Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
	ML030160099
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	01/09/2003
From:	Nazar M; Nuclear Management Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	L-PI-03-005
	Download: ML030160099 (105)
	v • d • e

Committed to Nuclear ErcenC January 9, 2003 Mano K. Nazar Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC 1717 Wakonade Dr. East

Welch MN 55089 L-PI-03-005 10 CFR 50.4 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Prairie Island Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Furnished with this letter are the recent changes to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures F3 and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures F8. This submittal includes the following documents:

INDEXES:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC EOF Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC REVISIONS:

F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies F8-5 Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Rev. 31 Rev. 8 DELETIONS:

None TEMPORARY CHANGE DELETIONS:

None INSTRUCTIONS:

Please post changes in your copies of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (F3 & F8). Procedures, which have been superseded or deleted, should be destroyed. Please sign and return the acknowledgment of this update to Bruce Loesch, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive East, Welch, MN 55089.

)

USNRC Nuclear Management Company, LLC January 9, 2003 Page 2 As per 10 CFR 50.4, two copies have also been provided to the Regional III Office and one to the NRC Resident Inspector. If you have any questions, please contact Mel Agen at 651-388-1121 Extension 4240.

Mano K. Nazar Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant C:

USNRC - Steve Orth, Region III (2 copies)

NRC Resident Inspector (wlo attachment)

Mfst Num:

2002 -

1030 Date

12/16/02 FROM

Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc

Prairie Island TO

UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure #

Rev Title Revisions:

F3-2 31 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES Temporary Change Deletions:

2002 1580 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File.

Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it.

Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,

Welch, MN 55089.

Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.

Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

I PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR

Title:

I GENERATING PLANT Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC I

I V

j Effective Date 12/16/02 I

I lApproved I I

I _PSuptI Document #

Title Rev F3-1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 19 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 31 F3-3 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL 18 EVENT F3-4 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA, 28 OR GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-5 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 21 F3-5.1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES 8

F3-5.2 RESPONSE TO FALSE SIREN ACTIVATION 9

F3-5.3 RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE 8

F3-6 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 16 F3-7 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 15 CENTER (OSC)

F3-8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 20 F3-8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR 13 THE ON SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER F3-9 EMERGENCY EVACUATION 18 F3-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 19 F3-11 SEARCH & RESCUE 8

F3-12 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 14 F3-13 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION 15 F3-13.3 MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS 11 F3-13.4 MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY 7

F3-13.5 ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA 5

Page 1 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR,1 Title : Emergency Plan Implementing GENERATING PLANT "

Effective Date : 12/16/02 Document #

F3-13.6 F3-14.1 F3-14.2 F3-15 F3-16 F3-17 F3-18 F3-19 F3-20 F3-20.1 F3-20.2 F3-21 F3-22 F3-23 F3-23.1 F3-24 F3-25 F3-26.1 F3-26.2 F3 -26.3 F3-29 F3-30 Procedures TOC Title WEATHER FORECASTING INFORMATION ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT (POTASSIUM IODIDE)

PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING & DECONTAMINATION DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK DOSE RATES ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY EMERGENCY SAMPLING EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY REENTRY OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS ERDS -

NRC DATA LINK EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES TRANSITION TO RECOVERY Rev 11 11 9

22 17 9

10 7

17 9

9 10 16 18 12 7

8 7

7 1

18 6

Page 2 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Title : Emergency Plan Implementing Effective Date : 12/16/02 Procedures TOC Document #

F3-31 F3-32 Title RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS Page 3 of 3

Rev 6

2

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES O.C. REVIEW DATE:

///2-'7/o>?. Sc.

IJVvjM-r"E M. Werner EFFECnIVE DATE 12-1 --

6Z Page 1 of 13

- :7REFERENCE USEý

"* Procedure segments may be performed from memory.

"* Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.

"* Mark off steps within segment before continuing.

"* Procedure should be available at the work location.

"-w PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT I

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE.......................................................................................................

3 2.0 APPLICABILITY..............................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIO NS................................................................................................

3 4.0 RESPO NSIBILITIES.....,.................................................................................

4 5.0 DISCUSSIO N...................................................................................................

5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 Definitions..............................................................................................

5 Emergency Action Levels.......................................................................

6 The Emergency Classification/DeclaratiornImplementation Process....... 7 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs...............................

8 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events......................................

9 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number.....................

9 6.0 PREREQUISITES.........................................................................................

10 7.0 PROCEDURE................................................................................................

11 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS - Summary of Emergency Action Levels Page 2 of 13 I

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Action Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the emergency into one of the four graded levels of emergency classifications. This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action level scheme.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators (CRO), Emergency Directors (ED) and Emergency Manager (EM).

3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Attempt to verify the indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators.

3.2 An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions described in Attachment I of this procedure.

3.3 These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite transportation incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of the plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.

3.4 Rapidly Escalating Then De-escalating Events 3.4.1 In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

3.4.2 During initial notifications to the NRC, the NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and also the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event. Emphasize the current emergency classification.

Page 3 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

F3: ~CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV:

31 3.4.3 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

3.5 Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.

4.2 Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager as necessary including authorization of an emergency classification.

4.3 Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected unit.

4.4 Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.

4.5 If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.

4.6 Control Room Operators and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisor in the identification ancý.

verification of control board indications.

Page 4 of 13

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 Definitions 5.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

5.1.2 Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of emergency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.

Any releases expected are limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

5.1.3 Site Area Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Any releases are not expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

5.1.4 General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

5.1.5 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airbome contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.

Page 5 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

FCLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 REV:

31 5.1.6 Safety System(s) - refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or transient to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 1 OCFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."

5.2 Emergency Action Levels Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels,. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency.

The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings ara-"

indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.

The Summary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based on the initiating conditions as required by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the Prairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations From NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

Page 6 of 13

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/implementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification, Declaration and Implementation.

5.3.1 Classification

The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification which the ongoing events are categorized. Assessing and classifying an event should be accomplished within a 15 minute period following the availability of indications that an emergency condition exists. This assessment period is consistent with the NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2.

5.3.2 Declaration

The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs. This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 1 OCFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.

5.3.3 Implementation

The act of making the notification and/or augmentation of the emergency organizations.

5.3.4 Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) should be filled out to near completion while the classification phase is being conducted. Once the declaration is made by the SM/ED/EM, the 15-minute offsite notification time starts. The SM/ED/EM should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to implement the E-Plan notifications.

5.3.5' Per 1 OCFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.

Page 7 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs Page 8 of 13 5.4.1 In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) Is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.

5.4.2 In other cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits for the period designated in the T.S. ACTIONS Table is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency. These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.

However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit T.S. ACTIONS Table COMPLETION Time, then a declaration of an Unusual Event should be declared.

5.4.3 With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handleK_

Technical Specification required shutdown in the following manner:

A.

The conditions of the plant should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately follow.

B.

Following the initiation of the reduction in power or temperature, the classification phase of the E-Plan is started. Review of the EALs should be done to assess for proper classification. Once the Shift Manager has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the Shift Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-minute offsite notification clock).

This classification phase should be done within a reasonable time frame determined by the circumstances (within 15 minutes for most instances).

C.

Once the declaration is made, the Shift Manager should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) tk_

ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator to implement the E-Plan notifications.

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet. To avoid possible confusion, other offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on the follow-up notification.

5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) to provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.

Page 9 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in the EAL Reference Manual. When the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiating condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number should be included on the form by using the label from "Emergency Initiating Conditions Labels - PINGP 1189" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels.

6.0 PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.

Page 10 of 13 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency condition SHALL be reported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergency Director immediately.

The events may be Instrumentation readings or visual 1VE.vj-*

observations made by plant personnel.

7.2 Attempt to verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports as applicable.

7.3 The Shift Manager, unaffected Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.

7.4 In those cases when an event rapidly escalates, then de-escalates or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

7.4.1 Inform the NRC of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.

7.4.2 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

Page 11 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 7.5 The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).

7.6 If the EOF is not activated, the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:

7.6.1 For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.

7.6.2 For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.

If the EOF is activated, contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.

7.7 Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in.

7.8 As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event classification.

7.8.1 For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:

A.

The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and B.

Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:

1.

Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of H4, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and Page 12 of 13 1

-1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

2.

Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Column 2 (April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and C.

The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.

7.8.2 Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review of 5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event Investigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine if this procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.

7.8.3 Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director if the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.

7.8.4 Termination of an Alert classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Organization. Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.

7.9 As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.

If the Site Area Emergency event does not require significant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the normal plant site organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, B, & C NOTE:**

are met, then the Site Area Emergency may be terminated without a transition to Recovery. However review and Implementation of SAWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.

See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction on transition to Recovery. Review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

Page 13 of 13 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Page 1 of 60 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No.

