ML023430513

Part 2 of 2, LaSalle, Cycle 9A Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)

ML023430513
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/02/2002
From:	Barnes G Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML023430513 (119)

Text

EMF-2440 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page 6-1 6.0 Transient Analysis for Thermal Margin - EODIEOOS Combinations This section describes the transient analyses performed to determine the MCPR and LHGR operating limits to support operation in the coastdown and combined FFTRPcoastdown extended operating domains in conjunction with the following EOOS scenarios:

Feedwater heaters out-of-service (FHOOS) - 1 00F feedwater temperature reduction.

1 recirculation pump loop (SLO).

• Turbine bypass system out-of-service (TBVOOS).

Recirculation pump trip out-of-service (no RPT).

Slow closure of 1 or more turbine control valves and/or no RPT.

Each of the EOOS scenarios presented also includes the failure of 1 SRV.

Results of the limiting transient analyses are used to establish MCPRp limits and LHGRFACr multipliers to suppor, opi ration.in the combined EOD/EOOS scenarios. All combined EODIEOOS analyses were performed with TSSS insertion times.

As discussed in Reference 9, the base case MCPR safety limit for two-loop operation'remains applicable for operation in the combined EOD/EOOS scenarios With the exception of single-loop operation. Also, the flow-dependent MCPR and LHGR analyses described in Section 3.4 remain applicable in all the combined EODIEOOS scenarios.

6.1 Coastdown With EOOS The impact of EOOS scenarios on coastdown 6peratio6n is discussed below. The MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp values established for nominal coastdown operation remain applicable for coastdown operation with 1 safety/relief valve out-of-service,-up to 2 TIPOOS (or the equivalent number of TIP channels) and up to 50% of the LPRMs'-out-of-se-rvicfe (Reference 9).

6.1.1 Coastdown With Feedwater Heaters Out-of-SerM'ce The discussion and results presented in Section-4.3 for'combirned OFFTRlcoastdown operation are applicable to coastdown operation with FHoos.

6.1.2 Coastdown With One Recirculation Loop The impact of SLO at LaSalle on thermal limits was presented in Reference 9. The only impact is on the MCPR safety limit. As presented in Section 3.2, the single-loop operation safety limit is Siemens Power Corporaton

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 EMF-2440 Plant Transient Analysis Revision 0 Page 6-2 0.01 greater than the two-loop operating limit (1.12 compared to 1.11). The base case coastdown ACPRs and LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable. The net result is an increase to the base case coastdown MCPRF limits of 0.01 as a result of the increase in the MCPR safety limiL 6.1.3 Coastdown With TBVOOS The exposure extension during coastdown can make the effects of the pressurization transients more severe. The TBVOOS assumption also increases the severity of pressurization events.

The nominal coastdown analysis for the load rejection event is performed assuming the turbine bypass system is inoperable. Therefore, the impact of the TBVOOS on the load rejection event is included in the nominal coastdown results.

The FWCF event was evaluated to ensure appropriate MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp values are established to support coastdown operation with TBVOOS. The results of the Cycle 9 coastdown FWCF with TBVOOS analyses for both ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel are presented in Table 6.1. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the ATRIUM-9B MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that support coastdown operation with TBVOOS. The coastdown with TBVOOS MCPRp limits for GE9 fuel are presented in Figure 6.3.

6.1.4 Coastdown With No RPT To ensure that appropriate MCPRp limits and LHGRFACpmultipliers are established to support coastdown operation with no RPT, analyses were performed for LRNB and FWCF events with RPT assumed inoperable. The results of the Cycle 9 coastdown no RPT analyses for both ATRIUM-SB and GE9 fuel are presented in Table 6.2. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the ATRIUM-SB MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that support coastdown operation with no RPT. The coastdown with no RPT MCPRp limits for GE9 fuel are presented in Figure 6.6.

6.1.5 Coastdown With Slow Closure of the Turbine Control Valve The slow closure of the turbine control valve eveht changes the characteristics of the LRNB event in that no direct scram or RPT occurs on Valve position. The effect of the increase in exposure resulting from coastdown operation can make the event more severe. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are presented in Table 6.3. While the TCV slow closure analysis is performed without RPT on valve position, it does not necessarily bound the LRNB no RPT or FWCF no RPT events at all power levels because the slow closing TCV provides some pressure relief until it Siemens Power Corporaion

S aa U t CEMF-2440 L~aSalle Unit2 Cycle 9 Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page 6-3

completelycloses. Therefore; the MCPP lirmits and LHGRFACp multipliers for the coastdown with TCV slow closure scenario are established Using the limiting of the coastdown no RPT results reported in Section 6.1.4 or the TCV slow closure results.

Figures 6.7 and 6.8 present the ATRIUM-9B coastdown with TCV slow closure and/or no RPT MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers and Figure 6.9 presents the coastdown with TCVslow closure and/or no RPT GE9 MCPR; limits.

6.2 CombIned FFTR/Coastdown WthECOS The imrpact of EOOS scenarios on combined FFTRlcoastdown operation is discussed below.

The FFTRPcoastdown MCPRP limits and LHGRFACp values established for combined.'

FFTRlcoastdown operation remain applicable for FFTR/coastdown operation with 1 safety/relief valve out-of-service, up to 2 TIPOOS (or the ecjuivalent number of TIP channels) and up to 50%

of the LPRMs out-of-service (Reference 9)..

6.2.1, Combined FFTR/Coastdown With One Recirculation Loop The impact of SLO at LaSalle on thermal limits was presented in Reference 9. The only impact is on the MCPR safety limit. As presented in Section 3.2, the single-loop operation safety limit is 0.01 greater than the two-loop operating limit (1.12 compared to 1.11). Thee base case FFTRPcoastdown LACPRs and LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable. The net result is anr increase to the base caseý FFTRPcoastdown MCPR, limits of 0.01 as a result of the increase In'-.

the MCPR safety limit.

6.2.2 Combined FFTRJCoastdown With TBVOOS The exposure extension and decrease in core inlet enthalpy during combined FFTPRcoastdown operation can make the 6ffects of the pressuriation transients more severe. The TBVOOS assumption also increases the severity of pressurization events. The nominal FFTRlcoastdown analysis for the load rejection event is performed assuming the turbine bypass system is inoperable. Therefore, the impact of the TBVOOS on the load rejection event is included in the nominal FFTR/coastdown results.

The FWCF event was evaluated to ensure appropriate MCPR, limits and LHGRFACp values are established to support combined FFTRlcoastdown operation with TBVOOS. The results of the Cycle 9 FFTR/coastdown FWCF with TBVOOS analyses for both ATRIUM-98 and GE9 fuel are Siemens Power Corporation

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 EMF-2440 Plant Transient Analysis Re 0

,,,'P a g e 6 -4 presented in Table16.4. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show the ATRIUM-9B MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that support combined FFTR/coastdown operation with TBVOOS. The FFTRlcoastdown with TBVOOS MCPRp limits for GE9 fuel are presented in Figure 6.12.

6.2.3 Combined FFTR/Coastdown With No RPT To ensure that appropriate MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers are established to support FFTRlcoastdown operation with no RPT, analyses were performed for LRNB and FWCF events with RPT assumed inoperable. The results of the Cycle 9 FFTPJcoastdown no RPT analyses for both ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel are presented in Table 6.5. Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the ATRIUM-9B MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that support combined FFTRlcoastdown operation with no RPT. The FFTR/coastdown with no RPT MCPR, limits for GE9 fuel are presented in Figure 6.15.

6.2.4 Combined FFTR/Coastdown With Slow Closure of the Turbine Control Valve Slow closure of the turbine control valve changes the characteristics of the LRNB event in that no direct scram or RPT occurs on valve position. While the decrease in steam flow due to the FFTR tends to lessen the severity of the event, the FFTR/coastdown exposure extension may have the opposite effect.The,CPR and LHGRFACp results are presented in Table 6.6. While the TCV slow closure analysis is performed without RPT on valve position, it does not necessarily bound the LRNB no RPT or FWCF no RPT events at all power levels because the slow closing TCV provides some pressure relief until it completely closes. Therefore, the MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers for the comb'ined" FFTR/coastdown with TCV slow closure scenario are established using the limiting of the FFTRlcoastdown no RPT results reported in Section 6.2.3 or the TCV slow closure results.

Figures 6.16 and 6.17 present the ATRIUM-9B combined FFTR/coastdown with TCV slow closure and/or no RPT MCPRP limits and LHGRFACpmultipliers and Figure 6.18 presents the FFTR/coastdown with TCV slow closure and/or no RPT GE9 MCPRp limits.

Siemens Power Corporation

,, LaSalle Un"It 2 Cycle 9 I.*

_ _=.-...

I, I~t Table 6.1 Coastdown Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Analysis Results Power i Flow ATRIUM GE9.

(% rated/

Event

% rated)

ACPR LHGRFACý ACPR SFWCF 100/105

.0.33 1.01 0.42 PFWC 801105 0.37 1.01' 0.40 FWCF 601105 0.42 1.00

'0.46 FWCF 40/105 0.54 1.00 0.55 vWCF 25/1Wo 0.86 1.08 0.88 EMF-2440 Revision 0 PaQe 6-5 II I P'lant Irn i

t InaSIIIrlloi

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Diew.} Tr'n*

pflmt Analv~ik EMF-2440 Revision 0 PBoe 6.6 0 IDIllo U *;*U,*c 1-Table 6.2 Coastdown Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Analysis Results Power / Flow ATRIUM GE9

.(% rated I Event

% rated)

ACPR LHGRFACý ACPR LRNB 1001105 0.44 0.89 0.56 LRNB 80/105 0.42 0.91 0.45 LRNB 60/105 0.39 0.91 0.47 LRNB 40/105 0.39 0.87 0.41 LRNB 25/105 0.29 1.01 0.28 FWCF 100/105 6"32 0.96 0.42 FWCF 80/105 0.35 0.98 0.38 FWCF 60/105 0.39 0.99 0.44 FWCF 40/105 0.47 0.97 0.48 FWCF 25/105 0.86 1.06 0.88 Siemens Power Corporation I

t

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis

'EMF-2440 Revision 0 P=*ae 6i-7 Table 6.3 Coaktdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure Analysis Results II Slow Power / Flow ATRIUM-9gB GE9

-Valve

,.--(%

rated/

Event' Characteristics

% rated)

L CPR LHGRFACp ACPR LRNB I1 TCV closing at 2.0 sec 100 / 105 0.44 0.93 0.55 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 8 00 105*

0.45 0.94 0.48

-LRNB 1 TCV closing at 2.0 sec

.80/1 O51 0.52 0.95 0.55 LRNB' A TCV cl osing" at 2.,0 sec

• 60/ l0ot 0.59 0.96 0.61 LRNB 1 TCV -closing at 2.0 sec 40/ 105t 0.79 0.87 0.78 LRNB 1 TCV closing at 2.0 sec 25 / 1051 0.99 0.74 0.93 Scram initiated by high-neutron flux.

Scram initiated by high dome pressure Siemens Power Comoration tt P2ne G-7

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis I I Table 6.4 FFTRPCoastdown Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Analysis Results I-SWemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-8

S, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2440 Revision 0

,_Page 6-9 Table 6.5 FF-iRPCoast'down Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Analysis Results Siemens Power Comomtion

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-10 Table 6.6 FFTRPCoastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure Analysis Results Slow Power I Flow ATRIUM-9B GE9 Valve

(% rated /

Event Characteristics

% rated)

ACPR LHGRFACp ACPR LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 100/ 105' 0.39 0.96 0.40 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 801105' 0.38 0.98 0.42 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec s01 /05t 0.49 0.98 0.52 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 60/105t 0.60 0.94 0.58 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 401 1051 0.72 0.83 0.71 LRNB I TCV closing at 2.0 sec 25 / 105t 0.98 0.76 0.83 Scram initiated by high-neutron flux.

