ML023260154
| ML023260154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/30/2002 |
| From: | Hynes C FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 50-334/02-301 50-334/02-301 | |
| Download: ML023260154 (84) | |
Text
RTL A5.670.AA BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Volume 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.3 SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #1 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator
.1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
REVIEWED BY:
E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Revision No.
Date 1
7/26/02 Revision No.
Date 7/26/02 Date Page 1 of 17
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Examiners:
FENOC - BVPS Unit I Scenario No.:
Candidates 1
Op Test No.:
2002 NRC 01 CRS RO PO Obiectives:
Initial Conditions:
Turnover:
Critical Tasks:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Power75%. IC-171.
FW-P-3A OOS. Reduce power to remove FW-P-11B from service. Severe weather expected.
E-O.F, Establish AFW Flow ECA-3.1.B, Cooldown RCS Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description I
R (RO)
Power reduction at normal rate.
N (US)
N (PO) 2 FWM01 B C (PO)
Tdp of main feed pump.
C(RO)
C (US) 3 PRS06A I (RO)
Pressurizer controlling level channel fails low.
I (US) 4 MSS14C I (PO)
SG 'B' controlling steam flow transmitter fails low.
I (US) 5 FWM07B M (All)
SG 'B' feedwater control valve fails shut requiring a Rx Trip.
MSS07 Condenser steam dumps fail to operate.
MSS12B SG 'B' atmospheric dump fails open on Rx Trip.
INH20 C (PO)
AFW pumps fail to auto start (manual start available).
INH21 C (US) 6 RCS03B M (All)
SG 'B' tube rupture of 500 gpm (ruptured/faulted).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 17
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario
Description:
The Crew will lower power in preparation for removing a main feed pump from service; however, when power has been lowered to approximately 70%, the feed pump will trip, requiring the Crew to rapidly reduce power to less than 63% to avoid a reactor trip.
When plant conditions have stabilized, the controlling Pressurizer level channel fails low causing letdown to isolate, charging flow to increase, and actual Pressurizer level to rise. After directing actions to restore Pressurizer level control, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to address the failed channel.
After letdown is re-established, a controlling steam flow transmitter on SG 'B' fails low requiring operator action to take manual control of the SG feedwater regulating valve to avoid a reactor trip. After stabilizing SG level, the same feedwater regulating valve fails closed resulting in a reactor trip.
Following the reactor trip, the steam dump valves fail to operate resulting in a high SG pressure and the SG 'B' atmospheric dump valve opens and sticks open (faulted SG).
Additionally, the operable motor driven AFW pump and the turbine driven AFW pump fail to automatically start, but can be started manually by the operator.
A 500 gpm SG tube rupture then occurs resulting in a ruptured and faulted SG.
The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -> E-2 --. E-3 -4 ECA-3.1.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario I Page 3 of 17
Prot, dm Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Coiiuitions REV I
(
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
The plant is at 75% power.
Tavg is 5690F.
RCS boron concentration is 1115 ppm.
Control Bank "D" is at 190 steps.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1.
Reduce power to remove FW-P-1 B from service ASAP (1% per min.) due to a motor bearing vibration.
- 2.
Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 3.
FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.
- 4.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
FW-P-3A OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior TS 3.7.1.2, Action c
- 1. Power reduction reactivity plan
- 2. 1OM-52.4.B, Load Following T
4 of 17
BEAVER VALLE' r UWER Training Administrative I
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I IPLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE EVENT #1 Lower Rx power to 63%.
Following the reactivity plan, the Crew lowers reactor power.
US directs load decrease to < 63% at 1% per minute.
PO initiates turbine load decrease.
RO initiates RCS boration as necessary to maintain Tavg -Tref.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I
(
STATION Volunc 3 Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 5 of 17
(
BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER Training Administrative PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE FW-P-1 B trips.
A7-37, SG Feed Pump Auto Stop A7-39, SG Feed Pump Disch Flow Hi Start 2 nd Pump STATION Volun',
3 Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PO recognizes feed pump trip and informs US.
US refers to ARP's as time permits.
US directs load decrease to < 63% at 5% per minute.
PO decreases turbine load at 5% per minute.
RO continues RCS boration to maintain Tavg-Tref.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
EVENT #2 After power is lowered to 70%
IMF FWM01B 6 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER Training Administrative INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE STATION Volun, 3 Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #3 After plant conditions have stabilized:
IMF PRS06A PZR level transmitter LT-RC-459 fails low.
"* A4-4, PZR Control Level Deviation Low
"* A4-3, PZR Control Level Low.
LCV-CH-460A, TV-CH-200A, B, C close and PZR heaters turn off.
Letdown isolates and actual PZR level rises.
RO recognizes problem with PZR level channel, informs US.
US refers to ARP and 1OM-6.4.IF,.
RO informs US that LT-RC-459 failed low.
Level alarms clear, charging flow begins decreasing, high flow alarm clears.
Continue with next event when letdown has been reestablished.
US directs Operator to defeat level control input with PZR level channel and recorder selector switches per 1OM-6.4.IF, Attachment 1.
RO informs US that Channels 460 and 461 are selected.
US directs Operators to re-establish normal letdown and re-energize PZR heaters.
US refers to T.S. Table 3.3-1, Item 11 to determine action required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 7 of17
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER Training Administrative I
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EVENT #4 "B" SG Steam Flow Transmitter
[FT-MS-484] fails low.
MSS14C, 0, 0 HLANT STATli.flR RF5 PPflIJc FT-MS-484 fails low.
0 A7-50, Loop 2 Feed > Stm Feedwater flow decreases causing SG levels to decrease.
SG level stabilizes.
STATION Volurni 3 Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE]
PO determines which channel has failed by comparing with other steam flow indicators.
US determines that 1OM-24.4.IF, is to be implemented.
PO places "B" SG FRV in manual and stabilizes steam generator level.
PO selects redundant steam flow transmitter by placing FC-1FFW-488 to FM-485 position.
PO returns "B" FRV to auto when SG level is returned to normal range.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 8 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r jWER Training Administrative l I
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MLPNI IAIU5UKI-'()NSF EVENT #5 After the Operator has taken manual control of feedwater and stabilized SG level, insert:
FCV-FW-488 fails closed causing a loss of feedwater flow to the "B" SG.
PO acknowledges alarms associated with loss of feedwater flow to "B" SG.
IMF FWM07B PO identifies and reports valve closure to Crew.
PO attempts to manually open the valve (failed, will not open).
PO reports valve will not open.
US acknowledges reports from Crew.
US directs a manual reactor trip due to rapidly degrading plant conditions.
Following the reactor trip, steam dump valves fail to operate, resulting in the SG atmospheric dump valves opening.
"B" SG ADV failure and steam break in Main Steam Valve Room.
RCS pressure drops.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 IMF MSS12B 9 of 17 t'LAN I b I A I Uti R RE:QP0K1!QP:
STATION Volun,= 3 Aanual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE IMF MSS07
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".
Turbine tripped. Throttle valves and governor valves closed.
Depress reheater controller, reset push button. Reheat flow control and block valves closed.
Main generator output breakers open.
Exciter circuit breaker open.
AE and DF busses energized.
Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status lights.
EDG's running.
All red marked SIS valve indicating lights lit.
Volun,, 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RO and PO commence immediate actions of E-0, US references E-0 to verify immediate actions.
RO verifies reactor trip.
PO verifies turbine trip.
RO sounds standby alarm.
PO ensures reheat steam isolation.
PO verifies generator trip.
PO verifies AE and DF busses energized.
RO initiates manual Safety Injection.
PO verifies EDG's running.
RO/PO verify SI system status.
Two HHSI pumps running.
FI-SI-943 indicates flow.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 10 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I LHSI pumps running.
FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 not started automatically.
CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew establishes the minimum required AFW flow rate to the SG's before transition out of E-0.
FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 started and running.
PO determines that no AFW Pumps are running.
PO informs US that none of the AFW pumps are running.
PO manually starts FW-P-3B and FW P-2.
MOV-FW-151 "A" through "F" open.
RPRW pumps running.
All indicating lights with orange marks lit.
All indicating lights with green marks lit.
All indicating lights with yellow marks lit.
CIB and Containment Spray not required.
PO/RO verify AFW status.
