ML022350086

Issuance of Amendment No. 210, TS Pages Re Primary Containment Isolation Valves

ML022350086
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	08/21/2002
From:	Pulsifer R NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1
To:	Thayer J Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee
References
TAC MB3431
Download: ML022350086 (13)

Text

"VYUPS TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION Page No. SURVEILLANCE 3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS .......... 99 ... 4.5 A. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection ................................. 99 ... A B. Containment Spray Cooling Capability ...... 102 ... B C. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System ................................ 103 ... C D. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems ..................... 104 ... D E. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

System ...................................... 105 ... E F. Automatic Depressurization System ......... 106 ... F G. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) ....................................... 107 ... G H. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability ....................... 108 ... H I. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe ...... 109 ... I BASES 110 3.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ........................ 115 ... 4.6 A. Pressure and Temperature Limitations ...... 115 ... A B. Coolant Chemistry ......................... 116 ... B C. Coolant Leakage ............................. 119 ... C D. Safety and Relief Valves .................. 120 ... D E. Structural Integrity ...................... 120 ... E F. Jet Pumps ................................... 121 ... F G. Single Loop Operation ..................... 122 H. Recirculation System ...................... 126 I. Shock Suppressors ........................... 128 ... I J. Thermal Hydraulic Stability ............... 134 ... J BASES 139 3.7 STATION CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ................... 146 ... 4.7 A. Primary Containment ....................... 146 ... A B. Standby Gas Treatment ..................... . 152 ... B C. Secondary Containment System .............. 155 ... C D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves ...... 156 ... D E. Reactor Building Automatic Ventilation System Isolation Valves (RBAVSIVs) ........ 158a ... E BASES 163 3.8 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS ......................... 172 ... 4.8 A. Deleted .. .................................. 172 ... A B. Deleted .. .................................. 172 ... B C. Deleted .................................. 172 ... C D. Liquid Holdup Tanks ...................... 172 ... D E. Deleted .. .................................. 173 ... E Amendment No. 4-4, -4, -83, , 4-9a, -iii 210

VYNPS BASES:

3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION which initiates a reactor In addition to reactor protection instrumentation provided which initiates scram, station protective instrumentation has been which are beyond the action to mitigate the consequences of accidents a single operator error reactor operator's ability to control, or terminate of Specifications This set before it results in serious consequences.

for the primary system provides the limiting conditions of operation of the core standby cooling and standby isolation function and initiation (i) to gas treatment systems. The objectives of the Specifications are of such systems even during assure the effectiveness of any component when portions of such systems are out of service for maintenance, periods to prescribe the trip settings required to testing, or calibration, and (ii) the assure adequate performance. This set of Specifications also provides rod block system and limiting conditions of operation for the control surveillance instrumentation.

that penetrate the primary Isolation valves are installed in those lines accident so that containment and must be isolated during a loss-of-coolant during an accident condition.

the radiation dose limits are not exceeded instrumentation shown Actuation of these valves is initiatel by protective for which isolation is required.

in Table 3.2.2 which senses the conditions primary containment Such instrumentation must be available whenever The objective is to isolate the primary containment integrity is required. an accident. The during so that the limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded to minimize the vacuum trip is objective of the low turbine condenser in case of a main radioactive effluent releases to as low as practical action condenser failure. subsequent releases would continue until operator the main steam line isolation was taken to isolate the main condenser unless The manual bypass were closed automatically on low condenser vacuum.

valves low power of the reactor during is required to permit initial startup operation.

isolation is connected in The instrumentation which initiates primary system in the bases for Thus, the discussion given a dual channel arrange..ent.

Specification 3.1 is applicable here.

is set to trip when reactor The low reactor water level instrumentation This trip initiates enriched fuel.

water level is 127" above the top of the valves. For a trip containment isolation closure of Group 2 and 3 primary valves will be fuel, the setting of 127" above the top of the enriched the maximum break and, even for closed before perforation of the clad occurs therefore, the setting is adequate.

bottom) is designated as a The top of the enriched fuel (351.5" from vessel The level instrumentation.

common reference level for all reactor water which may result confusion intent is to minimize the potential for operator from different scale references.

is set to trip when reactor The low-low reactor water level instrumentation reactor water level instrumentation water level is 82.5" H20 indicated on the above the top of the enriched fuel. This trip initiates closure of the Group 1 primary containment isolation valves and also activates the ECCS and system. This trip RCIC System and starts the standby diesel generator spurious operation, but prevent setting level was chosen to be low enough to to initiate ECCS operation and primary system isolation so that high enough occur, and so that post-accident no melting of the fuel cladding will will not be violated.

the limits of 10CFRI00 cooling can be accomplished and 75 Amendment No. S-&, 468, 4-14, BVD a! S2, 210

VYNPS 3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT OPERATION I 4. From and after the date that a LPCI Subsystem is

4. Deleted.

made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during that time all active components of the other LPCI and the Containment Cooling Subsystem, the Core Spray Subsystems, and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available, shall be operable.

