ML020810429
| ML020810429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2002 |
| From: | Pace P Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EPIP-1, Rev 18 | |
| Download: ML020810429 (52) | |
Text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 MAR 1 u
10 CFR 50, App E.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
)
Docket No.
50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN)
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISION In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP.
EPIP Rev Title Effective Date EPIP-1 18 Emergency Plan Classification 2-15-2002 Flowchart Filing instructions are included with these documents.
There are no regulatory commitments in this letter.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.
Sincerely,
- Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure J/
cc:
See page 2 Printed on recycled paper
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 MARs Enclosure cc (Enclosure)
NRC Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure)
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2 copies)
Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,
SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
FILING INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENT NUMBER p-I REMOVE REV 17 INSERT REVXL COMMENTS____________
/I
/0
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATING PROCEDURES EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART Revision 18 Unit 0 NON-QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:
Frank L. Pavlechko (Type Name)
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION:
Emergency Planning APPROVED BY:
Frank L. Pavlechko EFFECTIVE DATE:
2/15/02 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 2 of 49 REVISION LOG Revision Implement Description of Revision Number ation Date D
0 04/13/90 New WBN-EPIP. Sipersedes IP-1.
1 02/04/91 Revised to separate RCS leak and identified S/G tube leak initiating conditions. Clarified initiating condition in fire. Updated ODS telephone numbers.
2 11/28/91 Add initiation conditions. Clarify reference to Attachment 1 Definitions. Define Protected Area, Owner Controlled Area, and Vital Areas throughout procedures. Clarify NOUE declaration for Uncontrolled Shutdown.
3 03/04/92 Change all Technical Specification references to reflect new "Merit" Tech Specs and ODCM references.
4 02/10/93 Procedure revised to reflect the new methodology for development of Emergency Action Levels per: NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 3, 1/92, endorsed by REG GUIDE 1.101 Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors Rev. 3, 8/92.
5 09/15/93 Editorial (non-intent) and formal changes. Text changes made to EALs to meet review comments identified by the NRC.
6 01/01/94 Procedure revised to reflect new 10 CFR 20 changes.
7 05/27/94 Procedure revised to reflect changes to System 90 (Radmonitoring) and establish site perimeter monitoring points.
8 01/10/95 FPBM, EAL 1.3.4, CNTMT, By pass, Loss (1), revised to eliminate potential for misclassification. Maps revised to reference north and wind direction. Table 7-2, Alert, Radiation Levels enhanced to provide Operators additional information.
9 4/28/98 Revised Revision Log to include page numbers. References added to the document. Fission Product Barrier Matrix revised to reflect information found in the EOP Set Point Verification Document (WBN-OS64-188). Reference to AOI-27 revised to AOI-30.2. Phone numbers to the National Weather Service changed due to their reorganization. Annunciator window references for the earthquake corrected to match Main Control Room alignment. All references to RM were changed to RE to make it consistent with site description documents. Tables in section seven revised to reflect the following:
System 90 changes, monitor efficiencies, default flow rates, release time durations, and annual meteorological data enhancements.
Revision Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected D
CN-1 09/28/95 10, 14, The following non-intent enhancements were made:
26 (CCP) Acronym added to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix in 1.2 RCS Barrier, (2. RCS Leakage LOCA),
to enhance description. New SI reference number for Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance identified in event 2.5 (RCS Unidentified Leakage) and 2.6 (RCS Identified Leakage). Area code and phone number in event 5.2 (Tornado) revised to new number.