Condition DescriptIon aM 1

Safety System Functions 3

2 Abnormal Primary Leak Rate 4

3 Deleted 8

4 Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak 9

5 Core Fuel Damage 13 6

Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 15 7

Secondary Coolant Anomaly 21 8

Radiological Effluents 26 9

Major Electrical Failures 31 10 Control Room Evacuations 35 11 Fires 36 12 Plant Shutdown Functions 38 13 Fuel Handling Accidents 44 14 Deleted 46 15 Deleted 46 16 Security Threats 47 17 Hazards to Plant Operations 48 18 ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events 53 19 Natural Events 54 20 Other 59 Page 2 of 60 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 3 of 60 Condition I : Safety System Functions Failure of a sa-etyor relief valve in as'ft-r ed system, to close foli6'ihb ieduct'iqn'of applicable pre'ssure.

r.

40 4-L (EAL Ref Manual I1B)

Notification of Unusual Event Visual and/or audible Indication at discharge of I open steam generator I safety or relief valve As determined by SS or SM Pressurizer safety > 185 F & NOT valve outlet I decreasina temperature, TI-436 I U

Pressurizer safety > 185 F & NO]

valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-437 Pressurizer relief > 185 F & NOT valve outlet decreasing temperature, TI-438 Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from either the pressurizer PORV's or safeties PZR Pressure on at I < 2335 psig least 2/3 channels I PRT Level increasing PRT Temperature I increasing PRT Pressure I increasing

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Primary system leak rate from, tinidentiflecd o6 'r uncontrolled sou'r exceeding Techn1caI Specifications,.

(EA. Ref Manual 2A)

Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds T.S.3.4.14 Requires a unit shutdown, as determined by the SM or SS Reactor power reduction or cooldown has been initiated Notification of Unusual Event

[Prmary coolant' leak rate greater than 50 gpml Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 I.

Sum of charging line flow + seal injection flow >50 gpm more than the R

Rlows 50 omI sum of letdown flow + RCP seal leakoff flow SS, SM, or ED opinion

Decreasing pressurizer level, as _

indicated by LI-426, LI-427, LI-4281 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon) > 50 mFR/h R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon) > 50 mR/hr R-1 1 (Containment Vent Rad Mon) sxio4 cpmJ

[Containment Position]

R-12 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)

X 6x10 3 cpm

[Containment Position]I (EAL Ref Manual 2B)

-- Alert

Note' A rapid temperature decrease 'n the RCS results In the same indications P

F73-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 5 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak LO'A" ea6-661excesýs of avilablepbump capacity.

(ure oSLIrCA WO g

fi aterthari-(EAL Ref Manual 2C)

SI floW.)

,*o, e~~~odenc 1, or,,,u3n, orI 41 T*S

>2 T'...

Emergency SI Actuated annunciator IlluminatedEmrec "OA SG is not depressurizing In an I uncontrolled manner "B" SG Is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure

i-

I F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 6 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Small LAand inMitiala 2ysucc)ssflECC

~Su~bsequient faiIl[6k 6f qontairirpqent hiet't r~enovaU ter i

ove r

I

-i (EAL Ref Manual 2D)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or4,

>200 °F General Emergency LOCA has occurred SS, SM or ED opinion that loss of ECCS is imminent Containment temp has become excessive, and

>30 F

still rising Containment pressure is [

pg high and increasing Operating containment Zero spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains O

L"

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 7 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Small a~nd are0As"i?4h7aiureiiic'a7 perform leading -t seere coe degridation or melt (EAL Ref Manual 2E) from hiinutes to hour's. Ultimafe' failure'o onta inet

,Ikely formelt sequences...

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 T.S. >200 -F General SS, SM or ED opinion that Emergency core cooling capability does not exist 44

High Head SI failure o

O~

I Low Head SI failure High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample analysis Valid high radiaiton R-48 3

R (Containment High Range

> 1x10 Mr Area Rad Mon)

Valid high radiaiton R-49 3

(Containment High Range

> lx 10 R/hr Area Rad Mon)

Decreasing RCS pressure Low subcooling margin and i<1o F decreasing I A SG is no depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner 1 "B' SG Is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner I Pressurizer Low Pressure I 1900 pi ST r ip I RCS pressure decreasing I SuncontrollablyI

,-J High containment radiation leve~ls*

High containment sump High containment humidity High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT I Condition 3: Abnormal Coolant Temperature/Pressure REV. 31 Page 8 of 60 DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 9 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary I Secondary Leak

~SPrcimarycatioha leak rat~e exce eding Technical~

(EAL Ref Manual 4A)

SG primary to secondary 150 GPD through any I SG leakage exceeds T.S.3.4.14 limits Notification of Unusual Event Primary /Secondaty leak rte greater than 50,gpm.

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Decreasing pressurizer level LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I R15 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)

Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP SealI Leakoff flow SS, SM, ED opinion (EAL Ref Manual 4B)

Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 10 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Failure of steamr generator tube(s) resulting in ECSCS ac*uation.-

"SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level (EAL Ref Manual 4C)

Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 11 of 60 Condition 4 : Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak

[ Failure of steam generator tEbe(s) reCS'u actuiatf*h and highp6tent!il for loss'ofb'ottainment.

(EAL Ref Manual 4D)

"*SI Actuated "annunciator illuminated on I the Aqua panel I Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 I R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Une Rad Monitor R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured 1 Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line break downstream of MSIV Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED Site Area Emergency C

4..

Al)

Uj U)

U)

U) 4 C

U)

IL

'B0 U)

L.,E

=

U) 40 If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel

Nfailure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition #6, Case 2.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4 : Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Fai'-z.re.of st*ea...nerator tu e(s)esu.ingin ECCS (EAL Ref Manual 4E) actatonanloss of offisite'power..'

"PSI Actuated nannunciator illuminated on I the Aqua panel I Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, PI-431

<1815 si PZR level cannot be maintained on at I > 5%

least 2/3 channels 1I-426, LI-427, LI-4281 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor > bkg R-52 Steam Une Rad Monitor I > bkg R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor 0

2 m

Unexpected Rise in either SG level 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]

< 3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 14172805]1 < 3500 Volts 4.16KV Bus 13 [231, 4119306 [4172806]

3500 1

Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24), 4119307 14172807] < 3500 Volts D1 [D5 ] Tach 900 rpm ['200 rpml D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4000o-4400 voltsi Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]

D2 [D6 ] Tach 900 rpm [1200 rPm A

D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts 4000- 4400 volts J

Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]1 a.*

Site Area Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 13 of 60 Condition 5 : Core Fuel Damage 17661 Damage Indication_.

(EAL Ref Manual SA)

R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon in alarm R-9 R9 confirmed by portable instrumentation Notification of Unusual Event primary High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.

SSevere Loss of fuel cladding (EAL Ref Manual 5B)

Dose equivalent 1-131 R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9 R-9 confirmed by portable I instrumentation I Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 14 of 60 Degraded core w~ith,,pssiblej loss of coolable gqonibtry.,,

Condition 5 : Core Fuel Damage (EAL Ref Manual 5C)

SS, SM, or ED opinion Core Delta T increasing No core Delta T Dose Equivalent 1-131 Core exit thermocouples RVLIS full range

'6

c3

'-0 Site Area Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 6 : Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)

REV. 31 Page 15 of 60 GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Three permutations exist for loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier; A. Failure of cladding and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of containment.

B. Failure of cladding and containment with potential loss of primary coolant boundary.

C. Failure of containment and primary coolant boundary with potential loss of cladding.

These 3 permutations are represented In the following 5 cases, each with Its own set of EAL's:

2.

All cases are applicable to operations in Modes 1, 2,3,

& 4.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 16 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers boCaseryLsso claoss of primary coolant ioqTay(LoCA), 'and high po6tentiail for loss ofEL..

Mnal6 Ref Manual 6) doritainm-rent.

Valid high radiation RI48 (Containment High Range AreaI _

1X10 3

l hr Rad Mon)

Valid high radiation R-49 General (Containment High Range Area 2' 1x103 R/hr E1erenc Rad Mon)

Emergency Dose equivalent 1-131

> 300 uCVcc Pressurizer low pressure trip I 0I 0

RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably High containment pressure

x.

"High containment humidity

~

High containment sump levels High containment radiation levels S

Am SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner N"B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Containment approaching

> 23 psig a 46 psig design pressure and increasing I Control Room containment isolation status lights for Train A

0. and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM. or ED opinion Operating containment Zero spray pumps 2

Operating containment fan < One train it coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 17 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers

,Cas,2:-LL!Dý f~cad, G~uer urb ridhig 66ientaI.

C PL Iol sbI

-JI (EAL Ref Manual 6)

General Emergency Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured SG MSIV Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam line break Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)

R-1 5 (Air Ejector)

Unexpected Rise In either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure PI-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 Dose equivalent 1-131

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 3-:. Loss of clad, con tanii en't fa 'i ure,' ind-a-i

.1 '-i7 A_4;.:

I (EAL Ref Manual 6)

SbI 0- "

i Dose equivalent 1-131 >3o uCLcC General I

Emergency Cold leg temperature decrease in thl > 100 °F last 60 minutesl RCS cold leg temperature < 250 °F Steam line break betweenI containment and the MSIVI Steam line break downstream o IVMSIV/I ai MSIV open-close indicator(s) sho q open or partially openl Co o

Control room containment isolatio "status lights for Train A and B indicat open or partially open for ano containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinioni IK

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 19 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers ndy A...(EAL Ref Manual 6)

Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM,or ED opinion RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples Pressurizer low pressure trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably I--.

