IR 05000387/1994007
| ML17158A279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1994 |
| From: | Bores R, Randolph Ragland NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-94-07, 50-387-94-7, 50-388-94-08, 50-388-94-8, NUDOCS 9405180219 | |
| Download: ML17158A279 (20) | |
Text
Inspection Nos.
Docket Nos.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-387 94-07'
-388/ 4-08
~gggg 5 -388 License Nos.
NPF-14'PF-22 Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht C m an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns Ivania 18101 Facility Name:
Inspection At:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2 Berwick Penns lv ni Inspection Conducted:
Mrch2-A ril1 ndthr u hM
1
Inspector:
R. C. Raglan, Jr., Rad tion Specialist date Approved by:
r. R. J.
res, Chief Facilities diation Protection Section date
H
58 5 35gg
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8
Steam Electric Station.
The inspection principally focused on the preparation, planning, and implementation of radiological controls for the refueling outage at Susquehanna Unit 2.
Areas reviewed included organization and staffing, training and qualifications of contract radiation protection technicians, external exposure controls and ALARA,the radiation workpermit (RWP)
system, radioactive material and contamination control, routine radiological controls, and respirator usage, In addition, a review of records of exposures to declared pregnant women was performed.
Routine radiological controls at Susquehanna Unit 1 were also reviewed.
~Findin:
The inspection revealed that, overall, very good radiological controls were implemented for the Susquehanna Unit 2 outage.
Radiological controls were well planned and implemented.
The radiological controls organization was well staffed, and the training and qualifications of contract radiation protection technicians were good.
Controls and exposures to declared pregnant women were found to meet regulatory requirements.
Also, radiological controls for routine activities at Susquehanna Unit
were adequate.
Noted program enhancements included the RWP system, shielding program, and radiation source/hot spot system flushing.
9405180219 940504 PDR ADOCK 05000387
DETAILS 1.0 Personnel Contacted 1.1 Licensee Personnel M. Bell, Health Physics Respiratory Protection R. Brouse, Health Physics Planning & Scheduling J. DeMarinis, Health Physics Specialist, ALARA T. DeBorton, Project Engineer, Nuclear Quality Assurance T. Dalpiaz, Manager of Nuclear Maintenance J. Griswold, Health Physics Specialist, Operations Technology J. Finnegan, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor D. Hagan, Health Physics Supervisor R. Kessler, Health Physics Specialist, Dosimetry G. Kuczynski, Nuclear Plant Services Manager E. Mcllvaine, Health Physics Foreman, ALARA D. McGann, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance W. Morrissey, Radiological Operations Supervisor H. Palmer, Jr., Manager of Nuclear Operations R. Saccone, Manager of Nuclear Systems Engineering D. Shane, Health Physics Assistant Foreman G. Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations B. White, Health Physics Assistant Foreman G. Walker, Health Physics Assistant Foreman 1.2
- S. Barber, Senior Resident Inspector Denotes attendance at the exit meeting on April 1, 1994.
The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.0 Areas Reviewed The following areas were reviewed during the inspection:
action on previous findings, organization and staffing, training and qualification, ALARA, radiation work permits (RWPs),
radioactive material and contamination control, routine radiological controls, respiratory protection usage,
control of exposure to a declared pregnant woman (DPW), and plant tours.
3.0 n nPr vi In Fin in 3.1 I
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I m 2-2-The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to investigate a personnel contamination event that occurred on February 4, 1992.
Appropriate short term and long term corrective actions were taken.
Examples include a briefing of all health physics technicians on the event (SOOR 92-041); a revision to Health Physics Level IItraining to incorporate specific guidance to require health physics assistance for entering areas greater than eight feet above floor level; and a revision to Health Physics Procedure HP-TP-320, "Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)", to include special instructions for work in areas eight feet above floor level.
This item is closed.
3.2 n
nr lv I m 7 l-l -
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions related to radioactive contamination found outside of the radiologically controlled area (RCA) in the cement silo building on July 8, 1991. The licensee's long term actions have not yet been completed.
This matter remains open pending completion of those activities and the NRC review of them.
l The inspector reviewed follow-upitems from NRC Inspection Nos. 50-387/94-02 and 50-388/94-02.
