IR 05000508/1982002
| ML20049J880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1982 |
| From: | Albert W, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049J876 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-82-02, 50-508-82-2, 50-509-82-01, 50-509-82-1, NUDOCS 8203290182 | |
| Download: ML20049J880 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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-50-508/82-02 Report No. 50-509/82-01 Docket No. 50-508/509 License No. CPPR-154 /15 5 Safeguards Group Licensee: Washington Public Power Supp1v System P.
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Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 Facility Name: WNP-3/5 Inspection at: WNP-3/5 Construction Site, Elma Washington Inspection conducted: January 1-31, 1982 Inspectors:
fk h
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e W.
G.
Albert, Sr. 4tesident Inspector
/Dat/ Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved by:
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O R.
T.
D o'd d s, Chici
/ Dgte Signed Reactor Projects Section 2 Date Signed Summary:
Inspection during January, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-508/82-02 and 50-509/82-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities, including observations off shift on two occasions.
Principal arers inspected included (1) open items related to shear stud welding and document control, (2) Licensee reported events including repair of unconsolidated concrete in reactor auxiliary building (RAB) (3) concrete placement, (4) welder
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qualification, (5) weld procedure qualification, (6) weld filler metal controls, (7) welding of primary loop, (8)
lay up of WNP-5, (9) nonconformance controls, and (10)
procedure reviews.
The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the principal areas inspected, no items of non-
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compliance were identified.
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$$g3N0182820309ocK05000h0h RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspection and construction personnel of the organizations listed below.
Key personnel, including those who attended the exit interview are specifically identified below:
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Washington Public Power Supply System (Licensee or Supply S y s t e m)
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S.
Leddick, Program Director, WNP-3/5
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A.
Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor
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E.
Trapp, Project Quality Assurance Manager N.
F.
Blaise, Senior Project Quality Engineer D.
R.
Coody, Project Quality Engineer N.
C.
Kaufman, Project Start Up Manager D.
J.
Lagrou, Engineering Supervisor
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L.
Stephens, Senior Project Quality Engineer J.
A.
Vanni, Senior Proj ect Quality Engineer J.
M.
Walker, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
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A.
Bast, Project Quality Engineer
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M.
Curtona, Deputy Project Quality Assurance Manager G.
E.
Ellis, Civil Design Engineer (ESSE)
M.
R.
Harris, Quality Assurance Engineer J.
W.
Hassett, Project Quality Engineer R.
G.
Peck, Quality Assurance Engineer l
c.
Combetstion Engineering (CE)
A.
Tuzes, Proj ec t Manager (Windsor, Conn.)
W.
G.
Douglass W.
Pratt d.
Morrison-Knudsen (MK or 263 Contractor)
S.
Schuerman, Quality Assttrance Manager
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Morrison-Knudsen/ESI/ Lord-Joint Venture l
T.
Baumgartner, QA Audits Supervisor i
W.
Holcombe, Project Quality Assurance Manager
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R.
Lawrence, Project Director L.
Murray, Welding Superintendent J.
Seifret, QA Engineer J.
Sowers, Project Quality Director R.
Tucker, Disipline Engineer i
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J.
A.
Jones Co.
(JAJ)
D.
Cordaro, QV Supervisor-G.
Wickliffe, Project QA Manager
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State of Washington (State)
G.
W.
Folta, Deputy Boiler Inspector R.
E.
Miller, Electrical Inspector II
- Designates those attending exit interview held on January 29, 1982.
2.
Site Tours Daily tours of some portion of the Unit 3 construction site were conducted by the resident inspector during each on-site workday.
Tours during this month also included the non-safety related areas of turbine building e ad cooling tower.
Tours of the Unit 5 area revealed only minor problems with rain water control which were referred to the Licensee.
No items of noncompliance were identified during these tours.
3.
