Information Notice 2000-02, Failure of Criticality Safety Control to Prevent Uranium Dioxide UO2 Powder Accumulation
| ML003685215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/22/2000 |
| From: | Weber M NRC/NMSS/FCSS/FCOB |
| To: | |
| Burrows S | |
| References | |
| IN-00-002 | |
| Download: ML003685215 (6) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
February 22, 2000
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2000-02: FAILURE OF CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL TO
PREVENT URANIUM DIOXIDE (UO2) POWDER
ACCUMULATION
Addressees
All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensed fuel-cycle conversion, enrichment, and
fabrication facilities.
Purpose
The NRC is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to a problem recently noted with
safety-significant level probes that are not self-checking. A level probe in a uranium dioxide
(UO2) powder hopper failed without indicating a failed condition due to a broken connector in
the level-probe circuit. This allowed UO2 powder to accumulate in a hopper and approach the
criticality safety mass limit before discovery. Recipients are expected to review this information
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
Suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements. Therefore, no
specific action nor written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On August 5, 1999, a fuel cycle facility operator noticed that dry UO2 powder was not coming
out of a granulator while the granulator was operating. Powder was being automatically fed to
the equipment at the time and a level probe was monitoring the powder level in the feed hopper
as a primary nuclear criticality safety control. The licensee determined that powder had blocked
the compaction section of the granulator and an unusual amount of dry UO2 powder had
accumulated in the powder hopper. The powder accumulation was not detected by the level- probe on the feed hopper because the probe had failed due to a broken connector in the level- probe circuit.
Discussion:
A fuel cycle licensee achieves uniform fuel particle size with equipment that compacts UO2 powder into a ribbon and then grinds up the compacted powder. Powder is added to the
equipment from safe-geometry containers called polypacks. A known difficulty with this
ML003685215 Template: NRR-052
2000-02 equipment is that the ribbon of compacted UO2 can jam and block the material flow. The safety
of the operation was assured by limiting mass and moderator in the equipment. Primary
criticality safety controls on mass included operator monitoring of the equipment, an interlock
system limiting the number of polypacks that can be added, and a level-probe in the powder
hopper that feeds the compactor.
An operator assigned to the compactor/granulator equipment observed that powder was not
coming out of the granulator while the equipment was in operation and powder was being
automatically fed to the compactor. The operator subsequently discovered that an unusual
amount of dry UO2 powder had accumulated in the hopper that feeds the compactor. Licensee
investigation revealed that the powder hopper level-probe, which was intended to detect this
type of failure, did not work due to a broken connector in the level-probe circuit. Additionally, the licensee determined that the limit on the number of polypacks that could be added to the
powder hopper was set too high to prevent the mass limit in the hopper from being reached.
Also the licensee determined that required visual checks for powder accumulation were set at
twice per shift without specific instructions on the required interval. Operators were allowed to
perform the checks at the beginning and end of a shift which was too long an interval to ensure
that the mass of UO2 powder did not exceed the mass limit in the hopper.
The primary contributing factor to the event was that the level-probe on the compactor/
granulator powder hopper did not self-indicate failure and alert the licensee to a lost control. A
properly functioning level probe would have indicated the powder accumulation in the hopper
before the powder approached safety limits. A self-indicating circuit would have informed the
licensee of probe failure so that corrective actions could be taken to restore the control.
Additional contributing factors were that the limit on the number of polypacks automatically
added to the hopper was set too high to protect against exceeding the mass limit and that the
interval between required visual checks was allowed to be too long to assure that
accumulations would be seen before the mass limit was exceeded.
This event highlights the need to establish the availability and reliability of safety-significant
controls involving nuclear criticality safety under all credible upsets. Licensees should evaluate
the need for safety-significant electronic equipment to be self-checking. Licensees should also
establish that supporting criticality safety controls will actually perform their intended function.
2000-02 It is expected that addressees will evaluate the above information for applicability to licensed
activities. This information notice requires no specific actions nor written response. If you have
any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate regional office.
