IR 05000508/1982003
| ML20049K072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1982 |
| From: | Dodds R, Dodds R, Haist D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049K069 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-82-03, 50-508-82-3, IEB-79-03, IEB-79-3, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-09, IEB-80-20, IEB-80-21, IEB-80-23, IEB-80-6, IEB-80-9, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-03, IEB-81-2, IEB-81-3, NUDOCS 8203290374 | |
| Download: ML20049K072 (13) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-
REGION Y
.
Report No.
50-508/82-03 Docket No.
50-508 License No.
CPPR-154 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541
-
Facility Name:
WNP-3 Inspection at:
WNP-3 Site (Satsop)
Inspection conducted:
February 1-5, 1982
/T'
2 4 2.
Inspector:
D.P.tiaift,ReactorInspector
-
/ Date Signed
~
Approved by:
2[2([b
'
R. T. Dodds', Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2 Date' Signea
""
"
"
"
Summary:
Inspection during the period of February 1-5, 1982 (Report No. 50-508/82-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by-a regional based inspector of construction activities including Unit 3 reactor building structural steel and upper steam generator support erection; licensee action on IE Bulletins l
and Circulars; licensee reports on 10CFR50.55(e) significant construction deficiencies; licensee action on previous items of noncompliance and action 'taken on an allegation
,
received by the licensee of inadequate welding engineer qualifications.
The inspection involved 39 inspection hours onsite and eight inspection hours in office by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
!
l l
l l
l l
8203290374 820301 PDR ADOCK 05000500
, _.
_ _.
,
,
..
.
.
" -
- :.
.
DETAILS ~
1.
Persons Contacted The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspection and construction personnel of the organizations listed below.
Key personnel, including those who attended the exit interview are specifically identified below:
a.
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- D. Dobson, Project Manager
- J. A. Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor J. M. Walker, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
- 0. E. Trapp, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- E. L. Stephens, Quality Assurance Engineer
- K. A. Kirkevold, Project Engineering Supervisor b.
Ebasco Services Inc. (Ebasco)
- R. Marshall, Site Manager
- A. M. Cutrona, Quality Assurance Manager
- L. A. Bast, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor
- R. Peck, Project Quality Engineer c.
J. A. Jones Construction Company (JAJ)
G. Wickliffe, Quality Assurance Manager D. Cardaro, Lead Quality Verification Inspeu?or, Level II J. Charboneau, Quality Verification Inspector, Level II 2.
Site Tour The inspector conducted a tour of Unit No. 3 on February 1,1982 to observe completed work, work in progress, and storage and mainten-ance of safety related equipment. The inspector also observed work activity inside the Unit 3 containment dome, application of nitrogen atmosphere to the pressurizer and measurements of dew point, and protection of the Unit 5 nuclear steam supply system components.
The inspector noted that containment spray piping being installed in the containment dome was not sealed to prevent the entrance of foreign material.
The construction manager directed the responsible contractor to correct the situation and corrective actions were immediately initiated.
The inspector identified a concrete repair area that had been chipped to sound concrete and been coated with " weld-crete" bonding agent.
The replacement pour back had not yet been completed.
The inspector had previously examined the manufacturer's data on this bonding agent and the engineer's approval for its use by the 265
.
5 k
,
N a
.
-2-contractor. Manufacturer's instructions require concrete placement within ten days of weld-crete application. The contractor did not have procedure provisions to record the date of application and ensure concrete placement within the ten day period.
The con-tractor took immediate action to establish these checks and issue a nonconformance report on the weld-crete application which was over ten days old. The contractor stated that no other concrete pour backs had been delayed longer than ten days after weld-crete application.
_
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Followup Items a.
(Closed) Followup Item-(50-508, 509/81-08/07) - Failure to Include Specific Drawing in Response to NRC Bulletin:
When responding to IE Bulletin No. 80-11 concerning the use of masonry walls, the licensee had failed to include one of tLa architectural drawings that' had been identified by the engineer as depicting masonry walls. The licensee responded to this omission by supplying the drawing to the NRC. This item is considered closed.
