Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) Revisions
	ML011790073
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/22/2001
From:	Salas P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
	-RFPFR
	Download: ML011790073 (139)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000 June 22, 2001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 - EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE (EPIP) REVISIONS In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, the enclosure provides the following EPIP:

EPIP Revision Title EPIP-I 31 Emergency Plan Classification Matrix Activation And Operation Of The EPIP-6 33 Technical Support Center EPIP-10 16 Medical Emergency Response EPIP-13 1 Dose Assessment In accordance with NRC RIS 2001-05, only one paper copy of this document is being sent to the NRC Document Control Desk. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please telephone me at (423) 843-7170 or J. D. Smith at (423) 843-6672.

Pd alas Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager A

Printed on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 22, 2001 Enclosure cc: (Via NRC Electronic Distribution)

Mr. R. W. Hernan, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-3624 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3415

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EPIP-1 EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Revision 31 QUALITY RELATED PREPARED BY: J. Randy Ford RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: Emergency Preparedness APPROVED BY: D. L. Koehl EFFECTIVE DATE: 06/11/01 LEVEL OF USE: REFERENCE REVISION DESCRIPTION: INTENT REVISION. Revised to incorporate changes from NP-REP, Appendix B, Revision 60.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 2 of 52 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides criteria to the Shift Manager (SM.) or Site Emergency Director (SED) to be used in classifying and declaring an emergency based on plant conditions. The responsibility for declaring an emergency, based on the criteria in this procedure, belongs to the SM or SED, the designated Unit Supervisor when acting as the SM, or the TSC SED. This responsibility cannot be delegated.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental Documents A. 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing Of Production And Utilization Facilities B. Reg Guide-1.101, Emergency Planning And Preparedness For Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing Numarc Nesp-007, Revision 2, 1/1992 Methodology For Development Of Emergency Action Levels.

C. Sequoyah Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPS), Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPS), Functional Restoration Guidelines (FRG), Technical Instructions (TI), Surveillance Instructions (SI), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are also referenced in Appendix B of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this matrix is detected and declared. The REP is not activated based on a reporting of past conditions. This procedure will be used in conjunction with the Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix B.

If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications then implement one of the following procedures as applicable:

EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 3 of 52 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS (Continued) 3.2 The criteria in SQN EPIP-1 are given for reference: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM or SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at an appropriate classification for a particular set of circumstances. These criteria apply to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The SED must be aware of the affects of simultaneous events on both units.

3.3 If there is a reason to doubt if a given initiating condition has actually occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications provided. Unless a suspected spurious or otherwise false alarm can be substantiated within an acceptable time frame (based on potential severity of the event), the SM or SED is to proceed with actions as required by this procedure until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

3.4 Classification Determination 3.4.1 To determine the classification of the emergency, review the Initiating Conditions of the respective status tree criteria that will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.2 If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the event classification for the modes listed on the classification matrix.

3.4.3 Declare the highest emergency class based on events that are in progress at the time that the classification is made.

3.4.4 If, during an ongoing event, investigation shows that a higher classification was previously met, then report that, as information only, to the Operation Duty Specialist (ODS) and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

3.4.5 If. following termination of an emergency declaration, investigation shows that a higher classification was met, then report that, as information only, to the ODS and the NRC. Do not declare or upgrade to a higher emergency class if the conditions do not exist.

3.4.6 If conditions have returned to a non-emergency state before any emergency can be classified, then the highest emergency class that was appropriate shall be reported, as information only, to the ODS and NRC and shall not be declared unless it is a noted exception (i.e. EAL 2.3).

SEMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 Rev 31 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Page 4 of 52 i

3.4 Classification Determination (Continued) 3.4.7 The NRC shall be notified within one hour of all classifications. Once made and reported, a declaration cannot be canceled or rescinded even if it is later determined to be invalid. If there is reason to doubt that a given condition has occurred, the SM or SED shall follow indications and proceed with classification, as required by this procedure, until otherwise proven false.