RO/PO verify RW System in service.
RO/PO verify CIA.
RO/PO verify FWI.
RO/PO verify MSLI.
RO verifies CIB and Containment Spray not required.
As Outside Operator, notify the Control Room that an ADV on "B" main steam line is open and blowing steam.
CCR pumps running.
SR detector selector switches in normal.
RO verifies SR detector HV selector switches in normal.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 INH20, INH21 Volurnt 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 11 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE AFW flow > 325 gpm.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
RCS Tvg decreasing.
All yellow marked SLI valve indicators lit.
PORV's closed.
Safeties closed.
Spray valves at zero demand.
Power available to PORV MOV's.
PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.
RCP's running.
RO checks if RCP's should be stopped.
RCS/SG D/P > 150 psid.
CCR flow normal.
"B" SG is faulted as indicated by pressure difference between "B" SG compared to "A" and "C" SG's.
PO checks if SG's are faulted.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 Volunii 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PO verifies AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.
PO verifies IA header pressure greater than 100 psig.
PO verifies RCS Tvg stable at or trending to 5471F; PO reduces AFW flow to 355 gpm.
Crew performs a SLI due to RCS cooldown.
RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.
12 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY'r-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE VoIumt= 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Crew transitions to E-2.
US exits E-0 at Step 22 and enters E-2.
When requested as U2 Operator, report 2HVC*MOD201A - D closed and 2HVC*MOD204A, B closed.
"B" SG tube rupture (500 gpm)
IMF RCS03B Report valves status to Control Room WR level increasing slowly without feedwater flow.
Control Room dampers shut. Timers running, Control Room pressurizing.
2HVC8MOD201A - D closed.
2HVC*MOD204A, B closed.
Valve indicators with yellow marks lit.
"A" and "C" SG pressures stable.
"B" SG pressure dropping uncontrollably.
FCV-FW-488 closed.
FCV-FW-489 closed.
MOV-FW-151C and D closed.
PCV-MS-101B open.
"B" SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner. PZR level and pressure decreasing.
US directs STA to monitor status trees.
PO initiates CREBAPS, and verifies system activated.
PO verifies CREBAPS actuated in U2 by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.
Crew verifies steam line isolation.
PO checks for any non-faulted SG.
PO identifies "B" SG as faulted.
PO closes/verifies "B" MFRV closed.
PO closes/verifies "B" BFRV closed.
PO closes MOV-FW-151C and D.
PO attempts to manually close PCV MS-101B.
PO directs Operator to close MS-16 and to open MS-17.
Crew checks if SG tubes are intact.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 13 of 17
(
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual L INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I Volurn%. 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE j Crew transitions to E-3.
US exits E-2 and enters E-3.
CREBAPS actuated.
All RCPs running. CCR flow, RCS/SG D/P > 150 psig.
"B" SG ruptured.
"B" SG atmospheric dump valve in manual, valve remains open.
RHR valve closed.
MS-16 shut.
TV-MS-111 B shut.
"B" SG main steam trip, bypass and non return valves shut.
"B" SG pressure > 380 psig.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
US directs Operators to verify CREBAPS actuated.
RO checks if RCP's should be stopped, does not stop RCP's.
US identifies "B" SG as the ruptured SG based on Operator reports.
US directs Operators to isolate flow from the "B" SG.
US directs operator to locally isolate steam dump valve.
PO checks ruptured SG NR level, verifies AFW flow to "B" SG secured.
PO checks ruptured SG pressure >
380 psig.
PO verifies station instrument air header pressure > 100 psig.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 14 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I Target temperature determined based on ruptured SG pressure.
Cooldown using "A" and "C" SG atmospheric relief valves.
RCS pressure < 1950 psig.
Average of the 5 highest TC's at target temperature.
Intact SG's < 13% NR level.
PORV's closed. Power available to PORV block valves, all PORV block valves open.
SI reset.
CIA and CIB reset.
CNMT IA header pressure > 85 psig.
LHSI pumps stopped and in automatic.
Cooldown complete.
"B" SG pressure < 250 psig above intact SG's.
Volurn-3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US determines target temperature and initiates cooldown. STA trends cooldown rate.
Crew initiates RCS cooldown at maximum rate to the target temperature.
RO blocks steamline SI when RCS pressure is below 1950 psig.
Crew stops RCS cooldown at target temperature.
PO checks intact SG level > 13% NR, maintains AFW flow > 355 gpm.
RO checks PORV's and block valves, power available and closed.
US verifies SI, CIA and CIB reset.
US verifies RCS pressure > 300 psig.
Directs RO to stop LHSI pumps.
US verifies RCS at target temperature.
Crew checks ruptured SG pressure >
250 psig above intact SG's.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 15 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r,WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I Crew transitions to ECA-3.1.
RWST > 19 feet.
Previously performed.
Previously performed.
Previously performed.
All busses energized.
No Quench Spray Pumps running.
RCS pressure greater than 250 psig.
LHSI pumps stopped.
"B" SG steam and feed flow isolated previously.
Aux. Building and safeguards radiation consistent with pre-event values. Obtain samples as listed in Step 9.b.
"B" SG previously identified and isolated.
"A" and "C" SG's intact.
Volun1,. 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US exists E-3 and enters ECA-3.1.
RO verifies CNMT vents and drains isolated; SI, CIA and CIB reset.
PO verifies stub busses energized.
PO verifies CNMT instrument air available.
PO verifies all AC busses energized by offsite power.
RO places all PZR heaters in Pull-To Lock.
RO check if any Quench Spray Pumps running.
RO checks if LHSI pumps should be stopped.
PO checks ruptured SG NR level and verifies "B" SG isolated.
US initiates evaluation of plant status.
PO checks if any SG's are faulted.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I 16 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY i-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Volur'ri 3 Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 P~i"m Rt-Q
_A INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSEJ CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew initiates cool down of the RCS to cold shutdown conditions at the highest achievable rate but less than 100°F per hour.
Terminate drill when cooldown is started in ECA-3.1.
Collect and review logs after allowing crew time to complete.
Erase any VOND markings.
SG NR level > 13%.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
Do not exceed 100°F/hour cooldown in RCS cold leg.
PO checks intact SG levels and maintains NR level > 13%, orAFW flow > 355 GPM.
PO verifies station instrument air header pressure > 100 psig.
PO commences cooldown using "A" and "C" SG atmospheric relief valves at < 100OF per hour.
US directs Chemistry to obtain hourly RCS boron samples.
BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 17 of 17 I
SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #2 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator 1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
REVIEWED BY:
E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 Revision No.
Date 0
7/26/02 Revision No.
Date 7/26/02 Date
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.:
2 Op Test No.:
2002-NRC-01 Examiners:
Candidates:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Initial Conditions:
97% power.
Turnover:
FW-P-3A OOS. Raise power to 100%. Severe weather is expected.
Critical Tasks:
E-O.Q, Turbine Trip E-O.D, Manual Safety Injection E-1.C,Trip All RCPs Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description 1
N (US)
Power ascension at normal rate.
N (PO)
PR channel N44 summing amplifier fails high causing control rods to step in.
I (US) 3 IOR I (RO)
Letdown backpressure regulating valve fails shut.
X06A087P I (US) 4 CCW03A C (PO)
IOR C (US)
CCR pressure control valve fails open.
X16A056P CCW08B C (All)
CCR supply leak to 'IB' RCP (ramp to 500 gpm).
5 RCS09B M (All)
RCP 'B' locked rotor causes automatic Rx trip.
INH48 C (PO)
Main turbine fails to trip automatically (manual trip available).
C (US)
RCS02B M (All)
SIS10A C (RO)
Failure of automatic safety injection (both trains).
SIS10B C (US)
I__
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 Page 2 of 16
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario Description The Crew will perform a normal power ascension at the rate of 12% per hour.
After power has been raised to 100% and the control rods are placed in automatic, power range channel N-44 summing amplifier output fails high causing inadvertent, automatic rod motion.
Operator action is required to place rod control in manual to stop the inward rod motion. After stabilizing the plant, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to verify all required actions have been performed.
After completing actions for the failed power range channel, the letdown backpressure regulating valve fails closed causing a loss of normal letdown, increased pressure in the letdown line, and lifting of the letdown relief valve with associated alarms.