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The inspector reviewed Procedure HP-TP-720, Rev. No. 17, and determined that specific guidance for obtaining representative air samples was added to the procedure with Revision 17. This item is closed.
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mnif1 The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken to document the calibration cross-check of air pressure regulators with a secondary standard.
The licensee is now documenting this cross-check by placing a calibration sticker on the air distribution manifold. The use of calibration stickers on air manifolds was confirmed by a selected examination of inservice air manifolds.
This item is closed.
4.0 aniza i n n
ffin The inspector reviewed the organization and staffing of the onsite radiological controls organization.
The inspector evaluated licensee performance in this area by review of applicable documentation including organizational charts, discussions with cognizant individuals, and independent observations ofon-going work activities during tours ofthe facilit The inspector determined that there was very good management oversight of work activities.
Assistant foremen were assigned to key areas of the plant to assure proper coordination with other work groups, and to ensure proper implementation ofradiological controls.
Health physics supervisory personnel were knowledgeable of radiologically significant work scheduled for the outage, and of ongoing work activities. In addition, the inspector determined that the radiological controls organization was adequately staffed to support ongoing work activities.
The licensee's staff had been augmented with 74 senior health physics technicians, 31 junior health physics technicians, and eight entry level technicians.
5.0 Trainin and uglification The inspector reviewed the training and qualification of radiological controls contractor personnel supporting outage work activities.
The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with personnel, review of resumes, and a review of training records and qualification documents.
5.1 Screenin Examination The inspector reviewed a health physics screening examination used by the licensee to evaluate the knowledge and experience of potential contract health physics technicians.
The examination was found to be very challenging and tested knowledge in a wide variety of areas including radiological controls for in-plant job coverage. The inspector noted that the screening examination was an effective tool for assessing the knowledge of contract health physics technicians.
5.2 ualification The inspector reviewed a random selection of resumes for contractor senior health physics technicians.
Experience levels were compared to the requirements specified in ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981, "Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel",
and Procedure HP-HT-14, "Screening and In-Processing of Contract HP Technicians".
ANSUANS 3.1-1981 states in Section 4.5.2, that "technicians shall have three years of working experience in their specialty of which one year should be related technical training."
The licensee's Procedure HP-HT-14 contained similar requirements for Level I Senior Health Physics Technicians. Allofthe resumes reviewed by the inspector documented experience and traiiiingwhich exceeded minimum requirements. In addition, the inspector also observed personnel performance during oversight of radiological significant work, in the field at health physics control points, and during a pre-job ALARAbriefing.
The technicians were knowledgeable of radiological conditions and control requirements for their areas of responsibilit.3 Procedure Trainin A review of training records was performed to verify that contract radiation protection technicians had received training on station procedures and the recent changes to 10 CFR 20.
The review was performed by randomly selecting names from a list of senior radiation protection technicians, and verifying that test results were available.
Test results were retrieved and were satisfactory to the inspector.
5.4 Conclusion The inspector concluded that contract radiation protection technicians were well qualiTied and were receiving adequate training. No safety concerns or violations were identified.
6.0 ALARA The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the licensee's program to maintain occupational radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
The principal focus of the review was planning, preparation, and implementation ofALARA controls for the Unit 2 outage.
The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with cognizant radiation protection personnel, a review of records and documentation, and independent observations of ongoing work activities.
Specific areas of review included the following:
planning and preparation for the Unit 2 outage, use of exposure goals, use of temporary shielding, radiation source and hot spot flushing, use of informational postings, and
~~ reviews.
6.1 Plannin and Pre aration The inspector reviewed ALARAplanning and preparation efforts for the Unit 2 outage.
The Health Physics department had a designated position for "Planner/Scheduler".
The individual fillingthis position was experienced in health physics and knowledgeable in both plant systems and outage planning activities.
The Planner/Scheduler was responsible for attending a variety of planning and coordination meetings including Unit 2 outage meetings, shift manager's meetings, and daily planning meetings.
The Planner/Scheduler played a key role in scheduling ~QU. initiatives, such as temporary shielding and radiation source flushing, into the outage schedule.
The Planner/Scheduler also provided the Health Physics Department with early notification of radiologically significant work, such as plant modifications and major outage activities.
