ML022670064
| ML022670064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/16/2002 |
| From: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-02-099 EPP/I-1a, Rev 2 | |
| Download: ML022670064 (84) | |
Text
EPP/I-la Unit 1 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 1 Revision 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.
0 OSC Approved 1
OSC Approved 2
OSC Approved 3
OSC Approved 4
OSC Approved 5
Non-Safety Related 6
OSC Approved 7
OSC Approved Issue 9 Rev.
0 Non-Intent Revision 1
OSC Approved 2
Non-Intent Revision 3
OSC Approved Rev.
5 OSC Approved 6
OSC Approved 7
OSC Approved 8
Non-Intent Revision Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
0 1
2 OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Simple Change Revision 2 EPP/I-la Unit I 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01 8-28-02 i
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-1a Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS A.
Purpose B.
References C.
Responsibilities D.
Action Levels/Precautions E.
Procedure F.
Final Condition G.
Attachments Revision 2 ii
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-1a Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 A.
PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.
2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.
3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.
B.
REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.
2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.
3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants
-4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1I/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).
7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 204 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.
10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".
11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 15.0 Condition Report #02-05069 16.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 244 Revision 2 1
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-1a Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-021 18.0 ODCM Procedure 1/2-ODC-2.01 19.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHM-87-014 20.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 21.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-99-014 C.
RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.
D.
ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.
1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.
2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs.
Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss ofAC) in classifying an event.
2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.
2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.
Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).
2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.
Revision 2 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types-of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:
3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:
These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers.
INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications suchl as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor.readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.
3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs:
These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.
3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:
Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 ShutdownSystems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.
Revision 2 3
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs.
The purpose of each is as follows:
3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:
is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),
operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.
Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.
3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION.
There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.
Revision 2 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such'that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,
tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Shift Manager shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.
3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.
3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the'cohdition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.
3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.
3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not-be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup.
In these cases, Tab -6,' Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.
3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the, existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.
3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is' made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the -specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elaptses), which-ever is sooner.
Revision 2 5
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.
3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.
3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:
3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.
However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT,condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.
3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated.
The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified.
Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.
3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period.
In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
Revision 2 6
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:
3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).
3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.
3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS'EPP provides the bases for these EALs.
The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.
3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.
Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.
E.
PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT'EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.
2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT
-BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.
2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.
2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 719 F Revision 2 7
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 gCi/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.
3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.
3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.
3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.
NOTE:
The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs.
IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
NOTE:
IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),
THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.
Revision 2 8
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:
4.3.1 Proceed to the n'ext'lower-severity'EAL and re-perform step 4.2
& 4.3.
4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.
4.3.3 IF the actions above do not' identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.
4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:
4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.
4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.
NOTE:
IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.
4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.
NOTE' A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.
The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.
Revision 2 9
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/1-la Unit 1 4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.
4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and 1/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:
6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).
Revision 2 NOTE:
The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.
NOTE:
The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.
I 10
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-la Unit 1 6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.
6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN following state and local agencies on a timely working hours.
6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 F.
FINAL CONDITIONS make courtesy calls to the basis consistent with normal BCEMA PEMA CCEMA HCOES 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.
2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.
G.
ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.
FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 2 11
EPP/I-Ia I
1.3 CNM,'Barrier Modes: 1,2,3,4 1.1 uelCladB 1Z RC BarieINSTRUCTIONS i~1~.1~iritkalM.
Iti.",Critic~al eF~tjsifction Statil_________60.______________OP______
- "fial ef",
°un 2*ti.3.1,0-tionrSca Safe Potential LOSS Potential LOSS "I A otnta LS NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET ftesad CoeCoig S
E oe Coig CSF~
Not Applicable CNMT CSF RED PATH
Ž"trsodhsberisracdorxeddnte Core oolig CS RED Core Cooli
'~
Snk CF ORbasis of confirmed observation or VALI, ntrmn PATI1 ORANGE PATli OR lheat
- Not applicable PATH OReat Actions ofFR-C.,I (RED readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement Sink CSF RED PATH; c
yi m
REDhPATtl
~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~
~
~
~ ~PATH!)
are INEFFECTIVE hncaijfnpaaersttmybernioy(eg 4-1.2FivXot'cs IEC~
4_________________________
containment pressure).
SooFeeHottestE.
,.WaterLeve nl L
r S,
LOSS.2 PoContatemntial.LOS NOTE:
The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the Greater than 1200 F Grt RVLIS Full Range <40%A, lPotential LOSS parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are not OR.*,
,,(rino RCPs running) up e
rTAnppreablesavailable or out of range and the existence of the condition it.
cannotbereasonablydisoeu"ne te-*
,'T-bd.
- '*'*g'
- l;1;3*v*Reactoir
- VesSeL*Water Level'*7 "Potential LOSS "following initial rise ORginitialriseOR P
aPotential LOSS OR CNMT H2 rises >4%
RVLIS Full Range <40%
RCS leak results in loss of Unisolable RCS leak that CNMT pressure or sumpOR' NOTE-An INDICATOR is considered to beME
/ith Not Applicable (no RCPs running),RCS subcooling requires an additional C
level response NOT CNMT pressure >8 PSIG judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR will charging pump be started consistent with LOCA with less than one full be MET imminently (i.e., within 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> i the absence
- ii*
,,vwith letdown isolated conditions train of CNMT spray of a viable success path)
The classification shall be made]
SOR
- o.....
as soon as this determination is made.
RCS leak causes safety injection actuation0ndicted t1a3Con by dW i1ectientry into EOPE-l Potential LOSS
- 1.
In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in required by EOP E-0 CNMT isolation is N
p aeach barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are incomplete creating a
Not Applicable met, check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column i'
,,*r,,,direct release path to the
- -,, *'** *::* 4 ;' o *,** *
"I-,
i lenvironment w e o6iat'A'tiýit eel 42.~Primar oScna#ek,'
eniomn hn~2 fn sietified fra particular var.~,reiew Potential LOSS
-otential LOSS 4.required potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or SPotentialnLOSSl LOSS Poentialmore INDICATORS are met, check thepoetaLOS SRCS activity >300
'~
SGTR that results in a safety igmdose equiv alentNotApplcable.....ijectionSGT thatactuationrlt Not Applicable
[
block at the bottom of the barrier column.
"-ltCi/gm dose equi~alent Not Applicable
'ijetin ctato I odine-131 OR l eEntry into E-3 requiredOby ORt-.
- 3.
Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA belowand
,Containsmen, make the appropriate declaration.
R 4 Potential LOSS I
, l
. Eto o
o d
t
~
RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID rise I
_o_
I Potential LOSS Potential LOSS FAULTED Outside of in reading on area or GENERAL EMERGENCY
- RM-CI101 A or B VALID
°
+VALID reading above CNMT ventilation montors in reading greater theh 3.5E5 Not Applicable background exceeds:
Not Applicable OR contiguous areas with LOSS ofany To S cpm with letdown unisolated I
~
~%
P-to-S leakrate
> T/S known LOCA b*-rier.
cpm wt with Time After RM-202 RM-201*
wihapprox.
4-8 hr.
OR OR S/D hirs mR/hr mRahr witeam prelease h
O n0OR 0-05 35 os steam release from Hi-tit Alarm on RM-LOSS ofall three (3) barriers.
05.4 20 03
,affected S/G via RW-IOOA,B,C, or D
- T0
\\ i2-:
4 4-12 1t 01
- Dueto streamingthruairlock nonisolable
/
SITEAREA EMERGENCY 12-24' 6
NIA 15 1-2 t
SGADV, or from MSLB NOT isolated
- A?.*,
4~SGAV, o fro MSB NO isoate LOSS o Potential LOSS of any Twvo (2) barriers
+ Readings basedon T/SRCSacnvity outside of CNMT i
LI oL(
Containfeni Rdiation*
°
,g
- .5 S"grnf-ca-"~
I*, ihioactii'i:
C.o*., ih* u
?ment'?.>.
L SS of one (I) barrier and a Potential LOSS of a second PoftentialLOS SPoeniLSSba er.
SPotential LOSS
- I Revision 2 ALERT
'-Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.
SOIOR Any LOSS o.r Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.
UNUSUAL EVENT 5LOSS orA Potential LOSS of CNMT barrier.
SEEALSO EAL 'S" 24 Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specific Activity >LCO) 2.5 RCS Unidentified or Pressure Boundry Leakage 2'6 RCS Identified Leakage
.ýl I I
DEFINITIONS/A CR ONVMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT,, GENERAL EfýERGENCY, SITE
- AREA EMERGENCY
- See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
SCIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e; the basis of the declaration). All classificeations are based on an assessment (I e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emerigency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the nedessity for these amsessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless other%vise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. "
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
isteam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as' leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
(INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g, increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a iprotected area without authorization.
'LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which
)combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
ILCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATIH: Monitoring ofrone'or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a VZSF is under severe challenge..
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile'mai be onsite or offsite:. Potential for damage is 'sifficiernt to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure 'oi'the 6perability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimei"e fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary-to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.,
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AR&A by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance." Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Dischiarge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability-of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED-AREA wkhich contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 3
21 Los S....1 Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents" Inability to monitor TRANSIENT in progress
[I and 2 and 3 and 4]
a SIGNIFICANT
- 1.
Loss of most (>75%)
annunciators or indications 2.,
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 3.,
- 4.
Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:
Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink Vessel Integrity Containment UNPLANNED loss ofmost annunciators or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or a loss of non-alarming compensatory indications
[1 and 2 and 3]
- 1.
UNPLANNED' loss of most
(>75%)
annunciators or indications for >15 minutes
- 2.
SM judgement that additional 'personnel (beyond, normal shift ýcomplement) are requir6d to monitor the safe operation of the unit
- 3.
[aor b]
- a.
b.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT
- progress, Loss of SER and SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators,or indications for >15 minutes
[I and 2]
I. UNPLANNED loss of most
(>75%)
annunciators or indications for >15 minutes
- 2.
SM judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit Mode 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 I-1 2
3 4
I ALL
____________II 22 Lss ofFuntio Criterion /lIndicator, Inability to cool the core
[I or 21 q C Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown
[1 or 2]
I.
Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink exists
- 2.
Five hottest core exit thermocouples >1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples
>719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%
Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier MatrLi" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs
[I and 2 and 3]
- 1.
Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR, CCR or RPRW) I (RHS, CCP, SWS)
- 2.
Inability to remove heat via the condenser
- 3.
Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S UNPLANNED Loss of communications
[I or 21 I.
In-plant [a and b and c],
- a.
UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones b
UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (Page/Party)
- c.
UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios (I landie-Talkies)
- 2.
Offsite [a and b and c]
- a.
UNPLANNED Loss of ENS
- b.
UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines
- c. UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to OfTsite
,I Faiureof x Potetio Criterion / Indicatof 4--
__-owe-Caot
_rer_ VA I In rpsini 2
2 1
2
__________ +
2 2
Reactor power >5% /oafter VALIDL trip signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability
[I and 2]
- 1.
Ops personnel report FR-S. I entered and subsequent actions result in reduction of power to decreasing has been do NOT
<5% and
- 1.
Actions of FR-C.1 (RED PATH) are INEFFECTIVE
- 2.
[a and b]
- a.
Five hottest core exit thermocouples
>1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level
<40%
- b.