Project Status At the end of the report period, construction on Unit 3 had reached 45 percent completion, the steam generators had been set in final position, welding on the primary loop hot legs was under-way and pulling of electrical cable had started. Sections of the reactor auxiliary building (RAB) walls had been erected to the highest roof elevation (463-feet).
4.
Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies a.
South Steam Generator Sliding Base Plates The replacement of these base plates and governing procedures was previously examined and reported upon in IE Inspection Report 50-508/81-19.
Paragraph 6 below discusses further examination of the plates by a comparison of movement forces between the two steam generators.
On January 22, 1982, the licensee forwarded the final report on this deficiency.
This final report discusses the as-found
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condition of the quertionable base plates which had been re-moved.
The report concludes that the finish of the removed
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-3-plates was such that the deficiency would have adversely affected the safe operation of the plant.
The report was examined by the NRC inspector and found to be satisfactory.
Corrective action involving changes to Joint Venture proccudre FQI 7.2 " Receipt Inspection of Joint Venture Furnished Equipment and Material" was verified.
The item is closed.
b.
Potential Weld Cracks in Embed Plates The licensee submitted an interim report on the deficiency and established a new final report date of March 12, 1982.
The Licensee was requiring further analyses by Ebasco before accepting the "use-as-is" disposition for the heaviest of the plates which had not been stress relieved.
c.
Understze Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Column In a letter of January 7,
1982, the licensee forwarded a report by Ebasco regarding the repair of RAB column B-32.
The column had been fabricated by the Isaacson Steel Co.
This deficiency had originally been reported as a potential 50.55(e) item by the licensee in a telephone call to the Region V office on August 7, 1981.
The report of Ebasco was examined, the repair was inspected in the field, and the disposition discussed with the re-sponsible engineer.
The facts indicate that the licensees'
conclusion that the condition would not have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant and was.not therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) appeared to be appropriate.
Since correction action has been satisfactorily accomplished, this item is closed.
d.
Concrete Consolidation in Shear Wall of Reactor Auxiliary Building In a letter dated January 22, 1982, the licensee responded to questions from the NRC with regard to repairs, corrective action, and engineering determinations for the repaired wall.
The licensee's letter report was examined by the resident inspector and was found to be a satisfactory response to the NRC's letter of December 12, 1981.
In a meeting on February 2, and during a tour of the repaired wall on February 3, 1982, the one remaining concern of the
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-4-NRC was discussed with the licensee.
This concern relates to an area questioned in the draft report of the NRC's consultant (see paragraph 4.2 of 50-508/81-21).
The questionable area is identified as points
"4E" and
"4D" as defined by the grid of test points on the wall.
- The draft report of the NRC's consultant had been previously
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commented upon by the NRC and'thus constituted a second or smooth draft.
Therefore, at this meeting, a copy was provided to the licensee for use in understanding the NRC's remaining concern and preparing a proposed course of. action.
The licensee was not expected to comment on the ' content of
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the report.
5.
Action on Previously Unresolved Items or Items of Noncompliance a.
(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (50-508/81-08/17) Failure to Bend Studs as Required The item of noncompliance related to the failure of stud welders to make test bends in accordance with test procedures in compliance with Structural Steel Welding Code AWS Dl.l.
This code was implemented by MK procedure A.I.15
" Stud Weld Inspection Procedure".
It was determined that the licensee had completed the procedure revision and train-ing of craft, inspection and supervising personnel as stated in the licensee's response dated August 19, 1981.
The effectivness of the corrective action was examined by the resident inspector during field observations as described in report 50-508/81-21 and by examination of a surveillance report of the licensee (Report 263-1108).
Both direct ob-scrvation and the surveillance report indicated that stud welding was being accomplished in accordance with procedure.
However, the surveillance report sampled the activities of two welders which were not included in the retraining records for April 1981.
Subsequent follow-up through MK payroll records showed that the welders in question had been hired and ini-tially qualified after the retraining took place.