Scram initiated by high dome pressure Siemens Power Corporation I

'LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 2.7 SEMF-2440 Revision 0

,Paoe 6-11 0

10 20 30 40 so 60 70 so s0 100 110 PowMd cRatmd)

Power

- MCPR, S(%)

... Limit 100

-1.44

-60 1.55.

ý 25'

- 2.05__

-25

_2.20 0

2.70 Figure-6.1 Coastdown Turbine" Bypa-ss Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel 225 2.15 S2.05 1M.

1.75-Rion-bane Or"ýr Pane 6-11

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis e0 0

OW POWW (%,

of Rxt@M}

Figure 6.2 Coastdown Turbini Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Power Corporation I I EMF-2440 Revision 0 R

oPage 6-12 I.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 "Plant Transient Analysis CL EMF-2440 Revision 0 Paoe 6-13 3

10 20 30 40 s0 1o 70 so0 S

100 110 Powm CAof atsd Power-.

MCPRp

_ (%)_

Umit

'100 1.53 60

-1.64 "25 2.15 25_

2.20 0

2.70 Figure 6.3 Coastdown Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel Siemens Power Comoration Pace 6-13

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis" iI CL EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-14 I0 60 70 s0 so 100 110 Pama (CA ffR~aq Figure 6.4 Coastdown Reclrculatlon Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Power Corporation II II

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle9....

Plant Transient Analysis 1.30 1.25 1.15' 1.10' 1.30'

~0.80 O.35 0.715 0M70 EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-15 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 POW," 1% of Ratid) 70 W0 o

100 110 Power LHGRFAC

(%).Multiplier 100 0.88

. 60 0.88

. 25 0.75 25 0.75 0

0.75 Figure 6.5 Coastdown Reclriculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Pm:w~r Cnoranmtinn

• RACF S

• U*RFACP SI t I* It

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 0

1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0

=5 0

0 1

1 1 POWr (of pRod)

Figure 6.6 Coastdown Recirculatjon Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel Siemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0 Ri0rage 6-1o I,

I

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-17 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle D Plant Transient Analysis IiL2 0

10 20 30 40 50 s0 70 s0 O0 10 110 Pow C% of Rated Power MCPRP S.....:(%)"Limit+

100--

1.. 55

-.. 1.62

. 80 1.70

.25.2.157

..25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 6.7 Coastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow'Closureandlor Recirculationi Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel M

1.15

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 0.95 0.90 Uss EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-18 0

0 20 30 40 5so W

70 8o 00 100 110 Pow" (% of RatM Power

.LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 0.88 80-0.88 80 0.85 25' 0.68 25 0.68 0

0.68 Figure 6.8 Coastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure andlor Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Powep-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Power Cormorafi

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-19

,, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 2.65 0

10 20 30o 40o _g0o W

70 so W

100 110 Porm (%of RMO

'Power..

MCPR

,_____(%)____

Limit

",100

1.

- -.67....

80 1.85

• 80'

-1.96.

25'

-- 2.15 25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 6.9 Coastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure andlor Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 2.15 2.75 2M5 115 2.0

~1.05 1.75 IM -

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-20 0 a 0

20 30 40 80 o

70 8o to 10M 11I POMrW(% d paw*

Power MCPRp

(%)

Limit 100 1.44 60 1.57 25 2.30 25 2.35 0

2.85 Figure 6.10 FFTRPCoastdown TurIlne Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Power Corporation I,

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis I,

• 2 IL EMF-2440 Revision 0 Pon a.")

1 P;atlA R..91 0

10 20 30 40 s0 o0 70 so 90 100 110 Power (%r ot M )

Figure 6.11 FFTR/Coastdown Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers'for ATRIUM-SB Fuel Siemens Power Corporation

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis CL EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-22 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 o

90s.

100 110 Poww rAof RA@

Power MCPRp

(%)

Umit 100 1.53 60 1.64 25 2.30 25 2.35 0o 2.85 Figure 6.12 FFTR/Coastdown Turbine Bypass Valves Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel Siemens Power Comoration

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis Ii1 ii 2M2 2.15 M.

IM.,5

~1i71 PMM % of Rata Figure 6.13 FFTR/Coastdown'Recimulation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Simpffnt Pnmwr rnmffinafnn EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-23

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis I

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-24

,, I so 70 so so 100 110 Pow M of Rta)

Figure 6.14 FFTRICoastdown Reclrculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-SB Fuel Siemens Power Corporation

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-25 St LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis II I "2W 2M5 235 225' 2.15"

2M05 0

10 20 30 40 50 so 70 so 9O 1W 110 Powr(% of Raxd Power MCPRp M

(

.Limit p100 1.67

-60 1.67

-25.

2.30 25 2.35 0-2.85 Figure 6.15 FFTRJCoastdown Recirculatlon Pump Trip Out-of-Serice Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel-'

4Z-i-rnamne Vr*,r rfr..-m,.,.***

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 to, Plant Transient Analysis II i

80 6

POOwM(% ofr A4 Figure 6.16 FFTR/Coastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel Siemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0

• Page 6-26

EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-27 S -LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 "4.' Plant Transient Analysis 1.20' 4=11 h

I.

a, 0

10 20 30

-40 8"

W 70 so so 0

10 110 Power (% of Rsd)M Power

-,LHGRFACp Multiplier

.. 100..

0.88 80-0.88 80*

0.85 25-0.65 25n 0.65 "0

0.65 Figure 6.17 FFTRJCoastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9g Fuel Siemens Power Corporation

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis I

0 10 2D 30 40 50 so 70 so so 1

110 Figure 6.18 FFTRlCoastdown Turbine Control Valve Slow Closure and/or Recirculation Pump Trip Out-of-Service Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel Siemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 6-28 f I

EMF-2440 LaSalie Unit 2 Cycle 9 Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page 7-1 7.0 Maximum Overpressurization Analysis This section describes the maximumoverpressurization analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with the ASME Boiler and P~,ressure Vessel Code. The analysis shows that the safety/relief valves at LaSalle Unit 2 have sufficient capacity and performance to prevent the pressure from reaching the pressure safety limit of 110% of the design pressure.

7.1 Design Basis The MSIV closuie'analysis was performed with the SPC plant simulator code COTRANSA2 (Reference 4) at a power/flow state point of 102% of uprated power/105% flow. Reference 9 indicates that an EOFP + 1000 MWd/MTU exposure is limiting for the overpressurization, analysis. The following assumptions were made in the analysis.

The most critical active component (direct scram on valve position) was assumed to fall.

However, scram on high-neutron flux and high-dome pressure is available.

At ComEd's request, analyses were performed to determine the minimum number of the highest set point SRVs required to meet the ASME and Technical Specification pressure limits. It was determined that having the 10 highest set point SRVs operable will meet the ASME and Technical Specification pressure limits. In order to support operation with I SRV out-of-service, the plant configuration needs to include at least 11 SRVs. As per ASME requirements, the SRVs are assumed to operate in the safety mode.

0 TSSS insertion times were used.

0 The initial dome pressure was set at the maximum allowed by the Technical Specifications (1035 psia).

0 An MSIV closure time of 1.1 seconds was assumed in the analysis.

0 EOC RPT is assumed inoperable; ATVWS (high-dome pressure) RPT is available.

7.2 Pressurization Transients Results of analysis for the MSIV closure event initiated at 102% power/1 05% flow are presented in Table 7.1. Figures 7.1-7.5 show the response of various reactor plant parameters to the MSIV closure event. The maximum pressure of 1346.2 psig occurs in the lower plenum at approximately 4.4 seconds. The maximum dome pressure of 1319.9 psig occurs at 4.6 seconds. The results demonstrate that the maximum vessel pressure limit of 1375 psig and dome pressure limit of 1325 psig are not exceeded.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page i-z~

Table 7.1 ASME Overpressurization Analysis Results 102%PI105%F II IIh Peak Peak Maximum Maximum Neutron Heat Vessel Pressure Dome Flux Flux Lower-Plenum Pressure Event

(% rated)

(% rated)

(psig)

(psig)

MSIV closure 373.7 136.6 1346.2 1319.9 Siemens Power Corporation

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis 0

I C,

0.

=

T 4.0 TIME, SECONDS Figure 7.1 Overpressurization Event at 1021105 IMSIV Closure Key Parameters Siemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0 pn 7.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis EMF-2440 Revision 0 Page 7,-4

,l i' I 0

Ix w

N I.

C')

0 z

-j

.I

-J

'a n

'a 4.0 TIME, SECONDS Figure 7.2 Overpressurization Event at 1021105 MSIV Closure Vessel Water Level Siemens Power Corporation

SLaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 4" Plant Transient Analysis TI, SECONDS Figure 7.3 Overpress-urIzation'Event at 1021105 MSIV Closure Lower-Plenum Pressure Siemens Power Corporation EMF-2440 Revision 0 Pace 7-5 Pao 7-

~a.

a i

0

-j

EMF-2440 Revision 0 "Page 7.6 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis u)

a.

(n W

a..

0 a.

4.0 TIME. SECONDS Figure 7.4 Overpressurization Event at 102/105 MSIV Closure Dome Pressure Siemens Power Corporation

EMF-2440 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page 7-7

-~vv n.

SRV BANK 1 SRV BANK 2 SRV BANK 3 SRV BANK 4 SRV BANK 5 0.0, 0/7---

A A1

,i S

I

.0

1.

2.0 3.0 I

4.0 TME, SECONDS 6UO 7.0 U.

Number of 1 Opening Bank SRVs Pressure (psia) 1 0

NA 2

2 1235.3 3

4 1245.6 4

4 1255.9 5

0 NA Figure 7.5 Overpressurization Event at 102/105 MSIV Closure Safety/Relief Valve Flow Rates 1((

.j 0 -i I/L 50 6*

""EMF-2440 LaSalleUnit2Cycle9

.Revision 0

"Plant Transient Analysis Page 8-1 8.0 References

1.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Calculation

--Plani,, DEG:00:031, February 25, 2000.

2.

XN-NF-80-1 9(P)(A) Volume 4 Revision 1,-Exxon Nuclear Methodology forBoiling Water Reactors: Application of the ENC Methodology to BWR Reloads, Exxon Nuclear Company, June 1986.

3.

XN-NF-80-1 9(P)(A) Volume 1 Supplement 3, Supplement 3 Appendix F,-and Supplement 4, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors:

Benchmark Results forthe CASMO-3G/MICROBURN-B Calculatiorn Methodology, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, November 1990.

4.

ANF-913(P)(A) Volume I Revision'l and Volume I Supplements 2, 3 and 4, CO TRANSA2: A Computer Program for Boiling Water Reactor Transient Analyses, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, August 1990.

5.

'ANF-524(P)(A) Revision 2 and Supplements I and 2, ANF Critical Power Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, November 1990.

6.

ANF-1125(P)(A) and Supplement 1'and 2, ANFB Critical Power Correlation, Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation, April 1990.,

7.

XN-NF-80-19(P)(A) Volume 3 Revision 2, Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactors, THERMEX: Thermal Limits 'Methodology Summary Description, Exxon Nuclear Company, January 1987.

