1

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 4 of 49

REVISION LOG (Continued)

Revision -

Implementation

l

Pages

l

Description of Revision

Number

Date

Affected

I

16

3/30/01

All

Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the

(Pg. 11 &14)

following revisions do not reduce the level of

effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings

in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose

assessment methodology.

Non intent change. Revised reference from annunciator

alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.

17

09/25/01

All

Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the

following revisions do not reduce the level of

Page 6, 11 B effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related

per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2.

The coversheet and records section of the procedure was

revised to reflect this change.

Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.

18

02/15/02

All

Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the

2, 1 lB. 44

following revisions do not reduce the level of

effectiveness of the procedure or REP:

Non-intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision

consist of changing 0Py to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure

consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101,

and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3

(containment isolation status also made per this

reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other

TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State

of Tennessee.

19

06/05/02

All

effectiveness determinations on these change(s)

indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of

4, 7 &30

effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Intent change(s): A revision to the Security Event (4.6)

was made to incorporate change(s) resulting from the NEi

to NRC (Mr. Bruce Boger) letter dated 12/18/01

requesting conformation for an EAL basis change to

include response to a Credible Site Specific Threat.

Table 4-3 was revised to incorporate this additional EAL.

This meets the compliance of the NRC's 10/6/01

Safeguards Advisory on this matter. This represents an

additional EAL and does not change existing criteria in the

Security Event Basis.

Revised 5.1 Interfacing documents by noting the

termination of EPIP 9 with reference to EPIP 16.

20

07/09/02

ALL,

Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s)

pg. 2, 10,

indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of

13,15, 20,

effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

24, 30, 32,

Intent change(s): Reference to T/S 3.4.16 in Event 2.4 EAl

39, 43

1 (a) revised to correspond to levels in AO1-28. Credible

Site-Specific was added to the definition pages. Removed

reference to the definition in Table 4-3 SECURITY

EVENTS to standardize with other TVAN sites.

21

03/03/2003

2,15

Plan effectiveness determinations on these change(s)

indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of

effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Non-intent change: Deleted reference to table which was

deleted from AO1-28, Ref. WBPER 03-004004-000.

EPIP-II

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 5 of 49

1.0

PURPOSE4

This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and

declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0

RESPONSIBILITY2' 4

The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this

procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or

designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site

Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.

3.0

INSTRUCTIONS 4

3.1

The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY:

knowledge of

actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that

additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined

with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a

classification for a particular set of circumstances.

3.2

The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated

when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

3.3

Classification Determination

3.3.1

To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating

Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or

suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions

referenced.

3.3.2

If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the

respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the

Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

3.3.3

The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL)

currently exists shall be declared.

.

EPIR-I

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 6 of 49

3.0

INSTRUCTIONS (continued)

3.3.4

After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that

Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification,

the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the

determination.

3.3.5

IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present

situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher

classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central

Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.

3.3.6

IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the

existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,

spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the

condition istNonsidered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the

indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.3.7

IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved

(prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall

not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist

(ODS) at the same clock time.

3.3.8

The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty

Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time

period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0

RECORDS

4.1

Non-QA Records

None

.EPIP-

CLASSIFICATION

Revision 21

FLOWCHART

Page 7 of 49

5.0

REFERENCES

5.1

Interfacing References

BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis

SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements

WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event

WBN-EPIP-3, Alert

WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency

WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency

WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-16)

WBN-EPIP-1 3, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery

WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response

WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies

CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures

SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant

System

5.2

Other Documents

10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities

10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation

REG GUIDE-1.101, EmergencyPlanning and Preparedness ForNuclearPower

Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency

Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOls),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry

Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also

referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operator's Manual

EPPOS #2, UNRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions

EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page 8 of 49

EMERGENCY

PLAN

CLASSIFICATION

FLOWCHART 1,3,4,

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Pa e9of49

11Cnaet

ai

X1l

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10

Safety Limit

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Ops)

3.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

3

3.3

Loss of DC

_

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

Flammable Gas

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4.2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

4.6

Security

4

Table 4-1

Table 4-2

4.7

SED Judgment

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-B

Table 4-3

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

5

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systems

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

6

6.3

Loss of DC (Shutdown)

6.4

Fuel Handling

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

Gaseous Effluent

7.3

Radiation Levels

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Handling

7

Table 7-1

Table 7-2

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1

Revision 21

PagelOof49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

,~

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety

function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition

is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event

exist Implicit in this defiition is the need for timely assersmd, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population dose xceeding the criteria of

IO CFRPart 100. RefertoFigure7-A.

EXPLOSION: Arapid violent unconfmed combustion ora

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attemptto cause

a ction atthestation by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steamn generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat ad light Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage againstthe stationto

ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction imthe level of severity of the RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. Areduction inthe level of severity is an

improvement in the applicable parameters, e~g, Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure orthe operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-O which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation

of plant equipment withithe intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine

runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications om related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

need for timely assessmen, Le., hithin 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact, denting penetration, rupture, cracking and/or paint

blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping scratches) should

NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is amy area within the PROTECTED AREAwhich

contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs byFR0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

EELJ

Core Cooling Red

Core Cooling Orange

Heat Sink Red

(RHR Not in Service)

Pressurized Thermal Shock

Red

Heat Sink Red

(RHR Not in Service)

S

Potential LOSS

RCS sample activity is

Greater Than 300 UCi/gm

Not applicable

dose equivalent iodine-1 31

_____________77__

, . >

.- .-5Le.-

.'9*--....I

e

.E..... . .