To further assure coverage of retraining, the NRC inspector randomly selected eight stud welders designated as SW-10, SW-19, SW-30, SW-35, SW-4, SW-68, and SW-73 and verified that they had either received retraining or had been hired after April 1981.
No discrepancies were found.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (81-08-14) Ebasco Determination of Nonconformances as a Result of Past Work by MK In late 1980, contractor QA personnel identified a problem with the posting of design changes to the proper document.
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Such posting was being done in accordance with references on the transmittal form rather than the references on the change document.
In April, 1981 a region based NRC inspector noted that although corrective ac ion had been taken to avoid recurrence of any problems, spec' ic action had not yet been taken to determine if probleem had occurred in the past because of the system which nad been used.
During this inspection the resident NRC inspector verified that Ebasco had taken the necessary ac, tion to review documenta-tion and ensure proper posting of changes as stated in Ebasco's letter report SRE-81-876.
Ebasco only identified minor discrepancies.
This item is closed.
6.
Setting of Safety Related Components The initial set of the steam generators and the monitoring of movement of the steam generators and the reactor vessel during primary loop welding was examined.
This examination included the taking of field data and the reduction of the data.
Since the sliding base plates under the south steam generator had been replaced because of problems with surface finish (see 4.a. above and 4.b.
of Report 50-508/81-19), the resident inspector examined the comparative forces required for movement of the two steam generators during the setting up for primary loop welding.
This was a means of confirming the movement capability of the north steam generator, the one which had not had its base plates replaced.
It was found that both steam generators moved under a force of approximately 130,000 pounds.
The movement of the north steam generator during primary loop welding was examined to verify data reduction and appropriate follow-up by the contractor's engineering organization.
It was found that side to side movement was being maintained well within the final setting tolerance established by CE of 1 1/16-inches, llowever, in-out movement after depositing approximately 1 1/2-inches of weld metal indicated that weld shrinkage may exceed the contractor's shrinkage allowance and that the final set of steam generators could be under the specified minimum spacing of 387-7/8-inches between the reactor vessel and the steam gen-erator.
The inspector verified that CE and Ebasco had examined the condition and were satisfied. hat additional weld shrinkage could be accommodated by appropriate adjustments in the upper lateral support structure of the steam generator. The inspector has no further questions on this matter.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Welding Procedures were reviewed, field observations conducted and in-process records examined during the month as they related to the completion of welds No. 113, 114, 213 and 214 for the hot legs evanecting the reactor vessel to steam generators 1 and 2.
Procedures and procedure qualifications were examined in the field and also in the regional office against the requirements of ASME Section IX.
Procedures for machine welding were also compared.to those in use at one other site which has successfully completed the same welds with the same equipment.
The principal 224 contract' procedures examined were.
(1)
Welding Procedure Specification Pl-109-1 Rev. 2 (2)
Welding Procedure Qualification Record, P1-109-R1 (3)
Welding Procedure Specification Pl-lll-1 Rev. 1 EC (4)
Welding Procedure Qualification Record Pl-lll-R1 Review of the above procedures by Combustion Engineering (NSSS Supplier) was also verified.
(See Report 50-508/81-21 regarding review of other supporting procedures.)
i Field observations included the comparison of weld parameters against weld procedure specification Pl-109, examination of in-process entries on travelers and weld data cards, verification of qualified welders, examination of filler metal controls by sampling from field to issue room and vice versa, pre-heat controls, and interpass temperature control.
The above items were sampled several times during the report period.
No discrepanceis were identified from the review of procedures or the field observations.
Although no items of noncompliance were identified in the above observations, the inspector found that a hold point (established by a nonconformance report) had.been worked through without established hold point'had been work'ed through without that an the required release from the QA/QC o'rganization.
However, it was found that the physical-conditions for releasing'the work
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had been accomplished and that the requisite sign off.was in process at the time the questioned work was initiated.
Prior to this observation, the NRC' inspector had met with'the licensee and Ebacco to develop an understanding of the nonconformanc,e
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control process, which appeared-to be cumbersome.