CN-2 11/10/95 3, 6, 34 The following non-intent enhancements were made:
Corresponding ERFDS system identifiers were added next to the rad monitors on Table 7-1; Table 7-1 was realigned to improve its usability; an enhanced description for RE-404 was provided in Note 3 of Table 7-1; the ERFDS Operators Manual was added to the Reference section.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-I CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 3 of 49 REVISION LOG(Continued)
Revision - Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected D
CN-3 05/24/96 8, 11, 16, The following non-intent enhancements were made:
19, 23, 24, Due to revisions made to AOI-27, it was added back 26, 29, 32, to the EALs in event 4.5 "Control Room Evacuation";
34 The Assessment Method on Table 7-1 was enhanced to correspond with the note at the top of the table. In addition, the reference to TI-30 was removed since this procedure will be terminated due to the enhancements being made to EPIP-16 and ERFDS. The word Projectile was added to the index and title reference to event 5.3 "Aircraft/Projectile Crash", to make it consistent with the EALs within it's classification.
10 3/15/99 All The following non-intent enhancement were made:
Software revised to Microsoft Word which re formatted pages along with other enhancements; minor typographical errors corrected; two references revised
- one added; SOS/ASOS replaced with SM/US; index page, effluent added to gaseous; vital area definition enhanced; spent fuel pit revised to pool on Table 7-2; SP revised to EAB in Event 7.1; TVA Load Dispatcher/Water Resources revised to River Systems Operations and revised ERFDS/P-2500 to ICS.
11 4/15/99 2, 34 Non intent change. Typo corrected. Changed >1.0 to
>0.1.
I1A 7/1/99 3,26 Corrected typo on phone number The remaining pages of this procedure are Rev 11 onlypage 3, and the fold out page for 26 have been changed.
12 9/30/99 All Non intent change. Minor editorial\\format changes made. Typographical errors corrected. Seismic windows revised to reflect DCN-50007 per ERPI Report 6695. (LTL) Lower toxicity limit replaced with (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit. This revision is also part of the resolution to PER 99-009326-000.
13 12/08/99 All Non-intent change. Revised page 33 for resolution of PER 99-015478-000. Minor editorial change to Event 5.1 step 1 of the Alert classification.
14 04/10/00 All Non-intend change. Revised page 45 for DCN 50484, (Pg.a & 45) stage I which moved 0-RE-90-101B, & -132B from ICS Screen 4RM2 to 4RM1. DCN also moved 1-RE 90-421B thru -424B and 0-RE-90-120 & -121 from ICS Screen 4RMI to 4RM2. This revision allows all liquid radiation monitors to be observable on one ICS screen and all gaseous radiation monitors to be observed on a separate ICS screen.
15 08/17/00 All Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors (Pg. 4, 1lA (1-RE-90-271, 272, 273, & 274) readings to
&B) correspond with the new TI-RPS-162, "Response of the Primary Containment High Range Monitors" readings (Reference EDC-50600). This analysis resulted in a revision to the EALs 1.1.5 on the Barrier matrix page, 1 lb. This revision resolves action items from CORP PER 99-000038-000. This revision was also determined not to reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 4 of 49 REVISION LOG (Continued)
Revision - Implementation Pages Description of Revision Number Date Affected 16 3/30/01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the (Pg. 11 following revisions do not reduce the level of
&14) effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
Intent change. Revised CNTMT Rad Monitors readings in the Barrier Matrix (1.3) to support new dose assessment methodology.
Non intent change. Revise reference from annunciator alarm printer to annunciator monitor per DCN D-50301.
17 09/25//01 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of Page 6, effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
1lB Intent change. Procedure revised to Non-Quality related per requirements of NQAP & pending revision to SPP-2.2. The coversheet and records section of the procedure was revised to reflect this change.
Non-Intent change. Corrected typo on Barrier Matrix.
18 02/15/02 All Plan effectiveness determinations reviews indicate the 2, 1 IB, 44 following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP:
Non-Intent change. Changes to the EALs in this revision consist of changing 03-y to gamma in Section 7.0 to ensure consistency with NUMARC/NESP-007, Reg Guide 1.101, and NEI 99-01 rev 4. Clarification to EAL 1.3.3 (containment isolation status also made per this reference.) This standardizes these issues with the other TVAN sites. These changes were approved by the State of Tennessee.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 5 of 49 1.0 PURPOSE4 This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.
2.0 RESPONSIBILITY2'4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). These duties CAN NOT be delegated.
3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4 3.1 The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY:
knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.