8.-

EMF-2323 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Principal Transient Analysis Parameters, Siemens Power Corporation, March 2000.

-9.

EMF-95-205(P) Revision-2, LaSalle Extended Operating Domain (EOD) and Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Safety Analysis for ATRIUMr-9B Fuel, Siemens Power Corporation, June 1996.

10.

EMF-95-049(P), Application 6f the ANFB Critical Power Con'elation to Coresident GE Fuel at the Quad Cities and LaSalle Nuclear Power Stations, Siemens Power Corporation, October 1995.

11.

XN-NF-84-105(P)(A) Volume I and Volume 1 Supplements 1 and 2, XCOBRA-T: A Computer Code for BWR Transient Thermal-Hydraulic Core Analysis, Exxon Nuclear Company, February 1987.

12.

EMF-1 125(P)(A) Supplement 1 Appendix C, ANFB Critical Power Correlation Application for Co-Resident Fuel, Siemens Power Corporation, August 1997.

13.

XN-NF-81-58(P)(A) Revision 2 and Supplements 1 and 2, RODEX2 Fuel Rod Thermal Mechanical Response Evaluation Model, Exxon Nuclear Company, March 1984.

EMF-2440 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page 8-2 8.0 References (Continued)

14.

LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2 Technical Specifications, as amended.

15.

EMF-2437 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

,16.

EMF-1 903(P) Revision 3, Impact of Failed/Bypassed LPRMs and TiPs and Extended LPRM Calibration Interval on Radial Bundle Power Uncertainty, Siemens Power Corporation, March 2000.

17.

ANF-1 125(P)(A) Supplement 1, Appendix E, ANFB Critical Power Correlation Determination of ATRIUMm-9B Additive Constant Uncertainties, Siemens Power Corporation, September 1998.

18.

ANF-1373(P). Procedure Guide for SAFLIM2, Siemens Power Corporation, February 1991.

19.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CoinEd), 'LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Transient Power History Data for Confirming Mechanical Limits for GE9 Fuel,* DEG:00:185, August 3, 2000.

20.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), 'LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 8 Abnormal Idle Recirculation Loop Startup Analysis,* DEG:99:070, March 8, 1999.

21.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), "Description of Measured Power Uncertainty for POWERPLEXO Operation Without Calibrated LPRMs,' DEG:00:061, March 7, 2000.

22.

Letter, J. H. Riddle (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), "Scram Surveillance Requirements for MCPR Operating Limits," JHR:96:397, Octob:r 8, 1996.

23.

EMF-2277 Revision 1, LaSalle Unit I Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 1999.

24.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), *Extension of LPRM Calibration Interval to 2500 EFPH,0 DEG:00:088, April 17, 2000.

Siemens Power Corporation

EMF-2440 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9-Revision 0 Plant Transient Analysis Page A-1

-Appendix A Power-Dependent LHGR Limit Generation The linear heat generation rate (LHGR) operating limit is established to ensure that the steady state LHGR (SSLHGR) limit is protected during normal operation and that the protection against power transient (PAPT) LHGR limit is protected during an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO). To ensure that the LHGR operating limit provides the necessary protection during operation at off-rated conditions, adjustmentsto the SSLHGR limits may be necessary. These adjustments are made by applying power and flow-dependent LHGR multipliers (LHGRFACp and LHGRFACI, respectively) to the SSLHGR limit. The LHGR operating limit (LHGROL) for a given operating condition is determined as follows:

LHGROL = min [LHGRFACp x SSLHGR, LHGRFACf x SSLHGR]

The power-dependent LHGR multipliers (LHGRFACp) are determined using the heat flux excursion experienced by the fuel during AOOs. The heat flux ratio (HFR) is defined as the ratio of the maximum nodal transient heat flux over the maximum nodal heat flux at the initiation of the transient. The HFR provides a measure of the LHGR excursion during the transient. The PAPT limit divided by the SSLHGR limit provides an upper limit for the HFR to ensure that the PAPT LHGR limit is not violated during an AOO. LHGRFACp is set equal to the minimum of the PAPTI/SSLHGR ratio over HFR, or 1.0. Based on the ATRIUM-9B LHGR limits presented in Reference A-1, LHGRFACp is established as follows:

PAPT,

= 1.35 SSLHGR HFR rI".35 LHGRFAC, = min LL 1 0 1 In some cases, the established MCPR limit precludes operation at the SSLHGR limit. This allows for a larger LHGR excursion during the transient without violating the PAPT LHGR limit.

This approach was used to provide less restrictive LHGRFACp multipliers for some cases.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 EMF-2440 Plant Transient Analysis Revision 0 Page A-2 References A.1 EMF-2404(P) Revision 1, Fuel Design Report for LaSalle 2, Cycle 9 ATRIUM'.gB Fuel Assemblies, Siemens Power Corporation, September 2000.

Siemens Power Corporation

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis Controlled Distribution Richland D. E. Garber (12 copies)

Uncontrolled Distribution tI E-Mail Notification D. G. Carr D. B. McBumey

0. C. Brown M. E. Garrett J. M. Haun J. G. Ingham R. R. Schnepp P. D. Wimpy EMF-2440 Revision 0

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results ARTS Improvement Program Analysis, Supplement I (Excerpts)

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results TOP/MOP and MAPFACp Requirements Equipment Out of Service No EOOS RPT OOS TBV OOS No EOOS RPT OOS TBV OOS TOP 24.9 30.3 28.7 50.1 57.1 62.7 MOP 25.2 30.6 30.0 52.0 59.0 64.5 Calculated MAPFACp 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.83 0.83 0.79 (a) Based on the GE9/10 LHGR Improvement Report, the MAPFACs are applied to LHGR (Reference 19)

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Ii I Limiting AOO LRNBP LRNBP FWCF FWCF FWCF FWCF Power 100 100 100 25 25 25 Generic MAPFACp 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.61 0.61 0.61 November 2002

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results TCV Slow Closure Analysis (Excerpts)

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results Table 4.-

TOP and MOP Values for the Off-rated Transient Events Note: (a) Based on Figure 3.2-2 in COLR.

(b) Based on the GE9/10 LHGR improvement Report, the MAPFACs are applied to LHGR (Reference 19).

- I÷ LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A

-LRNBP, One TCV Slow LRNBP, All TCV Slow Closure at 50%/s, 3 TCV Fast Closure at 19%/s Closure Calculated TOP 26.17 49.27 Calculated MOP 26.17 55.30 f*Adjusted MOP.

60.83 Required MOP 38.0 Required MAPFAC 0.62 Limiting MACFAC

,0.60 (a)

November 2002

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results I.

TI Ilcau VI1 IKflUU I.

I 3-0.9.

1 9w_

v TIta In I I

I 11K aum Figure 1. LRNBP from Rated Power, All TCV Fast Closure, Direct Scram, EOC-RPT November 2002 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A

• VUIEL 1PRESS lISEIFI I I SAFElIT VALVE FLOM ILIe IJLn rM Iii 11

'A 8

a

"Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9 Reload Transient Anatysis Results II Sm

• a ii tIm IRnUMO IIK lullts ISA I.

IRK IMOltlWi IRKII Figure 2. LRNBP from Ratecd Power; One TCV Slow Closiure(5O%/c/seo6nd)/nrce TCV Fast Clfosue, Flux Scram, EOC-RPT OOS LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002 I

I I

t iL i i i

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9 Reload Transient Analysis Resuft tIM eiCmm11 TIM 6tS(WI IRK IlUNNI IRK IIca1I Figure 3. LRNBP from 50% Power, One TCV Slow Closurt(50%/dsecondyrhre TCV Fast Closure, Flux Scram LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002 a

S.

• a I

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ý9ýxs =I H a! 413,14,11 11 SA 1 41 it 110063"S VU1

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary, FRAMATOME AP March 22,2001 DEG:01:046 Dr. R. J. Chin Nuclear Fuel Services (Suite 400)

Exelon Corporation 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515-5701

Dear Dr. Chin:

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected. Fuel Thermal Conductivity Ref. 1:

LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2 Technical Specifications, as amended.

Reif 2:

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

Reft 3:

EMF-2437 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

Reft 4:

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Base Case Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram limes," DEG:01:014, January 18, 2001.

Ref:. 5:

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "Trarnsmittal of Condition Report 9191,' DEG:01:038, February 27, 2001.

Exelon has proposed replacing the currernt Technical Specifications (Reference 1) with Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) during LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 (L2C9) operation.

The operating limits for L2C9 (References 2 and 3) are established consistent with the scram times presented in Reference I and are not consistent with, the proposed ITS surveillance times. Exelon has requested that FRA-ANP perform analyses to support a mid-cycle transition to the ITS for base case operation and one equipment out-of-service (EOOS) scenario. Reference 4 described the determination of analytical scram times consistent with the ITS and provided base case operating limits. Reference 5 identifies an error In the fuel thermal conductivity used in the transient analyses for LaSalle, including the analyses provided In Reference 4.

P Framatome ANP Richland, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road Teh:

(509) 375-8100 Richand. WA 99352 Fax:

(509) 375-8402

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary Dr. R. J. Chin DEG:01:046 March 22,2001 Page 2 The attachment provides the L2C9 base case and slow TCV closure/FHOOS and or no RPT transient analysis results and operating limits using the analytical scram times and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The base case operation limits provided In the attachment supercede those transmitted in Reference 4.

Very truly yours, David Garber Project Manager sig Enclosure cc: P. Kong

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-1 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Ope rting6 Limits "

for Proposed ITS Scram Times arid Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.3.3 of the current LaSalle Unit 2 Technical Specifications (Reference 1) specifies the average scram insertion times of all operable control rods. The average control rod insertion times must not exceed the scram times for the requirements of LCO 3.1.3.3 to be met. Exelon is planning to implement Improved Technical Specifications (ITS*)for LaSalle Unit 2 during Cycle 9. The scram surveillance times in the proposed ITS are slightly more restrictive than those presented in Reference 1. Additionally, the surveillance requirement for the ITS s that each rod must meet the scram times. The LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 (L2C9) operating limits (References 2 and 3) are based on the average scram times presented in Reference 1. Therefore, the limiting transient analyses used to set the operating limits provided in References 2 and 3 must be reanalyzed iith revised scram tim~es in order to support the mid-cycle implementation of the ITS.

p FRA-ANP provided proposed ITS surveillance scram times to Exelon'in Reference 4, Table 1. Theq' Reference 4 analytical scram times are presented in Table I for completeness.

FRA-ANP infoirmed Exelon of an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in COTRANSA2 calculations (Reference 5).' The analysis results presented In Tables 2 and 3 include the effect of the corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

Reference 9 provided a disposition of LOCA and UFSAR events for ITS scram times for LaSalle.

The Reference 9 disposition remains applicable.

Base Case Operation '

Reference 4 provided base caseoperating limits for the proposed ITS scram times. After Reference 4 was issued, FRA-ANP informed Exelon of-an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in COTRANSA2 calculations (Reference 5). 'The analyses'provided in Reference 4 have biien reanalyzed using the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.

Framatome ANP Richland, inc. Proprietary DEG:01 :046 Attachment DEG:0:046Page A-2 Figures 1 and 2 present the revised base case MCPRp limits for the ATRIUM"h-9B* and GE9 fuel.

respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 2) and the ACPR results from Table 2 are also presented In Figures 1 and 2.

The Reference 2 base case LHGRFACp multipliers and the I.-IGRFACp results from Table 2 are presented in Figure 3. Review of Figure 3 shows that all of the ATRIUM-9B I.-IGRFACp results are above the LHGRFACp multipliers, and therefore, the Reference 2 base case LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable for the proposed ITS scram times.