0 "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure General Emergency "Af SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 20 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers (EAL Ref Manual 6)

Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV 0

"Ca ra General Emergency SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure

<181, PI-429, PI-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels

>5%

LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 L

I Stuck open ruptured SG PORV or Safety valve Steam line break downstream of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows open or partially open RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)

R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly

'Faid~

ýessr'iatonof sedondary

Side.'.

SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure occurred Steam Generator A/B pressure differential Increasing Containment Pressure Indications of a steam line break outside of containment Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORV, or SG Safety Valve Hi Steam Flow Lo-Lo Tavg Indication of steam line break downstream of MSIVs (EAL Ref Manual 7A)

Notification of Unusual Event REV. 31 Page 21 of 60

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 22 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Steamn line break. ins ide cont ainmeni.,t'"

with significant (greater thani 16 Ogrn)-ý primary to secondary, le-ak ra~te.~-

(EAL Ref Manual 7B)

High containment pressure R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg Alert to.

C3

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 23 of 60 Condition 7 : Secondary Coolant Anomaly

Unisolable steam Iiih'ebreak o'utside -J containment wvitJt sinifitain (gre'qte'r,*.,,

thanl0 Il p

irn) riry to seconcfarv leak r

Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety (EAL Ref Manual 7C)

Site Area Emergency e

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 24 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Steam Linerek 1iiconti ent With g -re,ater,th'ai'50.gp prin arytoý

ýseon ia-ea,'*g aidý 'indiat'o'n of fu'el damage.,I If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 (EAL Ref Manual 7D)

Primary to Secondary Leakage Valid high radiaiton R-48

>200 Pr (Containment High Range Area >

Rad Mon)

Valid high radiaiton R-49 a 200 R/hr (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Steam generator A/B pressure I >1 00-iog differentialI High containment pressure

-4 Valid steamline low pressure I<pg safety injection signal I Hi steam flow I -.745x 106 Lo-Lo Tavg Site Area Emergency U)

U

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1

,and condensate-syE i4ernov~aI system)i fo~l emergency !eedw,a

~extendbed period. IC In vdiralS-hurs.,U

'containrnient likely]

REV. 31 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly iy loss. of feedwat6er

terns (prInclpal, h~at

liowed by failure of er~ sy-stem, fot ELRfMna E 4L Re Mnul E

ore melting pOssiDle Itimate oilure of ftcore mnelts.'~

Condensate and Main Feedwater angX.

be established to either SG I General Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established Emergency to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be established to the RCS 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring

>30 minutes actuation of SI No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the RCS Noe Cannot be established" means that procedural guidance for establishing condition will not be successful based on knowledge of system/component condition/availability.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents "Airborne en adi6oSpe cfa effluent,

-Technlcal.,Specifications e xceece-i&j (EAL Ref Manual 8A)

Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection Confirmation of total gaseous activity by Rad Chemist that a 300 second mannell gas grab L sample analysis from 1[2]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Notification of Unusual Event bquldRad16log'ic6aIl efflent TechnIcal; Specification limnits excbeded.

(EAL Ref Manual 86)

Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Uquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,ODCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close Notification of Unusual Event L..

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 27 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents Liquid Radiologi6al eff luent greater than t en ti mes Technical Specification litiis.

(EAL Ref Manual 8C)

Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits ofOperations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.

2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Uquid Discharge Rad Mon)

> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-1 8 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) > 10 times High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close (EAL Ref Manual 8D)

Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Protection.

Confirmation by RPS that local measured count rate on 1[2]R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent

> o m

Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber Valid 1 R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

C Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

> 5x*°*

rr Valid 1 R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range

> 1.2 mR/hr Rad Mon) I Valid 2R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range

-2 Rad Mon)

Alert 12

6:

Airborne Radio'l o'gical eff lue'nts greaterthUanjten iimes'Technical

,Specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which,. If,

'continued toe over two hiours, would result II n about 1 mrem TEDE, at the site bounrdary under average met c onditions. TEDE,,= Total

Dose.Eqluivalent).4 Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 28 of 60 Condition 8: Radlolog Ical Effluents (EAL Ref Manual BE)

Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary TEDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary

> 50 mP/hr for MF hr

500 mR/hr for 2 rain

> 250 mrem/hw for 1/'2 hri

> 2500 mrem/hr

[o 2 rain S> 70 m~dr

> 70 mR/hr FIr

> 250 mrem/h r 12 hr

> 2500 mmrrVhr for 2 rain S> 50 mrerrhrfor 1/2 h

> 500 mrem/hr for 2 min J

Site Area Emergency Airborne E~ffiuent onitors ~etl e corresponding to brea-ter than:

1.50 tiremlhrTLEDE fr&ehalf hou r, or

2. '250 mrehilhr Thyroidi CDE for onehl OU I, or

3. 500 rnreiih~rTEDE for two'rnlnutes, 4.. 2500:rnreIhr Thyroid CDE~for two minutes:

at the site-boundary for adverse meteorology.

TEDE =$Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

CDE =Comnmitted Dose Equivalent Ja 0

U)

C ci S 0

Ia.

I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 29 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents (EAL Ref Manual 8F)

Radiation survey teams measure gamma dose rates at or beyond the site boundary Radiation survey teams measure field data at the site boundary, corresponding to Thyroid CDE Valid 1 R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

.i TEDE offsite dose projections at the site

) *boundary Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the site boundary V)

Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 30 of 60 Condition 8 : Radiological Effluents flZdiatici levrYIels or airb orne conta'mination-w-hich:-

indicate i seeed;egaaini the contrcol radiodactive materialsý (e.g.,in~reas of factor Of (EAL Ref Manual 8G)

SS, SM, or ED opinion Unexpected increase in plant area radiation factor of 1000 monitors I Widespread unexpected iodine or 0

particulate airborne concentrations as per 1 OCFR20 appendix B table 1, Column 3.

Widespread unexpected contamination in >0I0000 dDM/lO00=

2 beta-aamma the Auxiliary Building > 50,000 dpnV1 00cm2 alpha activt

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9 : Major Electrical Failures (EA 4AM (EAL Ref Manual 9A) 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21],4119304 [4172804]

4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805] 1 <3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 13 [231,4119306 [4172806] 1 <35o0 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] 1 <3500 Volts D1 [D5 ] TachI 90Pm12 D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4 Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]

D2 [D6 ] Tach 1900 rpm [12C D2 D6 ] Gen Volts 4000 - 4400, Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]

Notification of Unusual Event tLoss of ons ite AC power capablifty (EAL Ref Manual 9B)

Loss of D1 & D2 [D5 & D6] diesel generators when they are required to be operable by Tech Specs Notification of Unusual Event I

a 0

C C

-J r

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Loss of offsite power and loss' of all, onsiteACPoe(SeStA"a Em-ergency for-eixter;ndeid i~ss).`.

(EAL Ref Manual 9C)

Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]

<3500VoRs Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805] <1 5Vo*ls Alert Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] <3500 Vohs I/

Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]

<4000 Volts Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301] <4oooVols Loss of offsite p~ower and loss-of on-site" AC power~ formore than 15 minutes.

(EAL Ref Manual 9D)

Blackout duration Bus 11 [211, 4119304 [4172804]

Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]

Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [41728061 Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]

Bus 16 (26], 4192401 [4192301]

'.. a 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV

'4oa-

I a

0 0

-J 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV 4.16 KV Site Area Emergency

,.a

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT I REV. 31 Page 33 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Faiureof ffsfe andn~lepwer a~on with total ioss of -emergeiicy feedwater, n akeu'cr*apabi~ifrrdaterthan 2.

(EAL Ref Manual 9E)

'hours'.This would lead to eventuarcoreý Turbine Driven A:u Feedwater pump o

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 TS>20TGeneral Emergency unavailable I]

> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from other unit unavailable 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804].<35°° Volts Co 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22],4119305[4172805]

<35WOVols 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [41728061 <535o Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

<35WoVols 4.16KV Bus 15 [251, 4191801 [4190401] <4o00Vol 4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [41923011] <40oVol

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 3401f60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Loss p1 all onsite DC po6wer (see Site' A~ear Ernerg'ency for-extended lossy.'