3.2 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.
3.3 Classification Determination 3.3.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and CARRY OUT the notifications and actions referenced.
3.3.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.
3.3.3 The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 6 of 49 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) 3.3.4 After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.
3.3.5 IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared.
3.3.6 IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e.,
spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.
3.3.7 IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) at the same clock time.
3.3.8 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.
4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 7 of 49
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1 Interfacing Documents BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause:Analysis SPP 3.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data WBN-EPIP-1 3, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Initial Dose Assessment For Radiological Emergencies CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures SI-4.04, Measurement of Identified and Unidentified Leakage of the Reactor Coolant System 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection From Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.
Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.
ICS Operator's Manual EPPOS #2, "NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.
EPI i18 Revision 18 o
EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART 1,3,4,'
EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 9 of 49 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.8 Turbine Failure 2
2.9 Technical Specification 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
Revision 18 Page 10of49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA-The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED ifthe release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment systems, devices, or material, the failure.
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Pa 1IAof49 EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page IIB of 49 1.1 Ful CladBarrie I
I.Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling Red Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)
RCS sample activity is Greater Than 300 1iCi/gm Not applicable dose eauivalent iodine-131
-OR
- 4. Reactor Vesse.l Water Level
[S Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33%
(No RCP running)
-OR-ý 5, ontainment Rad~ia-tion Menftor~s VALID reading increase of Greater Than:
74 RDhr On 1-RE-90-271 and 272 OR 59 R/hr On 1-RE-90-273 and 274 Potential LOSS Not Applicable
-OR
- 6. Site Emergency Direcqtor J udg me.nt Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4 Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock Red OR Heat Sink Red (RHR Not in Service)
-OR
(<650F Indicated),
[850F ADV]
Potential LOSS Non Isolatable RCS Leak Exceeding The Capacity of One Charging Pump (CCP)
In the Normal Charging Alignment.
OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1
-OR I. Steam Generator Tubeý Rupture I
nPotential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3
- 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level VALID RVLIS level
<33%
(No RCP Running)
Potential LOSS Not Applicable
- 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.
I Not Applicable Rtapid unexplainea oecrease following initial increase OR Containment pressure or Sump level Not increasing (with LOCA in progress)
Potentia LULO 5 Containment (FR-Z.1) Red OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are I NEFFEC==*TIVEI Potential LOSS Containment Hydrogen Increases to >4% by volume OR Pressure >2.8 PSIG (Phase B) with < One full train of Containment spray
-OR 13, Containment Isolation Status Containment Isolation is Incomplete (when required)
AND a Release Path to the Environment Exists Potential LOSS Not Applicable 4.: ContaI~nment Bypass Potential LOSS RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID increase FAULTED outside CNTMT in area or ventilation RAD OR monitors in areas adjacent to Prolonged (>4 Hours)
CNTMT (with LOCA in Secondary Side release progress) outside CNTMT from a S/G with a SGTL > T/S Limits
-OR
- 5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment Not Applicable Potential LOSS VALID Reading increase of Greater Than:
108 R/hr on 1-RE-90-271 and I -RE-90-272 OR 86 R/hr on 1-RE-90-273 and 1 -RE-90-274 1 I-R-0--,-
-OR.
6.Site E~mergep.ncy DirecQtor Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates
.Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.
teCn itin L iste Above.
INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within Ito 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in the absence of a viable success path).
The classification shall be made a soon as this determination is made.
- 1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.
Circle these CONDITIONS.
- 2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING CONDITIONS have been MET.
- 3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the classification flowchart.
- 4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate declaration.
EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier I
s I
N P
R 0
U C
T B
A R
R I
E R
M A
T R
I U
1 Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.
I I
V g
I i
H I
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 12 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1
LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4
Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 13 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identifyv an Event tor purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15%thermnal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure.