,
i b.
(Closed) Followup Item (50-508, 509/81-12/02) - Calibration of snert Gas Blanket Monitoring Gauges
-
Cgt The inspector had identified that pressure gauges used to monitor inert gas blankets on vessels in storage were not being controlled in accordance with Project Site Proceaure No. PSP-MM-11-9, Rev. O.
The licensee did not intend to apply a complete calibration program to these gauges a'nd revised the subject procedure to allow a limited six month checksfor instrument operability. The inspect'or verified that those procedure changes had been accomplished. This item is con-sidered closed.
'
~
c.
Potentially Generic Issue
-
~
The inspector requested the licensee to investigate whether or not Crane tilting disc check valves are to be used at either unit.
Numerous problems have been identified with these i
valves including failure of hinge pin retention, failure of seat ring retention and fabrication inconsistencies.
The licensee determined that none of the subject valves have been ordered for use on WNP-3 and 5.
This-issue is considered
-
closed.
O
.
$
.
.
-
-
--
-
_
-3-
-
4.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement' Items (Closed) Noncompliance (50-508/81-17/05) - Failure to Conditionally Release Containment Penetration in Accordance with Procedures The inspector had identified failure to evaluate the effect which conditional release of containment penetrations for partial installation may have on completion of the vendor-supplied procedure for resetting the bellows assemblies.
The licensee's response to this item of noncompliance was detailed in letter No. G03-82-055 dated January 20, 1982._ Corrective actions included redisposition of-the applicable nonconformance report and revision of the vendor's procedure to describe the method of checking bellows alignment after partial installation and the method for resetting, if required.
-
To prevent recurrence of' this situation, engineering personnel were
'
reinstructed in the procedures for conditional: release.. The inspector verified the above actions and = interviewed the engineering and quality personnel of the installing contractor to verify that their understanding of the revised procedure coincided with that of the engineer.
This item is considered closed.
.
5.
Licensee Action on 10CFR50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies a.
Linear Indication in ASME Pipe Spool (Unit 3) - Licensee Final Report dated October 29, 1981 A crack-line indication was discovered in the weld end prepara-tion of a 3-inch schedule 40 SA-106 Grade carbon steel seamless pipe spool fabricated for the auxiliary feedwater system.
A liquid penetrant examination disclosed a tight crack-like indication running essentially the full length of the pipe. The licensee initiated an investigation to identify and inspect all piping produced from the same heat of material (Heat No. WE218).
The records supporting the licensee's final report (G03-81-2676)
were examined and discussions held with personnel involved in the dispositioning of this item.
The pipe was manufactured by U.S. Steel at their Lorain-Cuyahoga Works plant.
It had been purchased by Mountain West Pipe and Supply and fabricated by Associated Pipe and Engineering for ultimate use at WNP-3/5.
No other pipe from this heat number was supplied to any other nuclear facility. Therecordsexaminedsupportthedisposi-tioning of these deficiencies as stated in the licensee s
final report. G03-81-2676, dated October 29, 1981.
.
.
-4-The licensee received some additional correspondence dated
January 12, 1982 that included'an analysis of the identified defects by U.S. Steel. Chemical analysis of the pipe showed-it to be within the specifications for ASTM A106 grade B
'
-
material.
In discussing the type defect obs'erved,.the Manager, Pipe Mills Metallurgical stated, "This' type of imperfection typically occurs from a dropped mandrel mill roll.
The stretch-reducing process then tightly closes the ' defect, making it difficult to locate by visual inspection." eThe:
licensee is now investigating this statement for its generic
'
.
implications and the need for more than a visual. examination of this type of pipe, recognizing that it is hydrostatically
,
pressure tested at 2500 psig at the mill. This latest infor-mation will be forwarded to Region IV for consideration. The
'
problem with this heat of material is considered to be closed.
b.
