IR 05000460/1982009
| ML20055A043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1982 |
| From: | Dodds R, Toth A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055A024 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-460-82-09, 50-460-82-9, 50-513-82-05, 50-513-82-5, NUDOCS 8207150421 | |
| Download: ML20055A043 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-460/82-09 Report No. Sn-s11/R7-ns Docket No. E _460/ sl a License No. cPPn-134/174 Safeguards Group Licensee: 1Jn nhi ngr nn Pitb l i c Rimnly Ryntom p-O Rnv 468 Richlnnd,__Washingtnn 491s2 Facility Name: JJn nh i ng ton Niin i nn r Project No. 1 (LINP-1)
Inspection at:
__WNP 1/4 Rien. Enntnn entinty L!nnhingenn Inspection conducted: nay 1 - 9 R _ 1989 Inspectors:
b cn [ h f.c1 hNE A. D. Toth, Senior ifesident Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
rdb 6 /h 3
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T. Dodds, Chief Oate' Signed Reactor Construction Projects Section 2 Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection on May 1-28, 1982 (Report No. 50-460/82-09)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of electrical penetrations installation work and records and previously identified inspection findings.
The inspection involved 74 inspector hours on-site by the resident inspector.
Findings:
In the one principal area inspected one item of noncompliance was identified.
(Failure to provide procedures for handling of electrical cables during the installation of penetra-tions, Paragraph 4).
Summary:
Unit 4 Inspection on May 1-28, 1982 (Report No. 50-513/82-05)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of on-site storage" of materials and equipment.
The inspection involved 2 inspector hours on-site.
Findings: No items of noncompliance were identified.
8207150421 820624
$DRADOCK 05000460 PDR RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
- W.
Root, Program Director WNP-1 I
- C.
Edwards, Project Quality Assurance Manager
- M.
Farrell, Quality Assurance Specialist F. Hood, Manager of Construction & Industrial Safety R. Lewis, Resource Manager C. Organ, Assistant Program Director, Engineering
- M. Rodin, Quality Compliance Senior QA Engineer United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C)
W. Anderson, Field Project Engineer, Electrical E. Haren, Project Quality Assurance Manager G.
Singh, Field Project Engineer, Electrical
- W.
Taylor, Construction Manager Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC)
- C.
Kasch, Project Construction Quality Control Engineer E. Edwards, Proj ect Manager D. Johnson, Manager of Quality
- J. Rudd, Proj ect Field Quality Assurance Engineer J. A. Jones Construction Company (JAJ)
C. Anderson, Assistant Project Quality Assurance Manager R. Harrington, Supervisor, Work Package Control, GSB Area D. Higginbotham, Senior Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Taylor, Technical Engineering Group Supervisor N. Venart, Superintendent, Containment Building R. Wilson, Quality Assurance Manager Foley, Wismer & Becker Company (FWB)
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Wetle, Quality Assurance Manager L. Thomas, Quality Engineer Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Company (PDM)
T. Arnold, Welder
- C.
Bauer, Quality Assurance Manager
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Castorina, Project Manager W. Gana, Quality Control Inspector W. Yokum, Quality Control Inspector Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (Washington State)
F. Rehfield, Electrical Inspector R. Frodi, Deputy Boiler Inspector other General Contacts and Notes In addition to the persons identified above, the inspector interviewed other personnel from the construction, engineering, and quality control site contractor organizations.
He interviewed various craft and supervision who were present in the work areas during the inspector s activities, or who had visited the in-spector's office.
- Denotes personnel present at the exit management meeting.
2.
General The resident inspector was on-site May 3-5, 7, 10-13, 17-18, 21 and 24-28.
During this period the inspector performed routine ex-aminations of activities, including plant tours, record reviews and interviews of personnel.
3.
Significant Project Events Noted During May the licensee continued to develop and implement project delay plans, in response to the April 29 Executive Board decision to suspend construction of the WNP-1 project.
By the end of May, all site construction activities had ceased, with minor exceptions of demobilization and cleanup.
Work walkdown/ inspection activities were being performed by each contractor, in addition to dispositioning of open CNCR's/NCR's/
RFI's and collection / indexing / review of documentation for turn-over to the construction manager (Bechtel).
Depending upon the particular contractor, these engineering / inspection / review activi-ties were expected to be continued for several months.
UE&C will continue with engineering / design of selected activities in pro-gress, including preparations to respond to any NRC first round questions on the FSAR.