Amendment No. 2-1,+/-+/--, +/-+/-e, *-9-, 210 101 I

VYNPS VYNPS 3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT OPERATION

5. Recirculation pump discharge valves shall

5. All recirculation pump be tested to verify full discharge valves and open to full closed in bypass valves shall be 27 5 t 5 33 seconds and operable or closed prior bypass valves shall be to reactor startup. tested for operability in accordance with

6. If the requirements of Specifications 3.5.A Specification 4.6.E.

cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

B. Containment Spray Cooling Capability B. Containment Spray Cooling Capability

1. Surveillance of the drywell spray loops

1. Both containment cooling shall be performed as spray loops are required follows. During each to be operable when the five-year period, an air reactor water test shall be performed temperature is greater on the drywell spray than 212OF except that a headers and nozzles.

Containment Cooling Subsystem may be inoperable for thirty days.

2. Deleted.

2. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

102 I Amendment No. -, S-3,*4+/-,, +/--+/-, ,e9, 210

4 .7 SUPVEILL.AŽICE PEQUIEMENTS 3.7 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AP is reduced to

<1.7) during required operabi lity testing of the HPCI system pump, the RCIC system pump, the drywell suppression chamber vacuum breakers, and the suppression chamber-reactor building vacuum breakers, and SGTS testing.

d. If the specifica tions of 3.7.A.9.a cannot be met, and the differential pressure cannot be restored within the subsequent six (6) hour period, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a Hot Shutdown condition in six (6) hours and a Cold Shutdown condition in the following eighteen (18) hours.

B. Standby Gas Treatment System B. Standby Gas Treatment System

1. At least once per

1. a. Except as specified operating cycle, not to in Specification exceed 18 months, the 3.7.B.3.a below, following conditions whenever the shall be demonstrated.

reactor is in Run Mode or Startup a. Pressure drop Mode or Hot across the combined Shutdown condition, HEPA and charcoal both trains of the filter banks is Standby Gas less than 6 inches Treatment System of water at shall be operable at 1500 cfm +/-10%.

all times when secondary contain b. Inlet heater input ment integrity is required.

is at least 7.1 kW.

I

b. Except as specified in Specification 3.7.B.3.b below, whenever the reactor is in Refuel Mode or Cold Shutdown condition, both trains of the Standby Gas 152 I Amendment No. 4-5, 4-9, , -I-4-, 4, *-4-, 210

WVNPS 4.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves 1 . Surveillance primary of the containment

i. During reactor power isolation valves should operating conditions all be performed as follows:

containment isolation valves and all instrument line flow a. The operable isolation valves check valves shall be that are power operable except as operated and specified in automatically Specification 3.7.D.2. initiated shall be tested for automatic initiation and closure time at least once per operating cycle.

b. operability testing of the primary containment isolation valves shall be performed in accordance with Specification 4.6.E.

c. At least once per quarter, with the reactor power less than 75 percent of rated, trip all main steam isolation valves (one at a time) and verify closure time.

2. whenever a containment isolation valve is

2. In the event any inoperable, the position containment isolation of at least one other valve becomes valve in each line having inoperable, reactor an inoperable valve shall power operation may be logged daily.

continue provided at least one containment isolation valve in each line having an inoperable valve is in the mode corresponding to the isolated condition.

3. If Specifications 3.7.D.1 and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

158 I Amendment No. l-2-&, 334, a-,-, 210

VTRIPS Intentionally Blank 159

&G,41, -a, 141,- 14-,

• 210 I Amendment No.

VYNPS Intentionally Blank 160 Amendment 6, q, , 9-,-, a-,a, 210

VMIPS Intentionally Blank 161 Amendment No. -- , 6-, 4S, i r 210

MINPS Intentionally Blank 162 I Amendment No. ., 94, 210

BASES: 3.7 (Cont'd)

An alternate electrical power source for the purposes of Specification 3.7.B.l.b shall consist of either an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) or the Vernon Fydro tie line. Maintaining availability of the Vernon Hydro tie line az an alternative to one of che EDGs in this condition provides assurance that standby gas treatment can, if required, be operated without placing undue constraints on EDG maintenance availability. Inoperability of both trains of the SGTS or both EDGs during refueling operations requires suspension of activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk.

Use of the SGTS, without the fan and the 7.1 kW heater in operation, as a vent path during torus venting does not impact subsequent adsorber capability because of the very low flows and because humidity control is maintained by the standby 1 kW heaters, therefore operation in this manner does not accrue as operating time.