TCV Slow ClosureIFHOOS and/or No RPT Exelon requested that FRA-ANP provide operating limits for the most limiting equipment out-of service (EOOS) scenario provided in Reference 2. Review of the Reference 2 limits shows that the most limiting two-oop operation EOOS scenario is TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT.

The TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits consider transient analysis results from the following scenarios: TCV slow closure (up to all four valves), EOC RPT OOS, FHOOS, and a r

combination of FHOOS and EO RPT GOS. (Note: TCV slow closure analyses with FHOOS are bound by TCV slow closure analyses at nominal feedwater temperature, and therefore, no specific analyses are required for this scenario.) In order to reduce the workscope required to establish new limits, only a subset of. the analyses reported in Reference 2 have been reanalyzed. Review of Figures 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18 in Reference 2 show that the TCV slow closure analyses are limiting for all power levels above 25% power, the FWCF no RPT with FHOOS is limiting at 25% power.

Additionally, these figures show that there is considerable margin between the analysis results and the limits at power levels of 40% and 60%.

Table 5.5 of Reference 2 was reviewed to determine which specific TCV slow closure analyses required reanalysis to establish the limits. Tables 5.1 (FHOOS) and 5.4 (EOC RPT OOS) of Reference 2 were also reviewed since the limits are applicable for EOC RPT OOS or FHOOS only.

Table 3 presents the analysis results required to adequately establish the slow TCV closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT limits.

Figures 4 and 5 present the revised slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPRp limits for the ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 2) and the ACPR results from Table 3 are also presented in Figures 4 and 5.

"ATRIUM is a trademark of Framatorne ANP.

"Framatorne ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-3 Figure 6 presents the revised slow TCV cl6isre/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFACp multipliers for the ATRIUM-9B fuel.

The MCPRp limits and LHGRFACý multipliers provided in Figures 4-6 protect operation with up to four TCVs dosing slowly, EQC RPT OOS, FHOOS and any combination of up to four TCVs closing slowly, EOC RPT OOS and FHOOS. The only equipment out-of-service scenarios provided in Reference 2 not explicitly protected by the slow TCV closurelFH00S and/or no RPT limits are single-loop-operation (discussed below), turbine bypass valves OOS, and abnormal startup of an idle loop.

Comparison of turbine bypass valves OOS and the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits in Table 2.2 of Reference 3 shows the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits clearly bound the turbine bypass valves OOS limits. Consequently, applying the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT limits will protect operation with the turbine'bypass OOS.

No analyses were performed to address the abnormal startu p of an idle loop limits with ITS scram times and the corrected fuel therrmal conductivity.

Single-Loop Operation Figures 1-3 provide the two-loop operation (TLO) MCPRp limits and,LHGRFACp multipliers for base case operation. Reference 7 indicates that the consequences of base case pressurization transients "in single-I6op operation (SLO) are bound by th consequences of the same transient initiatedfrom

-the same power/flow conditions in TLO and that the TLO base case ACPRs and the I.HGRFACp multipliers remain applicable for SLO. -Reference 2 indicates the L2C9 TLO safety limit MCPR is 1.11 and the SLO safety limit MCPR is 1.12. Since the TLO tCPR results are'applicable to SLO, the SLO ATRIUM-gB and GE9 MCPR limitscan b-determined by adding 0.01 to the base case operation MCPRp limits provided in Figures I arid 2 to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR.

The base case LHGRFAC multipliers shown in figure 3 remain applicable for SLO.

The conclusion that TLO LCPR results generally bound SLO results has been demonstrated for both base case operation and some equipment out-of-service scenarios for other BWRs. Although specific L2C9 analyses for a combination of TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or noRPT in SLO have npt been performed, FRA-ANP expects the TLO operation ACPR results would remain applicable in SLO for this scenario. Therefore, SLO MCPRP limits for TCV slow closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT can be determined by adding 0.01 to the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPRp limits

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary Attachment DEG:01:046 Page A-4 reported in Figures 4 and 5 to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR. The Figure 6 TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable for SLO.

,GE9 Mechanical Limits Reference 6 provides an evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for L2C9. An evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for the rated power analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3 was performed. It has been demonstrated that the maximum nodal power ratio history curve for the analyses are bound by the previously approved L2C9 curve. Therefore, it is FRA-ANP's position that no further evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits is required.

References

1.

LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2 Technical Specifications, as amended.

2.

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

3.

EMF-2437 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

4.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), 'LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Base Case Operating Umits for Proposed ITS Scram Times,* DEG:01:014, January 18, 2001.

5.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "Transmittal of Condition Report 9191,' DEG:01:038, February 27, 2001.

6.

Letter, D. F_ Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CoinEd), "l.aSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Transient Power History Data for Confirming Mechanical Limits for GE9 Fuel,' DEG:00:1 85, August 3, 2000.

7.

EMF-95-205(P) Revision 2, LaSalle Extended Operating Domain (EOD) and Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Safety Analysis forA TRlUM'm-9B Fuel, Siemens Power Corporation, June 1996.

8.

EMF-2323 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Principal Transient Analysis Parameters, Siemens Power Corporation, March 2000.

9.

Letter D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (CornEd), "Evaluation of Improved Technical Specification Scram Times at Dresden, LaSalle and Quad Cities Station," DEG:99:195, July 26, 1999.

I

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-5 Table I Proposed ITS Scram Insertion Times 1

-'I 2-'

The 0.20-second delay is considered a nominal value that cannot be verified by the plant, Therefore, the transient nailysis calculations are performed to bound a range of no delay (linear insertion from start signal to notch 45) to a delay value just before notch 45. This is consistent with the information provided in Reference 8.

I I

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary

,DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-6 Table 2 Base Case Transient Analysis Results With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Peak Peak Power ATRIUM-9B AtRIUM-9B GE9 Neutron Flux Heat Flux I Flow ACPR LHGRFACp ACPR

(% rated)

(% rated)

LRNB FWCF 1001105 0.26 1.09 0.32 301 123 801105 0.29 1.05" 0.36 268 101 601105 0.37" 1.01" 0.42 173" 77*

401105 0.53*

0.93 0.59*

112" 58*

251105 0.82*

0.77 0.90*

73*

45*

The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The ACPR and LHGRFAC1 results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-1 5 Table 3 EOOS Transient Analysis Results With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Power Slow Valve ATRIUM-9B ATRIUM-9B GE9 I Flow Characteristics

,&CPR LHGRFACý ACPR Slow TCV Closure 1001105o 1 TCV dosing in 2.0 seconds

-0.42 0.93 0.52 80 / 57.2 1 TCV dosing in 2.0 seconds 0.51 0.97 0.75 80/105t 2 TCV dosing in 2.0 seconds 0.544 0.94 0.58e 80 / 57.2t 2 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds" 0.59 0.85 0.85 25/1051 1 TCV dosing In 2.0 seconds 1.00 0.75 0.95 LRNB No RPT 100/105 zNA 0.40 0:819 0.51

-FWCF With 'FHOOS 25/105

-.NA 0.68*

1.13*

FWCF

-No RPT With FHOOS 25/105 NA 1.00

~

0.67

• 1.11it Scram initiated by high neutron flux.

Scram initiated by high dome pressure.

The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

I

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 2.7 2-5 2.6 2.4*

2.1 ZO.

Attachment Page A-8 0

10 20 30 40 s0 60 70 60 90 100 110 Pmser M o RM4 Power MCPRp

(%)

Limit 100 1.41 60 1.48 25 1.93 25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 1 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-SB Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity 0

"Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietaiy DEG:01:046 I

Attachment Page A-9 0

10 20 30 40 s0 60 70 s0 U0 100 110

n. pawr f% of pift Power MCPRI

(%).Limit

-100 1.51 60

.1.53

_-2.01 25 2.20

_0 2.70 Figure 2 EOC Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for.

GE9 Fuel With Proipoisded ITS Scram "'Times an.id' Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

.2J

Framatomne ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-IO "DEG:01:046 0

10 240 so G0 70 0

s 1o 0 110 Povai (% of Ra Power LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 1.00 60 1.00 25 0.77 25 0.77 0

0.77 Figure 3 EOCBase Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity I

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-1I DEG:01:046 2.*

i IL 0

10 20 30 40 o

" W 70 80 so 1W 110 PammrI% d 2.17 2.35 2.85 Figure 4 EOC Slow TCV ClosurniFHOOS andlor NoRPT-Povwer-DeNpendent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Pro6se~d ITS Sciram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

.2 MCPRp Umit 1.53 1.62 1.70

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG: 01:046 Attachment Page A-12 0

10 2D 30 40 W0 60 70 60 so 100 110 Povm 1% & cIRic Power MCPRp

(%M Umit 100 1.63 80 1.86 80 1.96 25 2.24 25 2.35 0

2.85 Figure 5 EOC Slow TCV Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and

.Corrected'PuetrTherrrfarCodIlu*tiVt..it

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary DEG:01:046 Attachment Page A-"A 0

10 20 30 40 i

so 70 so 30 100 110 P~m C% ofRxb4 Power

LHGRFAC,

(%)

Multiplier 100 0.89 80 0.89 80 0.85 25 0.67 25 0.67 0

0.67 Figure 6 EOC Slow TCV ClosureIFHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Equipment Out-of-Service Operating Limits Using Nominal Scram Speed And Exposure Limited to 14,000 MWd/MTU LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

Frarnatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary

/FRAMAT"OME ANP January 10, 2002 DEG:02:009 Mr. F. W. TnUr Exelon Nuclear Nuclear Fuel Management.:

4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Dear Mr. Trikur.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Equipment Out-of-Service Operating Limits Using Nominal Scram Speed and Exposure Limited to 14,000 MWdIMTU

Reference:

- 1) Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R' J. Chin (Exelon), LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity,' DEG:01:046, March 22, 2001.

2) -Exelon Task Order, L2C9 TCV Slow Closure Analysis with NSS Insertion Times, NFM-MW-B040, Exelon, November 29,2001.

Turbine control valve (TCV) testing at LaSalle Unit 2 indicated that some of the turbine control valves do not meet the fast closure criteria. Due to TCV slow closure, the plant must be operated using the more restrictive TCV slow closure equipment out-of-Service (EOOS)

MCPRp limits provided in Reference 1. Based on the Reference lIEQOS MCPRp limits, Exelon expects to run into MCPR margin problems in February 2002. Exelon requested FRA "ANP (Reference 2) to provide revised ATRIUMm-9B EOOS limits that will Improve MCPR, margin to support continued operation until a mid-cycle outage to correct the TCV closure rate.

The attachment provides the L2C9 TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT transient'

• analysis results and operating limits based on nominal scram speed and a maximum cycle exposure of 14,000 MWd/MTU. *The operating limits in the attachment provide significant additional margin as noted by comparison of the100% power MCPRP limit of 1.42 versus 1.53 provided in Reference 1. -The GE9 operating limits presented in Reference I remain applicable.

Please forward the attachment to Exelon at "your eaflitst convenience.

Very truly yours, D. E. Garber Project Manager Framatome ANP, Inc.