3.4.8 The State shall be notified by the ODS within 15 minutes of any declaration and notified, for information only, within one hour of any classification that was met but not declared as allowed above. If the State is notified of a declaration that is invalidated before the NRC is notified, terminate the classification, if not already done, and report the declaration to the NRC.

3.4.9 The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the ODS of an emergency declaration is considered to be five (5) minutes. This is the time period between declaration of the emergency and notifying the ODS.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 QA Records None.

4.2 Non-QA Records None.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 5 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-1 Table 4-3 Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 6 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK

EPIP-1 I EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 SQN Page 7 of 52 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six which access is controlled.

CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and .relief valves, and other connections up to and including EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the primary and secondary isolation valves.

one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes. RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant the EAB.

equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; potentially damage permanent structures or equipment.

(2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _>10%.

"TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a

'-.ýAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO 2 , etc.)

slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal smoke and/or heat are observed.

operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER procedures are UNPLANNED.

EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this demands will be met by the site.

definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, IMMINENT: Within two hours.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH.

conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

INITIATION CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, area without authorization.

system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and visible damage.

methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and

-onitor alarm/trip setpoints.

VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by

"*--te CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required. exposure to radiation.

I MODES 1,2,3,4 EPIP-1 SQN Rev 31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 8 of 52 I

1 1. RC are 1~~~ 1. ulCadBrir

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status Potential LOSS Potential LOSS Core Cooling Red Core Cooling Orange Not Applicable. Pressurized Thermal (FR-C.2) Shock Red (FR-P.1).

(FR-C.1)

OR OR Heat Sink Red (RHR SD Heat Sink Red (RHR SD cooling not in service) cooling not in service)

(FR-H.1). (FR-H.1).

-OR -OR-

2. Prima Coolant Activity Level 2. RCS LeakageILOCA I Potential LOSS Potential LOSS Not Applicable. RCS leak results in Non isolatable RCS leak RCS sample activity is subcooling < 40 OF as exceeding the capacity of greater Than 300 4iCi/gm one charging pump in the dose equivalent Iodine-1 31 indicated on XI-94-101 OR 102 (EXOSENSOR). normal charging alignment.

-OR OR

3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average

Potential LOSS RCS Leakage Results in eater than 1200 OF on Greater than or equal to Entry Into E-1.

tXI-94-101 OR 102 700 OF on XI-94-101 or (EXOSENSOR). 102 (EXOSENSOR).

-OR

-OR 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level ,* Potential LOSS

Potential LOSS SGTR that results in a Not Applicable.

iable. VALID RVLIS level < 40% safety injection actuation.

on LI-68-368 or 371 with OR no RCP running.

Entry into E-3.

-OR

5. Containment Radiation Monitors

] Potential LOSS -OR VALID reading of Greater Not Applicable. 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level Than: 0 e*Potential LOSS VALID RVLIS level < 40% Not Applicable.

2.8E + 01 Rem/hrOn on LI-68-368 or 371 with RM-90-271 and 272. no RCP running.

OR 2.9E + 01 Rem/hr On RM-90-273 and 274.

-OR -OR Site Emergency Director Judgment 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment

'fAny condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, tindicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier I comparable to the conditions listed above.

I I I

Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above. I I

IrIr-i EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 SQN Page 9 of 52 1.3~~~ Cotimn -are INSTRUCTIONS I 1. Critical Safety Function Status NOTE: A condition is considered to be MET if, in the LSS Potential LOSS N- judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the Containment Red condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within I*UL i"il*i IJ I I i-el:lIJ I *; *

(FR-Z.1) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ). The classification shall be made as OR soon as this determination is made.

Actions of FR-C.1 (Red Path) are INEFFECTIVE (i.e.: core TC's trending up).

1. In the matrix to the left, REVIEW the Initiating Conditions in all three barrier columns and CIRCLE the Conditions that are Met.