(EAL Ref Manual 9F)

SS, SM opinion that DC power is not available for one unit "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]

Loss of all viWl onsite DC powerfori more than 15 minutes (EAL Ref Manual 9G)

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DCOI FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-0501]

Site Area Emergency "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502] I Loss of DC power has lasted more i15 mi.

than 15 minutes Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 35 of 60 Condition 10: Control Room Evacuations iEvacuation of thb'Con'trol'h I mo-m

~nt~Iptedor ie'utre~d w~ith cotrolo

'shutdb6wn 6061is'etabli 7 shed -froi HIot Shutdown Pane'ls and local staionis.-x (EAL Ref Manual 10A)

SS,SM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room Is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations If reason for evacuation Is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 1 IC,

"*Fire compromising the functions of safety systems" for possible reclassification.

Evacuatijo i- 'f the Con~trol Room and 4bontrol o6f slutdown systemfs not established from Hot, Shutdown Panels and local stations within 15 mnltutes.

Evacuation of Control Room conducted Control of shutdown systems not established from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations within 15 minutes (EAL Ref Manual IlOB)

Site Area Emergency I

Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 11 : Fires REV. 31 Page 36 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 11A)

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in I the Control Room I hi Fire confirmed within the Reactor Bldg.,

Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg., Cooling Tower Equip.

House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Fire not extinguished within 10-minutes of I 10 minutes alarm or notification I Notification of Unusual Event Fire potentially affecting safety systems.

(EAL Ref Manual 11 B)

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of oe td..

smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do te:

j*

not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT lj required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Physical observation of a fire that is [

affecting 2m train of a safety system I J>NAlert SS, SM, or ED opinion I I

-1

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT I REV. 31 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11 : Fires (EAL Ref Manual I1C)

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for the same unit Site Area Emergency SS, SM, or ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions 0,

onunction aiaarrms.it o ntt01-'

(EAL Ref Manual 12B)

SS or SM opinion that annunciators are nonfunctional Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and loss of plant computer Loss of BOP Annunciator System and loss of plant computer (ERCS)

Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System REV. 31 Page 38 of 60 Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12C)

Most or all alarmns (ainunclators) lost.,i Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 T.S. >200 °F SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional Loss of plant computer (ERCS)

Loss of NSSS Annunciator System

~.Alert Loss of BOP Annunciator System

'6 0

'0

.0

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 39 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions n(ARreiMatniusyl1st nititný r in(EAL Ref Manual 12D)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Loss of plant computer (ERCS)

SS, SM, or ED opinion that annunciators are non-functional SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient has occurred or is in progress Loss of NSSS Annunciator System Loss of BOP Annunciator System Site Area Emergency T

A transient is an UNPLANNED event involving one of more of the following:

(1) automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection V -actuation, or (5) thermal power increase or oscillations >10%.

2!

Cx a

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 12 : Plant Shutdown Functions tentary loss of corec66Iingiin' d

(EAL Ref Manual 12E)

Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Interruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flow

'Iability to maintain plant Irn Mode 5,.'.

Cold Shutdown.-

REV. 31 Page 40 of 60 Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 12F)

Mitigation actions are unable to prevent RCS temperature

>0200 F exceeding 200 OF Alert

'Loss of water Ilevel that has -uncove Ired or will, uncover the fuel, in the reactor vessel while at Mode 5, Cold Shutdown..

(EAL Ref Manual 12G)

Mode 5, Cold Shutdown tT.S.

A<r eF 771_

Site Area Total loss of RHR system cooling Emergency Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss LU

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions 77-,.

6omplel loss f nunction n6eedejd for Plant i~odae 3,ý kot Standyý.

ýAsoQe~

Crdto # f~~si~~neral'i ife~ed arnd b1l'e-d is init'i at'!,d)Ži Mode 1,2, or 3j Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 SI pumps and loss of all charging pumps for more than 15 minutes)

SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow No Auxiliary Feedwater flow Wide range level in both SG's (EAL Ref Manual 12H)

Site Area Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 42 of 60 Reactor or turbine trip due ti Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions g rea to (EAL Ref Manual 121).

o turbine failure Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion Turbine failufreie clausing 'csing penetration.

(EAL Ref Manual 12J)

As determined by visual inspection Alert SS, SM or ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions Failure of the reactor protection system to initiateand corn ie~rip hichi f (EAL Ref Manual 12K)

Any valid reactor trip setpoint has I been exceeded I Intermediate range detectorI output not decaying Failure to bring reactor subcritical I (EAL Ref Manual 12L) with control rods inserted I No indication of core damage SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient Is in progress (EAL Ref Manual 12M)

Failure to bring reactor subcdtical I with control rods insertedI RCS pressure

> 24851 Rapidly increasing containment pressure and temperature I Dose equivalent 1-131 Alert Transient requiring operation of shutdown system -s with failure to'trip (continued power generation but no core damage imimediately evldentý.-

Site Area Emergency Transient requiting 0-peraition of shutdown systems with failure to trip which results In core damage or

Additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems (which could lead to core melt).

LX General Emergency I

iI.......

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 44 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13A)

During refueling operations SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)

Valid R7 (containment area)

Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid Ri1 (containment vent)

Valid R12 (containment vent)

J Fuel damage accident with release of

,radioactivity to the fuel handling building.

(EAL Ref Manual 13B)

SS, SM, or ED opinion Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area rad monitor R5 Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent)

Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

Alert Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 45 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents Majoy-dainago shei fuel 16 eontinetbr fuel handling bidn

~e~4:Irg~b~ect damages. fuel or water io~ss

~

bec~ u eve.

(EAL Ref Manual 13C)

SS, SM, or ED opinion E :

Valid R48 (containment area b

hi range) hi Alarm Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm

.1 SS, SM, or ED opinion Valid R50 (shield bldg vent

"b &

hi range)

Valid R5 (SFP area)

Site Area Emergency t

F4 1P. a

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

Condition 15 : Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16 : Security

'r~e-dible s~ite-'ýs'pecifi'c si~c~r-ity thireat`

notificationfr6attempted enjtry or, attemipted s~abotage,_

Security determines the threat to be credible I Threat would have an adverse impact on safe operation or shutdown capability of the plant Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification received 0 Ong oing securiity compIr o Imise (EAL Ref Manual 16A)

Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 16B)

Security Safeguards Contingency event that, results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant protected area, but not controlling shutdown capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected area and outside of any vital area High Credible Security Threat notification received Alert

Imminent loss of jphysical con~trol of the

~

(A e Mna 6 "plant(EAL Ref Manual 16C)

Physical attack on the plant involving imminentS occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary I;1,;"*Site Area shutdown panels or other vital areas Emergency Bomb device discovered within a vital area L Los**of physical control of the plant' Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the Control Room or any other vital areas (EAL Ref Manual 16D)

General Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Aicraft crash, onnsite or~unu§siial aiircraf activity overfilt.

(EAL Ref Manual 17A)

Reported to the SS or SM Aircraft crash onsite within owner controlled fence SUnusual threatening aircraft activity over facility Notification of Unusual Event Aircraft crash in the protectedaa.

(EAL Ref Manual 17B)

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash j Alert in the protected area Air~cr~aft-crash within pr'ot~ctecl area' and~

affecting vital structures by impact o,,+ I fires witti -plant not' in' Mode'5ý Cold Shiutdown.'

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash within protected area and affecting vital structures by impact or fires with either unit in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 (EAL Ref Manual 17C)

T.S. >200 OF Site Area Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 49 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Near or onsite 6p~l~o6i (EAL Ref Manual 17D)

Visually observed evidence of an unplanned or unexplained explosion within the owner controlled fence but not affecting plant safe operation Reported to the SS or SM Notification of Unusual Event Known explosion damigeto facility

.affecting plant operation' (EAL Ref Manual 17E)

Visually observed evidence of an unplanned A

explosion directly affecting plant safe operation Alert Reported to SS or SM

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 50 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Missile impacts from whatever source ofail eiity Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts on facility from whatever source (EAL Ref Manual 17F)

Alert S§evere da mag6 to safe shuitdlo~wn equipment from missiles or explosi09,~1 with plant not In Molde 5; C6,d. Shutdown];

(EAL Ref Manual 17G)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missile impacts and/or explosion on facility from whatever source Reactor trip system is inoperable Inadequate high pressure injection flow (no safety injection or charging]

pumps are available)

All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable Unable to establish* any Condensate and Main Feedwater flow Unable to establish* any Auxiliary Feedwater flow Site Area Emergency

°I 0

(U 0

0 0

.4 0

6

0 (U

b 0

0 0 0 4 0 (U

0 S

"Unable to establish" criteria met if procedural attempt to establish condition has been made, but was unsuccessful or if an attempt cannot be made.

I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations N~ror ons' ite-toxi'c or flammrfable gas release (EAL Ref Manual 17H)

Widespread toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsie (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or sheltering of personnel outside the plant Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event Notification of Unusual Event Entry into ti:eplant environs of toxicorj Sflammable gases~

(EAL Ref Manual 171)

Explosive gas concentrations being measured within the plant at a distance of

> elsve limits greater than 10 feet from the source JD-ý Alert Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured within a large area of the plant at the breathing zone

> 50 ppm hydrazine

> 300 ppm ammonia

> 50 PPm rochloric acid

> 1400 p morpholine

> 30 ppm ethanolamlne ETA

> IDLH for any to~dc gas (see D14.4 AOP 1)

Note: IDLH =Amediately Dangerous to Life or Health.