Defective Structural Steel
-
Undersized fillet welds and unacceptable undercut at attach-ments were identified during'the receipt inspection'of structural steel beams supplied by Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), Salt Lake City, Utah. The records pertaining to this potential deficiency were examined and personnel involved _in the evalua-tion interviewed.
Ebasco Engineering has evaluated all of the deficiencies and concluded that most of the deficiencies are within or close to the AWS requirements, Section 8.15 and Section 9.25, and that the deviations were not significant design-wise and, therefore, not a reportable condition.
Nevertheless, CB&I has been required to repair (rework) all welds not in compliance with the code.
Because of this, the inspector considers this item to be closed.
6.
Licensee Action in Response to IE Bulletins and Circulars The review and dispositioning of the following NRC issued bulletins and circulars were examined by a review of associated records and
.
discussion with responsible licensee personnel.
a.
Bulletin 79-03 Rev. A - Long Weld Defects ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Combustion Engineering letter of February 12,1981 (CEEB2-81-032)
confirms the licensee's response dated March 25,1981 (G03-81-853)
that no SA312 or A-312, type 300 series fusion welded pipe was to be used that had a design stress in excess of 85% of allowable stress. This finding was also confirmed in Ebasco's l
letter EBWP-80-557 dated December 16, 1980. This item is closed.
-
l l
..
.
.
_.
.
..
~
-
.
.
- 5-
.
,
.
,
~
b.
Bulletin 80-06 - ESF Reset Controls '
,
_
In a memorandum dated March 26, 1980, R. V. Seidl' stated that the system review of protection and scram. circuits'will
-
include a review of the concerns raised by the bulletin.
The results of this review will be examined during a future inspection by the Operations Branch.
,
c.
Bulletin 80-09 - Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies In the final responses to the NRC dated March 2,1981, the licensee stated that Valtek supplied actuators do"not use the springs manufactured from incorrect material 'and the actuators have been sized adequately using the new nomographs supplied by the actuator manufacturer.
Ame'rican Warming and Ventilation supplied actuators are being subjected to examination and testing and corrective action for assurance of output adequacy.
This program will be implemen-ted prior to the completion of work under this contract.
Confirmation of the above actions was stated in letter No.
69EB80-32 to Ebasco from the contractor dated July 23, 1980.
.
This item is closed.
d.
Bulletin 80-20 - Westinghouse Type W-2 Control Switches In the response to the NRC dated October 1, 1930, and as confirmed in an inter-office memorandum dated September 17, 1980, the licensee stated thet although the W-2 control switches are used, the neutral contacts are not connected to any circuitry, and the problem described in the bulletin is not applicable.
This item is closed.
e.
Bulletin 80-21 - Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcom Foundry Company In response letter No. G03-81-2000 dated May 20, 1981 and as noted in Ebasco's memorandum No. EBWP-81-141 to the licensee, the licensee stated that all valve contractors and subcontrac-tors have been contacted and have determined that there are no valves with yokes cast by Malcolm Foundry being supplied for the project.
This item is closed.
f.
Bulletin 80-23 - Valcor Solenoid Valves The licensee's response letter No. G03-81-840, as supported by Ebasco's memorandum No. EBWP-81-75, indicates that all con-cerned contractors and subcontractors have been contacted and a
.
-6-that no Valcor solenoid valves having part numbers V70900-21-1 or -3 have been used or were supplied to contractors for safety-related systems.
This item is closed.
g.
.Bulletin 81-02 - Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against a Differential Pressure In response letter Nos. G03-81-2666 and G03-81-2697, the licensee indicated that no Westinghous'e Electro-Mechanical Division motor operated gate valves or Borg-Warner Nuclear Valve Division valves in question will be installed, or maintained as spares for installation, in safety-related systems where they are required to close against a differential pressure. This item is' closed.
~
h.
