IR 05000456/2025420
| ML25125A112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2025 |
| From: | Clark J Security Performance Evaluation Branch |
| To: | Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation |
| Negrete P | |
| References | |
| IR 2025420 | |
| Download: ML25125A112 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 & 2 - SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2025420 AND 05000457/2025420
Dear David Rhoades:
On May 1, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Jefferson K. Clark, Chief Security Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Security Operations Docket No. 05000456 and 05000457 License No. NPF-72 and NPF-77
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000456 and 05000457
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000456/2025420 and 05000457/2025420
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-420-0006
Licensee:
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC
Facility:
Braidwood Station
Location:
Braceville, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 07, 2025, to May 02, 2025
Inspectors:
D. Bradfield, Team Leader, NSIR
K. Maloney, Senior Physical Security Inspector, RIII
P. Negrete, Physical Security Inspector, NSIR
A. Woyansky, Senior Physical Security Inspector, NSIR
Approved By:
Jefferson K. Clark, Chief
Security Performance Evaluation Branch
Division of Security Operations
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a security baseline inspection at Braidwood Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2201, Security Inspection Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
SAFEGUARDS
71130.03 - Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing
Contingency Response - Force-On-Force Testing (1 Sample)
- (1) NRC inspectors completed the Contingency Response - Force-on-Force (FOF)
Testing inspection procedure by evaluating the licensees performance in implementing the physical protection program to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to, and including, the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. Two NRC-evaluated FOF exercises were conducted for the evaluation.
REPORT ATTACHMENTS
Supplemental Information for the report is considered Safeguards Information and is located separately within the NRCs Safeguards Information Local Area Network and Electronic Safe database (SLES), under NS126204.
INSPECTION RESULTS
No findings were identified.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On May 1, 2025, the inspectors presented the security baseline inspection results to Adam Schuerman, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Security door malfunction
07/07/2023
Lighting criteria
2/20/2025
Bollard functionality
03/13/2025
Camera distortion.
03/29/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
separate subjects for evaluation contained in this AR.
04/29/20
Evaluate time outs and event matrix.
04/29/25
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Description:
1. Two neutralizations - evaluate port manipulation. 2.
Evaluate having a planned timeout to move shift weapons in
BREs/ Evaluate the placement of the shift weapons. 3.
Evaluate the FOF Schedule/timeline [drill window opened 27
minutes later than scheduled]. 4. During timeouts, ensure all
plant employees are allowed access to pass through
(specifically Service Building, MAF, and PAF). 5. Include
turnover timeouts in the drill matrix. 6. To include oncoming
and off-going times. 6. Plant personnel in area - Evaluate
communications with site personnel for interactions during
drills and exercises to limit impact. 7. Evaluate turning on
WIFI during FOF exercises (communication purposes for
inspectors). 8. For mobile barriers on Turbine Building 451',
evaluate the possibility of opening windows more for better
usability of mobile barriers. 9. Brief out limiting access to SAS
to necessary personnel during exercise window for on shift.
10. PCRA to update OCAG. OCAG references EAL HG1
incorrectly. vs required EAL HS1. 11. Called false cover but
could have been more specific with exact location. 12.
Corporate to evaluate effects on false cover from either
adversary or player engagement. 13. Golf port position was
not correct exiting time out. 14. When determining officer
status, utilize viking box to prevent alerting adversaries. 15.
Evaluate safety brief OPEX inclusion. Limit OPEX to 2-3
04/29/25
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
recent OPEX for force on force.
Exercise #2 LL:
A post did not request an additional sling for SAAB weapon.
No plant page/announcement (just simulated).
Accidental keying up of radio at beginning of drill (action
to add reminder to the safety brief to ensure everyone is on
the correct radio channel).
Catchers Mitt personnel gate closure was not completed by
primary location. Secondary location completed closure.
Area controller not utilized to control traffic exiting
security ready room.
Positives:
No neutralizations or friendly fire
Drill window opened early due to efficient search process
(improvement from exercise 1)
MSO quickly called code upon identification of unusual
activity.
Good target identification and communication to security
force.
04/30/2025
S-361.pdf
Lake Screen House - 3
07/17/1987
S-369.pdf
Lake Screen House - 4
07/19/1976
S-378.pdf
Lake Screen House - 2
07/24/1987
Drawings
S-379.pdf
Lake Screen House
07/19/1976
Engineering
Evaluations
SY-AA-101-106-
F-06
CST Evaluation
Revision 2
Braidwood Planned Modifications
2/13/2025
SY-AA-150-102-
F-17
Non-Safeguards Event Sheet - Exercise 1
04/29/25
Miscellaneous
SY-AA-150-102-
F-17
Non-Safeguards Event Sheet - Exercise 2
04/30/25
Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities
Revision 38
Procedures
SY-AA-101-132-
F-07
Demonstration Planning Worksheet
Revision 4
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SY-AA-101-145-
F-02
Security Post Orders
Revision 2
Preparing For Demonstrations
Revision 2
Adversary Engagement - Use of Deadly Force
Revision 22
Duties and Responsibilities of the Nuclear Security
Organization
Revision 22
Adversary Engagement - Use of Deadly Force
Revision 22
SY-BR-101-116
Security Inspection of Underground Pathways
Revision 19
SY-BR-101-501
Supplemental Security Contingency Plan
Revision 9
SY-BR-101-502
Braidwood Clean Energy Center Target Sets
Revision 12
Ltr ML25125A112
OFFICE
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETA
R-III/DRSS/SEPIRB
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETC
NSIR/DSO/SPEB
/ETA
NAME
PNegrete
KMaloney
DBradfield
JClark
DATE
May 6, 2025
May 6, 2025
May 7, 2025
May 13, 2025