IOLH-

Reference:

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations "En't r try x 0

or flamimable gases inio" r'fti6 ai'as w4ith 01a66f not lin Mode 58

- I Cold §Shut own.'.

(EAL Ref Manual 17J)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 T.S. >200 F Site Area S+

Emergency Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a major portion of a vital area from an unisolable source such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured in a maior portion of a vital area at the breathing zone such that further access to the vital area is being restricted at a time when it is needed

> explosive limits

> 50 ppm hydrazine

>3o00pX ammonia

-j r>30 ppm ethanolamine (ETA)

F

>IDL.H for any toxic gas (see D14.4 AOP 1)

Note: IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health. IDLH

Reference:

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.

1

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 "Condition 18 :ISFSI Events iSFSi cask~ tip'over or drbp resiultinig in

~caskSeaiileakage.

REV. 31 Page 53 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 18A)

Notification of Unusual Event Loaded cask tipped over or dropped r

Overpressure monitoring tank 0o pressure decreasing to 0 psig Loss of ISFSI cask/fuel containment,

~barrier (EAL Ref Manual 18B)

While loaded cask is outside the plant I protected area I A radiation field near ISFSI cask increase by a factor of 1000 above the ambient radiation field (background >1,0°° X ambient rad. field plus the normal radiation field from the cask(s))

> 1,000,000 dpm/100 Widespread contamination c eta-gmma outside the ISFSI protected

> 50,000 dpm/100 area c* alpha Alert 0

go

'U cz

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 Condition 19: Natural Events Any,.confirmhed earth uquke REV. 31 Page 54 of 60 (EAL Ref Manual 19A)

Confirmed by one or more off-site sources Annun "Seismic Event" received on the seismograph As experienced by plant personnel Earthquake gr~eat~etilan,Operational' Bsis Earthquake;:<

Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19B)

Annun "Operational Basis Earthquake" received on the seismograph As experienced by plant personnel Alert Earthqu ake.,greater than Des igiiBsln~

Earthquake with plant not in Mode 5">

Cold Shutdow n, (EAL Ref Manual 19C)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Annun "Design Basis Earthquake" received on the seismograph As experienced by plant personnel I'

Site Area Emergency

--- 41

F73-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 55 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events Any orad~o n site~j (EAL Ref Manual 19D)

Notification of Unusual Event Reported to the SS or SM Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security Any tornado striking thefacihit" (EAL Ref Manual 19E)

Reported to the SS or SM, or ED Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security

Alert

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events 50'Ya lo.

(EAL Ref Manual 19F)

River Intake Elevation

6m ft Flood levels approaching design levels River Intake Elevation (USAR 2.4.3.5) - requires both units to

>692 ft be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 Flood levels exce'edi'ng design levels with plant not in Mode 5, Cold Sle!tdow Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19G)

Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19H)

Mode 1,2, 3, or 4 T.S. >200 °F Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level

698 ft transformers will function)

/

I

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19 : Natural Events Low water-e eing expe~rienrc'd or, Ipr~oiectedbeyond usual leyels,.

River intake elevation (11/21 Cooling Water Pump - Low Water Level Trip )

ILowwater levels being experienced ori

ýprojected to be near design levels.

River intake elevation

< 669.5 ft Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 River Intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &

Dam # 3 Major vital equipment failure (EAL Ref Manual 191)

Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 19J)

Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19K)

Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation

With plantjnotin Mode 5 Cold Shutdown, low water levels being experienced or projected to be less than

-design levels, or failure of vital

~equipment with low water level.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events (EAL Ref Manual 19L)

Sustained wind speed indicated by I > oomph met tower I Alert (EAL Ref Manual 19M)

Modes1 2,3, or4 T.S. >200 TF Sustained wind speed indicated by I > loo mph met towerI As determined by the SS, SM, or ED Site Area Emergency (EAL Ref Manual 19N)

General Emergency projected

ar dsin*

le vo-.*.

Any 'major ont r

xenal o xe event (e4., flres; earthquake,~ substantially beyond design levels) which could or has caused massive dam iage to plant systems resulting9 or potential for tesulting in large rele'ases to the off site--,

environment in excess of. the EPA Protective. Action Guides.'

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 31 Page 59 of 60 Condition 20 : Other (Et a

plantop Ma2ion awarene+'

-rh par ofEAL Ref Manual 20A)

SM and SS concurrence that plant [

conditions warrant increased awareness I Inability to reach, required shutdown

,:within Techinical Specification Limits.,

Notification of Unusual Event (EAL Ref Manual 20B)

T.S.ACTION TABLE not met 1

/

Notification of requires plant shutdown or cooldown Unusual Event Reactor power reduction or cooldown requirements have been exceeded

,Conditions that involve other than

~n 6ma I controlled shutdown.

(EAL Ref Manual 20C)

Reactor power reduction or cooldown has I been initiated I Emergency Safeguard Function equipment I did NOT perform its function if requiredI Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification Notification of "Unusual Event

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 I

REV. 31 Page 60 of 60 Condition 20: Other Condition sithat via rant activalf 6on of Tech fnical support Center I nasf

-Emergencj.Operation-aciity (EAL Ref Manual 20D)

SS, SM, or ED opinion I

(EAL Ref Manual 20E)

SS, SM, or ED opinion I

Other plant conditions exist, from*

whatever source, that make release of i

I large amounts of radioactivity in a short' situation SS, SM, or ED opinion I

(EAL Ref Manual 20F)

General Emergency I

Alert Site Area Emergency I

Mfst Num:

2002 -

1032 Date

12/16/02 FROM

Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc

Prairie Island TO

UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure #

Rev Title Revisions:

F8-5 8

OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT & PROTECTIVE ACTI RECOMMENDATIONS UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it.

Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,

Welch, MN 55089.

Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.

Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR

Title:

I GENERATING PLANT EOF Emerg Plan Implementing Procedures TOC I

II jI Effective Date : 12/16/02 I

l IJI I

lApproved By:

/Tae I'w 9PS SU-p tY Document #

F8-1 F8-2 F8-3 F8-4 F8-5 F8-6 F8-8 F8-9 F8-10 F8-11 F8-12 Title EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA OR GENERAL EMERGENCY IN THE EOF ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF THE EOF EMERGENCY SUPPORT & LOGISTICS OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT & PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING & CONTROL AT THE EOF OFFSITE AGENCY LIAISON ACTIVITIES EVENT TERMINATION OR TRANSITION TO RECOVERY RECORD KEEPING IN THE EOF TRANSFER TO THE BACKUP EOF EMERGENCY REMP Page 1 of 1

Rev 7

7 5

4 8

6 4

7 2

3 3

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 k,, j O.C.

EVIEW DATE-OWNER:

J-I2 Ia I ) z-S.C..

EFFECTIVE DATE M. Werner Page 1 of 24

"* Procedure segments may be performed from memory.

"* Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.

"* Mark off steps within segment before continuing.

"* Procedure should be available at the work location.

m

]

e PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR G!ENERATING PLANT (EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENT7ING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE.......................................................................................................

3 2.0 APPLICABILITY..............................................................................................

3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS..............................................................................................

3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES.......................................................................................

4 5.0 DISCUSSION...................................................................................................

4 6.0 PREREQUISITES............................................................................................

4 7.0 PROCEDURE...................................................................................................

5 7.1 General Emergency Protective Action Recommendations.....................

5 7.2 Site Area Emergency Protective Action Recommendations.................. 5 7.3 Radioactive Plume Release Assessment......................

6 7.4 Liquid Release Assessment...............................

9 7.5 Ground Deposition Assessment............................

9 7.6 Ingestion Pathway Assessment............................................................

11 7.7 Return Assessments...........................................................................

12 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Ground Deposition Graph Basis.........................................................

15 Table 2 Guidance On Field Team Deployment................................................

16 Table 3 Relocation Or Secondary Evacuation Dose Projection........................ 17 Table 4 Relocation Protective Action Guide.....................................................

19 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Ground Deposition Graph.....................................................................

14 Figure 2 Exposure Pathways, Incident Phases, and Protective Actions............ 24 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Definitions Related To PARS.....................................................

20 Page 2 of 24

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance for assessing the consequences of a radioactive release and formulating Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the general public during the early and intermediate phases of a radiological emergency.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Radiation Protection Support Supervisors (RPSS) and all Emergency Managers.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 Declaration of a General Emergency requires immediate initial protective action recommendations (PARs) to offsite agencies. Under these circumstances, NO dose projections are required for formulating the initial offsite protective action recommendation.

3.2 Implementation of protective actions for offsite areas is the responsibility of the State of Minnesota and the State of Wisconsin. If it is determined, by the Emergency Manager, that immediate protective actions are required, and the State EOCs are not activated, the Emergency Manager SHALL authorize such recommendations to be made directly to the local authorities. Once the State EOCs are activated, all Protective Action Recommendations SHALL be made to the State EOCs.

