ML021610358
| ML021610358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/31/2002 |
| From: | Hackenberg J AmerGen Energy Co |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| References | |
| 50-219/02301 | |
| Download: ML021610358 (28) | |
Text
Scenario Outline ES -D-1 Scenaio OulineES-D-I Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No. SRO #1 Op Test No.
Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 80% power with the 'A' Isolation Condenser and the 'A' CRD Summary Pump out of service. The crew will begin by swapping the RBCCW Pumps. APRM 4 will then fail upscale requiring the crew to evaluate Tech Specs, bypass the APRM, and reset the half scram. The
'A' Feedwater Pump trips requiring the crew to reduce power to maintain reactor level. A loss of power to Bus 1 B will result in the crew manually scramming due to a loss of all feedwater. The diesel generator will auto start and restore power to Bus 1D, but the 1B CRD pump will fail to restart due to a logic malfunction. The lB CRD pump can be manually restarted. The 'B' Isolation Condenser fails to initiate requiring EMRVs to be used to control Reactor pressure. The 'A' EMRV fails to reclose following manual actuation. This causes a loss of RPV level, which will result in the need to Emergency Depressurize.
Initial Condition 80% power Turnover: See Attached "Shift Tumover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description SRO I N BOP Swap Reactor Water Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Pumps SRO 2 MAL NIS 20D I RO APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)
SRO 3 MAL CFW 6A C RO 'A' Feedwater Pump Trips BOP SRO 4 R RO Power Reduction to Control Level BOP SRO 5 MAL EDS 18 M RO Loss of Power to 4160V Bus 1B - Results in Plant Scram BOP SRO 6 CLF BKR CRDI I RO 'B' CRD Pump Fails to Auto Restart due to a Logic Malfunction on BOP Power Restoration SRO 7 CLF ICS10, opt C RO 'B' Isolation Condenser fails to initiate due to a Valve Failure 6 V-14-35 BOP [Initiation signal on low level]
SRO 8 MAL NSS 24A C RO 'A' EMRV Fails to Reclose After Manual Actuation BOP
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
- Unit At 80% Power INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
"* 'A' Isolation Condenser (IC) has been out of service for two days
"* 'A' CRD Pump tripped four hours ago SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
- Place 1-1 RBCCW pump in service and secure 1-2 RBCCW pump due to excessive leakage around pump shaft. Perform when turnover complete.
SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
0 None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
S'A'WIC
- 'A'CRD pump GENERAL INFORMATION:
Place 1-1 RBCCW pump in service and secure the 1-2 RBCCW 5AW pump Operating Procedure 309.2, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Section 15.0 I.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: I Page I of 8 Event Descript ion: Swap Reactor Water Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Pumps Cause: Excessive leakage around pump shaft Automatic Acti ons: None Effects: None Time P'osition Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO - Direct that RBCCW pumps be swapped lAW Operating Procedure 309.2, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Section 15.0 BOP lAW 309.2, step 15.3.1;
, Direct an Equipment Operator to vent the pump casing for 1-1 RBCCW pump using V-5-51 1.
0 Start 1-1 RBCCW pump on 13R, verify the pump ON light is energized and pump achieves proper discharge pressure.
- Stop 1-2 RBCCW pump.
- Direct an Equipment Operator to verify proper operation of 1-2 RBCCW pump
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 8 Event
Description:
APRM 4 Fails Upscale (Tech Spec)
Cause: Instrument failure causes upscale response Automatic Actions: RPS System I half scram Effects: Operator action required to bypass APRM and reset the half scram Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
"* G-1-c: SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN
"* G-1-f: APRM HI-HI/INOP
"* G-3-f: APRM HI
"* G-1-d: CHANNEL I lAW Response to Alarm Procedures (RAPs); confirm automatic action and indications including RPS system 1 scram lights out on 4F and APRM 4 indications on 4F.
Based on alarms and indications, reports RPS system 1 half scram due to APRM 4 failing upscale.
SRO "* Refers to Standing Order 21, Allowable Bypass Configuration for APRM/LPRM System
"* Requests Work Management assistance and/or may direct the I&C technician to investigate the problem
"* Evaluate TS 3.1, Protective Instrumentation, to ensure that it permits the APRM to be bypassed
"* Directs APRM 4 to be bypassed and the half scram to be reset CT RO "* Bypasses APRM 4 by placing the joystick in bypass.
