ML022750272

RERP Plan Implementing Procedure

ML022750272
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/20/2002
From:	Detroit Edison
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
EP-545
Download: ML022750272 (18)

Text

DETROIT EDISON - FERMI 2 AUTOMATED RECORD MANAGEMENT DISTRIBUTION CONTROL LIST 09/20/02 To: 00935 US NRC PAGE 1 DOCUMENT CNTRL DESK WASHINGTON, DC 20555 Media: 8 1/2 X 11 Number Cnt Issue DTC Doc. Serial Number Page Rev Copies Lvl Date Sec Status TPEPT EP-545 17 1 ST 09/20/02 AFC Please destroy or mark all revised, superseded, or cancelled documents as such. CONTROLLED stamps must be voided by lining through and initialing.

Detroit Edison EF2, C/O Info Mgmt 140 NOC, 6400 North Dixie Highway, Newport MI 48166. (734) 586-4338 OR (734) 586-4061 for questions or concerns.

Ref: ca6076

I This procedure contains pages larger than 8 1/2/" X 11". To print -(ensure 11 X 17 paper is in printer) open procedure, select file from toolbar, select print, select setup, select size 11 X 17, select landscape, click ok, select page # and click ok.

Fermi 2 EP-545 RERP Plan Implementing Procedure Revision 17 Page 1 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Revision Summary

1) Added notes 2 and 3 to PAR Flowchart, Enclosure A, to clarify PAR basis.

Implementation Plan

1) This procedure goes into effect upon issuance.

Attachments - None Enclosures A 090402 PAR Flowchart B 050602 Downwind Affected Sector to Area Conversion Table C 012798 Protective Action Areas D 012798 EF 2 10-Mile EPZ Evacuation Time Estimates Summary E 012798 EF 2 10-Mile EPZ Population Analysis F 050602 Representative Shielding Factors From a Gamma Cloud Source G 050602 Inhalation Shielding Factors for a Wood House, Snug Doors, Closed Windows (Thyroid) CONTROLLED

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 2 1.0 PURPOSE To provide guidelines for formulating and recommending appropriate protective actions for the general public in the event of a General Emergency.

2.0 USE REFERENCES 2.1 EP-290, Emergency Notifications 3.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 3.1 A Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is declared.

4.0 GENERAL INFORMATION 4.1 Protective actions (evacuation and/or sheltering) are required for the affected areas of the general public at the General Emergency declaration and are recommended to local and/or state authorities as appropriate.

4.2 Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) formulation involves an assessment of risk to the general public. Appropriate recommendations are determined using Enclosure A, PAR Flowchart, which considers risk assessment based on two primary indicators.

4.2.1 Dose Projections

1. Dose projections are classified as "Actual" or "Potential".

a. Actual doses are based on radioactivity actually being released from the plant. They are calculated using either effluent radiation monitor readings (normal), grab sample results, or actual field measurements.

b. Potential doses are based on radioactivity in primary containment available for release. They are calculated using Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRMs) or containment atmosphere grab sample results.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 3

2. PAR decision making may be based on an estimate of radiation exposure an individual might receive over a projected period in comparison to a Protective Action Guideline (PAG).

a. A PAG is a level of exposure that an individual might receive that warrants a specific protective action to be implemented.

b. PAG values are expressed in units of dose and represent the risk of health effects to the exposed population.

c. PAG values are as follows:

TEDE 1 rem Adult Thyroid 5 rem

d. A projected dose greater than a PAG value is used to initiate PAR decision-making and normally requires an evacuation.

3. The risk associated with a projected dose that exceeds a PAG value is generally higher than the risk associated from an evacuation.

a. The risks associated with an evacuation during inclement weather or other competing disasters may be greater than that associated with a PAG value. This will require state decision-makers to assess those risks and take appropriate protective actions.

4. When projected doses exceed a PAG value at a distance greater than 10 miles, manual dose calculations may be used to determine the affected areas and distances.

4.2.2 Plant Status

1. PAR decision-making also includes an assessment of plant conditions, specifically core damage estimates.

2. A General Emergency declaration represents a significant risk to the general public and indicates a severe core damage accident is in progress or projected (>20% gap release).