-OR

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen 2. In each of the three barriers columns, IDENTIFY if any

Potential LOSS Loss or Potential Loss Initiating Conditions have been Rapid unexplained pressure Containment hydrogen Met.

decrease following initial increases to > 4% by volume increase on Pdl-30-44 or 45 on H21-43-200 and 210. 3. COMPARE the number of barrier Losses and Potential OR OR Losses to the Criteria below and make the appropriate Containment pressure or Pressure > 2.81 PSID (Phase declaration.

sump level not increasing on B) with no containment spray LI-63-178 or 179 with a LOCA operating when required NOTE: MONITOR the respective status tree criteriaif a CSF in progress. (FR-Z. 1). is listed as an Initiating Condition.

-OR Containment Isolation Status S* Potential LOSS EMERGENCY CLASS CRITERIA Containment isolation, when Not Applicable.

required, is incomplete and a GENERAL EMERGENCY release path to the environment exists. LOSS of any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier.

-OR

4. Containment Bypass ____________

Potential LOSS Secondary side release Unexpected VALID increase in SITE AREA EMERGENCY outside containment from a area or ventilation RAD RUPTURED SIG that cannot monitors adjacent to LOSS or Potential LOSS of any two be terminated in < 15 minutes containment (with LOCA in barriers.

(E-2 and E-3). progress).

OR

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months secondary side ALERT release outside containment from a SIG with a SIG tube Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad leak > T/S limits (AOP-R.01, barrier.

App A). OR

-OR

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS

Potential LOSS barrier.

Not Applicable. VALID Reading of greater than:

3.6 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-271 and RM-90-272.

I OR UNUSUAL EVENT 2.8 E + 02 Rem/hr on RM-90-273 and RM-90-274. LOSS or Potential LOSS of Containment

-OR Barrier.

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment m

Any condition that, in the judgment of the SM or SED, indicates loss or potential loss of the CNTMT Barrier comparable to the conditions listed above. I

EPIP-1 I MODES 1,2,3,4 SQN Rev 31 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Page 10 of 52 THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 1.

-- -- -. - -. I rui .4 I EMERGENCY PLAN r'-I-'I1 - I I SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 11 of 52 I

INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.9 Safety Limit 2

LOSS OF POWER 31 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

"--.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security 4.2 Explosion Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Table 4-1 Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-A Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory "O.DIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS

.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPIP-1 I EMERGENCY PLAN I SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 12 of 52 I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six which access is controlled.

CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the primary and secondary isolation valves.

one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes. RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which Jindicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant the EAB.

equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor power; potentially damage permanent structures or equipment. (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _10%.

"TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a

_.-AULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g.,

body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as skin contact (e.g., chlorine, CO 2 , etc.)

slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not constitute a fire.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal smoke and/or heat are observed.

operations, testing or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases at concentrations > than the LOWER procedures are UNPLANNED.

EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL).

UNPLANNED RELEASE: A release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the site to ensure that release has not been authorized by a Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this demands will be met by the site.

definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the DP, (e.g., alarm setpoints, IMMINENT: Within two hours.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

INEFFECTIVE: When the specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED or ORANGE PATH condition within VALID: An indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is 15 minutes from identification of the CSF Status Tree RED or ORANGE PATH. conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indication on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel.

INITIATION CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes.

personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency Plan Classification.

VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in the protected regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, area without authorization.

system, or component. Example damage includes deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, or paint blistering. Surface ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is a supporting document to the Tech blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, etc.) should NOT be included as Specs. that contain Rad Effluent Controls, Environs Monitoring controls, and visible damage.

methodology for calculating routine gaseous and liquid effluent offsite doses and

-nonitor alarm/trip setpoints. VITAL AREA: Any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material which the failure, destruction, or 4ANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that release of, could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by

"-the CSF(s) is under severe challenge; prompt operator action is required. exposure to radiation.

