IR 05000460/1982001
| ML20041F451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1982 |
| From: | Dodds R, Toth A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041F441 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-460-82-01, 50-460-82-1, 50-513-82-01, 50-513-82-1, NUDOCS 8203160515 | |
| Download: ML20041F451 (13) | |
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. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
50-4
_,o2-01 Report No. 50-513/82-01 Docket No. 50-460/513 License No.
CPPR-134/174 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Supply System P.
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Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project Nos. 1/4 (WNP-1/4)
Inspection at: WNP-1/4 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
January 1-15, 1982 Inspectors:
hi A.
D.
Toth, Senior Resident Inspector Ddte Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved by:
K.
1.
Dodds, (,;11101
/ Date Signed Reactor Construction Projects Section 2 Date Signed Summary:
Unit #1:
Inspection January 1-15, 1982 (Report No. 50-460/
82-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of reactor coolant loop piping and welding, containment penetrations (pipe), and follow-up on an unusual flooding event.
The inspection involved 38 inspector-hours on-site by the senior resident inspector.
Results: One item of noncompliance was identified relative
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to reactor coolant loop piping welding transitions.
,U n i t #4:
Inspection January 14, 1982 (Report No. 50-513/
82-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of thc status of the containment and general service building and equipment which are in a deferred construction mode.
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RV Form 219 (2)
8203160515
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The inspection involved 2 inspector-hours on-site by the senior resident inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
s Washington Public Power Supply System
- C.
R.
Edwards, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- F.
C.
Hood,. Manager of Construction & Industrial Safety
- R.
F.
Lewis, Resource Manager
- C.
B.
Organ, Assistant Program Director, Engineering
- M.
E.
Rodin, quality Compliance Senior QA Engineer United Engineers and Constructors
- G.
L.
Faust, Field Superintendent, Quality Assurance J.. Feil, Quality Assurance Engineer
- E.
C.
Haren, Project Quality Assurance Manager Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)
W.
R.
Clayton, Quality Control Supervisor, Mechanical A.
J.
Curtis, Construction Superintendent
- T.
F.
Fallon, Project Field Quality Control Engineer
- J.
B.
Gatewood, Project Field Quality Assurance Engineer
- D.
R.
Johnson, Manager of Quality
- J.
C.
Kotler, Contracts Coordinator
- J.
L.
Rudd, Quality Assurance Engineer J.
A.
Jones Construction Company
- C.
E.
Anderson, Assistant Project-Quality Assurance Manager J.
E.
Bott, Welding Engineer, Containment
- J.
R.
Cortez, Project Manager J.
Dale, Quality Verification Lead Inspector, Containment
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R.
Harrington, Supervisor, Work Package Control, GSB Area D.
Higginbotham, Senior Quality Assurance Supervisor D.
King, Senior Quality Assurance Supervisor
- W.
Roe, Quality Assurance Manager W.
Roweley, Field Engineer, Containment R.
Tanner, Engineering Manager H.
S. Wellenbrock, QA Supervisor, Special Projects P.
Zaludil, Field Engineer, Containment J.
Zizak, Quality 7..rification Supervisor Foley, Wismer & Becker Company
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P.
Merlin, Quality Control Supervisor
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Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and' Insurance Company J.
L. Densley, Authorized Inspector'and Coordinator D.
Howland, Authorized Inspector
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Other General Contacts and Notes i
In addition to the persons ident'ified_above, thefinspector interviewed personnel from the construction, engineering, and quality control site contractor organizations.
He inter-viewed various craft and supervision who were present in the work areas during the inspection activities, or who had visited the inspectors office.
- Denotes personnel present at the exit management meeting.
2.
General
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The resident inspector was on-siteJJanuary 4-8, and 11-15.
During this period, the inspector performed routine examina -
tions of activities, including plant tours, record reviews, and interview of personnel.
He interviewed several craft and inspection individuals regarding their quality concerns and the applicability of NRC regulations.
No significant issues were identified which were not already being addressed by the " Hotline" program or contractor management internal corrective actions programs.
An NRC regional office inspector was on-site the week of January 18.
His activities are documented in a separate inspection report.
3 '.
Significant Personnel Changes Noted J. A. Jones announced that the Quality Assurance Manager (Mr.
W.
Roc) plans to move to the corporate office by Feb-ruary 1, and Mr.
R.
Wilson would assume the site QA Manager position.
