IR 05000373/1994005
| ML20029D987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1994 |
| From: | Clayton H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029D986 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-94-05, 50-373-94-5, 50-374-94-05, 50-374-94-5, NUDOCS 9405130227 | |
| Download: ML20029D987 (15) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Report ho.
50-373/94005(DRP); 50-374/94005(DRP)
Docket hos.
50-373; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Comnionwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West 111 1400 Opus Place Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
March 2 through April 19, 1994 Inspectors:
D. Hills K. Ihnen F. Brush J. Belanger J. Gavula R. Zuffa, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Approved By:
'H. Brent Clayton, Chief Date Reactor Projects Branch 1 Inspection Summary Insoection from March 2 throuah April 19. 1994 (Recorts No. 50-373/94005(DRP):
50-374/94005(DRP)).
Areas Ir.soected: A routino, unannounced safety inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and an Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety inspector.
The inspection included followup on previously identified items and licensee event reports, review of operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, and engineering activities, and review of a security concern.
Results:
No violations were identified.
One non-cited violation was identif'ed involving bypassing of the auxiliary hoist travel limits when i
moving control rod blades.
Two unresolved items were identified involving an inconsistency between a relay setting order and the Unit 2 current transformer winding ratio and the application of a reduction f actor to seismic response spectra in seismic analyses.
Five open items were identified involving diesel generater starting air system moisture problems, penthouse heater failures causing oackwards rotation of diesel generator ventilation fans, a loss of
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shutdown cooling and vessel leven drop due to a failed valve, missile barrier protection design of the diesel generator air intakes, and a failed snubber and resulting support damage on recirculation piping.
Plant Operations Fuel unload went well absent the problems noted in previous similar endeavors.
This demonstrated the significant accomplishments that could be derived from more extensive plant management and bargaining unit cooperation to overcome obstacles.
Plant communications were mixed with examples of both good (discovery of inappropriate bypassing of interlocks through conversations with personnel from another facility) and poor (inadequate and untimely dissemination of information regarding a contaminated water spill)
communications.
This indicated a challenge to plant management to ensure consistency in this area across the organization.
Likewise, increased consistency in personnel using a questioning attitude was needed. An example of benefits derived from a good questioning attitude was an operator identifying broken cooling fans for a safety related bus transformer.
However, this type of questioning attitude was not demonstrated during diesel generator testing described in paragraph Sc.
Activity coordination problems continued including personnel scheduling, lack of anticipatory actions, and shift turnover deficiencies.
Despite previous NRC concerns expressed regarding turnover problems and resulting actions taken by the licensee, good turnover practices were still not consistently applied.
Congestion at the shift engineer's office and shift control room engineer's desk was still observed although plans to implement a work control center may help alleviate the problem.
Maintenance The need for greater consistency of personnel using a questioning attitude was demonstrated by the failure of several licensee personnel to question the acceptability of foreign material in diesel generator comporients.
Examples of poor plant material condition included inoperable diesel generator penthouse heaters anl the failure of a valve causing a vessel level drop and loss of shutdown cooling.
Both issued will be tracked as open items and will remain under review by the NRC.
Engineerina Two examples of good engineering support were the identification of the proper scram pilot valve diaphragm replacement interval through discussions with another facility and identification of tripped harmonic restraint relays which could have led to a premature unit auxiliary transformer trip.
Other engineering issues currently being reviewed by the NRC included diesel generator ventilation air intake design, a failed recirculation piping snubber, and the methodology utilized for seismic analyses.
Plant Supogri Several new initiatives were implemented with others planned in an attempt to address radworker performance issues (following administrative requirements and plant housekeeping). However, some problems continued to occur indicating inconsistent reception of the needed improvement message.
