IR 05000498/1981034
| ML20039A001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1981 |
| From: | Randy Hall, Tapia J, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038D161 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-81-34, 50-499-81-34, NUDOCS 8112160124 | |
| Download: ML20039A001 (6) | |
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APPENDIX U.S.~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV~
Report:
50-498/81-34; 50-499/81-34'
Docket:
50-498; 50-499 Category A2 Licensee:
Houston Lighting and Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted: October 19-23, 1981 Inspectors:
AO ll-7.6 - S l J. 7. JTapfe, Reacft)r Inspector, Engineering and Date MiMrials Secti'tfn n (A.
b 11 - 7 6 - 8 i D.Pyomlinsongeactor' Inspector,Engineeringand Date Ma<.erials Section
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Approved:
1b l( 2.6 - 6 I l
R. E.
lliActigChief,CEngineeringandMaterials Date
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Inspection Summary i
h Inspection Conducted During October 19-23, 1981 (Report 50-498/81-34; l
50-499/81-34)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspectio 'of construction activities i
relative to items reported under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) and to concrete place-
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ment.. The inspection involved 62 inspector-hours by two NRC' inspectors.
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Results:
No violations or deviations were' identified.
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8112160124 811125 PDR ADOCK 05000498 G
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DETAILS-1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- J. E. ' Geiger, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J. W. Williams, Site Manager
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T. K. Logan, Project QA Supervisor - Civil R. R. Hernandez, Supervising Engineer M. E. Powell,; Licensing. Team Leader
B. R. Schulte, Civil-QA Specialist T. H. McGriff,-Civil.QA Specialist-
-D. Teague, Mechanical QA Specialist :
J. A. Thursby, Mechanical QA' Specialist
,D. R. Keating, Project QA. Supervisor
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Other Personnel
- D. J. Harris, Manager, Quality Engineering, Brown & Root (B&R)
- F. W. Rothe.rmel, As~sistant Manager of-Special Projects,.B&R M. D. Muscente, Welding Project Manager, B&R l
The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel including members of~the QA/QC and engineering staffs.
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview.-
2.
Review of Items Reported Under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)-
A review was conducted of Quality Assurance documentation relative to the following construction deficiencies reported under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e):
a.
Essential Cooling Water (ECW) Intake: Structure Gantry Crane Tornado Load
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On May 16, 1979, the licensee reported the failure to properly
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include the effects of tornado wind loading on the ECW Intake
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Structure Gantry Crane.
Table 3.2.A-1 of the Final Safety
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Analysis Report (FSAR) identifies the ECW Gantry Crane as a Seismic Category I structure, and Subsection 3.3.2.1 of the FSAR requires Seismic Category;I structures to be designed to
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j withstand the effects of design basis tornado winds of 360 mph.-
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Contrary-to this requirement, the specification for the design
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of the crane (No. 7P200NS061) did not'specify the correct wind.
load.
In addition to the omission in the specification, the Engineering Procedure for' Design Verification,-No.' STP-DC-015-I, i
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was found deficient in that it did not include structures classified as nonsafety-related Seismic Category I and thus failed to detect the deficiency.
The corrective action taken was'to extend the crane rails so that over-turning of the crane due to wind induced loading would not impact on the'ECW Intake Structure.
The design of the 100-foot
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long crane-rail. structure' extension was~ reviewed during this inspection. Operational limitations ~ have been established which will preclude the crane from being' operated _during adverse weather conditions ~and which will provide for the crane to be stored in a locked position at the end of.the! extended rails.
The action taken to preclude recurrence and to assure that similar omissions have not occurred was to revise the Engineering Procedure on Design Verification to include nonsafety-related Seismic Category I structures and to make the revision retroactive.
Based on the review of the actions taken to assure operability of the safety-related ECW' structure, this construction deficiency is considered closed.
b.
Beam to Column Connection Design On September 24, 1980, the licensee reported that the design of the structural steel inside the Reactor Containment Building was reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).
Reveri-fication of the structural steel design calculations revealed that horizontal force components; such as Accident Thermal Loads, Seismic Loads, and Reactor Containment Fan Cooler Duct Design Pressure Loads, were not properly taken into consideration or were erroneously assumed to be negligible.
The reverification of the calculations stems from a previously reported failure of the designer to properly consider the application of certain postulated loads. -The original notifi-cation on October 25, 1978, entailed numerous examples of design errors involving the improper consideration of loads, loading combi-nations, allowable stresses, and design inputs.' On June 5, 1979, the licensee submitted a Final Report on the Reportable Deficiency Concerning Beam to Column Connections, and on September 24, 1980, HL&P requested that the item be reopened.
During this inspection, a review was performed of the second Final Report Concerning Beam to Column Connection Design, submitted on September 8, 1981.
The review disclosed that sufficient infor-mation was not provided to permit analysis and evaluation of the corrective action as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55(e)(3).
