ML020810429
| ML020810429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2002 |
| From: | Pace P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EPIP-1, Rev 18 | |
| Download: ML020810429 (52) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 MAR 1 u 10 CFR 50, App E.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP.
EPIP Rev Title Effective Date EPIP-1 18 Emergency Plan Classification 2-15-2002 Flowchart Filing instructions are included with these documents.
There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.
Sincerely, Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure J/
cc: See page 2 Printed on recycled paper
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 MARs Enclosure cc (Enclosure)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)
Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
FILING INSTRUCTIONS /I DOCUMENT NUMBER /0 I p-REMOVE REV 17 INSERT REVXL COMMENTS____________
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 18 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko (Type Name)
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: Emergency Planning APPROVED BY: Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE: 2/15/02 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 REVISION LOG Revision Implement Description of Revision Number ation Date D 0 04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Sipersedes IP-1.
1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.
2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.
3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.
4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.
5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.
6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.
7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.
8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, Bypass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.
9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:
System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.
Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected D CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, The following non-intent enhancements were made:
26 (CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),
to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.
CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made:
Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-I CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)
Revision - Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected D CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made:
19, 23, 24, Due to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back 26, 29, 32, to the EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation";
34 The Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.
10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:
Software revised to Microsoft Word which re formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised
- one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.
11 4/15/99 2, 34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to
>0.1.
I1A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 onlypage 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.
12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorial\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.
13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.
14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, (Pg.a& 45) stage I which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE 90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RMI to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.
15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 1lA (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to
&B) correspond with the new TI-RPS- 162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 1lb. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)
Revision - Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 16 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the (Pg. 11 following revisions do not reduce the level of
&14) effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.
Non intent change. Revise reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.
17 09/25//01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of Page 6, effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
1lB Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.
Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.
18 02/15/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the 2, 1IB, 44 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing 03-y to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 4
1.0 PURPOSE This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.
24 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY '
The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.
4 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.
3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.
3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.
3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.
3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.
3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.
3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,
spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.
3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.
4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1 Interfacing Documents BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause:Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, GeneralEmergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of MeteorologicalData WBN-EPIP-1 3, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological ControlResponse WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For RadiologicalEmergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency EnvironmentalRadiological Monitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the ReactorCoolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Productionand Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for ProtectionFrom Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planningand PreparednessFor NuclearPower Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.
Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.
ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.
EPI i18 Revisiono 18 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART 1,3,4,'
EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 9 of 49 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 2.3 2.4 Loss of Function/Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation 2.7 2.8 2.9 Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification 2
2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Loss of DC 3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
Revision 18 Page 10of49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group oftwenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required.
(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage ofa magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation.
catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA- The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations.
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
observed.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment systems, devices, or material, the failure.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 EPIP-1 Pa 1IAof49 Revision 18 Page IIB of 49 1.1Ful CladBarrie I --- -----. .- Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4 I.Critical Safety Function Status Potential LOSS INSTRUCTIONS Core Cooling Red Potentia LULO5 Core Cooling Orange Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Containment (FR-Z.1) Red I OR Red OR NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the s Heat Sink Red Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the OR are INEFFEC==*TIVEI condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within Ito 2 (RHR Not in Service) I Not Applicable Heat Sink Red hours, in the absence of a viable success path). I (RHR Not in Service) The classification shall be made a soon as this determination is made.
N
-OR
- 1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING Potential LOSS P CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which,
- 2. RCS Leak-age/L.OCA Rtapid unexplainea oecrease Containment Hydrogen if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.
R RCS sample activity is following initial increase Increases to >4% by volume 0 Potential LOSS OR Circle these CONDITIONS.
Greater Than 300 1 iCi/gm Not applicable RCS Leak results in OR dose eauivalent iodine-131 Non Isolatable RCS Leak Containment pressure or Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase Loss of subcooling 2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any U Exceeding The Capacity of Sump level Not increasing B) with < One full train of
(<650 F Indicated), One Charging Pump (CCP) LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING C (with LOCA in progress)
I I V g Containment spray
[850 F ADV] In the Normal Charging CONDITIONS have been MET. T Alignment.
-OR 3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING B OR RCS Leakage Results In 13, Containment Isolation Status CONDITION; the respective status tree A Potential LOSS criteria will be monitored and used to R Entry Into E-1 determine the EVENT classification for the Containment Isolation is Not Applicable R Incomplete (when required) Modes listed on the classification flowchart.