I

Framatonme ANP, Inc, Proprietary DEG:02009 Attachment Page A-1 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Equipment Out-of-Service Operating Limits for Nominal Scram Speed and Exposure Limited to 14,000 MWdIMTU Turbine control valve (TCV) testing at LaSalle Unit 2 indicated that some of the turbine control valves do not meet the fast closure criteria. Due to TCV slow closure, the plant must be operated using the more restrictive TCV slow closure equipment out-of-service (EOOS) MCPRp limits provided In Reference 1. Based on the Reference I EOOS MCPRP limits, Exelon expects to run into MCPR margin problems in February 2002. Exelon requested Framatome ANP, Inc. (FRA-ANP)

(Reference 2) to provide revised ATRIUM.-SB° EOOS limits that will improve MCPR margin to support continued operation until a mid-cycle outage to correct the TCV closure rate.

MCPR margin was gained in the EOOS operating limits by reanaly zing TCV slow closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT analyses based on nominal scram speed (NSS) and limiting the cycle exposure over which the limits are applicable to BOO - 14,000 MWdMTI.

Scram times corresponding to NSS were taken from the LaSalle Unit 2 plant transient analysis parameters document (Reference 3). The scram times used are presented in Table 1 for informational purposes.

TCV Slow ClosureIFHOOS andlor No RPT" The'TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no ROT limits consider transient analysis results from the following scenarios: TCV slow closure (up to all four valves), EOC RPT ODS, FHOOS, and a combination of FHOOS and EOC RPT OOS. (Note: TCV slow closure analyses with FHOOS are bound by TCV slow closure analyses at nominal feedwater temperature, and therefore, no specific analyses are required for this scenario.) In order to reduce the workscope required to establish new limits, only a subset of the analyses reported in Reference 4 have been reanalyzed. The subset of analyses reanalyzed is similar to the subset presented in Reference I and Is based on results presented in Reference 4. Review of Figures 5.16, 5.17, and 5.18 in Reference 4 shows that the TCV slow closure analyses are limiting for all power levels above 25% power;, the FWCF no RPT with FHOOS is limiting at 25% power. FWCF with FHOOS cases were included in this analysis resulting in a slightly more limiting case at 25% power than the FWCF no RPT with FHOOS cases.

ATRIUM is a b-ademark of Framatome ANP.

L

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary

.2Attachment DEG:02:009 Page A-2 Cases at power levels of 40% and 60% were included in this analysis for completeness even though Reference 4 shows considerable margin to the limits at these power levels.

Table 2 presents the analysis results used to establish the slow TCV closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT limits. Figure 1 presents the revised slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPRp limits for the ATRIUM-gB fuel. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 4) and the ACPR results from Table 2 are also presented In Figure 1.

Figure 2 presents the revised slow TCV closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFAC, multipliers for the ATRIUM-9B fuel.

The ATRIUM-9B MCPRp limitsand LHGRFACp multipliers provided in Figures I and 2 protect operation with any-combination of up to four TCVs closing slowly, EOC RPT oOS, and FHOOS up to a cycle exposure of 14,000 MWd/MTU (NEOC). The only equipment out-of-service scenarios provided in Reference 4 not explicitly protected by the slow TCV closurelFHOOS and/or no RPT

'limits are single-loop operation (discussed below), turbine bypass valves OOS (discussed below),

and startup of an idle loop. The limits support scram speeds at least as fast as the NSS insertion times presented In Table 1; the slower technical specification scram'speed (TSSS) insertion times are not supported by these limits.

Comparison of turbine bypass valves OOS and the TCV sloW closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT limit In Table 2.1 of Reference 4 shows the TCV slow closureIFHOOS and/or no RPT limits clearly bound the turbine bypass valves OOS limb. Consequently, applying the TCV slow closure/PHOOS and/or no IPT limits will protect operation with the turbine bypass OOS.

No analyses were performed to revise limits for startup of an idle loop.

Single-Loop Operation Figures I and 2 provide the two-loop operation (TLO) MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp-multipliers.

Reference 5 indicates that the consequences of base case pressurization transients in single-loop operation (SLO) are bound by the consequences of the same transient initiated from the same power/flow conditions in TLO and that the TLO base case LCPRs and the LHGRFACP multipliers P

remain applicable for SLO. The conclusion that TLO LCPR results generally bound SLO results hab*

been demonstrated for both base case operation and some equipment out-of-service scenarios for other BWRs. Although specific L2C9 analyses for a combination of TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or

-~

-t....r.D MIA A sIP r

L AV D

eMC3,.~mL

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:009 Attachment Page A-3 remain applicable in SLO for this scenario. Reference 4 indicates the L2C9 TLO safety limit MCPR is 1.11 and the SLO safety limit MCPR is 1.12. Therefore, SLO MCPRp limits forTCV slow closurelFHOOS andlor no RPT can be determined by adding 0.01 to the TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT MCPRp limits reported in Figure 1 to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR.

The Figure 2 TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable for SLO.

References

1.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivlty, DEG:01:046, March 22,2001.

2.

Exelon Task Ordr,'L2C9 TCV Slow Closure Analysis with NSS Insertion Times, NFM-MW B040, Exelon, November 29, 2001

3.

EMF-2323 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Principal Transient Analysis Parameters, Siemens Power Corporation, March 2000.

4.

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

5.

EMF-95-205(P) Revision 2, LaSalle Extended Operating Domain (EOD) and Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Safety Analysis forATRIUMT"-9B Fuel, Siemens Power Corporation, June 1996.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprletaly DEG,02:009 Attachment.

"Page A-4 Table I' Nominal Scram Insertion Times J(Reference_3)-

9.

-I The 0.20-second delay Is considered a nominal value that cannot be verified by the plant. Therefore, the transient analysis calculations are performed to bound a range of no delay (linear insertion from start signal to notch 45) to a delay ýalue just before notchA45. -Thiissconsistent with the Information provided In i

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Atchment Page A-5 DEG:02:00 9 Table 2 EOOS Transient Analysis Results With Nominal Scram Speed and Exposure Limited to 14,000 MWdlMTU power SlowValve ATRIUM-9B ATRIUM-9B I Flow Characteristics ACPR LHGRFACp Slow TCV Closure

• 1001105" 1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.31 0.98 100 181*

1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.31 1.00 801 105' 1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.35 0.97 801 57.2" 1 TCV closing In 2.0 seconds 0.40 1.00 801105t I TCV closing In 2.0 seconds 0.54 0.85 80157.2 1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.49 0.92

-601 105t 1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.62 0.83 60135.1 1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.59 0.95 401 105t I TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.75 0.78 251 10 5 "*

1 TCV closing in 2.0 seconds 0.98 0.70 LRNB No RPT 1001105 NA 0.27 0.99 80/105 NA 0.27 1.00 FWCF With FHOOS 40/105 NA 0.61 0.88 251105*

NA 1.02 0.69.

FWCF No RPT With FHOOS 25 /105*

NA 1.01 0.68

• Scram Iitiated by high neutron flux.

t Scram initated by high dome pressure.

M L..

vvrcfmro nrinr to NEOC (14.000 MWd/MTU). The dCPR and LHGRFAC.

tI

OCZ 0

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Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-7 DtG:02:009 a

to o

0 o

so ao 70 so so 10 1W pew 1% of R-4 Power LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 0.98 80 0.97 80 0.85 25 0.68 25 0.68 0

0.68 "Figure 2 NEOC (14,000 MWdIMTU) Slow TCV Closure/FHOOS and/or No RPT Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With NSS Insertion Times

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Cycle Extension,to 19,300 MWd/MTU LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

A FRAMATOME ANP FRAMATOME ANP, Inc.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary An AREVA and Siemens company August 9, 2002 DEG:02:125 Mr. F. W. Trikur Exelon Nuclear Nuclear Fuel Management 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

Dear Mr. Trdkur:

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Cycle Extension to 19,300 MWd/MTU

Reference:

1)

Exelon task order NFM-MW-B080, LaSall 2Ccle 9 Coastdown Analyss, July 9, 2002ale2Cce9CadwnAayiJl

2)

Contract for Fuel Fabrication anid Related Components and Services dated as of October 24, 2000 between Siemens Power Corporation and Commonwealth Edison Company for LaSalle Nuclear PlanL In response to Reference I analyses have been performed to support extending operation at LaSalle' Unit 2 Cycle 9 out to 19,300 MWd/MTU. Umits are established for base case operation and three equipment out-of-service scenarios. The analysis results and operating limits are presented in the attachmenL Very truly yours, D. E. Garber Project Manager -

1

FRAMATOME ANP, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road - Richland WA 99352 Tel.: 509-375-8100 Fax: 509-375-8402 www.us.freimatome-onp.com

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 Attachment Page A-1 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Cycle Extension to 19,300 MWdIMTU With Technical Specification Scram Speeds Exelon has determined that LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 (L2C9) will exceed the current EOC licensing exposure of 18,458.2 MWd/MTU and requested (Reference 3) Framatome ANP, Inc. (FRA-ANP) to perform additional analyses to support operation to an exposure of 19,300 MWd/MTU for the following scenarios:

Base case operation with TSSS.

FHOOS operation with TSSS.

Operation with no bypass and FHOOS with TSSS.

Operation with any combination of TCV slow closure, no RPT or FHOOS with TSSS.

The current EOC operating limits for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 were provided in References 1 and 2, and support operation to a cycle exposure of 18,458.2 MWd/MTU. The limiting analyses from References 1 and 2 were analyzed to determine the operating limits for the cycle extension to 19,300 MWd/MTU. Additional power/flow state points were analyzed for certain events to ensure completeness in determining the operating limits. The analyses were performed with the Reference 4 parameters with the exceptions noted in Reference 3; FFTR/FHOOS temperature reduction, steam line pressure drop, and recirculation pump torque. This letter report summarizes the transient analysis results and operating limits to support the L2C9 cycle extension.

Cycle Extension L2C9 was originally licensed to an EOC cycle exposure of 18,458.2 MWd/MTU. Recent discussions with Exelon indicate that L2C9 is expected to begin coastdown operation at approximately 17,300 MWd/MTU. Data provided by Exelon indicates that the cycle will extend coastdown operation to an exposure of approximately 19,020 MWd/MTU. In order to provide some conservatism and flexibility, additional full power capability was included. L2C9 is conservatively modeled to operate at rated power to a cycle exposure of 19,300 MWd/MTU.

TSSS Base Case Operation The base case limits consider transient analysis results from the load rejection with no bypass (LRNB) and feedwater controller failure (FWCF) events. Reference 1 provided the EOC base case operating limits for TSSS scram times.

FramatomeANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-2 DEG:02:125 Table 1 presents the analysis results used to establish the TSSS base case limits for the cycle extension. -Figures 1 and 2 present TSSS MCPRp limits to support base case operation for ATR1UMT'-9B* and GE9 fuel, respectively. The ium of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per, Reference 5) and the ACPR results from Table 1 are also presented in the figures.- Figure 3 presents the base case LHGRFAC ulttipliers for ATRIUM-9B fuel and the LHGRFAC results from Table 1.

TSSS FHOOS Operation,.

Exelon requested that FRA -ANP provide a set of operating limits to protect operation for, FHOOS.

This set of limits considers transient analysis results from the FWCF with FHOOS and the LRNB with FHOOS events.

Table 2 presents the'analysis results used to establish limits to protect operation in the FHOOS scenario for the cycl.e extension. Figures 4 and 5 present TSSS MCPRp limits to support operation with FHOOS for ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 5) and the ACPR results from Table 2 are also presented in the figures.

Figure 6 presents the FHOOS LHGRFACp multiplilers for ATRIUM-9B fuel and the LHG RFACO'results from Table 2.