Foley, Wismer and Becker announced that the Quality Manager Supervisor-(Mr.. Paul Merlin) would be leaving the company.
Initially, the position would remain vacant, with site QC/QA personnel reporting directly to the site QA manager.
4.
Unit #4~ Status On January 15, 1982, the WPPSS Managing Director introduced his formal recommendatlon to the Board of Directors to set January 22, 1982 as a termination date for the WNP-4 project.
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Lack of sufficient financial support for the temporary sus-pension _(mothballing) has been defined as the basis for termination procedings.
Future inspection activities at the WNP-4 facilities will be related to' assuring the licensee maintains a program to provide for possible future utiliza-tion'of equipment and materials and the potential resumption-of construction activities by someone other than the Supply System.
5.
Unit #4 Layup The inspector toured the Unit #4 general services building and containment areas.
This included the arens of the two installed diesel generators, the two decay heat removal pumps, two containment spray pumps, and two auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The facilities were clean with little if any fire hazards and water lines appeared to have been drained to prevent freezing and flooding.
Measures were underway to improve access control, including plans for door / locks.
The inspector observed coverings over equipment and indicator lighting for heaters.
He interviewed the Bechtel maintenance supervisor, who described his staff's routine inspection efforts; these include general surveillences and punch-card directed meggering, shaft rotations, and lubrication of equipment.
The inspector identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
6.
Reactor Coolant Loop Pipe Welding Activities The inspector noted that the'large bore NSSS piping between the reactor-vessel / pumps / heat-exchangers has been complete except for the addition of cladding or. fill passes on the inside diameters of the welds.
Activities in-progress this month
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involved acid etching the interiot surface ofJthe weld areas and cleaning / grinding.
The inspector observed the process control sheet and interviewed the ASME inspector, contractor inspectors, and supervisor for this work for weld #17.
This process appeared to be under. rigorous control and intensive surveillence.
The inspector observed _ work activities, examined in-process records, and interviewed personnel regarding welding the high pressure coolant-makeup line weld MUS-412051-FWOO3C1.
This weld is in the 2-1/2 inch schedule 160 type 304 stainless steel line MUS-119-2.
The inspector considered th,e weld identification / location, weld history record and procedure
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i control at the work location, weld procedure,'ER308 filler metal for the TIG process, purge and shielding gas flow and gage-
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calibration, preheat interpass temperatures of 60/250, weld equipment condition and tool. availability to the welder, repair record control, welder identification, quality control
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inspection status, and general appearance of the weld in process.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Reactor Coolant Loop Piping Weld Visual Observations The inspector selected the following ten welds in the containment building and. examined their appearance. The inspector also
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examined associated records and interviewed engineering and
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quality control personnel with regard to his findings or for paragraph 8, below.)
general record correlations.
(Also see The welds represented a sample selection from ASME Class 1,2, and 3 piping systems:
i-HPR-412117-FW002 6-INCH CARBON STEEL ASME-2
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HPR-412117-FWOO3C1 6-INCH CARBON STEEL ASME-3
CCW-412096-FW002 12-INCH CARBON STEEL ASME-2 CCW-412096-FW003Cl '12-INCH CARBON STEEL ASME-3
DHR-412029-FW001 12-lNCH STAINLESS STEEL-ASME-1 DHR-412031-FWOO2 10-INCH STAINLESS STEEL ASME-1 DHR-412033-FWOO3 12-INCH STAINLESS STEEL ASME-1 FWA-412013-FW300 6-INCH STAINLESS-STEEL ASME-2 i
FWA-412014-FW302
'6-INCH STAINLESS STEEL ASME-2 FWA-412043-FW503 6-INCH CARBON STEEL ASME-2-The-inspector considered the location, size, surface finish, inside appearance where accessible, transitions in wall thick-ness, weld' reinforcement, absence of attachments and arc strikes, suitability for inservice -inspection, grinding, and
general absence of unacceptable surface defects.
The inspector noted the following exceptions:
a.
The welds at two valves did not. appear to meet the weld j
transition requirements prescribed by ASME Code Section III
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NC-4250.
The records showed that each weld had a final visual inspection by the contractor's quality inspectors.
i This part of tb6 Code requires gradual transitions at welds of items having unequal diameter / wall-thickness
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at and near the weld joint.
For the outside diameter,
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the Code requires that-the slope of the transition be not greater than 30-degrees, within a distance'from the
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wall-thickness,ofsthe-thinner: member.)
