IR 05000387/1988016
| ML17156A914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1988 |
| From: | Blough A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17156A913 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-88-16, 50-388-88-19, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-5, NUDOCS 8811080216 | |
| Download: ML17156A914 (19) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.:
50-387/88-16 50-388/88-19 Docket Nos.:
50-387 50-388 License Nos.:
NPF-22 Licensee:
Penns lvania Power and Li ht Com an 2 North. Ninth Street Allentown Penns lvania 18101.
. Facility Name:
Inspection At:
Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Salem Townshi Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:
Au ust
1988 Se tember
1988 Inspectors:
F. Young, Senior Resident Inspector, SSES J. Stair, Resident Inspector, SSES
. Approved By:
A.
Randy Blo
, Chief Reactor Projects Section No.
3B Division of, Reactor Projects Date Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected:
Routine resident inspection of plant operations, physical security, plant events, surveillance, and maintenance activities.
Specifi-cally, items reviewed in more detail in the facility operations areas were:
improper location of Reactor Water Cleanup System high temperature sensor; inadvertent actuation of Standby Gas Treatment System; inadvertent Reactor Water Cleanup System isolation; and inoperable drywell vacuum breaker position indication.
Other items reviewed included:
licensee's July monthly operating report; followup on NRC Bulletin 88-05; and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
Results:
Routine review of maintenance and surveillance activities noted good control and performance.
Licensee event reports (LERs)
and monthly reports were complete and accurate.
Licensee's action on resolving the vacuum breaker position indication problem was technically correct and properly documented.
The RWCU isolation demonstrates a
need for the licensee to continue their evaluation to resolve this problem.
With respect to NRC Bulletin 88-05, the licensee action plan was complete; however, their effort in this area has been suspended in response to the NRC supplement to this bulletin.
In general, adequate management involvement and attention was applied.
88110802i6 881026 PDR ADQCK 05000387 G
PNU
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Introduction and Overview.
~Pa e
1.1 NRC Staff Activities (Module Nos.
71707, 71709, 71881, 82301, 92703)
1.2 Unit 1 Summary..................
.1.3 Unit 2 Summary.
1.4 Persons Contacted.
1-
1 2.0 Rou'tine Periodic Inspections 2. 1 Scope of Review......
2.2 Reactor Water Cleanup System (Module No. 93702)........
2.3 Standby Gas Treatment System
,(Module No. 93702)........
2.4 Common Standby Gas Treatment (Module No. 71710)
Isolation - Unit 2 Actuation System Walkdown 3.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities 3. 1 Monthly Surveillance Observations (Module No. 61726).....
3.2 Monthly Maintenance Observations (Module No. 62703)......
4.0 Licensee Reports-4. 1 In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (Module No. 90712)............
~.
4.2 Review of Periodic Reports (Module No. 90713)..........
5.0 Extended High Temperature Effects (Module No. 92701)........
~..
6.0 Improper location of Reactor Water Cleanup System High Temperature Sensor - Unit 1 (Module No. 92701)
7.0 Inoperable Drywell Vacuum Breaker Position Indication Unit (Module No. 93702)........
8.0 NRC Bulletin No. 88-05 Followup (Module No. 92703)............
~
9.0 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Modul.e No. 92701)....
10.0 Exit Meeting (Module No. 30703).
DETAILS 1.0 'ntroduction and Overview 1. 1 NRC Staff Activities The purpose of this inspection was to assess licensee activities at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES)
during power operation as it related to reactor safety and worker radiation protection.
Within each area, the inspectors documented the specific purpose of the review, the scope of inspection activities and findings, and appro-priate conclusions.
This assessment is based on actual observation of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, measure-ment of radiation levels, 'or independent calculation and selective review of applicable documents:
1.2
~Ui Unit
operated at or near full power throughout the inspection period.
Scheduled power reductions were conducted during the period for control rod pattern adjustments, surveillance
.testing, and scheduled maintenance.
An unplanned actuation of the standby gas treatment system occured on September 1,
due to a
momentary power interruption.
See Detail 2.3.
Unit
operated at or near full power throughout the inspection period.