After letdown is restored with the controller in manual, a component cooling pump trips and the pressure control valve fails open requiring operator action to take manual control to restore system pressure.
A component cooling line leak then occurs in the supply line to RCP 'B' and increases to 500 gpm requiring operator action to locate and isolate the leak. Before the reactor can be manually tripped; however, RCP 'B' will experience a locked rotor resulting in an automatic reactor trip.
Following the reactor trip, the main turbine will fail to automatically trip requiring operator action to manually trip the turbine.
A 900 gpm LOCA occurs along with a failure of automatic safety injection Train 'A' and Train 'B'.
Operator action is required to manually initiate safety injection.
The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -- E-1.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 Page 3 of 16
Prog, dm Title 2002 NRC Examination INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Initial Co.l,,*tions REV
- The plant is at 97% power.
- Tavg is 5750F.
RCS boron concentration is 1055 ppm.
° Control Bank "D" is at 215 steps.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1.
Raise power to 100% at 12% per hour and place control rods in automatic.
- 2.
Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 3.
FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.
- 4.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED
- 1. Power increase reactivity plan
- 2. 1OM-52.4A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load Operation BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 1
ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior TS 3.7.1.2 Action c 4 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES -
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 1
EVENT 1 Raise power to 100%.
Turbine load and reactor power increasing at 12% per hour.
US assumes control and directs Operators to increase reactor power to 100% lAW 1OM-52.4.A, Step A.118.
Crew reviews/agrees with reactivity plan. US approves for use. Crew begins power increase.
RO places rod control in automatic when 100% power is reached.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 5 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]
EVENT2 After power has been raised to 100% and control rods are placed in automatic, insert:
PR Channel N-44 Fails High NIS03D (0 0)
N-44 power indications upscale.
"* A4-69, Neutron Flux Rate High
"* A-465, NIS PR High Setpoint Neutron Flux High Control rods inserting.
Turbine load decreasing.
RO determines failed instrument.
US directs RO to place control rods in Manual.
RO places rod control in Manual.
US refers to AOP-1.2.1C.
US directs turbine load decrease at 1%
per minute to maintain Tavg within 20F of Tref. PO initiates turbine load decrease.
PO removes control power supply fuses of N-44 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
PO turns Rod Stop Bypass switch to Bypass for N-44.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 6 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE -TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]
Note:
STA will perform (simulate) QPTR and report satisfactory results.
PO turns the Comparator Channel Defeat switch to N-44.
RO verifies vertical board recorders are selected to monitor only operable detectors.
US refers to T.S. 4.2.1.1.b and directs that AFD be monitored and trended in accordance with 1OM-49.4. L.
US refers to T.S. 3.2.4, and Table 3.3-.1, Item 2, Action 2.
Continue with next event at Lead Examiner's discretion.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 7 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY t-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE 1 OBJECTIVE 7EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 1
EVENT3 PCV-1CH-145 fails closed resulting in a loss of normal letdown flow.
"* A3-107, NRHX Disch Press High
"* A2-3F, Letdown Flowpath Trouble RO notes indications and alarms.
RO notifies US. Refers to ARP.
US refers to AOP-1.7.1.
RO reports zero flow indicated on 1CHS-FI150.
RO takes manual control of PCV-1CH 145 and restores letdown flow to previous value.
US contacts I&C to investigate failure of PCV-1CH-145.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 IOR X06A087P (0 0) 1 8 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES J PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSEV EVENT 4 IMF CCW03A IOR X16056P (5 0) 0 CCW08B, 500 gpm, 600 sec.
Running CCR Pump trips and PCV-1CC 100 Fails Open A3-83, React. Cool PP Upper BRG Lube Oil Cool Water Flow Low A3-76, React Cool PP Motor Bearing Temp High.
A6-35, Primary Water Supply Press Low.
Decreasing CCR surge tank level.
Increasing Containment sump levels.
RCP "C" motor and bearing temperatures increasing.
Level control in manual with maximum makeup.
PO identifies trip of running CCR pump.
PO identifies PCV-1CC-100 is full open.
US refers to 1OM-15.4.AAE and directs PO to place PCV-1CC-100 in manual and raise CCR pressure.
Crew identifies and reports leak in CCR system.
Crew determines that CCR header leak is inside containment.
Crew performs actions per 1OM 15.4.AAC.
Check CCR system status.
Place surge tank level control valve LCV-1CC-100A in manual and adjust control signal to maximize makeup to surge tank.
Monitor RCP motor bearing upper and lower temperatures for RCP's.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 9 of 16
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BEAVER VALLEY -r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Non-essential loads isolated.
Crew attempts to locate the leak.
US may direct a reactor shutdown.
Crew: If any RCP temperatures are approaching limits (2000F) OR operating CCR pumps discharge pressure and current indicates cavitation:
"* Manually trip the reactor.
"* Trip all RCPs.
"* Enter E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 10 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT5 Prior to the Crew's decision to manually trip the reactor, insert:
IMF RCS09B INH48 (Pre-loaded)
After RCP "B" locked rotor, insert:
IMF RCS02B, 900 GPM Crew enters E-0.
RCP "B" Locked Rotor with Auto Turbine Trip The main turbine will fail to trip automatically following the reactor trip.
RCS loop 2 flow indication low (< 90%).
Loop 3 R.C. LOW FLOW Status Panel lights lit (Chan 1 RED, Chan II WHITE, Chan III BLUE)
RCS Loop "B" 900 GPM LOCA Reactor fails to trip automatically.
Neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit, Rod position at "0".
Plant standby alarm sounded Throttle and governor valves open reheat stop and intercept valves open.
Crew identifies and reports trip of RCP "B" with loss of RCS loop flow.
RO/PO perform Immediate Operator Actions of E-0:
"* RO determines reactor failed to automatically trip and manually trips the reactor.
"* Verify Reactor Trip.
"* Alert Plant Personnel.
Verify Turbine Trip.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 11 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY t-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew manually trips the turbine before a severe (orange path) challenge develops on either the Subcriticality or Integrity CSF.
Reheat flow control valves and MOV's open.
Steam dumps to OFF.
Following manual turbine trip, throttle and governor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.
Main generator output breakers open.
Exciter circuit breaker open.
PO reports main turbine failed to trip.
US directs PO to trip the turbine.
PO trips the turbine manually.
PO verifies generator trip.
AE and DF busses energized.
EDG's running.
SIS10A, SIS10B (Pre-loaded)
CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew manually actuates at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards before transition to any ORP.
PO verifies power to AC emergency busses.
PO verifies both EDG's are running.
RO determines SI failed to actuate automatically.
RO manually actuates both SI trains.
RO verifies two charging/HHSI pumps are running.
LHSI pumps running.
RO checks HHSI to BIT flow indicated.
RO/PO checks both LHSI pumps are running.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 12 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r-,.WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE -TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Motor driven AFW pump "3B" running unless previously placed in P-T-L.
Turbine driven AFW pump is running.
RPRW pumps running.
CCR Hx pressure > 20 psig.
All indicating lights with orange marks lit.
All indicating lights with green marks lit.
All indicating lights with yellow marks lit.
All indicating lights with red marks lit.
CCR pumps running.
SR detector selector switches in Normal.
AFW flow > 325 gpm.
RO/PO check all valves indicating lights with RED marks are LIT.
PO determines "B" Motor Driven AFW pump is running.
PO determines Turbine driven AFW pump is running by verifying AFW steam supply trip valves are open..
PO verifies all SG AFW throttle valves are full open.
RO/PO verify RW System Status.
RO/PO verify 2 CCR pumps running.
RO/PO verify CIA.
RO/PO verify FWI.
RO/PO verify FWI.
RO/PO verify MSLI.
RO/PO verify SI.
RO/PO verify CCR Status.
RO verifies SR detector HV Selector Switches in Normal.
PO verifies AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 13 of 16
(
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
PORV's closed.
Safeties closed.
Spray valves at zero demand.
Power available to PORV MOV's.
Power available to PORV MOV's.
PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.
D/P between RCS pressure and highest SG pressure < 200 psid.
All RCP's stopped.
No SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner.
No SG levels rising in an uncontrolled manner.
RCS pressure and PZR level decreasing rapidly.
