IR 05000456/2025420

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Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000456/2025420 and 05000457/2025420
ML25125A112
Person / Time
Site: Braidwood  
Issue date: 05/13/2025
From: Clark J
Security Performance Evaluation Branch
To: Rhoades D
Constellation Energy Generation
Negrete P
References
IR 2025420
Download: ML25125A112 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 - SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2025420 AND 05000457/2025420

Dear David Rhoades:

On May 1, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jefferson K. Clark, Chief Security Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Security Operations Docket No. 05000456 and 05000457 License No. NPF-72 and NPF-77

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000456 and 05000457

License Numbers:

NPF-72 and NPF-77

Report Numbers:

05000456/2025420 and 05000457/2025420

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2025-420-0006

Licensee:

Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

Facility:

Braidwood Station

Location:

Braceville, IL

Inspection Dates:

April 07, 2025, to May 02, 2025

Inspectors:

D. Bradfield, Team Leader, NSIR

K. Maloney, Senior Physical Security Inspector, RIII

P. Negrete, Physical Security Inspector, NSIR

A. Woyansky, Senior Physical Security Inspector, NSIR

Approved By:

Jefferson K. Clark, Chief

Security Performance Evaluation Branch

Division of Security Operations

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a security baseline inspection at Braidwood Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2201, Security Inspection Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

SAFEGUARDS

71130.03 - Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing

Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing (1 Sample)

(1) NRC inspectors completed the Contingency Response - Force-on-Force (FOF)

Testing inspection procedure by evaluating the licensees performance in implementing the physical protection program to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to, and including, the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. Two NRC-evaluated FOF exercises were conducted for the evaluation.

REPORT ATTACHMENTS

Supplemental Information for the report is considered Safeguards Information and is located separately within the NRCs Safeguards Information Local Area Network and Electronic Safe database (SLES), under NS126204.

INSPECTION RESULTS

No findings were identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On May 1, 2025, the inspectors presented the security baseline inspection results to Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AR 04689280

Security door malfunction

07/07/2023

AR 04838826

Lighting criteria

2/20/2025

AR 04845147

Bollard functionality

03/13/2025

AR 04850386

Camera distortion.

03/29/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 04861606

separate subjects for evaluation contained in this AR.

04/29/20

AR 04861605

Evaluate time outs and event matrix.

04/29/25

71130.03

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

AR 04861606

Condition Description:

1. Two neutralizations - evaluate port manipulation. 2.

Evaluate having a planned timeout to move shift weapons in

BREs/ Evaluate the placement of the shift weapons. 3.

Evaluate the FOF Schedule/timeline [drill window opened 27

minutes later than scheduled]. 4. During timeouts, ensure all

plant employees are allowed access to pass through

(specifically Service Building, MAF, and PAF). 5. Include

turnover timeouts in the drill matrix. 6. To include oncoming

and off-going times. 6. Plant personnel in area - Evaluate

communications with site personnel for interactions during

drills and exercises to limit impact. 7. Evaluate turning on

WIFI during FOF exercises (communication purposes for

inspectors). 8. For mobile barriers on Turbine Building 451',

evaluate the possibility of opening windows more for better

usability of mobile barriers. 9. Brief out limiting access to SAS

to necessary personnel during exercise window for on shift.

10. PCRA to update OCAG. OCAG references EAL HG1

incorrectly. vs required EAL HS1. 11. Called false cover but

could have been more specific with exact location. 12.

Corporate to evaluate effects on false cover from either

adversary or player engagement. 13. Golf port position was

not correct exiting time out. 14. When determining officer

status, utilize viking box to prevent alerting adversaries. 15.

Evaluate safety brief OPEX inclusion. Limit OPEX to 2-3

04/29/25

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

recent OPEX for force on force.

AR 04861954

Exercise #2 LL:

A post did not request an additional sling for SAAB weapon.

No plant page/announcement (just simulated).

Accidental keying up of radio at beginning of drill (action

to add reminder to the safety brief to ensure everyone is on

the correct radio channel).

Catchers Mitt personnel gate closure was not completed by

primary location. Secondary location completed closure.

Area controller not utilized to control traffic exiting

security ready room.

Positives:

No neutralizations or friendly fire

Drill window opened early due to efficient search process

(improvement from exercise 1)

MSO quickly called code upon identification of unusual

activity.

Good target identification and communication to security

force.

04/30/2025

S-361.pdf

Lake Screen House - 3

07/17/1987

S-369.pdf

Lake Screen House - 4

07/19/1976

S-378.pdf

Lake Screen House - 2

07/24/1987

Drawings

S-379.pdf

Lake Screen House

07/19/1976

Engineering

Evaluations

SY-AA-101-106-

F-06

CST Evaluation

Revision 2

Braidwood Planned Modifications

2/13/2025

SY-AA-150-102-

F-17

Non-Safeguards Event Sheet - Exercise 1

04/29/25

Miscellaneous

SY-AA-150-102-

F-17

Non-Safeguards Event Sheet - Exercise 2

04/30/25

SY-AA-101-132

Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities

Revision 38

Procedures

SY-AA-101-132-

F-07

Demonstration Planning Worksheet

Revision 4

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

SY-AA-101-145-

F-02

Security Post Orders

Revision 2

SY-AA-1025

Preparing For Demonstrations

Revision 2

SY-AA-500-126

Adversary Engagement - Use of Deadly Force

Revision 22

SY-AA-500-126

Duties and Responsibilities of the Nuclear Security

Organization

Revision 22

SY-AA-500-126

Adversary Engagement - Use of Deadly Force

Revision 22

SY-BR-101-116

Security Inspection of Underground Pathways

Revision 19

SY-BR-101-501

Supplemental Security Contingency Plan

Revision 9

SY-BR-101-502

Braidwood Clean Energy Center Target Sets

Revision 12

Ltr ML25125A112

OFFICE

NSIR/DSO/SPEB

/ETA

R-III/DRSS/SEPIRB

NSIR/DSO/SPEB

/ETC

NSIR/DSO/SPEB

/ETA

NAME

PNegrete

KMaloney

DBradfield

JClark

DATE

May 6, 2025

May 6, 2025

May 7, 2025

May 13, 2025