Continued plant management focus was warranted in this area. Although vessel disassembly went relatively well, some improvement in radiation protection considerations was also warranted. Drywell housekeeping and its affect on potential suppression pool strainer plugging was under NRC review.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
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- W. Murphy, Site Vice President j
- D. Ray, Plant Manager J. Gieseker, Site Engineering and Construction Manager C. Sargent, Support Services Director
- D. Farr, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- M. Santic, Maintenance Manager
- R. Crawford, Work Planning Assistant Superintendent
- K. Kociuba, Master Electrical Mechanic
- M. Cray, Master Instrument Mechanic
- J. Lewis, Radiation Protection Improvements Manager
- D. Leggett, Assistant Superintendent Operations
- J. Schmeltz, Operations Manager
- J. Bell, Maintenance Staff Supervisor
- L.
Aldrich, Staff Health Physicist
- T.
Shaffer, Executive Assistant
- E. McVey, Regulatory Assurance Nuclear Reaulatory Commission
- B. Clayton, Chief, DRP, Branch 1
- D. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector
- E. Schweibinz, Reactor Inspector
- K. Ihnen, Resident Inspecto'r
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on April 19, 1994.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified items (92701 and 92702)
(Closed) Violation (50-374/93028-01(DRP)):
Failure to follow procedure with regard to fuel bundle mispositioning.
Based on observations described in paragraph 4 of this report, this item is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (50-374/93028-02(DRP)):
Inadequate corrective actions for fuel bundle mispositionings.
The corrective action program at LaSalle is considered a fundamental weakness area.
The licensee is addressing this concern through the business unit plan.
As additional corrective action violations have been issued since that time (including escalated enforcement issues), the implementation effectiveness of these plans will be tracked through the subsequent violations.
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Open Item (50-373/93030-03(DRP)):
Review licensee actions with I
respect to main steam safety relief valve actuator air leaks.
Licensee
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actions were described in inspection report 50-373/93035; 50-374/93035 l
and thi. item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followuo (92700)
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The following licensee event reports were reviewed to ensure that reportability requirements were met, and that corrective actions, both
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immediate and to prevent recurrence, were accomplished or planned in l
accordance with the technical specifications:
l (Closed) LER 373/94004; Control Rod Position Indication System Failed Due to Card Failure (Closed) LER 374/94002; Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperable Due to Turbine Exhaust Line Pressure Spike (Closed) LER 374/93010 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Declared Inoperable Due to Loss of Power From Malfunctioning Relay l
(Closed) LER 374/94005; 2A Diesel Generator Air Start System Pressure Dropped Below 200 Psig Due to Equipment Failure.
Diesel generator FA air receivers were at 192 psig, which was below the technical specification operability surveillance requirement of 200 psig.
Starting air system check and relief valves were not properly reseating following actuation due to air system moisture content.
This was a recurring problem and the licensee had initiated replacement of the air dryers on an as needed basis. This is an unresolved item (50-374/94005-Ol(DRP)) pending an historical review of this problem and long term effectiveness of this action.
In addition, recent problem identification forms (PIF) were reviewed in order to monitor conditions related to plant or personnel performance and to detect potential development of trends.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Plant Operations (40500. 60710. and 71707)
The inspectors reviewed the facility for conformance with the license and regulatory requirements.
a.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room activities for proper control room staffing; coordination of plant activities; adherence to procedures or technical specifications; operator cognizance of plant parameters and alarms; electrical power configuration; and the frequency of plant and control room visits by station managers.
Various legs and surveillance records were reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
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Significant observations were:
(1)
Imoroved Refuelino Activities i
The inspectors verified that refueling activities were being
conducted as required by technical specifications and i
approved procedures.
This was done on a sarrpling basis through direct observation of activities and equipment, discussion with licensee personnel, review of work requests
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and procedures, and independent verification of safety system status and limiting condition for operation (LCO)
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action requirements. The inspectors noted fuel unload was
well controlled, resulting in no errors and incorporated corrective actions from previous violations in this area.
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Good communications between the refuel floor and control room personnel during fuel movement were noted.
The reactor
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engineer was knowledgeable on reactivity controls during core unload and other refueling personnel were knowledgeable of their responsibilities.
control was good.
Operator aids on the bridge were being effectively utilized.
Shutdown risk initiatives were being
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conducted in accordance with administrative procedures.