Observations
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indicate that-further inspection effort may be appropriate in
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order to determine whether or not this observation indicates in-adequate control of nonconforming items b'y using the Joint Venture's procedure FQP 15.1.
Subsequent to this observation, the Joint Vendure modified their procedures to provide for a direct tie between the work traveler and any applicable nonconformance reports by requiring that the traveler specifically list any limitations established by nonconformance report '
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-7-The matter of nonconformance controls is considered to be unresolved. (Unresolved Item 82-02/01)
8.
Welder Qualification Joint Venture proc 2 dure FEP 300 N Qualification of Welders, was examined against the requirements of ASME Section IX.
The NRC inspector had only minor questions regarding clarification of wording.
Following the procedure examination, the actual records for welder qualifications were examined against procedure require-ments for a sample of six welders known to be working in the field.
The six were identified by symbols T-5, T-8, T-13, T-15, T-18 and T-28.
All records verified qualifications to the extent that the NRC inspector was aware of their field application.
For instance, welder T-5 was known to be working to procedure P1-109 for machine welding of carbon steel and the record confirmed his qualification for this procedure.
The inspector questioned the record keeping method for renewel of welder qualification and was informed that this had also been questioned by the Joint Venture's QA auditing group.
As a consequence, a computer program, based on dates.of procedure usage by welders, was under development.
In-put data to the program will be obtained from weld filler metal withdrawal authorizations on QA Form-035.
No specific problems were evident in the existing system.
The Joint Venture's system for the renewal of qualification will be examined again following implementation of the new com-puterized program.
(Follow-up Item No. 82-02/02)
An examination of actual qualification activities was made in the welder test area used for manual welding. (Note: Machine welding is separate.)
The inspector verified conformance to procedure FEP 300 N and, in particular, the use of a specified test traveler designed to assure the integrity of the testing process.
The identity of three randomly selected individuals being tested was verified against the test record.
Set up and conditions for limited access welding were examined although no limited access tests were underway, i
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Concrete a.
QA/QC Procedures (JA)
The inspector examined and commented upon various J.
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Jones Co. Nuclear Project Operating Procedures (POP-N).
None of the comments were proffered as deficiencies in the
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procedures themselves but rather, as items which provided
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No items of noncompliance wete identified.
b.
Change Control (JAJ)
During a site tour, the inspector noted that replacement shear studs for a vertical section of the south
"D" ring (lateral steam generator support) were one size smaller than the original shop installed and drawing spec'fied studs.
The original studs had been removed in order to facilitate placement of the "D" ring among previously erected rebar.
The Project Change Proposal (PCP) governing this change was examined to verify adequate control.
The smaller size studs had been used because it was necessary to flash weld these studs in a horizontal position.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Concrete Placement (MK)
Consolidation and other placement activities were witnessed one evening during placement 3-ABW-243 at the NW corner of RAB-3.
No items of noncompliance were observed.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph 7.
11.
Other Significant Meetings The following summarizes meetings not otherwise discussed in this report.
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January 6 - Met with Supply System and Ebasco personnel to discuss site nonconformance controls.
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January 11, 15 and 22 - Weekly discussions of resident inspection I
activity with licensee representatives.
January 13 - Met with State of Washington represenatives to examine interfacing inspection activity.
January 22 - Discussion with CE of reasons for lack of
"N" stamp on pressurizers.
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l-9-January 23 - Meeting with Supply System to review entries in thefr
" llo t Line" program.
January 26 - Met with senior management for the Joint Venture to clarify issue of accessibility to in-process date sheets.
12.
Exit Interview On January 29 the NRC inspector met with the WNP 3/5 Program Director and other members of his staff.
The items of this report were either summarized or referenced to the weekly discussions.
The Supply System described at. on-going investiga-tion they were conducting on a welding inspector who may possess a falsified American Welding Society QC-1 Certificate.
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