Bulletin 81-03 - Clam Infestatifon 'of Water Systems-Licensee response letter No. G03 81 2206 provides~ansiers?to
~
1 i all the questions raised,by the, subject bul.letin.
In the final analysis, the licensee does not believe that clam ~
infestation will be a problem, principally because the source of makeup and in-plant _ water is from a' system of wells.. This
~
item is closed.
A 1.
Circular 80-14 - Radioactive Contamination of Demineralized Water Systems In memorandum No. E35-JEW-80-636, the licensee discusses how deionized water will be maintained free from sources of radioactive contaminated water, including the utilization of check valves on the outlets to preclude backflow from transfer pumps.
Other measures to preclude contamination were also cited. This item is closed.
J.
CircCar 80-17 - Fuel Pin Damage from Water det Baffle Plate Corner In memorandum No. E35-JEW-80-636, the licensee stated that Combustion Engineering has evaluated and determined that the circular does not apply tc CE reactor vessel internals.
The core shroud does not have gaps or open seams which could allow lateral flow jet-impingement on the fuel rods.
This item is closed.
k.
Circular 80-22 - Confirmation of Employee Qealification Information in the licensee's file on this item was incom-plete.
It appears that action was referred to the Manager, Personnel Programs and was only sent to the several Supply
. _,
.
.
-
.
-7-
-
System sites for "information".
Quality Assurance did have a copy of a memorandum from the Supply System's Manager, Quality Assurance Engineering Systems, stating that their screening of quality assurance personnel working for the Supply System should preclude this problem but requested the site Quality Assurance Managers to submit any suggested changes in policy.
It was not apparent from the infonnation available that action had been taken to assure contractors and responsible site personnel were apprised of the contents of this circular.
This item remains open pending consideration of its applica-bility by the licensee to the site, including construction contractors.
1.
Circular 80-23 - Beloit Power System Generators In memorandum No. E35-JEW-80-530, the licensee stated that it had been determined that the Supply System was not purchasing Beloit Power System generators with frame sizes 5 or 6.
This item is closed.
,
m.
Circular 81-01 - Honeywell Indicating Pushbutton Switches In memorandum No. E35-JEW-81-735, the licensee stated that series 2 indicating pushbutton switches manufactured by the Micro Switch Division of Honeywell Incorporated are not used on the project. The MCS series 10 pushbutton' switches being used have been designed and selected so as not.to be suscep-tible to the failures described in the circular. : This item is closed.
-
-
n.
Circular 81-02 - Performance of HRC. Licensed Individuals While on Duty
<>
The perform'ance of licensed. operators while on duty will be addressed during operator and general plant training according to memorandum No. PFA-35-81-5 by the WNP-3/5 Plant Manager.
This iteni will be examined further during. the review of preparations for plant operations.
~
o.
Circular 81-03 - Inoperative Seismic Instrumentation Discussion of the licensee evaluation of this circular is contained in menarandum No. E35-JEW-81-380, dated April 28, 1981.
Due to the wide variety of failures cited in the circular, no specific corrective action can be taken. A rigorous checkout and testing of all plant equipment as it is turned over to the Supply System at startup is planned. The maintenance program will highlight items that show exceptional high drift or failure rates.
Such equipment will be analyzed
T L
.
.
-8-for cause and appropriate corrective action, including change
'
of design or replaceme1t.
This item will be examined further during inspections of
'.
'
preoperational test'results.
,
~
Circular 81-04 - Role of Shift Technical Advisers
.p.
The role of shift technical adviser and the importance of reported events have been evaluated by the licensee in res-ponse to the circular in memorandum No. PFA-35-81-101, dated June 2, 1981. The licensee does not. plan to use STA since
,
shift operations management will meet or exceed the educa-tional and experience requirements now being discussed-by the'
industry and the NRC.. This item will be examined further during the revies of plant operations staff.
,
6.
Containment (Steel Structures and Supports) - Contract 265 a.
Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedures The inspector reviewed the following contractor work pro-
~
cedures and Ebasco specifications associate'd with structural steel erection and installation.of the upper structures for the steam generator keys and snubbers. The procedures were reviewed against the requirements of the PSAR, the AISC Manual of Steel Construction, the AWS Structural Welding Code, and appropriate ANSI standards.
Procedure No.
Title WE-SITP-102, Rev. 3 Site Inspection and Test Procedure for Welding Inspection WE-SP-107, Rev. 4 Special Process Procedure for, Stud Welding WE-WP-18, Rev. 2 Construction Work Procedure for Lift and Installation of D-Ring Upper Steam Generator Supports WE-WP-11, Rev. 3 Construction Work Procedure for Weld Filler Metal Control
,.
WE-WP-4, Rev. 4 Handling, Storage and Erecting Structural Steel WE-SP-116, Rev. O Procedure for Pretensioning Structural (Commentcopy)
Column Anchor Bolts
.
'
(cont.)
-9-Procedure No.
Title Ebasco Specification High Strength Bolted Field 3240-501WA Connections Ebasco Specification 3240-541 Structural Steel Erection Ebasco Specification 3240-443 Structural Steel The inspector noted that the contractor's procedure No. WE-WP-4, Rev. 4, did not include the requirement for use of a. hardened washer over an oversized.or short-slotted hole in an outer ply.
The contractor took imediate action to incorporate this requirement into the procedure.
Final. bolting has not yet
~
begun on reactor building structural steel.so this' omission will not have any adverse impact 'on.the structural._ steel.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
.,
b.
Observation of Work'and Worx Act'ivitie's
-
The inspector observed the following work'actiivities being conducted in accordance with approved procedures:
(1) Fitup of structural steel members in the reactor build-ing, elevation 395 feet, azimuth 240 - 270.
(2) i.ocation, identification, and configuration of reactor building structural column Nos. CR-16,' 17, and 18 including anchor bolt plans and base plate details.
(3) Storage and identification of reactor building structural steel (4) Field splice connections (J. A. Jones assigned Nos. D1 and DS) on the upper steam generator support assembly including use of proper bolts, nuts and washers evidence of proper tightening and inspections.
15) Completed clip to embed plate welds including size, configuration, and quality.
The inspector noted the use of both marked A-307 and unmarked A-325 bolts for structural steel fitup.
Contractor procedura No~. WE-WP-4 requires that A-325 bolts used for fitup be marked so that they may be removed and inspected for fitup damage prior to being tightened.
The procedure does not specify when the bolts are to be marked and in some cases, an entire
-.
.
-10
.
connection was assembled with pennanent and unmarked A-325 bol ts.
The inspector questioned the possibility that without marking or an inspection hold point, these connections may be tightened without the required bolt irispection for fitup damage.
The contractor took immediate action to require marking of bolts prior to fitup activities.
The inspector observed that there does not appear to be a consistent procedure regarding welding through beam and column stiffener cope holes on reactor building structural steel.
The inspector identified beam No. 411-E-A for which stiffener cope holes had been welded closed in apparent contradiction with the vendor shop drawing No. 411E, which indicated that the stiffener edges should be clipped, implying a cope hole.
Vendor drawing No. IB states that " fillet welds of plate or gusset shall not be extended around corner insite clip.
Fillet welds at clip shall start or stop 0 to.1/4" from edge of clip and may taper at same slope as fillet weld."
Ebasco Engineering personnel are investigating the requirements regarding cope holes. This item will be examined during the next inspection. Followup item (50-508/82-03/01)
The inspector observed an apparent problem with the assignment of Ebasco EMDRAC vendor drawing numbers to Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) structural steel drawings.
CB&I has assigned two contract numbers within the 3240-113 contract, contract No. 3271 to represent reactor building structural steel and'
3272 to represent the reactor building embedment plates.