The success of this activity was an indication of the benefits
derived from the licensee providing sufficient and cooperative management and worker focus on resolving
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eroblems.
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Although reactor vessel disassembly went well, there were lessons to be learned to improve future similar activities:
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During reactor vessel disassembly, the inspectors
noted some confusion among contractor detensioning personnel as to the proper detensioner operating sequence. This activity was previously done by i
station personnel and thus, despite a pre-job briefing, additional training would have been
appropriate for these contractor personnel.
However, there was a vendor representative from the detensioner manufacturer available during head detensioning which helped to eliminate part of the confusion.
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The sequence utilized to replace a malfunctioning detensioning machine used more than necessary equipment maneuvers.
This resulted in longer exposure tirro and greater dose to workers.
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Radiological precautions did not include physical verification of the vessel level or intensive local radiological monitoring while lifting the reactor
vessel head.
This was especially noteworthy, as installed instrumentation measurement of the open reactor vessel level near the flange was not precise.
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Upon lifting the reactor vessel head, reactor water level was observed at actually 16 inches below the vessel flange instead of the requisite four to eight inches previously verified through indications.
(2)
Poor Communications Example The inspectors noted inconsistent plant communications regarding a contaminated water spill. On April 2, 1994, a spill occurred in the Unit I raceway while hydrolazing.
The inspectors noted that this event was not discussed in operator logs and the Unit 1 operating engineer was not aware of the event four days later when questioned by the inspectors.
However, a problem identification report had been issued.
(3)
Good Operator Questioning Attitude Example The inspectors noted that an operator's identification of degraded equipment indicated a good questioning attitude.
On April 9, 1994, an operator while on rounds identified a broken mounting and blades on the switchgear 236Y transformer which affected Unit 2 division 2 loads. The appropriate limiting condition for operations was entered and an engineering evaluation conducted. Specific loads were taken out-of-service to ensure adequate transformer cooling capacity for design basis events. The licensee was conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the fan failures.
(4)
Activit_Y Coordination Problems Congestion was noted around the shift engineer's office and shift control room engineer's desk from maintenance personnel awaiting work approval.
The inspectors will further evaluate this area following implementation of the licensee's planned work control center.
There were inconsistent shift turnover briefings with some operators taking little time when walking down panels. This was previously noted as a problem in a recent inspection report. Although some actions were taken previously by the licensee, with immediate improvement noted, they did not appear to be effective for all operators in the long term.
In addition, personnel did not appear to be working from a common schedule during turnover briefings.
Finally, the shift turnover briefings from the shift supervisors to non-licensed operators did not always include pertinent information disseminated in the earlier turnover briefing of other personnel.
The licensee is forming an action plan to improve operator performance, including the quality of turnover briefings.
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b.
On a routine basis the inspectors toured accessible' areas of the facility to assess worker adherence to radiation controls and the
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i site security plan, housekeeping or cleanliness, and control of
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field activities in progress.
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i Significant observations were:
Radworker performance (1)
During the first week in April 1994, the licensee extended the boundaries of the radiologically controlled area (RCA),
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reduced the number of access points, and placed personnel at
these points to provide tighter RCA control.
In addition, a j
series of expectation meetings were being held with
radworkers to emphasis the importance of adherence to good
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radworker practices.
Further actions to enhance radworker performance were planned.
The long term effectiveness of these actions will be evaluated in later inspections.
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(2)
The inspectors noted numerous radworkers needlessly congregated in elevated dose rate areas although low dose rate areas existed nearby.
The licensee subsequently posted q
additional signs to designate each type of area.
(3)
The inspectors noted improvement in radiological
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housekeeping from the last refueling outage with most areas of the plant clean and free of excess debris or stored
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materials.
Two work areas of exceptional cleanliness and overall organization of tools and materials during maintenance activities were the Unit I low pressure heater bay and the Unit I diesel generator rooms.
However, some areas were allowed to deteriorate such as the Unit I reactor building basement area including the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) room, the residual heat removal (RHR) corner rooms, and the reactor basement piping raceway area.
Although some progress was being made in this area, continued licensee management focus is warranted.