This allowed
IJ
for work coordination and adequate time for preparation of ALARA reviews for scheduled outage work.
In addition, the inspector evaluated ALARA planning and preparation through independent discussions with HP Assistant Foremen and HP ALARASpecialists.
These individuals were found to be knowledgeable of the outage schedule and prepared for radiologically significant work.
6.2 Ex osure Goals The licensee had established goals to limitradiation exposure to 355 person-rem for the Susquehanna Station in 1994, including 225 person-rem for the Susquehanna unit 2 outage.
Performance versus goals was tracked and published for jobs with the highest exposures.
ALARAgoals were found to be reasonable and based on comprehensive evaluation of work scope and prior historical data.
6.3 Tem ora Shieldin During the Unit2 outage, the licensee employed extensive use of temporary portable lead shielding to reduce job specific and general area dose rates.
The majority of shielding was installed in the drywell where, generally, higher work area dose rates exist.
Approximately 30 shielding packages, totalling approximately 58,000 lbs. of portable lead shielding and associated hardware were installed in the drywell.
The majority of drywell shielding packages were installed to shield major accessible portions of recirculation piping, reactor water clean-up piping, core spray, and residual heat removal (RHR) piping.
In addition, shielding was installed on lower dose rate radiation sources for areas with high occupancies.
Examples included the control rod drive (CRD) scram volume discharge header and liquid radwaste piping.
The inspector noted that these shielding installations were evidence of support for the ALARAconcept.
During the inspection, various temporary shielding packages were examined by the inspector.
The installations were neat, orderly, and effective in reducing radiation dose rates.
The installation and removal process appeared to be properly scheduled and well managed.
The inspector noted that the effort and focus of the temporary shielding program were exceHent.
This indicates strong management support for the ALARA program.
6.4 Radiation Source and Hot S ot Flushin Another ALARAinitiative undertaken by the licensee was radiation source and hot spot flushing of systems and piping. The licensee established an informal, but very effective, outage radiation source/hot spot flushing program. Flushes were planned, scheduled, and
implemented on an as needed basis.
Results of flushes performed during the Unit 2 outage were provided to the inspector.
Significant dose reductions were achieved through this effort.
Notable dose rate reductions were obtained from the following flushes:
recirculation loop and valve drain lines, RHR system valve drain lines, RHR shutdown cooling system piping, and core spray system piping.
The significant dose rate reductions indicate that radiation source and hot spot flushing are an effective ALARAtool.
6.5 Informati nal Postin During tours through the station, the inspector noted extensive use of dose rate and radiation source informational postings.
This included the following:
enlarged survey maps with radiation source and low dose rate areas highlighted with pink and green shading, hanging 3-sided mobiles with dose rate range postings, radiation source postings, hot spot postings, and low dose rate posting.
These postings were informative and provided excellent information to personnel working within the radiologically controlled area.
The inspector also randomly selected plant workers in the reactor building and drywell areas, and questioned their knowledge of work area dose rates. Allindividuals questioned were knowledgeable of work area dose rates and the locations of designated lower dose rate areas.
6.6 ALARAReviews 6.6.1 R~WP The inspector reviewed a biased sampling of RWPs for radiologically significant work in the dryweH. The inspector noted, that as a result of recent changes made to the RWP system, a significant amount of ALARAinformation was incorporated into the body of all RWPs.
Examples include:
special instructions for health physics technicians, radiation and contamination alert levels, ALARAdose estimates, and special instructions to worker.6.2 ALARAPre'ob Review The inspector also reviewed a biased sampling of ALARAprejob reviews that were included in the RWP packages.
These reviews were in the format of a check list, and included and addressed the following:
person-rem estimates, work planning, external exposure controls, internal exposure controls, industrial safety respiratory protection considerations, health physics operational considerations, dosimetry and radiological monitoring, anticipated dose rates and airborne radioactivity, additional comments and instructions (paragraph format), and synopsis of work.
These ALARAreviews were found to be comprehensive and of high quality.
6.6.3 ALARAPre'ob Briefin The inspector attended a prejob briefing in preparation for the performance of CRD changeout.
The briefing was conducted by an ALARASpecialist assigned responsibility for CRDs, and a Health Physics Assistant Foreman assigned to the drywell. Participants were provided with handouts of anticipated radiological conditions.