The welds in question measured less.than thisidistance co a 45-degree transition
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the, valve ~. body:
slope on
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(1)
The 45-degree level commenced within 5/8-inch from the ap' parent. centerline'of welds HPR-412117-FWOO2
, sand FWO3C1, on valve HPR-V392.
At least 1-inch is prescribed by the' Code 1-1/2'lt/ min criteria.
(2)
The 45-degree bevel commenced within 1/2-inch from the apparent centerline of welds CCW-412096-FWOO2 and FW003C1, on valve CCW-V280.
At least 21/32-inch is prescribed by the Code 1-1/2 t/ min criteria.
The inspector discussed this matter with the on-site ASME Code Inspector, and the Bechtel quality control represen-tative, who examined the conditions in question.
It was not yet known if the condition extends to components other than valves.
The transition discrepancy appears to be an item of noncompliance, relative to Criterion IX (460/82-01-01)
b.
During the inspection of a recently completed field weld, the inspector noted a questionable condition on the root of a shop weld, (FWA-411043-#3) on a 6-inch stainless steel reducer fitting.
The inspector observed local oxidation of the type that welding craft commonly allude to as " sugar-ing" due to its rough, granular texture appearance.
The in-spector discussed this condition with an~ experienced qualified welder who was present in the work area; this individual'
stated that he had seen similar conditions in his past experience as being associated with loss of purge gas.
The vendor specification (#137) required-that purge / backing gas be used during welding of stainless steel, but the ex-istance of the oxide appears to indicate that some irregu-larity may have been experienced.
The weld records showed that gas-metal-arc welding process was.used, but gave no indication of purge gas or inspection to assure that it was used.
The records showed that the weld was final in-spected in the vendor shop on October 23, 1979, including a checkpoint indicating, "No lack of penetration".
However, this weld is ASME Code Class 3, which requires a penetrant examination of the exterior surface, and visual inspection of interior welds which are within one diameter of the open end.
In this case, the weld was about 8-inches from the open end of the 6-inch diameter pipe.
X-ray NDE was not available for this Class 3 weld, i
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The inspector requested.the licensee to explore the-conditions of this weld to ascertain its acceptability.
This is a followup item. (460/82-01-02)
c.
During-inspection of the' surface finish of the ten welds, the inspector noticed that the grinding for in-service-inspection had not yet been accomplished for some of these and nearby completed welds.
Subsequent interview i
of the (J. A.
Jones) field engineers showed that grinding had been deferred in the past, but that a program is being
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developed to assure that it is achieved.
The field engineers demonstrated to the inspector that they had researched the isometric drawings and work packages for piping within the containment building and had developed work moni-toring charts to schedule this ISI work.
The engineer
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demonstrated that they had given much attention to define specific requirements for controlling ISI overgrinding; there appeared to be agreement that some further clarifi~
cations of inspection criteria were needed.
The engineers referred to " informational" ultrasonic measurement of pipe walls, and past practice of recording the fact of such test but not the detailed test report.
The inspector noted that elements of Criterion XVII must be' met relative to measurements which'will be used as a basis for accep-tance decisions.
During the record review of several work packages, the inspector encountered at least one ultrasonic thickness test record and"did.n'ot' identify any missing records.
However, this sample was insufficient to establish acceptability of this' aspect,'particularly in view of the field engineers' reco11cetions.
The licensee agreed to review this matter, and thisaitem.will be con-sidered during further, routine inspection activities as a followup item.
(460/82-01-03)-
8.
Reactor Coolant Loop Piping Weld Records The inspector examined the work packages which contained the records for the following four welds:
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CCW-412096 Field Weld #3 DHR-412031 Field Weld #300 FWA-411043 Field Weld #12 & #503 The records show that quality inspection hold points were established and implemented; inspection results affirmed the acceptability of the work; and the records appeared to be i
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the weld records had generally not yet been " bottom-lined" by quality verification or quality assurance reviewers, and that radiography records had not yet been filed in the work packages or the results yet noted on the weld history records.
The JAJ management and engineering and audit staffs all stated that a program was in-progress to expedite transfer of radio-graphy records from the QV/NDE files and finalize the weld records for completed welds.
Procedures were in the process of development and review for this activity.
During the record review the inspector interviewed a Quality Assurance Engineer (QAE) and examined procedures and associated documents regarding QA review of weld records prior to issuance to the field for action.
The QAE reviews the record and iden-tifies hold points for inspection.
A block on the form pro-vides for field identification of limited access joints.
The QAE appeared knowledgeable in requirements for various welds, but could not produce an approved checklist of the specific items to be considered during such reviews.
Although some checklists were available for other than piping records, these appeared to have no formal management status / approval, nor were they controlled documents.
The available written instruc-tions for weld record reviewer thus did not convey an im-pression of' uniform and consistent reviews.
A written approved procedure only called for the performance of the review, but did not provide detailed guidance on the specifics to be con-sidered. Rumors of changes in the amount of hold points were difficult to confirm or ignore, based on the absence of written criteria for the QAE's who select and place the hold-points on the weld records.
The contractor and licensee representatives indicated that improvement of this area was in progress
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This matter will be further reviewed during future inspections-(460/82-01-04).
Ilowever, the inspector did not identify any weld record discrepancies which would suggest ineffectiveness of the current QA reviews.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Work Activities The inspector toured the containment building in the areas where principal piping work activities were in progress.
In addition to general observations, he considered the following four activities relative to specification #211 and the JAJ work instructions.
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Issuance and use of specified materials For pipe spool #MUS-412051-2, the inspector checked the marking on the pipe, the material release records #37308 and #47073 in the field work package, the associated record in'the work package control area files, and associated files in the vault.
He also interviewed the ASME Code inspector, who stated that he had performed'
a recent review of the material issuance and control system and had found no discrepancies.
The records showed that the material had been obtained.from the salvage area in accordance with design change written direction, and had been released in a controlled manner with quality control inspection monitoring.
No dis-crepancies were identified. *
b.
Handling of piping and components For pipe spools FWA-412014-2, CSS-412006-3, DHR-412033-1, and other stainless steel piping and valves, the in-spector examined the rigging and general handling.
These items were rigged with chains wrapped with tape, or with bare chains over tape wrapped on the pipe, or with nylon slings.
The slings contained tags which identified the load rating / configuration relationship for the re-ference by the riggers, and the slings appeared to be in good condition.
Rigging was from the eye-bolts mounted in the concrete structure, or from structural steel attachments.
No temporary rigging from permanent-plant pipe supports was observed, and the records for spool DHR-412031-1 showed a November 11, 1981 example that such rigging is included in quality _ verification sur-veillence checks and has been identified in the past and corrected.
c.
Protection of stainless steel piping:
The inspector observed measures to protect the stainless steel piping in the containment building annulus area from exterior and interior debris.
In addition to coverings on open p.iping_ ends, the inspector observed wrapping of the stainless" steel piping with one layer of visqueen covering..The general foreman stated'that this was to protect the material from debris from above.
A JAJ welder assisted the, ins'pector to. test the' material for. effectiveness in pre'ventin'gJaccidental arc-strikes on the piping.
Using an E7018, welding electrode and a
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The inspector conveyed this information.to the JAJ and.Bechtel quality verifi-cation and construction management.
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The inspector observed..a general * practice of taping of t
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weldsjoints after!fitup but'priorito welding.
At a horizonal' weld:Joini atlan~ elbow near weld MUS-412051-S
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003C1,fth'e,inspdetor, observed}the"l fitter place plastic
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spacing ; material; bdtween]the two, weld end preparations
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prior,t6 his'tsping the j oint at thE end of the shift.
This p r o t e c't i o n 'w'a s iih 'Yd d i t i'o n ' t o the procedurally
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p r e s c r i b e d.J a p.i n g > f o r' 'c l e a n l i n e s s, and offered additional
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t protectibn a g a i n s t h,f o.r c e d m e t S.l > c o n t a c t and gouging from personnel steppingxon or,oth'erwise exertiag forces near the horizo'nal j oint s,The fitter stated that this
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was a normal and' typical. practice.'
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Miscellan'eous n-For the various pipe weld. joints at equipment and at the containment wall, the^ inspector observed that welding of the joints had been deferred until other welds and'in-stallation of hangers has been completed to preclude cold spring at the final tie-in points to the equipment or containment penetration units.
These joints appeared to be all taped for cleanliness protection.-
10.
Con'tainment Penetration (Piping) Work Activities The inspector observed the installation of the small-bore piping penetration assembly at. containment penetration number 046.
The inside-containment end of the pentration had been provided by the vendor with a flange extension'which-interferredtwith proper nondestructive testing.
The. flange had been field ~ machined to provide a weld joint geometry acceptable for radiography.
The inspector _ examined the work package at the work area, and reviewed the design change documents for proper approvals, and the process control sheet for inspection points and sign-offs.
He measured the machined flange'for inspection points and sign-offs.
He measured the machined flange for_ general compliance with the design.
Documents examined included:
Process Control Sheet
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- CPN-046 S/N-4048 Project Change Proposals -
14Q05246A, 14QO3313A, 14QO3286, 14QO3091. 14Q00219A, 14QO3313, 01QO3139
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Request For Information[2 211-81'-074, 211-81-271, 211-FP-046 Contract Waiver Reques't -
211-009, 211-083B Drawing
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S-805310 No items of noncompliance were. identified.
11.
Piping Related Supplementary Structurai Steel The inspector examined records and interviewed personnel associated with structural steel to followup on rumors of deficiencies in these records for structural steel.
The in-spector ascertained that the JAJ quality verification organ-ization was aware of such deficiencies and was preparing associated nonconformance control documentation.
He examined some of the backup documentation for the nonconformance document being prepared for beam E216.
The inspector visited the General Services Building work package control area and examined the available data in the work packages for drawings E226 and E262 and beam details 1-1958B-1 and 1-1947A-1.
He observed personnel compiling the beam detail packages into the related area drawing packages.
The records appear to be filed by area-steel and beam-detail drawings supplied by the structural steel contractor, Schurtleff and Andrews.
The installation control and inspection records for some of these drawings (e.g. #E262)had not yet been located by the JAJ work package control, engineering, or quality assurance organizations.
Of the records in the files, various discrepancies have been identified, including absence of bolting inspection records.
This matter has been identified by the contractor's quality assurance program and was being addressed in accordance with that program.
The contractor's actions will be reviewed during future inspections.
(460/82-01-05)
12.
Potential 10 CFR 50.55(e):
Flooding of General Services Building During the weekend of January 9, 1982 a clamp apparently came loose on a 6-inch temporary fireline within the general services building.
This resulted in flooding of the emergency safe-guards area at elevation 395.
The inspector toured the area on January 12, and 14.
A decay heat removal pump and motor and containment spray system pump and motor, in addition to stainless and carbon steel piping and other material / equipment had been exposed to the water.
The contractors have taken water samples and inventoried the equipment involved as part of the evaluation for the determination of required corrective actions.
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-11-The water had been removed and the floors essentially dried by January 14.
Some pipe caps have been removed to facilitate drainage and drying of the piping.
Cleanup crews were noted.
The licensee called the resident inspector and the regional office regarding this matter on January 11, to advise that the matter was being evaluated relative to reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
No items of noncompliance were identified regarding this matter.
13.
Employee Concerns The electrical contractor quality control supervisor advised the inspector that a design change had been issued to change the weld size from 1/4-inch to 3/8-inch on cable tray supports.
Apparently this change had not been incorporated into the electrical contractor's procedures.
This placed in question the welds on about 600 supports, or greater than 10,000 welds.
The contractor's quality control inspectors have been in-structed to inspect these welds for weld size.
They have been instructed to inspect them through the paint, which has been determined to be about 4-mils thick.
However, they have also been given the prerogative to have the paint removed if it appears to be too thick to obtain a sufficiently accurate measurement.
These welds had previously been completed and inspected for surface quality and the size criteria that appeared in the design documents at that time.
A contractor inspector expressed concern that the contractor's general weld inspection criteria involves AWS-D1.1, which is specific in defining the surface condition and reject criteria for weld inspection; it would prohibit inspection of weld quality through a coating of paint.
(However, the welds in question were already inspected for quality and accepted, and the reinspection is for only one aspect which has little interference from the paint acating.)
This item was also reported to the WPPSS Hotline program.
Completion of the NRC review will consider followup on the Hotline response, the details of the identified discrepancy and the reinspectian data. (460/82-01-06)
14.
Management Meeting The inspector met with the licensee quality assurance manager approximately weekly to discuss the status of inspection findings and other inspector activities relating to this project.
On January 15, the inspector met with the WPPSS QA and construction management and representatives of some of the contractor organizations.
Persons contacted who attended this meeting are so noted (*) in paragraph 2 of this report.