Scheduled power reductions were conducted during the period for control rod pattern adjustments, surveillance testing, and scheduled maintenance.
A Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation occurred on August 19, on high differential temperature.
See Detail 2.2.
1.4 Persons Contacted During the course of the inspection, the inspector interviewed, dis-cussed issues, and received information from various licensee employees.
Listed below are the senior people and/or those individuals who sup-plied substantive information.
Members who attended the exit inter-view on September 23, 1988 are indicated by an asteris J. Blakeslee, Assistant Superintendent of Plant, SSES
" F. Butler, Supervisor of Maintenance, SSES
" R.
Byram, Superintendent of Plant, SSES.
" T. Dalpiaz, Supervisor of Technical Support, SSES J.
Doxsey, Reactor Engineering Supervisor, SSES
" A. Dominguez',
Senior Results'ngineer, Operations, SSES E. Figard, Supervisor of I&C/Computer, SSES J.
Graham, Assistant Manager, NQA F. Malek, Personnel and Administration Supervisor, SSES T.,Markowski, Day Shift Supervisor, SSES D.
McGann, Compliance Engineer, SSES T. Nork, Plant Engineering Group Supervisor, SSES
" R.
Prego, Supervisor of QA Operations, NQA
- H. Riley, Supervisor of Health Physics/Chemistry, SSES
- D. Roth, Senior Compliance Engineer, SSES
- R. Stotler, Supervisor of Security, SSES 2.0 Routine Periodic Ins ections 2.1 ~IR
I The NRC resident inspectors periodically inspected the facility to determine the licensee's compliance with the general, operating requirements of Section 6 of the Technical Specifications (TS) in the following areas:
I review of selected plant parameters for abnormal, trends; plant status from a maintenance/modification viewpoint, includ-ing plant housekeeping and fire protection measures; control of ongoing and special evolutions, including control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including logkeeping practices; implementation of radiological controls; implementation of the security plan, including access control, boundary integrity, and badging practices; control room operations during regular and backshift hours, including frequent observation of activities in progress, and periodic reviews of selected sections of the unit supervisor's log and control room operator's log and other control room daily logs;
followup items on activities that could affect plant safety or impact plant operations; areas outside the control room; and, selected licensee planning meetings.
Also, the inspectors reviewed specific events in more detail as.
described, in the sections that follow.
2a2 Reactor Water Cleanu S stem RWCU Isolation Unit 2 On August 19, 1988, a Division II Reactor Water Cl eanup (RWCU) i sol a-tion occurred when the RWCU filter/demineralizer room high differen-tial temperature (dT) reached its setpoint of 31'ahrenheit (F).
As a result, the outboard isolation valve (F004)
closed and the RWCU pumps tripped.
The high dT occurred due to outside ambient tempera-ture dropping overnight to 57~
F and to residual heat in the RWCU room maintaining the room at approximately 88'F.
Supply air heaters did not energize since the outside air temperature did not drop below the thermostat's setpoint.
The system remained isolated for several hours in order to allow for system cooldown to perform work on a sys-tem vent valve.
When the work was completed, the RWCU system was returned to service.
Followup actions by the licensee included raising the temperature controller setpoint to maintain supply air at approximately
F and adjusting Zone II supply air louvers to the RWCU penetration room to obtain a differential temperature of approximately 12~F based on engineering calculations'he licensee also adjusted the trip-set-point to approximately
F to help alleviate inadvertent RWCU isola-tions due to low supply air temperature.
The inspector verified proper system response to the isolation signal and found the licen-see's actions acceptable.
2.3 Standb Gas Treatment S stem Actuation On September 1,
1988, an unplanned actuation of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS)
occurred due to a momentary power interrup-tion to the Division II, Zone III heating, ventilation and air condi-tioning (HVAC) isolation logic.
Plant response was per design with the exception of the B SGTS train inlet damper (PDD07554B), which did not function properly.
This damper modulates to control air flow from the reactor building HVAC recirculation supply plenum to the SGTS.
As a result the licensee declared the B train of 'he SGTS inoperable and entered the seven day Limiting Condition for Operation of Technical Specification 3.6.5.3.a.
The Division II, Zone III lockout relay was reset and secondary containment restored to its
normal lineup within 15 minutes.