-OR AND a Release Path to the I
-OR Environment Exists 4. Compare the barrier losses and potential E I. Steam Generator Tubeý Rupture losses to the EVENTS below and make the R
- 4. Reactor Vesse.l Water Level I nPotential LOSS appropriate declaration.
[S Potential LOSS I SGTR that results in a M Not Applicable 4.: ContaI~nment Bypass Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33% safety injection actuation A (No RCP running) OR
- Potential LOSS T Entry into E-3 RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase R FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD I OR monitors in areas adjacent to
-OR-ý Prolonged (>4 Hours) CNTMT (with LOCA in I Secondary Side release progress) 5, ontainment Rad~ia-tion Menftor~s 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level outside CNTMT from a S/G U with a SGTL > T/S Limits EVENTS 1 Potential LOSS Potential LOSS VALID reading increase Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level Not Applicable UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT of Greater Than: <33% -OR (No RCP Running) 5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment Loss or Potential LOSS of Any LOSS or Potential 74 RDhr On 1-RE-90-271 Containment Barrier LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier and 272 Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID Reading increase of OR Greater Than: OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and Any LOSS or Potential I -RE-90-272 LOSS of RCS barrier OR i
-OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 1-RE-90-274 1I-R-0--,-
- 6. Site Emergency Direcqtor Judg me.nt 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, H
-OR.
Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above. Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above. 6.Site E~mergep.ncy
. ... DirecQtor
... ... Judgment .,.-..
Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates LOSS or Potential LOSS of LOSS of any two barriers
.Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third the Conditions Listed Above.
barrier teCn L iste itin Above.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4
4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity action is required.
to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. inoperable.
within 15 minutes.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR runback > 15%thermnal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. System Activation.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.
sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt threat of force. normal plant operations.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A observed. release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, will not explode due to ignition. minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station. VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or monitor readings or personnel observations that identifyv an Event tor impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 14 of`49 2.2Lss ofFnto Mode I Initiatinil/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" and Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatnix" "RadiologicalEffluents" (Section 7)
Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Complete loss Complete of function needed to achieve or maintain loss of function needed to achieve or maintain progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4) Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)
- 1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators 1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red 1,2 (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications 1,2 3,4 3,4 2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red
- 3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS Note: Also Refer to "Failureof Rx Protection"(2.3) and "FissionProductBarierMatrix"
- 4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:
Sub-criticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs indications for >16 minutes with either a (1 and 2 and 3)
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3) 4 1. Shutdown is required
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR 2. Loss of RHR capability 1,2 annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or 3,4 indications for >15 minutes. 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser
- 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)
- 3. (a orb)
UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Corrmunication annunciators or indications in the Control Room capability (1 and 2 and 3) for >16 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)
ALL 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones 1,2 annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios 3,4 indications for >15 minutes.
or
- 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Conmnunication compliment) capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)
- 3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and 1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones capable of displaying data requested. 2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies
- 3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system
- 4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines
- 5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system
[FPIP Revision 18 aeL15of49 2.Fue Clad Degadaio InitiatinglCondition Mode
+
InitiatinalCondition
~,. II-Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals - -----------
1,2 did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and S decreasing (I and 2) Refer to "FissionProduct BamerMatrx" Y
- 1. (a orb) S
- a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red T
- b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red E M
- 2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto D Refer to *FissionProductBarrierMatrix" and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3) E
- 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required G R
- 2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful.
A
- 3. FR-S.1 has been entered. D A
T 0
+
N Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix' 112 and manual trip from MCR was successful (I and 2) U
- 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required
- 2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.
Not Applicable Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16) 1,2, 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb) 3,4, a. Dose equivalent iodine (1-131) >1.0 pCi/gm 5 for >48 Hours or inexcess of T/S Figure 3.4.16-1
- b. Specific activity >1O0/Ej+/-Ci/gm
[EPIPI Revision 18 Page 16 of 49
- 2. RC Idenifie Leaag M7 ode fInitiatincilCondition Mode Initiating/Condition
- 1*
Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrerMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatnix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" I
Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix"
>10 GPM 1,2, 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)
1,2 1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as >25 GPM (a orb) defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated 3,4, 3,4, *5
- 5 below (a orb) a. 1-SI-68-32 results
EPIP- 1
[Revision 18
]Page ]7 of 49
- 2. Tubn alr Mvoue Initiating/Condition Moe Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProduct BaonerMatnx" Refer to "FissionProductBarnerMatrix" S Y
S T
E M
1- 4 Refer to "FissionProductBarferMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBanierMatrix" D
E G
R A
D A
T 0
N Refer to "FissionProductBaoier Matrx" Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing U I Safety Related equipment
- 1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE 1,2,3 DAMAGE in any of the following areas:
Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg.
Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station CST 4
UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety 1,2,3 Injection Initiation (1 and 2) 1,2,3 1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing 2r Damage to Main Generator Seals
- 1. Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System
(<675 psig)
- 2. Safety Injection has initiated or is required
EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 18 of 49 2.0Saft Limi I I Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applcable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable I
Not Applicable Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech. Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)
Spec. limits (1 and 2) 1,2, 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and 1,2 1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.
3,4, reduction, has been entered Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits" 3,4 5
- 2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode 2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety within the time prescribed by the LCO Action limit (>2735 psig)
Statement
EPIP- 1 Revision 18 Page 19 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Function/Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit 2
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4*.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4*.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash Table 5-1 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss Loss Fuel of AC (Shutdown) of DC (Shutdown)
Handling 6
RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
EPEP-1 I Revision 18 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): Aplant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required.
(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation.
catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations.
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
observed.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure.,
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release ofwhich could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
IEPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 21 of 49 I
I 'Z I I rnmccw inku A u P.,%tn nrv,-
I iMode InitiatinglCondition Initiating/Condition Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (I and 2) Not Applicable 1,2, 1. 1A and I B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 for >15 minutes
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Core Cooling Red or Orange
- b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.
Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes Not Applicable
- 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 1,2, for >15 minutes 3,4 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes
- 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 1,2, 5,6, 1. 1A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 2. 1A or lB Diesel Generator not available or for >15 minutes De fuel Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)
Loss of Offsite Power for >16 minutes (1 and 2) UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2) 1,2 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3A4 5,6, 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes
- 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its or respective Shutdown Board 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power De to its respective Shutdown Board fuel
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 22 of49 L
inltlatingiuonaition 0 r I Mode S
Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatrix"and "Lossof Function" (2.2) S 0
F P
0 1,2, Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes W 3,4 1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery E Buses 1-1 and 1-11 and 1-111 and 1-IV R for >15 minutes U
Also Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatdx",
"Loss of Function"(2.2), 1 and "Lossof Instrumentation"(2.1)
Also Refer to "FissionProduct BanmerMatrix",
I "Lossof Function"(2.2),
and "Lossof Instrumentation"(2.1)
UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes 5,6, or (I or 2)
De-fuel
EPIP-1 Revision 18 PEa e 23 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Power Ops)
Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Loss of DC 3
HAZARDSand SEJD.wG.MN 4 .Fire 4.3 Flam l as 4 .Control Ro~auto
,4.2, Explosion 4.4, Toxn(a4. Seeurit Table 4-1 Table 4-2, ý42 SE!) Judgment4 Figure 4-A -F'gr 4 13 Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 5.2 5.3 Earthquake Tornado Aircraft/Projectile 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash 5
Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-I Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
[EPE-1 Revision 18 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION).
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event inoperable.
exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of System Activation.
10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt threat of force. normal plant operations.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release will not explode due to ignition.
rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be ensure that demands will be met by the station. VALID when it is conclusively verified by (i) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition need for timely assessment i.e., within 15 minutes.
within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system. or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. NOT be included.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which a protected area without authorization. contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected. thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite.