Preparations were being made for the ASME Section III Division 2 authorized nuclear inspectors to perform the document review for the containment building.
The structural integrity test has been scheduled for December 6, 1982.
Site manual manpower has been reduced to 337.
Total manpower for the project was at 226.
Containment Building Electrical Penetrations Work Inspection Objectives:
Determine if electrical penetration assemblies have been installed into containment building penetration sleeves in accordance with the applicable NRC requirements and Safety Analysis Report commit-ments.
This includes determination of the following:
a.
Construction specifications, drawings and work procedures used for the work are technically adequate, current and properly approved.
b.
Penetration components / assemblies meet purchase specifications, including any qualification tests or conditions, c.
Method of assembly of components is consistent with design drawings and work specifications.
d.
Measures exist and are in force to protect installed components from construction debris, physical damage, and hostile en-vironments.
e.
Installation activities and other activities, such as testing, are conducted with reference to specified procedures.
f.
Nondestructive examination is performed in accordance with work specifications, and examination personnel are qualified for the work they are performing.
g.
Inspection (QC) activities are performed as required by established procedures and by properly qualified personnel, h.
Installed materials are in accordance with specified l
requirements.
Inspection Appgoach:
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l Item "b" abovc was considered during field observations, and I
addressed morc completely in conjunction with a general records
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review of penetrations work, discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.
The inspector examined the installed penetrations in all areas outside the containment building (as shown on drawing 9779-S-3037644, the weld joint fit-up and/or partial weld of two
! penetr tions (HE3 and HE4), the configurations at several pene-
[ traticis at the inside of the containment building (HJ4 and HH4),gind conditions of several penetration assemblies stored i
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t-4-in the level-B warehouse (llH4, llJ6, llDl, IIB 4, HF6 and IIC1).
The inspector interviewed the two quality control inspectors and one welder directly assigned to the work by the mechanical contractor, the electrical contractor's quality engineer who performed surveillance of the mechanical work, the quality assurancc managers of the electrical and mechanical contractors, the Bechtel QC surveillance engineer, the State boiler and electrical inspectors, and other management and engineering personnel associated with this work.
The inspector examined the applicable specification sections (#218 parts 16D, 16E and 17A), the contract between the electrical and the mechanical contractors (#218010), the electrical contractor's quality assurance manual and pro-cedures manual (including QCP-2. QCP-7 and QCP-10), Westing-house installation instructions (including PEN-TR-76-48, June 21, 1978), and Westinghouse fabrication-erection drawings (including E-40196, E-40150, E-40106, E-40193 and E-3018).
The inspector examined the mechanical contractor's process control logs for the work, welder qualifications log, ultra-sonic test reports logs, and magnetic particle testing logs, relative to consistent entries and entries specific to the two penetrations observed in-progress in the field.
Findings:
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Because the work involved welding to the ASME Code N-stamped
steel containment liner sleeves, the electrical contractor (FWB) had subcontracted the work-to the mechanical contractor (PDM).
The electrical contractor provided the union electricians to assist with the handling of the electric cables.
l This work started March 2, 1982.
The following discrepancies I
were identified which had not been previously identified by either the Bechtel QC surveillane or the WPPSS QA surveillance
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personnel, a.
Neither the electrical contractor (who had primary responsibility) nor the mechanical contractor (a sub-contractor to the electrical contractor) implemented l
quality control inspections for the handling, pulling, and installation of the electrical cable portion of this work.
Neither contractor could produce inspection records relating l
to in-process observations of the cable handling aspects
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of this work.
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-5-The mechanical contractor confined his inspection activities to the ASME Code welding, and had neither qualified electrical inspectors nor appropriate electrical inspection procedures applicable to the work.
The PDM Quality Assurance Manager stated that the electrical portion of the work was the responsibility of the electrical contractor, as defined in the contract.
For usual work by the electrical contractor, the FWB Quality Assurance Manual QAP-13 part 6.4 requires that,
"Where special precautions are required for handling of items to prevent damage or other considerations, detailed instructions and/or procedures shall be prepared and im-plemented".
Implementing procedure QCP-7 (part 4.7) requires a process travel for owner-furnished equipment, with hold points for quality inspection.
Procedure QCP-10 defines cable pulling criteria, including inspection of minimum bend-radius, maximum pulling tensions, cafe edges, jacket condition, and similar matters.
None of these program re-quirements were implemented for the subcontracted electrical penetration work.
