IR 05000498/1981031
| ML20031H470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1981 |
| From: | Randy Hall, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031H464 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-81-31, 50-499-81-31, NUDOCS 8110270514 | |
| Download: ML20031H470 (4) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report: 50-498/81-3'!; 50-499/81-31 Dockets: 50-498; 50-499 Category A2 Licensee: Houston Lighting and Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility M ra: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection conducted: September 8-11, 1981 Inspector:
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10 - ( - O g D. P. Tomi on, Reacthf Inspector, Engineering and Materials Date Section Approved:
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h lo - 1 - B t R.-E. Hall ting Chief ()Enginee?ing and Materials Section Date Inspection Summary _
Inspection on September 8-11, 1981 (Report 50-498/81-31;50-499/81-31)
Areas Inspected: Unannounced follow-up inspection of construction activities including inspection of representative procedures and records; visual inspection of vendor-supplied structural members; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 21 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- J. W. Williams, Site Manager J. E. Geiger, Site QA Manager
- D. R. Keating, Project QA Supervisor Other Personnel
- J. Thompson, Site Manager, Brown & Root (B&R)
A. Smith, Project QA Manager, B&R
- F. Rothermel, Assistant Project Manager, B&R J. Adkins, Assistant QC Manager, B&R
- D. Harris, Management Analysis Corporation
- R. Deutschman, Management Analysis Corporation
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview.
2.
Review of Structui i Steel Welding IE Inspection Report 81-30 identified an unresolved item relative to nonconforming conditions on American Bridge structural steel received on site. On January 8,1981, Houston Lighting & Power Company (:lL&P)
reported these conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). An HL&P memo, dated January 12, 1981, stated that the nonconformances consisted of undercutting and undersized welds that could possibly compromise the structural integrity of the steel.
The first interim report from HL&P was issued on February 6, 1981, confirming the conditions and stating that a reinspection prograni had been initiated.
It further stated that a 100% surveillance inspection of welded material received from American Bridge would be performed consistent with AWS Dl.1 prior to any further shipment of Category I structural steel components. As of February 6, 1981, a total of 40 nonconformance reports (NCRs) had been evaluated representing 31 beams and columns installed in Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building (MEAB) No. 1.
The nonconformances documented were predominantly minor undercutting and locally undersized welds. HL&P further added that, although the 40 NCRs documented violations of design drawings and/or AWS Dl.1 requirements, no safety hazard was identified relative to these nonconforming weld conditions.
On June 1, 1981, HL&P issued their second interim report stating that tne reinspection prtsgram was continuing and that NCRs bad been written for each of the nonconformances identified. An engineering analysis of the discrepant ccnditions identified nothing that would represent a failure condition. This report also stated that a group of three independent welding consult:nts, including active AWS Code commitree members, had inspected a rardom sample of the welds rejected by the reinspection program.
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The report written by the consultants, dated April 23, 1981, stated that the Quality Control acceptance criteria implemented at STP were more stringent than those required by the AWS Code. The consultants added that most of the repairs they observed were needless and suggested that they be stopped with the exception of possible weld metal addition to increase the size of some fillet welds and to correct undercut.
At the time this purchase order was placed, the AWS Dl.1 Code in effect was the 1976 version. Specification 3A010SS012-G, however, allows the use of the latest Code issue.. The latest, or 1981, version has more liberal and realistic requirements for weld dimensions, undercut and visual acceptance.
It was the opinion of the consultant panel that if the 1981 AWS Dl.1 Code were applied for weld acceptance, the anticipated rework would be reduced by at least 90% witSout compromising the safety of the structures.
The NRC inspector, accompanied by representatives of B&R and HL&P, toured the lay-down area where the discrepant beams, columns, and trusses we n being stored. His examination of approximately 100 randomly selected welds, which had already been reinspected and marked for repairs, revealed no major or serious structural deficiencies. This inspection was performed with the 1981 AWS Code requirements as the acceptance criteria.
Four fillet welds were found to have an undersized leg dimension in excess of the allowable 10% of the total weld length.
One weld was also found to have excessive undercut at one toe of the weld. The NRC inspector later toured the construction area and visually examined approximately 500 addi-tional welds on beams installed in the upper portions of MEAB No.1 and Fuel Handling Building No. 1.
This examination also was made with the 1981 AWS Code requirements as acceptance criteria. Due to the location of the installed roof beams, it was not practical to attempt to accurately tabulate the conditions noted. All conditions noted on the installed beams were similar in nature and magnitude to those on the beams in the storage area.
B&R issued Procedure ST-QAP 10.5, " Reexamination of Vendor Performed AWS Dl.1 Welds," on June 2,1981, in which acceptance criteria were established for the re-examination program.
Revision 1 to ST-QAP-10.5 was issued on July 29, 1981, in which these criteria were further defined and brought into accord with the 1981 version of AWS Dl.l.
Currently under review is a proposed SAR change which would invoke the 1981 Code for the inspection of all AWS welding.
The matter of the American Brioge structural steel welds was directed to the NRC ;hrough a letter from a representative of an intervenor group to the Region IV Investigative Staff, dated September 2,1981. As stated earlier, this matter was reported by the licensee on January 8,1981, i
under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
Licensee actions between the time of this notification and receipt of the intervenor's letter appear to be consistent with NRC requirements and licensee commitments.
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Pending an SAR change or other licensee actions to permit use of acceptance criteria from the 1981 version of AWS Dl.1, this matter will remain unresolved.
3.
Site Tour The NRC inspector walked through various areas of the site to observe construction activities and to inspect general housekeeping. The tour included Reactor Building No.1, MEAB No.1, Fuel Handling Building No.1, several storage areas, and areas of the Essential Cooling Water (ECW)
piping excavations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. One unresolved item, as identified in IE Inspection Report No. 81-30, is discussed in paragraph 2.
5.
Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on September 10, 1981. The scope and findings of this inspection were discussed at the meeting.
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