Although some plant personnel had accepted the message for needed improvement and were acting accordingly, others had not.
This presented a strong and continual possibility of quickly deteriorating conditions and practices.
This was especially true of the more remote areas (accessed less by plant management) such as those areas noted above.
(4)
Although not as frequent as before, the inspectors continued to note some evidence of poor radworker practices, such as yellow and magenta rope and yellow gloves in a green (uncontaminated waste container), and chewing gum on the refuel floor (a contaminated area).
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(5)
During the inspection period, the inspector attended pre-job ALARA briefings involving the following work activities:
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Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Detensioning and Removal
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1A Residual Heat Removal Pump Impeller Removal and Storage on Refuel Floor
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Local Power Range Monitor Removal (In and Under Vessel Work)
The inspector found the briefings to be well organized with positive control maintained by the Radiation Protection Department.
c.
Walkdowns of select engineered safety features (ESF) were performed.
The ESFs were reviewed for proper valve and electrical alignments.
Components were inspected for leakage, lubrication, l
abnormal corrosion, ventilation and cooling water supply j
availability. Tagouts and jumper records were reviewed for i
accuracy where appropriate.
No violations or deviatioqs were identified in this area.
5.
Maintenance (40500. 61726. and 62703)
Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related and important to safety systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and did not conflict with technical specifications.
The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
i Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set Work Package Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Diesel Engine Inspection lA and 1B Turbine Driven Reactor feed Pump Overhaul Flow Control Valve 60A (lA Reactor Recirculation Pump Discharge Flow l
Control Valve)
lA Diesel Engine Inspection lA Circulating Water Pump Rebuild Motor Driven Reactor Feed Pump Feed Water Regulating Valve Rebuild
"0" Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Strainer Overhaul
"0" Diesel Engine Inspection Unit 1 Main Turbine Partial Component Overhaul Significant observations were:
a.
Inocerable Diesel Generat',r Penthouse Heaters The inspectors noted that ventilation fan blades for some diesel generators, although not operating, were moving in a backwards direction.
Further review identified that the room heaters in the diesel generator penthouse were not functioning with a resulting
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differential temperature causing the rotation.
The licensee subsequently repaired the heaters.
This is considered an open item (50-373/94005-02(DRP)) pending completion of a licensee l
analysis as to safety significance of the backwards rotation i
should the diesel generators (and fans) receive an automatic initiation signal.
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Drywell Housekeepina
The inspectors noted similar conditions on the Unit I drywell
floor (underneath the grating) as identified in the previous Unit 2 refuel outage.
This included loose debris, water, and peeling
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paint.
If allowed to migrate to the suppression pool, this material was a potential source of emergency core cooling system
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suction strainer plugging.
The Unit 2 drywell floor was cleaned
following the previous concerns and the inspectors will perform a j
similar inspection of Unit 1 prior to drywell closure.
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c.
Lack of Questionina Attitude Example i
During post-maintenance test preparation for diesel generator (DG)
IB, the inspectors noted metal filings, grit, and small pieces of rags in the rocker arm area of the DG.
Although there was some
subsequent controversy among licensee staff on the acceptability
of this condition, it was clear this was not being questioned by licensee personnel until questioned by the inspectors.
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Activity Coordination Problem
During pre-run checks of DG 18, maintenance personnel discovered
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the crankcase oil level was low, further delaying start of testing.
This was despite being a common condition under this maintenance evolution which should have been anticipated.
e.
Loss of Shutdown Coolino On February 23, 1994 while swapping shutdown cooling loops, Unit I reactor vessel level unexpectantly dropped 14 inches.
The loop was secured and shutdown cooling eventually restored to the other loop.
Temperature rise was minimal.
The level drop was caused by leakage past the test return valve to the suppressien pool.
This is an open item (50-373/94005-03(DRP)) pending completion of the root cause analysis review.
Surveillance testing required by technical specifications, the safety analysis report, maintenance activities, or modification activities were observed or reviewed. Areas of consideration while performing observations were procedure adherence, calibration of test equipment, identification of test deficiencies, and personnel qualification.
