ML021610534
| ML021610534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/31/2002 |
| From: | Hackenberg J AmerGen Energy Co |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| References | |
| 05000219/02301 | |
| Download: ML021610534 (27) | |
Text
Scenario Outline ES-D-I Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Examiners Scenario No.
SRO #1 Op Test No.
Operators PRO URO Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 80% power with the 'A' Isolation Condenser and the 'A' CRD Summary Pump out of service. The crew will begin by swapping the RBCCW Pumps. APRM 4 will then fail upscale requiring the crew to evaluate Tech Specs, bypass the APRM, and reset the half scram. The
'A' Feedwater Pump trips requiring the crew to reduce power to maintain reactor level. A loss of power to Bus 1 B will result in the crew manually scramming due to a loss of all feedwater. The diesel generator will auto start and restore power to Bus 1 D, but the 1 B CRD pump will fail to restart due to a logic malfunction. The lB CRD pump can be manually restarted. The 'B' Isolation Condenser fails to initiate requiring EMRVs to be used to control Reactor pressure. The 'A' EMRV fails to reclose following actuation. This causes a loss of RPV level, which will result in the need to Emergency Depressurize.
Initial Condition 80% power Turnover:
See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description SRO I
N BOP Swap Reactor Water Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Pumps SRO 2
MAL NIS 20D I
RO APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)
SRO 3
MAL CFW 6A C
'A' Feedwater Pump Trips BOP SRO 4
R RO Power Reduction to Control Level BOP SRO 5
MAL EDS 1B M
RO Loss of Power to 4160V Bus I B - Results in Plant Scram BOP SRO 6
CLF BKR CRD1 I
'B' CRD Pump Fails to Auto Restart due to a Logic Malfunction on BOP Power Restoration SRO 7
CLF ICS10, opt C
'B' Isolation Condenser fails to initiate due to a Valve Failure 6 V-14-35 BOP
[Initiation signal on low level]
SRO 8
MAL NSS 24A C
'A' EMRV Fails to Reclose After Manual Actuation BOP
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
Unit At 80% Power INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
"* 'A' Isolation Condenser (IC) has been out of service for two days
"* 'A' CRD Pump tripped four hours ago SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
Place 1-1 RBCCW pump in service and secure 1-2 RBCCW pump due to excessive leakage around pump shaft. Perform when turnover complete.
SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
0 None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
'A'WIC
'A'CRD pump GENERAL INFORMATION:
Place 1-1 RBCCW pump in service and secure the 1-2 RBCCW pump lAW Operating Procedure 309.2, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Section 15.0
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions Scenario No.:
SRO #1 Event No.:
I i:
Swap Reactor Water Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Pumps Excessive leakage around pump shaft s:
ES-D-2 Page I of 8 osition Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct that RBCCW pumps be swapped lAW Operating Procedure 309.2, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Section 15.0 BOP lAW 309.2, step 15.3.1;
"* Direct an Equipment Operator to vent the pump casing for 1-1 RBCCW pump using V-5-51 1.
"* Start 1-1 RBCCW pump on 13R, verify the pump ON light is energized and pump achieves proper discharge pressure.
"* Stop 1-2 RBCCW pump.
"* Direct an Equipment Operator to verify proper operation of 1-2 RBCCW pump
Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions:
Effects:
Operator Actions Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.:
2 APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)
Instrument failure causes upscale response RPS System 1 half scram Operator action required to bypass APRM and reset the half scram ES-D-2 Page 2 of 8 Position RO SRO CT RO Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
"* G-1-c: SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN
"* G-1-f: APRM HI-HI/INOP
"* G-3-f: APRM HI
"* G-1-d: CHANNEL I lAW Response to Alarm Procedures (RAPs); confirm automatic action and indications including RPS system 1 scram lights out on 4F and APRM 4 indications on 4F.
Based on alarms and indications, reports RPS system 1 half scram due to APRM 4 failing upscale.