The momentary power interruption was apparently due to the inadvertent tripping of isolation logic supply breaker in panel lY226 by two individuals who were in the process of hanging a
permit; however, the licensee was unable to positively confirm this.
The licensee repaired the recirculation supply plenum damper, verified its proper functioning and returned the SGTS to service on September 3,
1988.
The inspector discussed the event with the licensee, verified the system response and found the licensee's actions acceptable.
2.4 ESF Walkdown Common Standb Gas Treatment S stem On September 1,
1988, the inspector independently verified the oper-ability of the Standby Gas Treatment System by performing a
walkdown of the accessible portions of the system.
The engineered safety system status verification included the following:
Confirmation that the licensee'
system check-off lists and operating procedure were consistent with the plant as-built drawings and as-built configuration.
Identification of equipment conditions and items that might de-,
grade performance.
Verification of proper breaker positions at local electrical boards and indications on control boards.
Verification of properly valved in and functioning instrumenta-tion.
Verification that valves were in the proper position, power was available, and appropriate valves were locked.
The inspector determined that the system was properly aligned in accordance with the operating procedure and the equipment conditions indicated the components were well maintained.
3.0 Surveillance and Maintenance Activities On a sampling basi s, the inspector selected several surveillance and main-tenance activities to ensure that specific programmatic elements described below were being met.
Details of this review are documented in the following section. 3. 1 Surveillance Observations The inspector observed the performance of surveillance and special tests to determine that:
the test procedure conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained before initiating the test; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved procedure; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operations were met; test data was accurate and complete; removal and restora-tion of the affected components was properly accomplished; test results met Technical Specification and procedural requirements; deficiencies noted were reviewed and appropriately resolved; and the surveillance was completed at the required frequency.
These observations included:
'I-079-235, Monthly Functional Test of the Refuel Floor High Exhaust Duct Radiation Monitor Channels RE-D12-2N015 A 5 B, per-formed on September 15, 1988.
- SI-079-236, Monthly Functional Test of the Refuel Floor Wall Exhaust Duct High Radiation Monitor Channels RE-D12-2N010 A 5 B, performed on September 10, 1988.
- No unacceptable conditions were identified.
3.2 Maintenance Observation The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, Technical Specifications, and industry codes or standards.
The following items were considered during this review:
Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and gC hold points were estab-lished where required; functional te'sting was performed prior to declaring the particular component(s)
operable; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; fire protection controls were implemented; and the equipment was verified to be properly returned to service.
These observations included:
Eddy Current examinations of the Unit 2 Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers, performed under WA V73780, on August 17, 198 I Investigation of the Unit
Reactor Building Chiller 2K206B tripping problem,. performed under WA V80676, on August 17, 1988.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.0 Licensee Re orts 4. 1 In-Office Review of Licensee Event Re orts The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy-of
'escription of the cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved,.and whether the event warranted onsite folloWup.
The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit
88-013-00 Reactor Water Cleanup System Division II Isolation on Pene-tration Room High Temperature.
88-015-00 Loss of Fire Detection Due to Thunderstorm Activity.
88-016-00 Main Steam Line Leak Detection Differential Temperature System Design Deficiencies'8-017-00 Reactor Water Cleanup System Penetration Room High Differ-ential Temperature. Division I Isolation.
The above LERs were found acceptable.
4.2 Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Upon receipt, the following periodic report submitted by the licensee was reviewed by the inspector.
The report was reviewed to determine that it included the required information, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance spec-ifications, that planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems, and whether any in'formation in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following report was reviewed:
Monthly Operating Report - 'July, 1988, dated August 15, 1988 No unacceptable conditions were identifie i
5.0 Extended Outside Ambient Hi h
Tem erature Effects The inspector discussed the issue of the'impact of extended outside, ambi-ent high temperatures with the licensee to determine if the licensee had initiated any actions, including'an engineering evaluation of the effects of extended high temperatures on plant structures, equipment and systems.
During a recent heat wave, several areas in each of the units experienced increased temperatures which brought them close to their associated tech-nical specification limits on maximum ultimate heat sink temperatures and maximum containment temperature; however, in no case were limits actually exceeded.
