IR 05000354/1979008
| ML19308C626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1979 |
| From: | Bateman W, Mcgaughy R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308C620 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-79-08, 50-354-79-8, NUDOCS 8002010020 | |
| Download: ML19308C626 (6) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-354/79-08 Docket No. 50-354 Category A
License No. CPPR-120 Priority
--
Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted October 30 - November 2,1979
//fft,/7(f Inspectors:
.
,
W. H. Bateman,' Reactor Inspector
'da te' s i ghed date signed date signed Approved by: hN ttb
)1/;/7 0, w
R.W.McGaughyQgef,ProjectsSection, dhtd si@ned
~
RC&ES Branch
..
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 30 - November 2,1979 (Report No. 50-354/79-08)
Areas Inspected:
Unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector to witness performance of the structural integrity test of the Hope Creek Unit 1 containment vessel. The inspection involved 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
<
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
g g g ) g Q%
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G)
- A. Barnabei, QA Engineer
- A. Smith, Project Construction Manager Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- C. Clark, Contract Engineer
- W. Hindle, Project Field Engineer
- L. Rosetta, Field Construction Manager S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Corporation (PDM)
K. Hazelbaker, Project Manager M. Steiger, Site QA Manager G. Williams, Containment Structural Integrity Test Director
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Plant Tour (Unit 1 Containment)
A tour of the Unit 1 containment was made to determine the state of prepared-
'
ness to perform the Structural Integrity Test (SIT). The inspector examined work items for any obvious defects or noncompliances with regulatory require-ments or license conditions. Areas observed included: placement of scaf-folding to enable sufficient access for inspection of welded joints; presence of foreign matter such as tape that could prevent a thorough inspection of welded joints; status of mechanical joints; and leak testing of the personnel access hatch and vent line bellows.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
I 3.
Description of Primary Containment The Hope Creek Unit 1 primary containment vessel consists of a light bulb shaped drywell, torus shaped suppression chamber, and interconnecting vent l
l
-
.
.
pipes. The dryweil is approximately 115' high with a 68' diameter spherical l
portion at the bottom, an upper 40' 6" diameter cylindrical section which l
blends up into a smaller cylinder of 33' 2" diameter that in turn is capped by a removeable flanged head at the top.
The suppression chamber, which has the configuration of a doughnut, sits outside of the drywell and is slightly lower in elevation than the drywell bottom. The torus has a 112'
8" diameter with a 30' 8" diameter cross section. A vent system consisting of 8 pipe sections, each of which is about 6' in dia@ter, interconnects between the drywell and the torus.
The primary containment was built in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Subsection NE, Requirements for Class MC Components, 1974 Edition, Winter 1974 Addenda.
4.
Review of Containment Structural Integrity Test Program and Test Procedure Pittsburgh-Des Moine Steel Company (PDM), fabricators of the primary contain-ment vessel, were responsible for setting up and performing the test in accordance with the following documents:
Bechtel Specification NJ. 10855-C-152(Q), Revision 14, Design Specifica-
--
tion for Furnishing, Designing, Detailing, Fabrication, Delivery, and Erection of Primary Containment.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1, Subsection
-
--
NE, Requirements for Class MC Components, Article NE-6000, 1974 Edition, Winter 1974 Addenda.
PDM Test Procedure PTP-1, Revision C, Field Test of Primary Containment
--
Vessel.
The inspector determined the requirements of these documents and reviewed PDM's test program for conformance.
Particular areas examined included the
'
organizational structure of test program personnel, personnel training, communications, safety, the availability and organization of the required test equipment, the state of readiness of the containment vessel for testing, test schedule, and the availability of the Authorized Nuclear Inspector.
PDM's test program was found to be in conformance with established require-ments and good engineering practice.
PDM test procedure PTP-1, Field Test of Primary Containment Vessel, was reviewed by the inspector prior to conduct of the test.
The test sequence specified pumping the ves:e1 to 5 psig, performing a visual inspection of all welds and mechanical joi.'ts, 56then{g.pon satisfactory' 10 minute holds at each u
completion of this ps increments < with.
test, pumping up to 71.5. psig in
__
,,
.
plateau, then holding for one hour, decreasing pressure to 62 psig, soap testing outer air lock door, increasing pressure to 71.5 psig, holding 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, then decreasing pressure to 62 psig and perfonning a visual inspection
,
of the inner air lock door and all containment vessel welds and mechanical joints. The test pressures specified are in accordance with ASME Code requirements. The test procedure required adequate instrumentation, relief protection, and the use of a nonflamable gas as the pumping medium. Weld maps identifying every weld in the containment structure by location and number were included with the procedure along with weld signoff sheets to be used for recording weld inspection status.
Every weld and mechanical joint was physically identified by painting the joint number onto the steel plate adjacent to the joint.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Observation of Containment Structural Integrity Test Sunny and mild weather conditions with a steady barometric pressure offered favorable conditions under which to perform the overpressure test of the primary containment structure.
Prior to commencing the pressurization, 169,600 cubic feet of the suppression chamber (to an elevation of 75' 10")
was filled with water to simulate actual operating conditions in the torus.
Pressurization of containment was at a rate of approximately 5 psig per hour using air as the test medium and a single connection in the suppression chamber as the flow path.
Prior to and throughout performance of the test the inspector witnessed or verified appropriate test attributes.
Test equipment calibration was verified to be in conformance with PDM's site QA procedural requirements, required signoffs. and personnel training were verified to have been completed, and data taking and data evaluation activities were verified to be in accordance with the test procedure requirements.
The inspector interviewed various PDM and B':chtel personnel including the test director, project engineer, and seve:al inspection teams to determine their knowledge of the assigned task. ihe inspector felt it was of particular importance to determine if the insroction teams were cognizant of the weld map signoff method employed to maintain an accurate status of the inspection effort.
In all cases the personnel appeared qualified to perform their assigned task.
Three items of concern arose as a result of the inspector's direct observation of test preparation and performance. The first item was identified during inspection of containment prior to the start of pressurization.
The inepec.i.or identified three welds with tape covering part of the weld inspection area.
.
__ _
,;'
o
.
.
,
PDM test personnel were notified and removed the tape prior to inspection of the weld. The other two concerns were identified during inspection of the welded joints at 62 psig: a circumferential weld joint was partially masked during inspection by debris contained in an adjacent trough and weld joints in the torus below the water line were wet during inspection.
PDM, in response to these concerns, cleared the debris away from the circumferential weld and reperformed the soap bubble inspection and waited for the torus weld surfaces below the water line to dry before making the final visual inspection.
At the conclusion of the test all weld map signoff sheets were reviewed by PDM to determine that all welds and mechanical joints had been inspected.
The results of the structural integrity test indicated that there were no leaks of any weld joints or the equipment and personnel hatches.
^
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 2,1979. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
f t'
f