. ..... ~ 11 1 -.................... .. %,

...

<.

iribee tosJ-tiQu

d A~er e uP

I

-

n~...:..*rtJL~

tn*

t.'a

_

_Potential LOSS

RCS Leak results in

Non Isolatable RCS Leak

Loss of subcooling

Exceeding The Capacity of

(<650F Indicated),

One Charging Pump (CCP)

[85°F ADV]

In the Normal Charging

Alignment.

RCS Leakage Results In

Entry Into E-1

Potential LOSS

SGTR that results in a

Not Applicable

safety injection actuation

Entery i int~o E-3

.

_ ,

_

. -

_ .....

_.L

.e

rulellulul ovvo

Greater Than 12000

G

7270F

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

W

., .........................................

ii..

...,....

.

1/2 s

--

OR....--..

... cz

dULI *I

I tSC

"Iellll

vI

...

.

Not Applicable

VALID RVLIS level <33%

(No RCP running)

I

_

'..

:: Z .....

-'s". e

.:,.; ..... .. ... ': ....-... ......

'5'

4. Reactor Vess1 WMmim

I

Ii

.

2

.

...

.

..

.

PntpntiIa LOSS

-

--

r

i -

Il

c

Potential LO055

VALID reading increase

Not Applicable

of Greater Than:

74 R/hr On 1-RE-90-271

and 272

59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273

and 274

..

._______

... _..

__'::B

VALID RVLIS level

Not Applicable

<33%

(No RCP Running)

-OR-

<2

S.

Site Emetgerioy Oltector Judgment

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SMISED,

Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad

Banier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED,

Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier

Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

EPIP-l

lRevision 21

l

SoPageIlB of 49

Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

INSTRUCTIONS

Not Applicable

Containment (FR-Z. 1) Red

Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path)

are INEFFECTIVE

NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the

judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the

condition will be MET imminently CTe., within I to 2

hours, in the absence of a viable success bath).

The classification shall be made a soon as this

determination is made.

Potential

LOSS

Rapid unexplained decrease

Containment Hydrogen

following initial increase

Increases to >4% by volume

Containment pressure or

Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase

Sump level Not increasing

B) with < One full train of

(with LOCA in

roress)

Containment spray

-A_

Potential LOSS

Containment isolation is

Not Applicable

Incomplete (when required)

AND a Release Path to the

nvironment Exists

_

Potential LOSS

RUPTURED

Unexplained VALID increase

FAULTED outside CNTMT

in area or ventilation RAD

monitors in areas adjacent to

Prolonged (>4 Hours)

CNTMT (with LOCA in

Secondary Side release

progress)

outside CNTMT from a S/G

with a SGTL > T/S Limits

Potential LOSS

Not Applicable

VALID Reading increase of

Greater Than:

108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and

1-RE-90-272

86 R/hr on 1 -RE-90-273 and

.~~~~~~~

.. . .. . .. ..,,

-R E - 9 0-2 7 4 , >

i BBB

1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING

CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which,

if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

Circle these CONDITIONS.

2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any

LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING

CONDITIONS have been MET.

3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING

CONDITION; the respective status tree

criteria will be monitored and used to

determine the EVENT classification for the

Modes listed on the classification flowchart.

4. Compare the barrier losses and potential

losses to the EVENTS below and make the

appropriate declaration.

EVENTS

UNUSUAL EVENT

ALERT

Loss or Potential LOSS of

Any LOSS or Poteni

Containment Barrier

LOSS of Fuel Clad I

F

I

S

I

0

N

P

R

0

D

U

C

T

B

A

R

I

E

R

U

tial

barrier

Any LOSS or Potential

LOSS of RCS barrier

~

, v

s

.

r

g

e....

in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates

I.or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to

the onditions Listed Above.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

LOSS or Potential LOSS of

any two barriers

GENERAL EMERGENCY

LOSS of any two barriers

and Potential LOSS of third

barrier

~.-. 1'1~I

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Pa e 12 of 49

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Cps)

3.2

Loss of AC(Shutdown)__4

3.3

Loss oftDCm

et

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

FlammableGas

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4,2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

4.6

Security

Table 4-1

Table 4-2

4.7

SED Judgment

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-13

Table 4-3

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systems

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

R

6.3

Loss of DC (Shutdown)

6

6.4

Fuel Handling

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

Gaseous Effluent

7.3

Radiation Levels

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Handling

7

Table 7-1

Table 7-2

Figure 7-A

EP P-1

Revision 21

Pa e 13 of 49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCrION (CSFs): A plant safety

function reqluired to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Themnal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition

is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event

exist. Implicit in this defition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population doses'exceeding the criteria of

10 CFRPart 100. Referto Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: Aperson(s) held as leverage againstthe stationto

ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction inthe level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an

improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operaticn

of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more ofthe following: (I) An automatic turbine

ninback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

inthe immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: Awork stoppage withintihe PROTECTED

AREAby a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or Mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, miniMum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indicaton or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit inthis definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact, denting, penetration rupture, cracking, and/or paint

blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should

NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is any area withinthe PROTECTED AREA wvich

contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1

l Revisionf1

lPave 14 of 49

S

"

i=Ulll

0

Mode

Initiating/Condition

I IMode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Matfix" and

'Radiological Effluents" (Secton 7)

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matdx

.