In many cases, the same drawing number was assigned to an embed plate drawing and a structural steel drawing.. The Ebasco document control organization failed to distinguish these drawings by the preceding contract number when assigning EMCRAC numbers or revisions. The result was that an embedment drawing cculd be superceded by an entirely different struc-
'
tural steel drawing with the same number and vice versa.
Another problem occurred when a revised vendor drawing was given a new EMDRAC number instead of the next revision to the original EMDRAC number. This allows both revisions of a drawing to be in circulation.
Ebasco personnel stopped work on structural steel that could be affected by the first problem described above, had identified 100 discrepancies and had generated a correct list of drawings and revisions.
Ebasco expected to have a correct set of contract 113 drawings to the affected construction contractor by February 8,1982.
Ebasco had also begun a review of a similar contract No. 3240-114 and had identified approximately twelve discrepancies.
Ebasco appeared to be taking effective action to correct these discrepancies and to determine the extent and cause of the problem. The results of these actions will be examined during the next inspection.
Followup item (50-508/82-03/02),
,-
-11-
'
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Review of Records The inspector examined the following records of quality activities for conformance to PSAR, specification, procedure and industry standard requirements:
'
(1) Material certification for steam generator upper support
'
structure piece mark Nos. 216-2, ~ 3 and 4, portions of.D-Ring assembly (material SA-36, electro-slag remelted)
(2) Material certification for steam generator upper support structure piece mark No.164-1 (Nelsonistuds - material A108)
-
-
.
(3) Material certification for steam g'enerator uppen support structure piece mark No. 185-1, portion of pedestal assembly (material.SA-36, electro-slag remelted)
(4) Daily connection logs and associated structural steel erection and bolting checklists for upper steam generator
,
field assembled splice connection Nos. D-1 and D-5 (5) Torque wrench No. TW-1 calibration records for January 18 and 19, 1982 (6) Skidmore-Wilhelm tension indicator No. SW-1 calibration records (7)
Inspector qualifications and certifications for two Level II and one Level I inspectors The inspector noted that the daily connection logs, which list connections inspected are not tied by reference to the erection and bolting checklists, which list the' attributes inspecred, other than by date. This could result in a problem in deter-mining the inspection applied to a particular connection if the two forms become separated.
The contractor committed to develop a numbering system to tie these two inspection documents
'
together.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Allegations of Improper Welding Engineer Qualifications On November 3,1981, the licensee infomed the NRC that they had been contacted by an individual who alleged that welding engineers working for the 251 contractor were inadequately qualified.
The
.
.
f
~
- -. -
.
--
-
-
_
-
, - +
~.
,-
.
-
s
.~
.
,
,
-12 -
-'
~
.
,
< -
,
,
alleger was himself a welding engineer and'had reached!thisl con-clusion based upon a job interview with the 251, contractor. The*
L licensee launched a two part investigation into the allegations:
,
which included a review of resumes and other' software and inte'r-4 >
-
viewswithindividualsfamiliarwiththeweldingengineers[in~5, question. This review was followed up by a review of responsi-
_
bilities and qualifications of the welding. engineers'by a licensee welding engineer. The licensee concluded that there was no. reason to believe that the welding superintendent and welding engineer were not qualified to fulfill their responsibilities.
The welding superintendent is responsible for the qualification of welders and welding procedures and other specialized welding problems. The welding engineer acts more as a technician, assisting welders in the field with technique. The licensee investigation disclosed that the 251 contractor lacks written position descriptions of authorities and duties and written qualification requirements.
The licensee recommended.that these details be established in writing e
and has met with some resistance by the contractor.
The inspector expressed concurrence with the licensee's recommendations and added that the NRC considers these written statements of authority and e
qualifications to be required program elements under 10CFR50,
'
Appendix B, Criterion I.
The licensee will reexamine the con-tractor's response to this item.
Followup item (50-508/82-03/03).
8.
Management Meeting The inspector met with the licensee and management personnel denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on February 5, 1982. ~The inspector discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The findings were acknowledged by the licensee.
l
i
i i