3.3 It is the responsibility of the county and state agencies and the National Weather Service to notify members of the Prairie Island community of approved protective actions. Protective action notification is accomplished by the activation of the Public Alert and Notification System (PANS).

3.4 Offsite protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway (ingestion of contaminated food and water) will be determined and implemented by the appropriate state authorities during the intermediate phase of an emergency.

Page 3 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Upon activation of the EOF, the Emergency Manager (EM) SHALL assume the non-delegatable authority and responsibility for issuing offsite Protective Action Recommendations from the Emergency Director.

4.2 The RPSS, once the EOF is activated, SHALL be responsible to promulgate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and SHALL channel all such recommendations through the EM for approval.

5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 This procedure has several parts. The first four (4) parts are for use during the early phase of a declared emergency condition; the other parts (ground deposition, ingestion pathway and return) are for use during the intermediate phase.

5.2 Definitions - See Attachment 1.

6.0 PREREQUISITES 6.1 A General Emergency has been or will be declared.

6.2 A Site Area Emergency has been or will be declared and there is an actual or potential airborne radioactive release that meets or exceeds the PAGs.

6.3 An Alert or Site Area Emergency has been or will be declared and there is an actual or potential liquid radioactive release that meets or exceeds the PAGs.

Page 4 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 General Emergency Protective Action Recommendations 7.1.1 If a General Emergency is declared, the RPSS SHALL refer to F3-8, Recommendations For Offsite Protective Actions, and formulate PARs in accordance with the 173-8 guidance contained in the section entitled "Protective Action Recommendation For a General Emergency".

7.1.2 The RPSS SHALL perform the duties and responsibilities as stipulated for the REC and route the particular forms to the Emergency Manager for review and approval prior to transmission to the Offsite agencies.

7.2 Site Area Emergency Protective Action Recommendations 7.2.1 No initial offsite Protective Action Recommendations for the general public are warranted during a Site Area Emergency unless the offsite dose projections exceed the established Protective Action Guides.

7.2.2 Potential Precautionary Shutdown of TI Casino A.

Precautionary recommendations may be warranted for the nearsite special population (Treasure Island (TI) Casino) under certain conditions.

IF the Site Area Emergency is based on any of the following EAL #'s: 2C, 4D, 4E, 5C, 7C, 7D, 8E, or 16C, THEN a recommendation of SHUTDOWN OF CASINO AND DISMISSAL OF CASINO PATRIONS should be completed.

B.

The RPSS should follow action of PINGP 585, Protective Action Recommendation Checklist, after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Page 5 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

FPROTECTI ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 7.2.3 Consideration should be given to Protective Action Recommendations for the general public during serious flooding conditions.

A.

A recommendation to relocate people in areas with restricted egress due to flooding within a ten (10) mile radius of the plant should be made at the Site Area Emergency level if it is clear we are not to de-escalate from the SAE in less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . This is to ensure that should the event escalate to a General Emergency, people are already relocated from areas where additional evacuation time would be required.

B.

Each county sheriff's department is aware of those areas in which there are restrictions to normal evacuation routes.

7.3 Radioactive Plume Release Assessment 7.3.1 Plume Projected Dose A.

Run the dose projection model to obtain information on the magnitude of plume projected doses, the likely location of affected areas, and time-related aspects of the release. (This includes potential, as well as, actual releases.)

B.

For potential releases, base the projections on the approximate releasable activity, considering the most probable release path, current as well as forecast weather conditions, a rapid release or a slow extended release.

C.

Post the current dose projection results on the status board. If projections are based on potential or hypothetical cases, be careful to clearly label as such.

Page 6 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT (EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 D.

IF dose projection results or meteorological conditions change significantly, THEN re-evaluate the recommended protective action and, if necessary, update the recommendation.

Significant meteorological changes would be:

i. Wind direction change that would cause a different geopolitical subareas to be affected.

In this situation all previous sectors and geopolitical areas are included with the new affected sectors and geopolitical areas.

If the wind direction change does not require a new geopolitical area to be added to the evacuated area, then a new PAR is not necessary. The wind shift information should be communicated in the next follow-up message to the offsite authorities.

ii. Wind speed decrease to below 5 mph that would cause a new PAR to be established for 3600 around the plant.

iii. Wind speed or stability class change that would cause new dose projection to establish an affected area beyond a current PAR area (e.g., greater than 5 miles or greater than 10 miles out).

E.

IF radiation survey results confirm calculated dose projections that exceed EPA 400 PAGs (1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem adult Thyroid CDE) in areas beyond 10 miles, THEN PINGP must recommend evacuation of the general public beyond 10 miles in those areas with the help of the offsite authorities. This will be an ad hoc formulation of an offsite protective action with collaborative assistance from MN and WI accident assessment staff.

Page 7 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

(EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONS REV:

8 7.3.2 Deployment of Field Teams A.

Deploy field teams (refer to Table 2 for guidance) to perform measurements and collect samples (per EPIP F3-15) with the objective of defining affected areas and providing data for comparison to the results of the dose projection model. In the case of a potential release, field teams should be used to confirm that no releases are occurring.

Two Important pieces of data are the ratio of radiolodines to noble gases and the magnitude of any radioparticulates In the release. If data Is not available through sampling ahead of the release point, field sampling should be Initiated to supply the Information.

B.

Keep field teams informed of the plant status and projected plume exposure rate levels. Ensure that survey team members are instructed to take appropriate protective actions.

C.

Record field team measurements using PINGP 647, EMERGENCY SAMPLE RESULTS LOG. Field measurements may be posted on a status board for easy reference and plotting results on the area maps is recommended as an aid to defining affected areas.

D.

Compare model results to field team measurements to establish the reliability of the model, including the thyroid and particulate dose projection components which are dependent on a good estimate of the radioiodine and particulate release terms.

E.

If the dose assessment system is determined to be unreliable (e.g., field measurements greater than model results), stop the distribution of results and decision-making based on them.

Consider the possibility of an unmonitored release. Options for dose assessment include adjusting the primary dose assessment system, switching to a back-up method, and using field measurements.

Page 8 of 24 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND "UMBER:

PROTECTIVE ACTION F8-5 RECOMMENDATIONSJ REV:

8 F.

When releases have substantially decreased, consider retrieval of the EMERGENCY TLDs, which are part of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, to provide additional information on actual doses. Contact the REMP Coordinator/Administrator for guidance, and ensure radiological support is provided to persons entering contaminated areas for TLD retrieval.

7.3.3 Determine PARs in accordance with F3-8, Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions, section entitled "Protective Action Recommendations Based On Offsite Dose Projections".

7.4 Liquid Release Assessment 7.4.1 Obtain sample analysis data on the liquid being released, either directly by having a survey team collect a sample for analysis (per EPIP F3-16),

or indirectly from Plant RP personnel.

7.4.2 Determine the off-she radiological consequences of the release according to directions given to F3-8, Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions.

7.4.3 Determine PARs in accordance with F3-8, Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions.

7.5 Ground Deposition Assessment 7.5.1 Ground Deposition Projections (Relocation Projected Doses)

A.

After the plume has dissipated and the release is terminated, ground deposition projections and field team measurements in contaminated areas may begin.

B.

Run the appropriate dose projection model to obtain information on the potential magnitude of ground deposition and likely location (footprint) of ground contaminated areas.

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8 C.

Use the projected footprint and contamination magnitudes as a guide to determine where field team measurements may begin.

D.

Determination of secondary evacuations or relocation of the public will be based on actual field team measurements and ground deposition projections and NOT solely on ground deposition projections.

E.

As a backup to the computer ground deposition dose projection model, Figure 1 may be used to establish a very rough estimate of potential contaminated areas and their relative magnitudes.

Carefully note the assumptions used for developing the ground deposition graph described in Table 1.

7.5.2 Deployment of Field Teams A.

Deploy field teams (refer to Table 2 for guidance) to obtain ambient dose rates and collect samples (per EPIP F3-15) in areas that are not evacuated, but with in the footprint. Within this region, concentrate first on areas suspected of having the highest deposition.

B.

Priority should be given to initially performing dose rate surveys, with more detailed smear surveys to follow.

C.

Target areas with dose rates above 0.1 mrem/hr or direct frisker readings above 20,000 cpm for collection of smear samples.

D.

Enough dose rate surveys/smear samples should be obtained to have confidence that "hot spots" have not been overlooked. Ten survey points per square mile is suggested as a minimum in areas where roads will allow this to be practical.

E.

Take care to ensure that areas not within the projected footprint are surveyed sufficiently to verify that the affected area has been identified completely.

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8 F.

Plot the field team results on a map. Compare them to the ground deposition projections, and direct follow-up surveys as appropriate to ensure the affected area is identified.

7.5.3 Relocation Protective Action Recommendations

~The conversion factor given below could be very conservative. The factor depends on the Isotopic deposition. With actual Isotopic data, a better conversion factor can be calculated using the data In Table 3.