Michael F. Weber, Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Technical Contact:
Sheryl A. Burrows, NMSS
301-415-6667 E-mail: sab2@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
2000-02 It is expected that addressees will evaluate the above information for applicability to licensed
activities. This information notice requires no specific actions nor written response. If you have
any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed
below or the appropriate regional office.
Michael F. Weber, Director
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Safeguards
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Technical Contact:
Sheryl A. Burrows, NMSS
301-415-6667 E-mail: sab2@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
FILE NAME: a:\\in2000-02.wpd
- See previous concurrences
OFC
TECH ED
FCOB
FCOB
FCOB
IMNS
FCSS
NAME
EKrauss*
SBurrows*
WSchwink*
PTing*
KRamsey*
MWeber*
DATE
01/21/00
01/3100
02/4/00
02/7/00
02/4/00
02/14/00
C = COVER
E = COVER & ENCLOSURE
N = NO COPY
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Attachment1
February 22, 2000 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
99-33
Management of Wastes
Contaminated With
Radioactive Materials
12/28/99
All medical licensees
99-32
The Effect of the Year 2000
Issues on Medical Licensees
12/17/99
All NRC medical licensees
99-31
Operational Controls to Guard
Against Inadvertent Nuclear
Critically
11/17/99
All NRC licensed fuel cycle
conversion, enrichment and
fabrication facilities
99-30
Failure of Double Contingency
Based on Administrative
Controls Involving Laboratory
Sampling and Spectroscopic
Analysis of Wet Uranium
Waste
11/8/99
All fuel cycle licensees and
certificates performing laboratory
analysis to determine uranium
content, in support of
administrative criticality safety
controls
99-29
Authorized Contents of Spent
Fuel Casks
10/28/99
All power reactor licensees and
spent fuel storage licensees and
applicants
99-28
Recall of Star Brand Fire
Protection Sprinkler Heads
9/30/99
All holders of licenses for nuclear
power, research and test
reactors, and fuel cycle facilities
99-27
Malfunction of Source
Retraction Mechanism in
Cobalt-60 Teletherapy
Treatment Units
9/2/99
All medical licensees authorized
to conduct teletherapy treatments
99-26
Safety and Economic
Consequences of Misleading
Marketing Information
8/24/99 All Distributors and/or
Manufacturers of Generally
Licensed Products
99-24 Broad-Scope Licensees
Responsibilities for Reviewing
and Approving Unregistered
Sealed Sources and Devices
7/12/99 All medical licensees of broad- scope and master materials
licensees
____________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
Attachment
February 22, 2000 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2000-01
Operational Issues Identified in
Boiling Water Reactor Trip and
2/11/2000
All holders of licenses for nuclear
power reactors
99-34
Potential Fire Hazard in the
use of Polyalphaolefin in
Testing of Air Filters
12/28/99
All holders of licenses for nuclear
reactors and fuel cycle facilities
99-33
Management of Wastes
Contaminated With
Radioactive Materials
12/28/99
All medical licensees
99-32
The Effect of the Year 2000
Issues on Medical Licensees
12/17
All NRC medical licensees
99-31
Operational Controls to Guard
Against Inadvertent Nuclear
Criticality
11/17/99
All NRC licensed fuel cycle
conversion, enrichment and
fabrication facilities
99-30
Failure of Double Contingency
Based on Administrative
Controls Involving Laboratory
Sampling and Spectroscopic
Analysis of Wet Uranium
Waste
11/8/99
All fuel cycle licensees and
certificates performing laboratory
analysis to determine uranium
content, in support of
administrative criticality safety
controls
99-29
Authorized Contents of Spent
Fuel Casks
10/28/99
All power reactor licensees and
spent fuel storage licensees and
applicants
99-01, Rev. 1
Degradation of Prestressing
Tendon Systems in
Prestressed Concrete
Constrainments
10/7/99
All holders of operating licensees
for nuclear power reactors
99-28
Recall of Star Brand Fire
Protection Sprinkler Heads
9/30/99
All holders of licenses for nuclear
power, research and test
reactors, and fuel cycle facilities