Actions taken have NOT resulted in a rising trend in RVLIS full range level or a
dropping trend in core exit thermocouple temperatures within 15 minutes' of initiation of restoration actions Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause a manual trip from the control room are unsuccessful.
- 1.
Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been entered and manual reactor trip from control room did NOT result in reduction of power to
<5% and decreasing Automatic reactor trip did not occur after VALID trip signal and manual trip from control room was successful
[I and 2]
- 1.
VALID reactor trip signal received or required.
- 2.
Manual reactor trip from control room was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Applicable EPP/I-Ia At: I I Mode Criterion / Indicator
__________ + Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
(
1 2
3 4
5 Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (refer to BVPS technical specification 3.4.8)
[I or 2]
I.
VALID high alarm on RM-CIt-101A or B reactor coolant letdown monitor 2
Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical Specification 3 4 8.
[-Mode
- 2.
[a or b]
a Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATIl terminus exists for core cooling or heat sink
- b. Five hottest core exit thermocouples
>1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%
4 1
2 3
4
,I=.
z H./
0./
__________ +/-
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
L cS Revision 2 t-Ii i
I
-IL Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Mfatrix "
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
I I
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS,.
ALERT, UNUSUAL
- EVENT, GENERAL, EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which definfe that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (Le, determination that the condition' is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Impli~it in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been'exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
11OSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control, Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is'most limiting, or' other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 miAutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF;Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full 'range) and/or decreasing trend on core theirmocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITIONFOR OPERATION:
as specified in thi BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of ohie or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.,
i PROJECTILE: 'Ah object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a p structure. The source of the projectile may be ofisite or offsite. Potent,...
for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATIH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMET ER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION:
A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit' in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on r~lated or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE:
Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whi contains equipment, systems, components, or
- material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation I
Mode Criterion Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Unidentified Gr pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM
- 1.
Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) >10 GPM as indicated below [a or b]
- a.
OST 1.6.2 results
- b.
With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM
(>1%/min indicated on LI-Ctt-I 15 with no VCT makeup in progress).,, _
- Applies to Mode 5 ifRCS Pressurized Mode I
1 2
3 4
5*
12.6 CS Idntifld
-Le a'ge Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM
- i.
Identified RCS leakage (as defined Technical Specifications)
>25 GPM indicated below [a orb]
by as
- a.
OST 1.6 2 or 1.6.2A Results
- b.
UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, DG-TK-I, and DG-TK-2
- Apphes to Mode 5 ifRCS Pressurized Mode 1-I 4
1 2
3 4
Criterion I Indicator Not Applicable Not Apphcable Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss of Function" Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Within Technical Specification Time Limits
[I and 2]
I.
A Technical Specification action statement, requiring a mode reduction, has been entered
- 2.
The unit has NOT been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the action statement 1
2 3
4 5
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded
[I or 2]
I.
Technical Specification 2.1.1 specifies the safety limits for the reactor core which are applicable in Modes I and 2.
2.
Technical Specification 2.1.2 specifies the safety limit for the Reactor Coolant System pressure which is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 CPP/1.Ia Att I U
4
-I
'2
- 3 4.
00 cli Revision 2
-I----
i I i I i I
i
- ý I ---
I I
Mode _
Criterion / Indicator z
0 H
Ci)
CI) 2.,
Tchia Seiicto I
- Z
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL tEMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 "BOMB: 'A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (t e., the basis of the declaration). All dIassifications are based on an assessment (ie., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwisenoted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. 'Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes~frrm identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g, increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures)
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance
" level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thdrown, or launched towaids a p1 structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potent for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's'operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes)
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering, Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA' is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whi contains 'equipment, systems, components, or material, the failur.,.'
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Turbine failure generated missiles cause penetration of a missile shield wall of any area containing safety related equipment
- 1.
Plant personnel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration of, a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 Turbine failure results in casing penetration
- 1.
Plant personnel report a turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing pr damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil leakage 1
2 3
4 ReertdebCriterion / rndicator I
-_._-__.1_-_.
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection actuation
[I and 2]
- 1. Ops personnel report rapid depressurization of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 psig)
- 2.
Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated EPPJI-I a Attachment I 0
0 rJ)
Table 2-1 Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall Penetratio~n EAL Control Room Electrical Switchgear Safeguards Diesel Generator Bldg Cable Tray Mezz Containment Primary Aux. Building IWT-TK-10 CI rN C-i Revision 2 T
urie ailr I Mode 1
2 3,
1 2
3 II.-
I i
I-Refer to Tab I "Fpfssion Product B~arrier Matrix"I
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL,EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused-explosive device-(See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications' being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the' Core Cooling CSF'Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g, increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area-without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATHI: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by-the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: Ab6bject ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of gafety equipment contained therein.
The
- PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATTI:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION:
A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine) 9 UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed.
Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e, within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE:, Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern, regarding the continued operability 'or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
LosfAC(Poe0 Mode Cr~iterion /In Indicator Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power
[I and 2]
- 1.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes
- 2.
[aorborc]
- a.
Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED, PATH or ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling
- b.
R~storation of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of loss '
- c.
Five hottest core exit thermocouples
>1200 F or five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with no RCPs running andd RVLIS full range <40%
Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes
- 1.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes AC power to emergency buses reduced to a single source of power such that any additional failure will result in the de-energization of both buses
[I and 2]
I.:
Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is de energized for >15 minutes 2.
The energized AE or DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source of power
[a'or b]
- a.
- b.
IA or ID 4KV normal bus Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes
[I and21]
1' IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for>15 minutes
- 2.
Each diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 3
o S
Mode 5
6 De fuel 5
6 De fuel Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" UNPLANNED loss of power for >15 minutes offsite and onsite AC I.
AE and DF 4KV, emergency buses NOT energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes Also Refer to Degradation-"
Tab '6 "Shutdown System UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes [1 and2]
- 1.
IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for>15 minutes
- 2.
Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 ReJer to lab I t'ission l'roduct lBarrier.AIatri x and Tab 2 2 "Loss of Function ", and Tab 61 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes
- 1.
Voltage <1104 VDC on DC buses I-I and I 2 and 1-3 and 1-4 for>15 minutes Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix". Tab 2 2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2 /
"Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6 1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems"
-t Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Afatrix",
Tab 2 2 "Loss of Function ", and Tab 2 1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6 1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems'"
UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 minutes
[I or 2]
- 1.
Voltage <1104 VDC on DC 1-3 for >15 minutes
- 2.
Voltage <1104 VDC on DC 1-4 for >15 minutes Buses 1-1 and Buses 1-2 and Refer to Tab 6 4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for modes 5, 6, and defueled
-J EPP/I-1a Attachment I 1
2 3
4 Revision 2 11 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4
-t
-4 i
Mode Criterion / Indicator i -
I w
I I
erp)
'-4
.DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS I
4 ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL' EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: SeeEAL4.7" I
BOMB: A fused expl6sive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these a~sessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in 'population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensu're that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATti TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance le'el for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATTI: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: Ah object ejected, tthrown,'or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be'ohsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or'reliability of safety equipment coniained therein.'
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled' areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATHI:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates thai a CSF is unde6 extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION:
A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine)
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition-specified, on the RWDA (e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or ieport or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
)
.3
TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS
- 4.
Exlsions Criterion / Indicator, C
FIRE in the control
- room, cable tray mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown"
- 1.
1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment
[I and 2]
I.
FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1
- 2.
[a or.b]
- a.
Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE
- b.
Control lroom indication of degraded system or cbmponent (within listed areas) response due to FIRE Mode All All Criterion / Indicator, Refer to Tab 4 1 "Fire " or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment
[1 and 2]
- 1.
EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas inf 2.
Table 4-I
[a orb]
- a.
Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area
- b.
Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 I.
UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" EPP/I-la Attachment I Control Room Cable Tray Me Process Cntrol Relay Room Rod Drive/M(
RWST (I1QS-'
ezz.
4Rm Diesel Gen. Room Intake Str Cubicles UIIU2 CV3 Cable Tunnel AE/DF Switchgear Conta Prim.
Safegl Demir FIRE in the control
- room, cable tray mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any required equipment results in an uncontrolled RCS Heatup
[1 and 2 and 3]
- 1.
1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered
- 2.
Olis pers6onel report inability to operate at least one' of each of the' following components of the available train:
Charging pump AFW pump Diesel generator RPRW pump BIP Steam relief path
- 3.
Uncontrtlled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes ainment Building Auxiliary Building uards Building n Water (1WT-TK-10)
Storage/PG Pump Rm Fuel Oil 4.1 Fr
[ Mode G Rm Fuel Building C02 TK-1)
RW Valve Pit D/G F Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA / SITE PERIMETER I '2 3 4 1
2 3
4
'All
'All C
FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1,not extinguished within 15 minutes from-the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm I.
Revision 2
-1,
v i
i I
i I
I H
0 N
6
I H
4 if"
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS..
ALERT, UNUSUAL
- EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one oi more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY:' See EAL, 4.7 indicates that a:CSF is under severe challenge.'
BOMB: A fused expiosive de'icc (See EXPLOSION)
PROJECTILE-,Ati bbj&t ejected, thrown, 'r launched towards a plant Cn structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potentiai CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently damage is uffiient to cause conce regarding the integrity of the protesting station operations or activities at the site....
i ufcet t as cnenrgrdn h
negiyo h
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (ie, the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs.
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.
Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received 'from-plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reductiorf in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the 'applicable parameters (e g, increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown oll:,tu lUlul u
Il Ufl*.,&(LJdSuJIt)
U! l IUII*
Ut I4UlIJIIICqIpmc contained therein'.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATIH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primaryto secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (eg., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution' flow, 'minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge'of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes)
'VISIBLE DAMAGE:' Damage-to equipment or structu"e that is readily observable withotit measurements, testing, 'or analyses.
Damage is sufficient, to 'cause 'oncern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.' Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
4.4 Toxic Gas Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire". Tab 4 2 "Explosion, or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire". Tab 4.2 "Explosion ", or Tab I. "Fission Product Barrier Matrix'"
Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a
VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5).
- 1.
Report or detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in concentrations, greater than explosive concentrations.
Release of flammable gas PROTECTED AREA deemed the safe operation of the plant.
(1o o2) affecting the detrimental to
- 1.
(a and b)
- a.
Report or detection of flammable gas that could enter the SITE, PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- b.
Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- 2.
Report by local, county or State officials for a
potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.
Mode All All Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within, 2r contiguous to, a
VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)
I., Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area required for continued safe operation in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.
- 2.
Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode
- 5) while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant.
(I or2)
I.
(a and b)
- a.
Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- b.
Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- 2.
Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.
Refer to AOP 1/2 44A.1 "Chlorine/toxic Gas Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits.
TABLE 4-2 HAS BEEN DELETED F'
I Mode I FIGURE 4-B HAS BEEN DELETED I
4 U
Revision 2 C
lvlvuý I
All All I
i Criterion / Indicator i
i 1-7 I
i I
4.3 Flammable Gas A-EPPII-Ia Attachment I I
0
(/7
FigUre4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Shutdown Panel [I and2]
- 1.
AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered
- 2.
Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 minutes of manning the shutdown panel Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" Evacuation of the control room Is required 1:
AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered 4.5 Coto RomEvcato rM odel Criterion / Indicator I Mode 4-I Mode Criterion I Indicator Security event resulting in loss of control of the systems necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown
[1 or 2]
- 1., Hostile armed force has taken control of the control room or the remote shutdown panel All
- 2.