This finding is based on the fact that the finalization of specific design loads, the completion of the reanalysis, and the completion
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of the' redesign and modification efforts have not been completed.
The cognizant licensee representatives committed to submitting a supplemental report once the remaining actions are complete.
This item will remain-open pending review of the supplemental report.
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c.
Vendor Fabricated Structural Steel Houston Lighting and Power (HL&P) originally identified the problem of nonconforming weld conditions and on January 8,1981, reported this to the NRC, Region IV office in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Interim reports were issued by HL&P on February 6 and June 1, 1981, stating licensee's actions.taken and giving status updates.
No records are available on site of the actual inspections performed by American Bridge prior to shipment of the steel assemblies. The steel was ordered to comply with Specification 3A010SS013-G which allows the use of the latest American Welding Socicty (AWS) Code.
The purchase order was issued when the latest AWS Code was the 1976 version.
The various committees which author the AWS Code are constantly refining and updating it to keep it in accord with state-of-the-art changes and current industry practices.
It has been determined by these committees that earlier versions of the Code placed very strict limits on the acceptance of certain weld irregu-larities.
Engineering analyses of these conditions revealed that removal and/or rewelding was expensive and time consuming and that the conditions, if not removed, presented no appreciable loss of strength in the welds.
AWS Code versions since 1976 have relaxed the requirements for certain weld conditions.
The results of inspections performed in accordance with later versions of the AWS Code can vary greatly from those using the 1976 requirements for acceptance.
Since Specification 3A010SS012-6 allows the use of the latest AWS Code version even though their commitment is to the 1976 version, HL&P is currently in the process of requesting a change to their Safety Analysis Report to incorporate the use of the latest Code revision for all AWS welding.
A group of three welding consult-ants, including two current Code committee members, has been retained by HL&P to independently inspect and evaluate the discrepancies noted on the American Bridge steel structures.
This inspection was performed on April 22, 1981, with the requirements and intent of the 1981 AWS Code as acceptance criteria.
The results of this random inspection indicate that on-site examinations were conducted in a manner not in accord with the requirements of the latest version of the Code, but instead used the committed to 1976 version as acceptance criteria.
The recommendation of the three consultants is to reinspect all areas presently marked for corrective work.
It is the concensus of this panel that the use of the 1981 AWS Code for acceptance would eliminate
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dt least 90% of the conditions marked for rework without compromising the structural integrity of the beams, columns, and trusses.
If previous Brown & Root inspections had been performed to the present
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acceptance criteria, the 995 NCRs issued for these structures through August 1,1981, would have been reduced by about 90L From this it can be seen that if the origincl American Bridge inspections and Brown & Root surveillances had been conducted in accordance with the 1981 Code version, very few questions would have been generated con-cerning weld integrity or the relevant inspection and surveillance programs. ~ The NRC inspector who is cognizant of this situation examined approximately 100 welds in the storage yard and 500 welds on beams and columns already installed in the upper portions of MEAB No. 1 and Fuel Handling Building No. 1.
Due to the location of the installed roof beams, it was not practical to attempt to accurately tabulate the conditions noted, but it appeared to the NRC inspector that welds on the installed beams were similar to those in the storage yard.
All of the discrepancies on installed and stored beams appeared similar in nature and severity.
B&R has finished a comprehensive program of reinspection for 1000 beams, columns, and trusses, but the results have not been compiled and analyzed. The number of welds to be included in the reinspection report will far exceed the 1000 number as each structural member includes a varying number of welds.
During the reinspection program, approxicately 995 NCRs were written to document deficiences noted on American Bridge steel, 268 of which applied directly to steel already installed.
Of the 1000 beams inspected, 270 had been installed.
A comparison of the total number of inspections (1000) with the total number of NCRS (996) and the installed beams inspected (270) with the number of NCRs against them (268) leads ~to the conclusion that similar conditions exist.
This comparison also indicates that the inspection and acceptance criteria were the same for both phases of the reinspection.
This item will remain open until the Safety Analysis Report change is made, and the documented weld discrepancies are dispositioned.
3.
Concrete Placement Activities The NRC inspector observed preplacement activities for three scheduled concrete placements.
These placements are Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building (RCB) Dome Lift R3, Unit 2 RCB Wall Lift 11, and the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Building Mat.
The dome placement is the last placement planned under the Complex Concrete Restart Program..The proposed place-ments were observed for state of cleanliness, general layout of tremies, arrangement of required lighting, weather protection, and provisions for the prevention of voids. All observations were consistent with standard nuclear industry practice for the successful placement of concrete.
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preplacement surveillance of the dome placement also included verification
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of the tendon sheathing location and of the construction drawing used.
No violations or deviations were identified during this portion of the inspection.
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4.
Exit Interview.
The NRC. inspectors met with the licensee representatives' denoted in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.
The NRC inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
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