ML022520124
| ML022520124 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/2002 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DLPM |
| To: | |
| Olshan L N, NRR/DLPM, 415-1419 | |
| References | |
| TAC MB5664, TAC MB5665, TAC MB5666 | |
| Download: ML022520124 (12) | |
Text
ESPS Manual Initiation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Manual Initiation LCO 3.3.6 APPLICABILITY:
Two manual initiation channels of each one of the ESPS Functions below shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
High Pressure Injection, Reactor Building (RB) Non-Essential Isolation, Keowee Start, Load Shed and Standby Breaker Input, and Keowee Standby Bus Feeder Breaker Input (ES Channels 1 and 2);
- b.
Low Pressure Injection (ES Channels 3 and 4);
- c.
RB Cooling, RB Essential Isolation and Penetration Room Ventilation (ES Channels 5 and 6); and
- d.
RB Spray (ES Channels 7 and 8).
MODES 1 and 2, MODES 3 and 4 when associated engineered safeguard equipment is required to be OPERABLE.
ACTIONS N OTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more ESPS A.1 Restore channel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Functions with one OPERABLE status.
channel inoperable.
(continued)
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I
I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.6-1
PAM Instrumentation 3.3.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE --------------------------------------------------------
These SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.8-1 except where indicated.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.
SR 3.3.8.2 --------------------------
NOTE Only applicable to PAM Functions 7, 10 and
- 22.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
12 months SR 3.3.8.3 -------------------
NOTES -----------------------
- 1.
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- 2.
Not applicable to PAM Functions 7,10, and 22.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
18 months Amendment Nos..328, 328 & 329 1
I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.8-4
EPSL Voltage Sensing Circuits 3.3.18 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.18 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Voltage Sensing Circuits LCO 3.3.18 Three channels of each of the following EPSL voltage sensing circuits shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
- b.
C.
d.
Startup Transformer; Standby Bus 1; Standby Bus 2; and Auxiliary Transformer.
-NOTES
- 1.
If both N breakers are open, Auxiliary Transformer voltage sensing circuits are not required to be OPERABLE.
- 2.
When not in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4, only EPSL voltage sensing circuit(s) associated with required AC power source(s) are required to be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS
--....................................-------------------------- NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each circuit.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required A.1
NOTE -----------
circuits with one The Completion Time channel inoperable, is reduced when in Condition L of LCO 3.8.1.
Restore channel to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
(continued)
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I I
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.18-1
RCS Specific Activity 3.4.11 j200 tI 8u so A*
so 40
,UNACCEPTABLE "OPERATION 70 s
so PERCENT OF RhMTU) THEIOMAL POWER Figure 3.4.11-1 (page 1 of 1)
Reactor Coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Specific Activity Limit Versus Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER With Reactor Coolant Specific Activity > 1.0 pCI/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 OCONEE UNITS 1,2, & 3 3.4.11-3 Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329. I ACCEPTABLE OPERATICN I
RCS PIV Leakage 3.4.14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.14.1 NOTE -------------------------
Not required to be performed in MODES 3 and 4.
Verify leakage from each required RCS PIV is 18 months equivalent to _< 0.5 gpm per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum of 5 gpm at an AND RCS pressure >_ 2150 psia and *2190 psia.
Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the unit has been in MODE 5 for
Ž 7 days, if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I
3.4.14-3 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 SJLJI al V
EI.I A~4'.JI Mr I....'.ES.j~
(contnued SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 NOTE --------------------------
Not required to be performed for an SL breaker when its standby bus is energized from a LCT via an isolated power path.
Verify each closed SL and closed N breaker opens on an actuation of each redundant trip coil.
FREQUENCY 18 months SR 3.8.1.15 NOTE --------------------------
Redundant breaker trip coils shall be verified on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
Verify each 230 kV switchyard circuit breaker 18 months actuates to the correct position on a switchyard isolation actuation signal.
SR 3.8.1.16 NOTE --------------------------
Only applicable when complying with Required Action C.2.2.4.
Verify one KHU provides an alternate manual As specified by Required AC power source capability by manual or Action C.2.2.4 automatic KHU start with manual synchronize, or breaker closure, to energize its non required emergency power path.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 i
v I
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.1-17
AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a.
One source from the offsite transmission network to the onsite AC electrical power distribution system(s) required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown". The offsite power source shall be an offsite circuit available or connected to one of the following:
- 1.
230 kV switchyard to a unit startup transformer to one main feeder bus,
- 2.
230 kV switchyard, or 525 kV switchyard for Unit 3, to the main step-up and unit auxiliary transformers to one main feeder bus, or
- 3.
Central switchyard to one main feeder bus.
- b.
One emergency power source capable of supplying the onsite AC electrical power distribution system(s) required by LCO 3.8.9. The emergency power source shall include one of the following:
- 1.
One Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) capable of providing power through the underground emergency power path to one main feeder bus,
- 2.