Hostile armed force has taken control of plant All
'equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functions [a or b or c]
a Subcriticality
- b.
Core cooling
- c.
Heat Sink Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public [ 1 or 2]
- 1.
VITAL AREA, other than the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force
- 2.
Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAIL AREA All Credible Security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant [1 or 2 or 3]
I.
BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA
- 2.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA All
- 3.
PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Credible Security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant [I or 2]
- 1.
BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All
- 2.
Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA All I Unusual events are in process
have occurred Events ire in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)
I Events ire in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)
Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level"of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.
Unusual events are in process orE have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
Table 4-3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump One Boric Acid Pump IFCV-CH-122 Table 4-4 SECURITY EVENTS
- a.
SABOTAGEIINTRUSION has or is Occurring Within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)
- b.
IIOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens to Interrupt Plant Operations
- c.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)
- d.
Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)
- e.
A credible site-specific security threat notification.
N ItZ H4 Revision 2 All I Events are in process or have occurred which All
- All
,AIL Not Applicable r
r-----F I
Ii I
I EPP/I-la
'I-All I
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EM!
AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7, BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: 'A gr6tulp~f t6n (10) or ino protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency conditio values which' define thit c6ndition'(i e'. the baris of th classificati6rs are based on an assessment (i e.,' dete condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that th been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless indications being available to Control Room operators Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A ph required to prevent significant release of core ra environment There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, C
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A bound BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR acci in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy o potentially damage permanent structures, systems or co EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondar steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolle generator pressure or the steam generator being comple FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light such as slipping drive belts oroverheated electrical I constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE: AKperson or object held as leverage ag ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentz procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator kn I conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Contro received from plant personnel, whichever is most evidence that the associated criterion may be exceede protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indicati to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Actio been 'exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) reduction in the level of severity of th'e RED PATHI minutes from identification of the Core Cooling 'CS]
PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level improvement in ihi applicable parameters (e.g, increas vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decrea thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile indiN protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentratioi combustible gases will not explode'due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIO the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fun(
level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ERGENCY SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An-object ejected,; thrown, or launched towards a plant
)re persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Dn and any numeric contained therein.
ýe declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas ermination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
he CRITERION has necessity for these RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and ant safety function safety injection.
adioactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
Shock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one lary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal dents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the on, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
ff sufficient force to mpnffcentf STRIKE ACTION:
A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA
)mponents by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
y side leakage (i.e.,
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of ed decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
-tely depressurized UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
gainst the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste ation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are aong calculantionsunintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases-that nowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, ol Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
ed.
Inherent in this completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID ions being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2)
)n Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in condioes nothresin 1athis definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes) condition within 15 FýStatus Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE:
Damage to equipment or structure that is readily of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or asing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or:component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, vidual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
n level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which "contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure,
)N: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the ctional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation 9
Figure 5-A Site Perimeter
- 5.
Trnd Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration occurs I
Analysis of Accelerograph Recording System data indicate ground acceleration >0 06g' in accordance with AOP 1/2.75.3'"Acts of Nature - Earthquake" Earthquake, detected by site seismic instrumentation, >0.0lg acceleration [I and 2]
- 1. -Ann' All-59 "Seisinic Accelerograph Operation" indicates initiation 'of the Accelerograph Recording System
- 2.
[a orb]
- a.
Ground motion sensed by plant personnel b
Unit 2 reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation Mode All All Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-I and results in structural damage [I and 2]
- 1. Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1
- 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures
- b.
Control room indications of degraded safety system, or component response within listed structures due to event Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1.
Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A)
Table 5-i Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Ili Wind and*Aircraft EALs Containment Building Safeguards Building Primary Aux. Building Fuel Handling Building RWST (IQS-TK-1)
C02 Storage/PG Pp Rm Service Building (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm)
Diesel Generator Building Main Intake Structure Demin. Water Sto. (I WT-TK-10)
I Mode All AMt 4.
4-All Revision 2 i
- 5.
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EPP/I-la tachment 1 I
tn
,-1
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS I,,,
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL IMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: 'Ste EAL 4.7 BOMB:- A fused explosive device(See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE:
A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (ie, determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded CIRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hteat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant, 'personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the 'necessity for these'assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE:.The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.,
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which conrbustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the'BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance
'level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
"ORANGE PATIh: Moiiitoring of dhn6 oir'fibe CSFs b)y the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An' object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plan structure: The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled,areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATIH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximfm release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: 'Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause,concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any, area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment,, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 9
Criterio r
Indicator Model Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in structural damage
"[1 and 2]
- 1.
Plant personnel report airciaft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 on previous page
- 2.
[a or b] " ,
a.,
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures b.:
Control Roomindications of degraded safety' system, or component response (within listed structures) due to event Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER I.
Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figtire 5-A" on previous page)
Mnde
.4-ALL
-L ALL
, Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix'"
River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level
[I or 21 I.
ILR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705 mean sea level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >52.48 Ft Nqote: M'an Sea Level - stage height + 652.52 Ft River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level
[1 or 21 I.
ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea Level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height
>47.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Mode
__________ 4 ALL
____________i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level
[1 or 2]
- 1.
ILR-CW-101 indicates < 648 6 Ft Mean Sea Level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height <-3.92 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Not Applicable Mee r to Criterion / Indicatorir ar
-- 4 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" 4 Watercraft strikes primary intake structure ALL Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix Watercraft strikes primary intake structure and results in a reduction of Reactor Plant or Turbine Plant River Water Flow
[I and 2]
I Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the primary intake structure 2
[aorb]
a RPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction to <20 psig on IPI-RW-! 13A and/or 113B
- b.
TPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction (Ann A6 118 "RAW Water Pump Disch Press Low" <15 psig)
EPP/I-Ia Att I 1
I ALL ALL
.I----
i In) 110 ITT Q~vdc;nn 9 I
I i
i I
I1 1
1 Criterion / Indicator 5.4 River Level HIGH I I 1'
I Refer to Tab I "'Fission Product B~arrier Matrix" I
0 CI)
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrer Matrix "
D DEFINITiONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, IGENERAL EMERGENCY, 'SITI AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e., the basis of/the declaration). Al classifications are based on an assessment (ie., determination that the condition is VALID) by the.Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha "been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety functior required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs-Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer tc Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat ol for&e.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE:
A,person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of' plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is, most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Ro6m Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A. reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which "combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown E ORANGE PATH-. Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:
An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant Y structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment c contained therein.
I The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas S within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
e RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which f
indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
y RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and n safety injection.
e SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of I plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one r or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal t reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the f BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ot inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the "expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive,Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).,
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (i) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, suchi that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for tiniely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or' material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 3
I 1/2 I
)
6 S
hut do Mod Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents"
- Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown
[I and 2]
A.,
UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or
'RPRW
- 2.
[a orb or c]
- a.
Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F.
- b.
(w/
RHR in-service)
RHR inlet temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200 F.
- c.
(w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 30 min-utcs, or there is evidence' of boiling in the Rx vessel."'
UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for cold shutdown that results in a core exit temperature increase of more than 10 F
[I and 2]
I.
UNPLANNED Loss of RlR or CCR or RPRW
- 2.
[aorborc]
- a.
Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperatuie has increased >IOF1
- b.
(W/
RHR in service)
RIIR inlet temperature has increased >10 F
- c.
(wv/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded f5 minutes Mode 4-5 6
.1.
5 6
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.
[1 and 2]
- 1.
[a orb]
- a.
- b.
Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate makeup
- 2.
[a and b]
a Ops personnel report LI-IRC-480, or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation (if 'available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches
- b.
Other confirmed indications of fuel uncoverv "Not Applicable Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with inadequate make-up
[1 and 2]
- 1.
Ops personnel report LI-IRC-480, or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation in the Control Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 inches
- 2.
Ops personnel report' inability, to make-up RCS inventory Mode 5
6 De Fuel 4
__________ 4 5
6 De Fuel
- 6.
L ss' o
C Suton Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes]
I.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses energized from Unit I sources for minutes not
>15 Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 minutes
[l and 2]
- 1.
IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized for>-15 minutes
- 2.
Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus IiI II s
fD Shudw' Mode I
4 I
5't De Fue'l Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents""
Refer to Tab 6 1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes
[1 or 2]
- 1.
Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses I-1 and I 3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority train
- 2.
Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-2 and I 4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority train I
Revision 2 C
EPP/I-Ia Ant !
5 6
5 6
c I
i I
I I
1 11 l
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS
- ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATI: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which "AREA EMERGENCY:" See EAL4.7 indicaies ihatia CSF is under'severe challenige.
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE:
A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e.. determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these
- assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: 'A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Arc available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATHt condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an iniprovement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temiperatures)
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combubstible gases'will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
PROJECTILE:t An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plar structure. The source of the projectile may be 6nsite or offsite:" Potentia.
I for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical loadi'(3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION:
A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.II TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ol'
\\
inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
)
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily obseivable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, jaint'blistering 'Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AEA whicr contains equipment, systenis, components, or material, the failure, "destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 3
6.5 Fue Hnding Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss, of wdater level that has or wdil uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel fl[ ahd2
- 1.
VALID tli-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104
- 2. 1 [a or bJ..-
a Plant personnel report damage 'of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods
- b.
Plaht personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered
'Refer to Tab 6 2for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered
[I and 2 and 3]
- 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal
- 2.
VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207
- 3.
Fuel remains covered with water F4 3 4 5
6 J
r7 I,-
unanticipated sustained positive startup rate Not Applicable EPP/I-Ia Attachment I y
-Mode IRvso
-L--I-ALL i
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7. 1 Gaseous Effluents" Inadvertent reactor criticality I.
Nuclear instrumentation indicate ALL C
Rr
Revision 2 INTENTIONALLY BLANK I
0 Cr' ci)
Cr) z C
ci) i L
m 16.6 Inadvertent Criticality 1, C
, q,
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT,_UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See E-AL4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE:
A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
,Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric
,values which define that condition (i.e. the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator bieing completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSiAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures)
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown ORANGE PATTI: Monitoring of one or more CS.Fs by the EOPs which indicat6s that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a r
- structure. -The source' of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote, )
for damage is sufficient'tb ocuse 'concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATTI:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require'or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine)
J UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in 'this definition are unintentiohal' eleasds, unmonitoied releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or'discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage'to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding, the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wb contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu.
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
Ga.seou-Efluei Criterion I indicator EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release
[1 or 2 or 31 I.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column'4 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION, is NOT exceeded I
1,1
- 2.
Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR fl-T for the' actual or projected duiation 'of the release
- 3.
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose
>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE "for the actual or projected duration of the release EAB dose resulting, from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivit that Xceeds 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release
[I or2or3]
I I.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Colunn 3 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this
,time period confirms that, the CRITERION is
'NOT exceeded I
I 2..
Field s'urvey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR P-y for the actual or projected duration of the releaise ',
I I,
- 3.
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose
>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that 'exceeds' 200 times Technical 'Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 minutes
[I or 2 or 3],
I.
A VALID gas effluent iad 'monitor 'reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the 'CRITERION is NOT-exceeded
,,,I 2.
Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hi 01-y at the EAB for >15 minutes 3
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose >10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2
times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation-Manual Limit for 60 minutes
[lor2or3Jl I.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reiding exceeds the values in Column I of-Table 7-1 for
>60 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded 2.
