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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARBVY 24-005, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-01-30030 January 2024 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 24-004, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-01-23023 January 2024 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 24-003, Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance2024-01-0404 January 2024 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance BVY 24-001, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2024-01-0202 January 2024 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-030, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-12-20020 December 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-029, Proof of Financial Protection2023-12-12012 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection BVY 23-028, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-11-28028 November 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-027, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-11-21021 November 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-026, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-11-13013 November 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-025, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-11-0202 November 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-023, License Amendment Request Addition of License Condition 3.K, License Termination Plan; Proposed Change No. 3172023-10-10010 October 2023 License Amendment Request Addition of License Condition 3.K, License Termination Plan; Proposed Change No. 317 IR 07200059/20234012023-10-0505 October 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200059/2023401 BVY 23-022, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-08-23023 August 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust IR 05000271/20230012023-08-15015 August 2023 Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, Llc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, - NRC Inspection Report 05000271/2023001 BVY 23-021, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-08-0202 August 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-020, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-08-0202 August 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-019, Update to 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report2023-07-24024 July 2023 Update to 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report BVY 23-018, Update to Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance2023-07-12012 July 2023 Update to Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance BVY 23-017, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-06-29029 June 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-015, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 1O CFR 20, Appendix G2023-06-0505 June 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 1O CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-016, 10 CFR 72.48 Report2023-06-0505 June 2023 10 CFR 72.48 Report BVY 23-014, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-05-31031 May 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-013, 2022 Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 2022 Radiological Environmental Operating Report BVY 23-011, 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report BVY 23-012, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-05-0202 May 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust ML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment BVY 23-009, 2022 Individual Monitoring NRC Form 5 Report2023-04-24024 April 2023 2022 Individual Monitoring NRC Form 5 Report BVY 23-008, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-04-0606 April 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-007, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-03-29029 March 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-006, Status of Decommissioning and Spent Fuel Management Fund for Year Ending 20222023-03-29029 March 2023 Status of Decommissioning and Spent Fuel Management Fund for Year Ending 2022 BVY 23-005, Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance2023-03-13013 March 2023 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance BVY 23-004, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-03-0202 March 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000271/20220022023-02-22022 February 2023 Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000271/2022002 BVY 23-003, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-01-31031 January 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 22-030, Documentary Evidence of Performance Bond2022-12-30030 December 2022 Documentary Evidence of Performance Bond ML22347A2792022-12-21021 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan Dated December 21, 2022 IR 05000271/20224012022-12-15015 December 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000271/2022401, Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont (Letter Only) BVY 22-028, Re Proof of Financial Protection2022-11-28028 November 2022 Re Proof of Financial Protection BVY 22-027, Bvy 