IR 05000498/1981030
| ML20031C995 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1981 |
| From: | Crossman W, Phillips H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031C976 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-81-30, 50-499-81-30, NUDOCS 8110090191 | |
| Download: ML20031C995 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE Of INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-498/81-30; 50-499/81-30 Docket No. 50-498; 50-499 Licensee: Houston Lighting and Power Company Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas HL&P Licensing, Clinton Drive, Houston, Texas HL&P Quality Assurance, Baybrook Office, Houston, Texas Inspection Conducted: August 1981 r
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S'. Phi' li'ps, Resident Reactor Inspector Date Project Section No. 3 Approved:
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W. A. Crossman, Chief, Project Section No. 3 Date Inspection Summary:
Inspection of August 1981 (Report No. 50-498/81-30; 50-499/81-30)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection by the Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI) included independent inspection; follow-up inspections of unresolved items; materials; safety-related concrete; safety-related structural welding.
The inspection involved fifty-three inspection-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
8110090191 810918 PDR ADOCK 05000498 l.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- R. A. Frazar, Manager Quality Assurance (QA)
- J. E. Geiger, Project QA Manager
- L. R. Jacobi, Jr., Licensing
- T. J. Jordan, Supervisor, Quality Systems
- M. E. Powell, Licensing
The PRI also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel including members of the eng o eering and ^.VQC staffs.
- Denotes attendance at the management meetings.
2.
Licensee Action on Show Cause Order, April 30, 1,9,8_0_
(0 pen) Show Cause Order, Item V.A.(1): Management Consultant Review.
HL&P Management of Program to Control All Aspects of the South Texas Project; Revision of Organizational Respc'1sibilities te Control the Design, Procurement and Construction Activities of the Limosee's Prime Contractor, Brown & Root, Inc. (B&R) and HL&P Overal? :lesponsi-bility for QA/QC Program.
(0 pen) Show Cause Order, Item V.A.(9): The Licensee Shall Develop and Implement an Impreved Audit System.
The RRI has performed follow-up inscection on the above items for a year or more. The licensee has fully implemented commitments regard-ing these items where the actior depended on HL&P initiatives.
During the same review period, the RRI determined that B&R met most of the commitments regarding the above items, however, NRC Reports 80-18 and 81-07 documented instances where corrective action was not adequate or conmitments were not adequately implemented.
The findings in Report No. 80-18 were subsequently resolved, but findings in NRC Report 81-07 have not been resU ed.
On August 25, 1981, the RRI reviewed the HL&P Houston Audit No. HBR-43, dated July 24, 1981, and it indicated that B&R has been unable to correct audit deficiencies in HL&P Audit Nos. BR-31, BR-34, BR-35 and BR-38, which deal with organization problems.
Due to the length of time that these problems have been open indicates that B&R ability to take effective and timely corrective action is still a major problem.
Brown & Root organization and procedures are still in a state of flux.
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The RRI discussed this with the Houston QA Manager and the new HL&P QA Manager of South Texas Project, who'was assigned on site in June 1981. These deficiencies have been recognized and the QA Manager,
at site, in coordination with the Houston QA Manager, has developed a new HL&P corrective action system which will proceed to stopping work if nonconformance, corrective action and audit report findings are not corrected and/or responded to within a specified time frame.
The RRI will continue to track progress on this item during future inspections.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (498/81-01-04): Centrifugal Charging Pumps Not Properly Protected.
The RRI reviewed the pump vendor report which documented the disassembly and inspection of centrifugal charging, positive displacement, reactor coolant purification and refueling pumps and motors. Sandblast material and dust had not entered bearings or other parts of the e;,uipment.
NCR No. SG002691 demonstrated that proper corrective action had been taken and instructions have been clarified as to whom similar NCRs should be directed in the future.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (498/81-01-06; 499/81-01-06):
Control of Westinghouse (W) Nonconformances.
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The RRI was originally informed that B&R nonconformances relating to W contingencies on W furnished equipment would be transferred out of
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_ Since W did not have an NCR system on site, the the B&R system to W.
RRI questioned the transfer and interpretation of these nonconformances and insisted that the contingencies should be handled under a controlled system.
The licensee has placed the contingencies under a controlled system described in Temporary Waiver Requests Procedure ST-QAP-15.5 approved on August 11, 1981.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (498/81-01-08; 499/81-01-08):
B&R Organization Charts Showed Positions Not Described in Maintenance Procedure GCP-35.
The RRI reviewed a current organization chart against Permanent Plant Maintenance Procedure GCP-35, Revision 4, May 15,1981.
The two docu-ments were found to be consistent.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (498/81-01-09); 499/81-01-09):
Functions Performed by S&M Technicians.