TSSS

-FHOOS and TBVOOS Operation I

V Exelon requested that FRA-ANP provide a set of operating limits to protect operation In the FHOOS and TBVOOS scenario. This set of limits considers transient analysis results from the FWCF With TBVOoS, FWCF FHOOS with TBVOOS, FWCF ikith FHOOS and LRNB with FHOOS events.

Reference 2 provided ihe EOC TBVOOS or FHcSoS operating limits for TSSS scram times.

Table 2 presents the analysis results used to establish limits to protect operation in the FHOOS and TBVOOS scenario for the cycle extension. Figures 7 and 8 present TSSS MCPRp limits to support operation in the FHOOS and TBVOOS scenario for ATRlUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 5) and theACPR results from Table 2 are also presented in the figures. Figure 9 presents the FHOOS and TBVOOS LHGRFACp multipliers for ATRIUM-9B fuel and the LHGRFACp results from Table 2.

ATRIUM is a trademark of FramatomeANP.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 Attachment Page A-3 TSSS TCV Slow Closure, No RPT or FHOOS Operation Limits to support operation-with-any-conbinatiefwof-T-TV-stew'-esure-no RPT or FHOOS consider transient analysis results for the following scenarios: TCV slow closure (up to all four valves); EOC RPT OOS; FHOOS; and a combination of FHOOS and EOC RPT OOS. (Note: TCV slow closure analyses with FHOOS are b6und by TCV slow closure analyses at nominal feedwater temperature.)

Reference 1 provided the EOC TSSS operating limits for the same EOOS scenarios.

Table 3 presents the analysis results used to establish the cycle extension limits for any combination of TCV slow closure, no RPT or FHOOS. Figures 10 and 11 present TSSS MCPRp limits to support operation with any combination of TCV slow closure, no RPT or FHOOS for ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 5) and the ACPR results from Table 3 are also presented in the figures. Figure 12 presents the any combination of TCV slow closure, no RPT or FHOOS LHGRFACp multipliers for ATRIUM-9B fuel and the LHGRFACp results from Table 3.

Single-Loop Operation Figures 1-12 provide the two-loop operation (TLO) MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers for the L2C9 cycle extension. Reference 7 indicates that the consequences of base case pressurization transients in single-loop operation (SLO) are bound by the consequences of the same transient initiated from the same power/flow conditions in TLO and that the TLO base case ACPRs and the LHGRFACp multipliers remain applicable for SLO.' The conclusion that TLO ACPR results generally bound SLO results has been demonstrated for both base case operation and some equipment out of-service scenarios for other BWRs. Although specific L2C9 analyses for SLO have not been performed, FRA-ANP expects the TLO operation ACPR results would remain applicable in SLO for all scenarios. Reference 5 indicated the L2C9 TLO safety limit MCPR is 1.11 and the SLO safety limit MCPR is 1.12. Therefore, SLO MCPRp limits for base case, FHOOS, FHOOS and TBVOOS, and any combination of TCV slow closure, no RPT or FHOOS can be determined by adding 0.01 to the appropriate MCPRp limits reported in the above figures to account for the increase in safety limit MCPR. The ATRIUM-9B LHGRFACp multipliers in Figures 3, 6, 9, and 12 remain applicable for.

SLO.

GE9 Mechanical Limits References 8 and 9 provided the initial evaluations of the GE9 mechanical limits for L2C9. These evaluations were updated in References 1 and 2. An evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for the

Frarnatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 Attachment Page A-4 ratel power analyses reported in Tables 1-3 was performed. The cycle extension analysis results

=areboundby-the previous_1rmItirng-L2uGE94

-stain-resus ptt ces 8 and 9.

Therefore, the adjustments (if any)`currefntly applied to the GE9 fuel limits remain applicable for the cycle extension.

Licensing Applicabl Ity References 5 and 6 provided the original L2C9 licensing analyses and limits for which FRA-ANP was responsible to a cycle exposure of 18,458.2 MWdrMTU. References 1 and 2 updated portions of the licensing analyses and limits for proposed ITS scram speeds and corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

FRA-ANP-has performed additional evaluations to determine the applicability of the current licensing analyses and limits to the 1209 cycle extension. The evaluations demonstrated that the current analysis results and limits remain applicable for the L2C9 cycle extension with the exception of the MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers.

The L2C9 operating limits provided in References 1 and 2 remain applicable to a cycle exposure of 18,458.2 MWd/MTU (core exposure of 30,266.2 MWd/MTU). The MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers presented in Figures 1-12 must be usecl for operation beyond a cycle exposure of 18,458.2 MWd/MTU, and are applicable to a cycle exposure of 19,300 MWd/MTU. The base case MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers are valid for any feedwater temperature within the upper and lower bounds defined by Reference 4, Item 3.12. The other limits support operation with up to a 120OF decrease in feedwater temperature from the nominal value.

Core Hydrodynamic Stability Analysis The L2C9 stability analysis was updated for the extended cycle exposure of 19,300 MWd/MTU. For each power/flow point, decay ratios were calculated to determine the highest expected decay ratio throughout the cycle. Table 4 provides the updated results for the stability decay ratio analysis.

Reference 6 provided the current stability analysis decay ratios. The cycle extension analysis was based on an updated STAIF methodology previously utilized for LaSalle Unit I Cycle 10.

For reactor operation under conditions of single-loop operation, final feedwater temperature reduction (FFTR) and/or operation with feedwater heaters out of service,* it is possible that higher decay ratios could be achieved than are shown for normal operation.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 Attachment "Page A-5 References

1.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity,"

DEG:01:046, March 22, 2001.

2.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 NSS Base Case and TBVOOS or FHOOS Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times with Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity," DEG:01:076, May 15, 2001.

3.

Exelon Task Order, LaSalle 2 Cycle 9 Coastdown Analysis, NFM-MW-B080, July 9, 2002.

4.

EMF-2323 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Principal Transient Analysis Parameters, Siemens Power Corporation, March 2000.

5.

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

6.

EMF-2437 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

7.

EMF-95-205(P) Revision 2, LaSalle Extended Operating Domain (EOD) and Equipment Out of Service (EOOS) Safety Analysis for ATRIUMTM9-B Fuel, Siemens Power Corporation, June 1996.

8.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Transient Power History Data for Confirming Mechanical Limits for GE9 Fuel," DEG:00:1 85, August 3, 2000.

9.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "Additional Analysis for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 1% Plastic Strain Compliance for GE9 Fuel,' DEG:00:213, September 6, 2000.

I

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary

'Attachment

, Page A-6 DEG:02:125 Table 1 Base Case Transient Analys.Results Power ATRIUM-9B '.

!ATRIUM-9B GE9 J Flow

'ACPR..

LHGRFACp ACPR

.. LRNB.

- FWCF I.

• The analysis results are from an exposure prior to 19,300 MWd/MTU. Thei&CPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the theifmal limits.-

1, I1

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-7 DEG:02:125 Table 2 TBVOOS and FHOOS Transient Analysis Results Power ATRIUM-9B ATRIUM-9B GE9

/ Flowv ACPR LHGRFACp ACPR FWCF With TBVOOS 100/105 0.35 0.971 0.42 80/105 0.38 1.000 0.46*

60/105 0.45 0.964*

0.52*

40/105 0.55 0.957 0.61 25/105 0.74 0.865 0.79 FWCFFHOOS With TBVOOS 100/105-0.33 1.015 0.38 80/105 0.39 1.031 0.44 60/105 0.49 1.007 0.53 40/105 0.65 0.925 0.70 25/105 0.94 0.789 1.00 FWCF With FHOOS 100/105 0.26 1.089 0.29 80/105 0'33 1.098 0.35 60/105 0.43*

0.964*

0.46*

40/105 0.59 0.957 0.62 25/105 1.06*

0.685*

1.13*

LRNB With FHOOS 100/105 0.26 1.015 0.31 80/105 0.26 1.038 0.30

• The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to 19,300 MWd/MTU. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

I

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-8 DEG:02:125

.-T-ableZ-EOOSF-'ransln.taiysis 4-tsI

" 1, Scram initiated by high neutron flux.

t Scram initiated by high dome pressure.

The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to 19,300 MWd/MTU. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

Power -

ATRlUM-9B

ý,ATRIUM-9B3 "GE9

/PFlow -

ACPR LHGRFACp~

ACPR TCV Slow Closure -

100/105*

--. 0.49 0.828

-0.62 80 /105*

0.45-0.894 -.

0.54 80/57.2*.

0.51*

-0.971*--

0.75t 8 0 /10 5t 0.57 0.8540 -

0.66 80 / 57.2t 0.594 0.944.

0.85*

60 / 105t 0.50 0.944 0.58 40 / 105t 0.80 0.818 0.87 25/105t 1.001 0.754 1.00 LRNB No RPT 100/105 0.46 0.799 0.61 80/105 0.39 0.871 0.49 FWCF No RPT 40/105 0.50 0.964 0.57 25/105 0.68 0.871 0.75 FWCF No RPT With FHOOS 40/105 0.61 0.925 0.67 25/105 1.040 0.675t 1.11*

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 Attachment Page A-9

-I aDt

-DmrpTrm~ys

,uecaylrHatt[&

un_---

"Power Maximum Maximum

/ Flow (%)'

Global Regional 30.1 /26.6 0.59 0.53 31.6/29.2 0.42 0.50 61.9/45.0

.0.67 0.88 73.6 / 50.0 0.73 0.95 78.2/60.0 0.52 0.63 82.4/60.0 0.57 0.72

Framatome ANP,' Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-IO DEG:02:125

-

-.-.- -*--. --

-' -,,.*

P50 60 "Power

-MCPRP Lmit

.100oo 1.44

.60

-1.48 I..

25 1.93

--25..

2.20

-.-.. 0.

2.70

.. Figure 1 Coastdown (19,300 MWdIMTU)

Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for-ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times 25 2.6 a1.

110

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 2.85 '

2.75' 2.6S 2.55, 2.45 2.35 2.25, 2.15 CL 2.05 1.95 1.85.

1.75 1.85' 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.25.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Power (% Maed)

Power MCPRp

(%)

Umit 100 1.52 60 1.53 25 2.01 25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 2 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU)

Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times Attachment Page A-11

'Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-12 DEG:02:125 Ii 1A400 1.300 S1.250' 1200 1.150.

& 1.100 S1.050 0.950

°0.900 0.800 0.750 7

700 0

10 20 30 40 so 60

" I Power (% fOted)

Power f

LHGRFACp,

(% ).......

-M ultiplier S100...

1.00...

• 60.

1.00 "0.77

" 25--

0.77

"- 0...

0.77 Fig'ure3Coalsitdown (19,300 MWd/MTU)

Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers forATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times

• LRNB m FWCF FLHGRFACp a

m a

70 -

s ID0 1U 110

.=A

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 2.85 2.75 2.65 2155 2.45 2.35 225 2.15 A.0 1.95 1.85 1.75 1.65 1.55 1.45 1.35 1 25 1.15 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 Power (% rated)

Power MCPRp

(%)

Limit 100 1.44 60 1.54 25 2.17 25 2.20 0

2.70 Attachment Page A-13 70 80 90 100 110 Figure 4 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) FHOOS Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 3.05 2.95 2.85 2.75 2.65 2.55 2.45 2.35 2.25 CL 2.15 a2.05 0

10 20 s0 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 110 Power (% rated)

Power MCPRp

(%)___

'Limit "100

-...1.52

'60....

.... 1.57..