22-027; Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station2022-11-11011 November 2022 Bvy 22-027; Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station BVY 22-026, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2022-10-31031 October 2022 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust ML22273A1492022-10-0404 October 2022 Review of Decommissioning Funding Status 2022 BVY 22-025, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2022-10-0404 October 2022 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 22-023, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2022-09-0101 September 2022 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 22-022, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2022-08-22022 August 2022 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 22-021, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2022-08-16016 August 2022 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 22-020, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2022-08-0101 August 2022 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust IR 05000271/20220012022-08-0101 August 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000271/2022001, Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, LLC, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont BVY 22-019, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2022-07-0606 July 2022 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 22-013, Notification of Revised Decommissioning Cost Estimate2022-06-17017 June 2022 Notification of Revised Decommissioning Cost Estimate 2024-01-04
[Table view] Category:Safety Evaluation
MONTHYEARML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment ML21159A0422021-06-28028 June 2021 VY and CR Indirect License Transfer Package ML19175A0422019-09-11011 September 2019 Arkansas Units 1 and 2; Grand Gulf, Unit 1; Indian Point 2 and 3; Palisades; River Bend, Unit 1; Waterford Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules ML18242A6392018-10-11011 October 2018 Safety Evaluation of License Transfer Request (License DPR-28, Docket Nos. 50-271 and 72-59 ML18156A1802018-08-15015 August 2018 Enc 2 SER ISFSI Only Tech Spec Amendment Package ML18165A4232018-07-25025 July 2018 Issuance of Amendment to Change the Physical Security Plan to Reflect an ISFSI-Only Configuration ML18099A1662018-05-0101 May 2018 Entergy Vermont Yankee Quality Assurance Program Manual - Review and Acceptance of Changes ML18053A1132018-03-30030 March 2018 VY ISFSI Only EP Final SER - Jack Parrott ML17082A3102017-06-20020 June 2017 Request for Exemptions from 10 CFR 30.11 for Vermont Yankee Alternate Disposal of Low-Activity Waste Water at Us Ecology Idaho ML17013A3032016-12-12012 December 2016 Draft Final SER ML16165A4672016-06-16016 June 2016 Safety Evaluation of the Entergy Vermont Yankee, Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 4 ML16165A4662016-06-16016 June 2016 Quality Assurance Program Manual Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility - Review and Acceptance of Changes ML16014A1692016-03-14014 March 2016 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - Issuance of Amendment No. 265 to Renewed Facility Operating License Re: Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule (CAC No. MF6403) ML16008B1032016-01-20020 January 2016 Evaluation of 10CFR 50.54(p)(2) Changes to the Security Plans ML15233A1662015-12-11011 December 2015 Issuance of Amendment No. 264 to Renewed Facility Operating License Changes to the Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Levels ML15292A2562015-11-0202 November 2015 Correction Letter Regarding Staff Review of Entergy'S Update to the Irradiated Fuel Management Plan ML15117A5512015-10-0707 October 2015 Issuance of Amendment for Defueled Technical Specifications and Revised License Conditions for Permanently Defueled Condition ML15274A3792015-10-0505 October 2015 Review of Update to the Irradiated Fuel Management Plan ML15120A3152015-05-0707 May 2015 Relief Request ISI-06, Inservice Inspection Limited Examinations for the Fourth 10-Year Interval ML15097A3612015-04-16016 April 2015 Request for Consent to Cancel Lines of Credit ML14304A5882015-02-12012 February 2015 Issuance of Amendment No. 261, Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Certain Requirements During Movement of Irradiated Fuel and Core Alterations Consistent with TSTF-51 ML14346A0652015-02-0404 February 2015 Issuance of Amendment No. 261, Revise Site Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Condition to Reflect Change in On-Shift Staffing and Emergency Response Staffing ML14217A0722014-12-22022 December 2014 Issuance of Amendment No. 260, Revise and Remove Certain Requirements from Technical Specification Section 6.0, Administrative Controls, No Longer Applicable for Its Permanently Defueled Condition ML14210A2662014-08-0808 August 2014 Arkansas, Units 1 & 2, Big Rock Point, James A. Fitzpatrick, Grand Gulf, Unit 1, Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3, Palisades, Pilgrim, River Bend, Unit 1, Vermont Yankee, Waterford, Safety Evaluation Quality Assurance Program Manual, Rev. 24 & ML13238A3982013-08-28028 August 2013 Relief Requests for the Fifth 10-Year Inservice Testing