D. Primary Containment Isolation Valves Generally, double isolation valves are provided on lines that penetrate the primary containment and communicate directly with the reactor vessel and on lines that penetrate the primary containment and communicate with the primary containment free space. Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

E. Reactor Building Automatic Ventilation System Isolation Valves (RBAVSIVs)

The function of the RBAVSIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). The operability requirements for RBAVSIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. The RBAVSIVs must be operable (or the penetration flow path isolated) to ensure secondary containment integrity and to limit the potential release of fission products to the environment. The valves covered by this Limiting Condition for Operation are included in the Inservice Testing Program.

In the event that there are one or more RBAVSIVs inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. The required action must be completed within the eight hour or four hour completion time, as applicable. The specified time periods are reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA occurring during this short time.

If any required action or completion time cannot be met as a result of one or more inoperable RBAVSIVs, the plant must be placed in a mode or condition where the Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply.

To achieve this status during reactor power operation, the reactor must be brought to at least hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. If applicable, core alterations and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and the fuel cask in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Amendment No. 4-44, !97, BVY 01 52 , 210 166a

VYNPS 5.0 DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Site The station is located on the property on the west bank of the Connecticut River in the Town of Vernon, Vermont, which Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC either owns or to which it has perpetual rights and easements. The site plan showing the exclusion area boundary, boundary for gaseous effluents, boundary for liquid effluents, as well as areas defined per 10CFR20 as "controlled The areas" and "unrestricted areas" are on plant drawing 5920-6245.

of the exclusion area as defined in minimum distance to the boundary 10CFRI00.3 is 910 feet.

No part of the site shall be sold or leased and no structure shall be located on the site except structures owned by Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC or related utility companies and used in conjunction with normal utility operations.

5.2 Reactor A. The core shall consist of not more than 368 fuel assemblies.

B. The reactor core shall contain 89 cruciform-shaped control rods. The control material shall be boron carbide powder (4C) or hafnium, or a combination of the two.

5.3 Reactor Vessel The reactor vessel and applicable design codes shall be as described I

in Section 4 of the FSAR.

5.4 Containment A. The principal design parameters and applicable design codes for the primary containment shall be as given in Table 5.2.1 of the FSAR.

B. The secondary containment shall be as described in subsection 5.3 of the FSAR and the applicable codes shall be as described in Section 12.0 of the FSAR.

C. Penetrations to the primary containment and piping passing through such penetrations shall be designed in accordance with standards set forth in subsection 5.2 of the FSAR.

5.5 Spent and New Fuel Storage A. The new fuel storage facility shall be such that the effective multiplication factor (Kff) of the fuel when dry is less than 0.90 and when flooded is less than 0.95.

B. The Keff of the fuel in the spent fuel storage pool shall be less than or equal to 0.95.

C. Spent fuel storage racks may be moved (only) in accordance with written procedures which ensure that no rack modules are moved over fuel assemblies.

z-?, ea, 2 +/--5+/-, 1-8-, 8-, 210 253 Amendment No.

VYN PS 6.2 ORGANIZATION (Cont'd)

C. Unit Staff Qualifications or exceed the minimum Each member of the unit staff shall meet Institute Standards qualifications of the American National for Nuclear 7 Training of Personnel N-18.1-19 1, ",Selection and manager who for the radiation protection Power Plants," except 1.8, Revision 1 Guide shall meet the qualifications of Regulatory shall have a who (September 1975) and the Shift Engineer, a scientific or engineering bachelor's degree or equivalent in in plant design, and response discipline with specific training and accidents.

and analysis of the plant for transients EXCEEDED 6.3 ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF A SAFETY LIMIT IS be followed in the event a safety Applies to administrative action to limit is exceeded.

shall be shutdown If a safety limit is exceeded, the reactor immediately.

6.4 PROCEDURES implemented, and maintained Written procedures shall be established, covering the following activities:

of systems and components A. Normal startup, operation and shutdown of the facility.

B. Refueling operations.

and foreseen potential C. Actions to be taken to correct specific Primary System suspected malfunctions of systems or components, leaks and abnormal reactivity changes or actual release of D. Emergency conditions involving potential radioactivity.

operations which could have E. Preventive and corrective maintenance an effect on the safety of the reactor.

F. Surveillance and testing requirements.

G. Fire protection program implementation.

H. Process Control Program in-plant implementation.

I. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual implementation.

6.5 HIGH RADIATION AREA of 10 CFR 20, the following controls As provided in paragraph 20.1601(c) in place of the controls shall be applied to high radiation areas 20.1601(b) of 10 CFR 20:

required by paragraphs 20.1601(a) and 210 257

-26, 4-2, 4-3, &4-, a-5-, 14s, 4 Amendment No.