I

I-I

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain

11,2

3,4

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in

progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators

(and Annunciator Monitor) or indications

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS

4. Inability to directly runitor any of the following

CSFs:

1,2

3,4

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain

Hot Shutdown (1 or2)

1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

(RHR not in service)

Note: Also Refer to 'Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and

'Fission Product Barder Matdx'

Sub-criticality

Core Cooling

PTS

Containment

I Heat S=fK

Ilvellmy

I

11,2

3,4

UNPLANNED loss of most (>76%) MCR

annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or

indications for >15 minutes with either a

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS

computer and SPIS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR

annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or

indications for >15 minutes.

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is

required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift

compliment)

3. (a orb)

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress

b. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS

4

Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold

Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs

(1 and 2 and 3)

1. Shutdown is required

2. Loss of RHR capability

3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser

1,2

3,4

UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System

annunciators or indications in the Control Room

for >15 Minutes (I and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR

annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or

indications for >15 minutes.

2. SMISED Judgment that increased surveillance is

required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift

compliment)

3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and

capable of displaying data requested.

ALL

A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Communication

capability (1 and 2 and 3)

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones

3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios

or

B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Communication

capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones

2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines

5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system

EPIP-1

Revision 21

l

Page15 of`49I

lV

0- 0

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals

1 ,2

did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <6% and

decreasing (1 and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in

a RX Power of <5% and decreasing

1,2

Rx power Not <6% and decreasing after VALID Auto

and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful.

3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matfix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix'

SY

IY

IS

T

E

M

lD-

EG

R

A

D

A

T

l0

N

U

IL

4

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix'

1,2

Automnatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal

and manual trip from MCR was successful (1 and 2)

1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and

power is <5% and decreasing.

Not Applicable

1,2,

3,4'

5

Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds

LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b)

a. Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131) >0.265 pLCigm

for >48 Hours

or

>21 pCI/gm.

b. Specific activity >1 O/E LCigm

-J

EPIP-I

Revision 21

lPa e 16 f 49

11111

IIIIIIIIIIIN

mm--

M eInitiatingConditionI

I Mode

Initiating/Condition

4

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matdix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix"

.1

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix'

Refer to 'Fission Product earner Matrix'

I

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix'

-4.

1,2

3,4,

5

Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage

>10 GPM

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as

defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated

below (a orb)

a. 1-SI-68-32 results

b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level Stable,

VCT Level Dropping at a Rate >10 GPM

1,2,

3,4,

5

Identified RCS leakage >26 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

>25 GPM (a orb)

a. 1-SI-68-32 results

b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT

or CVCS Holdup Tank

AM#"

A ,.nflaeM Mnfl., A it PCS Prsssuflzad

Note: Applies to Mode 5 if ROS Pressurized

_

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Pae17 of 49

>Modiernmfl me Ial

~, -Mode

I

Iuitiatin!c./Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

l

Refer to 'Fission Product Baoier Matflx'

Refer to 'Fission Product Baoier Matrix"

Refer to 'Fission Product Banier Matrix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Baoier Matrix'

S

T

E

M

Ds

E

G-

R

A

D

AT

0

N

IU.

1I

I

Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Mathx'

Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that

cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing

Safety Related equipment

1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE

DAMAGE in any of the following areas:

1,2,3

Control Building

Auxiliary Building

Unit #1 Containment

Diesel Generator Bldg.

RWST

Intake Pumping Station

CST

1,2,3

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam

System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety

Injection Initiation (1 and 2)

1.

Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System

(<675 psig)

2. Safety Injection has initiated go is required

1,2,3

Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration

1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the

Turbine Casing 2! Damage to Main Generator Seals

I

ll EPIP-I

It8 revlio 21

l

llPag 18o~nf 49

-

- 6P - 0

mil

YP

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

IIll111E1111

Initiating/Condition

Not Applicable

1,2

3,4

Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.

Spec. limits (1 and 2)

1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode

reduction, has been entered

2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode

within the time prescribed by the LCO Action

Statement

1,2,

3,4,

5

Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)

1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and

RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WEN Tech.

Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 'Reactor

Core Safety Limits'

2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety

limit (>2735 psig)

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Pa e 19 of 49

K->..

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10

Safety Limit

'A'

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

Flammable Gas

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4.2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

4.6

Security

4

Table 4-1

Table 4-2

4.7

SED Judgment

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-8

Table 4-3

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

5

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

5

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systems

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

6

6.3

Loss of DC (Shutdown)

6.4

Fuel Handling

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

Gaseous Effluent

7.3

Radiation Levels

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Handling

7

Table 7-1

Table 7-2

Figure 7-A

EPIP.-I

Revsion 21

l Page 20 of 49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safey

function required to prevent significamt release of core radioactivity

to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT comnences when recognition

is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event

exist Implicitinthis definitionistheneed fortimely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surromnding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population dosesehceeding the criteria of

10 CFRPart 100. ReerftoFigure7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, uconfined combustion, or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause am action at the station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat amd light Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fie.

Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leveage against he statiom to

ensre that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. Areductonintheblevel of severity is an

improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperature.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs byFR- which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or laumched towards a

plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fenc as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required,

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation

of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine

runback> 15%thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection>

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) SafAy Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An evet or actionthat is notthe expected result of

normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in

corctive or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regardto radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in

is definition are

unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g, alarm setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indiation or report or conditiom is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this defidition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safay structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact, denming, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint

blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should

NOT be includedr

VITAL AREA: Is amy area wihnm the PROTECTED AREA which

contains equipment, systemis, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

l EPIP-I

Revision 21

l

Pae21 of 49_

SW

S

O

I IMode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power

(1 and 2)

1,2,

1. lAand 1B6.9KV Shutdown Bdsde-energized

3,4

for >15 minutes

2. (a orb)

a. Core Cooling Red or Orange

b. Restoration of Either I A or 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown

Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.

Loss of Offsite ;and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes

1. 1 A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized

1,2,

for >15 minutes

3,4

Loss of Offsite Power for >16 minutes (1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

1,2,

3,4

2. 1A or 1 B Diesel Generator not available

Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)

1,2

1. Cand D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

3,4

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its

respective Shutdown Board

Not Applicable

5,6,

or

De-

fuel

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power

for >15 minutes

I. IA andl186.9KV Shutdown Eds de-energized

for >15 minutes

Also Refer to Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)

5,6,

or

De-

fuel

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes

(1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power

to its respective Shutdown Board

zI

We

a D 'a

Initiating/Condition

I Mode

Refer to 'Fission Product Banier Matrix" and

Loss of Function' (2.2)

L

0

S

0

F

P

0

W

E

R

1,2,

3,4

Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery

Buses 1-l and 1-11 and 1-111

and 1-IV

for >15 minutes

Also Refer to 'Fission Product Barnder Matrix",

"Loss of Functon" (2.2),

-

and 'Loss of Instrumentaton" (2.1)

Also Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matrx,

"Loss of Function (2.2),

and "Loss of lnstrumentaWon" (2.1)

5,6, or

De-fuel

UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of

DC power for >15 minutes

(1 or 2)

1. Voftage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Batery

Buses 1-1 and 1-Ill for >15 minutes

2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vdal Battery

Buses 1-Il and 1-IV for >15 minutes

EPIP-1

Revision 21

lPae 23 of 49

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10

Safety Limit

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Ops)

3.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

3.3

Loss of DC

!:03

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

n

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

<

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systemsn

>

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown) .. E

63

Loss of DC (Shutdown) ..

6.4

Fuel Handling

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

GaseousEffluent

7. 3 R

adiationLevel

s

g

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Handling

Tab

le

7-1

Table 7-2Crash

5

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page24of49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: Agroup oftwerty (20) or morepersons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICALJSAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety

function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognitom

is made that one or more of The conditions associated with the event

exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WBN units in whichli'stulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of

10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, uconfined combustion, or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: Aperson(s)held as leverage againstthe station to

ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an

improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization

ODCM: Offlite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation

of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine

runback > 15%thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREAby a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or actionthat is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g. alarmr setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without measmrements, testing, or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact denting penetration, rupture, cracking and/or paint

blistering Surface blemishes (e.g. paint chipping scratches) should

NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: s my area within the PROTECTED AREA which

cortais equipment systems, devices, or material, The failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Initiating/Condition

I

I Mode

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix"

__A

g

0 0

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matrix"

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matrix

Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or

Fission Product Banter Matrix'

All

FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that

is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb)

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure

or Safety Related equipment in the

specified area is observed due to the FIRE

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety

System or component response due to the

FIRE

All

EXPLOSION In any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that

Is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1

2. (a orb)

a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to

Safety Related equipment

b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System

or component response due to the EXPLOSION

Refer to 'Security (4.6)

FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening

any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not

extinguished within 16 minutes from the Time

of Control Room notification or verification of

Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED

AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent

structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)

All

Refer to 'Security" (4.6)

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page26 of 49

TABLE 4-1

PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS

Unit #1 Reactor Building

Auxiliary Building

Control Building

Diesel Generator Building

CST

Additional Diesel Generator Building

Intake Pumping Station

Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1 &2)

RWST

Figure 4-A

PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

H

A

z

A

R

D

S

I

S

E

D

U

D

G

M

E

N

T

U

1

EPIP-1

Revision 21

1

Pa se27of'49

9_

e

44

0

-

aww

Initiating/Condition

I

I Mode

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Bantrr

M/atflx"

Refer to 'Fission Product Baner Matdx"

Refer to "Fission Product Baner Matridx

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Mat'ix"

UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within

a facility structure containing Safety Related

equipment or associated with Power

production

1. Plant personnel report the average of three

readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as

indicated on the monitoring instrument within

any building listed in Table 4-2.

All

Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which

Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to

establish or maintain Cold SID (I and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building

listed in Table 4-2

2. (a orb)

a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health

Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes,

nose, throat, dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure

Limit

3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions

necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown

while utilizing appropriate personnel protection

equipment.