Program Interval ML13228A1972013-08-22022 August 2013 Relief Request ISI-05 - Fifth 10-Year ISI Interval - Alternative to Maintain Certain ISI Related Activities on 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda ASME Section XI Code ML13212A2012013-08-15015 August 2013 Issuance of Amendment No. 258 Change to Licensing Basis Regarding Station Blackout ML13127A1762013-05-21021 May 2013 Staff Assessment in Response to Recommendation 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML13105A1752013-04-26026 April 2013 Issuance of Amendment No. 257 Request to Revise Requirement of the Recirculation Pump Discharge Bypass Valves ML13042A2722013-04-17017 April 2013 Issuance of Amendment 256 Revision to License Condition 3.P and 3.S ML13025A3062013-03-14014 March 2013 ANO 1 & 2, Big Rock, FitzPatrick, GGNS, Indian Point 1, 2 & 3, Palisades, Pilgrim, RBS, Vermont Yankee, and Waterford - Correction to Amendments Issued on 12/28/12, Revise QA Program Manual and Staff Qualification Technical Specifications ML13055A0092013-03-0101 March 2013 Relief Request ISI-PT-02 - Fourth 10-Year ISI Interval - Alternative to System Leakage Test for the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Flange Leak-Off Lines ML1300903212013-01-30030 January 2013 Issuance of Amendment Rod Worth Minimizer Bypass Allowance TS Change (TAC No. Me 7927) ML1300902152013-01-30030 January 2013 Issuance of Amendment Change to Suppression Chamber Drywell Leak Rate Test Surveillance Frequency ML12261A2922012-11-13013 November 2012 Issuance of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule Milestone ML1214501962012-05-31031 May 2012 Closeout of Bulletin 2011-01, Mitigating Strategies, ML1207601522012-03-28028 March 2012 Core Plate Hold Down Bolt Inspection Plan and Analysis - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML1127904592011-11-0404 November 2011 Issuance of Amendment Revised Reactor Vessel Pressure-Temperature Limitation Curves ML1127205902011-09-30030 September 2011 Issuance of Emergency Amendment Modification of Technical Specification for Single Loop Operation ML1121014312011-08-25025 August 2011 Issuance of Amendment Elimination of Technical Specification Provisions Allowing HPCI and RCIC Suctions to Be Aligned to the Suppression Pool ML11152A0132011-07-20020 July 2011 License Amendment, Cyber Security Plan ML1103400782011-02-23023 February 2011 Issuance of Amendment Control Rod Block Actuation Logic System Functional Test ML1100601792011-02-0909 February 2011 Issuance of Amendment Regarding Modification to Technical Specification 4.12 as Result of Changes Made by License Amendment Nos. 230 and 239 and to Revise Wording in TS 3.7.A.8 ML1025717732010-10-0606 October 2010 License Amendment, Issuance of Amendment Scram Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves ML1026002492010-10-0101 October 2010 Relief Request VY-ISI-014, Alternative Examination Requirement for Nozzle-To-Vessel Weld and Inner Radius Using ASME Code Case N-702-Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ML1004316132010-03-0808 March 2010 Issuance of Amendment Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio Change ML1001203062010-01-26026 January 2010 Issuance of Amendment Revision to Requirements for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves ML0936208072010-01-22022 January 2010 Cover Letter, (Non-Proprietary) Order Extending the Effectiveness of the Approval of the Indirect Transfer of Facility Operating Licenses for Big Rock Point, Fitzpatrick, Indian Point, Palisades, Pilgrim, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power St ML0936208952010-01-22022 January 2010 Safety Evaluation,(Non-Proprietary) Order Extending the Effectiveness of the Approval of the Indirect Transfer of Facility Operating Licenses for Big Rock Point, Fitzpatrick, Indian Point,Palisades,Pilgrim, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power ML0933604432010-01-0404 January 2010 License Amendment 241 Revision of High Radiation Area Controls 2023-05-01
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November 18, 2002 Mr. Jay K. Thayer Site Vice President - Vermont Yankee Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC P.O. Box 0500 185 Old Ferry Road Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500
SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF LICENSING ACTIVITY FOR GENERIC LETTER 96-06, ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (VY) (TAC NO. M96880)
Dear Mr. Thayer:
Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions, was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on September 30, 1996. The GL requested that licensees determine (1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either water-hammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions, and (2) if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of fluid so that over pressurization of piping could occur.
By letters dated January 28, 1997, October 30, 1998, July 27, 1999, September 16 and October 29, 1999, March 29, June 22 and October 17, 2000, and September 17, 2002, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (now Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operation, Inc./the licensee) provided information in response to GL 96-06.
