ML023260154

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Draft - Section C Operating
ML023260154
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 09/30/2002
From: Hynes C
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To: Conte R
NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
50-334/02-301 50-334/02-301
Download: ML023260154 (84)


Text

RTL A5.670.AA BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION Volume 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.3 SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #1 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. Date 1 7/26/02 INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: .1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date REVIEWED BY: E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Page 1 of 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC - BVPS Unit I Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2002 NRC 01 Examiners: Candidates CRS RO PO Obiectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: Power75%. IC-171.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Reduce power to remove FW-P-11B from service. Severe weather expected.

Critical Tasks: E-O.F, Establish AFW Flow ECA-3.1.B, Cooldown RCS Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description I R (RO) Power reduction at normal rate.

N (US)

N (PO) 2 FWM01 B C (PO) Tdp of main feed pump.

C(RO)

C (US) 3 PRS06A I (RO) Pressurizer controlling level channel fails low.

I (US) 4 MSS14C I (PO) SG 'B' controlling steam flow transmitter fails low.

I (US) 5 FWM07B M (All) SG 'B' feedwater control valve fails shut requiring a Rx Trip.

MSS07 Condenser steam dumps fail to operate.

MSS12B SG 'B' atmospheric dump fails open on Rx Trip.

INH20 C (PO) AFW pumps fail to auto start (manual start available).

INH21 C (US) 6 RCS03B M (All) SG 'B' tube rupture of 500 gpm (ruptured/faulted).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario

Description:

The Crew will lower power in preparation for removing a main feed pump from service; however, when power has been lowered to approximately 70%, the feed pump will trip, requiring the Crew to rapidly reduce power to less than 63% to avoid a reactor trip.

When plant conditions have stabilized, the controlling Pressurizer level channel fails low causing letdown to isolate, charging flow to increase, and actual Pressurizer level to rise. After directing actions to restore Pressurizer level control, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to address the failed channel.

After letdown is re-established, a controlling steam flow transmitter on SG 'B' fails low requiring operator action to take manual control of the SG feedwater regulating valve to avoid a reactor trip. After stabilizing SG level, the same feedwater regulating valve fails closed resulting in a reactor trip.

Following the reactor trip, the steam dump valves fail to operate resulting in a high SG pressure and the SG 'B' atmospheric dump valve opens and sticks open (faulted SG).

Additionally, the operable motor driven AFW pump and the turbine driven AFW pump fail to automatically start, but can be started manually by the operator.

A 500 gpm SG tube rupture then occurs resulting in a ruptured and faulted SG.

The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -> E-2 --. E-3 -4 ECA-3.1.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario I Page 3 of 17

Prot, dm Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Coiiuitions REV I (

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 75% power.
  • Tavg is 5690 F.
  • Control Bank "D" is at 190 steps.

ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)

FW-P-3A OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior TS 3.7.1.2, Action c SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Reduce power to remove FW-P-1 B from service ASAP (1% per min.) due to a motor bearing vibration.
2. Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3. FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.

4.

SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED T

1. Power reduction reactivity plan
2. 1OM-52.4.B, Load Following BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I 4 of 17

(

BEAVER VALLE' r UWER STATION Volunc 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 I ILIrun* ,a-.-,r... C I -. . - -

Figure 5-9.6 IINO I KUL I IUNAL .UIUI-LINlI'- I IPLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #1 Lower Rx power to 63%. Following the reactivity plan, the Crew lowers reactor power.

US directs load decrease to < 63% at 1% per minute.

PO initiates turbine load decrease.

RO initiates RCS boration as necessary to maintain Tavg -Tref.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I 5 of 17

(

BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER STATION Volun', 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #2 After power is lowered to 70% FW-P-1 B trips. PO recognizes feed pump trip and IMF FWM01B informs US.

  • A7-37, SG Feed Pump Auto Stop US refers to ARP's as time permits.
  • A7-39, SG Feed Pump Disch Flow Hi US directs load decrease to < 63% at Start 2 nd Pump 5% per minute.

PO decreases turbine load at 5% per minute.

RO continues RCS boration to maintain Tavg-Tref.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 6 of 17

STATION Volun, 3 BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #3 After plant conditions have stabilized:

IMF PRS06A PZR level transmitter LT-RC-459 fails RO recognizes problem with PZR level low. channel, informs US.

"* A4-4, PZR Control Level Deviation US refers to ARP and 1OM-6.4.IF, Low Attachment 1.

"* A4-3, PZR Control Level Low.

LCV-CH-460A, TV-CH-200A, B, C close RO informs US that LT-RC-459 failed and PZR heaters turn off. low.

Letdown isolates and actual PZR level rises.

US directs Operator to defeat level control input with PZR level channel and recorder selector switches per 1OM-6.4.IF, Attachment 1.

Level alarms clear, charging flow begins RO informs US that Channels 460 and decreasing, high flow alarm clears. 461 are selected.

Continue with next event when US directs Operators to re-establish letdown has been reestablished. normal letdown and re-energize PZR heaters.

US refers to T.S. Table 3.3-1, Item 11 to determine action required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 7 of17

BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Volurni 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 I ILIr.rrm ,fl-ri..-%., .. r. i..- I -. . . . -- - -- - - - - -

Figure 5-9.6 llIt' II I IUINAL ,UIIUI"LIINII' I HLANT STATli.flR RF5 PPflIJc OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE]

EVENT #4 "B" SG Steam Flow Transmitter

[FT-MS-484] fails low.

MSS14C, 0, 0 FT-MS-484 fails low.

0 A7-50, Loop 2 Feed > Stm PO determines which channel has failed by comparing with other steam flow indicators.

Feedwater flow decreases causing SG US determines that 1OM-24.4.IF, levels to decrease. Attachment 3 is to be implemented.

SG level stabilizes. PO places "B" SG FRV in manual and stabilizes steam generator level.

PO selects redundant steam flow transmitter by placing FC-1FFW-488 to FM-485 position.

PO returns "B" FRV to auto when SG level is returned to normal range.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 8 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r jWER STATION Volun,= 3 Training Administrative l Aanual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 I I i"lrlft I T D I Im ki A I f I Irtr ' l I k l r-- ' I X.

Figure 5-9.6 ii'l*.] I r\L, I IJI'I/-4PNL LUILJ LIIIO' I MLPNI IAIU5UKI-'()NSF OBJECTIVE t'LAN I b I A I Uti R RE:QP0K1!QP:

EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #5 After the Operator has taken FCV-FW-488 fails closed causing a loss PO acknowledges alarms associated manual control of feedwater and of feedwater flow to the "B" SG. with loss of feedwater flow to "B"SG.

stabilized SG level, insert:

IMF FWM07B PO identifies and reports valve closure to Crew.

PO attempts to manually open the valve (failed, will not open).

PO reports valve will not open.

US acknowledges reports from Crew.

US directs a manual reactor trip due to rapidly degrading plant conditions.

IMF MSS07 Following the reactor trip, steam dump valves fail to operate, resulting in the SG atmospheric dump valves opening.

IMF MSS12B "B" SG ADV failure and steam break in Main Steam Valve Room.

Reactor trip, turbine trip.

RCS pressure drops.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 9 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Volun,, 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RO and PO commence immediate actions of E-0, US references E-0 to verify immediate actions.

Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, RO verifies reactor trip.

neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".

Turbine tripped. Throttle valves and PO verifies turbine trip.

governor valves closed.

RO sounds standby alarm.

Depress reheater controller, reset push PO ensures reheat steam isolation.

button. Reheat flow control and block valves closed.

Main generator output breakers open. PO verifies generator trip.

Exciter circuit breaker open.

PO verifies AE and DF busses AE and DF busses energized.

energized.

Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status RO checks if SI is actuated.

lights.

RO initiates manual Safety Injection.

EDG's running. PO verifies EDG's running.

All red marked SIS valve indicating lights RO/PO verify SI system status.

lit.

Two HHSI pumps running.

FI-SI-943 indicates flow.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 10 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Volurnt 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE LHSI pumps running.

INH20, INH21 FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 not started PO determines that no AFW Pumps automatically. are running.

PO informs US that none of the AFW pumps are running.

CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 started and PO manually starts FW-P-3B and FW establishes the minimum required running. P-2.

AFW flow rate to the SG's before transition out of E-0.

MOV-FW-151 "A" through "F" open.

RPRW pumps running. PO/RO verify AFW status.

CCR HX pressure > 20 psig. RO/PO verify RW System in service.

All indicating lights with orange marks lit. RO/PO verify CIA.