All

A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas

within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report the average of three

readings taken in a -1 Oft Triangular Area is

>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as

indicated on the monitoring instrument

within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to

Figure 4-8)

All

A. Normal Operations impeded due to access

restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations

within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2

B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials

that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has

occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to

enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the

(PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an

Evacuation (Figure 4-4)

B. Confirmed report by Local, County, Er

State Officials that a Large Offsite

Flammable Gas release has occurred

within One Mile of the Site with potential to

enter the SITE PERIMETER in

concentrations >25% of LEL Lower

Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

EPIP lI

Revision 21

Page 28 of 49

TABLE 4-2

Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs

Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings

Auxiliary Building

Control Building

Diesel Generator Building

Additional Diesel Generator Building

Intake Pumping Station

Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2)

CDWE Building

Turbine Building

Figure 4-B

ONE MILE RADIUS/SITE PERIMETER

H

A

z

A

R

D

S

/

S.

E

J

U

D

G

M

E

N

T

U

'1

,

Mode I

Initiating/Condition

1

am.m

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matnx,

All

Evacuation of the Control Room has been

initiated and Control of all necessary

equipment Has Not been established within 16

minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control

Room (1 and 2 and 3)

1. (a or b)

a. AO1-30.2 'Fire Safety Shutdown" entered

b. AOI-27'Main Control Room Inaccessibility

entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation

3. Control has Not been established at the

Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of

manning the Auxiliary Control Room and

transfer of switches on Panels Lii A and LII B

Evacuation of the Control Room is Required

(1 and 2)

1. (a orb)

a. AO1-30.2 'Fire Safe Shutdown" entered

b. AOI-27'Main Control Room Inaccessibility'

entered

2. SMISED Orders Control Room evacuation

Security Event resulting In loss of Control of the Plant

1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant,

All

Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability

Security Event has or is occurring which results in

Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to

Protect the Public

All

1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been

penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force

Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or

Potential Substantial Degradation In the level of Safety

of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)

All

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED

AREA

3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile

Armed Force

Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area and

Site Perimeter

Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential

Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2)

All

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA

2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the

events listed in Table 4-3

All

Not Applicable

EPIP-

lRevision 21

1

lPage 30 of 49

K

-'WA

3

l-fS

66f

iMode

=

InitiatinglConrdition__

Ira

An

Events are in progress or have occurred

which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial

Core Degradation or Melting With Potential

for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases

can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA

Plume Protective Action Guidelines

Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION

AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

H

A

z

A

R

D

S

I

S-

E

D

All

Events are in progress or have occurred

which involve Actual or Likely Major Failures

of Plant Functions needed for the Protection

of the Public. Any releases are not expected

to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed

EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines

Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION

AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.

Table 4-3

SECURITY EVENTS

a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring

within the PROTECTED AREA

b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to

interrupt Plant Operations

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE

PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED

AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant

Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers

and/or Intelligence received)

e. A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC security threat

notification.

U

D

G

M

E

N

T

All

Events are in progress or have occurred

which Involve Actual or Potential Substantial

Degradation of the Level of Safety of the

Plant. Any releases are expected to be

limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume

Protective Action Guidelines Exposure

Levels.

All

Unusual Events are in Progress or have

occurred which indicate a Potential

Degradation of the Level of Safety of the

Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material

requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are

expected unless further degradation of

Safety Systems occurs.

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page 31of49

K->..

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10

Safety Limit

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Ops)

3.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

3.3

Loss of DC

3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

Flammable Gas

4.2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

Teb.h

A-1

Tohta A2)

A

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4.6

Security

A 7

c;rn

TAument

44

-.s1

s--

. AU9a

uoss

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-B

Table 4-3

nESRUTIE HEQMNO

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systems

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

6.3

Loss of DC (Shutdown)

6.4

Fuel Handling

6

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

Gaseous Effluent

7.3

Radiation Levels

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Handling

Table 7-1

Table 7-2

7

Figure 7-A

0

EPIP-1

Revision 21

lPa e 32of 49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The deteriination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety

function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition

is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event

exist Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population dosesxceeding the criteria of

IOCFRPartl00. RefertoFigure7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attemptto cause an action atthe station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maimtained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: Aperson(s)held a leverage against the station to

ensure that demands will be met by the station

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction inthe level of severity is an

improvenient inthe applicable parameters, eg. Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offlite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or oflsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment or mis-operation

of plant equipment withithe intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more of the following: (I) An automatic turbine

rnnback > 15%thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

unintentional releases, ummoitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without menasurements, testing, or analyses Damage is

sufficient enough to cause coacern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact, denting penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint

blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g. paint chipping, scratches) should

NOT be included

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which

contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Pa e33 of 49

TM."

@-I

0

HSOU

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matrix'

All

Earthquake detected by site seismic

instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. (a and b)

a. Ann.166 D indicates 'OBE Spectra Exceeded"

b. Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording

Initiated'

2. (a orb)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at

1 -(303) 273-4500 can confirm the event.

All

Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in

Table 6-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (I and 2)

1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one

minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety

System or component response due to event

Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fals to 0 at >100 mph.

National Weather Serrice Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can

provide additional intfnnation if needed.

All

Earthquake detected by shte seismic

instrumentation (1 and 2)

1. Ann. 166 E indicator"Seismic Recording Initiated"

2. (a orb)

I

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel

b. National Earthquake Information Center at

1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.