A.

As exposure rate data is obtained, calculate relocation projected doses using the conversion factor of 5000 mrem per mR/hr (i.e., 5000 mrem relocation projected dose per 1 mR/hr initial gamma exposure rate 1 meter above the ground).

B.

As smear samples are analyzed and isotopic data is obtained, use I Table 3 to refine the relocation projected doses.

C.

Plot the relocation projected doses on a map. (Consider using a dedicated map to avoid confusion.)

D.

Determine PARs in accordance with Table 4, Relocation Protective Action Guide.

7.6 Ingestion Pathway Assessment 7.6.1 Field Team Deployment A.

Contact the Health Department of each affected state and see if they have sample collection needs of particular priority in which we could assist.

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8 Monticello NGP and Prairie Island NGP survey teams have the capability of performing dose rate, smear, liquid, solllsnow and air sampling and analysis. If there Is a need for more sophisticated environmental samples have the REMP Administrator contact Teledyne Isotopes Midwest Laboratory and Implement the letter of agreement Once notified, Teledyne will dispatch a team to the affected site.

They will also make their laboratories available for use should we need to send samples for analysis.

B.

Direct the field teams to obtain samples according to the State(s) needs or to collect samples to confirm the results of the State(s) survey team.

7.6.2 Ingestion Pathway Dose Assessment A.

Ingestion pathway dose assessment will not be performed by the PINGP. The plant will instead concentrate available resources on the collection, analysis, and transmittal of results to the States of smear, liquid, soil, and/or snow samples.

B.

Ingestion pathway protective actions will be determined by the Minnesota Departments of Health and Agriculture and/or the Wisconsin equivalents.

7.7 Return Assessments 7.7.1 Field Team Deployments A.

As soon as resources allow, obtain dose rate surveys and smear samples per EPIP F3-15 in evacuated areas that are believed to be outside the contaminated areas or footprint.

B.

As the priority for return to evacuated areas within the known footprint increases (per the State recommendation), obtain dose rate surveys and smear samples per EPIP F3-15.

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8 7.7.2 Relocation Projected Dose A.

Use Table 3 and calculate relocation projected doses based on known (measured) ground deposition.

B.

Plot the relocation projected doses on a map.

7.7.3 Return Recommendation A.

PINGP may recommend return of the general public to previously evacuated areas that are confirmed not contaminated.

B.

PINGP will NOT make recommendations on the return of the general public to previously evacuated areas that have various levels of measured contamination. Appropriate state and local agencies will make these decisions based on contamination data and other social-economic considerations.

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8 Figure I Ground Deposltlon Graph 100 111 Activity Released (oci) 401M1 20Ml 10111 7111 4113 tWl l.0E.071,-

1 100 0.1 1

1010 I m; 100C Projected Grotmd Deposition 11i/m2 Page 14 of 24

OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

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8 Table I Ground Deposition Graph Basis The ground deposition graph was calculated using relations in R.G. 1.109 &

R.G. 1.111. The following assumptions pertain to the graph:

1. Unstable (A,B,C) Pasquill stability class. This results in the highest depositions for elevated releases. For ground level releases, the stability class has little effect on calculated deposition rates. For a stable stability class, actual ground deposition could be zero out of many miles from the plant.

2. Elevated (100 meter) release height. For ground level releases, deposition rates will be slightly higher out to 20 miles, and somewhat less beyond 20 miles.

3. The plume is deposited uniformly within half-width of a sector arc (about 11 degrees), for constant wind directions. Actual plume widths for unstable stability classes are significantly wider than this. This assumption causes the projected area ground contamination to be at least as high as the highest (centerline) actual deposition that would occur under stable conditions for deposition I.A.W. a normal distribution with distance from the centerline.

if several wind shifts occurred during the release, determine the approximate number of sectors into which the plume deposited material for each release period of Interest. Divide "t<

this value by 0.5 and divide the result into the ground J

depositions predicted by the graph, to obtain an estimate of the degree the deposition was "diluted". For example, if the plume was spread out over 2 sectors, the ground deposition values obtained from the graph should be divided by 4.

4. Wind speeds and stability classes vary often. The Van der Hoven study concludes there is a 50/50 chance of a significant wind shift within 2-4 hours at any given location. Therefore, the plume could be spread out more than the graph assumes and alter the resulting deposition. Rain showers could increase deposition greatly.

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8 Table 2 Guidance On Field Team Deployment The following Is a discussion of strategy and some of the more important kinds of information which can be obtained through the use of field teams.

1. An approximation of the downwind and horizontal dimensions of a plume can be developed using the plume search technique. This information should be a high priority because of the limitations of the straight-line model used in MIDAS.

2. The maximum or centerline exposure rate from a plume, as measured at ground level, can be compared to dose projection results as a check on the accuracy of the model.

3. The isotopic mix of gaseous releases is only estimated by MIDAS. If samples for isotopic analysis are not or cannot be obtained from plant systems, field samples should be collected and analyzed to provide more accurate information on the.

release components.

4.

If fuel integrity is good, radioiodines and radioparticulates should not be a problem.

In order to remove any uncertainty or to assess the core status, the ratio of iodine to noble gas should be evaluated and used to update the default value (.0001) used by MIDAS. It may be necessary to re-evaluate this parameter several times in the course of an event.

5.

Since the plume from a serious accident is essentially a quickly moving high radiation area, large doses can be received, or prevented, over relatively small time frames. Unlike the plume, the time available to effect evacuation due to ground shine should be much greater (e.g., a 5-rem dose due to Cs-1 34 initially exhibits an exposure rate of about 1 mR/hr). Therefore, plume surveys and plume dose projections are of higher priority.

6. At Prairie Island, consider that plume diversion may occur if the plume is traveling towards the bluffs (Wisconsin and/or Minnesota). Deploy the survey teams to conduct a plume search both beyond the bluffs and down the valley, where plume diversion is likely to occur.

7. Ground deposition surveys are generally lower priority than plume activities.

However, if the release rate has substantially lowered and plume exposure rates are also low (e.g., less than 10 mrem/hr), some ground deposition surveys may be considered. Resources available for ground deposition surveys should be allocated first to areas affected by the plume which remain populated.

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8 Table 3 Relocation Or Secondary Evacuation Dose Projection Ground shine Dose (mrem Ier uCVm )

Inhalation Dose (mrem per uCi/mW) 11 34 7.4 14 1.3 118 52 11 3.3 1.4 1.4 Relocation Projected Dose -TEDE (mrem Ier uCVm) 11 34 7.4 15 1.3 118 52 11 4.7 Initial Exp.

Rate (mR/hr per uCiVm2) 0.0162 0.0055 0.0023 0.0047 0.0183 0.0073 0.0279 0.0023 Relocation Projected Dose - TEDE per Initial Exp. Rate (mrem per mR/hr) 2100 1300 6700 280 6400 7200 390 2000

1. Ground shine Is the whole body dose (1 meter above the ground) received after a 1-year exposure to unit ground contamination (uCi/m2) as measured at the beginning of the exposure period.

2. Inhalation Is the committed effective dose received from the Inhalation for I year of re-suspended unit ground contamination (uCim 2) as measured at the beginning of the exposure period. A re-suspension rate of IE-6/meter Is assumed.

3. The Relocation Projected Dose - TEDE per Initial Exposure Rate column is the TEDE that would be received after a 1-year exposure to contamination that caused an Initial unit exposure rate (mR/hr, i.e., gamma only) at I meter above the ground. (the effective mrem per mR/hr for a mixture would be equal to a weighted average of the values In this column, which Is computed by multiplying the value in this column times the ratio of the individual Isotope to the total.)

4. The projected doses pertain to adults. Infant projected doses are not more than two times higher than the adult doses (other than for Iodine which does not contribute greatly to overall dose for Infants or adults).

Page 17 of 24 Isotope Sr-90 Zr-95 Ru-103 Ru-106 1-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 Ba-140 Ce-144 PRAIRIE IISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT (EOF) EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

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8 Table 3 Relocation Or Secondary Evacuation Dose Projection

5. Doses could be significantly lowered due to shielding from homes, decontamination, etc.

6. Elimination of the source term due to weathering as well as radioactive decay is assumed.

7. The doses listed include the dose from radioactive daughters.

SECONDARY EVACUATION DOSE ASSESSMENT Ground Reloc Dose Initial Dose Smear Direct Contain TEDE Rate Isotope (dpm)

Frisk (cpm)

(uci/m2)

(mrem)

(mremn/hr)

Ru-106 260,000 58,000 130 2000 0.30 Cs-134 34,000 7,400 17.0 2000 0.32 1-131 3,000,000 660,000 1,500 2000 7.2 Rules of Thumb

1. The most restrictive nuclide in terms of projected relocation dose per measured initial dose rate is Cs-137 (about 7000 mrem per mrem/hr). Cesium-134 is the most restrictive nuclide in terms of projected relocation dose per unit contamination (about 120 mrem per uCi/m 2).