PO checks IA header pressure > 100 psig.
PO verifies RCS Tavg stable or trending to 5470F.
RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.
RO checks if RCP's should be stopped.
PO checks if SG's are faulted.
PO checks if SG tubes are intact.
US determines RCS is not intact.
US exits E-0 and enters E-1.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 14 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Control Room dampers shut. Timers running, Control Room pressurizing.
When requested as U2 Operator, report 2HVC*MOD201A - D closed and 2HVC*MOD204A and B closed.
D/P between RCS pressure and highest SG pressure < 200 psid.
CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew trips all RCP's when RCS to highest S/G D/P criteria is exceeded and SI flow is verified prior to exiting E-1.
All RCP's stopped.
PO initiates CREBAPS and verifies system activated.
PO verifies CREBAPS activated in U2 by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.
RO checks if RCP's should be stopped.
RO stops all RCP's if not stopped previously.
No SG pressures dropping in an uncontrolled manner.
AFW flow > 325 gpm.
Instrument air header pressure > 100 psig.
PORV's closed.
Safeties closed.
Spray valves at zero demand.
Power available to PORV MOV's.
PO checks if any SG's are faulted.
PO maintains AFW flow > 355 GPM until NR SG level is > 13%.
PO checks IA header pressure > 100 psig.
RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2
(
15 of 16
BEAVER VALLEY, JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES -
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.
No SG levels rising in an uncontrolled PO checks if SG tubes are intact.
manner.
RCS pressure and PZR level lowering.
RO checks is SI flow should be terminated.
A1-2H lit. CNMT pressure > 8 psig. All RO checks CIB CNMT spray status.
indicating lights with blue CIB marks LIT.
Both trains of SI reset.
CIA reset.
RO resets CIA.
RCP pressure dropping.
RO checks if LHSI pumps should be RCP pressure dropping.
secured.
RO checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 5470F.
RO checks SG pressure stable or rising.
RO checks RCS pressure stable or dropping.
Terminate drill.
Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete.
Erase any VOND marks.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 16 of 16
SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #1 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
REVIEWED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator 1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
E. Emfield APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Revision No.
Date 1
7/26/02
-I
+ Revision No.
I Date 4
7/26/02 Date 7/26/02 Date Date I
SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #3 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
REVIEWED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator 1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
7/26/02 Date 7/26/02 Date E. Emfield APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 Revision No.
Date 0
7/26/02 Revision No.
Date i
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
FENOC BVPS Unit I Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
2002-01 Examiners:
Candidates:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Initial Conditions:
7% power.
Turnover:
FW-P-3A OOS. Continue the plant startup. Severe weather is expected.
Critical Tasks:
E-O.A, Trip Reactor; E-0.0, Close Containment Isolation Valves E-O.E, Manually Start Quench Spray Pump Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description 1
N (PO)
Shift in-service turbine plant component cooling pumps.
N (US) 2 R (RO)
Plant startup.
N (US) 3 NIS07A I (RO)
Intermediate range channel instrument power fuse blows.
I (US) 4 PRS013 I (RO)
Pressurizer level controller fails low.
I (US) 5 MSS1 1 I (PO)
Steam pressure channel fails high causing steam dump I (US) valves to open.
6 MSS-1C M (All)
SG 'C' faulted inside containment.
CRF-12A C (RO)
Automatic reactor trip failure (manual trip available).
C (US)
SlS-2A C (RO)
Quench spray pump 'lA' trips 15 seconds after start.
C (US)
INH43 C (RO)
Quench spray pump '11B' fails to start automatically (manual C (US) start available).
INH50 C (RO)
Automatic containment isolation phase 'B' failure (manual C (US) available).
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 2 of 17
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario
Description:
The Crew shifts in-service turbine plant component cooling pumps and continues the reactor startup increasing reactor power above 10%.
After exceeding 10% power, an intermediate range instrument power fuse blows requiring the RO to verify the failed instrument channel. The Unit Supervisor should direct actions in accordance with AOP-1.2.1 B and refer to Technical Specifications.
The Pressurizer master level controller then fails low causing charging flow to decrease, backup heaters to turn off as level drops, and letdown to isolate. The RO must take manual control of the Pressurizer level controller to terminate the event.
After Pressurizer level control is re-established, the steam header pressure transmitter fails high causing the condenser steam dump valves to open. After identifying the failure, the PO will take manual control and close the steam dump valve.
When conditions have stabilized, a steam break occurs on 'C' SG inside containment followed by failure of the reactor to automatically trip; however, manual trip is available.
Following safety injection, quench spray pump 'IA' trips and quench spray pump '18' fails to start automatically but can be manually started. Containment isolation phase 'B' isolation then fails to actuate automatically, but can be manually initiated by the operator.
The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -* E-2 -> ES-I. 1.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 3 of 17
Pro9.dm Title 2002 NRC Examination INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Initial Coi*uitions REV The plant is at 7% power.
Tavg is 5491F.
RCS boron concentration is 1868 ppm.
Control Bank "D" is at 103 steps.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1.
Shift the in-service CCT pumps.
- 2.
Continue with the plant startup.
- 3.
Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 4.
FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED
- 1. Power increase reactivity plan
- 2. 1OM-52.4A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load Operation BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 2
ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago TS 3.7.1.2 Action c 4 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
When the shift turnover is complete, place the Simulator to RUN and commence the drill.
Simulator running.
Crew assumes control of the unit.
EVENT #1 PO shifts in-service CCT Pumps.
Verify 1CC-P-3B aligned for standby operation.
Direct local operator to verify 1CC-P 3B has adequate oil level.
1CC-P-3B running.
1CC-P-3A stopped.
Start 1CC-P-3B.
Direct local operator to verify proper operation.
Stop 1CC-P-3A and place control switch in automatic.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 Shift in-service CCT Pumps 5 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY t-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]
EVENT #2 Reactor Power Increase Continue with plant startup.
Reactor at 7% power.
Status lights on Panel 176 actuate at 10%.
Status light Intermediate Range Rx Trip blocked is on.
Status light Power Range Low Setpoint Blocked in on.
NOT P-7 is off.
Crew commences power increase in accordance with reactivity plan.
US references 1OM-52.4.A, Step 4.b to continue the power increase.
RO commences raising reactor power to between 10 and 20%.
RO verifies P-10 bistables actuate as required as power increases to > 10%.
RO blocks the IR Trip and Rod Stop and verifies status lights on.
RO blocks Power Range low Overpower Trip and verifies status lights on.
RO verifies that status light NOT P-7 is off.
RO selects highest power range channels on NR-45 recorder.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 6 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]
EVENT #3 Intermediate Range NI-35 Failure After Crew has raised reactor power to greater than 10% and IR trips have been blocked, insert:
Meters for NI-35 indicate zero and blown fuse indication exists on drawer.
IR Channel NI-35 Channel Trip IMF NIS07A 0 Rod block alarms actuated. Loss of detector/compensating voltage.
"* A4-93, NIS Intermediate Range Loss Of CH I Detector Voltage
"* A4-94, NIS Intermediate Range Loss Of CH I Compensation Voltage RO acknowledges alarms and performs a channel check to identify NI-36 as the failed channel.
US refers to AOP-1.2.1B. Verifies Unit is in Mode 1 and goes to step 4.
Crew verifies power still greater than 10% and intermediate range trip is still blocked.
Crew places a caution tag on source range channels.
US references Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.
US directs the Crew to continue with the Unit startup.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 7 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY. JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RO withdraws rods to raise reactor power to 15 to 18%.
RO/PO maintain reactor power, Tavg, and SG level in preparation for Unit synchronization.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 8 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
EVENT #4 IMF PRS013 PZR Level Controller Fails Low Charging pump flow decreases. Backup heaters may turn off as level drops.
Letdown isolation may occur.
A3-58, Charging Pump Disch Flow High/Low RO notes indications and alarm, informs US.
US refers to ARP's.
PZR level control in manual.
US directs RO to take manual PZR level control.
RO takes manual control of PZR level controller.
US requests I&C to investigate controller failure.
EVENT #5 IMF MSS11 PT-1 MS-464 Fails High Condenser steam dump valves open.
PO recognizes steam dumps opening and diagnoses failure of PT-1 MS-464.