All

Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within

the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

0

EPIP-1

Revision 21

l

lPage 34 of 49

I Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Banier Matflx'

Refer to 'Fission Product BanierMatfix"

D

E

S

T

R

U

C

T

I

V.

E

P

H

E

N

0

M

E

N

0

N

U

1

All

Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any

Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting In

VISIBLE DAMAGE (l and 2)

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE

has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1

2. (a orb)

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE

b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety

System or component response due to the

event within the specified areas

Table 5-1

Plant Structures Associated With

Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs

Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings

Auxiliary Building

Control Building

Diesel Generator Building

Additional Diesel Generator Building

Intake Pumping Station

Additional Equipment Buildings (Units I & 2)

CDWE Building

Turbine Building

RWST

CST

All

Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE Impact within

the SITE PERIMETER

1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or

PROJECTILE impact within the SITE

PERIMETER

(Refer to Figure 5-A)

lEPIP-1

Revision 21

lPa eS35 of 49

I ni

an

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

i

l

I Mode

Refer to 'Fission Product Barier Matflx'

Refer to 'Fission Product Bamer Matix'

Refer to 'Fission Product Barnier Matflx'

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matdx'

I

All

River Reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning

(1 or 2)

1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft

2. Stage 11 Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued

by River Systems Operations

All

River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by

River Systems Operations

All

River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning

(1 or2 or3)

1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from Aprl 16 thru

September 30

2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1

thru April 15

All

River Reservoir level is *673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by

River Systems Operations

3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued

by River Systems Operations

lEPIP-I

Revision 21

l

lPage 36 of 49

l

i"OTMMIWM

'I Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matrx'

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix'

D

E

S

T

R

U

C

T

I-

V

E

P

H

E

N

0

M

E

N

0

N

Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matdx"

.a

All

Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station

resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling

Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)

(l and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the

Intake Pumping Station

2. (aorborc)

a. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train A

O-PI-67-1SA is '15 psig

b. ERCW Supply Header Pressure Train B

O-PI-67-17A is <15 psig

c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is

<1 5 psig

1

Revision 21

Figure 5-A

PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

EPIP-1

I

<-V

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10 Safety Limit

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Ops)

3.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

3.3

Loss of DC

3

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

Flammable Gas

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4.2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

4.6

Security

Table 4-1

Table 4-2

4.7

SED Judgment

4

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-B

Table 4-3

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

5

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

RADIOLOGICAL

7.1

Gaseous Effluent

7.3

Radiation Levels_

7.2

Liquid Effluent

7.4

Fuel Hadling

Table 7-1

Table 7-2/

Figure 7-A

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page 39 of 49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WBN senior plant management through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety

function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition

is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event

exist Implicit in this definition is the need fortimely assessmen, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population dosesexceeding the criteria of

10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause m action atthe station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: Aperson(s) held as leverage against the stationto

ensure that demands will be met by the station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result

in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an

improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Tremd in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: PlantParameters radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plam Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: OffMite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-O which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ofthe

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR- which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment or mis-operation

of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine

runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection>

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands

made on TVA The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to inteupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

uintentional releases, urmonitored releases, or planned releases that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints,

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorred tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily

observable without measurements, testing or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint

blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should

NOT be included.

VITAL AREA: Is my area within the PROTECTED AREA which

contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

23

sEPTP-I

lRevision 21

l

lPa e 40 of49

-I___ ~:3U_

ead

l ['W1 I.f

0_ 000

Mode I

Initiating/Condition

l Mode

Initiating/Condition

5,6

Note: Additional information will be provided later

pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or

will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT

closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)

5,6

1. Loss of RHR capability

2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'

3. Incore TCs (if availablejndicate

RCS temp. >2000 F

4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT

5. CNTMT closure is established

Note: If CNTMT open, refer to 'Gaseous Effluents'

(7.1)

Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown

(1 and 2 and 3)

5,6

1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling

2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate

RCS temp. >2000 F

3. CNTMT closure is established

Not Appicable

Not Applicable

UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power

for >16 minutes

1. 1 A and I B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized

for >15 minutes

5,6

or

De-

Fuel

UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >16 minutes

(1 and 2)

1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes.

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its

respective Shutdown Board

5,6

or

De-

Fuel

N

5,6

Note: Additional information will be provided later

pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs

0

EPIP-I

Revision 21

Pa e4 1 of49

Mode I

Iniiat6innlfnnrlifinn

.4

UC

_

Mode

Initiating/Condition

I I

......

tsF

Sw ~

us

Not Applicable

Refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7. 1)

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss

of water level that has or will uncover

Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor

Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or

All

O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or

1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112

or 1-RE-90400 or2-RE-90400

2. (a orb)

a. Plant personnel report damage of

Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture

Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop

has or will exceed makeup capability

such that Irradiated Fuel will be

uncovered

UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent

Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity gr Transfer

Canal with fuel remaining covered

(I and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in

Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or

All

Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or

O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-9O-59 or

1-RE-90-60

3. Fuel remains covered with water

S

H

U

T

D

0

W

N

S

Y

S

T

E

M

S

D

E

G

R

A

D

A

T

I

0

N

U

1

5,6

or

De-

fuel

UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of

DC Power for >16 minutes (1 or 2)

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital

Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111

for >15

minutes

2. Voltage <1OSV DC on 125V DC Vital

Battery Buses 1-11 and 1-IV for >15

minutes.