The FWB Quality Assurance Manager stated that the inspection of the electrical portions of the work were included with the subcontracted installation scope to PDM.
With the above absence of controls, there occurred cases where the cables exited the penetration sleeves (e.g. HH4 and HJ4) over the unprotected sharp edges of the pipe ends.
Cables outside containment were draped over hand-rails, with the.10-foot length hanging free, and exerting tension at the bend point.
One week after the inspector identified this matter the contractor installed flame-proof cloth around and under the cables at each penetra-tion, corrective action appeared to be adequate.
Also, cable support trays had been inserted under heavy cable groups within the penetration sleeves, without wheels or other measures normally applied by the electrical contractor during cable pulling operations.
This also appeared inconsistent with the manufacturer's installation instruction sequence (Westinghouse procedure PEN-TR-76-4B),
which describes installation of the trays prior to insertion of the penetration assemblies into the sleeves.
The con-sequent damage to the cable jackets, if any, is unknown.
The" failure to implement a quality program for the handling of electrical cable during the installation appears to be an item of noncompliance.
(460/82-09-01)
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-6-The Bechtel quality control surveillance and WPPSS quality assurance surveillance personnel believed that quality control inspections had been provided, but could not identify any qualified inspectors, inspection procedures, nor records re-lative to the electrical installations of the penetration
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assemblies, b.
Nondestructive testing of the welds was not performed in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract specifications:
The ASME Code Section III Part NE-5277 requires radiography of welds of electrical penetrations, except "when the joint detail does not permit radiographic examination.... ultrasonic examination plus liquid penetrant or magnetic particle ex-amination....may be substituted.
The absence of suitable radiographic equipment shall not be justification for such substitution."
The electrical specification 9779-218 Re-visions 3 and 264, part 5.1.2 requires:
" Welds at outer end i
of the penetration shall be radiographed."
The mechanical contractor did not perform the radiography, electing to substitute ultrasonic and magnetic particle examinations,
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based upon verbal understandings that such action would be acceptable and eventually endorsed by a formal contract change (after inquiry into this matter by the inspector, PDM issued contract waiver request CWR-W-541 on May 21, 1982; it was approved by the Engineer June 8).
Whether or not the joint details do " permit" radiographic examina-tion appears to be a matter of interpretation of how much unusual effort should be applied to accomplish such examina-tion.
Installed electrical cables within the penetration sleeves interfere with normal radiographic techniques.
The penetrations were pre-assembled and installed as a unit, with wiring intact, as described in the manufacturer's installation instructions.
This is a variable dependent upon the specific circumstance of cable loading in each penetrations sleeve.
However, it clearly involves a greater number of radiographs than normal for a weld of this size.
(The inspector examined the most accessible of the penetra-tions with three level II radiographers from another con-tractor working in the area, who agreed that as many as 20 exposures would be required, with an exposure area of about 2-inches per exposure.
This is due to density varia-tion aspects arising from having to place the isotopic source outside the genetration sleeve for most of the exposures).
The use of tae substitute examinations appeared to be justifiable, and the licensee and Engineer representatives stated that the use of the alternative was agreed to in meetings.
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Containment Building Electrical Penetrations Records Inspection Obj ectives Determine whether the containment penetration records demonstrate work accomplishment consistent with the NRC requirements and Safety Analysis Report commitments.
This includes determination of the following:
a.
Materials and components requirements were met.
b.
Certification of material requirements meets guidelines.
c.
The penetration components were receipt inspected for damage.
d.
The penetration components were inspected to verify con-formance to purchase specifications.
c.
Installation inspections have been performed as required and at the approved frequency.
f.
Welding was performed in accordance with approved procedures.
g.
Inspections have been performed to verify correct positioning and alignment.
I h.
Inspections confirm that the required leak testing has been satisfactorily accomplished.