One of the areas involved the reactor water cleanup (RWCU)
system in both units which experienced several isolations as a result of room temperatures exceeding their isolation trip setpoints.
RWCU isola-tions were reviewed in NRC Combined Inspection Report 50-387/88-12 and 50-388/88-15.
The remaining areas which exhibited increased temperatures were the-Unit
drywell and the Emergency Service Water/Residual Heat Removal Service Water (ESW/RHRSW)
spray pond, reaching 133 F
and
F respectively.
Corresponding technical specification limits are 135 F and 88'F respectively.
Based upon their operating experience, the licensee believes that they do not have a problem with extended high temperatures.
The, licensee, there-fore, has not conducted a
comprehensive programmatic evaluation of the impact of extended high temperatures on plant structures, equipment, and systems.
The licensee has, however, performed specific evaluations of increased ambient temperature effects on the ability of certain'systems to perform their design functions.
These systems include the ESW/RHRSW spray pond, ESW/RHRSW Pump House heating, ventilation and air conditioning, and drywell cooling.
As a result of their studies, the licensee has implemen-ted a modification on the Unit 1 drywell cooling system and is planning the same modification on Unit 2.
6.0 Im ro er Location of Reactor Water Cleanu S stem Hi h Tem erature Sensor
- Unit
On August 24, 1988, the licensee determined that one of the Division I high temperature sensors in the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU)
room was located such that it did not sense the ambient room temperature as required.
The sensor was located within a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) duct which passed through the RWCU System pump rooms, but did not draw air from this room.
The high temperature sensors are used to isolate the RWCU system in the event of a RWCU pipe break 'outside containment.
The licensee processed a design change in order to relocate the sensor to a position outside the duct where it will sense ambient room temperatures.
In order prevent an adverse chemistry excursion which could result from isolating the RWCU system, the licensee requested a one-time relief from that portion of the technical specification which specifies placing one trip system in the trip condition.
The request was granted by Region The licensee determined that the cause for the improper location of the temperature sensor was a misinterpretation of the design drawings used to depict temperature sensor locations due to their inadequate location representation.
The inspector verified the licensee's actions and found them acceptable.
7.0 Ino erable'Dr well Vacuum Breaker Position Indication - Unit'
8.0 During performance of the Monthly Vacuum Breaker surveillance (SO-159-002)
on September 5,
1988, Vacuum Breaker PSV-15704E2 showed dual indication when open and full closed indication when shut.
The licensee immediately entered the technical specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
3.6.4 Action Statement (a)
which 'requires that the inoperable vacuum breaker be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be that at least Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> a'nd in Cold Shutdown within the fol-lowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
On September 7,
1988, the licensee determined that the vacuum breaker was in fact operable and that the problem was in the position indication.
An engineering evaluation determined that the valve was operable.
This determination was based on an analysis of the timing sequence (independent of the failed position indication)
arrived at by:
(1) data from the open indicating light; (2) valve closing time following release of the test button; and (3) historical experience with the vacuum bre'akers indicating that the likelihood of a
valve failure is remote.
This allowed the licensee to exit the L.C.O.
action statement (a)
and enter action statement (c),
which allows the unit to continue operation and to verify the other vacuum breaker in the pair to be closed within
hours and at least once per 15 days thereafter, otherwise be in at least Hot Shutdown within the next
hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee is presently checking the position of the remaining vacuum breaker in the pair on a shiftly basis and plans to perform repairs during the.first available outage.
The inspector discussed the problem with. members of the plant staff and observed a
position indication check, noting the dual indication on PSV-15704E2.
The inspector considers the licensee's actions in regard to this problem acceptable.
NRC Bulletin No. 88-05 Followu
Nonconformin Materials Su lied B
Pi in Su lies Inc. at Folsom New Jerse and West Jerse Manufacturin Com an at Williamstown New Jerse NRC Bulletin No.
88-05
"Nonconforming Materials Supplied By Piping Sup-plies, Inc.