Briefing topics included the following:
job description, identification of radiation sources, historical dose rates, historical exposures, methods to minimize radiation exposure, work coordination between maintenance personnel and health physics personnel, dosimetry requirements, required health physics surveys, RWPs and RWP requirements, and special job situations and requirements.
Individuals performing CRD changeout were required to have experience with CRD changeout, or must have completed CRD Mock-up Training.
The health physics and maintenance personnel attending the briefing were all experienced in CRD changeout, and the discussions served to reinforce existing knowledge.
The inspector found the briefing to be comprehensive and informative,
No safety concerns or violations were identified.
7.0 Radiation Work Permits The inspector performed a selected review of the RWP system, noting that the licensee implemented a new revised RWP system in the Pall 1993.
The focus of the review was to evaluate the radiological control instructions provided to health physics technicians and to station workers, and to evaluate the ease of use of the RWPs in the plant.
The evaluation was based on a review of RWPs at various health physics control points, discussions with cognizant radiation protection personnel, and interviews with station workers.
The inspector made the following observations.
The scope of the RWPs and work activities was well defined.
Radiological control instructions provided to health physics personnel and to station workers were clear, specific, and informative, The RWPs were very flexible and specific.
One RWP could be used for a variety of work activities with different protective clothing requirements.
The RWPs included significant ALARAinformation.
Although health physics personnel considered the new RWPs more difficultto write, plant personnel found the RWPs easier to understand and follow.
The inspector found the RWP system to be excellent.
8.0 Radioactive Material and Contamination Contr l The inspector reviewed the control of radioactive material, contaminated material, and contamination.
The following matters were reviewed:
posting and labeling of radiological control boundaries, posting and labeling of contaminated and radioactive material, adequacy ofcontamination surveys to support planning forand support ofongoing work, personnel frisking practices, and frisking practices for tools and equipment.
The licensee was effectively controlling radioactive and contaminated material and contamination.
Allpackages of radioactive material examined by the inspector were posted properly, and radiological control boundaries were clear and well maintained.
The inspector did point out one area located on 699-ft elevation of the turbine building condenser bay, where electrical cables and tubing were not secured at the point of crossing from a clean area to a designated contaminated area.
The licensee stated that action would be initiated to secure these material.1 Personal Contamination Re orts PCRs The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for monitoring PCRs to determine if PCRs were being tracked, properly evaluated, and ifthe root causes of PCRs were being utilized for corrective actions.
The licensee's performance in this area was evaluated based on discussions with cognizant radiation protection personnel and a review of records and documentation.
A PCR was generated when an individual's skin or clothing was found to have radioactive contamination greater than 100 counts per minute above background, as measured on a HP-210 GM detector.
The licensee had established a goal to limitthe number of PCRs to less than 0.8 PCRs per 1000 RWP man-hrs.
This resulted in an outage goal of 75 PCRs, and a yearly goal of 260 PCRs.
The PCR Coordinator reported that as of March 31, 1994 the number of outage PCRs was 19 and the yearly total was 66, and that these numbers were close to the anticipated rate of accumulation for the established goals.
The licensee utilized a computer data base to track the circumstances associated with each PCR (e.g., name, workgroup, date, location ofcontamination, activity, cause, etc.). The PCR Coordinator demonstrated that the data were easily retrievable and could be sorted by data base fields. The PCR Coordinator also indicated that the PCR database was routinely used to report PCR data back to workgroups forpossible corrective actions, and that a yearly report is also generated.
The inspector noted that the established PCR goals were challenging, the number of PCRs accumulated to date was comparatively low, and the method used to track PCRs was effective.
However, other than the yearly report, and the informal transmittal of PCR data back to work groups, a formal process for evaluating the cause of PCRs and implementing corrective actions (e.g., revisions to traiiiing, changes to RWPs or work practices, modification ofprescribed protective clothing, etc.)
was not being used.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's observation.
9.0 R utine Radi
ical C ntr
The inspector reviewed the adequacy and implementation of radiological controls provided for the ongoing Susquehanna Unit 2 refueling outage.
