ML031110553
| ML031110553 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/2003 |
| From: | Ogle C NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB |
| To: | Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR-03-007 | |
| Download: ML031110553 (8) | |
Text
April 18, 2003 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
NOTIFICATION OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-390/03-07
Dear Mr. Scalice:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Region II staff will conduct a safety system design and performance capability inspection at your Watts Bar facility during the weeks of June 23, 2003, and July 7, 2003. A team of five inspectors will perform this inspection. The inspection team will be led by Mr. Frank Jape, a Senior Reactor Inspector from the NRC Region II Office. This biennial inspection will be conducted in accordance with baseline inspection program Attachment 71111.21, Safety System Design and Performance Capability.
This inspection will evaluate the capability of installed plant equipment to detect and respond to a steam generator tube rupture event. Procedures which direct the mitigating actions for this event will also be evaluated.
During a telephone conversation on April 17, 2003, Mr. Jape of my staff, and Ms. R. N. Mays of your staff, confirmed arrangements for an information gathering site visit and the two-week onsite inspection. The schedule is as follows:
Information gathering visit: Week of June 2, 2003 Onsite inspection weeks: June 23, 2003 and July 7, 2003 The purpose of the information gathering visit is to obtain information and documentation outlined in the enclosure needed to support the inspection. Mr. R. Bernhard, a Region II Senior Reactor Analyst, may accompany Mr. Jape during the information gathering visit to review probabilistic risk assessment data and identify risk significant components which will be examined during the inspection. Please contact Mr. Jape prior to preparing copies of the materials listed in the Enclosure. The inspectors will try to minimize your administrative burden by specifically identifying only those documents required for inspection preparation.
During the information gathering visit, the team leader will also discuss the following inspection support administrative details: office space; specific documents requested to be made available to the team in their office space; arrangements for site access; and the availability of
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knowledgeable plant engineering and licensing personnel to serve as points of contact during the inspection.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions regarding the information requested or the inspection, please contact Mr. Jape at (404) 562-4541 or me at (404) 562-4605.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA: James H. Moorman for/
Charles R. Ogle, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-390 License No.: NPF-90
Enclosure:
Information Request for the Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection cc w/encl:
Karl W. Singer Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution James E. Maddox, Acting Vice President Engineering and Technical Services Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution William R. Lagergren Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution (cc w/encl contd - See page 3)
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(cc w/encl contd)
General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution Robert J. Adney, General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution Mark J. Burzynski, Manager Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution Paul L. Pace, Manager Licensing and Industry Affairs Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution Larry S. Bryant, Plant Manager Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution County Executive Rhea County Courthouse 375 Church Street, Suite 215 Dayton, TN 37321-1300 County Executive Meigs County Courthouse Decatur, TN 37322 Lawrence E. Nanney, Director TN Dept. of Environment & Conservation Division of Radiological Health Electronic Mail Distribution Ann Harris 341 Swing Loop Rockwood, TN 37854 John D. White, Jr., Director Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Electronic Mail Distribution Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)
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Distribution w/encl:
M. Podavan, NRR L. Slack, RII EICS RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB PUBLIC OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE JAPE MOORMAN CAHILL NAME JAPE MOORMAN CAHILL DATE 4/18/2003 4/18/2003 4/18/2003 4/ /2003 4/ /2003 4/ /2003 4/ /2003 E-MAIL COPY?
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO PUBLIC DOCUMENT YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML031110553.wpd
Enclosure INFORMATION REQUEST FOR THE SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT Note: Electronic media is preferred if readily available. (The preferred file format is searchable.pdf files on CDROM. The CDROM should be indexed to facilitate use.
Please provide 5 copies of each CDROM submitted.)
1.
Design basis documents for the engineered safety features and other systems used to mitigate the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event. Design basis documents for the high, intermediate, and low voltage electrical systems that power these components.
Design basis documents for pressurizer relief valves, secondary system relief valves, atmospheric dump valves and turbine bypass valves. Include performance history of these valves for the past 10 years.
2.
All procedures used to implement the mitigation strategy for the SGTR event. Include alarm response procedures as well as abnormal and normal operating procedures as appropriate. Also, include all emergency operating procedures (EOPs), the EOP users guide, and EOP setpoint document. Also, include the EOP writers guide for EOPs used during the SGTR event.
3.
Surveillance procedures used to ensure the operability of equipment required by your Technical Specifications that is used during the mitigation of an SGTR event.
4.
Summary results of the steam generator (SG) in service inspection program.
5.
A list of all temporary modifications and operator work-arounds for the past 3 years.
6.
A list of major modifications completed in the past 5 years to components or systems required for detection or mitigation of an SGTR event.
7.
List of deferred modifications for any components or systems required for detection or mitigation of a SGTR event.
8.
System descriptions and operator training modules for an SGTR event and the systems used to mitigate the event.
9.
Procedures used to sample the reactor coolant system and the SGs during an SGTR event.
10.
Calibration and functional testing procedures for the main steam line, condenser air ejector, and steam generator blowdown radiation monitoring instrumentation.
11.
Performance history of valves or support equipment used to isolate SGs in the event of a tube rupture.
12.
Calibration and functional test procedures of instruments used to monitor reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, pressurizer level and pressure, SG level and pressure, hot and
2 Enclosure cold leg temperature, subcooling monitor, feedwater flow, steam flow, core exit temperature, high pressure injection (HPI) flow, low pressure injection flow, refueling water storage tank level, pressurizer heater status, safety relief valve position indicator, AFW flow, condensate storage tank (CST) level, charging flow, and letdown flow.
13.
P&IDs for RCS, HPI, SI, AFW, chemical and volume control system, main steam and other systems used to mitigate the SGTR event. (Paper copies are preferred for these.)
14.
Key electrical one-line drawings of the high, intermediate, and low voltage alternating current systems and of the direct current power systems that provide power for the pumps, valves, and instrumentation and control circuits associated with the systems that accomplish the SGTR mitigation strategy. (Paper copies are preferred for these.)
15.
Probabilistic risk assessment event tree for the SGTR event. A list of PRA identified system dependencies and success criteria for systems used to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture. (ie. PRA system notebooks) 16.
System health reports and/or other performance monitoring information for systems used to detect and mitigate the SGTR event and their power supply systems.
17.
A list of non-routine work requests initiated since 1998 related to: 1) the systems used to detect and mitigate the SGTR event and 2) to inservice inspection activities of steam generator tubes.
18.
Maintenance Rule performance criteria for systems used to detect and mitigate the SGTR event and their electrical power systems. A list of maintenance rule failures of equipment and their power supplies that are used to detect or mitigate the SGTR event for the previous three years.
19.
A list of equipment used to mitigate a SGTR that changes state or is manually manipulated during implementation of the SGTR mitigation strategy and the indications used by plant operators to make decisions during the event. Provide equipment failure rates over the past 10 years for these components and a list of Problem Evaluation Reports and non-routine work requests initiated since 1998 for these components.
20.
Plant Technical Specifications, Bases, and Technical Requirements Manual 21.
A current copy of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
22.
Procedures that provide implementation guidance for the following programs: Corrective Action Program, Maintenance Rule Program, and Operating Experience Program.