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 4

3. Severe core damage accidents reflect an amount of radioactivity that may be available and present an unacceptable risk to the general health of the public.

These accidents would require evacuation of those close to the plant and sheltering of further out areas should later evacuations be needed.

4. The risks due to the potential radiation exposure from a severe core damage accident are reduced by the implementation of protective actions.

5. PAR decision-making based on plant status represents the desired proactive approach to the protection of the public. It focuses the decision-maker on the likelihood of radiation exposure thereby offering the greatest reduction of risk.

6. Careful evaluation of plant conditions is needed to properly determine if a fuel melt accident is in progress or projected. This evaluation may include, but is not limited to:

a. Status of injection capabilities

b. How long fuel has been uncovered (reactor water level)

c. CHRRMs

d. Core damage estimates such as EP-547, "Rapid Estimate of Core/Fuel Damage Based on Containment High Range Radiation Monitor," or dose assessment program

7. Fuel melt sequences represent the greatest risk to the health of the general public. Activity produced from these sequences, if released, can produce severe early health effects and necessitates immediate protection of the public.

8. Analysis of potential primary containment failure during a severe accident may prove to be extremely difficult or impossible to predict due to plant conditions are outside of plant design. Therefore, status of primary containment is not considered for the initial PAR development.

4.2.3 PARs must be continually evaluated to assure the public's health and safety as conditions change or more information becomes available.

1. If dose calculations become available after an initial PAR has been made the impact on PAR effectiveness must be determined.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 5

2. Meteorological data and the Offsite Radiological Emergency Team (RET) survey(s) provide useful information for PAR development. Each provides information on plume position.

3. Current offsite hazards may also exist that might impact protective actions.

The presence of physical or environmental hazards (e.g., tornadoes, ice storms, road hazards, etc.) should be communicated to offsite authorities for their consideration.

4. The current status of emergency response efforts can provide insight to future PARs. Successful (or failed) efforts can provide decision makers with data to help determine likelihood of further core damage.

4.3 Other considerations may be involved when evaluating the effectiveness of a PAR and are normally evaluated by state decision-makers.

4.3.1 Certain members of the general public may be at a greater risk from an evacuation or evacuation efforts may take much longer. These members may include, but are not limited to, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, parks, golf courses, etc.

4.3.2 Evacuations are most effective if completed before plume arrival.

1. Enclosures D and E identify evacuation time estimates and total population which may be useful to evaluate evacuation effectiveness.

4.3.3 Dose received before PAR implementation is not used for PAR effectiveness evaluations.

4.3.4 In cases where evacuations are not prudent, sheltering may be appropriate.

1. Enclosure F, Representative Shielding Factors From a Gamma Cloud Source, and Enclosure G, Inhalation Shielding Factors for a Wood House, Snug Doors, Closed Windows (Thyroid), may be used to evaluate sheltering effectiveness by multiplying projected Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and adult thyroid dose respectively by the Enclosure's shielding factors.

4.4 Protective actions for the early phase of a General Emergency are prescribed for the 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) surrounding the site.

4.4.1 For planning purposes, the EPZ is divided into concentric rings of 2, 5, and 10 miles.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 6 4.4.2 The EPZ is also divided into sixteen 22.50 sectors.

4.4.3 The EPZ is further divided into five Protective Action Areas (PAAs) as shown in Enclosure C, Protective Action Areas.

4.4.4 When making PARs, the minimum area considered is the PAAs located in the 2-mile radius, and the projected plume's centerline sector, and two adjacent sectors out to five miles.

1. When developing PARs for "Security Event Resulting in Loss of Physical Control of the Plant" (HG 1), the minimum area considered is the PAA located in the 2-mile radius (Area 1).

2. If the projected dose exceeds a PAG value >10 miles away, adhoc protective actions would be developed in conjunction with offsite authorities.

4.4.5 Once a PAR has been determined and communicated, less stringent recommendations are normally not considered or used.

4.4.6 Other information such as better understood accident sequence, presence of significant particulate fission products or radioiodine, or the presence of an unmonitored or unfiltered release path may lead to more stringent Adhoc protective actions.