In the enclosed safety evaluation the NRC staff concluded that the occurrence of a water hammer event under the conditions postulated in GL 96-06 would be very unlikely at VY. The staff is satisfied with the licensee's response to GL 96-06, and consider the associated activities to be closed. If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-3016.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-271
Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: See next page
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station cc:
Regional Administrator, Region I Mr. Raymond N. McCandless U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Vermont Department of Health 475 Allendale Road Division of Occupational King of Prussia, PA 19406 and Radiological Health 108 Cherry Street Mr. David R. Lewis Burlington, VT 05402 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Mr. Gautam Sen Washington, DC 20037-1128 Manager, Licensing Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC Ms. Christine S. Salembier, Commissioner P.O. Box 0500 Vermont Department of Public Service 185 Old Ferry Road 112 State Street Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500 Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 Resident Inspector Mr. Michael H. Dworkin, Chairman Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Public Service Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State of Vermont P.O. Box 176 112 State Street Vernon, VT 05354 Montpelier, VT 05620-2701 Director, Massachusetts Emergency Chairman, Board of Selectmen Management Agency Town of Vernon ATTN: James Muckerheide P.O. Box 116 400 Worcester Rd.
Vernon, VT 05354-0116 Framingham, MA 01702-5399 Mr. Michael Hamer Jonathan M. Block, Esq.
Operating Experience Coordinator Main Street Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC P. O. Box 566 P.O. Box 250 Putney, VT 05346-0566 Governor Hunt Road Vernon, VT 05354 Mr. Michael R. Kansler Sr. Vice President and Chief Operating G. Dana Bisbee, Esq. Officer Deputy Attorney General Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
33 Capitol Street Mail Stop 12A Concord, NH 03301-6937 440 Hamilton Ave.
White Plains, NY 10601 Chief, Safety Unit Office of the Attorney General Mr. John J. Kelly One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Director, Licensing Boston, MA 02108 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
440 Hamilton Avenue Ms. Deborah B. Katz White Plains, NY 10601 Box 83 Shelburne Falls, MA 01370
November 18, 2002 Mr. Jay K. Thayer Site Vice President - Vermont Yankee Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC P.O. Box 0500 185 Old Ferry Road Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500
SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF LICENSING ACTIVITY FOR GENERIC LETTER 96-06, ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (VY) (TAC NO. M96880)
Dear Mr. Thayer:
Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions, was issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on September 30, 1996. The GL requested that licensees determine (1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either water-hammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions, and (2) if piping systems that penetrate the containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of fluid so that over pressurization of piping could occur.
By letters dated January 28, 1997, October 30, 1998, July 27, 1999, September 16 and October 29, 1999, March 29, June 22 and October 17, 2000, and September 17, 2002, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (now Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operation, Inc./the licensee) provided information in response to GL 96-06.
In the enclosed safety evaluation the NRC staff concluded that the occurrence of a water hammer event under the conditions postulated in GL 96-06 would be very unlikely at VY. The staff is satisfied with the licensee's response to GL 96-06, and consider the associated activities to be closed. If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-3016.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert M. Pulsifer, Project Manager, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-271
Enclosure:
Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC J. Andersen M. OBrien W. Beckner PDI-2 R/F R. Pulsifer OGC ACRS SRichards(e-mail SAR) C. Anderson, RI CHammer DTerao RCaruso SWeerakkady WJensen DOCUMENT NAME: ML022760229
- See previous concurrence OFFICE PDI-2/PM PDI-2/LA SRXB SPLB EMEB PDI-2/SC NAME RPulsifer LCox for MOBrien RCaruso* SWeerakkady* DTerao* JAndersen DATE 11/12/02 11/14/02 10/15/02 10/18/02 10/25/02 11/14/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OF THE RESPONSE TO GL 96-06 ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity during Design-Basis Accident Conditions, issued on September 30, 1996, requires among other considerations that licensees provide evaluations of containment air cooling water systems to determine susceptibility to thermally induced pressurization of piping runs penetrating the containment, water hammer and two-phase flow during postulated design-basis accidents. If systems are found to be susceptible to these conditions, licensees are expected to assess the operability of affected systems and take corrective action as appropriate. The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and subsequently Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC (the licensee) provided the required evaluations for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) as described in the following discussions.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Water Hammer Water hammer occurrence has been postulated within containment cooling systems following a loss of offsite power (LOOP) causing the cooling water to drain. Water hammer could occur either, (1) as part of the draining process as steam condensation causes water slugs to converge in horizontal pipes or (2) as steam voids collapse following the restart of pumps supplying water to the containment coolers. A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) could increase the possibility of steam formation and hence water hammer occurrence by causing boiling to occur within the fan cooler units or connecting piping.