Field survey results indicate >0.1 mR/hr -'y at the EAB for >60 minutes'
- 3.
EPPdose projection results indicate EABI3dose
>0.1 mP TEDE for the duration of the release TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIAITON MONITOR EAL'S
'All All Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that 'exceeds 200 times Technical Specifications 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 minutes
[I or21,
- 1.
A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutei, unless dose projections within this "time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Sample results exceed 200 times the Technical Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactiiity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to
,the 'environment that exceeds 2 times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 minutes
[1 or 21
- 1.
A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-1 for
>60 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Sample, results exceed ' 2 times Technical Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite-Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration EPP/I-! a Attachment I NOTE:
The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specIifed dose projection/assessment, as listed at the bottom of each column If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes per UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading NOTE These monitors have the ability to divert or terminate effluent flow. Ensure that a release is in progress prior to using the EAL Column I Site General_____
Column I I
UE Column 2 Alert All Revision 2 I Mode I
I I I All 1-All I
All
- Ivivull I
'I SAVA*WV w-i i
i I
I Column 3 Site C~olumn 4
-I If a RWDA (Batch Release) is Applicable 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit RM-ILW-104 9 68E+05 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-ILW-116 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-101B (RBC Purge) 2.40E+03 cpm 2.40E+05 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-109 Channel 5 (RBC Purge) 2.86E+03 cpm 2.86E+05 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-1I10 Channel 5 (RBC Purge) 1.33E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-108B (GWDT) 7.86E+05 cpm ni/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 (GWDT) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm For All Other Unplanned Releases 2x the ODCM Limit 200xy the ODCM Limit Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (also called Ventilation Vent)
RM-IVS-101B 6 OOE+03 cpm 6.00E+05 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-109 Channel 5 2.94E+03 cpm 2.94E+05 cpm 6.01E+05 cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-109 Channel 7 n/a cpm n/a cpm 6 69E+01 cpm 6.69E+02 cpm RM-IVS-109 Channel 9 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm I 32E+01 cpm RM-IVS-l I 1HR (SA-9) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-Ill LR (SA-10) n/a cpm n/a cpm 7.32E+03 cpm 7.32E+04 cpm cpm Reactor Building/SLCRS Vent System (also called Elevated Release)
RM-IVS-107B 1.29E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-110 Channel 5 6.76E+03 cpm 6.76E-'E05 cpm 9.08E+05 cpm n/a cpm RM-IVS-I110 Channel 7 n/a cpm n/a cpm 7.98E+01 cpm 7.98E1+02 cpm RM-IVS-I10 Channel 9 n/a cpm s/a cpm n/a cpm 2.28E+02 cpm RM-IVS-112 HR (SA-9) n/a cpm
'n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.53E+01 cpm RM-IVS-112 LR (SA-10) n/a cpm
.a cpm 1.19E+04 cpm 1.19E+05 cpm Gaseous Waste/Process Vent System RM-IGW-108B n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 n/a cpm (n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 7 4 80E+03 cpm 4 80E+05 cpm 7.90E+05 cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 9 n/a cpm
'n/a cpm 1 83E+04 cpm 1.83E+05 cpm RM-IGW-1I10 HR (SA-9) n/a cpm
ýn/a cpm 1.59E+04 cpm 1.59E+05 cpm RM-IGW-II0LR(SA-10) n/a cpm tn/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm Main Steam Reliefs RM-IMS-101 n/a cpm na cpm n/a cpm 8.00E+01 cpm Liquid Effluent Pathways RM-ILW-104 9.68E+05 cpm Ln/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-ILW-116 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IRW-100 5.14E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IDA-100 2.44E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm r Minimum Release Duration 60 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes Assessment Method for Gaseous Release 1/2-ttPP-03.06 012 1/2-IIPP-03.06.012 EPP/IP-2 6.x EPP/IP-2.6 x 1/2-HPP-03 06 013 I/2-HPP-03.06 013 EPP/IP-2.6 x Assessment Method for Liquid Release EPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.7.1 EPP/IP-2.7.1 I
0 Q
0 I-,,
I
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT,- GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring-of one or more CSFs by the EOPs whic' AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4 7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
'-PROJECTILE:
An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant S"
structure. The'soiirc6 of the projectile may be on~site or offsite. Potential CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently,, srutu.Th.,ur.othpoletemybonioroft.Ptnia proIesting sta NEon operations or activities at the site for damage is sufficieht to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected sru1treo Ar the nnerbhilit or -linhilit z f" znfetv. 2 m..
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the
,.condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not,result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE:
Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensbre that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available 'via instrumentation, -calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE:- The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend ofn core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration ievel below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING ICONDITION FOR OPERATIOIN:
as specified in the' BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown contained therein.
H, Thee.PROTECTED AREA
-encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
e RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that Sresult in corrective or mitigative actions being titken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, 'a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
- Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rites, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in
",this definition is th& need for timely assessinient (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses..Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability, of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,
-scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to fadiation
)
_3
Rad~~~iainLvl Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations or establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown
[I or 2]
I.
VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room or PAF (on U2 DRMS) for > 15 minutes 2., [a andbh
- a.
VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in,Table 7-2 b.,
Access restrictions impeder, operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown See Note Below UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the facility
- 1.
VALID area radiation monitor readings increase by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15
- minutes, Note-In either the UE or ALERT EAL, the ED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other CRITERIA/INDICATORS for applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mRihr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a more significant event).
- 7.
Ful adln Mode All I
ALL Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel
[I and 21]
- 1.
VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM.203 or RM.RM 207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 A/B
- 2.
[a or b]
a Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods '
b Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered
[1 and2 and 3]
- 1.
Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal 2
VALID lli-lti alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM 207 or
- 3.
Fuel remains covered with water EPP/I-1 a I Mode Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY All 11 All Table 7-2 1
Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 LOCATION INDICATOR READING Chem Sample Panel (735' PAB)
RM-RM-212
>100 mR/hr general area PASS Sample Pnl (735' PAB)
Survey Results I>100 mR/hr general area Manual Valve Chg. Pump Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area Discharge (722' PAB)
Safeguards 752' Valves IHY-110, Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area IHY-111, IHY-196, 1HY-197 767' PAB SA9/SAI0 Gas Monitors Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area 752' PAB SPING Monitor RM-RM-210 I
>100 mR/hr general area 752' Safeguards Valves IRS-157, Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area 1RS-159 735' West Cable Vault Valves, Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area IIA-90, IHY-101, IHY-102, IHY-103, IHY-104 735' Safeguards QIQSS, AFW)
Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area Main Steam Valve Room (752' Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area Safeguards)
A Penetrations (722' Safeguards)
Survey Results
>5 Rfhr general area East Cable Vault (735' Safeguards)
Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area Normal 4kV Switchgear Survey Results
>I100 mR/hr general area Process Instrm. Room Survey Results I
>100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results I
>100 mR/hr general area EDG 1-1, 1-2 Survey Results
>100 mR-hr general area
.-v;C;nn7' 0
Q 0
0 I
r-.4 M
i I
i i
I I
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB:-A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently!
protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition 'and any numeric values which define that condition (i e. the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the' condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has "been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Suberiticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received, from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core therinocouple temperatures)
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below vwhich combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATH:-Mohitoringof one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:
An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety, equipment contained therein The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATh:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event inv'olving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors.
The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow,'minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank)
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 9
)
.4-EPP/I-lb Unit 2 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 2 Revision 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev.
Issue 9 Rev.
0 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
0 1
2 3
Rev.
5 6
7 8
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
0 1
2 OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Safety Related OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision OSC Approved Non-Intent Revision Simple Change Revision 2 i
EPP/I-lb Unit 2 3-12-87 8-13-87 10-8-87 2-9-88 2-9-89 3-15-89 4-18-89 4-12-90 10-9-90 4-4-91 12-29-92 1-27-93 12-9-93 10-7-94 7-22-98 12-31-99 4-17-01 12-12-01 8-28-02
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Purpose References Responsibilities Action Levels/Precautions Procedure Final Condition Attachments Revision 2 ii A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 A.
PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate a~tions to be-taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.,
2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classificatioris and emergency action levels.
3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.
B.
REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station*Emergency, trepirednes Plan and Implementing
'Procedures.'
2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.
3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and, 'Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants
'4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Oper ting Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 "ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Contair*nmenlt Monitor Readings 'due to LOCA's
'with-various SourceoTerms).
'7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report 4991327-1 9.0 Unit-.1 'Technical" Specificati6n -Amendment "204 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.
"10.0 EPPOS #2 "Eneirgdncy -Preparedness P6sition (EPPOS) on Timeliness of S'Classification of Emergency Conditions".' -'
11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 *Condition Report #00-3939
,7 Revision 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 K
14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 15.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-021' 16.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHM-87-014 17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 18.0 ' Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-99-014 C.
RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly, relieved by a designated alternate) has the responisibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.
D.
ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0.
ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.
1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency, operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.
2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix..The Emergency, Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss ofAC) in classifying an event.
-.2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency, classification is-appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.
2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed.
Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).
Revision 2 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions SEPP/I-lb
"" Unit2 S..
2.4 - - The Emergency-Director shall take whatever-mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action S-would result in escalation of the emergency classification.
3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1.
StructureoftheEALs.
,U
-3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:
3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs:
These EALs address conditions
"*that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of "the Fuel Clad,.,RCS, or Containment fission product barriers..
INDICATORs of these conditions include S-
-CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water
-level; 'or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost:
Event-Based -EALs:
These EALs address discrete
" -conditionsor events that are generally precursors to fission -product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external,(e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss
-of
-offsite -power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases..
3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:
r Tab I Tab 2 Tab 3
'Tab 4 Tab 5 Tab 6 Tab 7 Fission Product Barrier Matrix System Degradation Loss of Power Hazards and ED Judgement
,.Destructi~'e Phenomena
- Shutdown Systems Degradation Radiological Revision 2 "3
Z*
J
'EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.1.3, Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address "one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent, to' eich-EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.
3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs.; The purpose of each is as follows:
3.1.4.1 - CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the, declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment. (i.e., 'determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the "necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes. (unless otherwise noted) of indications being
. available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.1.4.2: INDICATOR:
is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),
-operator knowledge. of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received "from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion "may be exceeded.,
Upon occurrence of one or more indicators,, the ' Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion.
Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or
.a detailed calculation 'is in th& case of a radioactivity release.
3.1.4.3 Inherent-.in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to: Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
Revision 2 4
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Unit 2-3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs~were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with
'assessment of the CRITERION.-:
There may be other INDICATORs not' envisioned by the writers of this
--procedure -that, n-i the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.
--3.2
' -Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an evenftoc6urs s'idh'that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,
tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN,the. senior Shift Manager
-shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.'.
3.2.2 IF the common plant condition' results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from that unit shall Make the appropriate Classification and assume the role of Emergehcy Director.
Mode Applicability
-3.3.1 The plant 'operating mode ihat existed at the time that the event
-occurred, prior to 'any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the cbndition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.
'3.3.2 3.3.3 IF ani'event Occiurs', and a lower Ior higher plant operating mode is reached: before'- the' classification - can be made, THEN the classification -sh1l be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.
The fission prbduct barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified \\using the fission product barrier matrix, even ifmod&4 is entered due to subsequent heatup. In these cases, "Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.r Revision 2 5
3.3
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb
- 'Unit2-3.4 - -Transient Events K1 3.4.1,, For, some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to
., duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency, classification is declared as soon as the
-Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.