US directs PO to take manual control of steam dump valve controller.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 9 of 17
(
BEAVER VALLEY ri-,WER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES ý PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE IOBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Steam dump valves closed.
PO takes manual control of AM-1 MS 464B and closes steam dump valves.
US contacts I&C to investigate failure.
EVENT #6 IMF MSSIC CRF-12A (pre-loaded)
CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew manually trips the reactor before performing the mitigation strategy of FR-S.1.
SG "C" Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Containment temperature and pressure rising.
Reactor fails to automatically trip.
Reactor trips, turbine trips, RCS pressure drops.
Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".
US directs manual reactor trip due to rising containment pressure.
RO and PO commence Immediate Operator Actions of E-0.
RO informs US of failure of reactor trip and first out annunciators.
US directs RO to manually trip the reactor.
RO manually trips reactor.
RO verifies reactor is tripped.
Throttle and governor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.
RO sounds standby alarm and announces reactor trip.
PO verifies turbine tripped.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 10 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY t-,WER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE 1 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
Reheat flow control valves and MOV's closed.
Main generator output breakers open.
Exciter circuit breaker open.
AE and DF busses energized.
Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status lights. SI actuated by low steam line pressure.
Both EDG's running.
HHSI pumps running.
LHSI pumps running.
All red marked SI valve indicating lights lit.
FW-P-3B running. MOV-FW-151A through F open.
RPRW pumps running.
Failure of Automatic Phase "B" Containment Isolation PO ensures reheat steam isolation by depressing reheat controller reset pushbutton and checks MOV-1OOA & B shut.
PO verifies generator trip.
PO verifies emergency busses energized.
RO checks if SI has actuated, reports SI has actuated.
PO verifies EDG's running.
RO/PO verify SI system status.
PO verifies AFW status.
RO verifies RW System in service.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 INH5O 11 ofl17
BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]
CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew closes Cnmt. isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each penetration before the end of the drill.
All indicating lights with orange CIA marks lit. CIB failed to actuate.
CIB actuated.
All indicating lights with orange CIB marks lit.
RO/PO verify CIA, determine that it has actuated and report CIA status to the US.
RO manually actuates CIB.
RO/PO verify CIB alignment.
All indicating lights with green FWI marks lit.
Containment pressure increasing, steam line pressure dropping.
All indicating lights with yellow marks lit.
Quench spray pump "B" fails to start automatically.
CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew manually actuates at least the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment before a red path challenge develops to the Containment CSF.
Quench spray pump running.
RO/PO verify FWI.
RO/PO determine MSLI is required.
RO/PO verify MSLI.
RO/PO reports QSS pump "B" failed to auto start.
US directs manual start of QSS pump "B".
RO/PO manually starts QSS pump "B".
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 INH43 12 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY
,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
QS pump 'A' trips 15 seconds after starting.
SR detector high voltage selector switches in normal.
AFW flow > 325 gpm.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
Tavg < 5740F and dropping rapidly. (SLI already verified.)
PORV's closed.
SIS-2A Safeties closed.
Spray valves at zero demand.
Power available to PORV MOV's.
PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.
RCP's stopped after CIB.
RO stopped RCP's after CIB actuation, reports status to US.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 RO reports Quench Spray status to US.
RO verifies SR detector high voltage selector switches in normal.
PO verifies total AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.
PO verifies station instrument air header pressure > 100 psig.
RO determines RCS temperature is dropping.
US directs personnel to perform emergency safety function checklists as time permits.
RO checks PZR PORV's and spray valve's status.
13 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY i-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE "C" SG pressure is decreasing due to steam line rupture in containment.
CREBAPS actuated on CIB.
All five Control Room bottled air red lights lit.
Both emergency ventilation timers running.
Control Room intake and Exhaust dampers closed.
When requested as U2 Operator, report 2HCV*MOD201A - D closed and 2HCV*MOD204A, B closed.
Yellow marks lit.
"A" and "B" SG pressures stable.
"C" SG pressure dropping uncontrollably.
FCV-1 FW-498 closed.
FCV-1 FW-499 closed.
MOV-FW-151A and 151B closed.
FW-P-2 aligned to SG's "A" & "B".
Crew transitions to E-2.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 PO checks SG pressures and reports "C" SG as faulted to the US.
US exits E-0 and enters E-2.
PO verifies CREBAPS actuated.
PO request Unit 2 Control Room to check dampers closed.
RO/PO verifies steamline isolation.
PO checks for non-faulted SG.
Crew identifies "C" SG as faulted.
PO closes/verifies "C" MFRV and BFRV closed.
PO closes MOV-FW-151A and 151B.
PO verifies turbine driven AFW pump steam supply.
14 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PCV-MS-101C closed.
HCV-MS-104 closed.
No SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner.
Crew transitions to ES-1.1, if SI termination criteria is satisfied.
Crew verifies "C" SG atmospheric dump valve closed.
Crew verifies RHR control valve closed.
Crew checks if SG tubes are intact.
US exits E-2 at Step 7 and enters ES 1.1.
Use LOA's as required to close breakers.
Report 8N22 and 9P21 closed.
SI reset.
CIA reset.
CIB reset.
One HHSI pump running.
1AE and 1DF 4KV stub busses energized.
CCR pumps in P-T-L.
Aux RW Pumps in P-T-L.
CNMT air recirc fans in P-T-L.
CRDM shroud fans in P-T-L.
PRZR heaters 2A and 2B in P-T-L.
RO resets CIA and CIB.
PO re-energizes stub busses.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3
(
ti 15 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE CNMT instrument air compressors in P-T-L.
480V stub busses energized.
Automatic cold leg recirc change over reset.
Chiller verified in service.
TV-1CC-110D and F2 open.
TV-1CC-110E2 and E3 open.
CNMT instrument air compressor running.
CNMT air header pressure > 85 psig.
RCS pressure stable or rising.
MOV-CH-289 and 310 open.
FCV-CH-122 throttled to maintain Pressurizer level.
MOV-SI-867A through D shut.
I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I RO/PO directs 480V stub busses energized.
RO resets automatic cold leg recirc change over (both trains).
PO starts CNMT instrument air compressors.
PO opens containment recirc cooling coils AC/RW outlet.
PO opens containment recirc cooling coils AC inlet containment isolation valves.
PO starts an available containment IA compressor.
RO establishes normal charging flow.
RO isolates the BIT.
Terminate the drill in after the BIT is isolated.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 16 of 17
BEAVER VALLEY'r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
Collect and review logs after allowing Operators to complete them.
Erase any VOND markings.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 17 of 17
SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #4 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
REVIEWED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator 1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
7/26/02 Date 7/26/02 Date E. Emfield APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 4 Revision No.
Date 0
7/26/02 Revision No.
Date
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
2002-NRC-01 Examiners:
Candidates:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Initial Conditions:
48% power.
Turnover:
FW-P-3A OOS. Raise power to 100%. Severe weather expected.
Critical Tasks:
FR-S.I.C, Insert RCCAs E-O.I, Manually Start HHSI Pump E-1.C, Trip all RCPs Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description 1
N (US)
Power ascension at normal rate.
N (PO)
R (RO) 2 FWM-15A I (PO)
SG feedwater level controller fails high.
I (US) 3 TUR16 I (PO)
Turbine impulse pressure transmitter fails high causing a I (RO) load rejection.
I (US) 4 PRS12 I (RO)
Pressurizer pressure master controller fails high causing a I (US)
PORV actuation and pressure decrease.
PRS03A C (RO)
PZR PORV leaks after lifting (block valve can be shut).
C (US) 5 PRS05 M (All) 400 gpm Pressurizer vapor space leak (LOCA).
CRF12A ATWS CRF12B SIS05A C (RO)
HHSI pump trips on safety injection.
INH40 C (US)
Standby HHSI pump fails to auto start (manual start available).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2 of 18
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario
Description:
After the Crew has raised power by 5%, a SG feedwater level controller fails high requiring the PO to take manual control to restore SG level back to program.
After SG level is stabilized, the turbine impulse pressure transmitter fails high resulting in a load rejection. The Crew must diagnose the failure and stop the load loss by taking manual control of the turbine EHC system. The Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to determine the actions required as a result of the plant transient.