Inspection Approach f
The inspector examined the receiving records for four penetration assemblies:
790913-HA5 - 13.8 Kv. Reactor Pump Power Supply w/ modules 790383, 790290 and 790913 780402-HJ6 - 480 volt, Heavy Power with modules 771011, 771013 and 771014 780501-HE8 - 480 volt Low-Medium Power with modules 771104, 771105 and 780401 780405-HE4
- Control Cables with modules 770710, 770711 and 770810 For each of the above, the inspector examined the following documents:
UE&C Material Receiving Reports Vendor Surveillance Quality Control Checklist / Plan Quality shipment Release Data Review Worksheet
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-8-Westinghouse Certificate of Conformance (IEEE-317/323)
Westinghouse ASME Code Data Form (N-2)
Westinghouse Process Traveler - Finished Module Assemblies Westinghouse Process Traveler - Bulkhead Extension Assembly Westinghouse Process Traveler - Finished Penetration Westinghouse Final Electrical Test Record Westinghouse Weld and NDE Records PDM Receiving Inspection Report l
PDM Fabrication Checklist PDM Weld Procedure Specification (WPS-75-55)
PDM Ultrasonic Examination Procedure (WUT-2) and Rep 6rt PDM Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure (WMT-1) and Report
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PDM Visual Examination Procedure WMT-1) and Report PDM Welder Qualification Records (welders D, P, and YY)
UE&C Contract Specification 55 UE&C Contract Specification 218, Sections 16A, 16D 17A The inspector also examined several of the Westinghouse prototype qualification testing reports for the medium voltage (15 Kv) and the lower voltage (480 volt) penetration assemblies, and the assoc-iated UE&C comments and resolutions.
Specific documents examined
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included:
Westinghouse Qualification Test Reports PEN-TR-78-22, PEN-TR-78-02, PEN-TR-77-107, PEN-TR-77-59, PEN-TR-78-63 and 64, and PEN-TR-78-32; and UE&C Comments on PEN-TR-76-47 (transmittal T-015).
These records were examined relative to the requirements of:
PSAR Sections 8.1.4.1, 8.3.5.4, and Questions 7.32 PSAR Sections 3.11.2.3.3 and 8.3.3.2 Regul.atory Guide 1.63 IEEE-317-72, IEEE-317-76, and IEEE-336-71 Findings:
l No discrepancies were identified in the site receiving and installation records, with exception of absence of records of inspection of electrical cable handling during installation, which is discussed in detail elsewhere in this report.
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The PSAR states that the penetrations are tested in accordance with IEEE-317-1972; the FSAR references IEEE-317-1976 and RG-1.63.
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l The Westinghouse Certificate Of Conformance dated January 15, 1982 for 790913-HA5 certifies that the penetration conforms" penetration
...to all the requirements of the contract #9779-55 and in addition meet the requirements of IEEE-317 (1972) and IEEE-323 (1974)."
The UE&C approved, Westinghouse qualification test re-j ports contained the following discrepancies:
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IEEE-317-76 part 6.1 states that qualification " Tests
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shall demonstrate that the electric penetration assembly
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will perform its intended function when subjected to con-ditions that simulate installed life under the specified
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Existing qualification test data may be used in lieu of new tests, when it can be shown by documented analysis or additional testing of components or assemblies, or both, that the existing test data are valid for the penetration assembly being qualified."
The Westinghouse test report PEN-TR-74-4, for low / medium voltage penetration assemblies ampacity tests, describes prototype tests with perforated steel trays installed in j
the nozzles to support the cable groups.
The reported test
results show that temperature rating of the insulation will not be exceeded when the cables are operated at the identi-
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fled currents.
Ac'tual. field installed conditions' included a wrapping of i
thermal barrier cloth around each of the three cable groups, in some cases for a length of 3-feet.
The PDM quality con-trol inspectors stated that up to seven layers of this wrapp-ing was put on, to assure that welding operations would not damage the cable.
The thermal insulation does not appear to be representative of the prototype test conditions for the insulation' temperatures has now initiated a review of the impact on the validity of the prototype test conditions.
This matter is unresolved pending review of that evaluation.
(460/82-09-02)
b.
For the medium voltage penetration assemblies (15 KV rated l
voltage) UE&C specification 55, section 16A, part 5.4, j
note (1) states that the " Type I penetrations need maintain only containment integrity in order to successfully pass t
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the tests."
The UE&C electrical field engineer explained that the only Type I assemblies used for WNP-1 are those for the 13.8 KV reactor coolant pumps power.
The pumps are not expected to function under loss-of-coolant-accident conditions and are not described in the safety analysis report as Class lE electrical or enviormentally qualified equipment.
Accordingly, the below noted deviations from the IEE-317-1976 criteria appear to be acceptable:
(1)
IEEE-317-72 part 5.1.2 and IEEE-317-76 part 6.4.13 require that "... rated voltage and current for power and control conductors...shall be present concurrently during the design basis event testing."
The UE&C Specification 55 Section 16A part 3.4.5.1 identifies the rated current as 625 amps rms.