j~Revision 18 Page25 of`49
- 4. Ex lsin I
IVIoUL Initia Mode I Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMatrix" Refer to "Control Room Evacuation,"(4.5) or Refer to "FissionProduct BarrerMatrix" FissionProductBarrierMatrix" FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2) EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)
- 1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1
- 1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1
- 2. (a orb)
All All 2. (a orb)
- a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified area is observed due to the FIRE Safety Related equipment
- b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System System or component response due to the or component response due to the EXPLOSION FIRE Refer to "Security"(4.6)
+
FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent extinguished within 16 minutes from the Time structure or equipment (Figure 4-A) of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)
All All Refer to "Security"(4.6)
EPIP-i Revision 18 Page 26 of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS H
Unit #1 Reactor Building Additional Diesel Generator Building A Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station z Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2) A Diesel Generator Building RWST R CST D S
/
Figure 4-A S PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER E D
J U
D G
M E
N T
U 1
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 27 of 49 Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarnerMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" I
Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBamerMatrix" 4-UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which a facility structure containing Safety Related Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to equipment or associated with Power establish or maintain Cold SID (1 and 2 and 3) production All 1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building All 1. Plant personnel report the average of three listed in Table 4-2 readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is
>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as 2. (aorb) indicated on the monitoring instrument within a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health any building listed in Table 4-2. Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)
- b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit
- 3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas A. Normal Operations impeded due to access within the SITE PERIMETER restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 All 1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1Oft Triangular Area is All OR
>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has Figure 4-B). occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to OR enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or Evacuation (Figure 4-B)
State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >26% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)
Revision EPIP- l 18 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs H A
Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Additional Diesel Generator Building z Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station A Control Building Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2) R Diesel Generator Building CDWE Building D Turbine Building S
/
S E
D Figure 4-B ONE MILE RADIUSlSITE PERIMETER J
U D
G M
E N
T U
1
EPIW Revision 18 Pag e29 of49
___________* ' **Vw- wA*E L- V IIVII viir.Ug I Mode Initiating/Condition F .--
Mae I
Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBarferMatrix" Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant
- 1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability I
Evacuation of the Control Room has been Security Event has or is occurring which results in initiated and Control of all necessary Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to equipment Has Not been established within 16 Protect the Public minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3) All 1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force All 1. (a or b)
- a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered
- b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered
- 2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation
- 3. Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels LI A and L11 B I
Evacuation of the Control Room is Required Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or (1 and 2) Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or3)
- 1. (a orb)
- a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered All 1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA All b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" 2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED entered AREA
- 2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A Fora Drawingof ProtectedArea and Site Perimeter 1*
Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Not Applicable Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (I or 2)
- 1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All
- 2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 30 of 49 A 7 mzw - I -Aam L Iwdlm*m EPAI1u"119iiul g Isi lil'ni Ing Isim Mode InitiatinglCondition Events are in progress or have occurred H
All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation -or Melting With Potential A for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA z Plume Protective Action Guidelines A Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A. R D
S Events are in progress or have occurred !
All which involve Actual o rrUkely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection Table 4-3 S of the Public. Any releases are not expected SECURITY EVENTS E to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines D Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.
within the PROTECTED AREA J
- b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to U interrupt Plant Operations D G
- c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA M
E Events are in progress or have occurred d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED N All which involve Actual or Potential Substantial AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant T Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers Plant. Any releases are expected to be and/or Intelligence received) limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume U Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels. 1 Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 31of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 3.3 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Loss of DC 3 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.6 4.7 Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 4
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 6.3 6.4 Loss of AC (Shutdown)
Loss of DC (Shutdown)
Fuel Handling 6
RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
]EPIP-I Revision 18 [
Page 32 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required.
(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. nmback > 15%thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation.
catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations.
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
observed.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
IIEPIP- I 18 Revision Page 33 ofJ49 ft i IN r" 3 ri 7%
Mode InitiatinglCondition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "FissionProductBamerMatfix" Refer to "FissionProductBarfierMatrix" I
Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarierMatrix" Earthquake detected by site seismic +
Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in instrumentation (I and 2) Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)
- 1. (a and b) All 1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one All a. Ann.166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded" minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1
- b. Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated" 2. (a orb)
- a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE
- 2. (a orb)
- b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety
- a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel System or component response due to event
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
Note: Site Met Data instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph.
National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additonalinformation if needed.
Earthquake detected by site seismic i Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER instrumentation (1 and 2)
- 1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within All 1. Ann. 166 E indicator"Seismic Recording Initiated" All the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 34 of 49 k e " A:----r-L r-h 1. e% I-ia-w I i i AI ,--T- IIIE i Iia-- i*rs]
rrI l4_
- 111 1 1 11 .- - - . -a - flA -ýB
-1 IMode Initiating/Condition D
Refer to "Fission Product Barer Matrx" E S
T R
U C
T Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" I V
E P
H E
N 0
Table 5-1 M Plant Structures Associated With E Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs N All Plant structure listed in Table 6-1 resulting in 0 VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)
Unit # 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings N
- 1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE Auxiliary Building has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 Control Building U
- 2. (a orb) Diesel Generator Building
- a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE 1
- b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety Additional Diesel Generator Building System or component response due to the Intake Pumping Station event within the specified areas Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)
CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within CST All the SITE PERIMETER
- 1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)
Pae 5of 49.