-2.24

__:25

-2.24 -

'2.74--

Figure 5.Coastdiowt (19,3000 MWd/MTU) FH'OOS P.--,pow;er-Depede'nt MCPR Limits for, SGE9 Fuel with TSSS'insertion Times Attachment Page A-14

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-15 DEG:02:125

+ FWCFFHOOS LRI8 FHOOS

-UIGRFACp 4.,4 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 Power (% rated) 70 80 90 100 110 Power LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 1.00 60 0.96 25 0.68 25 0.68 0

0.68 Figure 6 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) FHOOS Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times 1.250 1200 1.150 1.050 S1.000*

0.850' 0.9m0, 0.750 0.700 0.650 n~i R

1-3m.

DEG:02:125 Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-16 110 power (% rated)

Power MCPRP Limit 100 1.46 60..

1.60 25.....

- -2.17

25

-2.20 0

2.70 Figu re 7 Coastdown f(19,300 MWd/MTU) FHOOS and No Bypass Power-Dependeht MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times h.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-17 3.05 2.95 -

1.85 1.75 2.68 1.55 1.45 1.35 2.25 2.15,

Z205, 1.95 1.85.

1.75.

1.55 1.45 1.1S.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Power (rawed) 70 80 90 100 11C Power MCPRp

(%)

Umit 100 1.53 60 1.64 25 2.24 25 2.24 0

2.74 Figure 8 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) FHOOS and No Bypass Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times

• -FWCF No Bypea x FWCF FHOOS No Bypass

+ FWCF FHOOS A LRN8 FHOOS

-OLMCPR x

+

x DEG:02:125

bEG:02:125 1.050 1.000 S0.950 S0.900 0.B0 0.800 0.750 0.700 0.650 Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-1i8 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Power (%rated)

"Power LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 0.97 60 0.96 25 0.68

--25-7 0.68

-_0...

0.68 Figure 9 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) FHOOS

,and No BypaSs Po'wer-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for

'ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion limes

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:125 2.85 2.75 2.65 2.55 2.45 2.35 2.25 2.15 "2.05 z1.95 Attachment Page A-19 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Power (% rated)

Power MCPRp

(%)

iUmit 100 1.60 80 1.62 80 1.70 25 2.17 25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 10 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) TCV Slow Closure/FHOOS or No RPT Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times

DEG:02:125 9.,

a.

A C,

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-20 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 Power (% rated)

Power:-

MCPRP

(,

.. Limit.

100--.

-1.73 80-.....

1.96

-_25_

2.24 25 2.24

.. --0-- -

2.74-70 80 90 100 110 Figure 11 Coastdown (19,300 MWdIMTU) TCV Slow ClosureIFHOOS

-or No RPT.Powe-Dependent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times

DEG:02:125 1.250 1.200 1.150 1.100 1.050 1.000 0.950 3 0.900 0.80 "

0.750 0.700.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-21 10 20 30 40 50 60 Power (. rated) 70 80 90 100 110 Power LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 0.79 80 0.79 80 0.79 40 0.79 25 0.67 25 0.67 0

0.67 Figure 12 Coastdown (19,300 MWd/MTU) TCV Slow Closure/FHOOS or No RPT Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel with TSSS Insertion Times A Slow TCV 4+ FWCF FHOOS A LRNBFHOOS LRNB No RPT X FWCF No RPT a FWCF FHOOS No RPT

-LHGRFACo A

+

A A

A A

x A

A A

A 0.650 0.600 0

I

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 NSS Base Case and TBVOOS or FHOOS Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A November 2002

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary

, ARAMATOME ANP May 15, 2001 DEG:01:076 "Dr. R. J. Chin Nuclear Fuel Services (Suite 400)

Exelon Corporation 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515-5701

Dear Dr. Chin:

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 NSS Base Case and TBVOOS or FHOOS Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Ref: 1:

LaSalle County Nuclear Station Unit 2 Technical Specifications, as amended.

Ref: 2:

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle'(,nit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

Ref: 3:

Letter, D. E. Garber to R. J. Chin (DEG:01:046) dated March 22, 2001.

Subject:

"LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity."

Ref: 4:

Letter, D. E. Garber to R. J. Chin (DEG:01:038) dated February 27, 2001.

Subject:

'Transmittal of Condition Report 9191.'

Ref: 5:

Contract for'Fuel Fabrication and Related Components and Services dated as of October 24, 2000 between Siemens Power Corporation and Commonwealth Edison Company for LaSalle N6,clear Plant.

Z Z2 Exelon is replacing th current Technical Specificaons (Refer/ce 1) with Improved Technical Specificati'ns (ITS) during LaSalle Unit DCycle 9 (

9) operation. The operating limits for 1.l}C9 (Reference 2) were established consistent with the scram times presented in Reference I and are not consistent with the proposed ITS surveillance times.

Exelon requested that FRA-ANP perform analyses to address a mid-cycle transition to the ITS for the turbine bypass valves out-of-service (TBVOOS) or feedwater heaters out-of service (FHOOS) scenario. Reference 3 describes the determination*of analytical scram times consistent with the ITS. Reference 4 identifies an error in the fuel thermal Framatome ANP Richland, Inc.

2101 Horn Rapids Road Richland, WA 99352 Tel:

(509) 375-8100 Fax:

(509) 375-8402

Framatome ANP Richland, Inc. Proprietary Dr. R. J. Chin DEG:01:076 May 15, 2001 Page 2 conductivity used in the transient analyses for LaSalle. A reevaluation of the nominal scram speed (NSS) limits previously provided in Reference 2 with the corrected fuel thermal conductivity is also presented.

2 The attachment provides L6.9 MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that support operation in either the TBVOOS or FHOOS scenarios. The limits are based on transient analyses that used the Reference 3 analytical scram times and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. Limits are also presented for the base case operation with NSS insertion times.

Results based on the ITS scram speeds and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity that demonstrate compliance with the ASME overpressurization requirements are also presented in the attachment.

Very truly yours, David Gabber Project Manager Attachment

bcc:,'

O.C. Brown, 34 D. G. Carr, 23 R. E. Collingham, 18 M. E. Garrett, 23 A. N. Ham, 23 J. M. Haun, 34 D. B. McBumey, 23 P. D. Wimpy, 34 File:,

LB

DEG:01:076 Attachment Page A-1 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 NSS Base Case and TBVOOS or FHOOS Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times

.WithCorrec!eo Fue

_ionductivity Reference 2 presents MCPRp limits and LHGRFACp multipliers that protect several equipment-out of-service (EOOS) scenarios, including turbine bypass valves out-of-service (TBVOOS) and feedwater heaters out-of-service (FHOOS). The Reference 2 limits are based on the limiting EOOS condition (TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT) and include the effects of ITS scram speeds and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity (Reference 3). Framatome ANP Richland, Inc.

(FRA-ANP) provided proposed ITS surveillance scram times to Exelon in Reference 2, Table 1.

Comparison of the Reference 1 analysis results show the TCV slow closure results are, in general, significantly larger than either the TBVOOS or FHOOS results. Therefore, the limits based on TCV slow closure/FHOOS and/or no RPT have considerable margin for the TBVOOS and FHOOS scenarios. As a result, Exelon has requested that FRA-ANP provide a set of limits that protects the TBVOOS and FHOOS scenarios but is less conservative than the Reference 2 EOOS limits. The maximum overpressurization analysis has also been reevaluated to include the effects of ITS scram speeds and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

Additionally, the limiting nominal scram speed (NSS) base case transient analyses have been reanalyzed to quantify the effect of the corrected fuel thermal conductivity.

TBVOOS or FHOOS Exelon requested that FRA-ANP provide a set of operating limits to protect operation in either the TBVOOS or FHOOS scenarios. This set of limits considers transient analysis results from the feedwater controller failure (FWCF) with TBVOOS and FWCF with FHOOS events. In order to reduce the workscope required to establish new limits, only a subset of the analyses reported in Reference 1 has been reanalyzed. Review of Figures 5.1-5.3 and 5.7-5.9 in Reference 1 show that the FWCF with TBVOOS analyses are limiting at 60% power and above. The FWCF with FHOOS scenario is limiting below 60% power. Additionally, these figures show that there is considerable margin between the analysis results and the limits at 40% power.

Tables 5.1 and 5.3 of Reference 1 were reviewed to determine which specific FWCF analyses required reanalysis to establish the limits. Table I presents the analysis results required to adequately establish limits to protect operation in the TBVOOS or FHOOS scenarios.

Attachment DEG:01 :076 Page A-2 figures I and 2 present the limits to support operation in either TBVOOS or FHOOS scenarios for the ATRIUM*m-9B* and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR (1.11 per Reference 1) and the ACPR results from Table I are also presented in the figures. Figure 3 presents the ATRIUM-9B LHGRFACp multipliers and the LHGRFACp results from Table 1.

NSS Base Case Operation Reference I provided base case operating limits for the NSS scram times. After Reference 1 was issued, FRA-ANP informed Exelon of an error in the fuel thermal conductivity used in the COTRANSA2 calculations (Reference 3). The limiting analyses provided in Reference I have been reanalyzed using the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The NSS base case limits consider transient analysis results from the LRNB and FWCF events.

Review of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 of Reference 1 show that the FWCF analyses are limiting for.all power levels at or below 60% power;, the LRNB event is limiting above 60% power. Additionally, Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.17 of Reference I show that there is considerable margin-between the analysis results and the limits at the 40% power level. -Table 2 presents the analysis results required to adequately establish the NSS base cas'e i "'"it.'

Figures 4 and 5 present the revised base case NSS MCPRI limits for the ATRIUM-9B and GE9 fuel, respectively. The sum of the L2C9 safety limit MCPR*(1.11 per Reference 1) and the ACPR results

'from Table 2 are also presented in Figures 4 and 5. The NSS base'case LHGRFACp results from Table 2 and the resulting LHGRFACp multipliers are presented in Figure 6.

Single-Loop Operation Reference 2 states that single-loop operation (SLO) limits are obtained by applying the increase in MCPR safety limit between two-loop operation.(TLO) and SLO to the TLO limits. This is applicable for both the ITS EOOS and NSS limits contained herein.

GE9 Mechanical Limits Reference 4 provides an evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for L2C9. An evaluation of the GE9 mechanical limits for the rated power analyses reported in Tables I and 2 was performed. It was demonstrated that the GE9 mechanical limits criteria have been met for the implementation of ITS for ATRIUM is a trademark of Framatorne ANP.

DEG:01:076 Attachment Page A-3 the TBVOOS and FHOOS scenarios. The GE9 mechanical limits criteria have also been met for operation with NSS scram timers.

Maximum Overpressure Analysis "The limiting overpressbirization event (MSIV closure), as described in Section 7 of Reference 1, was reanalyzed with ITS scram times and the corrected fuel thermal conductivity. The transient response is similar to that presented in Reference 1. The maximum pressure of 1345 psig occurs in the lower plenum. The maximum dome pressure is 1319 psig. The results demonstrate that the maximum vessel pressure limit of 1375 psig and dome pressure limit of 1325 psig are not exceeded.

References

1.

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

2.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity,"

DEG:01:046, March 22, 2001.

3.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "Transmittal of Condition Report 9191," DEG:01:038, February 27, 2001.

4.

Letter, D. E. Garber (SPC) to R. J. Chin (ComEd), 'LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Transient Power History Data for Confirming Mechanical Limits for GE9 Fuel,* DEG:00:185, August 3, 2000.