3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.
3.4.3 IF
- plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before 'the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.
3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the, time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.
3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such-that, the CRITERION is no longer-met), prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:
3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL
- EVENTS, no emergency is declared.
- However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies -designated to receive the initial notification form., These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT, condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.
Revision 2 6
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb "Unit2 I -
3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the,bases for these EALs.
The bases can be used "for g'uidance-toaýssist the Emergency Director in,,classifying events *forwhich -the classification is not immediately apparent.
Revision 2 7
'4.,
3.4.5.2 For transient events that would ha~ve been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL
- EMERGENCY, Ithe event shall-be declared and the S....,:..°,+-,
/_
-emergency response" organization activated.
The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold
-that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has :been.rectified.
Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.
"3.5 Declaration Timirig and Assessment Emergency conditiohs shall be 'Classified - as soon -as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL-specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the'co ndition cannot be corrected within the specified period.
In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:
,3.5.1.1.. IF the EAL-specifies a, dration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for 'one. hour), THEN the.,issessment time runs
, concurrently-withthe required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in'this example, one hour).
.3.5.1.2-. The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive. -!1 3.5.2 IF the-assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, S..
THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
" 3.6 '
Bases
""- r B ýý'
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions "3.7.-* -
Defined Terms EPP/I-lb
- Unit2, If:
3.7.1 In the EALs, words-written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.
Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in theEAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.
E.
PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE-THAT EXISTED.AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.
-2.0-DETERMINE, IF THE -CONDITION f'AFFECTS, FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.
2.1 IF the condition involves any 'of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to: Tab 1I ard follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.,
2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3, 2.1.4' 2.1.5. :
"2.1.6 2.1.7 2.1.8 2.1.9 2.1.10.
CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions Core exit thermocouple readings abtove 729 F Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs)
Elevated RCS activity >300 PtCi/gm Elevated Cofntainment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading RCS leakrate large enough to 7require a 2nd charging pump Loss of RCS subcooling -
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Containment bypass or loss of integriity Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.
i' 3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices lrovided at the start of each tab.
3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.
Revision 2 8
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2
.3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.
NOTE:
The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible,and within 15, minutes of the 'occurance of one or more INDICATORs.
IF the :assessment cannot be completed within the specified period,, THEN the;,event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.
-7 NOTE:
IF the EAL sp'ecifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),
THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration
[AND is the same length.
4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate.the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL.
4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed,,THEN:
4.3.1 - Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2
& 4.3.
4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re A.
perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.
--4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review 'the -obseived conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgrment.
- 4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified,; THEN proceed to step 6.0.
4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:.
4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.
Revision 2
EPP/Implementing Procedure Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions "EPP-I-U b
Unit 2 4.4.2 Initiate any sampling; inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL..
NOTE:
IF-the CRITEtRION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be'made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR: when it-is' apparenttlhat the duration will be Sexceeded, whichever is earlier.
.4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.
4.5
-IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made.' Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6'
'IF the assessment'concludes' that the CRITERION is not -met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as 4.7' IF no classification results from thle above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.
-5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY, CLASSIFICATION'AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL _ EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF anALEZT is'declared, 'THEN pr6ceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 Revision 2 10 A given INDICATOR'may apply to more than one CRITERION.
The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.-
NOTE' The declaration of the'emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to' state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.
EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NOTIFICATIONS NON-EMERGENCY 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and l/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:
6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).
6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.
6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.
6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 F.
FINAL CONDITIONS BCEMA PEMA CCEMA HCOES 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.
2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.
G.
ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H.
FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 2 11 NOTE The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.
I
IPotential LOSS 2CHS-RQIOI A/B
[3051]
VALID reading greater than Not Applicable 300jiCi/ml with letdown unisolated II Potential LOSS VALID reading exceeds:
Not Applicable 2RMR-RQ206
- Due to streaming thru airlock Time After 2RMR-RQ207 2-fR.RQ2021 S/D, hrs R/hr mR/hr 2RNM-RQ202 -ichn 302D 0-0$
340 I 102R.IR-RQ206
- chn 1029 0 5-4 190 560 2nR.RQ207 h
4-12 120 280 12-24 60 130 Potential LOSS
+VALID reading above background exceeds:
Not Applicable "Time After 2RMR-RQ201 2RMR-RQ202
- Due to streaming thru airlock
- SfD13, mhrs mhr mRP/hr 0-05 130 10 05-4 80 05 4-12 40 03 2RNIR-RQ201 - chni1026 1i 12-24 25 N/A 2RM-RQ202 - chn 020 P
+ Readings based on T/S RCS Activity OS
. Potenti CNMT isolation is incomplete creating a direct Not A1 release path to the environment when required EPP/I-lb Attachment I Modes: 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS SNOE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if the stated threshold has been,ý or is. reached or exceeded, on the basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e g.,
containment pressure)
INOTk.The INDICATOR)should be cinsidered MET if the parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are not[
available or out of range and the existence of the conditionI can not be reasonably discounted NOT An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if in the Sa judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR willb be MET imminently (i e, 'within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the absence[
Sof a viable success path). The classification shall be madeI Sas soon as this determination is made I.
2.*
3.
ii Ii In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in each barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.
If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the "potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LOSS block at the
- bottom of the barrier column.
Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and I
H<
- 0) z 0
'I 0
I 11 i
I I
4
- 1 ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL ENI AREA EMERGENCY: SCe'EAL 4.7 I*OMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) i CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or mo protesting station operations or activities at the site.
lach CRITERION identifies the emergency conditio values which define that condition (i e., the basis of th classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., det cbndition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that t leen met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless kidications being-available to Control Room operators ction Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
RITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A p rquired to prevent significant release of core enIvironment.
There' are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, 5ýink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal t (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
'EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): Aboun 1BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR acc iln population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR "FIigure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combusti failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy
ýjotentially damage permanent structures, systems or co IXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the 1rce VFAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of seconda
- sieam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolh generator pressure or the steam generator being compl FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light such as slipping drive belts of overheated electrica constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred bu "1lrge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
I HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage ensure that demands will be met by the station lll4DICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumen
ý.rocedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator k conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Contr
'rTceived from plant personnel, whichever is mos idence that the associated criterion may be exceed
ýrotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be fminutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indica
-t6 Control Room Operators that an Emergency Acti been exceeded.
Iri INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) rIeduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH mr inutes from identification of the Core Cooling CS PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level ihprovement in the applicable parameters (e.g., incre v~essel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decre
- iermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER:
Suspected hostile ind protected area without authorization.
I I OWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentrati combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATI the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fu
- Ivel for equipment required for safe shutdown.
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates'that'a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:
An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential ire persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment on and any numeric contained therein.
he declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas termination that the within the security perimeter fence as shuwn on Figure 4-A.
the CRITERION has w
e necessity for these RED PATII:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which s otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.-
s that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and
)lant safety function safety injection.
radioactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation'of Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
Shock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one idary surrounding the or more of the following:
(I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal idents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) t Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the ion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
of sufficient force to aomponents STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS e station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
ary side leakage (i.e.,
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of led decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
etely depressurized.
dUNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that al equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with ut is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste
, Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are tation,o-calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that knowledge of plant exceed a condition, specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, trol Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, st limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
ded. Inherent in this e completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID Ltions being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) ion Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in
) does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
I condition within 15 SF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily I of severity is -an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is easing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or easing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, dividual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
ion level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, 1destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the ION:
as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation inctional performance V
I,
- 4 ii ii 0
20Ln fnsrunnat5l Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents" Inability to monitor a
TRANSIENT in progress
[I and 2 and 3]
SIGNIFICANT
- 1. Loss of most (>75%) annunciators or indications
- 2.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress
- 3.
Inability to directly following CSFs:
Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink monitor any of the Vessel Integrity Containment UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or a
loss of non-alarming,compensatory indications
[1 and 2 and 3]
I.
UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%)
annunciators or indications for
>15 minutes
-2.
SM judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit
- 3.
[a or b]
- a.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress
- b.
Loss of SPDS UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or indications for >15 minutes
[1 and 2]
I.
UNPLANNED loss of most
(>75%)
annunciators or indications for
>15 minutes
- 2.
SM judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit Modep2riterionoI Inddcato
.I..
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
ALL Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown
[1 or 21 I.
Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink exists
- 2.
Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples
>729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level <40%
Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs
[I and 2 and 3]
I.
Loss of decay heat removal capability (RItR,-CCR, or RPRW) / (RIIS, CCP, SWS) 2.'
Inability to remove heat via the condenser
- 3.
Shutdown to mode 5 required by TIS UNPLANNED Loss of communications
[I or21, I.
In-plant [a and b and c]
- a.
UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones
- b.
UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (Page/Party)
- c.
UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios (I landie-Talkies)
- 2.
Offsite [a and b and ci
- a.
UNPLANNED Loss of ENS b.,
UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines
- c.
UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to Offsite L
23 Filtre f
R Pr'tetio Mode F Mode 1
2 2
2
______i Criterion / Indicator Inability to cool the core
[I or 21
- 1. 'Actions of FR-C.1 (RED PATH) are INEFFECTIVE
- 2.
[a and b]
a, Three max core exit thermocouples
>1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level
<40%
- b.
Actions taken have NOT resulted in a rising trend in RVLIS full range level or a dropping trend in core exit, thermocouple temperatures within' 15 minutes of initiation of restoration actions Automatic reactor trip did not occur after Automatic reactor trip did not occur after VALID trip signal and manual trip from control room was successful
[I and 2]
- 1.
VALID reactor trip signal received or required.
- 2.
Manual reactor trip from control room was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Not Apphcable EPP/II b Art I Modd Criterion I Indicator 1
2 3
4 5
1.
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrixi" Criterion / Indicator ReefoTbI FsinPodcIare Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barer Matrix" Reactor coolant system specific activity Reactor coolant system exceeds LCO (refer to specification 3.4.8)
[I or 2]
specific activity BVPS technical I. VALID high alarm on 2CIIS-RQIOIA/B "130511 reactor coolant letdown monitor
- 2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical Specification 3.4 8 en.
C-2.
r-q 0l Reactor power >5%
after VALID trip signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability
[I and 21]
I.
Ops personnel report FR-S. I has been entered and subsequent actions do NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and decreasing
- 2.
[a or b]
a Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH terminus exists for core cooling or heat sink
- b. Three max core exit thermocouples
>1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level
<40%
1 2
3 4
I 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) with reactor power >5%
and attempts to cause a manual trip from the control room are unsuccessful.
- 1.
Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been entered and manual reactor trip from control room did NOT result in reduction of pow&r to <5% and decreasing '
Refer to Tab r
"Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
I 1
A I
1 i
i i
I f
2 2
I z H
0 H
ci)
ReeioTbI FsinPodciare
1 I
been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
DEFINITIONS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EVERGENCY, SITE
- REA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
" Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric
,"Yvalues which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All lassifications are based on an assessment (i e, determination that the
- ondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these
- assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noled) of
,indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency 1Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
,CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function
)'required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the
'6environment.- There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the
ýBVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result lin population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to 4Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of
- ' force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not
",ýconstitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if Slarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station I
INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to' life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
0 UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, aind/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
(
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
/ACRONYMS ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for di-tiage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge:
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
i
Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission P'roduct Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage >10 GPM
- 1.
Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications)
>I0 GPM as indicated below [a or b]
- a. OST 2.6.2A results
- b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable,
- VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM (>l0/dmin indicated on 2CIIS LI-I15 with no VCT makeup, in progress)
- Applets to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized Mnde 1
2 3
4 5*
2 RC-d, t, d
k.
Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 1 IFission. Product Barrier Matrix".
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier MatrIx "
Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM
.' Identified RCS leakage (as defined Technical Specifications) >25 GPM indicated below [a or b]
by as
- a.
OST 2 6 2 or 2.6 2A Results b
UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, 2DGS-TK-21, and 2DGS-TK-22
- Apphes to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized I
[
Mode chia-Seileto 4
1 2
3 4
Criterion / Indicator Not Applicable Not Applicable Refer to Tab 2 2, "Loss of Function" Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Within Technical Specification Time Limits
[I and 2]
I.
A Technical Specification action statement, requiring a mode reduction, has been entered
- 2.
The unit has NOT been placed in the required mode within the time prescribed by the action statement IModel Criterion Ilndicator I k I X/al Appnc-Aoý e 1
2 3
4 5
L..L Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded
[1 or 2]
I. Technical Specification 2.1.1 specifies the safety limits for the reactor core which are applicable in Modes 1 and 2.
,2. Technical Specification 2.1.2 specifies the safety limit for the Reactor Coolant System pressure which is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
EPP/I-lb
, AttI 2
3 4
5*
Mode i
i I I Nlot Applicable i
0 0
CI) 0 0
N 0
In 0
Not Applicable
- r been exceeded.
,INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration acti6n(s) does not result in a ieduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 Jminutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor' vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a
$'rotected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which
'6ombustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
,LCO, LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in
,the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance evel for equipment required for safe shutdown.
by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).'
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damfage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage 'is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or, reliability of affected safety'structure, system, or component.
Example "--
damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering: Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any,area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
)
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or mor6 CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: ýe'e EAL 4.7 indicates that a-CSF is under severe challenge.
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant YJ CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential p gstation operations or activities at the site.for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.
values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i e, determination that thew-nA condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
ýbeen met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which*
aýssessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
)indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary 1Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded, leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function safety injection.
required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of
!environment. There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable./
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
"SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following:
(I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.I EXPLOSIgure A.The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by I
a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS
'EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt 1 force.
normal plant operations to be considered.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIR: Cmbutin caraterze byhea ad lght Sorcs o smke UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the uFIRE: Combhustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that dsuch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with "constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
iarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
' HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition
- are, cDICA EntOry(s Are availaletc.),operainstorumentatiowledg lantion unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that
- ,rocedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm se~tpoints, 6zonditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimumoditionsf init imes, m a
rm'm
- eleaerts, Sreceived from plant personnel, 'whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, 6videnice that the associated criterion may be exceeded.' Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID mninutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) io Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation
)
.1 1,
I Li' I
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Turbine failure generated missiles cause penetration of a missile shield wall of any area containing safety related equipment
- 1.
Plant personnel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration of a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 Turbine failure results in casing penetration I.
Plant personnel report a turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil leakage Mode i
£ 1
2 3
4 Criterion / Indicator Refer, to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix ""
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection actuation
[I and 2]
- 1.
Ops personnel report rapid depressurization of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 psig)
- 2.
Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated Table Plant Areas Associate Penetratiý Diesel Generator Bldg.
Electrical Switchgear 730' Main Steam Valve Room 2FWE-TK210 4
EPPJI-Ib I z 0
C#72 Cr'
! With Shield Wall nEAL Service'Bldg 745' and 760' Containment Primary Aux. Building, tqr cli I__I__
I Revc;nn 9 I
Mode J.
1 2"
3 4
1 2
3 ivLvuv I
I ----------
i
,2.9ý ý,ý,'Tu!rbin'eFailu re I
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EM)
AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or mo protesting station operations or-activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency conditio vAlues which define that condition (i e, the basis of th classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., dete c(ýndztion is VALID) by the Emergency Director that td lcei met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the ais'dssments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless
,6mhli-ations being available to Control Room operators AI A*1ion Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A pl reluired to prevent significant release of core r edvironment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Si~nk, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal (ontainment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A bound B3VPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR acci inl population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR
- Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combusti.
failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy o pdtentially damage permanent structures, systems or co E.CTORTION: An attempt to causean action at the force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondai steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolle generator pressure or the steam generator being comple FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
suIch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:. A person or object'held as leverage af ensure that demands will be met by the station 14 DICATOR(s):'
Are available via instrument procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator ka conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Contri received from plant personnel, whichever is most L
evidence that the associated criterion may be exceedi protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indicati tolControl Room Operators that an Emergency Actio been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) reduction in the level of severity, of the RED PATH minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CS PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increa.
vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decrea tli~rmocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile indi protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentratio I
combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
I LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIC thl BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fun level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS
- ERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. "
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsiteor offsite. Potential re persons violently for damage is'sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment on and any numeric contained therein.
he declaration). All herdeciaration).hAllThe PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas eCRmITERIONthatthe within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
he CRITERION has*
necessity for these RED PATIH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which otherwise noted) of indicatesthat a CSF is under extreme challenge.
that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and lant safety function safety injection.
"adioactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of C.ore Cooling, Heat CorehColingInegityplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
Shock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one dary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal idents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the on, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
af sufficient force to fmponents STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS station lby threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
try side leakage (i.e.,
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or'health by reason of ed decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
tely depressurized.
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that Sequipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
gainst the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste ation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are ttone oalculantions unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases' that nowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, ol Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, tlimiting, or other
,ed. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID ions being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) on Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in condioes nothresin 1athis definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
condition within 15 F Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE:
Damage to equipment or structure that is readily of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is ising trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or asing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering' Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, vidual pscratches) should not be included.
- n level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the 3N:
as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation ictional performnance C)
C) i 0D
Mode Criterion / Indicator 1
2 3
4 Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes
[I and 21 I.
2A and 2D 4KV normal buses energized for > 15 minutes Los ofAC Siid'n de-
- 2.
Each diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus Mode 5 6 De fuel Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 6
"Shutdown System Degradation" Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power
,[I and 2]
- 1.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes
- 2.
[aorborc]
- a.
Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH or ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling
- b.
Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss
- c.
Three max'core exit thermocouples
>1200 F or three max core exit thermocoupl~es>729 F with no RCPs running and RVLIS full rang;e <40%
Loss of offsite an_..d onsite AC power for >15 minutes
- 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes AC power to emergency buses reduced to a single source of power such that any additional failure will result in the de energization of both buses
[l and 21
- 1.
Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is de-energized for >15 minutes
- 2.
The energized AE or DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source of power
[a or b]
- a.
- b.
2A or 2D 4KV normal bus UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes
- 1.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes Also Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes/[1/and 2]
- 1.
2A' and 2D 4KV normal buses de energized for >15 minutes
- 2.
Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 1 2 3
4 I
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier 1
2 3
4 Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to T ab I "Fission Product Bsarrier Matrix" and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1
"ýLoss of Shutdown Systems" Loso l ia Cpoe o 1
iue Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes I.
Voltage <1104 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and 2-2 and 2-3 and 2-4 for >15 minutes Also Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", Tab 2 2 "Loss of Function ". and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6 1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Refer to Tab I "Fission product Barrier Matrix ", Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function ", and Tab 2 1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 minutes
[1 or 2]
- 1. Voltage <1 10.4 VDC on DC Buses 2-1 and 2-3 for >15 minutes
- 2. Voltage <1!10.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for >15 minutes Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown) "for modes 5, 6, and defueled
/Mode 5 6 De
'fuel 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 I
2 3
4 I
Refer to Tab 6
"Shutdown System Degradation" i
I I
I I
EPP/I-lb Attachment I SI 0
Revision 2
I:
4 p
DEFINITION' ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
ýýCIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) ormore persons violently ijprotesting station operations or activities at the site.
- Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e, the basis of the declaration). All
- classifications are based on an assessment (I e, determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has
"'been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these vassessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of
'indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the
ýBVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result
.in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic
'failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION:
An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of
'force.
'FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam Senerator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
lFIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke ruch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not oonstitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
SHOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station NDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, rocedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant onditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports
- received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other Ividence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this 16rotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15
,ninutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available 0o Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
'INEFFECTIVE:
The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a feduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor v*essel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend'on core "thermocouple temperatures).
'iNTRUSION/INTRUDER:-Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which
'combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in t*he BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe slhutdown.
S/ACRONYMS ORANGE PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:,An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be'onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving. one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
Q
)
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g, alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
(
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation
Criterion / Indicator FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB I), Cable Spreading Room (CB-2), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications Room' (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any required equipment results in an uncontrolled RCS Ileatup [1 and 2 and 3]
- 1.
2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered
- 2.
Ops personnel report inability to operate any of the following equipment required by 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 2CHS-P21A 2SWS-P21A 2FWE-P23A & 2FWE.P22 EGS-EG2-t Black DG Alternate S/D Panel 2SAS-C21A 2CCP-P21A 2RHS-P21A
- 3.
Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB-2), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-I) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown"
- 1.
2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment
[l and 2]
- 1.
FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-I
- 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE
- b.
Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE All All 4 Mee rt "io nrsitri Indicator Berer Mo Tatr4.1i"Fire"or laI issionrroaucr Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment
[I and 21
- 1.
EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1
- 2.
[a orb]
a Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area
- b.
Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4 6"Security" UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1
- 1. 'UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Refer to Tab 4. 1. "Fire" or Tab I Product Barrier Matrix'"
Refer to Tab 4 6"Security" "Fission TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AF[D EXPLOSION EALS 3)
Containment Building Prim. Auxiliary Building Rod Control Cable Vault Bldg.
Cable Spreading Room 725 West Communications Room 707 ERF Substa & ERF DG Bldg RWST 2QSS-TK21 1
2 3
4 Control Room Diesel Gen. Bldgs Inst & Relay Rm 707 Intake Str Cubicles Emerg. Switchgear UI/U2 Cable Tunnel (CV.
Relay Room Safeguards Building Main Steam Vlv Rm Fuel Building Penetrations Area Service Building Cable Tunnel 712 Cable Tunnel 735 1
2 3
4 All All FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm i
I i
b--
,.=
I EPP/I-lb I
M N
-.2°,
i i~i".ii~I
- ii0, R rviinn 9
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERC AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more p protesting'station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition a "values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the d4 classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determi condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the C been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the ne assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless oth indications being available to Control Room operators tha
,Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
.4 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS GENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant('
persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential 0 r
for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment rid any numeric contained therein.
feclaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas Rination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITERION has
.cessity for these RED PATih:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which ierwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
at an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety function safety injection.
Dactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation'of Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
tock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one
- surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal ts will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) 1t 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
ufficient force to Donents STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS ition by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threateh to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
ide leakage (i.e.,
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of 0
lecrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
/
depressurized.
UNPLANNED:' An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the purces of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that uipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
ist the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are
)n, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that vledge of plant exceed a condition specified oni the RWDA (e.g., alarm'setpoints,'
noom, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, inrting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
Inherent in this mpleted with 15 VALID: An indication or report or coridition is considered to be VALID being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2)
Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in es not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
idition within 15 3tatus Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage'is g trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or g trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, nin a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, ual present in ascratches) should not be included.