All indicating lights with green marks lit. RO/PO verify FWI.

All indicating lights with yellow marks lit. RO/PO verify MSLI.

CIB and Containment Spray not RO verifies CIB and Containment required. Spray not required.

As Outside Operator, notify the CCR pumps running. RO verifies CCR status.

Control Room that an ADV on "B" main steam line is open and blowing steam.

SR detector selector switches in normal. RO verifies SR detector HV selector switches in normal.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 11 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Volunii 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE AFW flow > 325 gpm. PO verifies AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO verifies IA header pressure greater 100 psig. than 100 psig.

RCS Tvg decreasing. PO verifies RCS Tvg stable at or trending to 5471F; PO reduces AFW flow to 355 gpm.

All yellow marked SLI valve indicators lit. Crew performs a SLI due to RCS cooldown.

PORV's closed. RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.

Safeties closed.

Spray valves at zero demand.

Power available to PORV MOV's.

PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.

RCP's running. RO checks if RCP's should be stopped.

RCS/SG D/P > 150 psid.

CCR flow normal.

"B" SG is faulted as indicated by PO checks if SG's are faulted.

pressure difference between "B" SG compared to "A" and "C" SG's.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 12 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY'r-,JWER STATION VoIumt= 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Crew transitions to E-2. US exits E-0 at Step 22 and enters E-2.

US directs STA to monitor status trees.

Control Room dampers shut. Timers PO initiates CREBAPS, and verifies running, Control Room pressurizing. system activated.

When requested as U2 Operator, 2HVC8MOD201A - D closed. PO verifies CREBAPS actuated in U2 report 2HVC*MOD201A - D closed 2HVC*MOD204A, B closed. by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.

and 2HVC*MOD204A, B closed.

Valve indicators with yellow marks lit. Crew verifies steam line isolation.

"A" and "C" SG pressures stable. PO checks for any non-faulted SG.

"B" SG tube rupture (500 gpm) "B" SG pressure dropping uncontrollably. PO identifies "B" SG as faulted.

IMF RCS03B FCV-FW-488 closed. PO closes/verifies "B" MFRV closed.

FCV-FW-489 closed. PO closes/verifies "B" BFRV closed.

MOV-FW-151C and D closed. PO closes MOV-FW-151C and D.

PO attempts to manually close PCV MS-101B.

PCV-MS-101B open. PO directs Operator to close MS-16 and to open MS-17.

Report valves status to Control "B" SG level rising in an uncontrolled Crew checks if SG tubes are intact.

Room WR level increasing slowly manner. PZR level and pressure without feedwater flow. decreasing.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 13 of 17

(

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Volurn%. 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE j L INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I Crew transitions to E-3. US exits E-2 and enters E-3.

CREBAPS actuated. US directs Operators to verify CREBAPS actuated.

All RCPs running. CCR flow, RCS/SG RO checks if RCP's should be D/P > 150 psig. stopped, does not stop RCP's.

"B" SG ruptured. US identifies "B" SG as the ruptured SG based on Operator reports.

US directs Operators to isolate flow from the "B" SG.

"B" SG atmospheric dump valve in US directs operator to locally isolate manual, valve remains open. steam dump valve.

RHR valve closed.

MS-16 shut.

TV-MS-111 B shut.

"B" SG main steam trip, bypass and non return valves shut.

AFW secured to "B" SG. PO checks ruptured SG NR level, verifies AFW flow to "B" SG secured.

"B" SG pressure > 380 psig. PO checks ruptured SG pressure >

380 psig.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO verifies station instrument air 100 psig. header pressure > 100 psig.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 14 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r- JWER STATION Volurn- 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Target temperature determined based on US determines target temperature and ruptured SG pressure. initiates cooldown. STA trends cooldown rate.

Cooldown using "A" and "C" SG Crew initiates RCS cooldown at atmospheric relief valves. maximum rate to the target temperature.

RCS pressure < 1950 psig. RO blocks steamline SI when RCS pressure is below 1950 psig.

Average of the 5 highest TC's at target Crew stops RCS cooldown at target temperature. temperature.

Intact SG's < 13% NR level. PO checks intact SG level > 13% NR, maintains AFW flow > 355 gpm.

PORV's closed. Power available to RO checks PORV's and block valves, PORV block valves, all PORV block power available and closed.

valves open.

SI reset. US verifies SI, CIA and CIB reset.

CIA and CIB reset.

CNMT IA header pressure > 85 psig. PO checks CNMT IA available.

LHSI pumps stopped and in automatic. US verifies RCS pressure > 300 psig.

Directs RO to stop LHSI pumps.

Cooldown complete. US verifies RCS at target temperature.

"B" SG pressure < 250 psig above intact Crew checks ruptured SG pressure >

SG's. 250 psig above intact SG's.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 15 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r ,WER STATION Volun1 ,. 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 Figure 5-9.6 INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Crew transitions to ECA-3.1. US exists E-3 and enters ECA-3.1.

RWST > 19 feet. RO checks RWST > 19 feet.

Previously performed. RO verifies CNMT vents and drains isolated; SI, CIA and CIB reset.

Previously performed. PO verifies stub busses energized.

Previously performed. PO verifies CNMT instrument air available.

All busses energized. PO verifies all AC busses energized by offsite power.

RO places all PZR heaters in Pull-To Lock.

No Quench Spray Pumps running. RO check if any Quench Spray Pumps running.

RCS pressure greater than 250 psig. RO checks if LHSI pumps should be LHSI pumps stopped. stopped.

"B" SG steam and feed flow isolated PO checks ruptured SG NR level and previously. verifies "B" SG isolated.

Aux. Building and safeguards radiation US initiates evaluation of plant status.

consistent with pre-event values. Obtain samples as listed in Step 9.b.

"B" SG previously identified and isolated. PO checks if any SG's are faulted.

"A" and "C" SG's intact.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario I 16 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY i-,JWER STATION Volur'ri 3 Training Administrative Manual Procedure 5-9 Revision 11 P~i"m Rt-Q _A INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSEJ I SG NR level > 13%. PO checks intact SG levels and maintains NR level > 13%, orAFW flow > 355 GPM.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO verifies station instrument air 100 psig. header pressure > 100 psig.

CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew Do not exceed 100°F/hour cooldown in PO commences cooldown using "A" initiates cool down of the RCS to RCS cold leg. and "C" SG atmospheric relief valves cold shutdown conditions at the at < 100OF per hour.

highest achievable rate but less than 100°F per hour.

Terminate drill when cooldown is US directs Chemistry to obtain hourly started in ECA-3.1. RCS boron samples.

Collect and review logs after allowing crew time to complete.

Erase any VOND markings.

BVPS -1 NRC Scenario 1 17 of 17

SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #2 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. Date 0 7/26/02 INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: 1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date REVIEWED BY: E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2002-NRC-01 Examiners: Candidates: CRS RO PO Obiectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: 97% power.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Raise power to 100%. Severe weather is expected.

Critical Tasks: E-O.Q, Turbine Trip E-O.D, Manual Safety Injection E-1.C,Trip All RCPs Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 N (US) Power ascension at normal rate.

N (PO)

R (RO) 2 NIS03D I (RO) PR channel N44 summing amplifier fails high causing control rods to step in.

I (US) 3 IOR I (RO) Letdown backpressure regulating valve fails shut.

X06A087P I (US) 4 CCW03A C (PO) 'IA' CCR pump trips.

IOR C (US) CCR pressure control valve fails open.

X16A056P CCW08B C (All) CCR supply leak to 'IB' RCP (ramp to 500 gpm).

5 RCS09B M (All) RCP 'B' locked rotor causes automatic Rx trip.

INH48 C (PO) Main turbine fails to trip automatically (manual trip available).

C (US)

RCS02B M (All) RCS loop 'B' 900 gpm LOCA.

SIS10A C (RO) Failure of automatic safety injection (both trains).

SIS10B C (US) I__

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 Page 2 of 16

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario Description The Crew will perform a normal power ascension at the rate of 12% per hour.

After power has been raised to 100% and the control rods are placed in automatic, power range channel N-44 summing amplifier output fails high causing inadvertent, automatic rod motion.

Operator action is required to place rod control in manual to stop the inward rod motion. After stabilizing the plant, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to verify all required actions have been performed.

After completing actions for the failed power range channel, the letdown backpressure regulating valve fails closed causing a loss of normal letdown, increased pressure in the letdown line, and lifting of the letdown relief valve with associated alarms.

After letdown is restored with the controller in manual, a component cooling pump trips and the pressure control valve fails open requiring operator action to take manual control to restore system pressure.