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For Type I penetrations (15Kv), UE&C specification 55, l
section 16A, part 5.2.3.13.B, specifically exempts
Type I penetrations from loading at rated current
or rated voltage.
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The Westinghouse test report PEN-TR-78-22 part 4.5.10
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states that, "A current of 600 Amps AC was run con-F
j tinuously for 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> of the test..."and "Within
15 minutes of introducing steam into the medium voltage
assembly, the 15 KVAC between the conductor in module
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assembly 2-4 and ground broke down.
The insulation
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resistance between the conductor and ground measured
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to be 100,000 ohms, and remained in this range through-out the test."
The breakdown was attributed to track-
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ing across the surface of the module; corrective steps were reported to have eliminated such tracking.
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(2)
IEEE-317-76 part 6.4.7 requires that "A rated continuous current test shall be performed on the electric pen-
etration assembly with each conductor in the assembly and its termination carrying its rated continuous current plus margin under the specified environmental ccnditions.
The maximum stabilized temperatures shall be measured and recorded and shall not exceed the
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design limits." UE&C specification 55, section 16A, part 5.2.3.7 recites this requirement, and part 3.4.5 identifies the rated current as 625 amps.
IEEE-317-76 part 6.2 identified rated current margin as +5 percent of rated value.
(This appears to require a 657 amp test current).
The Westinghouse qualification test report PEN-TR-78-22, for type I penetrations, does not describe a separate
rated continuous current test.
However, it does describe a " Design Basis Event-Rated Continuous Current Test", run at 600 amps, as noted in item "b" above.
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The test results include the statement that the test"...was run continuously for 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> without incident", but do not identify / record the maximum stabilized temperatures nor that they did not exceed the design limits.
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(3)
IEEE-317-76 part 6.4.5 requires a partial discharge (corona) test demonstrating"...a partial-discharge
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extinction voltage not less than rated voltage
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plus margin.
The test apparatus calibration, and test procedure shall be in accordance with Part 6
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of IPCEA S-19-81 (NEMA WC 3)".
The UE&C specifica-i tion 55, section 16A, part 5.2.3.6 invokes this re-quirement.
Specification section 16A, part 3.4.5.1
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i states that the. rated voltage is 15 Kv, and IEEE-317-76 part 6.2 calls for voltage minimum test
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margin of +10 percent of rated voltage.
(This
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appears to require a 16.5 KV test voltage).
The Westinghouse qualification test report PEN-TR-78-22, for type I power penetrations, states in part 4.5.5 that
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"The corona extinction level for module assembly 2-4 was 11KV and 12KV for 6-9 prior to the start'of qualifica-tion testing."
The UE&C electrical field engineer stated
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that this acceptance criteria is consistent with the l
minimum extinction voltage of the IPCEA-S-19 standard,
which he considered accept'able in. view of the non-class-
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lE status of these assemblies.
The engineer showed the
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inspector shipping data which demonstrated that' corona testing of each production module was made, with at least 16 KV extinction voltage.
6.
Employee Concerns j
A site employee expressed concerns regarding the depth of grinding marks on the containment liner plate; it appeared to the employee that the marks exceeded a 1/16th inch maximum allowable which he had noted at other projects.
The employee stated that he had not actually measured the depressions.
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The inspector interviewed PDM quality control inspectors and
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examined procedure EIS-14693 Part 19.4.2, which defines a 1/16th inch maximum depth of excavation, and which requires quality control inspection of removal of temporary attachments.
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Inspection records showed that such inspections had been per-
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formed, and the inspectors interviewed stated that they had performed such inspections; they demonstrated awareness of the 1/16th inch criteria.
The inspector accompanied the individual to the locations in question and measured the depth of each depression.
Each was less than 1/16th inch deep.
The employee stated that his questions were resolved.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
l 7.
Licensee Action on Previous NRC Inspection Findings i
l The inspector reviewed licensee actions taken to resolve issues identified during previous NRC inspection activities.
This in-volved review of records, examination of work, and interview of personnel.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (460-80-03-01)
NRC inspection report 50-460/80-07 paragraph 15 described that the licensee had established a joint WPPSS/UE&C engineering task force to research and make recommenda-tions regarding potential intergranual stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) phenomena.
The task force report was to be issued June 1, 1980 and actions determined thereafter.
The IGSCC report was issued June 1, 1980 (UEJJ-80-5392)
and direction was issued to J.A. Jones Company by Sign-ificant Project Change Proposal 14S00001D dated July 30, 1980.
This included the recommended immediate actions to revise field installation procedures for stainless steel welding, such as:
(1)
Avoidance of grinding, including inspection of shop furnished counterbores for unnecessary machining practices and blending / polishing to 32 RMS.
(2)
Maximum weld interpass temperature of 250F for the first 1/2 inch of weld deposit.
(3)
Maximum weld heat-input of 30 KJ/ inch for the first 1/2 inch of weld deposit.
The Project Change Proposal did not include any backfit requirements other than item 1 above.
The J. A. Jones implementation of these requirements is shown in work procedures:
JAJ-WP-P8 Revision 4 (dated December 19, 1981)
JAJ-ITI-020 Revicion 1 (dated December 31, 1981)
JAJ-WI-16.1 Revision 1 (dated December 31, 1981)
JAJ-NDE-007 Revision 3 (dated April 11,.1981)
The task force report had also recommended that WPPSS
" promote a plant-wide program of cleanliness that focuses on eliminating chlorides.
The program as a minimum, should address:
Shipping and site-storage, site erection, system testing, plant operations..."
With the exception of the cleanliness controls, the licensee appears to have implemented reasonable corrective actions for the work following the conclusions of the engineering evaluation.
The resident inspector has routinely observed
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implementation of,these actions in the field and during review of records of welding stainless steel.
However, the
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March 1981 NRC Special Report To Congress " Identification of New Unresolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear Power
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Plants" (NUREG-0705) defines PWR-Pipe-Cracks (which in-l cludes consideration of intergranular stress corrosion cracking)
as a matter for which further NRC study is
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planned.
Future developments in this area will be con-
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sidered in connection with the surface contamination issue summarized in paragraph 12.d of NRC inspection Report 50-460/82-06 (reference unresolved item 460/80-03-01).
b.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (460/80-15-04)
The licensee planned to follow-up on the ASME resurvey of the mechanical contractor J.A. Jones, anticipated for
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January 1980.
i The ASME resurvey was performed and, apparently, resulted i
in a finding that previously identified deficiencies had been sufficiently corrected to permit award of the Certification of Authorization.
Certificate N-2465-1 was issued by ASME on March 2, 1981, for ASME type-NA
work at the WNP-1/4 sites.
The State-boiler inspector
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stated that the ASME issues no other associated survey report with the certificate.
This mattter is closed.
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Unit #4 On-Site Material Storage
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The inspector toured the on-site warehouses number 1 and 4
and metal storage sheds numbers 1,2,3,4 and 25.
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sheds are on concrete pads.
The inspector also' toured a shed where spring hangers for piping are stored.
The areas contained Unit 1 and Unit 4 equipment and material.
Each piece of equipment examined was tagged and on proper dunnage.
Space heater, equipment heaters and building in-sulation were provided in building where rotating equipment was stored.
Most of the Unit 4 material has been shipped to i
the off-site Pasco warehouses.
The on-site storage of the Unit 4 fuel storage racks and various piping spring-supports (SGC-13-SV7, FWA10-SU-12, DHR-39-SV-3, DHR-22-SV-3A, DHR-4-SU-3 and RCS-23-SC-4) was found to be in accordance with
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program requirements.
These were each tagged, some with hold tags to document that the receiving inspection activities for them had not yet been completed.
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-14-The inspector briefly interviewed the preventive maintenance manager and the quality control inspector assigned to the Pasco warehouses.
These persons stated that they were assigned rssponsibility for and were implementing the pre-ventive maintenance program for the equipment stored at the Pasco warehouses.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5 of this report.
10. Management Meeting The inspector met with a licensee quality assurance representative approximately weekly to discuss the status of inspection findings and other inspector activities relating to this project.
On May 28, the inspector met with the WNP-1 Program Director and others as donoted in paragraph 1 of the report.
At the meeting, the licensee representatives stated opinions that quality control inspections were not required for the electrical portions of the containment penetration installa-tions, nor was sequential adherance to installation procedures.
(See paragraph 4 of this report).
The inspector recited re-quirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion 2, 5, 10, 13 and 17 as relevent to this matter, and stated that the licensee position will be considered.
Subsequent to the exit meeting, on June 8, the inspector met with the UE&C electrical field engineer to further discuss the quality class and non-lE classification of the 15 KV penetration assemblies for the reacier coolant pumps.
At that time, the inspector agreed that the apparent PSAR deviations identified during the exit meeting appeared to be consistent with the PSAR commitments (see Paragraph 5 of this report).
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