At the time that this item was identified, the RRI was told that these technicians performed some safety related functions that were not described in an earlier revision of GCP-35.
During a subsequent follow-up inspection, the RRI was told that they do not perform any safety related functions.
The licensee performed review of work activity and determined that they do not perform safety related functions.
This item is closed.
4.
Observatior, of Safety Related Concrete Activities The RRI observed selected preplacement work activities on concrete placement CS1-R1, elevation 155'-00" to 161'-10\\".
Prior to the pour, No.11 vertical and horizontal reinforcement bars and tendon sheathing were randomly selected for inspection to determine if they
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were properly spaced and/or located.
The randomly selected items were measured with a measuring tape.
Approximately 6 vertical and 6 hori-zontal reinforcement bars were checked for proper spacing at each location, Azimuth 50 degrees and at Azimuth 265 degrees.
The same reinforcement bars were checked to assure proper distance from the reactor containmer.t steel liner at Azimuth 310 degrees and at Azimuth 0 degrees.
Eight vertical tendon sheaths were checked for proper location at Azimuth 165 degrees.
Trumplet assemblies were inspected to assure that sheathing was properly tied into the trumplet assembly located between Azimuth 195 degrees to 310 degrees.
The RRI reviewed PRESCON Inspection, STP 70-70, of the tendon system installation.
The inspection documented proper installation of this system.
The RRI contacted the B&R area engineer to jointly review B&R Drawing No. VTD 3, dated August 4, 1981, and Drawing No. 2-C-22(1-C-10340, revised December 1, 1978).
Both drawings were released for construction on August 4, 1981.
The location and spacing of items shown above were compared to these drawings and were within tolerances specified.
On August 13, 1981, the RRI reviewed testing being performed by Pittsburg Test lab (PTL) personnel at the point where the trucks discharged con-crete into the hoppers and was being pumped through slicklines to the point of placement.
Slump and air content tests were within the specified range for batch ticket Nos. 53268, 53260, 53255, 53253, and 53249.
A correlation sample was taken on batch ticket No. 53260.
While observing concrete placement activities, the RRI observed another correlation sample being taken at the point of placement.
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The RRI observed placement activities around the entire circumference of the dome.
Inspection personnel, supervisory personnel, and area engineers were observed.
In addition, all backup equipment and lighting were in place or available.
The placement activities were observed and were accomplished in accordance with Concrete Procedure CCP-25, Revision 4, dated November 3, 1980.
The RRI observed a batch, ticket No. 53305, being loaded into truck 71.
The ticket was reviewed to determine the proper design mix.
A PTL inspector was checking batches made by Champion Company personnel who operate the batch plant.
His inspection indicated that the operation was proper.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Review of Structural Steel Welding Repairs On January 8,1981, HL&P reported construction daficiencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) relative to deficiencies on American Bridge Struc-tural Steel received on site.
B&R inspection identified welding deficien-cies that occurred at the vendor's plant.
B&R inspection personnel proceeded to identify defects on several hundred beams and several hundred nonconformance reports were identified since a nonconformance report was generated on each beam rather than listing all beams on ane NRC.
On July 7,1981, the RRI determined that some controversy between engineering and inspection pe'rsonnel existed relative to reinspection criteria.
Apparently, the engineers were focusing on inspecting known structural defects and inspectors were concerned that their inspection must be to the original inspection criteria specified by the Code or appropriate justification and changes must occur in the pro-cedures, specifications and/or applicable commitments made to the NRC.
The HL&P QA personnel assured the RRI that this issue was abeing resolved with appropriate B&R personnel.
The RRI stated that the NRC would inspect these items during a future inspection in accordance with MS D1.1 inspection criteria and a violation would be identified i f necessary.
On August 22, 1981, the RRI determined that HL&P and B&R QA/ Engineering personnel had agreed on inspecting in accordance with B&R " Reexamination of Vendor Performed Structural Welds", ST-QAP-10.5 which became effective on August 10, 1981.
It appears that engineerirg personnel precluded reexamining some inspection characteristics or criteria as allowed by the AW5 01.1 Code.
This matter is unresolved pending review of the quality assurance / control, engineering actions, and follow-up impection of these items.
(498/81-30-01; 499/81-30-01)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Site Tours The RRI performed independent inspections during s*te tours of all Stor ige and Laydown Areas and Warehouse D.
No viciations or deviations were identifieo.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required ir order to ascertain whetl.er they are acceptable items, violations, or
deviations.
One unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is l
discussed in paragraph 5.
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Management Meetings l
The RR1 met with one or more of the persons identified in paragraph 1 on l
August 21 and 26, 1981 to discuss inspection findings and to discuss licensee actions and positions.
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