I I Mode InitiatinqPCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" 4 River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Reservoir level is at Stage 11Flood Warning (1 or 2) River Systems Operations All 1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft All
- 2. Stage IIFlood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning River Reservoir level is _673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by (1 or 2 or 3) River Systems Operations
- 1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru All September 30 All
- 2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15.
- 3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations
JlEPIP-1 Revision 18
[ Page 3 6 of 49 Il .. . . P.
0 4% UA l b fun dari-rmff r!3- ria V -&_1 . L % p. cI.
A I Mode Initiating/Condition I
D E
Refer to 'Fission ProductBarrierMatrix' S
T R
U C
T I
Refer to 'Fission ProductBauner Matrix" V E
P H
E N
0 M
E I.. ...-........
Reter to "FissionProductBamer Matrix" N 0
N U
1 Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling All Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)
(1 and 2)
- 1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station
- 2. (a orbor c)
- c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is
<15 psig
IRevisioni! i PaeZ7of 49j Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER
Revision 18 Page 38 of 49J ]
MEPIP-I1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment 1
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutd0oi Systeis 6.2 Loss of AC (Shwtdown)
.6~3 Loss of DC (Shtutdowrt) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
ReEPIPIo 18 Revision 18 [
Page 39 of 49 ]
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ofthe BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required.
(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation.
catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations.
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
observed.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity ofthe RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Revision 18 Pag 40of 49 I ^
A I ---
aL,4.wmI
-,r rm mimi ii r.11u .v7 AA ** tAFAE ARI.IEEEs I I Mae~ InitiatinalCondition Moue wntaic/odto InitiatinglCondition Not Applicable 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or 4.
will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT Not Applicable closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6 1. Loss of RHR capability
- 2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'
- 4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT
- 5. CNTMT closure is established Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power (1 and 2 and 3) for >15 minutes 5,6 1. RHR capability is not available for RCS Cooling 5,6 1. 1A and 1B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized or for >15 minutes
- 3. CNTMT closure is established i UNPLANNED
- 4. loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)
- 1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes.
5,6 or 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its De respective Shutdown Board Fuel 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 41 of449 1 6.4 F Han _
Mode InitiatinsluCondition S Not Applicable H Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7.1) U T
D 0
W N
S Not Applicable Refer to "GaseousEffluents (7.1) Y S
T E
M S
D E
G R
Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss Not Applicable of water level that has or will uncover A Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor D Vessel (1 and 2)
A
- 1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or T All O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 I or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400
- 2. (aorb) 0
- a. Plant personnel report damage of N Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods
- b. Plant personnel report water level drop U has or will exceed makeup capability 1 such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered 5,6 UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent or DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or 2) Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered De 1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital (1 and 2 and 3) fuel Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-111 for >15 minutes 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or
- 2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Transfer Canal Battery Buses 1-11 and 1-IV for >15 All minutes. 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60
- 3. Fuel remains covered with water
Revision 18 Page 42 of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 1.3 RCS Containment I
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 Loss of Function/Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit 2
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.4 Toxic Gas Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.6 4.7 Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 4
DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 5.3 Tornado Aircraft/Projectile Crash 5.5 5.6 River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A 5
Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 (GaseousEffluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4, Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
M EIP
=
Revision 18 Page 43 of49J DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity action is required.
(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
is made that one or more ofthe conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i.e.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation within 15 minutes. of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
runback > 15% thermal reactor power-, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a System Activation.
catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas for safe operation. in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED threat of force. AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVAL The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage normal plant operations.
(i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release ofradioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are will not explode due to ignition. unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release ensure that demands will be met by the station. rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or purposes of Emergency Plan Classification. component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should a protected area without authorization. NOT be included.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge. the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
SPIP-I Revision 18 Page 44 of'49 Mode IInitiating/Condition Modej T
Initiating/Condition EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds Not Applicable 1000 mrem TEDE or 6000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or2or3)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values All under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.
- 2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mremnhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 p Ci/cc at SP
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fiaure 7-Al EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent +
release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds Not Applicable 100 mrem TEDE or 600 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)
All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded
- 2. Field survey results indicate >100 mremlhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 ýt Ci/cc at SP
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A) t -
Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >16 minutes Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3) (1 or 2)
All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values All 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that assessment within this time period confirms that the the Criterion is Not exceeded Criterion is Not exceeded.