A component cooling line leak then occurs in the supply line to RCP 'B' and increases to 500 gpm requiring operator action to locate and isolate the leak. Before the reactor can be manually tripped; however, RCP 'B' will experience a locked rotor resulting in an automatic reactor trip.

Following the reactor trip, the main turbine will fail to automatically trip requiring operator action to manually trip the turbine.

A 900 gpm LOCA occurs along with a failure of automatic safety injection Train 'A' and Train 'B'.

Operator action is required to manually initiate safety injection.

The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -- E-1.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 Page 3 of 16

Prog,dm Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Co.l,,*tions REV 1 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 97% power.
  • Tavg is 5750 F.

° Control Bank "D"is at 215 steps.

ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)

FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior TS 3.7.1.2 Action c SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Raise power to 100% at 12% per hour and place control rods in automatic.
2. Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3. FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.

4.

SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED

1. Power increase reactivity plan
2. 1OM-52.4A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load Operation BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 4 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES - PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 1 US assumes control and directs Operators to increase reactor power to 100% lAW 1OM-52.4.A, Step A.118.

EVENT 1 Raise power to 100%. Turbine load and reactor power Crew reviews/agrees with reactivity increasing at 12% per hour. plan. US approves for use. Crew begins power increase.

RO places rod control in automatic when 100% power is reached.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 5 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]

EVENT2 After power has been raised to PR Channel N-44 Fails High 100% and control rods are placed in automatic, insert:

NIS03D (0 0)

N-44 power indications upscale.

RO determines failed instrument.

"* A4-69, Neutron Flux Rate High US directs RO to place control rods in Manual.

"* A-465, NIS PR High Setpoint Neutron Flux High Control rods inserting.

RO places rod control in Manual.

US refers to AOP-1.2.1C.

Turbine load decreasing. US directs turbine load decrease at 1%

per minute to maintain Tavg within 20 F of Tref. PO initiates turbine load decrease.

PO removes control power supply fuses of N-44 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

PO turns Rod Stop Bypass switch to Bypass for N-44.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 6 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE-TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]

PO turns the Comparator Channel Defeat switch to N-44.

RO verifies vertical board recorders are selected to monitor only operable detectors.

Note: US refers to T.S. 4.2.1.1.b and directs that AFD be monitored and trended in STA will perform (simulate) QPTR accordance with 1OM-49.4. L.

and report satisfactory results.

US refers to T.S. 3.2.4, and Table 3.3-.1, Item 2, Action 2.

Continue with next event at Lead Examiner's discretion.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 7 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY t-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE 1 OBJECTIVE 7EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE 1 EVENT3 IOR X06A087P (0 0) 1 PCV-1CH-145 fails closed resulting in a loss of normal letdown flow.

"* A3-107, NRHX Disch Press High RO notes indications and alarms.

"* A2-3F, Letdown Flowpath Trouble RO notifies US. Refers to ARP.

US refers to AOP-1.7.1.

RO reports zero flow indicated on 1CHS-FI150.

RO takes manual control of PCV-1CH 145 and restores letdown flow to previous value.

US contacts I&C to investigate failure of PCV-1CH-145.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 8 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r- JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES J PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSEV EVENT 4 IMF CCW03A Running CCR Pump trips and PCV-1CC 100 Fails Open IOR X16056P (5 0) 0 CCW08B, 500 gpm, 600 sec. " A3-83, React. Cool PP Upper BRG PO identifies trip of running CCR Lube Oil Cool Water Flow Low pump.

" A3-76, React Cool PP Motor Bearing PO identifies PCV-1CC-100 is full Temp High. open.

" A6-35, Primary Water Supply Press US refers to 1OM-15.4.AAE and Low. directs PO to place PCV-1CC-100 in manual and raise CCR pressure.

Decreasing CCR surge tank level. Crew identifies and reports leak in CCR system.

Increasing Containment sump levels. Crew determines that CCR header leak is inside containment.

RCP "C" motor and bearing Crew performs actions per 1OM temperatures increasing. 15.4.AAC.

Check CCR system status.

Level control in manual with maximum Place surge tank level control valve makeup. LCV-1CC-100A in manual and adjust control signal to maximize makeup to surge tank.

Monitor RCP motor bearing upper and lower temperatures for RCP's.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 9 of 16

(

BEAVER VALLEY -rJWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Non-essential loads isolated. Crew attempts to locate the leak.

US may direct a reactor shutdown.

Crew: If any RCP temperatures are approaching limits (2000 F) OR operating CCR pumps discharge pressure and current indicates cavitation:

"* Manually trip the reactor.

"* Trip all RCPs.

"* Enter E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 10 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT5 Prior to the Crew's decision to RCP "B" Locked Rotor with Auto Turbine manually trip the reactor, insert: Trip IMF RCS09B INH48 (Pre-loaded) The main turbine will fail to trip automatically following the reactor trip.

RCS loop 2 flow indication low (< 90%). Crew identifies and reports trip of RCP "B" with loss of RCS loop flow.

Loop 3 R.C. LOW FLOW Status Panel lights lit (Chan 1 RED, Chan II WHITE, Chan III BLUE)

After RCP "B" locked rotor, insert: RCS Loop "B" 900 GPM LOCA IMF RCS02B, 900 GPM Crew enters E-0. Reactor fails to trip automatically. RO/PO perform Immediate Operator Actions of E-0:

Neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom "* RO determines reactor failed to lights lit, Rod position at "0". automatically trip and manually trips the reactor.

Plant standby alarm sounded "* Verify Reactor Trip.

"* Alert Plant Personnel.

Throttle and governor valves open

reheat stop and intercept valves open.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 11 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY t-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I Reheat flow control valves and MOV's PO reports main turbine failed to trip.

open.

Steam dumps to OFF. US directs PO to trip the turbine.

Following manual turbine trip, throttle PO trips the turbine manually.

and governor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.

CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew Main generator output breakers open. PO verifies generator trip.

manually trips the turbine before a Exciter circuit breaker open.

severe (orange path) challenge develops on either the Subcriticality or Integrity CSF.

AE and DF busses energized. PO verifies power to AC emergency busses.

EDG's running. PO verifies both EDG's are running.

SIS10A, SIS10B (Pre-loaded) RO determines SI failed to actuate automatically.

RO manually actuates both SI trains.

CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew CH-P-1A and CH-P-1B running. RO verifies two charging/HHSI pumps manually actuates at least one train are running.

of SIS-actuated safeguards before transition to any ORP.

RO checks HHSI to BIT flow indicated.

LHSI pumps running. RO/PO checks both LHSI pumps are running.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 12 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY r-,.WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE-TEXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RO/PO check all valves indicating lights with RED marks are LIT.

Motor driven AFW pump "3B" running PO determines "B" Motor Driven AFW unless previously placed in P-T-L. pump is running.

Turbine driven AFW pump is running. PO determines Turbine driven AFW pump is running by verifying AFW steam supply trip valves are open..

PO verifies all SG AFW throttle valves are full open.

RPRW pumps running. RO/PO verify RW System Status.

CCR Hx pressure > 20 psig. RO/PO verify 2 CCR pumps running.

All indicating lights with orange marks lit. RO/PO verify CIA.

All indicating lights with green marks lit. RO/PO verify FWI.

All indicating lights with yellow marks lit. RO/PO verify FWI.

All indicating lights with red marks lit. RO/PO verify MSLI.

RO/PO verify SI.

CCR pumps running. RO/PO verify CCR Status.

SR detector selector switches in Normal. RO verifies SR detector HV Selector Switches in Normal.

AFW flow > 325 gpm. PO verifies AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 13 of 16

(

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Station instrument air header pressure > PO checks IA header pressure > 100 100 psig. psig.

PO verifies RCS Tavg stable or trending to 547 0 F.

PORV's closed. RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.

Safeties closed.

Spray valves at zero demand.

Power available to PORV MOV's.

Power available to PORV MOV's.

PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.

D/P between RCS pressure and highest RO checks if RCP's should be SG pressure < 200 psid. stopped.

All RCP's stopped. RO stops all RCP's.

No SG pressures dropping in an PO checks if SG's are faulted.

uncontrolled manner.

No SG levels rising in an uncontrolled PO checks if SG tubes are intact.

manner.

RCS pressure and PZR level decreasing US determines RCS is not intact.

rapidly.

US exits E-0 and enters E-1.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 14 of 16

(

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Control Room dampers shut. Timers PO initiates CREBAPS and verifies running, Control Room pressurizing. system activated.