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 14 of`49 Mode I Initiatinil/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Radiological Effluents" (Section 7)
Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)
- 1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications
- 2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress
- 4. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:
Sub-criticality Core Cooling Heat Sink PTS Containment Inventory UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or indications for >16 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.
- 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)
- 3. (a orb)
UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety System annunciators or indications in the Control Room for >16 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications for >15 minutes.
- 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)
2.2 Lss ofFnto Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2 3,4 4
ALL Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)
- 1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red
Note: Also Refer to "Failure of Rx Protection" (2.3) and "Fission Product Barier Matrix" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. Shutdown is required
- 2. Loss of RHR capability
- 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant Corrmunication capability (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1.
- 2.
3.
UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX) phones UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones UNPLANNED loss of all radios or B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite Conmnunication capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5)
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
5.
UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX) phones UNPLANNED loss of all Radio frequencies UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4 1,2 3,4
InitiatinglCondition Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Trip Signals 1,2 did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (I and 2)
- 1. (a orb)
- a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red
- b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red
- 2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and decreasing 1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after VALID Auto and Manual trip signals (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required
- 2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not successful.
- 3. FR-S.1 has been entered.
112 Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was successful (I and 2)
- 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or required
- 2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.
Not Applicable Mode 1,2, 3,4, 5
- 2. Fue Clad Degadaio InitiatinalCondition
+
~,.
II-Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrx" Refer to *Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
+
Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Reactor Coolant System specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)
- 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b)
- a. Dose equivalent iodine (1-131) >1.0 pCi/gm for >48 Hours or in excess of T/S Figure 3.4.16-1
- b. Specific activity >1O0/Ej+/-Ci/gm S
Y S
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[FPIP Revision 18 aeL15of49
[EPIPI Revision 18 Page 16 of 49 M7 ode fInitiatincilCondition
- 1*
Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix"
- 1-Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage
>10 GPM
- 1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as indicated below (a orb)
- a. 1-SI-68-32 results
- 2.
RC Idenifie Leaag Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2, 3,4,
- 5 Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matnix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM
- 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)
>25 GPM (a orb)
- a. 1-SI-68-32 results
- Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized
- Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized 1,2 3,4,
- 5 I
I
EPIP-1
[Revision 18
]Page ]7 of 49 Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Baoner Matnx" 1-Refer to "Fission Product Barfer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Baoier Matrx" 4
UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation (1 and 2)
- 1.
Rapid depressurization of Main Steam System
(<675 psig)
- 2. Safety Injection has initiated or is required
- 2.
Tubn alr Moe Initiating/Condition 1,2,3 1,2,3 Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix" 4
Refer to "Fission Product Banier Matrix" Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area containing Safety Related equipment
- 1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following areas:
Control Building Auxiliary Building Unit #1 Containment Diesel Generator Bldg.
RWST Intake Pumping Station CST Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration
- 1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration of the Turbine Casing 2r Damage to Main Generator Seals Mvoue I
1,2,3 S
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EPIP-I Revision 18 Page 1 8 of 49 Initiating/Condition Not Applcable Not Applicable Not Applicable Inability to reach required Shutdown within Tech.
Spec. limits (1 and 2)
- 1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a Mode reduction, has been entered
- 2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement 2.0Saft Limi Mode Initiating/Condition Not Applicable 1,2, 3,4, 5
Not Applicable Not Applicable Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)
- 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature, and RCS pressure > safety limits as indicated by WBN Tech.
Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limits"
- 2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)
I I Mode I
1,2 3,4
FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4
4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4
Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4
Figure 4-A Figure 4-B RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Technical Specification Safety Limit 2
.5 Control Room Evacuation
- .6 Security
- .7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling 5
6 RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 19 of 49 1
EPEP-1 I
Revision 18 Page 20 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): Aplant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure.,
destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
IEPIP-1 I
Revision 18 Page 21 of 49 I
iMode I
'Z I I rnmccw inku A
u P.,%tn nrv,-
InitiatinglCondition Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power (I and 2) 1,2,
- 1. 1A and I B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 3,4 for >15 minutes
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Core Cooling Red or Orange
- b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.
Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes
- 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized 1,2, for >15 minutes 3,4 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)
- 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 1,2, 3,4
- 2. 1A or lB Diesel Generator not available Loss of Offsite Power for >16 minutes (1 and 2) 1,2
- 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes 3A4
- 2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board Initiating/Condition 5,6, or De fuel 5,6, or De fuel Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC power for >15 minutes
- 1. 1A and 1 B 6.9KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (6.1)
UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes (I and 2)
- 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes
- 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 22 of49 r
I Mode 1,2, 3,4 I
5,6, or De-fuel inltlatingiuonaition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix" and "Loss of Function" (2.2)
Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes
- 1. Voltage <1 05V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-1 and 1-11 and 1-111 and 1-IV for >15 minutes Also Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matdx",
"Loss of Function" (2.2),
and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)
Also Refer to "Fission Product Banmer Matrix",
"Loss of Function" (2.2),
and "Loss of Instrumentation" (2.1)
UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of DC power for >15 minutes (I or 2)
0 S
S 0
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U 1
EPIP-1 Revision 18 PEa e 23 of 49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDSand SEJD.wG.MN 4.Fire 4.3 Flam l as 4
.Control Ro~auto
,4.2, Explosion 4.4, Toxn(a4.
Seeurit Table 4-1 Table 4-2,
ý42 SE!) Judgment4 Figure 4-A
-F'gr 4 13 Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5
5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-I Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
[EPE-1 Revision 18 Page 24 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (see EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected. thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (i) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system. or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
j~Revision 18 Page25 of`49
- 4.
Ex lsin I
Initia Refer to "Fission Refer to "Control Room Evacuation," (4.5) or Fission Product Barrier Matrix" FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)
- 1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1
- 2. (a orb)
- a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or Safety Related equipment in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE
- b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the FIRE FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not extinguished within 16 minutes from the Time of Control Room notification or verification of Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)
Mode I All All Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matrix" EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)
- 1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1
- 2. (a orb)
- a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment
- b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response due to the EXPLOSION Refer to "Security" (4.6)
+
UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any permanent structure or equipment (Figure 4-A)
Refer to "Security" (4.6)
IVIoUL All All
EPIP-i Revision 18 Page 26 of 49 TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Unit #1 Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building CST Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1 &2)
RWST Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER H
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Refer to "Fission Product Barner Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrer Matrix" UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within a facility structure containing Safety Related equipment or associated with Power production
- 1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1 Oft triangular Area is
>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within any building listed in Table 4-2.
A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1. Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -1Oft Triangular Area is
>25% (LEL) Lower Explosive Limit, as indicated on the monitoring instrument within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 4-B).
OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite Flammable Gas release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >26% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)
Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" All All 4-Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of systems required to establish or maintain Cold SID (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, dizziness)
- b. Sampling indications > (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit
- 3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.
A. Normal Operations impeded due to access restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS concentrations within a Facility Structure listed in Table 4-2 OR B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the Site Perimeter in concentrations >than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure Limit thus causing an Evacuation (Figure 4-B)
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 27 of 49 All All I
EPIP-l Revision 18 Page 28 of 49 TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1 &2)
CDWE Building Turbine Building Figure 4-B ONE MILE RADIUSlSITE PERIMETER H
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EPIW Revision 18 Pag e29 of49
' **Vw-wA* E L-V viir.Ug IIVII Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barfer Matrix" Evacuation of the Control Room has been initiated and Control of all necessary equipment Has Not been established within 16 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. (a or b)
- a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safety Shutdown" entered
- b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered
- 2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation
- 3. Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels LI A and L11 B Evacuation of the Control Room is Required (1 and 2)
- 1. (a orb)
- a. AOI-30.2 "Fire Safe Shutdown" entered
- b. AOI-27 "Main Control Room Inaccessibility" entered
- 2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 1*
Not Applicable F.--Mae I Mode All All Initiating/Condition I
I Security Event resulting in loss of Control of the Plant
- 1. Hostile Armed Force has taken Control of the Plant, All Control Room, or Remote shutdown capability Security Event has or is occurring which results in Actual or Likely Failures of Plant Functions needed to Protect the Public All
- 1. VITAL AREA, other than the Control Room, has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Confirmed Security Event which indicates an Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (1 or 2 or 3)
All
- 1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA
- 2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA
- 3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a Hostile Armed Force Refer to Figure 4-A For a Drawing of Protected Area and Site Perimeter Confirmed Security Event which indicates a Potential Degradation in the level of Safety of the Plant (I or 2)
- 1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED AREA All
- 2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-3 I
mzw - I EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 30 of 49 Mode InitiatinglCondition Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial Core Degradation -or Melting With Potential for Loss of Containment Integrity. Releases can be reasonable expected to exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.
Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual o rrUkely Major Failures of Plant Functions needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY, Refer to Figure 7-A.
Events are in progress or have occurred All which involve Actual or Potential Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Plume Protective Action Guidelines Exposure Levels.
Unusual Events are in Progress or have occurred which indicate a Potential Degradation of the Level of Safety of the Plant. No releases of Radioactive Material requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.
Table 4-3 SECURITY EVENTS
- a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has occurred or is occurring within the PROTECTED AREA
- b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation that Threatens to interrupt Plant Operations
- c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA
- d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA which threatens to interrupt Normal Plant Operations (Judgment Based on behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence received)
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EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 31of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 4
6
]EPIP-I
[
Revision 18 Page 32 of 49 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine nmback > 15%thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
IIEPIP-I Revision 18 Page 33 ofJ49 Mode InitiatinglCondition Refer to "Fission Product Bamer Matfix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (I and 2)
- 1. (a and b)
All
- a. Ann.166 D indicates "OBE Spectra Exceeded"
- b. Ann.166 E indicates "Seismic Recording Initiated"
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation (1 and 2)
- 1. Ann. 166 E indicator"Seismic Recording Initiated" All
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel
- b. National Earthquake Information Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can confirm the event.
Mode Initiating/Condition All All Refer to "Fission Product Barfier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barier Matrix"
+ Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)
- 1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE
- b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to event Note: Site Met Data instrumentation fails to 0 at >100 mph.
National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additonal information if needed.
Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)
I i
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EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 34 of 49 ia-w i
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-ýB Initiating/Condition Refer to "Fission Product Barer Matrx" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any All Plant structure listed in Table 6-1 resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)
- 1. Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE
- b. Control Room indications of degraded Safety System or component response due to the event within the specified areas All Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER
- 1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)
Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi Wind and Aircraft EALs Unit # 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings Auxiliary Building Control Building Diesel Generator Building Additional Diesel Generator Building Intake Pumping Station Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2)
CDWE Building Turbine Building RWST CST D
E S
T R
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P H
E N
0 M
E N
0 N
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- 1.
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InitiatinqPCondition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrer Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood Warning 4
River Reservoir level is at Stage 11 Flood Warning (1 or 2)
- 1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft
- 2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood Warning (1 or 2 or 3)
- 1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 thru September 30
- 2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15.
- 3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations All All Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations River Reservoir level is _673 Ft (AOI-22) as reported by River Systems Operations I
I Mode All All
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UA b
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-&_ 1 L
- p. cI.
Initiating/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barrier Matrix' Refer to 'Fission Product Bauner Matrix" I..
Reter to "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water (RCW)
(1 and 2)
- 1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has struck the Intake Pumping Station
- 2. (a orbor c)
- c. RCW Supply Header Pressure O-PI-24-22 is
<15 psig JlEPIP-1 Revision 18
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D E
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MEPIP-I1
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Revision 18 Page 38 of 49J FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment 1
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutd0oi Systeis 6.2 Loss of AC (Shwtdown)
.6~3 Loss of DC (Shtutdowrt) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A
ReEPIPIo 18 Revision 18
[
Page 39 of 49
]
DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping. scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
Revision 18 Pag 40of 49
.