"* Resets half scram I,/
Operator Actions .E 5-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 8 Event Descriptiol n: 'A' Feedwater Pump Trips Cause: Motor malfunction causes overload trip Automatic Action is: Pump trip alarms Effects: Reactor water level decrease. Requires operator action to reduce reactor power Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
- a. J-1-d: FEED PUMP TRIP A
- J-2-d: FEED PUMP OL A lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including Feed pump amps, discharge pressure, flow, etc.
SRO Coordinate on power reduction, for details see Event 4 RO BOP Direct Equipment Operator to investigate feed pump and its breaker K
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 8 Event
Description:
Power Reduction to Control Level Cause: Response to Feedwater pump trip Automatic Actions: none Effects: Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action reduces required feedwater flow Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor power, using recirculation flow, to within the capacity of the remaining feed pumps (approximately 70% power) lAW 3200-ABN 2000.17, Feedwater System Flow Control Failure RO IAW ABN 17
"* Reduce recirculation flow by dialing down on the Master Recirc Controller as required to control Reactor level.
"* Monitor Reactor parameters BOP Monitor Feedwater pumps and flow
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No. SRO #1 Event No.: 5 Page 5 of 8 Event
Description:
Loss of Power to 4160V Bus 1B - Results in Plant Scram Cause: Bus fault causes loss of power to 4160V loads Automatic Actions: Loss of all operating feedwater pumps Effects: Lowering reactor level leads to reactor scram Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms 0 T-1-c: MN BRKR 1B TRIP lAW RAPs, confirm automatic actions and indications including 1B breaker status, bus voltage and equipment without power SRO 0 Recognize loss of feedwater to reactor
"* Direct manual scram of reactor in accordance with ABN 01, Reactor Scram
"* Implement Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
RO lAW ABN 01 BOP 0 Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on panel 4F 0 Place the Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN BOP Perform the following actions when directed RO 0 Verify that the reactor is shutdown by:
"* Verify that all control rods are fully inserted
"* Insert SRM and IRM detectors
"* Verify that reactor power is dropping
- Confirm that the Main Turbine is tripped SRO Recognize entry into EOP 3200.01A, RPV Control - No ATWS due to reactor BOP level below 138 inches.
RO SRO Direct actions lAW the EOP BOP Perform EOP actions as directed by the SRO.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 6 Page 6 of 8 Event
Description:
'B' CRD Pump Fails to Auto Restart due to a Logic Malfunction on Power Restoration Cause: Breaker malfunction prevents auto restart of CRD pump Automatic Actions: none Effects: Requires operator action to restart CRD pump Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognizes EDG 2 closure on to Bus 1D RO
- Recognize failure of 'B' CRD pump to automatically restart when EDG 2 supplies power to Bus 1D CT = Manually restart 'B' CRD pump SRO Directs follow-up actions on re-powering of Bus 1 D and Unit Substations (USS)
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 8 Event
Description:
'B' Isolation Condenser (IC) fails to initiate due to a Valve Failure Cause: Valve malfunction prevents auto initiation of IC
.Automatic Actions: none Effects: Requires operator action to control reactor pressure Time Position - Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognizes failure of 'B' IC to initiate Report the failure to the SRO SRO Directs pressure control using the EMRVs IAW the EOPs RO Monitor and report Reactor plant parameters
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #1 Event No.: 8 Page 8 of 8 Event
Description:
'A' EMRV Fails to Reclose After Manual Actuation Cause: Electronics malfunction causes failure of EMRV to reclose Automatic Actions: none Effects: Requires operator action to mitigate inventory loss Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Directs pressure control using EMRVs.
BOP Manually opens EMRVs to control pressure Recognizes 'A' EMRV fails to reseat when placed back into AUTO RO Monitors and report Reactor plant parameters including the loss of Reactor level SRO Direct ADS Timer Switches to be placed in Bypass when level cannot be maintained above 61 inches BOP Place the ADS Timer Switches in Bypass when directed SRO Confirm the start of at least 2 core spray subsystems BOP SRO 0 Directs Emergency Depressurization lAW EOP 3200.04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS, when reactor level reaches 0 inches
"* Direct the Reactor Overfill Protection System (ROPS) to be bypassed
"* Direct that level be controlled with Core Spray when it begins injecting during depressurization.