REvisio 21

l

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4)

1.1

Fuel Clad

1.2

1.3

Containment

1

SYSTEM DEGRADATION

2.1

Loss of Instrumentation

2.6

RCS Identified Leakage

2.2

Loss of Function/Communication

2.7

Uncontrolled Cool Down

2.3

Failure of Reactor Protection

2.8

Turbine Failure

2

2.4

Fuel Clad Degradation

2.9

2.10

Safety Limit

LOSS OF POWER

3.1

Loss of AC (Power Ops)

3.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

3.3

Loss of DC

HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT

4.1

Fire

4.3

Flammable Gas

4.5

Control Room Evacuation

4.2

Explosion

4.4

Toxic Gas

4.6

Security

Table 4-1

Table 4-2

4.7

SED Judgment

4

Figure 4-A

Figure 4-B

Table 4-3

DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON

5.1

5.4

River Level High

5.2

Tornado

5.5

River Level Low

5.3

Aircraft/Projectile

5.6

Watercraft Crash

5

Crash

Figure 5-A

Table 5-1

SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION

6.1

Loss of Shutdown Systems

6.2

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

6.3

Loss of DC (Shutdown)

6.4

Fuel Handling

6

-7

EPIP-I

Revision 21

Page 43 of 49

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and

GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons

violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by

WEN senior plant managemet through use of information found in

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety

function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity

to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core

Cooling Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commances when recognition

is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event

exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.

within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of

the area surrounding the WEN units in which postulated FSAR

accidents will not result in population doseexceeding the criteria of

10CFRPart 100. Referto Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a

catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of

sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required

for safe operation.

EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by

threat of force.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage

(ic., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease

in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely

depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical

components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred

but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are

observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at

concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LMHIT (LEL)

will not explode due to ignition.

HOSTAGE: Aprson(s) held as leverage againstthe stationto

ensurethat deands will be met bythe station.

INEFFECTIVE: The specifiedrestoraon action(s) does notresult

in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition

within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF

Status Tree RED PATH. Areduction inthe level of severityis an

improvemeit in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in

Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend

on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation

monitor readings or personnel observations that ideaify an Event for

purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in

a protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offite Dose Calculation Manual.

ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one ormore CSFs by FR-4 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a

plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment

contained therein.

PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas

within the security protected area fance as shown on Figure 4-A.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which

indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator

action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Geneator) Existence of primary to secondary

leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment or mis-operation

of plant equipment witjithe intent to rende the equipment

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event

involving one or more ofthe following: (I) An automatic turbine

runback > 15% thermal reactor powera (2) Electrical load rejection >

25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection

System Activation.

SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas

in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED

AREAby a body of workersto enforce compliance with denands

made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt

normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of

normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in

corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with

abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A

release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been

authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are

unintentional releases, unmnonitored releases, or planned releastes that

exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g. aarn setpoints,

mnnimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release

rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be

VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel

check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by

direct observation by plat persnnel. Implicit inthis definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipmentthat is readily

observable without measurements, testing or analyses. Damage is

sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued

operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or

component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or

impact denting, penetration, rupture, cracking and/or paint

blistering Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should

NOT be included

VITAL AREA: isany area withnthe PROTECTED AREAwhich

contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure,

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger

the public health and safety by exposure to radiation

.I ~

P-

S 0

l

I Mode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiatinq/Condition

All

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent

release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds

1000 mrem TEDE or 6000 mrem Thyroid CDE for

the actual gr projected duration of the release

(1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes,

unless assessment within this time period confirms

that the Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mremlhr gamma

or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 p CUcc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE

for the actual or projected duration of the release

(Fiaure 7-A)

All

EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent

release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds

100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the

actual or projected duration of the release

(1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless

assessment within this time period confirms that

the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results lridlte >100 mrem/hr gamma

or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 p Ci/co at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for

the actual or projected duration of the release

(Figure 7-A)

All

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous

Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM

Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless

assessment within this time period confirms that

the Criterion is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma

at SP >15 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release

(Figure 7-A)

Not Applicable

Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that

exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes

(1 or2)

All

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless

assessment within this time period confirms that the

Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value

for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15

minutes in duration

Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the

Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for

>60 minutes (1 or2)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless

assessment within this time period confirms that the

All

Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value

for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity

>60 minutes in duration

All

Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous

Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM

Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values

under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless

assessment within this time period confirms that

the Criterion Is Not exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mremlhr gamma

at SP for >60 minutes

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release

(Figure 7-A)

EPIP-1

Revision 21

Page 45 of 49

TABLE 7-1

EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS(1 )

NOTE:

The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If

the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the

declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation

monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is

unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local

indication as necessary.

Monitor

ICS Screen

Units

UE

Alert

Site

General

Total Site

EFFI

ptCi/s (2)

1.5E+05

1.5E+07

2.5E+08

2.5E+09

Ut Shield Building

1-RE-90-400

EFFI

Ci/s

6.7E+04

6.7E+06

1.OE+08

L.OE+09

U2 Shield Building

2-RE-90400

EFFI

pCi/s

1.5E1+04

1.5E+06

2.5E+07

2.6E+08

Auxiliary Building

....