When requested as U2 Operator, PO verifies CREBAPS activated in U2 report 2HVC*MOD201A - D closed by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.

and 2HVC*MOD204A and B closed.

D/P between RCS pressure and highest RO checks if RCP's should be SG pressure < 200 psid. stopped.

CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew trips all All RCP's stopped. RO stops all RCP's if not stopped RCP's when RCS to highest S/G previously.

D/P criteria is exceeded and SI flow is verified prior to exiting E-1.

No SG pressures dropping in an PO checks if any SG's are faulted.

uncontrolled manner.

AFW flow > 325 gpm. PO maintains AFW flow > 355 GPM until NR SG level is > 13%.

Instrument air header pressure > 100 PO checks IA header pressure > 100 psig. psig.

PORV's closed. RO checks PZR PORV's, safeties and spray valves.

Safeties closed.

Spray valves at zero demand.

Power available to PORV MOV's.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 15 of 16

BEAVER VALLEY, JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES - PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.

No SG levels rising in an uncontrolled PO checks if SG tubes are intact.

manner.

RCS pressure and PZR level lowering. RO checks is SI flow should be terminated.

A1-2H lit. CNMT pressure > 8 psig. All RO checks CIB CNMT spray status.

indicating lights with blue CIB marks LIT.

Both trains of SI reset. RO resets SI.

CIA reset. RO resets CIA.

RCP pressure dropping. RO checks if LHSI pumps should be secured.

RO checks RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 5470 F.

RO checks SG pressure stable or rising.

RCP pressure dropping. RO checks RCS pressure stable or dropping.

Terminate drill.

Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete.

Erase any VOND marks.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 2 16 of 16

SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #1 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. I Date 1 7/26/02 4

-I

+

I INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: 1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date E. Emfield 7/26/02 REVIEWED BY:

Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1

SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #3 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. Date 0 7/26/02 i

INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: 1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date REVIEWED BY: E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC BVPS Unit I Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2002-01 Examiners: Candidates: CRS RO PO Obwectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: 7% power.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Continue the plant startup. Severe weather is expected.

Critical Tasks: E-O.A, Trip Reactor; E-0.0, Close Containment Isolation Valves E-O.E, Manually Start Quench Spray Pump Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 N (PO) Shift in-service turbine plant component cooling pumps.

N (US) 2 R (RO) Plant startup.

N (US) 3 NIS07A I (RO) Intermediate range channel instrument power fuse blows.

I (US) 4 PRS013 I (RO) Pressurizer level controller fails low.

I (US) 5 MSS1 1 I (PO) Steam pressure channel fails high causing steam dump I (US) valves to open.

6 MSS-1C M (All) SG 'C' faulted inside containment.

CRF-12A C (RO) Automatic reactor trip failure (manual trip available).

C (US)

SlS-2A C (RO) Quench spray pump 'lA' trips 15 seconds after start.

C (US)

INH43 C (RO) Quench spray pump '11B' fails to start automatically (manual C (US) start available).

INH50 C (RO) Automatic containment isolation phase 'B' failure (manual C (US) available).

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 2 of 17

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario

Description:

The Crew shifts in-service turbine plant component cooling pumps and continues the reactor startup increasing reactor power above 10%.

After exceeding 10% power, an intermediate range instrument power fuse blows requiring the RO to verify the failed instrument channel. The Unit Supervisor should direct actions in accordance with AOP-1.2.1 B and refer to Technical Specifications.

The Pressurizer master level controller then fails low causing charging flow to decrease, backup heaters to turn off as level drops, and letdown to isolate. The RO must take manual control of the Pressurizer level controller to terminate the event.

After Pressurizer level control is re-established, the steam header pressure transmitter fails high causing the condenser steam dump valves to open. After identifying the failure, the PO will take manual control and close the steam dump valve.

When conditions have stabilized, a steam break occurs on 'C' SG inside containment followed by failure of the reactor to automatically trip; however, manual trip is available.

Following safety injection, quench spray pump 'IA' trips and quench spray pump '18' fails to start automatically but can be manually started. Containment isolation phase 'B' isolation then fails to actuate automatically, but can be manually initiated by the operator.

The expected procedure flow path is E-0 -* E-2 -> ES-I. 1.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 3 of 17

Pro9.dm Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Coi*uitions REV 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 7% power.
  • Tavg is 5491F.
  • Control Bank "D" is at 103 steps.

ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)

FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago TS 3.7.1.2 Action c SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Shift the in-service CCT pumps.
2. Continue with the plant startup.
3. Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4. FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.

SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED

1. Power increase reactivity plan
2. 1OM-52.4A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load Operation BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 4 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

When the shift turnover is Simulator running. Crew assumes control of the unit.

complete, place the Simulator to RUN and commence the drill.

EVENT #1 Shift in-service CCT Pumps PO shifts in-service CCT Pumps.

Verify 1CC-P-3B aligned for standby operation.

Direct local operator to verify 1CC-P 3B has adequate oil level.

1CC-P-3B running. Start 1CC-P-3B.

Direct local operator to verify proper operation.

1CC-P-3A stopped. Stop 1CC-P-3A and place control switch in automatic.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 5 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY t-,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]

EVENT #2 Reactor Power Increase Continue with plant startup. Reactor at 7% power. Crew commences power increase in accordance with reactivity plan.

US references 1OM-52.4.A, Step 4.b to continue the power increase.

RO commences raising reactor power to between 10 and 20%.

Status lights on Panel 176 actuate at RO verifies P-10 bistables actuate as 10%. required as power increases to > 10%.

Status light Intermediate Range Rx Trip RO blocks the IR Trip and Rod Stop blocked is on. and verifies status lights on.

Status light Power Range Low Setpoint RO blocks Power Range low Blocked in on. Overpower Trip and verifies status lights on.

NOT P-7 is off. RO verifies that status light NOT P-7 is off.

RO selects highest power range channels on NR-45 recorder.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 6 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE:]

EVENT #3 Intermediate Range NI-35 Failure Meters for NI-35 indicate zero and blown fuse indication exists on drawer.

After Crew has raised reactor IR Channel NI-35 Channel Trip power to greater than 10% and IR trips have been blocked, insert:

IMF NIS07A 0 Rod block alarms actuated. Loss of detector/compensating voltage.

"* A4-93, NIS Intermediate Range Loss RO acknowledges alarms and Of CH I Detector Voltage performs a channel check to identify NI-36 as the failed channel.

"* A4-94, NIS Intermediate Range Loss US refers to AOP-1.2.1B. Verifies Unit Of CH I Compensation Voltage is in Mode 1 and goes to step 4.

Crew verifies power still greater than 10% and intermediate range trip is still blocked.

Crew places a caution tag on source range channels.

US references Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.

US directs the Crew to continue with the Unit startup.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 7 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY. JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RO withdraws rods to raise reactor power to 15 to 18%.

RO/PO maintain reactor power, Tavg, and SG level in preparation for Unit synchronization.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 8 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

EVENT #4 IMF PRS013 PZR Level Controller Fails Low Charging pump flow decreases. Backup heaters may turn off as level drops.

Letdown isolation may occur.

A3-58, Charging Pump Disch Flow RO notes indications and alarm, High/Low informs US.

US refers to ARP's.

PZR level control in manual. US directs RO to take manual PZR level control.

RO takes manual control of PZR level controller.

US requests I&C to investigate controller failure.

EVENT #5 IMF MSS11 PT-1 MS-464 Fails High Condenser steam dump valves open. PO recognizes steam dumps opening and diagnoses failure of PT-1 MS-464.

US directs PO to take manual control of steam dump valve controller.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 9 of 17

(

BEAVER VALLEY ri-,WER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES ý PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE IOBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Steam dump valves closed. PO takes manual control of AM-1 MS 464B and closes steam dump valves.

US contacts I&C to investigate failure.

EVENT #6 IMF MSSIC SG "C" Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment Containment temperature and pressure US directs manual reactor trip due to rising. rising containment pressure.

CRF-12A (pre-loaded) Reactor fails to automatically trip. RO and PO commence Immediate Operator Actions of E-0.

RO informs US of failure of reactor trip and first out annunciators.

US directs RO to manually trip the reactor.

Reactor trips, turbine trips, RCS RO manually trips reactor.

pressure drops.

CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, RO verifies reactor is tripped.

manually trips the reactor before neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom performing the mitigation strategy lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".

of FR-S.1.

RO sounds standby alarm and announces reactor trip.