4.5 Responsibility for PARs 4.5.1 Detroit Edison decision-makers only recommend protective actions. State decision-makers make the final decision on what protective action(s) to implement.

4.5.2 If the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) are not functional:

1. The Shift Technical Advisor evaluates available information and advises the Emergency Director in matters related to protective action recommendations.

2. The Emergency Director is responsible for making the final recommendation(s) to local and/or state authorities as appropriate.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 7 4.5.3 If the TSC is functional and the EOF is not functional:

1. The Radiation Protection Advisor and/or Technical Engineer, as appropriate, evaluate available information and advise the Emergency Director in matters related to protective action recommendations.

2. The Emergency Director is responsible for making a final recommendation to local and/or state authorities as appropriate.

4.5.4 If the EOF is functional:

1. The Radiation Protection Coordinator evaluates available information and advises the Emergency Officer in matters related to protective action recommendations. The Nuclear Operations Advisor should assist as appropriate.

2. The Emergency Officer is responsible for making a final recommendation to local and/or state authorities as appropriate.

4.5.5 PARs are made to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) if the SEOC is functional.

1. Recommendations will be discussed with the State Emergency Director before issuance, when time permits.

2. The State Emergency Director will consider recommendations and issue a Protective Action Order, when appropriate, acting with the delegated authority of the Governor.

4.5.6 PARs are made directly to Wayne and Monroe Counties when the SEOC is not functional.

1. Recommendations will be discussed with county officials before issuance, when time permits.

2. When deemed appropriate, recommendations will be passed on to the public by county officials.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 8 5.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 5.1 When a Site Area Emergency is declared:

NOTE: Do not make any PAR until a General Emergency has been declared.

5.1.1 Initiate formulation of PARs using Enclosures A and B when possible before declaration of a General Emergency.

5.2 When a General Emergency is declared:

NOTE: A PAR shall be made to appropriate offsite authorities concurrent with the initial notification of General Emergency declaration and documented using a Nuclear Plant Event Notification Form.

5.2.1 Formulate PARs using Section 6.0.

6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 Initial PAR 6.1.1 Determine centerline sector using available resources.

6.1.2 Determine appropriate PAR using Enclosures A and B.

NOTE: Notifications of initial PARs must be completed within 15 minutes of the General Emergency declaration.

6.1.3 Immediately communicate the PAR to offsite authorities in accordance with EP-290, "Emergency Notifications."

6.1.4 GO TO step 6.2.

6.2 PAR Effectiveness 6.2.1 Evaluate the effectiveness of the existing PAR using the questions listed in Enclosure A, "Evaluation Considerations for PAR Effectiveness" block as a guide.

6.2.2 Modify the existing PAR using Enclosures A and B as necessary.

EP-545 Revision 17 Page 9 NOTE: Notifications of any change to PARs must be completed within 15 minutes upon indication(s) of conditions requiring a PAR change.

6.2.3 Immediately communicate the new PAR to offsite authorities in accordance with EP-290, "Emergency Notifications."

7.0 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 7.1 Continue to evaluate PAR effectiveness (step 6.2.1) as conditions require.

7.2 Keep offsite authorities informed of current dose projection results, plant status, response efforts, and other information which may potentially affect PARs in accordance with EP-290, "Emergency Notifications."

8.0 RECORDS 8.1 There are no required records generated through this procedure.

END OF TEXT

E1'-545 lE1nclosurc A, Iagc I of' 1 090402 PAR FLOWCHART Initiate formulation of PARs by considering

[SITE A-REAEMER-effectiveness of emergency response efforts and current and anticipated plant and Evaluation Considerations for PAR Effectiveness radiological conditions in case of General Emergency declaration. Make NO PAR at this time.

1. Are wind shifts expected to affect areas where protective actions are not in place?

2. Is a lake breeze in effect? Is precipitation present?

3. Is offsite RET survey data available? NOTE (1): May be determined using CHRRMs and Dose Assessment 4.

5.

Are core cooling capabilities being maintained?

Are core damage estimates available?