(
cvel below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which K contains equipment, systems, components, or, material, the failure, as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the onal performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant required to prevent significant release of core radio environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal' Sh (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR acciden in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Par Figure 7-A.II EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of su potentially damage permanent structures, systems or compo EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the sta force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary s steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled d generator pressure or the steam generator being completely FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. So such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical eq constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage again ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentatio procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator know conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc ) in the Control R received from plant personnel, whichever is most lir evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
protocol is the necessity for these assessments to, be con minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action L been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) doe reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH con minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF S PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasinl vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasin thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile indiv'idt protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration c, combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functio level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
A
A s
4.3-:-
I Criterin ndcao Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4 2 "Explosion'". or Tab I"Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a
VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5).
- i.
Report or, detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in concentrations greater than explosive concentrations.
Release of flammable gas PROTECTED AREA deemed the safe operation of the plant.
(1 or2)
- 1.
(a and b)'
affecting the affecting the detriimental to
- a.
Report or detection of flammablegas that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- b.
Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- 2.
Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based oh an offsite event.
All All Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within, o.r contiguous to, a
VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)
I.
Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area required for continued safe operation in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.
- 2.
Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode
- 5) while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
Release of TOXIC' GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant.
(I or 2)
- 1.
(a and b)
- a.
Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A)
- b.
Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).
- 2.
Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.
Refer to AOP 1/2 44A.]
"Chlorine/toxic Gas Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits TABLE 4.2 HAS BEEN DELETED EPP/I-lb CIA FIGURE 4-B HAS OEEN DELETED I
Q C,)
N 0
0 Revision 2 I Mode I
All All lTvlv
t-I Criterion /lIndicator I
I
,Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY S...
EXCLUSIO ARE
"~
2' BcOUNDARY V
AK 0ý0 4
1 AI r,,
rope 44Kin 44 ASON 44l
14S C,
5o 55M.
Sc tio' Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 4.1 "FinE" Evacuation of the control room, has 'been initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of manning the Shutdown Panel [1 and 2]
- 1.
AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered
- 2.
Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 minutes of manning the shutdown panel Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" Evacuation of the control room is required
- 1.
AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been entered 4.6 Scrt Mode All All All All Criterion / Indicator Security event resulting in loss of control of the systems necessary to establish or maintain cold shutdown
[1 or 21 I.
Hostile armed force has taken control of the control room or the remote shutdown panel 2.
Hostile armed force has taken control of plant equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functions [a or b or c]:
a b.
C.
Subcriticality Core cooling Heat Sink Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public
[I or2]
- 1.
VITAL AREA, other than the control room, has been penetrated by a hostile armed force 2.
Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL AREA Credible Security event which indicates an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant
[1 or 2 or 3]
I.
BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA 2.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA
- 3.
PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Refer-to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Credible Security, event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant
[I or2]
- 1. 'BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA
- 2.
Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA
- 4.
E'erg' ny i
Sto:iu'ge e I Mode I,
(
'I Mode
'1 4
All All All Criterion / Indicator Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)
Events are in process or have occurred which involve aitual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.
Any releases are NOT expected to-result in exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.
(Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page.)
Events are in process or have' occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.
Unusual events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
Table 4-3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump One Boric Acid Pump and Boration Valve 2CHS*FCV122 Table 4-4 SECURITY EVENTS
- a.
SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has or is Occurring Within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)
- b.
IIOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens to Interrupt Plant Operations
- c.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)
- d.
Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to-Interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)
- e.
A credible site-specific security threat notification.
I I
P'E.
All 4-All All Not Applicable EPPII-lb I,
zJ i
i i
ii t
I I
4 DEFINITIONS[
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EN;ERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: S~e EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE:
A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric Qalues which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All celassifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the
ýondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
&RITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
$ink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the
- 3VPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to 6iotentially damage permanent structures, systems or components
ýXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke
-uch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
hIOSTAGE: A person 'or object held as leverage against the station to unsure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant Stonditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports V"eceived from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other 4vidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this Ai lirotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result-in a I eduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor Zessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core liermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a SIrotected area without authorization.
iOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which i ombustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in
&ti BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance lev'el for equipment required for safe shutdown.,
/ACRONYMS ORANGE PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by-the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.,
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant (
structure* The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment, contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA
'encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATII:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of, plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:, An UNPLANNED event involving one or more'of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the
-immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:' A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the 'RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or' reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly, endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation, C)
C'fJ
5.1 arthu~ak Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
- Earthquake greater than.0.06g acceleration occurs)[I and 2]
- 1.
A seismic event has occurred as indicated by Ann AI0-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset and/or Spectral Accelerations"
- 2.
[a and b]
- a.
One or more alarm lamps and horn energized on the Seismic Warning panel
[2ERS-ANN-11
- b.
Review of the printout on 2ERS-RSA-1 Response Spectrum Analyzer reveals an acceleration >0 06g has occurred (see 20M-45.4F "Seismic Instrumentation Central Control Cabinet [2ERS-CCC-I]
Running")
Also refer to AOP I/2.75 3 "Acts of Nature Earthquake "
Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation >O.Olg acceleration [I and2],
- 1.
Ann AIO-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset and/or Spectral Accelerations" indicates initiation of the Accelerograph Recording System
- 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Ground motion sensed by plant personnel
- b.
Unit I reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation
__________ 4 All All i
Mode Criterion / Indicator Y
P t
lee
_- J_-P n-
- -*...-I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Tornado or high wind'strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage [I and 2]
I.
Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1
- 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures
- b.
Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response within listed structures due to event Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1.
Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A)
Containment Safeguards Bu Primary Aux.
'Fuel Handling RWST (2QSS 24 ton C02 ur Service Build Table 5-1 1
Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Airraft EALs Building Control B gd uilding Cable VauAt and Rod Control Bldg
.Building Main Steahi Valve Room g Building Main Intal~e Structure S-TK21)
Demin. Whter Sto. (2FWE-TK-210) mit Diesel Gen'erator Building ling (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm)!
I Mode
+
All All i
R~efer to T ab I "Fission Product Harrier Matrix" i
i - -
... I EPP/I-lb Attachment I i
....~!::.:.:.:.:.-...
ci:
"i:.
- . 4.:...:'.-"..". "-.
I Revision 2 I
'ALERT, UNUSUAL
- EVENT, GENERAL EMER(
AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 I
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) dIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more p protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition w values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the d classifications are based on an assessment (i.e. determ 4ýondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the C been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the ne assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless oth ihdications being available to Control Room operators tha Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
&RITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant required to prevent significant release of core radio invironment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core
$ink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Sh
'Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR acciden
.In population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Par Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of su j.otentially damage permanent structures, systems or compo IXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the stat f'orce.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary s sAeam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled d g nerator pressure or the steam generator being completely II IRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. So such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical eq constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
IIOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage again ensure that demands will be met by the station I NDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentatio procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator know conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control R r~ceived from plant personnel, whichever is most lir e',idence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be con minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications tý Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action L been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) doe reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH con niinutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF S PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of iinprovement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing thlermocouple temperatures).
I*JTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individu protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration lei c~mbustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
t1le BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functio I vel for equipment required for safe shutdown.
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS GENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by.the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:, An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential ersons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment and any numeric contained therein.
'eclaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas Ination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITERION has
-cessity for these RED PATII:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which
,erwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
at an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety function safety injection.
oactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Cooling, Hteaity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
iock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal.
ts will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; ý3) rt 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
ufficient force to onents STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by I
a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS tion by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
- ide leakage (i e.,
TOXIC GAS: A gas thatI is dangerous to life or health by reason of
[ecrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
depressurized.
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the
)urces of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that Nuipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
ast the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a' Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are n, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases'that ledge of rplnts exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g., alarm setpoints, loom, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, miting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
Inherent in this rmpleted with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2)
Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in rs not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
idition within 15 3tatus Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is g trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or g trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, S present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, ua pescratches) should not be included.
evel below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems,-components, or material, the failure, as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the nas performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation
- )nalperfomanc
'C' 0
0
Rioee Crierl OnW niao Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in structural damage
[I and 2]
- 1.
- Plant, personnel report airci PROJECTILE has impacted any listed in Table 5-1 on previous page raft '
or structure
- 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures
- b.
Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response (within listed structures) due to event Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1.
Plant personnel report aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on previous page)
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" ALL ALL River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level
[f or 2]
- 1.
ILR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705 mean sea level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height
>52.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652 52Ft River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level
[ or 21
- 1.
ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea Level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >47.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft.
'I A
ALL River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level
[I or 2]
- 1.
ILRL-CW-101 indicates <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level
- 2.
National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lock' (724-643-8400)
Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height < -3.92 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652 52 Ft Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Not Applicable I
I
- J..1 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" ALL I
I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Re.
oTaI Fsso rdutBrieIarx Watercraft strikes primary intake structure Watercraft strikes primary intake structure and results in a reduction of Service Water flow
[1 and 2]
I.
Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the primary intake structure
- 2.
SWS flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction to <30 psig on 2SWS-PI 113Aand/or li3B I
Refer to AOP 2.30.1 "Loss of Service Water'"
Reviqion 2 I Mode 53 Airrf/PogciWCah EPPI. lb All I Criterion / Indicator ALL ALL
%0 tie)
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
i
-- -- r 1 I--
i I
I Mode Criterion / Indicator n..
, 0 ---
S......
.I Mode I
i i i
i I
I I
i I
I - -
I I I L-1 Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
I I
i1 z
0 z
Q (I)
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix "
Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL IýMEI I AREA EMERGENCY: 'See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the classifications are based on an assessment (ie., deter condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the
'assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless c indications being available to Control Room operators t
'Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A pla required to prevent significant release of core ra(
environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, C
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A bounda BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accid in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR]I Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustio failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of potentially damage permanent structures, systems or con EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the force.
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS RGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that bi CSF is under severe challenge. "
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards 'a plant e
structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential epersons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment and any numeric contained therein.
declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas rmination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
e CRITERION has necessity for these RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and nt safety function safety injection.
idioactivity to the SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of
'ore Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
Shock),
Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one ary surrounding the or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal tents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the n, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
f sufficient force to mponents station by threat of FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator beifig completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation,, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs,, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, 'or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED "PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a' protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance
- level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the:
expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observatlorr--
by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation, I
ýj I
6.3 Los ofAC(hton' Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 7,J "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown
-t Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown
[I and 2]
I.
UNPLANNED Loss of RI IS or CCP or SWS
- 2.
[a orb or c]
- a.
Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F.
- b.
(wIRHS in service)
RHS inlet temperature has increased >10 F and has exceeded 200 F.
- c.
(w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel.
UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for cold shutdown that results in a core exit temperature increase of more than 10 F
[I and 2]
- 1.
UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS
- 2.
[a or b or c]
- a.
Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if available) indicate the temperature has increased >10 F
- b.
(W/RHS in service)
RIIS inlet temperature has increased >10 F
- c.
(w/o CETCs or RIIS), loss has exceeded 15 minutes Mode
__________ J.
5
.5-5 6.2RCSInenty-Shutdow Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel
[l and 2]
- 1.
[a orb]
- a.
- b.
Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate makeup
- 2.
[a and b]
- a.
Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches
- b.
Other confirmed,indications of fuel uncovery Not Applicable Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with inadequate make-up
[I and 21
- 1.
Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation in the Control Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 inches 2..
Opis personnel report inability to make-up RCS inventory I
r Mode 5,
6 De Fuel 5 6 De Fuel Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7. 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes I.