Areas of consideration while reviewing surveillance records were completeness, proper authorization and review signatures, test results properly
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dispositioned, and independent verification documented.
The following activities were observed or reviewed:
LaSalle Operating Surveillance (LOS)-DG-M3, "1B(2B) Diesel
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Generator Operability Test,"
LOS-DG-M2, "lA Diesel Generator Monthly Operability Test,"
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LOS-VG-M1, " Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test,"
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LOS-RD-SR3, " Control Rod Operations In Plant Condition 3 or 4,"
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LOS-RD-SR5, " Control Rod Drive Timing,"
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LOS-RP-M2, " Manual Scram Instrumentation Functional Test,"
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LaSalle Mechanical Surveillance (LMS)-DG-01, " Main Emergency
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e Diesel Unit Surveillance," and LaSalle Electrical Procedure (LEP)-DG-103, " Diesel Generator
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Governor 011 Change and Compensation Adjustment."
Significant observations were:
Activity Coordination Problem Operations personnel needed for plant evolution support were scheduled for training without the knowledge of on-shift personnel, resulting in diesel generator (DG) IB testing delays.
Another surveillance was postponed when equipment operators were then assigned to this job.
No vio',tions or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Enaineerina (62703 and 71707)
a.
Good System Enaineer Ouestionino Attitude Example On March 7, 1994, a plant system engineer noted inconsistencies in g
the position of harmonic restraint contacts on the Unit 2 unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) differential current relays.
Some of these relays were in the tripped condition.
Although the conditions were such that complete logic had not actuated, this increased the possibility of an inadvertent UAT trip.
This observation indicated a good questioning attitude on the part of the system engineer, as this condition was difficult to identify.
The licensee determined that the current transformer winding ratio was not consistent with the relay setpoint prescribed in the relay setting order.
This is an unresolved item (50-374/94005-04(DRP))
pending further review of the root cause of this inconsistency.
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b.
Diesel Generator Intake Design The inspectors noted the absence of missile barrier protection for the diesel generator (DG) intakes in the DG penthouses.
The walls of this area were not designated as being missile barriers in the updated final safety analysis report. The licensee could not identify any calculations previously performed to show the penthouse walls met tornado resistance requirements. This is an open item (50-373/94005-05(DRP)) pending completion of the licensee's analysis of this issue and further NRC review of the licensing basis.
c.
Good Communication With other Facilities Examples The inspectors noted two recent examplos of good communications
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with other facilities resulting in identification and actions to address issues:
(1)
On March 9, 1994, the licensee, through conversations with other facilities, identified that the method utilized for control rod blade movements during refueling violated plant a
technical specifications.
Bypassing the up-travel limit of the auxiliary hoist was commonly done to clear the refueling chute when transferring blades to the fuel pool. The up-
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travel limit setting did not take into account the length of the control blade grapple, which' necessitated this action.
This was a violation of technical specification 3.9.6 which required all cranes and hoists used for handling fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor vessel to be operable.
Part of the corresponding surveillance requirements was demonstrating operation of the up-travel stops. Although the greater height was higher than that.
assumed in the bundle drop accident, the much smaller weight of the control blade compared to a fuel bundle would most
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likely result in less impact energy.
The licensee subsequently adjusted the up-limit stops to provide adequate clearance.
This was a Severity Level V violation identified by the licensee and was not cited because the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
(Enforcement Policy,10 CFR 2, Appendix C) were satisfied.
(2)
The licensee, through conversations with other facilities,
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icentified that preventive maintenance on the sciam pilot
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valve air diaphragms was not in accordance with vendor recommendations. The diaphragm replacement. frequency was longer than specified.
Control rods with diaphragms older than that specified were satisfactorily tested on Unit 2.
The licensee planned to replace the diaphragms during refueling outages (including the current Unit 1 outage) to.
conform with the prescribed intervals.
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Snubber Failure on lA Reactor Recirculation Pipina During unrelated maintenance activities in the area, the support steel for snubber RR00-1008S was observed to be severely damaged.