EPIP-1 I SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 I SQN Page 13 of 52 I

Mode Initiating I Condition Mode Initiating / ConditionI Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Not Applicable.

"RadiologicalEffluents" (Section7)and Continue in This Column.

Not Applicable.

On either unit an inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT Not Applicable.

TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4):

1, 1.Loss of > 75% of MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications.

2, 2. Loss of Plant Computer.

3. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs:

3 Subcriticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 4 4. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

I On either unit an UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR Not Applicable.

annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 15 minutes with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or plant 1* computer unavailable. (1 and 2 and 3):

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% MCR annunciators and the annunciator printer for >15 minutes or > 75% of safety 2, system indications for > 15 minutes.

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 3, required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

3. (a or b) 4 a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress.

OR

b. Loss of plant computer.

I.

A. UNPLANNED loss of all in-plant communication On either unit an UNPLANNED loss > 76% MCR capability (1 and 2 and 3):

annunciators and annunciator printer or > 75% of safety system indications for > 16 minutes and plant

1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX phones.

computer available. (1 and 2 and 3): A 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound powered phones.

L 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios.

1. UNPLANNED loss of >75% of MCR annunciators OR 2, and the annunciator printer for > 15 minutes or > 75%

L B. UNPLANNED loss of all offsite communication of safety system indicators for > 15 minutes. capability (1 and 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 and 6):

2. SM/SED judgment that increased surveillance is 1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX phones 3, required (> shift compliment) to safely operate the

2. UNPLANNED loss of all radio frequencies unit.

3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX (Microwave) system 4 3. The plant computer is capable of displaying requested 4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1-FB-Bell lines data. 5. UNPLANNED loss of all NRC ENS and HPN phones

6. UNPLANNED loss of all satellite phones

- A

I EPIP-1 SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 Page 14 of 52 Initiating I ;onflltniof ModeInitiating / Condition Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Cener io in Ti-roducm Continue"Fission This Column. n a. er Matrx ( ecuon 11and trip signals and loss of core cooling capability.

(1 and 2):

1. FR-S.1 entered and immediate operator actions did not result in a reactor power of _< 5% and decreasing.

I 2. (a or b)

a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1).

OR

b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1) r m _ - a Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix"(Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

auto and manual trip signals.

1 NOTE: Although a mode change may occur before classificationthis event will still be classified and declared as SAE.

- .5.

Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing after VALID Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

auto trip signal but a manual trip from the Control Room is successful. (1 or 2)

I1. Reactor power > 5% and not decreasing following auto trip signal.

2, 2. Manual trip in the Main Control Room successfully reduces reactor power _ 5%.

NOTE: Although a mode change will occur this event will still be classified and declared as an ALERT. I Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds Refer to "FissionProductBarrerMatnx" (Section 1). Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (Refer to SQN Tech. Spec. 3.4.8):

1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a orb):

1,

a. Dose equivalent Iodine (1-131)

>0.35 4.Ci/gm for > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or in 2, excess of T/S Figure 3.4-1 with Tave _>500 OF.

3 OR

b. Specific activity > 100/t ptCi/gm with Tave _>500 IF.

- I -===ýW 1.

I trir-E"PIr- I 4

I SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 I SQN Page 15 of 52 I

2.6er RCJSsw IdentfugD!ie IVdIA kg Le Mode Initiating I conaition Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Kererfo Continue ininTisColumn.i

[

This Column. l rfit! IVJac,,A t.ec n Continue in This Column.

.1 __________________________________________________ - .1.

I Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix"(Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Continue in This Column.

- I

-. 5. ____

Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix"(Section 1) and I Refer to "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column.

Continue in This Column.

RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage RCS Identified leakage > 25 GPM.

> 10 GPM.

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Tech. Spec.)

1, 1,

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined > 25 GPM as indicated by (a orb):

by Tech. Spec.) > 10 GPM as indicated by (a orb):

2, 2, a. SI-OPS-068-1137.0 results.

a. SI-OPS-068-137.0 results. OR 3, PH 3, b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM into PRT, RCDT or CVCS holdup tank

b. With RCS temperature and PZR level stable, the 4 (Refer to TI-28).