(PSI)
at Folsom, New Jersey and West Jersey Manufacturing Company (WJM) at Williamstown, New Jersey,"
was issued on May 6, 1988 to inform licensee's that the NRC had obtained copies of certified material test reports (CMTRs) for material supplied by PSI and WJM that contain
false information about material supplied to the nuclear industry. Licen-sees were required to submit information regarding materials supplied by PSI and WJM and requested to 1)
take actions to assure that mater'ials
'omply wth ASME Code and design specification requirements or are suitable for their intended service, or 2) replace such materials.
The licensee responded to the Bulletin on September 2,
1988 (PLA-3076) and stated that approximately 1100 flanges had been identified to date.
No fittings or material from vendor Chew's-Landing, who was also identified in the Bulletin as potentially supplying nonconforming parts was identi-fied.
Of the 1100 flanges, about 400 have not yet been located, but it is not believed that any are installed in safety related systems'his is based on initial reviews
,for nearly all safety-related piping in both units.
Reviews of non-safety system piping are still being performed.,
However,
'construction documentation for non-safety system components rarely included heat numbers; thus it is unlikely that the review wi 11 identify many additional installations of these flanges.
Reviews were also conducted of material purchased by Morrison-Knudson for the
"E" diesel generator project.
.This review identified 34 flanges,installed in the "E" diesel.'o date licensee actions have included:
Sending several of the suspect flanges from the warehouse to an independent lab for analysis.
Conducting hardness testing using Equotip equipment on 48 flanges in safety-related applications.
Providing 21, flanges from the warehouse to Bechtel for testing.
All installed flanges which were tested have been determined to be accept-able based on test results.
Based on PP8 L and industry test results, the licensee has determined that continued use of installed flanges which have not been tested does not present a safety problem.
Flanges in the ware-house are on hold pending resolution of the need for additional action.
The inspector reviewed the results from the independent lab tests, and witnessed two in-plant hardness tests on flanges in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
system.
Field verification by the inspector was found acceptable.
The licensee's corrective actions in regard to this bulletin will be reviewed in a
subsequent NRC inspection following the licensee's final submitta.0 Followu on Previous Ins ection Findin s
9.1 Closed Ins ector Followu Items 387/87-08-04 388/87-08-04:
Insufficient Data on Notification Form
'
In April 1987, during a routine safety inspection of the licensee's annual emmergency
'preparedness exercise; the inspector noted that during communications via the Emergency Notification, System (ENS)
and to offsite authorities, the notification form used does not provide all the necessary information which the NRC headquarters duty officer requires regarding type of event, cause of failure, and corrective
'ctions to be taken.
During a drill held on August 23, 1988, the inspectors reviewed the notification forms used by the licensee to report information to NRC and found that Form EP-IP-002-01 is used by a designated communicator to provide current information on plant status, emergency classifi-cation, and a description of the accident to NRC and offsite author-ities.
The NRC's Event Notification Worksheet is simultaneously used by the Shift Technical Advisor to report additional details on acci-dent information to the engineering support staffs The inspector found the licensee's actions acceptable and considers this item closed..
9.2 Closed Ins ector Followu Items 387/88-06-02 388/88-05-02:
Ade uac of Control Room Staffin In February 1988, during a routine safety inspection of the licen-
.see's annual emergency preparedness exercise, the inspector noted that instead of demonstrating their primary response duties such as verifying instrument readings and performing plant manipulations, the plant control room operators were assigned to communications func-tions; therefore the inspector could not make a determination if the control room staff present was sufficient to perform all required functions.
The licensee conducted a
health physics drill on August 23, 1988 which included activation of the TSC, EOF, response by site and cor-porate emergency staff, and decision making in each emergency response facility.
The drill was initiated in the simulator. 'he inspectors observed the personnel
'available in the simulator and determined that adequate staff are available to perform both plant mitigation and emergency response functions.
Licensee representa-tives stated that if additional communications support is needed, an operator from the unaffected unit would be designated for this func-
~
tion.
The inspector found the licensee's actions acceptable and considers this item close.0 ~Ei M
On September 23, 1988, the inspector discussed the findings of this inspection with station management.
Based on NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives, it was deter-mined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restrictions.
At the conclusion, the licensee acknowledged the NRC findings and did not disagree with the findings or their characterization.