Throttle and governor valves closed, PO verifies turbine tripped.

reheat stop and intercept valves closed.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 10 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY t-,WER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE 1 EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I Reheat flow control valves and MOV's PO ensures reheat steam isolation by closed. depressing reheat controller reset pushbutton and checks MOV-1OOA & B shut.

Main generator output breakers open. PO verifies generator trip.

Exciter circuit breaker open.

AE and DF busses energized. PO verifies emergency busses energized.

Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status RO checks if SI has actuated, reports lights. SI actuated by low steam line SI has actuated.

pressure.

Both EDG's running. PO verifies EDG's running.

HHSI pumps running. RO/PO verify SI system status.

LHSI pumps running.

All red marked SI valve indicating lights lit.

FW-P-3B running. MOV-FW-151A PO verifies AFW status.

through F open.

RPRW pumps running. RO verifies RW System in service.

CCR Hx RW pressure > 20 psig.

INH5O Failure of Automatic Phase "B" Containment Isolation BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 11 ofl17

BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]

All indicating lights with orange CIA RO/PO verify CIA, determine that it marks lit. CIB failed to actuate. has actuated and report CIA status to the US.

CIB actuated. RO manually actuates CIB.

CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew closes All indicating lights with orange CIB RO/PO verify CIB alignment.

Cnmt. isolation valves such that at marks lit.

least one valve is closed on each penetration before the end of the drill.

All indicating lights with green FWI marks RO/PO verify FWI.

lit.

Containment pressure increasing, steam RO/PO determine MSLI is required.

line pressure dropping.

All indicating lights with yellow marks lit. RO/PO verify MSLI.

INH43 Quench spray pump "B" fails to start RO/PO reports QSS pump "B" failed to automatically. auto start.

US directs manual start of QSS pump "B".

CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew Quench spray pump running. RO/PO manually starts QSS pump "B".

manually actuates at least the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment before a red path challenge develops to the Containment CSF.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 12 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY ,JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

SIS-2A QS pump 'A' trips 15 seconds after RO reports Quench Spray status to starting. US.

SR detector high voltage selector RO verifies SR detector high voltage switches in normal. selector switches in normal.

AFW flow > 325 gpm. PO verifies total AFW flow greater than 325 gpm.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO verifies station instrument air 100 psig. header pressure > 100 psig.

Tavg < 5740 F and dropping rapidly. (SLI RO determines RCS temperature is already verified.) dropping.

US directs personnel to perform emergency safety function checklists as time permits.

PORV's closed. RO checks PZR PORV's and spray valve's status.

Safeties closed.

Spray valves at zero demand.

Power available to PORV MOV's.

PORV MOV's open with associated PORV's in automatic.

RCP's stopped after CIB. RO stopped RCP's after CIB actuation, reports status to US.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 13 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY i-UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE "C" SG pressure is decreasing due to PO checks SG pressures and reports steam line rupture in containment. "C" SG as faulted to the US.

Crew transitions to E-2. US exits E-0 and enters E-2.

CREBAPS actuated on CIB. PO verifies CREBAPS actuated.

All five Control Room bottled air red lights lit.

Both emergency ventilation timers running.

Control Room intake and Exhaust dampers closed.

When requested as U2 Operator, PO request Unit 2 Control Room to report 2HCV*MOD201A - D closed check dampers closed.

and 2HCV*MOD204A, B closed.

Yellow marks lit. RO/PO verifies steamline isolation.

"A" and "B" SG pressures stable. PO checks for non-faulted SG.

"C" SG pressure dropping uncontrollably. Crew identifies "C" SG as faulted.

FCV-1 FW-498 closed. PO closes/verifies "C" MFRV and BFRV closed.

FCV-1 FW-499 closed.

MOV-FW-151A and 151B closed. PO closes MOV-FW-151A and 151B.

FW-P-2 aligned to SG's "A" & "B". PO verifies turbine driven AFW pump steam supply.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 14 of 17

ti BEAVER VALLEY r-UWER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE PCV-MS-101C closed. Crew verifies "C" SG atmospheric dump valve closed.

HCV-MS-104 closed. Crew verifies RHR control valve closed.

No SG level rising in an uncontrolled Crew checks if SG tubes are intact.

manner.

Crew transitions to ES-1.1, if SI US exits E-2 at Step 7 and enters ES termination criteria is satisfied. 1.1.

SI reset. RO resets SI.

CIA reset. RO resets CIA and CIB.

CIB reset.

One HHSI pump running. RO secures one HHSI pump.

1AE and 1DF 4KV stub busses energized.

Use LOA's as required to close CCR pumps in P-T-L. PO re-energizes stub busses.

breakers.

Aux RW Pumps in P-T-L.

Report 8N22 and 9P21 closed. CNMT air recirc fans in P-T-L.

CRDM shroud fans in P-T-L.

PRZR heaters 2A and 2B in P-T-L.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 15 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I CNMT instrument air compressors in P-T-L.

480V stub busses energized. RO/PO directs 480V stub busses energized.

Automatic cold leg recirc change over RO resets automatic cold leg recirc reset. change over (both trains).

Chiller verified in service. PO starts CNMT instrument air compressors.

TV-1CC-110D and F2 open. PO opens containment recirc cooling coils AC/RW outlet.

TV-1CC-110E2 and E3 open. PO opens containment recirc cooling coils AC inlet containment isolation valves.

CNMT instrument air compressor PO starts an available containment IA running. compressor.

CNMT air header pressure > 85 psig.

RCS pressure stable or rising. RO checks RCS pressure.

MOV-CH-289 and 310 open. RO establishes normal charging flow.

FCV-CH-122 throttled to maintain Pressurizer level.

MOV-SI-867A through D shut. RO isolates the BIT.

Terminate the drill in after the BIT is isolated.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 16 of 17

BEAVER VALLEY'r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

Collect and review logs after allowing Operators to complete them.

Erase any VOND markings.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 3 17 of 17

SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1 LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #4 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. Date 0 7/26/02 INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: 1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date REVIEWED BY: E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2002-NRC-01 Examiners: Candidates: CRS RO PO Obiectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: 48% power.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Raise power to 100%. Severe weather expected.

Critical Tasks: FR-S.I.C, Insert RCCAs E-O.I, Manually Start HHSI Pump E-1.C, Trip all RCPs Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 N (US) Power ascension at normal rate.

N (PO)

R (RO) 2 FWM-15A I (PO) SG feedwater level controller fails high.

I (US) 3 TUR16 I (PO) Turbine impulse pressure transmitter fails high causing a I (RO) load rejection.

I (US) 4 PRS12 I (RO) Pressurizer pressure master controller fails high causing a I (US) PORV actuation and pressure decrease.

PRS03A C (RO) PZR PORV leaks after lifting (block valve can be shut).

C (US) 5 PRS05 M (All) 400 gpm Pressurizer vapor space leak (LOCA).

CRF12A ATWS CRF12B SIS05A C (RO) HHSI pump trips on safety injection.

INH40 C (US) Standby HHSI pump fails to auto start (manual start available).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2 of 18

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario

Description:

After the Crew has raised power by 5%, a SG feedwater level controller fails high requiring the PO to take manual control to restore SG level back to program.

After SG level is stabilized, the turbine impulse pressure transmitter fails high resulting in a load rejection. The Crew must diagnose the failure and stop the load loss by taking manual control of the turbine EHC system. The Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications to determine the actions required as a result of the plant transient.

After conditions have been stabilized, the Pressurizer master controller fails high causing the following control channel actions: PORV opens, heaters turnoff; spray valves open, and RCS pressure decreases. Manual control of the Pressurizer master controller will fail to close the PORV and the RO should take alternate action to close the PORV. After closing, the PORV will leak requiring the crew to close its block valve to stop the leakage and meet the Technical Specifications action statement requirement.

After the PORV block valve has been closed a 400 gpm Pressurizer vapor space leak (LOCA) will result in a reactor trip condition; however, the reactor trip will fail leading to an ATWS.

As the Pressurizer vapor space leak continues, the running high head SI pump will trip on safety injection actuation and the standby high head SI pump will fail to automatically start, but can be manually started by the operator.

The expected procedure flow path is E-0 --> FR-S.1 --> E-0 -4 E-1.

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Prog, am Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Conuitions REV 1

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INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 48% power.
  • Tavg is 5590 F.
  • Control Bank "D"is at 152 steps.

ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)

FW-P-3A is OOS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ago TS 3.7.1.2 Action c SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Raise power to 100%.
2. Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3. FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.

SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED

1. Power increase reactivity plan
2. IOM-52.4.A, Raising Power From 5% To Full Load 4 of 18

BEAVER VALLE' r .WER STATION

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Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

EVENT #1 Raise power. Reactor at 48%. US assumes control and directs Operators to increase reactor power to 100% lAW 1OM-52.4.A, Step A.118.

Turbine load and reactor power Crew reviews/agrees with reactivity increasing at 12%/hr. plan. US approves for use. Crew begins power increase.

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BEAVER VALLEY', JWER STATION K Training Administrative Manual I IN I U I IUNAL UUID-LINES If I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE PCJ PLNTSTTU RREPOS OBJECTIVEF I P P1=rTrfl 5RT1 iflFI'T I EVENT #2 "A" SG Feedwater Level Controller FCV-1 FW-478 output fails high.

Output Fails High IMF FWM-15A "A"SG feed flow rises. "A"NR level rises.

NOTE: Level deviation dependent 0 47-42, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow PO notes problem with "A" SG level on time of establishing Greater Than Steam Flow control valve FCV-FW-478, takes normal MFRV control to manual control and informs the US.

restore "A" SG level.

Crew determines that FCV-FW-478 output is failed high.

A7-42 clears after FCV-1 FW-478 in US directs PO to restore "A" SG level manual feed flow reducing. to program value.

US notifies I&C of FCV-FW-478 controller problem.

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Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I EVENT #3 Turbine EHC 1 st Stage Impulse PT-MS-216 output fails high.

Pressure Transmitter Failure ACTIVATE TUR16 Load rejection at rate of 2% per minute Crew recognizes loss of load and occurs. Reactor power starts to inform US.

decrease and turbine governor valves slowly close.

NOTE: AOP-1.35.2 expected FCV-FW-478 in manual. US directs Operators to stabilize the student responses may plant and refers to AOP-1.35.2.

not be performed if < 10%

load is lost.

US directs PO to control "A" SG level.

PO adjusts FCV-FW-478 as necessary to maintain "A" SG level at program value during the transient.

Rods inserting in automatic and Tavg RO places control rods in automatic dropping to match Tref. and checks auto rod insertion.

RO or PO sounds standby alarm and announces Unit 1 load rejection.

US references T.S. 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1 and 3.2.5.

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BEAVER VALLEY r-OWER STATION K Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE_]

Load decrease will stop by going to Load loss terminated. US directs Crew to select IMP IMP OUT or Turbine Manual. OUT/Turbine Manual and stabilize the plant.

Crew notifies System Operator of load rejection.

Rod insertion and/or boration continues PO checks Tavg -Tref within +/- 20F.

until Tavg -Tref < 5 0 F.

EHC system pressure normal. PO verifies normal EHC system operation.

US directs I&C to investigate reason for load loss.

As Turbine Operator, report leak on PT-MS-216.

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BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE]

EVENT#4 Pressurizer Pressure Master PORV opens, control heaters turn off, Controller Fails High spray valves open, RCS pressure decreases rapidly.

IMF PRS12 After PORV is open, insert: "* A4-1 1, Pressurizer Control Pressure RO notes indications and alarms, Low informs US.

IMF PRS03A

" A4-10, Pressurizer Control Press US refers to ARP's.

Deviation High

" A4-5, Pressurizer PORV Open RO notes failure of Pressurizer Master Controller and informs US.

"* A4-6, Pressurizer Safety Valve Or PORV Open

"* A4-25, Pressurizer Power Relief Line Discharge Temp High Manual control of PZR master controller US directs RO to place PZR master fails to close PORV. controller in manual, close spray valves and PORV, and take manual control of PZR heaters.

PORV and spray valves closed. PZR RO uses individual component controls heaters on. to shut spray valves and take manual control of PZR heaters and close the PORV.

US contacts I&C to investigate failure.

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BEAVER VALLEY r ,JWER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE RCS pressure continues to decrease Crew identifies PORV is leaking.

due to PORV leakage. Charging flow increases.

PORV MOV block valve closed. US directs RO to close PORV MOV.

RO closes PORV MOV to stop leakage.

US references T.S. 3.4.11.

10 of 18

BEAVER VALLE, JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I EVENT #5 Pressurizer Vapor Space Leak RCS pressure continues to decease due (LOCA) to vapor space leak. Charging flow remains high, CNMT dewpoint and IMF PRS05 pressure slowly increase.

"* A4-72, Radiation Monitoring High RO monitors CVCS, identifies that High RCS pressure is continuing to decrease.

"* A4-71, Radiation Monitoring High RO checks radiation levels.

"* A4-11, Pressurizer Control Press Low

"* A3-58, Charging Pump Discharge Flow High-Low Crew identifies RCS leak and informs the US.

US directs an emergency plant shutdown per AOP-1.5.1.

NOTE: Power reduction may occur Power lowering. Crew refers to reactivity plan and at 2% or 5% per minute. begins power reduction.

US informs System Operator of power reduction.

US directs STA to monitor RCS leakage rate.

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Training Administrative Manual PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I RO monitors CVCS for proper RCS pressure dropping.

operation.

RO identifies that RCS pressure is Charging flow rising.

dropping.

Crew continues to investigate source CNMT dew point and pressure rising. of RCS leakage.

Crew identifies vapor space leak.

RCS pressure dropping, CNMT pressure US directs a manual reactor trip.

and temperature rising.

RO trips the reactor.

CRF12A, CRF12B (pre-loaded) Reactor not tripped.

Crew identifies that the reactor failed to trip.

RO depresses reactor trip pushbutton Control rods not inserting. to trip the reactor.

US enters FR-S.1 and announces Immediate action steps of FR-S.1. entry to Crew.

PO presses both turbine trip Turbine tripped. pushbuttons.

RO/PO verify Tref is decreasing.

RO places control rods in automatic Control rods inserting.

and verifies rods are inserting.

RO drives rods in manual after automatic rod motion stops.

12 of 18

BEAVER VALLEY ,-_WER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES F PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE US dispatches Operator to locally trip CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew inserts the reactor.

negative reactivity into the core by inserting RCCAs before completing the immediate actions steps of FR S.1.

RO/PO sound the standby alarm and announce the reactor trip without scram.

2 minutes after direction to locally RTB "A" and RTB "B" open (after 30 trip the reactor, insert LOA's to second delay).

open RTB's.

Control rods insert. Power decreases. US directs SM to evaluate EPP.

After the trip breakers are open the RCP "B" tripped.

Crew should trip RCP "B".

PO verifies turbine trip.

Throttle and govemor valves closed, reheat stop and intercept valves closed.

Steam dumps in Off. PO places steam dump control interlock switches in Off.

PO ensures reheat steam isolation by Reheat flow control valves and MOV's closed. depressing reheat controller reset pushbutton and checks MOV-100A & B shut.

PO verifies AFW status.

FW-P-3B and FW-P-2 are operating.

MOV-FW-151A through F open.

RO initiates emergency boration.

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BEAVER VALLEY r OWER STATION

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Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I SIS05A CH-P-1A trips on SI. Verifies or starts a HHSI pump.

INH40 CH-P-1 B fails to automatically start. RO determines no HHSI pump running, informs US, and manually starts CH-P-1B.

CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew CH-P-1B started manually. MOV-1CH RO opens emergency boration valve.

establishes flow from at least one 350 open.

high head ECCCS pump before transition out of E-0.

ICH-P-2A(B) running in fast speed. RO starts inservice boric acid transfer pump in Fast speed.

Boration flow > 30 gpm. RO verifies emergency boration flow >

30 gpm.

FCV-1CH-122 indicates > 75 GPM. RO opens charging flow control valve to establish > 75 gpm flow.

PZR pressure < 2325 psig. RO verifies PRZ pressure < 2325 psig.

Any SI annunciator. SI actuation status RO checks if SI has actuated, reports lights. SI actuated by low PZR pressure. SI has actuated.

US directs performance of first 11 steps of E-0, as time permits.

AFW flow > 630 gpm. PO checks intact SG levels > than 13%

and AFW flow.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO verifies station instrument air 100 psig. header pressure > 100 psig.

14 of 18

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BEAVER VALLEY' r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES - PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE SR detector high voltage selector RO aligns neutron flux monitoring for switches in normal. shutdown.

NR-45 transferred to operable source and intermediate range displays.

RO verifies all dilution paths are isolated.

FCV-1CH-1 13B closed.

FCV-1CH-1 14A closed.

FCV-1CH-1 14B closed.

RCS temperature and SG pressure not Crew checks for reactivity Insertion from uncontrolled cooldown.

dropping in an uncontrolled manner.

PO verifies steamline isolation.

Yellow SLI marks lit.

Crew determines that no SG's are SG pressures stable.

faulted.

0 RO checks five hottest core exit TC's Five hottest core exit TC's < 1200 F.

< 2000 F.

RO verifies reactor is subcritical.

Power below the power range and negative SUR.

US exits FR-S.1 and enters E-0.

Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, RO verifies reactor is tripped.

E-0 Immediate Operator Actions neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at "0".

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BEAVER VALLEY, UWER STATION

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Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I RO sounds standby alarm and announces reactor trip.

Throttle and governor valves closed, PO verifies turbine trip.

reheat stop and intercept valves closed.

Retest flow control valves and MOVs PO ensures reheat steam isolation.

closed.

US refers to SM to ensure that EPP is evaluated.

Main generator output breakers open. PO verifies generator trip.

Exciter circuit breakers open.

PO verifies power to AC emergency AE and DF busses energized.

busses.

SI actuated. RO verifies SI is actuated.

US directs performance of ESF checklists as time permits.

Acknowledge request to perform US directs PAB operator to perform 1OM-46.4.G to place H2 Analyzers 1OM-46.4.G.

in service.

Leak collection exhaust fan running. PO verifies leak collection fan running.

Tavg stable or trending to 547 0F. RO check RCS Tavg stable at or trending to 5470 F.

PORV-455C closed but leaking. RO checks PZR isolated and PRT conditions are normal.

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Training Administrative Manual INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE_]

Spray valves at zero demand.

Safety valves closed.

PRT conditions normal.

Power available to MOV's. MOV-1 RC 535 closed. All other PORV MOV's open with associated PORV in automatic.

CRITICAL TASK #3: Crew trips all RCP's stopped due to CIB. Crew checks if RCP's should be RCP's when RCS to highest SG stopped.

D/P criteria is exceeded and prior to transitioning from E-1.

No SG's faulted. Crew checks if any SG's are faulted.

No SG's ruptured. Crew checks if any SG's are ruptured.

CNMT pressure not normal. Crew checks if RCS is intact.

CNMT sump level not normal.

CNMT radiation levels not normal. US exits E-0 and enters E-1.

Control Room dampers shut. Timers PO verifies CREBAPS actuated.

running, Control Room pressurizing.

All five Control Room bottled air red lights lit.

Both emergency ventilation timers running.

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Training Administrative Manual I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE7 Control Room intake and Exhaust dampers closed.

When requested as U2 Operator, PO verifies CREBAPS actuated in U2 report 2HCV*MOD201A - D closed by requesting U2 CREBAPS status.

and 2HCV*MOD204A, B closed.

Trip of RCP's satisfies CT #3. RCP's secured. Crew checks if RCP's should be stopped.

Terminate the scenario any time after the Crew completes CT #3.

Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete.

Erase any VONDS markings.

18 of 18

SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO COVER PAGE PROGRAM TITLE: 1LOT5 NRC Simulator Examination SUBDIVISION: Simulator SCENARIO TITLE/NO. Scenario #5 COMPUTER CODE FOR L.P. N/A Revision No. Date Revision No. Date 0 7/26/02

__________________________ I ___________________________

INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING: BVPS-1 Simulator APPROXIMATE DURATION: 1.5 Hours PREPARED BY: Western Technical Services, Inc. 7/26/02 Date REVIEWED BY: E. Emfield 7/26/02 Date APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Date BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2002-NRC-01 Examiners: Candidates: CRS RO PO Obiectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: 97% power. IC-175.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Lower reactor power to remove FW-P-1 B from service.

Severe weather expected.

Critical Tasks: E-O.C, Energize AC Emergency Bus FR-H.1.A, Establish Feedwater Flow Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description 1 R (RO) Reduce power at normal rate.

N (PO)

N (US) 2 IOR I (RO) Inadvertent boration due to a boration integrator failure.

X061029L I (US) 3 EPS03B C (US) Loss of the system station service transformer.

4 PRS07 I (RO) TAVG input to Pressurizer level controller fails low.

I(US) 5 FWM014 I (PO) SG feedwater flow transmitter fails low causing FWRV to open.

I(US) 6 CND01 M (All) Condensate pump trips.

CND03 Condensate header rupture.

EPSI 1B EDG No. 2 trips 30 seconds after output breaker closes FWM11C C (PO) Turbine driven AFW pump trips (can be recovered with operator action).

C (US)

EPS04E C (PO) 4160V emergency bus trips.

INH53 C (US) EDG No. 1 fails to automatically start (can be started manually).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 2 of14

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario

Description:

The Crew will lower power in preparation for removing a feed pump from service. After lowering reactor power by 5%, an inadvertent boration due to an integrator failure will result in power continuing to lower. The RO will diagnose the cause of the inadvertent boration and take action to manually terminate boration flow.

After stabilizing reactor power, a loss of the system station service transformer will occur. After the PO has diagnosed the failure, the Unit Supervisor will refer to Technical Specifications and direct steps to satisfy the action statement requirements within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Before implementing the Technical Specification required actions, the auctioneered TAVG signal to the Pressurizer level master controller fails low causing charging flow to reduce and actual Pressurizer level to lower. Depending on Operator action, this may result in a Pressurizer high level, associated alarms and the backup heaters to energize. The RO must take manual control to restore Pressurizer level back to program.

After stabilizing Pressurizer level, a SG feed flow transmitter fails low causing the "A" SG feedwater regulating valve to open. The PO must take manual control of the valve to stabilize SG level.

A condensate pump then trips forcing the crew to manually trip the reactor followed by a rupture of the condensate header piping.

Emergency diesel generator No. 2 trips 30 seconds after its output breaker closes causing a loss of emergency 4KV bus 1DF and disabling motor driven AFW pump "3B". The turbine driven AFW pump also trips resulting in a loss of all feedwater flow to the SG's.

The remaining emergency 4KV bus trips on the transfer to offsite power. Emergency diesel generator No. 1 fails to automatically start; however, it can be manually started to supply power to the bus. The turbine driven AFW pump will be restored by operator action to terminate the loss of heat sink event.

The expected procedure flow path is E-0 ->ES-0.1 -> FR-H.1 ->ES-0.1.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 3 of 14

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Progam Title 2002 NRC Examination Initial Cohuitions REV 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The plant is at 97% power.
  • Tavig is 5751F.
  • RCc boron concentration is 1055 ppm.
  • Con trol Bank "D" is at 215 steps.

ADDITIONAL LINEUP CHANGES STICKERS VOND MARKINGS FW-P-3A in P-T-L FW-P-3A YCT W/Red Slash N/A FW-P-3A ESF Status Light lit EQUIPMENT STATUS DATE/TIME OOS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION(S)

FW-P-3A 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior 3.7.1.2 Action c SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Reduce power to remove FW-P-1B from service.
2. Severe weather is forecasted for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3. FW-P-3A is on clearance due to a motor ground and is not expected back this shift.

4.

5.

SCENARIO SUPPORT MATERIAL REQUIRED

1. Power reduction reactivity plan
2. 1OM-52.4.B, Load Following BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 4 of 14

BEAVER VALLEY t-OWER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual Procedure INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE EVENT #1 Lower reactor power. Reactor power at 97%. Following the reactivity plan, the Crew lowers reactor power.

US directs the load decrease to < 80%

power.

PO initiates a turbine load decrease.

RO commences RCS boration as necessary to maintain Tavg - Tref.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 5 of 14

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BEAVER VALLEY r-JWER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE I EVENT #2 Inadvertent RCS Boration Due To Integrator RIC-ICH-113 fails and Integrator Failure boration continues.

After Crew has lowered power approximately 5%, insert:

IOR X061029L (0 0) 0 Tavg decreasing. RO identifies and reports decreasing Tavg and unexpected control rod motion.

RO reports unexpected boration of RCS.

RO determines boration integrator has failed.

US directs PO to stabilize load. PO reduces turbine load to match Tavg/Tref.

Boration halted. RO stops the boration.

Dilution initiated. RO initiates a dilution to reestablish desired power level.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 6 of 14

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BEAVER VALLEY r JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES T PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]

EVENT #3 Loss of Station Transformer 1 B After Crew stabilizes reactor power, A8-13, System Station Service PO responds to alarms and determines insert: Transformer 1B Differential that SSST "1B" has been lost.

Protection EPS03B A8-31, System Station Service Transformer lB Undervoltage PO verifies SSST "1B" is isolated.

138KV OCB83 tripped.

When Crew requests 1 OST-36.7 to Crew determines what the actuated perform breaker alignment protection was using the Sequence of verification, continue with the next Events Recorder.

event.

Crew requests Local Operator to verify that the transformer cooling pumps and fans are stopped.

US refers to T.S. 3.0.5.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 7 of 14

BEAVER VALLEY', JWER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual Procedure INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE_]

EVENT#4 At Lead Examiner's direction, Auctioneered Tavg signal to Pressurizer insert: level controller fails low.

IMF PRS07 Charging pump flow decreases.

  • A4-2, Pressurizer Control High Level RO notes indications and alarms, Deviation informs US.

US directs RO to place PZR level controller or FCV-CH-1 22 in manual.

PZR level controller or FCV-CH-122 in RO takes manual control of PZR level manual. controller.

Alarm clears if Pressurizer level US requests I&C to investigate controller is placed in manual. auctioneered Tavg signal failure.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 8 of14

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BEAVER VALLEY i UWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES - PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE--

EVENT #5 At Lead Examiner's direction, SG "A" feed flow transmitter fails low.

insert:

IMF FWM014 SG feed flow and level rise. PO notes problem with SG level control and informs US.

"* A7-48, Loop 1 Steam-Feedwater US refers to ARP's and 1OM-24.4.IF, Flow Mismatch Attachment 2.

"* A7-42, Loop 1 Feedwater Flow Crew determines feed flow transmitter Greater Than Steam Flow has failed low.

"* A7-45, SG 1A Level Deviation From Setpoint NOTE: Level deviation is FCV-1 FW-476 modulates open in PO takes manual control of SG dependent on time of automatic. feedwater control valve.

establishing normal MFRV SG level control in manual. US directs PO to restore SG level to control to restore SG level. program value.

US directs I&C to investigate feed flow transmitter failure.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 9 of 14

BEAVER VALLEY ri-WER STATION (

Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE-]

EVENT #6 IA Condensate Pump Trip IMF CND01 SG levels decrease. PO acknowledges alarms and informs US.

US directs Crew to trip the reactor.

After 1A condensate pump trips, Pipe rupture in condensate header RO manually trips the reactor.

insert: results in a loss of suction to main feed pumps and reactor trip.

IMF CND03 RO and PO commence immediate actions of E-0, US references E-0 to verify immediate actions.

E-0 Immediate Manual Actions Reactor trip and bypass breakers open, RO verifies reactor trip.

neutron flux decreasing. Rod bottom lights lit. Rod position indication at 0.

RO sounds standby alarm and announces Unit I reactor trip.

US directs SM to evaluate EPP.

Turbine tripped. Throttle valves and PO verifies turbine tripped.

governor valves closed.

Reheat flow control and block Valves PO ensures reheat steam isolation.

closed.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 10 of 14

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BEAVER VALLEY O-WER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE Main generator output breakers open. PO verifies generator trip.

Exciter circuit breaker open.

Loss of "DF" Bus and "3B" AFW EDG No. 2 trips 30 seconds after output PO verifies DF bus deenergized Pump breaker closes. following diesel sequencing.

EPS1 1B Recognizes diesel trip and informs US.

INH53 EDG No. 1 fails to automatically start. US directs PO to manually start EDG No. 1 CRITICAL TASK #1: Crew EDG No. 1 started and "AE" bus PO performs steps to start EDG No. 1.

energizes at least one AC energized.

emergency bus before transition out of E-0.

Crew dispatches an Operator to investigate problem with the No. 2 EDG.

Approximately 2 minutes after the No SI annunciator RO checks if SI has actuated.

reactor trip, report the condensate pump trip and header rupture to the Control Room.

SI actuation status lights not lit. Crew determines SI is not required.

Approximately 3 minutes after request, report that the No. 2 EDG local panel is deenergized and request Electrical Maintenance aid in the investigation.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 11 of 14

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BEAVER VALLEY , OWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE I EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE ]

FW-P-2 trips. Loss of all feed to SG's. All SG levels PO informs US of FW-P-2 trip and loss less than 5% narrow range. of all feedwater.

FWMIlC US exits E-0 and enters ES-0.1 until red path of FR-H.1 is applicable.

US directs STA to monitor CSF status trees.

No SI annunciator RO checks if SI has actuated.

SI actuation status lights not lit.

RCS temperature > 547 0 F and rising. RO checks RCS temperature.

Condenser steam dumps open as PO dumps steam using condenser necessary: steam dumps to maintain RCS temperature.

Steam dumps in steam pressure mode in PO places steam dump controller in manual. steam pressure mode in manual.

Station instrument air header pressure > PO checks station instrument air 100 psig. header > 100 psig.

US exits ES-0.1 and enters FR-H.1 when notified of the red path condition for heat sink.

RCS pressure > SG pressure. PO checks if secondary heat sink is required.

RCS hot leg temperature > 3200 F.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 12 of 14

BEAVER VALLEY, JWER STATION Training Administrative Manual Procedure

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] IhITDI 4 If'TI,'n IAI i-*1 II1"r1 Ikll"e' I r I"-- - - - - - - ----- - I .

L"' 10 IxY.U'.., I IN/.I'4-L. *UUII-LII*I PLA-II S I A I US Ul I NS I R .I) TI I

..I ........ ,- .....

, ... I m l I-= I .. I I.I= I SG wide range levels all > 13%. US checks if RCS bleed and feed is not required.

PZR pressure < 2325 psig.

PDWST level > 27.5 feet. PO checks PDWST level > 27.5 feet.

SG blowdown isolated. PO checks SG blowdown isolation status.

FW-P-3A on clearance, FW-P-3B without Crew tries to establish AFW flow to at power. least one SG.

FW-P-2 throttle valve trip collar is FW-P-2 tripped. Crew dispatches an Operator to damaged. investigate trip of FW-P-2.

AFW pump suction pressure - 10 psig. PO checks AFW pump suction pressure.

No AFW flow. PO verifies total AFW flow < 355 gpm.

Crew dispatches an Operator to locally start the dedicated AFW pump.

When requested to check FW-P-2, report that the pump trip collar is damaged and will not reset.

Maintenance assistance is needed immediately.

SI not in service. Crew minimizes RCS heat input.

RCP's stopped. RO stops all RCP's.

Pressurizer heaters in P-T-L.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 13 of 14

(

BEAVER VALLEY r UWER STATION

(

Training Administrative Manual Procedure I INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDELINES I PLANT STATUS OR RESPONSE I OBJECTIVE EXPECTED STUDENT RESPONSE As the Operator requested to startup 1FW-P-4, after 3 minutes report to the Control Room that the pump will not start (breaker keeps tripping).

Condensate header not available due to PO checks condensate system in pipe rupture. service.

NOTE: Crew will exit FR-H.1 by recovering FW-P-2.

Report FW-P-2 is available.

CRITICAL TASK #2: Crew FW-P-2 in service. US directs FW-P-2 placed in service.

establishes feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required.

Crew feeds intact SG's using FW-P-2.

All SG NR levels < 13%. PO checks SG levels.

AFW flow > 355 gpm. PO verifies AFW flow > 355 gpm.

Terminate the scenario when the US exits FR-H.1 and enters ES-0.1, Crew transitions to ES-0. 1. step in effect.

Collect and review logs after allowing Crew time to complete them.

Erase any VOND markings.

BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 5 14 of 14

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: FENOC BVPS Unit 1 Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: 2002 NRC 01 Examiners: Candidates CRS RO PO Obiectives: In accordance with plant procedures:

Initial Conditions: Power75%. IC-171.

Turnover: FW-P-3A OOS. Reduce power to remove FW-P-1B from service. Severe weather expected.

Critical Tasks: E-O.F, Establish AFW Flow ECA-3.1.B, Cooldown RCS Event Malf. No. Event No. Type* Event Description I R (RO) Power reduction at normal rate.

N (US)

N (PO) 2 FWM01 B C (PO) Trip of main feed pump.

C(RO)

C (US) 3 PRS06A I (RO) Pressurizer controlling level channel fails low.

I (US) 4 MSS14C I (PO) SG 'B' controlling steam flow transmitter fails low.

I (US) 5 FWM07B M (All) SG 'B' feedwater control valve fails shut requiring a Rx Trip.

MSS07 Condenser steam dumps fail to operate.

MSS12B SG 'B' atmospheric dump fails open on Rx Trip.

INH20 C (PO) AFW pumps fail to auto start (manual start available).

INH21 C (US) 6 RCS03B M (All) SG 'B' tube rupture of 500 gpm (ruptured/faulted).

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor BVPS-1 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 17