VCT level on LI-62-129 or LI-62-130 is dropping 4 at a rate > 10 GPM.

Refer to "Shutdown Systems Degradation" (Section 6.3).

I

EI-PI-1 I SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 Page 16 of 52 Mode Initiating I Conclition mocie inlnlanng I %,OnouiOn1 Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrx" (Section 1) and Refer to "FissionProduct BarrerMatrix" (Section 1) and Continue in This Column. Continue in This Column.

-I m

Refer to "FissionProductBarrierMatrix" (Section 1) and Refer to "FissionProductBatrerMatnx" (secion 1) and Continue in This Column. Continuein This Column.

- I.

Refer to 'Fission Product Barrner Matx" (Section 1) and Turbine failure has generated projectiles that cause Continue in This Column. visible damage to any area containing safety related 1, equipment.

1. Turbine generated PROJECTILES have resulted in 2, VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following areas:

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg.

3 Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station Unit #2 Containment Common Sta. Ser. Xfmr's ERCW Pumping Station Condensate Storage Tanks Additional Equipment Bldgs.

UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the main Turbine failure results in casing penetration or main steam system resulting in a rapid RCS cooldown and generator seal damage.

1, safety injection initiation. (1 and 2): 1,

1. Turbine failure which results in penetration of the

1. Rapid depressurization of any or all steam generators turbine casing or damage to main generator seals.

2, or the main steam system to < 600 psig on 2, PI-1 -2A, 2B or 9A ,9B or 20A, 20B or 27A, 27B.

3 2. Safety injection has initiated or is required. 3 Refer to "Hazardsand SED Judgement"(Section 4.3)

EPIP-1 I SQN SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 Page 17 of 52 Mode

.1.

Not Applicable.

4 Not Applicable.

v Not Applicable.

Safety ULmits have been exceeded. (1 or 2):

1, 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS temperature and RCS pressure > safety limit indicated by SQN Tech. Spec. Figure 2.1-1 "Reactor Core Safety Limit".

2, OR

2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit 3, (> 2735 psig).

4

LI-PII-'-1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION Rev 31 I SQN Page 18 of 52 I

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK END OF SECTION 2.

EMERGENCY PLAN EPIP-1 SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 19 of 52 INDEX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2 RCS Barrier 1.3 Containment Barrier SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Safety Limit 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC AZARDS and SED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas or Smoke 4.6 Security Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 SED Judgment Figure 4-A Figure 4-B Table 4-3 Figure 4-C DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Table 5-1 Figure 5-A SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of Shutdown Capability 6.3 Loss of RCS Inventory RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

-. - -. I Irlr-r-E-sI- I EMERGENCY PLAN -1"11"- I I SQN CLASSIFICATION MATRIX Rev 31 Page 20 of 52 I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown or launched towards a plant BOMB: An explosive device. (See EXPLOSION) structure resulting in damage sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons within the EAB equipment contained therein. The source of the projectile may be onsite or violently protesting onsite operations or activities at the site. offsite.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to PROTECTED AREA: The area encompassed by the security fence and to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six which access is controlled.

CSFs; Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RCS: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the primary and secondary isolation valves.

one or more of the initiating conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes. RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is required.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): That area surrounding the reactor, in which the reactor licenses has the authority to determine all activities including RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. For purposes of of a magnitude greater than the capacity one charging pump.

Emergency Action Levels, based on radiological field measurements and dose assessments, and for design calculations, the Site Boundary shall be defined as SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or misoperation of plant the EAB. equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

EXPLOSION: Rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of pressurized or electrical equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback >15% thermal reactor power; potentially damage permanent structures or equipment. (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4)

Safety Injection System Activation; (5) Thermal Power Oscillations _10%.

1,TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the site by threat or force.

'K---t.'AULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (e.g., STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.