After conditions have been stabilized, the Pressurizer master controller fails high causing the following control channel actions: PORV opens, heaters turnoff; spray valves open, and RCS pressure decreases. Manual control of the Pressurizer master controller will fail to close the PORV and the RO should take alternate action to close the PORV. After closing, the PORV will leak requiring the crew to close its block valve to stop the leakage and meet the Technical Specifications action statement requirement.
After the PORV block valve has been closed a 400 gpm Pressurizer vapor space leak (LOCA) will result in a reactor trip condition; however, the reactor trip will fail leading to an ATWS.
As the Pressurizer vapor space leak continues, the running high head SI pump will trip on safety injection actuation and the standby high head SI pump will fail to automatically start, but can be manually started by the operator.
The expected procedure flow path is E-0 --> FR-S.1 --> E-0 -4 E-1.
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Prog, am Title 2002 NRC Examination INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Initial Conuitions REV The plant is at 48% power.
Tavg is 5590F.
RCS boron concentration is 1213 ppm.
Control Bank "D" is at 152 steps.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1.
Raise power to 100%.
- 2.
Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 3.
FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED
- 1. Power increase reactivity plan
- 2. IOM-52.4.A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load 4 of 18
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1 ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago TS 3.7.1.2 Action c
BEAVER VALLE' r.WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
EVENT #1 Raise power.
Reactor at 48%.
Turbine load and reactor power increasing at 12%/hr.
US assumes control and directs Operators to increase reactor power to 100% lAW 1OM-52.4.A, Step A.118.
Crew reviews/agrees with reactivity plan. US approves for use. Crew begins power increase.
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IN If I
U I IUNAL UUID-LINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE PLNTSTTU RREPOS OBJECTIVEF I P P1=rTrfl 5RT1 iflFI'T PCJ EVENT #2 "A" SG Feedwater Level Controller Output Fails High FCV-1 FW-478 output fails high.
IMF FWM-15A NOTE:
Level deviation dependent on time of establishing normal MFRV control to restore "A" SG level.
"A" SG feed flow rises. "A" NR level rises.
0 47-42, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Greater Than Steam Flow
- A7-45, Steam Generator 1A Level Deviation From Setpoint A7-42 clears after FCV-1 FW-478 in manual feed flow reducing.
PO notes problem with "A" SG level control valve FCV-FW-478, takes manual control and informs the US.
Crew refers to ARP's.
Crew determines that FCV-FW-478 output is failed high.
US directs PO to restore "A" SG level to program value.
US notifies I&C of FCV-FW-478 controller problem.
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I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
EVENT #3 Turbine EHC 1st Stage Impulse Pressure Transmitter Failure PT-MS-216 output fails high.
ACTIVATE TUR16 Load rejection at rate of 2% per minute occurs. Reactor power starts to decrease and turbine governor valves slowly close.
Crew recognizes loss of load and inform US.
NOTE: AOP-1.35.2 expected student responses may not be performed if < 10%
load is lost.
FCV-FW-478 in manual.
Rods inserting in automatic and Tavg dropping to match Tref.
US directs Operators to stabilize the plant and refers to AOP-1.35.2.
US directs PO to control "A" SG level.
PO adjusts FCV-FW-478 as necessary to maintain "A" SG level at program value during the transient.
RO places control rods in automatic and checks auto rod insertion.
RO or PO sounds standby alarm and announces Unit 1 load rejection.
US references T.S. 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1 and 3.2.5.
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BEAVER VALLEY r-OWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE_]
Load decrease will stop by going to Load loss terminated.
IMP OUT or Turbine Manual.
Rod insertion and/or boration continues until Tavg -Tref < 50F.
EHC system pressure normal.
US directs Crew to select IMP OUT/Turbine Manual and stabilize the plant.
Crew notifies System Operator of load rejection.
PO checks Tavg -Tref within +/- 20F.
PO verifies normal EHC system operation.
US directs I&C to investigate reason for load loss.
As Turbine Operator, report leak on PT-MS-216.
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PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE]
EVENT#4 Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller Fails High IMF PRS12 After PORV is open, insert:
IMF PRS03A PORV opens, control heaters turn off, spray valves open, RCS pressure decreases rapidly.
"* A4-1 1, Pressurizer Control Pressure Low A4-10, Pressurizer Control Press Deviation High
" A4-5, Pressurizer PORV Open
"* A4-6, Pressurizer Safety Valve Or PORV Open
"* A4-25, Pressurizer Power Relief Line Discharge Temp High Manual control of PZR master controller fails to close PORV.
PORV and spray valves closed. PZR heaters on.
RO notes indications and alarms, informs US.
US refers to ARP's.
RO notes failure of Pressurizer Master Controller and informs US.
US directs RO to place PZR master controller in manual, close spray valves and PORV, and take manual control of PZR heaters.
RO uses individual component controls to shut spray valves and take manual control of PZR heaters and close the PORV.
US contacts I&C to investigate failure.
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BEAVER VALLEY r,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCS pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage. Charging flow increases.
Crew identifies PORV is leaking.
US directs RO to close PORV MOV.
RO closes PORV MOV to stop leakage.
US references T.S. 3.4.11.
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PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
EVENT #5 Pressurizer Vapor Space Leak (LOCA)
IMF PRS05 RCS pressure continues to decease due to vapor space leak. Charging flow remains high, CNMT dewpoint and pressure slowly increase.
"* A4-72, Radiation Monitoring High High
"* A4-71, Radiation Monitoring High
"* A4-11, Pressurizer Control Press Low
"* A3-58, Charging Pump Discharge Flow High-Low RO monitors CVCS, identifies that RCS pressure is continuing to decrease.
RO checks radiation levels.
NOTE: Power reduction may occur Power lowering.
at 2% or 5% per minute.
Crew identifies RCS leak and informs the US.
US directs an emergency plant shutdown per AOP-1.5.1.
Crew refers to reactivity plan and begins power reduction.
US informs System Operator of power reduction.
US directs STA to monitor RCS leakage rate.
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I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
CRF12A, CRF12B (pre-loaded)
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE RCS pressure dropping.
Charging flow rising.
CNMT dew point and pressure rising.
RCS pressure dropping, CNMT pressure and temperature rising.
Reactor not tripped.
(
I Control rods not inserting.
Immediate action steps of FR-S.1.
Turbine tripped.
Control rods inserting.
EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I RO monitors CVCS for proper operation.
RO identifies that RCS pressure is dropping.
Crew continues to investigate source of RCS leakage.
Crew identifies vapor space leak.
US directs a manual reactor trip.
RO trips the reactor.
Crew identifies that the reactor failed to trip.
RO depresses reactor trip pushbutton to trip the reactor.
US enters FR-S.1 and announces entry to Crew.
PO presses both turbine trip pushbuttons.
RO/PO verify Tref is decreasing.
RO places control rods in automatic and verifies rods are inserting.
RO drives rods in manual after automatic rod motion stops.
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BEAVER VALLEY,-_WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES F
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US dispatches Operator to locally trip the reactor.
CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew inserts negative reactivity into the core by inserting RCCAs before completing the immediate actions steps of FR S.1.
RO/PO sound the standby alarm and announce the reactor trip without scram.
2 minutes after direction to locally trip the reactor, insert LOA's to open RTB's.
RTB "A" and RTB "B" open (after 30 second delay).
Control rods insert. Power decreases.
RCP "B" tripped.
Throttle and govemor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.
Steam dumps in Off.
Reheat flow control valves and MOV's closed.
FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 are operating.
MOV-FW-151A through F open.
US directs SM to evaluate EPP.
After the trip breakers are open the Crew should trip RCP "B".
PO verifies turbine trip.
PO places steam dump control interlock switches in Off.
PO ensures reheat steam isolation by depressing reheat controller reset pushbutton and checks MOV-100A & B shut.
PO verifies AFW status.
RO initiates emergency boration.
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PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
SIS05A INH40 CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew establishes flow from at least one high head ECCCS pump before transition out of E-0.
CH-P-1 B fails to automatically start.
CH-P-1B started manually. MOV-1CH 350 open.
ICH-P-2A(B) running in fast speed.
Boration flow > 30 gpm.
FCV-1CH-122 indicates > 75 GPM.
PZR pressure < 2325 psig.
Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status lights. SI actuated by low PZR pressure.