I,,

DEG:01:076 Attachment Page A-4

-Table 1 'TBVOOS and FHOOS Transient Analysis Results With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Power ATRIUM-9B13 ATRIUM-9B I GE9 1Flow ACPR LHGRFACp

-ACPR FWCF With TBVOOS

. FWCF With FHOOS The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The ACPR and LHGRFACP results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

I,

DEG:01:076 Attachment Page A-5 Table 2 NSS Base Case Transient Analysis Results With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Peak Peak Power ATRIUM-9B ATRIUM-9B GE9 Neutron Flux Heat Flux

/Flow ACPR LHGRFACp ACPR

(% rated)

(% rated)

LRNB FWCF The analysis results presented are from an exposure prior to EOC. The ACPR and LHGRFACp results are conservatively used to establish the thermal limits.

ý,l DEG:01:076

,2.85.

2.75.

2.65 2.55 1.45, 2.35 -

225 2.15.

~2.15 S1.95 1.865 1.75' 1.65 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.25 I4 44iI 0

10 20 30 40

.:so 6o Power (/. of Rated) 70 80 90 100 110 Figure I EOCPower-DeiendeintMCPR Limits for ATRIUM-9B Fuel F With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity for TBVOOS or FHOOS I

Attachment Page A-6 SFVYVF No BypA=

0FWCF FHOOS II

DEG:01:076 Attachment Page A-7 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Powo r%

of RAtao Power MCPRp

(%)

Limit 100 1.52 60 1.63 25 2.24 25 2.35 0

2.85 Figure 2 EOC Power-Dep endent MCPR Limits for GE9 Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity for TBVOOS or FHOOS I.

DEG:01:076 a=.

U 3

Attachment Page A-8 Power LHGRFACp

/(%).Multiplier 100.

0.99 60" 0.96 S

25,--

-0.68 25' 0.68 0 -,

0.68 Figure 3 EOC Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity for TBVOOS or FHOOS

I DEG:01:076 I~

Attachment Page A-9 0

10 20 30 40

'50 s

0 70 80 90 100 110 PovWr(% of Rxb4 Power MCPRp

(%)

Limit 100 1.39 60 1.44 25 1.91 25 2.20 0

2.70 Figure 4 EOC NSS Base Case Power-Dependent MCPR Limits for ATRIUM-gB Fuel With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity

"'DEG:01:076 I,

Ix 0

10 20 30

-40

.s0 60 70 80 90 100 110 Pmwr(% v(Rab4 Figure 5 EOC NSS Base Case Power-Dependent MC

• CPR.Limits for GE9 Fuel "With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity Attachment Page A-IO

DEG:01:076 1.30 125 1.20 1.15-1.10-1.05 1_00 100 ag.

• 0.95.

SO.gO 085 080 0.75 0.70 065 0 MI Attachment Page A-1I 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 PO(MWth Power.

LHGRFACp

(%)

Multiplier 100 1.00 60 1.00 25 0.78 25 0.78 0

0.78 70 80 90 100 110 Figure 6 EOC NSS Base Case Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for ATRIUM-9B Fuel With Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity 1.

• 46 4

p a

U4GRFACP

• LRN8 R FVVCF

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9A Reload Transient Analysis Results 0 Transmittal of Licensing Evaluation for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A i,

November 2002

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary A

An AREVA and Siemens Company FRAMATOME ANP October 30, 2002 DEG:02:153 Mr. F. W.Trikur Ex-elon Generation Company 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 Dear Mr. Trikur.

LicensingdEvaluatio-n for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A

Reference:

1)

Contract for Fuel Fabrication and Related Components and Services dated as of October 24, 2000 between Siemens Power Corporation and Commonwealth Edison Company for LaSalle Nuclear Plant.

LaSalle Unit 2 was shut down on October 25 to perform in-core fuel sipping to identify the location of failed fuel. Five failed assemblies were replaced. The attached assessment is provided in support of continued core licensing analysis applicability. This assessment is based on the revised core loading provided in the reference.

Relative to startup, FANP recommends Exelon perform the normal tests required for the restart of the reactor from an unplanned mid-cycle shutdown. It has been shown'that the revised Cycle 9A core loading blehaves globally the same as the original core loading. Hence, FANP does not believe this needs to be treated as a new reload startup, e.g.,,the x' test is not required.

If Exelon intends to monitor this revised core as a' new cycle (resetting the cycle exposure to zero) then the POWERPLEX)(-I CMSS* needs to be cleared as described in the POWERPLEX User's Manual, Section 4.1.4, except for the GAF-file. The last LPRM calibration is still valid and will be utilized appropr!ately as long as the ELPRM anQdCELPRM arrays are preserved from the original Cycle 9.

Very truly yours, D. E. Garber Project Manager POWERPLEX is a registered trademark of Framatome ANP.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:153 Attachment Page A-1 Licensing Analysis Evaluation for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Summary A revised core design fo& LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 (L2C9A) will result from a late cycle shuffle to discharge and replace assemblies with failed fuel rods. Fuel sipping has determined that there are 5 ATRIUMTn-9B* assemblies with failed fuel rods. These 5 ATRIUM-9B assemblies will be discharged from the core and replaced with previously discharged GE9 assemblies. Reference 1 presents the loading plan for the L2C9A core. With the change in core design, a review of the licensing analyses and operating limits is necessary to support operation to the end of Cycle 9A.

References 2 and 3 provided results of the original LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 licensing analysis performed by Framatome ANP (FANP). References 4 and 5 were Issued to provide modified operating limits to support the change to ITS scram speeds and correct the thermal conductivity used in the transient analyses. Operating limits to support FFTR/coastdown operation for L2C9 were provided in Reference 6. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the continued applicability of the operating limits provided in References 2, 4, 5, and 6 for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A.

Each of the licensing analyses identified below has been reviewed and dispositioned based on the extent of the core loading changes, the sensitivity of the event to the changes and conservatisms in the licensing analyses. It is concluded that the L2C9 operating limits presented in Reference 2 as modified by References 4 and 5 remain applicable for Cycle 9A to a Cycle 9A exposure of 1492.3 MWd/MTU. The operating limits provided in Reference 6 are applicable for Cycle 9A operation to a cycle exposure of 2334.1 MWd/MTU. Exelon should ensure that the axial power shape at end of full power remains in compliance with the licensing basis power shape reported in Reference 2.

Thermal-Hydraulic Design The fuel designs which make up the revised Cycle 9 core loading are the same as the fuel designs in the original Cycle 9 core loading: The changes in the core loading have negligible impact on the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the core and are explicitly accounted for in the core monitoring system.

ATRIUM is a trademark of Framatome ANP.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:1 53 Attachment Page A-2 Safety Limit Minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) safety limit is primarily sensitive to core radial power and local peaking distributions. Calculations were performed to evaluate the impact of the Cycle 9A core design on the MCPR safety limit. The results showed that for the same MCPR safety limit, fewer rods "are expected to experience boiling transition than in the L2C9 MCPR safety limit analysis reported in Reference 7. Thereforethe L2C9 two-loop operation MCPR safety limit of 1.11 and single-loop operation MCPR safety limit of 1.12 remain applicable for Cycle 9A.'

Cold Shutdown Margin (To be addressed by Exelon.)

Standby Liquid Control System (To be addressed by Exelon.)

Stability The changes caused by the shuffle from Cycle 9 to Cycle 9A have a minimal impact on the core parameters e.g., core void coefficient, axial and radial power peaking (see Table 1) that could significantly affect the stability analysis. Therefore, the stability analysis reported i6 Reference 6 remains applicable for Cycle 9A.

Core-Wide Pressurization Transients Core-wide pressurization transients occur when a pressurization wave collapses the voids in the reactor core and the resulting reactivity insertion creates a power spike. The results of these events, along with the results of the control rod withdrawal error (CRWE) event are used to set the power dependent MCPR operating limits. Pressurization transients are sensitive to the core average reactivity characteristics, void coefficient and the core average axial power profile. The L2C9A changes to the core design do not have a significant effect on the core average characteristics. The XLRNOR parameter used in the transient analyses is related to the void coefficient and provides a measure of the change in core reactivity for a given change in pressure. A higher value of XLRNOR makes pressurization events more severe. The XLRNOR value for Cyc'le 9A is slightly lower than the L2C9 value at the equivalent exposure. A comparison of the L2C9 licensing basis axial power profile and the L2C9A power shape at the equivalent EOFP exposure is presented in Figure 1. The comparison shows that the L2C9 power shape is limiting because there is less power in the bottom third of the core. Since the L2C9 licensing analyses used a more top-peaked axial power shape and a more severe void coefficient (XLRNOR), the L2C9 analyses and power-dependent operating limits remain applicable for L2C9A.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:153 Attachment to Page A-3 Flow Excursion Transients A flow excursion transient is a core-wide transient in which there is an unplanned increase in core flow. The maximum attainable core flow and the slope of the runup path impact the magnitude of the power increase. FANP performed cycle-specific flow excursion analyses for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 and established flow-dependent MCPR operating limits and LHGR multipliers. Evaluation of the L2C9A core design demonstrates that the flow-dependent MCPR operating limits and the flow dependent LHGR factors established for the original core design remain applicable.

Core Inlet Moderator Temperature Change Excursions (Loss of Feedwater Heating)

(To be addressed by Exelon.)

ASME Overpressurization Event The ASME event is a core-wide pressurization event and is sensitive to the same phenomenon described for the pressurization transients. Evaluation of the revised core design demonstrates that the results of the ASME analysis for the original core design remain applicable.

Control Rod Withdrawal Error (To be addressed by Exelon.)

Fuel Loading Error (To be addressed by Exelon.)

LOCA The MAPLHGR limits are established based on LOCA analyses performed with conservative core reactivity characteristics and are applicable for mixed core and equilibrium core designs. Therefore, the ATRIUM-9B MAPLHGR limits presented in Reference 2 remain applicable for Cycle 9A.

Control Rod Drop (To be addressed by Exelon.)

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary DEG:02:153 Attachment I

Page A-4 References

1.

Exelon TODI NF0200148, "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Design Basis Loading Plan," October 29, 2002.

2.

EMF-2437 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

3.

EMF-2440 Revision 0, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis, Siemens Power Corporation, October 2000.

4.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times and Corrected Fuel Thermal Conductivity,"

DEG:01:046, March 22; 2001.'

5.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to R. J. Chin (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 NSS Base Case and TBVOOS or FHOOS Operating Limits for Proposed ITS Scram Times With Correct~d FueIl Therrmal Conduictivity," DEG:01:076, May 15, 2001.

6.

Letter, D. E. Garber (FRA-ANP) to F. W. Trikur (Exelon), "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Operating Limits forWCycl& Extension t6-19,300 MWd/MTU," DEG:02:125, August 9, 2002.

7.

Letter, D: E. Garber (SPC) to R.-J. Chin (Exelon), "MCPR Safety Limit Results for LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9," DEG:00:135, June 1,2000.

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment

. Page A-5 Table 1 Comparison of, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 and LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Core Parameters at Equivalent EOC Licensing Exposure LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Radial power peaking 1.37 1.40 Axial power peaking 1.43 (node 20) 1.35 (node 20)

Void coefficient 0.0105 0.0104 (XLRNOR)

II it DEG:02:153

Framatome ANP, Inc. Proprietary Attachment Page A-6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Axial Node (bottom to top)

[

L2C9.

L2C9A Figure 1 Comparison of LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 and LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9A Licensing Axial Power Profiles DEG:02:153 1.600 1.400 1.200 L

0 3: 1.000 0

0.

E o 0.600 z

0.400 0.200 0.000 II h