LGENERAL EMERGENCY (declared) program or EP-546 and/or EP-547. Other methods may also be acceptable.

6. Is there a release in progress? Is the release monitored? Is it filtered? NOTE (2): This PAR is based on plant status.

7. Has containment failed or likely to fail? Is a flammable/explosive condition NOTE (3): This PAR is based on dose calculations.

(H2 ->6% and 02 ->5%) present? HG 1 SSecurity event

8. Are there significant physical or environmental hazards offsite that would impede *. resulting in loss o physical control

/

an evacuation? ofthe Plant?

9. Are current emergency response efforts successful?

10. Are plant conditions present that may lead to a fuel melt accident?

N Fuel melt N sequence in progress Y or orolected?

L>100% gap activity in containnient atmosphere)

(see Note 1)

Y I * --or ? 5 Reinm "* Evacuate Area 1.

"* Evacuate to 5 Miles Downwind Affected Area(s).

"* Sheller all remaining areas.

(see Enclosure B)

(see Note 2)

" Evacuate Area 1 N Y

" Evacuate to 5 Mies Downwind Affected Area(s).

" Shelter all remaining areas (see Enclosure B)

(see Note 2) When initial evacuation is complete, evacuate all sheltered areas.

(This is a change in PAR)

(see Note 2)

Evacuate Areas 1, 2, and 3.

SContinu evaluation to verify E,Evacuate to 10 Miles Downwind Affected Area(s).

Shelter all remaining areas PAR effectiveness, (see Enclosure B)

(see Note 3)

L- If PAGs are exceeded beyond 10 miles, to verify identify the population at risk and PAR evaluation Continue effectiveness.

develop adhoc protective actions in conjunction with offsite authorities.

(see Note 3)

Continue evaluation to vefity PAR effectiveness.

PReffectiveness.

EP-545 Enclosure B, Page 1 of 1 050602 DOWNWIND AFFECTED SECTOR TO AREA CONVERSION TABLE NOTE: The Centerline Sector can be identified on:

0 the ERIS "Straight Line" plume plot display 0 dose reports indicating "Affected Sector" 0 field team data When evacuating to 5 miles "Downwind Affected Area(s)" The "Downwind Affected Area(s)" are:

If Downwind Centerline Sector is E, F, G, H, or J Area 1 If Downwind Centerline Sector is A, B, C, or D Areas I and 2 If Downwind Centerline Sector is K, L, or M Areas 1 and 3 If Downwind Centerline Sector is N, P, Q, or R Areas 1, 2, and 3 When evacuating to 10 miles "Downwind Affected Area(s)" The "Downwind Affected Area(s)" are:

If Downwind Centerline Sector is R, A, B, C, or D Areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 If Downwind Centerline Sector is E, F, G, H, or J Areas 1, 2, and 3 If Downwind Centerline Sector is K, L, or M Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 If Downwind Centerline Sector is N, P, or Q Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

EP-545 Enclosure C, Page 1 of 1 012798 PROTECTIVE ACTION AREAS A

C D

N E

5 MILE -,

S\ / ,* , / ' .,

F S, ~Lake

/

K Erie N r - -,/'-

K -

G

/

H

EP-545 Enclosure D, Page 1 of 1 012798 EF2 10-MILE EPZ EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES

SUMMARY

Ar~ Day-ighgh

__.. ... .. .. . .......... .Nor .rse ...... ...

Summer' Sunnner.xý Summer -Summer, -Winter,

. .. .N i.........

Winter Orm Winter al Winter Adverseb Sectors to 2 miles 2:55 -All3:25 155 2:05 2:55 3:30 1:55 2:15 I& 2 All Sectors to 2 miles 2:55 3:25 1:55 2:05 2:55 3:30 1:55 2:15 Northwest sectors to 5 miles 1&3 All Sectors to 2 miles 2:55 3:25 1:55 2:05 2:55 3:30 1:55 2:15 Southwest sectors to 5 miles 1, 2, & 3 All sectors to 5 miles 2:55 3:25 1:55 2:05 2:55 3:30 1:55 2:15 1, 2, 3, & 4 All Sectors to 5 miles 3:10 3:35 2:20 2:35 3:10 3:45 2:20 2:50 Northwest sectors to 10 miles a.