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tAFAE ARI.IEEEs InitiatinalCondition 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel with CNTMT closure established (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5) 5,6
- 1. Loss of RHR capability
- 2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718'
- 4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT
- 5. CNTMT closure is established Note: If CNTMT open, refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown (1 and 2 and 3)
- 3. CNTMT closure is established 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs Moue 5,6 or De Fuel 5,6 or De Fuel InitiatinglCondition Not Applicable 4.
Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power for >15 minutes
- 1. 1 A and 1 B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds de-energized for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes
- 4. UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2)
- 1. C and D CSSTS not available For >15 minutes.
- 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board wntaic/odto I
^
A I
-,r rm i
EPIP-1 Revision 18 Page 41 of449 1
6.4 F
Han Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC Power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)
Mode All All InitiatinsluCondition Refer to 'Gaseous Effluents' (7. 1)
Refer to "Gaseous Effluents (7.1)
Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)
- 1. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-1 01 or O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods
- b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capability such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal
- 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or O-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1 -RE-90-60
- 3. Fuel remains covered with water 5,6 or De fuel S
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Revision 18 Page 42 of49 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2
2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC 3
HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment 4
Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash 5
Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown) 6.4 Fuel Handling RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 (Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4, Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A I
=
M EIP Revision 18 Page 43 of49J DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7).
BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION).
CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.
CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).
EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i.e.
within 15 minutes.
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.
EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures required for safe operation.
EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.
FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.
FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.
FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition.
HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.
INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.
INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.
INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization.
ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.
PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.
Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.
PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.
RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.
RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.
SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.
SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power-, (2) Electrical load rejection >
25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.
SITE PERIMETER (SP): Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-Aand 7-A.
STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVAL The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.
TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).
UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.
UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.
VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.
VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be included.
VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.
SPIP-I Revision 18 Page 44 of'49 Mode IInitiating/Condition EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 6000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or2or3)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.
- 2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mremnhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 p Ci/cc at SP
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Fiaure 7-Al EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 600 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded
- 2. Field survey results indicate >100 mremlhr gamma or an 1-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 ýt Ci/cc at SP
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A) t
-Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >15 minutes (1 or2 or3)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded
- 2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded
- 2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma at SP for >60 minutes
- 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose
>0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)
Modej Initiating/Condition All All Not Applicable
+
Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for >16 minutes (1 or 2)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.
- 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for
>60 minutes (1 or 2)
- 1. A VALID rad monitor reading exceeds the values under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the Criterion is Not exceeded.
- 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity
>60 minutes in duration All All All All T
EPIP-18 Revision 18 Page 4 5 of 49 TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS("
1 NOTE:
The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications as displayed on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.
Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General Total Site EFFI
.tCi/s (2) 1.5E+05 1.5E+07 2.5E+08 2.5E+09 Ul Shield Building 1-RE-90-400 EFFI ptCi/s 6.7E+04 6.7E+06 1.OE+08 1.OE+09 U2 Shield Building 2-RE-90-400 EFFI jiCi/s 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 2.5E+07 2.6E+08 Auxiliary Building O-RE-90-101B 4RMI cpm 1.2E+04 1.2E+06 Service Building O-RE-90-132B 4RM1 cpm 4.3E+03 4.3E+05 9.8E+06 V
-4 U1 Condenser Vacuum Exhaust I-RE-90-404A 3PAM p.tCi/cc(3 )
5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+0I 8.83E+02 I-RE-90-404B 3PAM ptCi/cc 5.5E-02 5.5E+00 8.83E+01 8.83E+02 S/G Discharge Monitors 1-RE-90-421 thru 4RM2 mR/hr(4 )
NA 3.5E+02 3.5E+03 3.5E+04 424 (B)
Liquid Monitors n/a
ýiCi/ml(2) 1.8E-05 1.8E-03 N/A N/A O-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm L.IE+06 N/A N/A I-RE-90-120,121 4RM2 cpm 1.OE+06 0-*(l)
N/A N/A O-RE-90-225 4RM2 cpm 9.2E+05 Ji(:I. N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 1.5E+04 1.5E+06 N/A N/A RELEASE DURATION minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary Note:
(1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale.