AFW flow > 630 gpm.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
Verifies or starts a HHSI pump.
RO determines no HHSI pump running, informs US, and manually starts CH-P-1B.
RO opens emergency boration valve.
RO starts inservice boric acid transfer pump in Fast speed.
RO verifies emergency boration flow >
30 gpm.
RO opens charging flow control valve to establish > 75 gpm flow.
RO verifies PRZ pressure < 2325 psig.
RO checks if SI has actuated, reports SI has actuated.
US directs performance of first 11 steps of E-0, as time permits.
PO checks intact SG levels > than 13%
and AFW flow.
PO verifies station instrument air header pressure > 100 psig.
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BEAVER VALLEY' r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES -
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE SR detector high voltage selector switches in normal.
NR-45 transferred to operable source and intermediate range displays.
RO aligns neutron flux monitoring for shutdown.
RO verifies all dilution paths are isolated.
E-0 Immediate Operator Actions FCV-1CH-1 13B closed.
FCV-1CH-1 14A closed.
FCV-1CH-1 14B closed.
RCS temperature and SG pressure not dropping in an uncontrolled manner.
Yellow SLI marks lit.
SG pressures stable.
Five hottest core exit TC's < 12000F.
Power below the power range and negative SUR.
Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".
Crew checks for reactivity Insertion from uncontrolled cooldown.
PO verifies steamline isolation.
Crew determines that no SG's are faulted.
RO checks five hottest core exit TC's
< 2000F.
RO verifies reactor is subcritical.
US exits FR-S.1 and enters E-0.
RO verifies reactor is tripped.
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PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
Throttle and governor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.
Retest flow control valves and MOVs closed.
Main generator output breakers open.
Exciter circuit breakers open.
AE and DF busses energized.
SI actuated.
Acknowledge request to perform 1OM-46.4.G to place H2 Analyzers in service.
Leak collection exhaust fan running.
Tavg stable or trending to 5470F.
PORV-455C closed but leaking.
RO sounds standby alarm and announces reactor trip.
PO verifies turbine trip.
PO ensures reheat steam isolation.
US refers to SM to ensure that EPP is evaluated.
PO verifies generator trip.
PO verifies power to AC emergency busses.
US directs performance of ESF checklists as time permits.
US directs PAB operator to perform 1OM-46.4.G.
PO verifies leak collection fan running.
RO check RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 5470F.
RO checks PZR isolated and PRT conditions are normal.
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CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew trips all RCP's when RCS to highest SG D/P criteria is exceeded and prior to transitioning from E-1.
Spray valves at zero demand.
Safety valves closed.
PRT conditions normal.
Power available to MOV's. MOV-1 RC 535 closed. All other PORV MOV's open with associated PORV in automatic.
RCP's stopped due to CIB.
No SG's faulted.
No SG's ruptured.
CNMT pressure not normal.
CNMT radiation levels not normal.
Control Room dampers shut. Timers running, Control Room pressurizing.
All five Control Room bottled air red lights lit.
Both emergency ventilation timers running.
Crew checks if RCP's should be stopped.
Crew checks if any SG's are faulted.
Crew checks if any SG's are ruptured.
Crew checks if RCS is intact.
US exits E-0 and enters E-1.
PO verifies CREBAPS actuated.
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I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE7 Control Room intake and Exhaust dampers closed.
When requested as U2 Operator, report 2HCV*MOD201A - D closed and 2HCV*MOD204A, B closed.
Trip of RCP's satisfies CT #3.
Terminate the scenario any time after the Crew completes CT #3.
Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete.
Erase any VONDS markings.
PO verifies CREBAPS actuated in U2 by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.
Crew checks if RCP's should be stopped.
RCP's secured.
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SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE:
SUBDIVISION:
SCENARIO TITLE/NO.
COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P.
1LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination Simulator Scenario #5 N/A INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING:
APPROXIMATE DURATION:
PREPARED BY:
BVPS-1 Simulator 1.5 Hours Western Technical Services, Inc.
REVIEWED BY:
E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 Revision No.
Date 0
7/26/02
__________________________ I ___________________________
Revision No.
Date 7/26/02 Date
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.:
5 Op Test No.:
2002-NRC-01 Examiners:
Candidates:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Initial Conditions:
97% power. IC-175.
Turnover:
FW-P-3A OOS. Lower reactor power to remove FW-P-1 B from service.
Severe weather expected.
Critical Tasks:
E-O.C, Energize AC Emergency Bus FR-H.1.A, Establish Feedwater Flow Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description 1
R (RO)
Reduce power at normal rate.
N (PO)
N (US) 2 IOR I (RO)
Inadvertent boration due to a boration integrator failure.
X061029L I (US) 3 EPS03B C (US)
Loss of the system station service transformer.
4 PRS07 I (RO)
TAVG input to Pressurizer level controller fails low.
I (US) 5 FWM014 I (PO)
SG feedwater flow transmitter fails low causing FWRV to open.
I(US) 6 CND01 M (All)
Condensate pump trips.
CND03 Condensate header rupture.
EPSI 1 B EDG No. 2 trips 30 seconds after output breaker closes FWM11C C (PO)
Turbine driven AFW pump trips (can be recovered with operator action).
C (US)
EPS04E C (PO) 4160V emergency bus trips.
INH53 C (US)
EDG No. 1 fails to automatically start (can be started manually).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 2 of14
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario
Description:
The Crew will lower power in preparation for removing a feed pump from service. After lowering reactor power by 5%, an inadvertent boration due to an integrator failure will result in power continuing to lower. The RO will diagnose the cause of the inadvertent boration and take action to manually terminate boration flow.
After stabilizing reactor power, a loss of the system station service transformer will occur. After the PO has diagnosed the failure, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications and direct steps to satisfy the action statement requirements within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Before implementing the Technical Specification required actions, the auctioneered TAVG signal to the Pressurizer level master controller fails low causing charging flow to reduce and actual Pressurizer level to lower. Depending on Operator action, this may result in a Pressurizer high level, associated alarms and the backup heaters to energize. The RO must take manual control to restore Pressurizer level back to program.
After stabilizing Pressurizer level, a SG feed flow transmitter fails low causing the "A" SG feedwater regulating valve to open. The PO must take manual control of the valve to stabilize SG level.
A condensate pump then trips forcing the crew to manually trip the reactor followed by a rupture of the condensate header piping.
Emergency diesel generator No. 2 trips 30 seconds after its output breaker closes causing a loss of emergency 4KV bus 1 DF and disabling motor driven AFW pump "3B". The turbine driven AFW pump also trips resulting in a loss of all feedwater flow to the SG's.
The remaining emergency 4KV bus trips on the transfer to offsite power. Emergency diesel generator No. 1 fails to automatically start; however, it can be manually started to supply power to the bus. The turbine driven AFW pump will be restored by operator action to terminate the loss of heat sink event.
The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -> ES-0.1 -> FR-H.1 -> ES-0.1.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 3 of 14
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Progam Title 2002 NRC Examination INITIAL CONDITIONS:
The Tavi RCc Con Initial Cohuitions REV plant is at 97% power.
g is 5751F.
boron concentration is 1055 ppm.
trol Bank "D" is at 215 steps.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION
- 1.
Reduce power to remove FW-P-1B from service.
- 2.
Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 3.
FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.
- 4.
- 5.
SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED
- 1. Power reduction reactivity plan
- 2. 1OM-52.4.B, Load Following BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5
(
2 ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)
FW-P-3A 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior 3.7.1.2 Action c 4 of 14
BEAVER VALLEY t-OWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure
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INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #1 Lower reactor power.
Reactor power at 97%.
Following the reactivity plan, the Crew lowers reactor power.
US directs the load decrease to < 80%
power.
PO initiates a turbine load decrease.
RO commences RCS boration as necessary to maintain Tavg - Tref.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 5 of 14
BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I
Inadvertent RCS Boration Due To Integrator Failure After Crew has lowered power approximately 5%, insert:
IOR X061029L (0 0) 0 Integrator RIC-ICH-113 fails and boration continues.
Tavg decreasing.
Boration halted.
Dilution initiated.
RO identifies and reports decreasing Tavg and unexpected control rod motion.
RO reports unexpected boration of RCS.
RO determines boration integrator has failed.