RO Bypass ROPS when directed CT BOP Open all EMRVs when directed CT BOP Control level with Core Spray after injection begins during depressurization TERMINATION CRIT "ERIA: Once ED is performed and reactor is depressurizing, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: ALERT: when Rx level is less than 61" TAF for greater than 5 minutes or SITE AREA EMERGENCY: when Rx level is less than 0" TAF for greater than 5 minutes /
Scenario Outline FR-13.1 Scenario utline 5-fl1 Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No. SRO #2 Op Test No.
Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 90% power with 4 recirc pumps operating. One recirc pump Summary has been secured due to emergent maintenance. The crew will begin by raising MVAR loading on the main generator. The crew will remove a recirc pump from service due to MG set malfunctions requiring the crew to reduce power to comply with pump and system limitations. A loss of power to a vital bus will occur requiring the crew to restore vital loads. This will require a Tech Spec evaluation.
A steam leak in the drywell will result in the crew manually scramming due to an increase in drywell pressure. Auto and manual scram functions will be disabled, but Alternate Rod Insertion will insert the rods. Drywell pressure will increase requiring Drywell Sprays using the Containment Spray system. The drywell spray valve fails to automatically realign and must operated manually to permit sprays to function.
Initial Condition 90% power Turnover: See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 SRO N BOP Raise MVAR Loading on the Main Generator SRO 2 C RO Recirc MG Set Malfunctions requiring Recirc Pump Shutdown BOP SRO 3 R RO Reduce Power during Recirc Pump Shutdown BOP SRO 4 MAL EDS3E C RO Loss of Power to the Vital Bus (Tech Spec)
BOP MAL NSS 17A, SRO 5 .031180s, .1/900s M RO Steam Leak in the Drywell MALNSS4C, BOP 1/180s SRO 6 MAL RPS 5 & 6 .1 RO Failure of the Auto and Manual Scram Logic SRO 7 CLF VLV CNS8, C BOP Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays opt 6 are required
- * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
- Unit At 90% Power with 4 Recirculating pumps operating INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
S'D' Recirc Pump is out of service for a MG Set brush replacement.
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
- None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
- 'D' Recirc Pump MG Set GENERAL INFORMATION:
Power System Director (PSD) has requested that Oyster Creek pick up an additional 20 MVAR. The S PSD has been informed that this will be completed after shift turnover.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: I Page 1 of 7 Event Descriptioin: Raise MVAR Loading on the Main Generator Cause: Request by Grid operator, part of turnover Automatic Actionis: none Effects: minor change to secondary plant indications Time Position. Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reactive loading be raised by 20 MVAR on the Main Generator lAW procedure 336.1, 24KV Main Generator electrical system.
BOP lAW 336.1, section 3.3;
"* Increase reactive load by 20 MVARs using the Amplidyne Adjust rheostat.
"* Adjust Exciter Field Rheostat Control (70M) as needed to maintain a slight BUCK setting I
Operator Actions ES -D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 7 Event Descript:ion: Recirc MG Set Malfunctions requiring Recirc Pump Shutdown Cause: System engineer requests an immediate shutdown of the A' Recirc Pump based on his observation of excessive arcing and sparking at the MG Set.
Automatic Acti ons: none Effects: Pump dP & flow and MG motor amps decrease when the Operator secures the Recirc pump.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO
- Direct shutdown of Re.nire niimn hb trinninr the R*prirr I*/r cot hr~anL'-
- Execute 3200-ABN-200.02, Recirculation Pump Trip.
RO Place Recirc MG set breaker to OPEN IAW ABN 02; a confirm discharge bypass valve OPEN and CLOSE discharge valve BOP
- Monitor Reactor plant parameters.
SRO Coordinate power reduction to maintain appropriate Hz on running pumps. See RO Event 3 for details.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 7 Event Descript ion: Reduce Power following Recirc Pump Shutdown Cause: Response to Recirc pump trip Automatic Acti ons: none Effects: Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action required to maintain the Recirc pumps within Hz limits Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor power to restore proper Recirc Hz by reducing Recirc flow lAW procedure 301.2, Reactor Recirculation system RO lAW 301.2;
"* Reduce power with Recirc flow to maintain Recirc pump speed at 30 Hz or less
"* Make notifications for unplanned power reduction BOP 0 Assist RO with procedure and manipulations
"* Monitor Reactor plant parameters during the power change.
"* Adjust reactor pressure as required with the EPR lAW 202.1, Power Operations
/"
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 7 Event Descripttion: Loss of Power to the Vital Bus (Tech Spec)
Cause: Breaker malfunction causes loss of power to vital bus Automatic Actiions: Loss of power to vital loads Effects: Loss of equipment powered by the vital bus. Operator action is required to restore loads and re-power RPS.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by reporting alarms;
"* U-3-c: 11B2 MN BRKR TRIP
"* T-7-d: FDR TO 460V 1B2 TRIP lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including 1B2 breaker status, bus voltage and lost equipment Confirm 1-1 RBCCW pump is running RO "* Confirm that the 'A' CRD pump is running SRO "* Direct the implementation of 3200-ABN-2000.48, Loss of Unit Substation 1 B2
"* Notify Work Management
"* Review TS 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical Power
- The reactor must be placed in cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> lAW TS 3.7.B and 3.0.A BOP lAW ABN 48;
"* Confirm Reactor Building HVAC is shutdown
"* Confirm SGTS is running RO 0 Monitor Reactor plant parameters
"* Review ABN 48 attachments for 1B2 loads that may require compensatory measures
Operator Actions ES -D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No. SRO #2 Event No.: 5 Page 5 of 7 Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Drywell Cause: Reactor coolant pipe leak Automatic Actions: none Effects: Containment pressure and temperature increase due to the steam leak. Operator action is required to mitigate the steam leak.
Time - Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior Recognize condition by reporting; RO
- Unidentified leak-rate change BOP 0 Containment pressure and temperature change
- C-3-f; DW PRESS HI/LO 0 Reference RAP C-3-f, DW PRESS HI/LO SRO ° Direct venting of Containment lAW procedure 312.11, Section 4.3, Nitrogen System and Containment Atmosphere Control.
0 Direct monitoring of Containment and investigate potential in-leakage paths using 2000-OPS-3024.09, Drywell Cooling System Diagnostic procedure BOP Vent Containment lAW procedure 312.11
- Vent the drywell via the Torus by opening Torus vent valves V-28-47 and V 28-18 on panel 11F.
- Vent the drywell via the drywell by opening drywell vent valves V-23-21 and V-23-22 on panel 12XR.
RO Identify the cause of the high drywell pressure condition as directed.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 6 Page 6 of 7 Event
Description:
Failure of the Auto and Manual Scram Logic Cause: Electronics malfunction prevents auto and manual scrams Automatic Actions: Failure to scram Effects: Operator action is required to initiate Alternate Rod Insertion Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Prior to reaching 3 psig DW pressure, direct a manual scram of the reactor lAW ABN 01, Reactor Scram.
RO lAW ABN 01
"* Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on 4F
"* Place Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN
"* Report the failure to scram condition SRO 0 Enter and execute EOP 3200.01 B RPV Control - With ATWS 0 Direct the initiation of Alternate Rod Injection (ARI) 0 Direct implementation of 3200-ABN-2000.01, Reactor Scram 6 Direct control of Reactor pressure and level CT BOP 0 Initiate ARI when directed RO 0 Control Reactor level as directed S Control Reactor pressure as directed 0 Perform remaining scram actions when directed SRO Recognize and report that the Control Rods are inserting (due to ARI).
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #2 Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 7 Event
Description:
Containment Spray Valve fails to realign automatically when sprays are required Cause: Breaker malfunction prevents valve movement Automatic Actions: none Effects: System configuration does not automatically realign. Operator action required to manually open valve Time Position -Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.02, Primary Containment Control when Drywell Pressure exceeds 3 psig.
- Direct lineup of Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray Mode per Support Procedure 29, Initiation of the Containment Spray System for Drywell Sprays BOP lAW SP-29;
"* Lineup Containment Spray in the Drywell Spray mode
"* Report failure of V-21-1 1, DW Spray Discharge Valve, to open CT "* Direct Equipment operator to manually open V-21-11
"* Spray Drywell when V-21-11 is open and conditions for spraying Drywell are met RO Control Reactor Level and Pressure as Directed TERMINATION CRITERIA: Once Drywell spray has been initiated and Drywell pressure is being controlled between 4- 12 psig, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated -
POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: ALERT: a scram signal received and power remains greater than 2%
(
Scenario Outline FR .13 -1 Scenario Outline FESfl-1 Simulation Facility Oyster Creek Scenario No. SRO #3 Op Test No.
Examiners Operators CRS PRO URO Scenario The scenario begins with the reactor at 100% power with the 'A' Isolation Condenser out of service.
Summary Following turnover, the crew will swap Main Air Ejectors. A SLC Tank Hi/Lo Temperature alarm will be received. Investigation will show that actual SLC tank temperatures are low due to a failed heater control circuit and a Tech Spec evaluation will be required. A small Main Condenser vacuum leak requires a power reduction and investigation of the vacuum leak. A RWCU leak will occur in the Reactor Building requiring entry into the Primary Containment Control EOP. A RWCU valve will fail preventing the isolation of the leak. Reactor Building Ventilation will fail to automatically isolate requiring manual action to stop the radioactive release. Emergency Depressurization will be required to mitigate the primary leak into the Reactor Building.
Initial Condition 100% power Turnover: See Attached "Shift Turnover" Sheet Event Malfunction Event Event No. No. Type* Description I SRO N RO Swap Main Steam Air Ejectors BOP OVR SLC ANN SRO 2 SLC3 I RO SLC Tank Low Temperature due to Failed Heater Control Circuit (Tech CLF PSW SLC5 BOP Spec) to trip MAL CFW17A. 1 SRO 3 or .4/60s C RO Main Condenser Vacuum Leak BOP SRO 4 R RO Lower Power to Control Vacuum BOP MAL RCUI3 3% SRO 5 600s M RO Reactor Water Clean-Up Leak into the Reactor Building BOP [HELB]
V-16-1&14 SRO 6 C RO Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valve Failure BOP MALRMS6M, SRO 7 6N I RO Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to Automatically Isolate IL____ IBOP
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor I
SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS:
- Unit at 100% Power INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT/LCOs:
- 'A'Isolation Condenser (IC)
SCHEDULED EVOLUTIONS:
- Swap M~ain Steam Air Ejectors for Maintenance SURVEILLANCES DUE THIS SHIFT:
- None ACTIVE CLEARANCES:
'A'IC W
GENERAL INFORMATION:
- After Shift Turnover, swap SJAE elements lAW Operating Procedure 325, Air Extraction and Off Gas System. Directed by station management to place 1A2 SJAE element in service and remove 1A1 SJAE element from service
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO#3 Event No.: 1 Page I of 7 Event Descriptior i: Swap Main Steam Air Ejectors Cause: none Automatic Action s: none Effects: No effect. Operator action required to change air ejector elements Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct that SJAE elements be swapped lAW Operating Procedure 325, Air Extraction and Off Gas System, Step 7.3.10 BOP lAW 325, step 7.3.10;
"* Open the steam and air valves for element 1A2
"° Close the steam and air valves for element 1AI Monitor Main Condenser Vacuum RO Monitor Reactor plant parameters
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 7 Event
Description:
SLC Tank Low Temperature due to Failed Heater Control Circuit (Tech Spec)
Cause: Heater Control Circuit malfunction Automatic Actions: none Effects: none Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO
- Recognize condition by reporting alarms; G-8-b: TANK TEMP HI/LO
- lAW RAPs; confirm local indications including tank temperature, tank level, heater status and heater breaker status; contact equipment operator to verify locally.
NOTE When requested, the crew will be told that:
"* The SLC Weight Percent is 18%
"* SLC Tank Temperature is 75°F
"* SLC Level of 2000 gallons
"* Red ground lights are lit SRO Evaluate compliance with TS 3.2, Reactivity Control
"* With a Weight Percent of 18%, the temperature needs to be maintained above -83 0 F IAWTS Figure 3.2.2
"* IAW TS 3.2.C.3.d, temperature must be restored to the required band or be in the shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
"* (May state that Boron Concentration is within the acceptable band, but this is not required)
Requests Work Management assistance, may direct I&C technician to investigate problem BOP Coordinate troubleshooting to restore the SLC Tank Heater.
Operator Actions ES-D -2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.: 3 Page 3 of 7 Event Descriptiorn: Main Condenser Vacuum Leak Cause: Excessive condenser in-leakage Automatic Actionis: none Effects: Condenser vacuum decrease. Operator action is required to mitigate the vacuum loss.
Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms
"* Condenser vacuum decrease
"* MWe decrease
"* Q-3-c: COND VAC LO 25 INCHES lAW SDRP or RAPs; confirm automatic action and indications including condenser vacuum at panels 5F/6F.
SRO Direct mitigation of condenser vacuum loss lAW 2000-ABN-3200.14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
"* Direct a power reduction as necessary to maintain vacuum greater than 22 inches
"* Direct Diagnosis of the cause of the vacuum loss in accordance with ABN 14 SRO Coordinate for power reduction, for details see Event 4 RO BOP Investigate the cause of the vacuum loss as directed by the SRO
"* Circulating Water Pumps
"* SJAEs
"* Gland Seal System
"* Gland Seal Exhauster
- SJAE Drain Pump NOTE Lowering reactor power will stabilize vacuum.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.: 4 Page 4 of 7 Event Descriptio n: Lower Power to Control Vacuum Cause: Response to vacuum loss Automatic Actior is: none Effects: Reactor power, steam flow and feed flow decrease. Operator action required to lower reactor power Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior SRO Direct reduction of Reactor power, using recirculation flow, as necessary to control condenser vacuum lAW 3200-ABN-2000.14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum RO IAW ABN 14 0 Reduce reactor power with recirculation flow as required 0 Monitor Reactor parameters SRO BOP Monitor condenser vacuum, report when vacuum stops lowering RO RO Discontinue the power reduction when vacuum stops dropping NOTE Lowering reactor power will stabilize vacuum.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No. SRO #3 Event No.: 5 Page 5 of 7 Event
Description:
Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) Leak into the Reactor Building Cause: RWCU pipe leak Automatic Actions: RWCU auto isolation Effects: Operator action required Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Recognize condition by observing indications or reporting alarms BOP
- Increase in unidentified leak rate
- Increase in containment parameters
- D-1-d/ D-2-d: RWCU HELB lAW RAPs; confirm automatic actions and indications including RWCU system status, area temperatures, area radiation levels SRO Enter and execute EOP 3200.11, Secondary Containment Control
- Recognize that RWCU is not fully isolated.
- Attempt to isolate the RWCU system and report the failure of the isolation valves. See Event 6 for details.
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO #3 Event No.: 6 Page 6 of r Event DescriptionI: Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valve Failure Cause: Breaker malfunction prevents auto valve closure Automatic Action s: none Effects: Incomplete RWCU system isolation. Operator action required mitigate unisolable leak Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior RO Identify failure of RWCU system to fully isolate BOP SRO
- Determine that a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment.
0 Before exceeding Max Safe temperatures, enter EOP 3200.01A, RPV Control - No ATWS, and shutdown the plant.
BOP Record and/or report area temperature and radiation indications CT RO When directed to scram
"* Depress both manual scram pushbuttons on 4F
"* Place Reactor mode switch to SHUTDOWN CT SRO Directs Emergency Depressurization lAW EOP 3200.04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS
"* Direct bypassing Reactor Overfill Protection System (ROPS)
"* Direct manually opening all EMRVs RO Bypass ROPS BOP Opens all EMRVs RO Control reactor level during the depressurization
//
Operator Actions ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario No.: SRO#3 Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 7 Event
Description:
Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to Automatically Isolate Cause: Electronics malfunction prevents isolation Automatic Actions: SGTS fails to auto start Effects: Operator action required to secure RB HVAC Time Position Applicant's Actions Or Behavior BOP
- Determines failure of Reactor Building HVAC to isolate when required
- Reports observations to SRO SRO
- Directs start of SGTS
- Starts SGTS RO Reports Secondary Containment conditions TERMINATION CRITERIA: Once ED is performed and reactor is depressurizing, or at the discretion of the lead evaluator, the scenario may be terminated POST SCENARIO EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: ALERT: primary containment isolation required and isolation valves malfunction causing unisolated release path or confirmed leak-rate exceeds 50 gpm from reactor coolant system