"* Refers to Standing Order 21, Allowable Bypass Configuration for APRM/LPRM System
"* Requests Work Management assistance and/or may direct the I&C technician to investigate the problem
"* Evaluate TS 3.1, Protective Instrumentation, to ensure that it permits the APRM to be bypassed
"* Directs APRM 4 to be bypassed and the half scram to be reset
"* Bypasses APRM 4 by placing the joystick in bypass.
"* Resets half scram Time
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions E
Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.:
3 Page 3 of 8 I:
'A' Feedwater Pump Trips Motor malfunction causes overload trip s:
Pump trip alarms Reactor water level decrease. Requires operator action to reduce reactor power Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
"* J-1-d: FEED PUMP TRIP A
"* J-2-d: FEED PUMP OL A lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including Feed pump amps, discharge pressure, flow, etc.
SRO RO BOP Coordinate on power reduction, for details see Event 4 Direct Equipment Operator to investigate feed pump and its breaker 3-D-2
Operator Actions Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Reduction to Control Level Cause:
Response to Feedwater pump trip Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action reduces required feedwater flow Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor power, using recirculation flow, to within the capacity of the remaining feed pumps (approximately 70% power) lAW 3200-ABN 2000.17, Feedwater System Flow Control Failure RO IAW ABN 17
"* Reduce recirculation flow by dialing down on the Master Recirc Controller as required to control Reactor level.
"* Monitor Reactor parameters BOP Monitor Feedwater pumps and flow ES-D-2
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Cause:
Automatic Actions Effects:
Time Scenario No. SRO #1 Event No.:
5 Loss of Power to 4160V Bus 1B - Results in Plant Scram Bus fault causes loss of power to 4160V loads Loss of all operating feedwater pumps Lowering reactor level leads to reactor scram Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior ES-D-2 Page 5 of 8 BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms T-1-c: MN BRKR 1B TRIP lAW RAPs, confirm automatic actions and indications including 1 B breaker status, bus voltage and equipment without power NOTE:
Due to a loss of all condensate pumps, an automatic scram on low reactor water level may occur before a manual scram is directed.
SRO 0
Recognize loss of feedwater to reactor
"* Direct manual scram of reactor in accordance with ABN 01, Reactor Scram
"* Implement Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on panel 4F Place the Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN BOP Perform the following actions when directed RO Verify that the reactor is shutdown by:
"* Verify that all control rods are fully inserted
"* Insert SRM and IRM detectors
"* Verify that reactor power is dropping Confirm that the Main Turbine is tripped SRO BOP RO SRO BOP RO Recognize entry into EOP 3200.01 A, RPV Control - No ATWS due to reactor level below 138 inches.
Direct actions lAW the EOP Perform EOP actions as directed by the SRO.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.:
6 Page 6 of 8 Event
Description:
'B' CRD Pump Fails to Auto Restart due to a Logic Malfunction on Power Restoration Cause:
Breaker malfunction prevents auto restart of CRD pump Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
Requires operator action to restart CRD pump Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognizes EDG 2 closure on to Bus 1D RO a
Recognize failure of 'B' CRD pump to automatically restart when EDG 2 supplies power to Bus 1D CT 0
Manually restart'B' CRD pump SRO Directs follow-up actions on re-powering of Bus 1D and Unit Substations (USS)
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.:
7 Event
Description:
'B' Isolation Condenser (IC) fails to initiate due to a Valve Failure Cause:
Valve malfunction prevents auto initiation of IC Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
Requires operator action to control reactor pressure Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognizes failure of 'B' IC to initiate Report the failure to the SRO SRO Directs pressure control using the EMRVs lAW the EOPs RO Monitor and report Reactor plant parameters ES-D-2 Page 7 of 8
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 8 Page 8 of 8 I:
'A' EMRV Fails to Reclose After Actuation Electronics malfunction causes failure of EMRV to reclose s:
none Requires operator action to mitigate inventory loss Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior NOTE:
EMRV may open automatically due to high reactor pressure. The valve will fail open after either manual or automatic actuation.