The inspector also reviewed routine radiological controls at Susquehanna Unit 1.
The inspector toured selected portions ofradiologically controlled areas, including Unit 2 drywell, Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor buildings, and the Unit 2 turbine building.
The inspector reviewed the following elements of the radiological controls program:
performance and adequacy of radiological surveys to support pre-planning of work and ongoing work activities,
use of appropriately calibrated instrumentation to measure radiation and contamination, personnel adherence to radiation protection procedures, radiation work permits, and good radiological control practices, posting, barricading, and access control as appropriate, to Radiation, High Radiation, and Airborne Radioactivity areas, and airborne radioactivity sampnng and controls.
The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with cognizant personnel, review of ongoing work activities, and review of various
. documents.
The inspector also questioned radiation workers and radiation protection personnel to evaluate personnel understanding of radiological conditions and program requirements.
The inspector's review indicated that the licensee's routine radiological controls were effective.
10.0 The inspector performed a selected review of the licensee's respiratory protection program.
The-inspector discussed respirator usage with the Respiratory Protection Specialist, examined documentation of respirator usage, and reviewed a job where respirators were eliminated in order to minimize total safety risk to personnel.
The inspector reviewed documentation of respirator use versus year and assignment of maximum permissible concentration (MPC)-hours for the years 1988 - 1993.
The inspector noted a generally declining trend in respirator usage and in the assignment of MPC-hours.
The Respiratory Protection Specialist reported that greater reliance on engineering controls (such as high efficiency air particulate (HEPA) filtrationunits and containments)
was being used rather than relying on respiratory protective devices to limitinternal radiation exposure.
10.1 T tal Ri k Conce t The licensee notified the inspector that a decision was made to delete the use of respiratory protection devices from a particular job that, in the past, typically required the use of respiratory protection devices.
The purpose for eliminating the respiratory protection requirement, was to attempt to minimize total risk to the personnel involved.
A high pressure coolant injection (HPC1) exhaust line weld was scheduled for in-service inspection during the Unit 2 outage.
Rust and scale had to be removed from the weld surface to perform the inspection.
The weld preparation employed hand scrubbing followed by use of a wet "power brush."
Contamination readings at the weld surface were 50,000 dpm/100 cm'mearable contamination, and 24 mrad/hr direct radiation
readings.
Use of a power brush on contaminated materials, at these levels, has the potential for generating low concentrations of airborne radioactivity.
In the past, respiratory protective devices were routinely used for this type of work.
The work location was a scaffold platform located approximately 20 feet below the suppression pool catwalk, and approximately 10 feet above the suppression pool water surface.
Access to the work location involved climbing down a ladder to reach the scaffold platform.
The licensee evaluated the work activity and determined that climbing the ladder and working on the platform with respiratory protection, presented an increased risk of falling, and involved greater risk than performing the work without respiratory protection.
As a result, the licensee made a decision to perform the work without respiratory protection. Individuals performing the work were thoroughly briefed, a 2,000 cubic feet per minute HEPA filtration system was set-up to maintain clean air, and face shields were utilized to prevent facial contaminations.
Air sample results indicated an airborne concentration during power brushing of0.46 times the derived air concentration (DAC). None of the individuals involved received skin or clothing contamination.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's evaluation, and decision to eliminate the use of respiratory protection for this specific job, were proper and supported the concept of minimizing total risk.
No safety concerns or violations were identified.
Control of Ex osure to a DPW The inspector reviewed the adequacy and implementation of controls for exposure to a DPW.
Specifically, the inspector reviewed the methods the licensee used to maintain exposures to the embryo/fetus less than regulatory limits and at a uniform rate.
The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based on discussions with cognizant radiation protection personnel, independent discussions with licensee and contractor personnel, and a review of procedures and work practices.
Procedural Controls Nuclear Department Procedure NDAP-00-0625, Rev. 2, "Personnel Radiation Exposure Monitoring Program", outlined the controls used for prenatal radiation exposure.
The procedure specified maximum dose limits for a DPW of 500 mrem during the gestation period, and 50 mrem in any month during the gestation period.