The mechanical snubber, attached to the reactor recirculation pump
1A suction piping, locked up in the hot position and overloaded l
the support steel during thermal contraction of the pipe.
The observed damage included an approximately 26 inch long crack in a 5/8 inch thick tube steel member with localized yielding in both a18-inch wide flange beam and a 2-inch support plate.
The extent of the damage rendered the support inoperable.
Analyses were performed to determine the impact on the piping system due to the support failure.
A limiting structural load of 140 kips was approximately calculated based on the observed structural damage and was applied in the piping analysis to evaluate the effect on the system.
With the applied load the piping was found to meet code allowable stresses.
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the licensee performed an analysis with support RR00-1008S removed and concluded that the piping met code allowables during cold shutdown conditions.
The snubber was removed from the system and functionally tested.
Drag loads were found to be well within acceptable limits, indicating that the snubber lockup was transitory in nature.
A field service specialist for the snubber manufacturer disassembled the snubber and concluded that it had been subjected to vibration or side loads above the snubber's design criteria. Additional results from other aspects of the root cause analysis efforts will be documented in a final report.
Pending NRC review of the final report, this is considered an open item (50-373/94005-06(DRP)).
e.
Reduced Seismic Spectra The inspectors noted that the analysis evaluating the operability of the recirculation piping with the above snubber removed, applied a reduction factor to the seismic response spectra.
The basis for this approach used a concept of equating the probability
for short duration conditions to the yearly probability of exceeding design basis accelerations, based on published seismic hazard curves.
The technical bases for the approach were submitted to the NRC in Ceco's March 23, 1994, letter to W. T.
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Russell, NRR.
The licensee subsequently performed an additional analysis using full seismic response spectra.
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concluded that the recirculation piping met code allowables for
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the cold shutdown conditions.
Based on this result, the reduced spectra issue was not a specific concern for the failed snubber, but was a generic concern for other applications of this methodology.
Pending review of the licensee's submittal, this is considered an unresolved item (373/94005-07(DRP)).
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ho violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Security Issue
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A physical security inspector reviewed a concern that a o';ard whe was previously suspended for misplacing his gun card was cal ed back ta l
serve as an unarmed watchman at the drywell access point. This access point required an armed guard.
The inspectors interviewed the station security administrator, the contract security force manager, and the security operations supervisor regarding the concern.
A review of the approved security plan, post orders, and shift duty assignment records was also conducted.
The interviews and records review showed that a guard lost his gun card on March 15, 1994. The licensee requested that this individual report to work as a watchperson but the individual declined and used sick days until the State of Illinois reissued him another card.
The individual returned to work as a guard on April 12, 1994 and later quit on April 18, 1994.
He never worked as a watchman at the drywell.
The currently approved revision of the licensee's secur!ty plan required that any time frequent access was permitted to containment, such as during refueling, a guard was to be posted 1.0 assure that only authorized personnel and materials are permitted into containment. On March 30, 1994 the licensee submitted a security plan change under the provisions to 10 CFR 50.54(p). This change permitted the use of a guard or watchman which was consistent with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(8).
The plan change was implemented on April 8,1994.
The NRC is currently reviewing
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the revision submitted on March 30, 1994 to assure that the changes are consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
Shift records showed j
that a watchman was posted at the drywell on April 19, 1994.
The specific concern that a guard who lost his gun card and was called in to work as a watchman on a post that required an armed guard was not substantiated. The guard did not come in to work as a watchman and the drywell post no longer required an armed guard because of the plan change submitted under 10 CFR 50.54(p) which is being reviewed by the NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Report Review (90713)
During the inspection, the inspector reviewed selected licensee reports and determined that the information was technically adequate, and that it satisfied the reporting requirements of the license, technical specifications, and 10 CFR as appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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9.
Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some
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i action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items j
disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6.
10.
. Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are
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discussed in Paragraphs 3 and 6.
11.
Exit interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection period on April 19, 1994.
The inspectors summarized the scope and
results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report.
The licensee acknowledged the information and did
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not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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