SRO Directs pressure control using EMRVs BOP Manually opens EMRVs to control pressure Recognizes 'A' EMRV fails to reseat when placed back into AUTO RO Monitors and report Reactor plant parameters including the loss of Reactor level SRO Direct ADS Timer Switches to be placed in Bypass when level cannot be maintained above 61 inches BOP Place the ADS Timer Switches in Bypass when directed SRO Confirm the start of at least 2 core spray subsystems BOP SRO RO CT BOP CT BOP TERMINATION CRITERIA:
"* Directs Emergency Depressurization lAW EOP 3200.04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS, when reactor level reaches 0 inches
"* Direct the Reactor Overfill Protection System (ROPS) to be bypassed
"* Direct that level be controlled with Core Spray when it begins injecting during depressurization.
Bypass ROPS when directed Open all EMRVs when directed Control level with Core Spray after injection begins during depressurization Once ED is performed and reactor is depressurizing, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
ALERT: when Rx level is less than 61" TAF for greater than 5 minutes or SITE AREA EMERGENCY: when Rx level is less than 0" TAF for greater than 5 minutes ES -D-2
Scenaio OulineES-fl-I Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Examiners Scenario No.
PRO URO Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 90% power with 4 recirc pumps operating. One recirc pump Summary has been secured due to emergent maintenance. The crew will begin by raising MVAR loading on the main generator. The crew will TRIP a recirc pump due to MG set malfunctions requiring the crew to reduce power to comply with pump and system limitations. A loss of power to a vital bus will occur requiring the crew to restore vital loads. This will require a Tech Spec evaluation.
A steam leak in the drywell will result in the crew manually scramming due to an increase in drywell pressure. Auto and manual scram functions will be disabled, but Alternate Rod Insertion will insert the rods. Drywell pressure will increase requiring Drywell Sprays using the Containment Spray system. The drywell spray valve fails to automatically realign and must operated manually to permit sprays to function.
Initial Condition 90% power Turnover:
See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
SRO N
BOP Raise MVAR Loading on the Main Generator SRO 2
C RO Recirc MG Set Malfunctions requiring Recirc Pump Shutdown BOP SRO 3
R RO Reduce Power during Recirc Pump Shutdown BOP SRO 4
MAL EDS3E C
RO Loss of Power to the Vital Bus (Tech Spec)
.03/180s,.1/900s M
RO Steam Leak in the Drywell MAL NSS 4C, BOP 1/180s 1
SRO 6
MAL RPS 5 & 6 1
RO Failure of the Auto and Manual Scram Logic SRO 7
CLF VLV CNS8, C
BOP Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays opt 6 are required
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor SRO #2 Operators Op Test No.
CRS Scenario Outline I:S-D-1
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
Unit At 90% Power with 4 Recirculating pumps operating INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
0
'D' Recirc Pump is out of service for a MG Set brush replacement.
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
0 Raise Main Generator MVAR loading by 20 MVAR SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
'D' Recirc Pump MG Set GENERAL INFORMATION:
The Power System Director (PSD) has requested that Oyster Creek pick up an additional 20 MVAR. The PSD has been informed that this will be completed after shift turnover.
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions Scenario No.:
SRO #2 i:
Raise MVAR Loading on the Main Generator Request by Grid operator, part of turnover s:
none minor change to secondary plant indications Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reactive loading be raised by 20 Event No.:
I ES-D-2 Page I of 7 MVAR on the Main Generator lAW procedure 336.1, 24KV Main Generator electrical system.
BOP lAW 336.1, section 3.3; Increase reactive load by 20 MVARs using the Amplidyne Adjust rheostat.
"* Adjust Exciter Field Rheostat Control (70M) as needed to maintain a slight BUCK setting
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.:
2 Page 2 of 7 i:
Recirc MG Set Malfunctions requiring Recirc Pump Shutdown System engineer requests an immediate TRIP of the 'A' Recirc Pump based on his observation of excessive arcing and sparking at the MG Set.
s:
none Pump dP & flow and MG motor amps decrease when the Operator secures the Recirc pump.
Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct shutdown of Recirc pump by tripping the Recirc MG set breaker Execute 3200-ABN-200.02, Recirculation Pump Trip.