In addition, upon declaration of pregnancy, the procedure requires a work area dose evaluation to be performed to ensure that exposures to a DPW do not exceed specified limits. Ifthe dose evaluation identifies that the individual is likely to exceed exposure limits, then reassignment of the DPW to a low dose area is recommende.2 Dose Evaluation The inspector reviewed an actual "Dose Evaluation For a Declared Pregnant Woman".
The individual was assigned to a control point desk in the reactor building for the Unit 2 outage.
Staytime at the control point was estimated to be approximately 108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br /> per month.
Dose rates in the assigned work area were measured to be approximately 0.6 mrem per hour.
The estimated monthly exposure was calculated to be 65 mrem/month.
This exceeded the 50 mrem/month procedural requirement, and a recommendation was made to relocate the individual to a lower dose rate area.
The work group reassigned the individual to a lower dose rate area as appropriate.
Il.l
Once an individual declares pregnancy, her name is entered into the Daily Dose Tracking Report requiring an extension to 50 mrem per month.
When the Daily Dose Tracking Report is printed, a listing of these individuals is printed as an attachment to the report.
This method allows for daily dose tracking for the DPW.
The inspector reviewed the Daily Dose Tracking Report for Tuesday 3/29/94.
Each individual who was currently classified as a DPW, was listed on the dose tracking report.
No exposure for a DPW exceeded 500 mrem during the gestation period, nor 50 mrem per month.
11.4 T~raikkikk
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The inspector evaluated the adequacy of prenatal radiation exposure training through independent discussions with licensee and contractor personnel, and by a review of training documents.
The inspector also randomly selected individuals within the protected areas and inquired about the level of prenatal radiation exposure training provided by the licensee.
All individuals contacted, were knowledgeable of radiation exposure limits to a DPW, and radiation exposure risks.
These individuals felt that the level of training provided pertaining to prenatal radiation exposure was adequate.
The inspector reviewed the following training documents related to prenatal radiation exposure.
These included the following:
Prenatal Radiation Exposure Training (HP-009), Rev. 1, Health Physics Level I Training (HP-001), Rev. 8, and Health Physics Level IITraining (HP-002), Rev. These instructional units were recently revised to incorporate the requirements specified in the new 10 CFR 20 regulations.
Prenatal Radiation Exposure Training (HP-009) is provided to all DPW. It includes instructions on the following:
radiation risks, NRC regulatory position, licensee policies, non-radiation risks, methods to reduce biological risks, and Regulatory Guide 8.13 "Instructions Concerning Prenatal Radiation Exposure".
This document was considered excellent.
It was comprehensive and provided a
considerable amount of information concerning radiation exposure risks.
The inspector also reviewed the level of training provided in Health Physics Level I and Health Physics Level II training.
Both of these courses are required in order to obtain unescorted access into the restricted area.
These documents included a brief discussion of radiation risks, exposure limits for a DPW, and licensee policies for exposure to a DPW. The inspector noted that these documents had recently been revised to incorporate the changes in the new 10 CFR 20 regulations.
The inspector pointed out, that as a result of the revisions to these training documents, the focus and emphasis of prenatal radiation exposure training had shifted to individuals who had officially declared pregnancy.
The licensee acknowledged this observation, and agreed to review Health Physics Level I &IItmining for possible enhancements.
The inspector concluded that the procedural controls, dose evaluations, work practices, and training for a DPW were effective in maintaining exposures to the embryo/fetus within regulatory limits.
12.0 Station Tours The inspector toured the Susquehanna Station periodically during the inspection and reviewed station conditions.
Housekeeping and material conditions, including areas inside the drywell were generally good.
Walkways and aisles were uncluttered, free of debris, and well illuminated. Radiological control boundaries were well maintained and posted properly.
The following matters were brought to the licensee's attention.
One location in the turbine building had acetylene and oxygen compressed gas cylinders stored less than 20 feet apart without a one-half hour fire wall. Upon notification, the licensee took immediate action to separate these cylinders and to store them in a proper manne Disassembled turbine components were stored immediately in front of a fire brigade storage area.
These materials could restrain immediate access to the storage area.
Upon notification, the licensee initiated actions to remove the materials blocking access to the door.
The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of this inspection, on April 1, 1994.
The inspector reviewed the inspection findings and the licensee acknowledged the results.