US directs PO to stabilize load. PO reduces turbine load to match Tavg/Tref.
RO stops the boration.
RO initiates a dilution to reestablish desired power level.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5
/
EVENT #2
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BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES T PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]
EVENT #3 Loss of Station Transformer 1 B After Crew stabilizes reactor power, insert:
EPS03B A8-13, System Station Service Transformer 1B Differential Protection PO responds to alarms and determines that SSST "1 B" has been lost.
A8-31, System Station Service Transformer lB Undervoltage 138KV OCB83 tripped.
When Crew requests 1 OST-36.7 to perform breaker alignment verification, continue with the next event.
PO verifies SSST "1 B" is isolated.
Crew determines what the actuated protection was using the Sequence of Events Recorder.
Crew requests Local Operator to verify that the transformer cooling pumps and fans are stopped.
US refers to T.S. 3.0.5.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 7 of 14
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INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE_]
EVENT#4 At Lead Examiner's direction, insert:
Auctioneered Tavg signal to Pressurizer level controller fails low.
IMF PRS07 Charging pump flow decreases.
A4-2, Pressurizer Control High Level Deviation PZR level controller or FCV-CH-122 in manual.
Alarm clears if Pressurizer level controller is placed in manual.
RO notes indications and alarms, informs US.
US directs RO to place PZR level controller or FCV-CH-1 22 in manual.
RO takes manual control of PZR level controller.
US requests I&C to investigate auctioneered Tavg signal failure.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 8 of14
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BEAVER VALLEY i UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE--
EVENT #5 At Lead Examiner's direction, insert:
SG "A" feed flow transmitter fails low.
IMF FWM014 NOTE: Level deviation is dependent on time of establishing normal MFRV control to restore SG level.
SG feed flow and level rise.
"* A7-48, Loop 1 Steam-Feedwater Flow Mismatch
"* A7-42, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Greater Than Steam Flow
"* A7-45, SG 1A Level Deviation From Setpoint FCV-1 FW-476 modulates open in automatic.
SG level control in manual.
PO notes problem with SG level control and informs US.
US refers to ARP's and 1OM-24.4.IF,.
Crew determines feed flow transmitter has failed low.
PO takes manual control of SG feedwater control valve.
US directs PO to restore SG level to program value.
US directs I&C to investigate feed flow transmitter failure.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 9 of 14
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PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]
EVENT #6 IA Condensate Pump Trip IMF CND01 SG levels decrease.
After 1A condensate pump trips, insert:
IMF CND03 PO acknowledges alarms and informs US.
US directs Crew to trip the reactor.
Pipe rupture in condensate header results in a loss of suction to main feed pumps and reactor trip.
RO manually trips the reactor.
RO and PO commence immediate actions of E-0, US references E-0 to verify immediate actions.
E-0 Immediate Manual Actions Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at 0.
Turbine tripped. Throttle valves and governor valves closed.
Reheat flow control and block Valves closed.
RO verifies reactor trip.
RO sounds standby alarm and announces Unit I reactor trip.
US directs SM to evaluate EPP.
PO verifies turbine tripped.
PO ensures reheat steam isolation.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 10 of 14
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INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Loss of "DF" Bus and "3B" AFW Pump EPS1 1 B INH53 CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew energizes at least one AC emergency bus before transition out of E-0.
Main generator output breakers open.
Exciter circuit breaker open.
EDG No. 2 trips 30 seconds after output breaker closes.
EDG No. 1 fails to automatically start.
EDG No. 1 started and "AE" bus energized.
PO verifies generator trip.
PO verifies DF bus deenergized following diesel sequencing.
Recognizes diesel trip and informs US.
US directs PO to manually start EDG No. 1 PO performs steps to start EDG No. 1.
Approximately 2 minutes after the reactor trip, report the condensate pump trip and header rupture to the Control Room.
Approximately 3 minutes after request, report that the No. 2 EDG local panel is deenergized and request Electrical Maintenance aid in the investigation.
Crew dispatches an Operator to investigate problem with the No. 2 EDG.
No SI annunciator SI actuation status lights not lit.
Crew determines SI is not required.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 BEAVER VALLEY O-WER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure 11 of 14
BEAVER VALLEY, OWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]
FW-P-2 trips.
FWMIlC Loss of all feed to SG's. All SG levels less than 5% narrow range.
PO informs US of FW-P-2 trip and loss of all feedwater.
US exits E-0 and enters ES-0.1 until red path of FR-H.1 is applicable.
US directs STA to monitor CSF status trees.
No SI annunciator RO checks if SI has actuated.
SI actuation status lights not lit.
RCS temperature > 5470F and rising.
Condenser steam dumps open as necessary:
Steam dumps in steam pressure mode in manual.
Station instrument air header pressure >
100 psig.
RCS hot leg temperature > 3200F.
PO dumps steam using condenser steam dumps to maintain RCS temperature.
PO places steam dump controller in steam pressure mode in manual.
PO checks station instrument air header > 100 psig.
US exits ES-0.1 and enters FR-H.1 when notified of the red path condition for heat sink.
PO checks if secondary heat sink is required.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5
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BEAVER VALLEY, JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure
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SG wide range levels all > 13%.
PZR pressure < 2325 psig.
PDWST level > 27.5 feet.
SG blowdown isolated.
FW-P-3A on clearance, FW-P-3B without power.
FW-P-2 throttle valve trip collar is damaged.
FW-P-2 tripped.
AFW pump suction pressure - 10 psig.
No AFW flow.
US checks if RCS bleed and feed is not required.
PO checks PDWST level > 27.5 feet.
PO checks SG blowdown isolation status.
Crew tries to establish AFW flow to at least one SG.
Crew dispatches an Operator to investigate trip of FW-P-2.
PO checks AFW pump suction pressure.
PO verifies total AFW flow < 355 gpm.
Crew dispatches an Operator to locally start the dedicated AFW pump.
When requested to check FW-P-2, report that the pump trip collar is damaged and will not reset.
Maintenance assistance is needed immediately.
SI not in service.
RCP's stopped.
Crew minimizes RCS heat input.
Pressurizer heaters in P-T-L.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 13 of 14 I R.I)
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BEAVER VALLEY r UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure
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I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I
PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE As the Operator requested to startup 1 FW-P-4, after 3 minutes report to the Control Room that the pump will not start (breaker keeps tripping).
NOTE: Crew will exit FR-H.1 by recovering FW-P-2.
Report FW-P-2 is available.
CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew establishes feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required.
Condensate header not available due to pipe rupture.
FW-P-2 in service.
PO checks condensate system in service.
US directs FW-P-2 placed in service.
All SG NR levels < 13%.
AFW flow > 355 gpm.
Terminate the scenario when the Crew transitions to ES-0. 1.
Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete them.
Erase any VOND markings.
Crew feeds intact SG's using FW-P-2.
PO checks SG levels.
PO verifies AFW flow > 355 gpm.
US exits FR-H.1 and enters ES-0.1, step in effect.
BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 14 of 14
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Examiners:
FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.:
Candidates I
Op Test No.:
2002 NRC 01 CRS RO PO Obiectives:
Initial Conditions:
Turnover:
Critical Tasks:
In accordance with plant procedures:
Power75%. IC-171.
FW-P-3A OOS. Reduce power to remove FW-P-1B from service. Severe weather expected.
E-O.F, Establish AFW Flow ECA-3.1.B, Cooldown RCS Event Malf. No.
Event No.
Type*
Event Description I
R (RO)
Power reduction at normal rate.
N (US)
N (PO) 2 FWM01 B C (PO)
Trip of main feed pump.
C(RO)
C (US) 3 PRS06A I (RO)
Pressurizer controlling level channel fails low.
I (US) 4 MSS14C I (PO)
SG 'B' controlling steam flow transmitter fails low.
I (US) 5 FWM07B M (All)
SG 'B' feedwater control valve fails shut requiring a Rx Trip.
MSS07 Condenser steam dumps fail to operate.
MSS12B SG 'B' atmospheric dump fails open on Rx Trip.
INH20 C (PO)
AFW pumps fail to auto start (manual start available).
INH21 C (US) 6 RCS03B M (All)
SG 'B' tube rupture of 500 gpm (ruptured/faulted).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 17