(2) These releases rate values in tCi/s and ýLCi/ml are provided on the gaseous and liquid release points for Information Only. Actual monitor readings are given in the table corresponding to the monitor forthe four emergency classifications.
(3) This eberline channel reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates l+/-Ci/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceeds 5.5E-02FiCi/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.
(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 6000F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).
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Revision 18 Page 46 of 49 Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTE: The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do Not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of "Site Boundary."
Note: Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.
U
ý
inin~.~i i i' f iilam W51IT oLg q
na..
Initiatinc/Condition Refer to 'Fission Product Barner Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
Rerer ro "-ission Product Bamer Matrix" or "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels within the Facility that impedes Safe Operations or establishment or maintenance of Cold Shutdown (1 or 2)
- 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results exceed 15 mrenmhr in the Control Room or CAS
- 2. (a and b)
- a. VALID area radiation monitor readings exceed values listed in Table 7-2
- b. Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for Safe Operation or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels within the Facility
- 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels Note: In Either the-UE or ALERT EAL, the SED must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other INITIA TING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a DBA).
Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
All All Refer to "Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)
Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel (1 and 2)
- 1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-101 or 0-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1 -RE-90-130/131 or 1 -RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or 2-RE-90-400
- 2. (a orb)
- a. Plant personnel report damage of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel Rods
- b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)
- 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or Transfer Canal
- 2. VALID alarm on O-RE-90-102 or 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60
- 3. Fuel remains covered with water.
Revision 18 Page 47 of49 All All 1"
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E PIP-I Revision 18 Page 48 of 49 Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Location Monitor Monitor No.
Building and Elevation Reading
- 1&2 RE-90-1 1-RE-90-2 0-RE-90-3 O-RE-90-4 0-RE-90-5 1&2-RE-90-6 1&2-RE-90-7 1&2-RE-90-8 0-RE-90-9 1&2-RE-90-10 O-RE-90-11 1-RE-90-61 0-RE-90-230 O-RE-90-231 Note: *These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.
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Auxiliary El. 757.0 (spent fuel pool)
Auxiliary El. 757.0 (personnel air lock)
Auxiliary El. 729.0 (waste pac. area)
Auxiliary El. 713.0 (decon room)
Auxiliary El. 737.0 (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.)
Auxiliary El. 737.0 (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.)
Auxiliary El. 713.0 (sample room)
Auxiliary El. 713.0 (aux. feed pump area)
Auxiliary El. 692.0 (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.)
Auxiliary El. 692.0 (cvcs area)
Auxiliary El. 676.0 (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)
Auxiliary El. 736.0 (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)
Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)
Turbine El. 685.0 (conden. demin.)
2.5 x 103 mR/hr 2.5 x 100 R/hr 2.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mRihr 1.5 x 103 mnRihr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 2 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 2.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr 1.5 x 103 mR/hr I
WBN EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 CLASSIFICATION Revision 18 FLOWCHART Page 49 of 49 SOURCE NOTES Page 1 of 1
- 1. NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, and MC 850321 809004, MSC-00956, NCO 920030366.
- 2. MC-84 0827 005 035A, MCS-2400
- 3. MC-8407 1900 3003, MSC-00701, NCO 920030222 CNTMT
- 4. ANSI Standard N. 18.7-1976 Subsection 5.3.9.3: 01 POI
- 5. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998
- 6. EPPOS #2 Monitor readings and challenges to barriers are provided in EPIP-1, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5), Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, Note 3.
SED duties that can not be delegated. Section 2.0 Responsibility.
Rad Monitors used in conjunction with a plant parameter to determine emergency classifications.
Monitor readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),
Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).
EPIPs will contain the following elements.
Chemistry detection of failed fuel.
Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.