One KHU capable of providing power through the overhead emergency power path to one main feeder bus, or
- 3.
One LCT energizing one standby bus via an isolated power path to one main feeder bus.
- - ----.---------------......-----------------NOTES -------------------------------------------
- 1.
A unit startup transformer may be shared with a Unit in MODES 1 through 6.
- 2.
The requirements of ITS 5.5.19, "Lee Combustion Turbine Testing Program," shall be met when a LCT is used for the emergency power requirements.
- 3.
The required emergency power source and required offsite power source shall not be susceptible to a failure disabling both sources.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 1
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.2-1
AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2
.ql IPVI::II I ANCE REQUIREMENTS
-qHPF~liLANE REUIREENT SURVEILLANCE t
NO TES T ES.........
- 1.
SR requirements for both standby buses or both main feeder buses are reduced to one standby bus and one main feeder bus.
- 2.
SR 3.8.1.4 requirement to energize the underground emergency power path is not applicable.
For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," except SR 3.8.1.7, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.14, SR 3.8.1.15 and SR 3.8.1.16, are applicable.
FREQUENCY In accordance with applicable SRs J ____________________________________
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I SR 3.8.2.1 I
3.8.2-4 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3
DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.4 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.4 APPLICABILITY:
125 VDC Vital I&C power source(s) shall be OPERABLE to support the 125 VDC Vital I&C power panelboard(s) required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown" and shall include at least one of the unit's 125 VDC Vital I&C power sources.
MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately 125 VDC Vital I&C required feature(s) power sources inoperable.
OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.
AND A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions.
AND (continued)
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I I
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.4-1
SSF 3.10.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.10.1.11 Verify for required SSF battery that the cell to 12 months cell and terminal connections are clean, tight and coated with anti-corrosion material.
SR 3.10.1.12 Verify battery capacity of required battery is 12 months adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required maximum loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.
SR 3.10.1.13 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each 18 months required SSF instrument channel.
SR 3.10.1.14 Verify OPERABILITY OF SSF valves in In accordance with the accordance with the Inservice Testing Inservice Testing Program.
Program SR 3.10.1.15
NOTE Not applicable to the SSF submersible pump.
Verify the developed head of each required In accordance with the SSF pump at the flow test point is greater Inservice Testing than or equal to the required developed head.
Program SR 3.10.1.16 Verify the developed head of the SSF 2 years submersible pump at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I I
OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.10.1-5
Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)
A loss of safety iunction exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
- a.
A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b.
A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c.
A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
5.5.17 Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin This program ensures the capability to accurately monitor the Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin. The program shall include the following:
- a.
Training of personnel, and
- b.
Procedures for monitoring.
5.5.18 KHU Commercial Power Generation Testing Program The KHU Commercial Power Generation Testing Program shall include the following and shall be met during periods of KHU commercial power generation:
- a.
Verify upon an actual or simulated actuation signal, each KHU's overhead tie breaker and underground tie breaker actuate to the correct position from an initial condition of commercial power generation every 18 months.
- b.
Verify upon an actual or simulated actuation signal, each KHU's frequency is < 66 Hz in < 23 seconds from an initial condition of commercial power generation every 18 months.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 5.0-25
ESPS Manual Initiation B 3.3.6 BASES APPLICABLE The ESPS manual initiation ensur.s that the control room operator can SAFETY ANALYSES rapidly initiate ES Functions. The manual initiation trip Function is required (continued) as a backup to automatic trip functions and allows operators to initiate ESPS whenever any parameter is rapidly trending toward its trip setpoint.
The ESPS manual initiation functions satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 1).
LCO Two ESPS manual initiation channels of each ESPS Function shall be OPERABLE whenever conditions exist that could require ES protection of the reactor or RB. Two OPERABLE channels ensure that no single random failure will prevent system level manual initiation of any ESPS Function. The ESPS manual initiation Function allows the operator to initiate protective action prior to automatic initiation or in the event the automatic initiation does not occur.
The required Function is provided by two associated channels as indicated in the following table:
Function Associated Channels HPI and RB Non-Essential 1 & 2 Isolation, Keowee Emergency Start, Load Shed and Standby Breaker Input, and Keowee Standby Bus Feeder Breaker Input LPI 3&4 RB Cooling, RB Essential isolation, 5 & 6 and Penetration Room Vent.
RB Spray 7&8 APPLICABILITY The ESPS manual initiation Functions shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and in MODES 3 and 4 when the associated engineered safeguard equipment is required to be OPERABLE. The manual initiation channels are required because ES Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. ESPS initiates systems that are either reconfigured for decay heat removal operation or disabled while in MODES 5 and 6.
Accidents in these MODES are slow to develop and would be mitigated by manual operation of individual components. Adequate time is available to evaluate unit conditions and to respond by manually operating the ES components, if required.
Amendment Nos. 328, 328 & 329 I
I B 3.3.6-2 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3