AE and DF 4KV emergency buses energized from Unit 2 sources for minutes not
>15 Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 minutes
[1 and 2]
- i.
2A and 2D 4KV normal buses de-energized for >15 minutes
- 2.
Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus I Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" 5 6 De Fue
+/-
Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems'"
UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes
[1 or 2]
- 1.
Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and 2-3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority train
- 2.
Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority train So Sh S
EPP/I.Ib Art I I ModelI
.5 6"
5 6
I 0
H 2 0
H z
0 H
Revision 2 I i i
i iV I
Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents'"
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATh: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY:- See EAL 4.7 in~dicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plai{
structure. The source of the proJfectile may be onsite or offsite. Potentia\\,!
p rosDISTURBANCE:o A group often (0)or more persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the
,protesting station operations or activities at the site.
affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these
'assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent sighificant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundaryrsurrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion,-or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steamn Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressuiized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.,
HIOSTAGE:
A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSIONIINTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason o inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine)
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the "expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With speci(fic regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
-Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID' when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
(
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation i
i SA 41
Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel
[1 and 2]
- 1.
VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMF-RQ202 "1[0311, 2HVR-RQ104A/B [1024,
- 10281, 2RMF-RQ301A/B [1032, 20321,or 2RMR RQ203 [10251 2.
[a or b]
- a.
Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods
- b.
Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 2for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered
[I and 2 and 3]
I.
Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal 2.'
VALID IIGII alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 11025] or 2RMF-RQ-202 [10311
- 3.
Fuel remains covered with water Mode Criterion Indicator I t EPPII-Ib I
0 0
H Ci)
Ci) 0 H
INTENTIONALLY BLANK I
-I I
ALL ALL I
I.
Revision 2 I Mode ICriterion
/ Indicator 1
I l
ff t-i
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL PMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY:' See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these "hssessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB):- A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, yiolent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results-in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.,
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE: 'A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded.
Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PAT1I condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g, increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
I 1
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ORANGE PATIH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs.by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE:
An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential-,
for damage is'sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity 'of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs' which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine).
UNPLANNED:,An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures'are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by 'a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.
VITAL AREA is any area within' the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation I.'~
Z'
Gaeu ffuns Criterion / Indicator EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release
[I or 2 or 3]
- 1.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR 0l-1 for the actual or projected duration' of the release
- 3.
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose
>I1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release
[I or 2 or 3l I.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time periJod confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR 01-y for the actual or projected duration of the release
- 3.
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB-dose
>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 minutes
[1 or 2 or 3]
- 1.
A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr 0-'y at the EAB for>>15 minutes
- 3.
EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose
>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2
times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 minutes
[I or 2 or 31
- 1.
A'VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for
>60 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Field survey results indicate >0 I mR/hr li-/at the EAB for>60 minutes
- 3.
EPP ddse projection results indicate EAB dose
>0 1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Mode All J.
7.2 Lqud~6 lunS Criterion / Indicator Not Applicable Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 minutes
[I or 2]
- 1.
A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for
>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Sample results exceed 200 times Technical Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite Dose' Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity > 15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times Technical Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 minutes
[I or2]
I.
A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-1 for
>60 minutes, unless dose projectionswithin this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded
- 2.
Sample results exceed 2 times the Technical Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration I,
I Mode Column 3 SiteI TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONIT R EALS NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform t~Ie specified dose projection/assessment, as listed at the bottom of each column., If the assessment cat not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the IALID reading.
NOTE:
These monitors have the ability to divert or terminate effluent flow. Ensure that a release is in progress prior to using the EAL's.
Column 4 General If a RWDA (Batch Release) is Applicable 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit 2SGC-RQ100 [1065 1.97E-03 uCi/ml
'a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml 2HVS-RQIOIB [2039] RBC Purge 1.4813-04 uCi/ce
!.48E-02 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc 2HVS-RQI09B LR [2040] RBC Purge 6.36E uCi/cc 6.36E-02 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCilcc 2HVS-RQI09B Eff [5040] RBC Purge 2.2613+03 uCi/sec 2.26t+05 uCi/sec n/a uCi/sec n/a uCi/sec RM-IGW-108B (GWST) 7.86E-+05 cpm r'a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 (GWST) n/a cpm a
cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm For All Other Unplanned Releases 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit SLCRS Unfiltered Pathway (also called Ventilation Vent) 2HVS-RQ 1011B [2039]
6.0213-04 uCi/cc 6.02E-02 uCi/ce 1.72E-01 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc SLCRS Filtered Pathway (also called Elevated Release) 2HVS-RQ109B LR [2040]
2.12E-04 uCi/ce 2.12E-02 uCilcc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc 2HVS-RQ109B MR [30401 n/a uCi/cC n/a uCi/ce 3.8813-02 uCi/cc 3.88E-01 uCilce 2HVS-RQI09B HR [4040]
n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc 3.88E-02 uCi/cc 3.94E-01 uCi/cc 2HVS-RQ109B Efft[50401 5.88E+03
'uCi/sec 5.88tE+05 uCi/sec 1.04E+06 uCi/sec 1.0413+07 uCi/sec Decontamination Building Vent,
2RMQ-RQ301B [2033]
6.3013-03 uCi/cc a
uCi/cc n/a uCi/ce n/a uCi/cc Waste Gas Storage Vault Vent 2RMQ-RQ303B [2037]
5.16E-02 uCi/ec ti/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/ce n/a uCi/cc Condensate Polishing Building Vent 2HVL-RQI 12B [2013]
3.2213-03 uCi/cc 3.2 E-01 uCi/ce n/a uCi/ce n/a uCi/cc Sr Main Steam Reliefs 2MSS-RQ1I01A/10B/101C n/a uCi/ce C ta uCi/cc i.77E-01 uCi/cc 1.7713-01 uCi/cc
[10051300515005]
2MSS-RQI01A/I01B/I01C Eft n/a uCi/sece I/a uCi/sec 5.101E+05 uCi/sec 5.1013+06 uCi/sec
[2005/4005/60051 Liquid Effluent Pathways 2SGC-RQ100 [10651 1.9713-03 uCi/ml ra uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml 2SWS-RQI01 [1068]
8.5613-05 uCi/ml 8.5qE-03 uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/mi 2SWS-RQ 102 [10671 8.56E-05 uCi/ml 8.5613-03 uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml 1
II Rpvicknn 9 Column 2 I
Alert All 4
All All All U
I.
0 ma (U I..
N Column 3 Colunin4 i
i EPP/I-lb Column I IUII I
I I
ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EME!
AREA EMERGENCY,: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more p
protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the classifications are based on an assessment (Le., deter condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that tht been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the
- assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless c indications being available to Control Room operators Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A pla required to prevent significant release of core ra environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, C
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundE BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accid in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustio failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of potentially damage permanent structures, systems or cor EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondar steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolle generator pressure or the steam generator being complet FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE:, A person or object held as leverage ag ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumenti procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator ki conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Contrc received from plant personnel, whichever is most evidence that the associated criterion may be exceede protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indicati to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Acti(
been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CS PATH TERMINUS.,
A reduction in the level improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increa vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decrez thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile indi protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentratio combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIK "the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fui level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
1
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS RGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATh: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla(
structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potenth i
SPersons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment n and any numeric contained therein.
declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas a CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
necessity for these RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF iý under extreme challenge.
that an Emergency RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and ant safety function safety injection.
dioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sore Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
Shock), - Integrity SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one ary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal dents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the Dn, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
& sufficient force to mponents STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce comlpliance with demands made on the BVPS station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
ry side leakage (i e.,
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason
)
ed decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine).
tely depressurized.
UNPLANNED:' An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with is NOT required if - abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
gainst the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Scc i
Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in' this definition are ation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases' that lRowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, o Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, ed. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID ions being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) on Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation.
by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, Irthe condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes) condition within 15
'F Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily of severity is an observablk without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is asing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or asing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, ividual present inascratches) should not be included.
f on level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whichK contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure,'
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the ON: as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation nctional performance 2
- 7.
adaio'i4~~
Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab I!"Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes safe operations o.r establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown
[I or 2]
- 1.
VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room 2RMC-RQ201/202 [1069/1072] or PAF 2RMS RQ223 (1071] for>15iminutes
- 2.
[a and b]
a VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2 b
Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown See Note Below UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the facility I.
VALID area radiation monitor readings increase by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes Note: In either the UE or ALERT SAL, the ED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other CRITERIAIINDICATORS for applicability (e g, a dose rate of 15 mRihr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a more significant event).
Mode L
I All
- All, Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" 2
"/
Refer to Tab ZlI "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel
[I and 2]
I.
VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 [10251 or 2RMF-RQ202. [1031]
or 2RMF-RQ301 A/B
[1032/2032] or2HVR-RQ104A/B [102411028]
- 2.
[a orb]
- a.
Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods
- b.
Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 "Shuidown System-'s" for In-vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered
[1 and 2 and 3]
I.
Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal
- 2.
VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 [1025] or 2RMF-RQ202 110311
- 3.
Fuel remains covered with water Tablet-2 R
Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 1 IND.ICATOR LOCATION EPPII-I b Attachment I READING 730' Service Bldg (112 Analyzers)
Survey Rbsults
>I100 mR/hr general area PASS Cubicle (735' PAB)
RMP-RE-204 [10501
>100 mR/hr general area Chem Sample Panel (718' PAB)
RMP-RQ-210 [1059]
>100 mR/hr general area 737' Safeguards (112 Control System RMP-RQ-205A,B
>I00 mR/hr general area Operations)
[1049]
_I_
741' Safeguards (Safe Shutdown Valves)
Survey R~sults
>I100 mR/hr general area 738'Cable Vault (RHR Suction Valves)
Survey Rsults
>100 mR/hr general area 773' PAB (WRGM Sampling)
Survey R sults
>100 mR/hr general area 788' Main Steam & Cable Vault Survey R~ sults
>100 mR/hr general area Alternate Shutdown Panel Room, Survey Rksults'
>I100 mRlhr general area West Cable Vault (730')
Survey Rsuits
>I100 mR/hr general area A Penetrations (713')
Surve R6su ts
>5 R/hr general area C&D Penetrations (718')
Survey R suits
>I100 mR/hr general area Cable Vault (755')
Survey suits
>100 mR/hr general area CNMT lnstr Air Room (773')
Survey Rbsults
>I100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results
>I100 mR/hr general area Turbine Bldg 735' West Survey Results
>100 mR/hr general area EDG 2-1, 2-2 Survey Results
>5 R/hr general area Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY 1 /
Iq 0
0 0
0 a_
U.J
(
Revsin 1'
4.
-Mode Ib All All 4
t
ý7.4 Ftiel Handling I
i I
, I I
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATIh: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which
,AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.
BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e.. determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded.
Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these "assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs):
A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment.
There are six CSFs:
Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat
- Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock),
Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,
steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.
Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s):
Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or-other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.
A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures).
INTRUSION/INTRUDER:
Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.
LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION:
as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.
ý --
- l. -. 1--.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pl structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potent!*
for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH:
Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.
RUPTURED:
(Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.
SABOTAGE:
Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:
An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:
(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)
Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.
TOXIC GAS:
A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED:
An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA).
Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).
VI EDAMAGE:
Damage to equipment or structure that is reidily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.
Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.'
VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whichL contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation