ML021220622
| ML021220622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/2002 |
| From: | Duke P Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | David Pinckney Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML021220622 (13) | |
Text
Document Transmittal Form TO NRC C/O PINCKNEY, DAVID DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK WASHINGTON, DC 20555 ID: HECGO065 Date :
04/19/2002 Please update your controlled set of documents with the following documents:
Document ID PRClHECG-HECG-TOC-BASISI000 PRCIHECG-SECT.1 1.3 (BASIS)I000 Revision Status 17 A
5 A
Quantity 1
1 Format RecNo H
135526 H
135568 This acknowledgement receipt must be returned to:
Document Management PSEG Nuclear PO Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 MC N04 Your signature below verifies that:
(1) the above documents have been filed and superseded documents have been removed and destroyed or clearly marked as obsolete.
(2) the mailing address and copyholder information are correct or corrections have been identified on this transmittal.
Place checkmark here to be removed from controlled distribution Signature:
Date:
PSE&G HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION C
T EVENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TECHNICAL BA, W
April 19, 2002 oo.v-CHANGE PAGES FOR REVISION #17 The Table of Contents forms a general guide to the current revision of each section and attachment of the Hope Creek ECG Technical Basis.
The changes that are made in this TOC Revision
- 17 are shown below.
- 1. Check that your revision packet is complete.
- 2.
Add the revised documents.
- 3.
Remove and recycle the outdated material listed below.
ADD REMOVE Pages Description Rev.
Pages Description Rev.
ALL TOC 17 All TOC 16 All Section 11.3 05 All Section 11.3 04 HC-ECG TB 1 of 1
PSEG Internal Use Only DQ[J9_L Technical Basis I JLI..U To"C.
('flN ITI'I Pg. 1 of 4 HOPE CREEK ECG TECHNICAL BASICt.'I'RL TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAQr Y
SECTION Hazards - Internal/External 9.1 Security Threats 9.2 Fire 9.3 Explosion 9.4 Toxic/Flammable 9.5 Seismic Event 9.6 High Winds 9.7 Flooding 9.8 Turbine Failure/Ve Gases
- hicle Crash/
Missile Impact River Level REV #
17 00 00 01 00 PAGES DATE T.O.C.
i ii 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 TITLE Table of Contents/Signature Page Introduction and Usage Glossary of Acronyms & Abbreviations Fuel Clad Challenge RCS Challenge Fission Product Barriers (Table) 3.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 3.2 RCS Barrier 3.3 Containment Barrier EC Discretion Failure to SCRAM Radiological Releases/Occurrences 6.1 Gaseous Effluent Release 6.2 Liquid Effluent Release 6.3 In - Plant Radiation Occurrences 6.4 Irradiated Fuel Event Electrical Power 7.1 Loss of AC Power Capabilities 7.2 Loss of DC Power Capabilities System Malfunctions 8.1 Loss of Heat Removal Capability 8.2 Loss of Overhead Annunciators 8.3 Loss of Communications Capability 8.4 Control Room Evacuation 8.5 Technical Specifications 18 5
03 02 03 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 02 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 9
6 5
11 4
7 5
7 4
3 5
9 8
13 18 15 8
10 44 4
6 8
4 01/21/97 Rev. 17 04/19/02 01/21/97 01/21/97 06/14/01 01/21/97 02/01/02 02/01/02 02/01/02 01/21/97 01/21/97 01/21/97 01/21/97 01/21/97 11/15/01 05/12/97 01/21/97 06/12/00 01/21/97 01/21/97 01/21/97 01/21/97 02/01/02 02/01/01 02/01/01 12/18/01 02/15/01 02/01/01 02/01/01 02/01/01 8
8 4
4 2
7.0 8.0 9.0 9.9 HCGS
PSEG Internal Use Only HOPE CREEK ECG TECHNICAL BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS/SIGNATURE PAGE SECTION TITLE REV #
HC EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 2 of 4 PAGES DATE Reserved for future use Reportable Action Levels (RALs) 11.1 Technical Specifications 11.2 Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 11.3 System Actuation 11.4 Personnel Safety/Overexposure 11.5 Environmental/State Notifications 11.6 After-the-Fact 11.7 Security/Emergency Response Capabilities 11.8 Public Interest 11.9 Accidental Criticality/
Rad Material Shipments - Releases 11.10 Voluntary Notifications 7
4 7
8 4
1 5
3 8
02 03 05 01 01 02 04 01 02 01 2
01/23/01 Rev. 17 10.0 11.0 01/23/01 02/28/02 04/19/02 01/23/01 01/23/01 02/28/02 02/28/02 01/23/01 01/23/01 HCGS
PSEG Internal Use Only REVISION
SUMMARY
Biennial Review Performed: Yes HC EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 3 of 4 o
NoX 11.3.3 Technical Basis - added statement that an actuation cannot be considered invalid if it results from an actual system parameter reaching its set point.
Rev. 17 HCGS
PSEG Internal Use Only HC EAL Technical Basis T.O.C.
Pg. 4 of 4 SIGNATURE PAGE Prepared By:
Paul Duke (If Editorial Revisions Only, Last Approved Revision)
Section/Attach Reviewed By:
Reviewed By:
ments Revised:
Section 11.3 (List Non-Editorial Only - Section/Attachments) t0.54q Effectiveness Reviewer Department Manager Date Date 62tic&
Date Reviewed By:
4 L 6 U(
Managa - Licensing Date (Reportable Action Level (Section 11) and associated Attachments marked by "L")
Reviewed By:
1--ergency Preparedness Manager Reviewed By:
/
Date N/A Manager - Quality Assessment - NBU (If Applicable)
Date N/A Mtg. No.
Hope Creek Chair Date Effective Date of this Revision:
SORC Review nd Station Approvals rman Vice President -
uclear Operations ILQ/Wi2A date/
L4 //
/at
-L Date I Rev. 17 03/29/02 Date Z
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels
- ,E&G 11.3 System Actuations REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL -11.3.1 U Py #ii IC ANY EVENT THAT RESULTS OR SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN ECCS DISCHARGE INTO THE RCS AS THE RESULT OF A VALID SIGNAL EXCEPT WHEN THE ACTION RESULTS FROM AND IS PART OF A PRE-PLANNED SEQUENCE DURING TESTING OR REACTOR OPERATION
[10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)]
RAL OPERATIONAL CONDITION - All BASIS Those events that result in either automatic or manual actuation of ECCS or would have resulted in actuation of the ECCS if some component had not failed or an operator action had not been taken are reportable.
For example, if a valid ECCS signal was generated by plant conditions and the operator put all ECCS pumps in pull-to-lock position, although no ECCS discharge to the vessel occurred, the event is reportable.
A valid signal refers to an intentional manual actuation, unless it is part of a preplanned test, or actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiation. Excluded from this reporting requirement would be those instances in which instruments drift, spurious signals, human error or other invalid signal causes action (e.g. jarring a cabinet, an error in the use of jumpers or lifted leads, error in actuation of controls or switches, or equipment failures).
Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other Page 1 of 2 RAL-11.3.1 Rev. 05 Valid ECCS Actuation, Manual or Automatic, has or should have occurred AND ECCS Actuation results or should have resulted in discharge to the vessel AND Actuation is NOT part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room. Manual actuations as directed by abnormal or emergency operating procedures (i.e., not part of a preplanned test or operational evolution) are reportable.
IF the ECCS discharges or should have discharged into the RCS as result of an INVALID signal, THEN a report under this RAL is not required REFERENCES HCGS UFSAR 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, section 3.2.6 Page 2 of 2 RAL - 11.3.1 Rev. 05
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels 11.3 System Actuations REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL - 11.3.2 IC ACTUATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM WHEN CRITICAL EXCEPT PREPLANNED SEQUENCE [10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)]
RAL OPERATIONAL CONDITION - 1, 2 BASIS An event involving a critical scram is reportable under RAL 11.3.2 unless it resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence. Manual RPS actuation in anticipation of receiving an "automatic RPS actuation is reportable.
Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.
REFERENCES 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 section 3.2.6 Page 1 of 1 RAL - 11.3.2 Rev. 05 Any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis 11.0 Reportable Action Levels 11.3 System Actuations REPORTABLE ACTION LEVEL - 11.3.3 IC VALID ACTUATION OF LISTED SYSTEM EXCEPT PREPLANNED
[10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)]
RAL OPERATIONAL CONDITION - All BASIS An eight hour report is required for a valid actuation of any of the systems named in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) unless the actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. Except for critical scrams (RAL 11.3.2), invalid actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10 CFR 50.72.
The system actuation flow chart provides guidance to determine reportability.
Page 1 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 05 Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any system listed in Technical Basis 11.3.3 except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis SYSTEM ACTUATION FLOW CHART Note 1 Is the system one of NoNNRPRBE the specifiedd Notes 2, 3 No 10 NONREPORTABLE Notes 4, 5 Yes Notes 6, 7 Page 2 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 05 CD-096F
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis NOTES
- 1. Systems for which this RAL applies are listed on page 4.
- 2. See page 4 for the list of reportable actuation signals (signals required for initiation of system safety function).
- 3. An ESF signal actuates equipment to mitigate the consequences of an accident, assure safe shutdown, minimize radioactive releases, etc. Process signals provided to protect equipment or as the result of good engineering judgment for system operating requirements (e.g., low flow starts, low suction pressure pump trips) are not ESF signals. If an actuation signal occurs, but distinction between "ESF" and "Process" cannot be determined immediately, the actuation is considered reportable. Retraction should be considered later, if necessary.
- 4. Valid actuations are those actuations that result from VALID SIGNALS or from intentional manual initiation, unless it is part of a preplanned test. Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirement for initiation of the safety function of the system.
An "actuation" is considered valid even if the resultant function (e.g., reactor SCRAM) has already been accomplished as a result of a prior actuation or a plant evolution, such as a routine shutdown.
- 5. Invalid actuations are by definition those that do not meet the criteria for being valid. Invalid actuations can include instrument drift, spurious signals, human error, jarring a cabinet, an error in the use ofjumpers or lifted leads, an error in the actuation of switches or controls, equipment failure, or radio frequency interference. Invalid actuations do not include actuations from the sensor by measurement of an actual physical system parameter that was at its setpoint.
- 6. Manual system actuation to mitigate the consequences of an accident, assuring safe shutdown of plant is reportable. Manual actuation as directed by normal operating or test procedures is not reportable. Manual actuations as directed by abnormal or emergency operating procedures (i.e., not part of a preplanned test or operational evolution) are reportable.
- 7. Preplanned actuations are those which are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates the specific actuation that is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.
Page 3 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 05
HCGS EAL/RAL Technical Basis 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) Specified Systems NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate UFSAR Chapter RPS (unless reported under RAL 11.3.2)
Reactor Protection System PCIS (6.2)
Containment Heat Removal ECCS (6.3)
HPCI ADS Core Spray LPCI Plant Systems MSIVs (5.4.5)*
RCIC Emergency AC Electrical Power AC Power Systems (8.3.1)
DG Systems (9.5.4 - 9.5.8)
ESF Components Primary Containment (6.1)*
Containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple MSIVs Hope Creek Reportable Actuation Signals (FSAR Table 7.3-15)
RPS (unless reported under RAL 11.3.2)
ANY RPS Trip Function (TS Table 3.3.1-1)
PCIS/ECCS//Plant Systems/ Power Systems Hi Drywell Pressure Reactor High Pressure Low Reactor Water Level (Level 2)
Low Reactor Water Level (Level 1)
Reactor Building Exhaust Hi Rad Refuel Floor Exhaust Hi Rad Bus Under voltage Reactor building/suppression chamber high differential pressure Suppression chamber/drywell high differential pressure LPCI injection valve pressure REFERENCES Automatic Depressurization System Core Spray pump discharge line flow RHR pump discharge line flow MSIV Isolation Hi Steam Line Flow Low Condenser Vacuum Low Steam Pressure (Run Mode)
Low Reactor Water Level (Level 1)
Steam Tunnel Temperature Main Steam Line Hi Rad CD - 096F HCGS UFSAR 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 10CFR50.73 NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, section 3.2.6 Page 4 of 4 RAL - 11.3.3 Rev. 05