O-RE-90-1O0B

4RMI

cpm

I .2E+04

1 .2E+06

d

?

Service Building

O-RE-90-132B

4RMI

cpm

4.3E+03

4.3E+05

9.8E+06

iziih

R

A

D

I

0

L

0

G

I

C

A

L

/

F

U

E

L

Ul Condenser Vacuum

Exhaust

>1-RE-90404A

1-RE-90404B

3PAM

ptCi/cc (3 )

pLCi/cc

5.5E-02

5.5E+00

8.83E+01

8.83E+02

zi/G Discharge

Monitors

1-RE-90421 thru

424 (B)

H

A

N

D

L

I

N

G

U

1

4RM2

NA

3.5E+02

3.5E+03

3.5E+04

Liquid Monitors

n/a

pCi/m1(2>

1.8E-45

1.8E-03

N/A

O-RE-90-122

4RM2

cpm

1.lE+06

?Hoiw,

N/A

I-RE-90-120,121

4RM2

cpm

1.OE+06

1

N/A

0-RE-90-225

4RM2

cpm

9.2E+05

Eg.o(.

N/A

O-RE-90-212

4RM2

cpm

1.5E+04

1.5E+06

N/A

RELEASE DURATION

minutes

60

15

ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary

Note:

(1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.

(2) These releases rate values in XCi/s and pCi/mI are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points

for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor

for the four emergency classifications.

(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCRK Indications of a radioactivity release via this

pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such

as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates pCi/cc and has a visual indication

of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02pCi/cc. This channel was included in the

table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path

for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [I] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig,

6000F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

X

EPIP-1

Revision 21

l1 Page 46 of 49

1

Figure 7-A

EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER

NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary

with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other

definitions of "Site Boundary."

Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

L

-

lEPIP-1

Revision 21

Paee 47 of 49

--

-0

0i

e

I I Mode

Initiating/Condition

Mode

Initiating/Condition

Refer to 'Fission Product Banter Matix" or

'Gaseous Effluents a7. 1)

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7. 1)

Refer to 'Fission Product BarrierMatfix" or

'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1)

.1

Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents" (.1)

All

UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within

the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or

establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown

(1 or 2)

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings I survey

results exceed 15 mremlhr in the Control Room or

CAS

2. (a and b)

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed

values listed in Table 7-2

b. Access restrictions impede operation of

systems necessary for Safe Operation gr the

ability to establish Cold Shutdown

See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below

All

Major damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of water level

that has or will uncover irradiated Fuel outside the

Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)

1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-1 01 or 0-RE-90-102 or

0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131

r 1-RE-90-112

or 1-RE-90O400 or 2-RE-90-400

2. (a orb)

a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel

sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will

exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will

be uncovered

All

UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within

the Facility

1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings Increase

by a factor 1000 over normal levels

Note: In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must

determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels

and Review OtherlNlTIATIING/CONDITIONS for

Applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mren/hr in the

Control Room could be caused by a release

associated with a DBA).

UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or

Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining

covered (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel

Pool or Reactor Cavity, _r Transfer Canal

2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-1 02 or 0-RE-90- 103 or

1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-SO-SO

All

3. Fuel remains covered with water.

EPIP-I

Revision 21

Page 48 of 49

Table 7-2

ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS

Location

Monitor

Monitor No.

Building and Elevation

Reading *

1&2 RE-90-1

Auxiliary

El. 757.0

2.5 x I03 mR/hr

(spent fuel pool)

El. 757.0

1-RE-90-2

O-RE-90-3

O-RE-90-4

O-RE-90-5

1 &2-RE-90-6

1&2-RE-90-7

1&2-RE-90-8

O-RE-90-9

1&2-RE-90-10

O-RE-90-11

1-RE-90-61

O-RE-90-230

O-RE-90-231

Auxiliary

(personnel air lock)

Auxiliary

El. 729.0

(waste pac. area)

El. 713.0

Auxiliary

(decon room)

El. 737.0

Auxiliary

(spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)

Auxiliary

El. 737.0

(comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)

Auxiliary

El. 713.0

(sample room)

Auxiliary

El. 713.0

2.5 x 100 R/hr

2.5 x IO' mnlhr

1.5 x IO' rnR/hr

1.5 x 103 Mrlhr

1.5 x103 rnR/hr

2 x103 mR/hr

1.5 x lO3 MR/hr

1.5 x 103 MR/hr

1.5 x103 Ronlhr

2.5 x iO3 MR/hr

1.5 x 1O3 MR/hr

1.5 x 103 MR/hr

R

A

D

I

0

L

0

G

J

C

A

L

/

F

U

E

L

H

A

N

D

L

I

N

G

U

1

(aux. feed pump area)

Auxiliary

El. 692.0

(wst cond. evap. tk. ar.)

Auxiliary

El. 692.0

(cvcs area)

Auxiliary

El. 676.0

(ctmt spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

Auxiliary

El. 736.0

(RB low. cmrpt. inst. rm.)

El. 685.0

Turbine

(conden. demin.)

Turbine

El. 685.0

(conden. demin.)

Note: *These monitors read out in mrlhr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

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