2. Assuming a 10% smear collection efficiency, 10% counter efficiency, and 20 cm 2 area "seen" by the probe for a direct frisk, the following relationships were developed:

a. Direct frisk ljCVm 2 = net cpm 400 Where net cpm is frisker count rate about 1 inch from surface in question.

b. Smear LCVm 2 = smear net cpm 200 Where smear net cpm is frisker count rate of 100cm2 smear from a smooth surface.

3. Based on assumed radiological characteristics of releases from fuel melt accidents, gamma exposure rates in areas where the projected relocation dose is in the range of 1-5 rems would be between about 2 and 10 mR/hr during the first few days after shutdown following an SST-2 accident severity type. Ground deposition values in the range of 200-800 uCVm 2 could also be expected.

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8 Table 4 Relocation Protective Action Guide

.Ii PAGs For Intermediate Phase Relocation Projected Doses Relocation Projected PINGP Recommended Comments Dose (mrem, TEDE')

Protective Actions 2 TEDE < 2000 mrem TEDE >= 2000 mrem Apply simple dose reduction techniques.

3 Relocate general public from affected areas not previously evacuated.'

These protective actions should be taken to reduce doses to as low as practicable levels.

Beta dose to skin may be up to 50 times higher.

Page 19 of 24

1.

Total Effective Dose Equivalent from one year of exposure to ground contamination and Inhalation of resuspended material.

2.

Protective actions based on EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992.

3.

Simple dose reduction techniques Include scrubbing andlor flushing hard surfaces, soaking or plowing soil, minor removal or soil from hot spots, and spending more time than usual Indoors or In other low exposure, rate areas.

4.

Because of unanticipated local conditions and constraints known to state and local officials, WI andlor MN may choose to relocate general public from affected areas at a lower or higher doses than the PAG of 2000 mrem TEDE.

5.

Significant unavoidable contribution to the total dose from Ingestion of food and water could Influence the state's relocation decision.

6.

First priority should be given to cleanup of residences of pregnant women who may exceed a TEDE of 500 mrem from the first year of exposure.

7.

It is an objective of these PAGs to assure that

1) doses In any single year after the first will NOT exceed 500 mrem, and 2) the cumulative dose over 50 years (including the 1st and 2nd years) will NOT exceed 5000 mrem.

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8 Attachment I Definitions Related To PARS 1.0 Affected Area is any area where radiation emanating from a plume or deposited material from the plume can be detected using field Instruments. (Also known as the footprint.)

2.0 Affected Sectors refer to those sectors that are in a downwind direction from the plant.

If the wind speed _5 mph, the affected sectors are the 2 sectors on either side of the downwind sector and the downwind sector. If the wind speed <5 mph, all sectors are affected sectors (because of meandering).

3.0 Dose Terms:

3.1 Dose Equivalent (rem) refers to the product of absorbed dose (rad) and the quality factor (i.e., rads X QF = rem).

3.2 Effective Dose Equivalent (rem) is the sum of the products of the dose equivalent (rem) to each organ and a weighting factor, where the weighting factor is the ratio of the stochastic risk arising from an organ or tissue to the total risk when the whole body is irradiated uniformly.

3.3 Committed Dose Equivalent (rem) refers to the dose equivalent to organs or tissues that will be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50-year period following the intake.

3.4 Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (rem) (CEDE) refers to the sum of the products of the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the committed dose equivalent to these organs or tissues.

3.5 Deep Dose Equivalent (rem) refers to the extemal whole body exposure due to external radiation from the radioactive plume or deposited radioactive material.

3.6 Total Effective Dose Equivalent (rem) (TEDE) refers to the sum of the deep dose equivalent and the committed effective dose equivalent (TEDE = Deep Dose Equivalent + CEDE).

3.7 Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (rem) (Thyroid CDE) refers to the committed dose equivalent to the thyroid due to the internally deposited radionuclides from inhalation.

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PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS R. Definitions Related to PARs (Cont.)

4.0 Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is a defined area around the Prairie Island plant to facilitate emergency planning by state and local authorities, to assure that prompt and effective actions are taken to protect the public in the event of a release of radioactive material. It is defined for:

4.1 Plume Exposure Pathway (10 mile EPZ)

The 10 mile radius around the Prairie Island plant defined for the early phase plume exposure. The principal exposure sources from this pathway are:

4.1.1 External exposure from the radioactive plume (either overhead of submergence);

4.1.2 External exposure from the radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume; and 4.1.3 Internal exposure from the inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

4.2 Ingestion Exposure Pathway (50 mile EPZ)

A 50 mile radius around the Prairie Island plant where the principal exposure would be from the ingestion of contaminated water or foods such as, milk or fresh vegetables.

5.0 Evacuation is the urgent removal of people from an area to avoid or reduce high-level, short-term exposure, usually from the plume or from deposited activity.

6.0 Geopolitical Subareas are subareas of the 10 mile EPZ defined by predetermined geographic and/or political boundaries. A table for selecting the affected geopolitical subareas are shown in the "Emergency Notification Report Form," PINGP 577.

7.0 Keyhole Area is a subarea of the 10 mile EPZ defined by a 360 degree area surrounding the plant out to a distance of 2 or 5 miles and continuing in a downwind direction which should include 2 sectors on either side of the affected sector, out to a distance determined by the Protective Action Guides.

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8 - Definitions Related to PARs (Cont.)

8.0 Nuclear Incident Phases relate to three time periods following the beginning of an nuclear incident. See Figure 2 for potential protective actions during the different emergency phases.

8.1 Early Phase or emergency phase is the period immediately following the beginning of the incident. There may be a threat of a radiological release or an actual ongoing radiological release to the environment. Immediate decisions concerning protective actions are required and usually based on plant conditions or offsite dose projections. This phase may last from hours to days.

8.2 Intermediate Phase is the period beginning after the source and releases have been brought under control. Based on environmental measurements, additional protective actions may be made. This phase may overlap the early and late phase and may last from weeks to many months.

8.3 Late Phase is the period beginning when offsite recovery action designed to reduce radiation levels in the environment to acceptable levels for unrestricted use are commenced. This period may extend from months to years.

9.0 Projected Dose refers to the future dose calculated for a specified time period on the basis of estimated or measured initial concentration of radionuclides or exposure -rates and in the absence of protective actions.

9.1 Plume Projected Dose refers to future calculated doses from plume submersion, plume shine, plume inhalation and 4 days of ground deposition exposure.

9.2 Relocation Projected Dose refers to future calculated doses from one year of exposure to ground deposition groundshine and inhalation of resuspended material, but excluding internal dose from consuming contaminated foodstuffs.

9.3 Ingestion Pathway Projected Dose is the projected CEDE (ICRP-30) from consuming contaminated foodstuff.

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8 I

I - Definitions Related to PARs (Cont.)

10.0 Protective Action refers to an action taken to avoid or reduce radiation dose to members of the public.

11.0 Protective Action Guide (PAG) refers to a projected dose level that warrants protective actions.

12.0 Public Alert and Notification System (PANS) is used to alert the public within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone of an emergency condition at Prairie Island. Once alerted, the public should then turn to local commercial broadcast messages for specific protection action instructions. The PANS consists of the following:

12.1 Fixed sirens for 100% coverage throughout the 5 mile zone and in population centers in the 5-10 mile zone.

12.2 Emergency vehicles with sirens and public address in the 5-10 mile areas not covered by fixed sirens.

12.3 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) activated tone alert radios In institutional, educational, and commercial facilities.

12.4 The Emergency Alert System (EAS) which has access to television and radio stations within the area.

13.0 Return refers to people permanently reoccupying their normal residence within a previously evacuated area.

14.0 Reentry refers to temporary entry into an evacuated area under controlled conditions.

15.0 Relocation refers to removal or continued exclusion of people from contaminated areas to avoid chronic radiation exposure.

16.0 Sheltering refers to the use of a structure for radiation protection from an airborne plume and/or deposited radioactive material.

Page 23 of 24

OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSEMENT AND NUMBER:

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8 Figure 2 Exposure Pathways, Incident Phases, and Protective Actions POTENTIAL EXPOSURE PATHWAYS AND INCIDENT PHASES

1.

External radiation from facility PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Sheltering Evacuation Control of access

2.

Exteral radiation from plume Sheltering Evacuation EA,LY Control of access

3.

Inhalation of activity in Sheltering plume Administration of stable iodine Evacuation Control of access

4.

Contamination of skin and Sheltering clothes INTERI EDIATE Evacuation Decontamination of persons

5.

External radiation from Evacuation ground deposition of activity Relocation Decontamination of land LA and property

6.

Ingestion of contaminated Food and water controls food and water I

7.

Inhalation of resuspended activity Relocation Decontamination of land and property Based on EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992 The use of stored animal feed and uncontaminated water to limit the uptake of radionuclides by domestic animals In food chain can be applicable to any of the phases.

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