- 2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value at SP >15 minutes for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) >60 minutes (1 or 2)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values All under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that assessment within this time period confirms that the the Criterion is Not exceeded Criterion is Not exceeded.
All
- 2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose >60 minutes in duration
>0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
EPIP-18 Revision 18 Page 4 5 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS(" 1 NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the R declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation A monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is D unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local I indication as necessary. 0 Monitor L ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General 0
Total Site EFFI .tCi/s (2) 1.5E+05 1.5E+07 2.5E+08 2.5E+09 G I
Ul Shield Building C 1-RE-90-400 EFFI ptCi/s 6.7E+04 6.7E+06 1.OE+08 1.OE+09 A L
U2 Shield Building /
2-RE-90-400 EFFI jiCi/s 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 2.5E+07 2.6E+08 F Auxiliary Building U O-RE-90-101B 4RMI cpm 1.2E+04 1.2E+06 . E L
Service Building O-RE-90-132B 4RM1 cpm 4.3E+03 4.3E+05 9.8E+06 V -4 H U1 Condenser Vacuum A
Exhaust I-RE-90-404A 3PAM p.tCi/cc(3 ) 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+0I 8.83E+02 N
I-RE-90-404B 3PAM ptCi/cc 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 D S/G Discharge L Monitors I 1-RE-90-421 thru 4RM2 mR/hr(4 ) NA 3.5E+02 3.5E+03 3.5E+04 N 424 (B)
Liquid Monitors G
n/a ýiCi/ml(2) 1.8E-05 1.8E-03 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm L.IE+06 ..........
.....N/A N/A I-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 1.OE+06 0-*(l) N/A N/A U O-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.2E+05 Ji(:I. N/A N/A I 0-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary Note: (1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.
(2) These releases rate values in tCi/s and ýLCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor forthe four emergency classifications.
(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates l+/-Ci/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02FiCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.
(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 6000 F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).
Revision 18 Page 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."
Uý Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.
Revision 18 Page 47 of49
-7 a - .
inin~ .~i i i' fiilam W51IT oLg Mode q - -------- na..
Initiatinc/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission ProductBarnerMatrix" or Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
"GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
Rerer ro "-ission ProductBamer Matrix"or Refer to "GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
"GaseousEffluents" (7.1)
I UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)
(1 or 2)
- 1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-101 or 0-RE-90-102 or
- 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 All results exceed 15 mrenmhr in the Control Room or All or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400 CAS
- 2. (a orb)
- 2. (a and b) a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel
- a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods values listed in Table 7-2
- b. Access restrictions impede operation of b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will systems necessary for Safe Operation or the exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will ability to establish Cold Shutdown be uncovered See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below 1"
UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within I UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or the Facility Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining All covered (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels
- 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal Note: In Eitherthe-UE orALERT EAL, the SED must All determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review OtherINITIA TING/CONDITIONS for 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or Applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 Control Room could be caused by a release associatedwith a DBA).
- 3. Fuel remains covered with water.
E PIP-I 18 Revision Page 48 of 49 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS R
Location Monitor A D
Monitor No. Building and Elevation Reading
- I 1&2 RE-90-1 0 Auxiliary El. 757.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr L
(spent fuel pool) 0 1-RE-90-2 Auxiliary El. 757.0 2.5 x 100 R/hr G I
(personnel air lock)
C 0-RE-90-3 Auxiliary El. 729.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr A (waste pac. area) L
/
O-RE-90-4 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x 103 mRihr F (decon room) U 0-RE-90-5 E Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 103 mnRihr L
(spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)
1&2-RE-90-6 Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr H A
(comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.) N 1&2-RE-90-7 Auxiliary El. 713.0 2 x 103 mR/hr D L
(sample room)
I 1&2-RE-90-8 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr N (aux. feed pump area) G 0-RE-90-9 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr U (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.) 1 1&2-RE-90-10 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (cvcs area)
O-RE-90-11 Auxiliary El. 676.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)
1-RE-90-61 Auxiliary El. 736.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)
0-RE-90-230 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)
O-RE-90-231 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)
I Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1
- 1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are 850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366. provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.
- 2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400 SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.
- 3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant 920030222 CNTMT parameter to determine emergency classifications.
Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),
Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).
- 4. ANSI Standard N. 18.7-1976 Subsection EPIPs will contain the following elements.
5.3.9.3: 01 POI
- 5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 Chemistry detection of failed fuel.
- 6. EPPOS #2 Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.