The containment structure at VY is the General Electric Mark I design. The design includes a drywell containing the reactor vessel and recirculation loops and a suppression pool. Drywell cooling is provided by four fan-coil air cooling units. The drywell air cooling system is a Enclosure
nonsafety-related system, and is therefore, not relied upon to mitigate any design-basis transient or accident at VY. Cooling water is provided to the drywell air coolers by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. The RBCCW system at VY is not relied upon for post-accident heat removal. The sole safety-related function is to remain structurally sound following design-basis accidents so that containment integrity will not be compromised.
Following a LOOP, the RBCCW pumps will stop. The pumps may auto-start in 73 seconds or they may be manually restarted at some later time. The RBCCW is a closed-loop system, equipped with a surge tank that maintains a head of water even after power is lost so that system draining is not expected following a LOOP event. The consequences of a LOCA concurrent with a LOOP were evaluated by the licensee as required by GL 96-06. The increased containment temperature and moisture content was determined to be capable of causing voiding within the RBCCW piping. The licensee evaluated the water hammer that might occur from the restart of the RBCCW pumps, using method of characteristics methodology developed by the Altran Corporation. At the time of the VY submittal, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff was reviewing essentially identical methodology submitted by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). This review was completed and the methodology was approved for generic use on April 3, 2002. Following the approval of the EPRI methodology, the NRC staff requested that the licensee provide a comparison of their methodology with that which had been approved. Specific questions were raised relative to 1) the heat transfer coefficient used in the VY analysis, 2) the amount of non-condensible gas that was assumed to be released, and 3) the specific risk associated with the event for VY. The licensees responses in all these areas indicate that the assumptions used in the VY analyses are conservative in comparison with the approved methodology. The staff, therefore, concludes that the VY methodology is acceptable. The staff further agrees with the licensee that the RBCCW system at VY is within the range of the systems evaluated for use using the EPRI methodology.
One conclusion from the EPRI review is that any condensation-induced water hammer that would occur during system draining would be bounded by that from column closure following pump restart. This conclusion also applies to VY.
As part of the review of the piping loads analysis, the NRC staff requested a summary of considerations used in these calculations. The licensee responded that stresses from the combination of loads due to dead weight, internal pressure and seismic excitation were considered concurrent with those from water hammer. Thermal expansion of the piping resulting from elevated temperature within the containment was also considered. The staff concludes that the licensees methodology is acceptable and agrees that failure of the RBCCW system such that containment integrity will be compromised is extremely unlikely at VY.
2.2 Two-Phase Flow In addition to water hammer, GL 96-06 is concerned with the occurrence of two-phase flow conditions within containment air coolers that might affect the assumptions used for heat removal during design-basis accidents. The containment air coolers at VY are not relied on to mitigate design-basis accidents and are designed to trip if such accidents occur, therefore this aspect of the GL does not apply to the containment air coolers at VY.
2.3 Thermally-Induced Pressurization The licensee identified five systems potentially vulnerable to a water solid volume that may be subjected to an increase in pressure due to heating of trapped fluid. The affected systems are:
RBCCW; radwaste system; main steam drain system; residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system; and nuclear boiler system. The licensee, for its long term corrective actions, installed pressure relief valves in the RBCCW and the radwaste systems lines. The licensee also installed check valves in the main steam drain lines and the RHR shutdown cooling and nuclear boiler (Sample) systems during the Fall 1996 refueling outage. The NRC staff finds that these corrective actions provide acceptable resolution for the issue of thermally induced pressurization of piping runs penetrating the containment.
3.0 CONCLUSION
S Based on the forgoing considerations, the NRC staff concludes that the occurrence of a water hammer event such as will affect plant safety as postulated in GL 96-06 is highly unlikely at VY.
Furthermore, the staff concludes that the licensee has provided the required evaluations and modifications where appropriate and has adequately addressed the issues raised in GL 96-06 regarding the potential for a water hammer, two-phase flow, and thermally induced pressurization of piping runs penetrating the containment. This closes TAC No. M96880.
Principal Contributors: C. Hammer W. Jensen