1, 2, 3, & 5 All Sectors to 5 miles 3:10 3:35 2:20 2:35 3:10 3:45 2:20 2:50 Southwest sectors to 10 miles a.

1,2, 3, 4, & 5 All sectors to 10 miles 3:15 3:45 2:25 2:40 3:15 3:55 2:25 2:55 I Iu*se are lsuiisVu times uial ubl data urawn from the o - .

• ia.... , . il i *3SO

.i.l. ll l. ltliU

-lLtfllU'.,

d o I oflhllt IWv ., I lai,

a. t If . IUIInK.

Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, Rev. 2, May, 1994, prepared by JB/A, Inc. Times are given in hours : minutes.

a. When evaluating an evacuation PAR for distances greater than 5 miles, and including Area 5, consideration should be given to the special needs of Mercy Memorial Hospital and Mercy Memorial Nursing Center. These facilities are located approximately 7 miles from the site and require approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - 20 minutes to complete an evaluation.

b. "Adverse" weather conditions are those which may impair visibility and/or traction, such as light snow, ice, rain, or fog.

EP-545 Enclosure E, Page 1 of 1 012798 EF2 10-MILE EPZ POPULATION ANALYSIS*

eurnuner ummr Nigh, -

SArea. WinterDay, , Winter Night 1 All Sectors to 2 miles 4419 3598 4398 3598 1& 2 All Sectors to 2 miles 7053 5571 7656 5571 Northwest sectors to 5 miles 1&3 All Sectors to 2 miles 15466 10413 13097 9633 Southwest sectors to 5 miles 1, 2, & 3 All sectors to 5 miles 18102 12388 16354 11608 1, 2, 3, & 4 All sectors to 5 miles 53888 45029 57547 44174 Northwest sectors to 10 miles 1, 2, 3, & 5 All sectors to 5 miles 65861 55516 71296 53334 Southwest sectors to 10 miles 1,2, 3, 4, & 5 All sectors to 10 miles 109937 96038 121367 93581

• EPZ population data extracted from the Evacuation Time Estimates Analyses for the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit No. 2 Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, Rev. 2. May, 1994, prepared by JB/A, Inc. Additional population data provided by local planning agencies using U.S. Census data.

EP-545 Enclosure F, Page 1 of 1 050602 REPRESENTATIVE SHIELDING FACTORS FROM GAMMA CLOUD SOURCE(a)

Structure or Representative Representative Location Shielding Factor (b) Range Outside 1.0 -

Vehicles 1.0 -

Wood frame house(c) 0.9 0.9 (no basement)

Basement of wood house 0.6 0.1 to 0.7(d)

Masonry house 0.6 0.4 to 0.7(d)

(no basement)

Basement of 0.4 0.1 to 0 .5 (d) masonry house Large office or 0.2 0.1 to 0.3(d,e) industrial building (a) Taken from SAND 77-1725 (Unlimited Release).

(b) The ratio of the dose received inside the structure to the dose that would be received outside the structure.

(c) A wood-frame house with brick or stone veneer is approximately equivalent to a masonry house for shielding purposes.

(d) This range is mainly due to different wall materials and different geometries.

(e) The shielding factor depends on where the personnel are located within the building (e.g., the basement or an inside room).

EP-545 Enclosure G, Page 1 of 1 050602 INHALATION SHIELDING FACTORS FOR A WOOD HOUSE, SNUG DOORS, CLOSED WINDOWS (THYROID) 1.0 GD 0.8 0

C)

Ii' 0

0 0 0.6 4..

I' Eq I

GD In 0.4 GD In 0

0 0

4..

'U

'U 0.2 0

0 2 4 6 8 10 Exposure Time (hr)

The above curve assumes the house remains closed up for the duration.

Actually, the dose inside the house can be further reduced by opening the doors and windows after the cloud has passed and purging the house with fresh air.

"Reactor Safety Study," Appendix VI, Wash-1400, October 1975 END