RO Place Recirc MG set breaker to OPEN lAW ABN 02;
"* confirm discharge bypass valve OPEN and CLOSE discharge valve BOP 0
Monitor Reactor plant parameters.
"* Verify proper feedwater system response to the power transient.
SRO Coordinate power reduction to maintain appropriate Hz on running pumps. See RO Event 3 for details.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.:
3 Page 3 of 7 Event
Description:
Reduce Power following Recirc Pump Shutdown Cause:
Response to Recirc pump trip Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action required to maintain the Recirc pumps within Hz limits Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor power to restore proper Recirc Hz by reducing Recirc flow lAW procedure 301.2, Reactor Recirculation system RO IAW 301.2;
"* Reduce power with Recirc flow to maintain Recirc pump speed at 30 Hz or less
"* Make notifications for unplanned power reduction BOP 0
Assist RO with procedure and manipulations
"* Monitor Reactor plant parameters during the power change.
"* Adjust reactor pressure as required with the EPR lAW 202.1, Power Operations
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 7 Event
Description:
Loss of Power to the Vital Bus (Tech Spec)
Cause:
Breaker malfunction causes loss of power to vital bus Automatic Actions:
Loss of power to vital loads Effects:
Loss of equipment powered by the vital bus. Operator action is required to restore loads and re-power RPS.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
"* U-3-c: 1B2 MN BRKR TRIP
"* T-7-d: FDR TO 460V 1B2 TRIP lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including 1 B2 breaker status, bus voltage and lost equipment Confirm 1-1 RBCCW pump is running RO Confirm that the 'A' CRD pump is running SRO 0
Direct the implementation of 3200-ABN-2000.48, Loss of Unit Substation 1 B2
"* Notify Work Management
"* Review TS 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Power and 3.5, Containment Integrity
"* The reactor must be placed in cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> IAWTS 3.7.B and 3.0.A If the isolation valves can not be restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, be in cold shutdown in the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, lAW TS 3.5.A BOP lAW ABN 48;
"* Confirm Reactor Building HVAC is shutdown
"* Confirm SGTS is running RO Monitor Reactor plant parameters Review ABN 48 attachments for 1 B2 loads that may require compensatory measures
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Cause:
Scenario No. SRO #2 Steam Leak in the Drywell Reactor coolant pipe leak Event No.:
5 Page 5 of 7 Containment pressure and temperature increase due to the steam leak. Operator action is required to mitigate the steam leak.
Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting; RO 0
Unidentified leak-rate change BOP Containment pressure and temperature change C-3-f; DW PRESS HI/LO
"* Reference RAP C-3-f, DW PRESS HI/LO SRO Direct venting of Containment lAW procedure 312.11, Section 4.3, Nitrogen System and Containment Atmosphere Control.
"* Direct monitoring of Containment and investigate potential in-leakage paths using 2000-OPS-3024.09, Drywell Cooling System Diagnostic procedure BOP Vent Containment lAW procedure 312.11
"* Vent the drywell via the Torus by opening Torus vent valves V-28-47 and V 28-18 on panel 11 F.
"* Vent the drywell via the drywell by opening drywell vent valves V-23-21 and V-23-22 on panel 12XR.
RO Identify the cause of the high drywell pressure condition as directed.
BOP Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
Time Position ES -D-2
Op Test No.:
Event Description Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions ES-D-2 Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.:
6 Page 6 of 7 Failure of the Auto and Manual Scram Logic Electronics malfunction prevents auto and manual scrams s:
Failure to scram Operator action is required to initiate Alternate Rod Insertion Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior NOTE:
The evaluator may direct the DW leakrate to be increased, if required SRO Prior to reaching 3 psig DW pressure, direct a manual scram of the reactor lAW ABN 01, Reactor Scram.
RO IAWABN 01
"* Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on 4F
"* Place Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN
"* Report the failure to scram condition SRO CT BOP RO SRO BOP RO 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Enter and execute EOP 3200.01 B RPV Control - With ATWS Direct the initiation of Alternate Rod Injection (ARI)
Direct implementation of 3200-ABN-2000.01, Reactor Scram Direct control of Reactor pressure and level Initiate ARI when directed Control Reactor level as directed Control Reactor pressure as directed Perform remaining scram actions when directed Recognize and report that the Control Rods are inserting (due to ARI).
Z
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.:
7 Page 7 of 7 Event
Description:
Cause:
Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays are required Breaker malfunction prevents valve movement Automatic Actions:
none System configuration does not automatically realign. Operator action required to manually open valve Effects:
Time Position CT CT Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.02, Primary Containment Control when Drywell Pressure exceeds 3 psig.
Direct lineup of Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray Mode per Support Procedure 29, Initiation of the Containment Spray System for Drywell Sprays BOP lAW SP-29;
"* Lineup Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray mode
"* Report failure of V-21-11, DW Spray Discharge Valve, to open
"* Direct Equipment operator to manually open V-21-11
"* Spray Drywell when V-21-11 is open and conditions for spraying Drywell are met RO Control Reactor Level and Pressure as Directed TERMINATION CRITERIA:
Once Drywell spray has been initiated and Drywell pressure is being controlled between 4-12 psig, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
ALERT: a scram signal received and power remains greater than 2%
Scenario Outline rQ n
I Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Examiners Scenario No.
SRO #3 Op Test No.
Operators Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power with the 'A' Isolation Condenser out of service.
Summary Following turnover, the crew will swap Main Air Ejectors. A SLC Tank HI/LO Temperature alarm will be received. Investigation will show that actual SLC tank temperatures are low due to a failed heater control circuit and a Tech Spec evaluation will be required. A small Main Condenser vacuum leak requires a power reduction and investigation of the vacuum leak. A RWCU leak will occur in the Reactor Building requiring entry into the Primary Containment Control EOP. A RWCU valve will fail preventing the isolation of the leak. Emergency Depressurization will be required to mitigate the primary leak into the Reactor Building.
Initial Condition 100% power Turnover:
See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description I
SRO N
Swap Main Steam Air Ejectors BOP OVR SLC ANN SRO 2
SLC3 I
RO SLC Tank Low Temperature due to Failed Heater Control Circuit (Tech CLF PSW SLC5 Spec) to trip MAL CFW17A.1 SRO 3
or.4/60s C
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak BOP SRO 4
R RO Lower Power to Control Vacuum MAL RCU13 3%
SRO 5
600s M
RO Reactor Water Clean-Up Leak into the Reactor Building BOP
[HELB]
V-16-1&14 SRO 6
C RO Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valve Failure
ý__
I_
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor CRS PRO URO Scenario Outline
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
Unit at 100% Power INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
'A' Isolation Condenser (IC)
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
Swap Main Steam Air Ejectors for Maintenance SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
SWA'IC GENERAL INFORMATION:
After Shift Turnover, swap SJAE elements lAW Operating Procedure 325, Air Extraction and Off Gas System. Directed by station management to place 1A2 SJAE element in service and remove 1Al SJAE element from service
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions E
Scenario No.:
SRO#3 Event No.:
I Page 14 I:
Swap Main Steam Air Ejectors none s:
none No effect. Operator action required to change air ejector elements Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct that SJAE elements be swapped lAW Operating Procedure 325, Air Extraction and Off Gas System, Step 7.3.10 BOP lAW 325, step 7.3.10;
"* Open the steam and air valves for element 1A2
"* Close the steam and air valves for element 1A1 Monitor Main Condenser Vacuum Monitor Reactor plant parameters S-D-2 Af 6 RO
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.:
2 Page 2 of 6 Event
Description:
SLC Tank Low Temperature due to Failed Heater Control Circuit (Tech Spec)
Cause:
Heater Control Circuit malfunction Automatic Actions:
none Effects:
none Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by reporting alarms; G-8-b: TANK TEMP HI/LO lAW RAPs; confirm local indications including tank temperature, tank level, heater status and heater breaker status; contact equipment operator to verify locally.
NOTE When requested, the crew will be told that:
"* The SLC Weight Percent is 18%
"* SLC Tank Temperature is 75°F
"* SLC Level of 2000 gallons
"* Red ground lights are lit NOTE If the candidate checks the Reactor Building ambient temperature (on the back panels), tell him that the ambient temperature is 75 degrees F.
SRO Evaluate compliance with TS 3.2, Reactivity Control
"* With a Weight Percent of 18%, the temperature needs to be maintained above -83 0 F lAW TS Figure 3.2.2
"* lAW TS 3.2.C.3.d, temperature must be restored to the required band or be in the shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
"* (May state that Boron Concentration is within the acceptable band, but this is not required)
Requests Work Management assistance, may direct I&C technician to investigate problem BOP Coordinate troubleshooting to restore the SLC Tank Heater.
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions ES-D Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.:
3 Page 3 of 6 I:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak Excessive condenser in-leakage s:
none Condenser vacuum decrease. Operator action is required to mitigate the vacuum loss.
Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms
"* Condenser vacuum decrease
"* MWe decrease
"* Q-3-c: COND VAC LO 25 INCHES lAW SDRP or RAPs; confirm automatic action and indications including condenser vacuum at panels 5F/6F.
SRO Direct mitigation of condenser vacuum loss lAW 2000-ABN-3200.14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
"* Direct a power reduction as necessary to maintain vacuum greater than 22 inches
"* Direct Diagnosis of the cause of the vacuum loss in accordance with ABN 14 SRO Coordinate for power reduction, for details see Event 4 RO BOP Investigate the cause of the vacuum loss as directed by the SRO
"* Circulating Water Pumps
"* SJAEs
"* Gland Seal System
"* Gland Seal Exhauster
"* SJAE Drain Pump NOTE Lowering reactor power will stabilize vacuum.
-2
Op Test No.:
Event Descriptior Cause:
Automatic Action Effects:
Time Operator Actions ES-D Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of n:
Lower Power to Control Vacuum Response to vacuum loss is:
none Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action required to lower reactor power Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor nower usino recirculation flow as necessarv to control condenser vacuum lAW 3200-ABN-2000.14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum lAW ABN 14
"* Reduce reactor power with recirculation flow as required
"* Monitor Reactor parameters Monitor condenser vacuum, report when vacuum stops lowering Discontinue the power reduction when vacuum stops dropping Lowering reactor power will stabilize vacuum.
-2 6
Operator Actions Op Test No.:
Scenario No. SRO #3 Event No.:
5 Page 5 of 6 Event
Description:
Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) Leak into the Reactor Building Cause:
RWCU pipe leak Automatic Actions:
RWCU auto isolation Effects:
Operator action required Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms BOP Increase in unidentified leak rate
"* Increase in containment parameters D-l-d/ D-2-d: RWCU HELB lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including RWCU system status, area temperatures, area radiation levels SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.11, Secondary Containment Control Direct the RWCU system isolation be verified RO Recognize that RWCU is not fully isolated.
BOP 0
Attempt to isolate the RWCU system and report the failure of the isolation valves. See Event 6 for details.
ES -D-2
Op Test No.:
Event Description Cause:
Automatic Action, Effects:
Time Operator Actions ES-D Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.:
6 Page 6 of 6 Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valve Failure Breaker malfunction prevents auto valve closure s:
none Incomplete RWCU system isolation. Operator action required mitigate unisolable leak Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Identify failure of RWCU system to fully isolate BOP SRO Determine that a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment.
Before exceeding Max Safe temperatures, enter EOP 3200.01A, RPV Control - No ATWS, and shutdown the plant.
BOP Record and/or report area temperature and radiation indications CT RO When directed to scram
"* Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on 4F
"* Place Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN CT SRO Directs Emergency Depressurization lAW EOP 3200.04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS
"* Direct bypassing Reactor Overfill Protection System (ROPS)
"* Direct manually opening all EMRVs RO Bypass ROPS BOP Opens all EMRVs RO Control reactor level during the depressurization TERMINATION CRITERIA:
Once ED is performed and reactor is depressurizing, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
ALERT: primary containment isolation required and isolation valves malfunction causing unisolated release path or confirmed leak-rate exceeds 50 gpm from reactor coolant system
-2