Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revisions
	ML011790073
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/22/2001
From:	Salas P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	-RFPFR
	Download: ML011790073 (139)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 June 22, 2001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority

) )

Docket Nos.

50-327 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT -

UNITS 1 AND 2 -

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISIONS In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP:

Revision 31 33 16 1

Title Emergency Plan Classification Matrix Activation And Operation Of The Technical Support Center Medical Emergency Response Dose Assessment In accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05, only one paper copy of this document is being sent to the NRC Document Control Desk.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J.

D.

Smith at (423) 843-6672.

Pd alas A

Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager Printed on recycled paper EPIP EPIP-I EPIP-6 EPIP-10 EPIP-13

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 22, 2001 Enclosure cc: (Via NRC Electronic Distribution)

Mr.

R.

W. Hernan, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St.,

SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3415

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 31 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY:

J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION:

Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY:

D. L. Koehl EFFECTIVE DATE:

06/11/01 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE REVISION DESCRIPTION:

INTENT REVISION. Revised to incorporate changes from NP-REP, Appendix B, Revision 60.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 2 of 52 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM.) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A.

10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing Of Production And Utilization Facilities B.

Reg Guide-1.101, Emergency Planning And Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing Numarc Nesp-007, Revision 2, 1/1992 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels.

C.

Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPS), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPS), Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRG), Technical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B.

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement one of the following procedures as applicable:

EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 3 of 52 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable time frame (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If. following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

SEMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 i

Page 4 of 52 3.4 Classification Determination (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None.

4.2 Non-QA Records None.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 5 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION Loss of Instrumentation Loss of Communication Failure of Reactor Protection Fuel Clad Degradation RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 RCS Identified Leakage Uncontrolled Cool Down Turbine Failure Safety Limit Loss of AC (Power Ops)

Loss of AC (Shutdown)

Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-1 Table 4-2 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 LOSS OF POWER 3.1 3.2 3.3

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 6 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX SQN EPIP-1 Rev 31 Page 7 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

"TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

'-.ýAULTED:

(Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATION CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and

-onitor alarm/trip setpoints.

ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that

"*--te CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and.relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _>10%.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO 2, etc.)

UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as visible damage.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

I

SQN MODES 1,2,3,4 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX 1~~~

1.

ulCadBrir

1. Critical Safety Function Status Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1)

Potential LOSS Core Cooling Orange (FR-C.2)

OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1).

-OR

2. Prima Coolant Activity Level I

Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not Applicable.

greater Than 300 4iCi/gm dose equivalent Iodine-1 31

-OR

3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average Potential LOSS eater than 1200 OF on Greater than or equal to tXI-94-101 OR 102 700 OF on XI-94-101 or (EXOSENSOR).

102 (EXOSENSOR).

-OR

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level

Potential LOSS iable.

VALID RVLIS level < 40%

on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.

-OR

5. Containment Radiation Monitors

]

Potential LOSS VALID reading of Greater Not Applicable.

Than:

2.8E + 01 Rem/hrOn RM-90-271 and 272.

OR 2.9E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-273 and 274.

-OR Site Emergency Director Judgment

'fAny condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, tindicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier I comparable to the conditions listed above.

I EPIP-1 Rev 31 Page 8 of 52 1

1.

RC are

1. Critical Safety Function Status Not Applicable.

2. RCS LeakageILOCA RCS leak results in subcooling < 40 OF as indicated on XI-94-101 OR 102 (EXOSENSOR).

Potential LOSS Pressurized Thermal Shock Red (FR-P.1).

OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1).

-OR-

-OR

3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable.

safety injection actuation.

OR Entry into E-3.

-OR

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level 0 e*Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level < 40%

Not Applicable.

on LI-68-368 or 371 with no RCP running.

-OR

5.

Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

I Potential LOSS Non isolatable RCS leak exceeding the capacity of one charging pump in the normal charging alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results in Entry Into E-1.

I I

I

SQN 1.3~~~

Cotimn

-are I 1. Critical Safety Function Status EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX

-OR

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen Potential LOSS Rapid unexplained pressure Containment hydrogen decrease following initial increases to > 4% by volume increase on Pdl-30-44 or 45 on H21-43-200 and 210.

OR OR Containment pressure or Pressure > 2.81 PSID (Phase sump level not increasing on B) with no containment spray LI-63-178 or 179 with a LOCA operating when required in progress.

(FR-Z. 1).

-OR Containment Isolation Status S*

Potential LOSS Containment isolation, when Not Applicable.

required, is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists.

-OR

4. Containment Bypass Potential LOSS Secondary side release Unexpected VALID increase in outside containment from a area or ventilation RAD RUPTURED SIG that cannot monitors adjacent to be terminated in < 15 minutes containment (with LOCA in (E-2 and E-3).

progress).

OR

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months secondary side release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube leak > T/S limits (AOP-R.01, App A).

-OR

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment

Potential LOSS Not Applicable.

VALID Reading of greater than:

3.6 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and RM-90-272.

I OR 2.8 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 and RM-90-274.

-OR

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above.

IrIr-i Rev 31 Page 9 of 52 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE:

A condition is considered to be MET if, in the N-judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

1.

In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the Initiating Conditions in all three barrier columns and CIRCLE the Conditions that are Met.

2.

In each of the three barriers columns, IDENTIFY if any Loss or Potential Loss Initiating Conditions have been Met.

3.

COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential Losses to the Criteria below and make the appropriate declaration.

NOTE: MONITOR the respective status tree criteria if a CSF is listed as an Initiating Condition.

I Potential LOSS LSS Containment Red (FR-Z.1)

OR Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TC's trending up).

EMERGENCY CLASS CRITERIA GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two barriers.

ALERT Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.

OR Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.

UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment Barrier.

m I*UL i"il*i IJ I I i-el:l IJ I *;

MODES 1,2,3,4 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 31 Page 10 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 1.

SQN I

I rui

.4 I

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX r'-I-'I1 - I Rev 31 Page 11 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier LOSS OF POWER 31 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

"--.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.2 Explosion Table 4-1 Figure 4-A 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 Figure 4-B 4.5 4.6 4.7 Control Room Evacuation Security SED Judgment Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile Table 5-1 5.4 5.5 5.6 River Level High River Level Low Watercraft Crash Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory "O.DIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2

I I

EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX EPIP-1 Rev 31 Page 12 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as the EAB.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

"TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

_.-AULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and/or heat are observed.

FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that demands will be met by the site.

IMMINENT: Within two hours.

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

INITIATION CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected area without authorization.

ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and

-nonitor alarm/trip setpoints.

4ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that

"-the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required.

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to which access is controlled.

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary and secondary isolation valves.

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Jindicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _10%.