IR 05000338/1994011
| ML20029E088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1994 |
| From: | Casto C, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029E086 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-94-11, 50-339-94-11, NUDOCS 9405160236 | |
| Download: ML20029E088 (16) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- . ~.. - ... -- . - = . . =.. - - -. .. -.. - . -... . ..- . , . , f#p aro,% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION u UNITED STATES . 3+ '-' & REGloN II
T 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2'XX) 7. - 0 R ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 0190 %, ,o ..... Report Nos.: 50-338/94-11 and 50-339/94-11 Licensee: Virginia Electric & Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF 7 - Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: April 18-22, 1994 Inspector: kh fk9g G. Wisenian Date Signed Accompanying inspectors: W. Miller, Jr M. Thomas C. Yates (NRC Intern) Approved by: 27 7% J# 'Nh? 3'2w8 99 C. Casto, Cfiief Date' Signed "' Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspect.on was conducted in the areas of design changes and plant modifications, and engineering and technical support activities.
Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
- -One Insoeetor Followup Item (IFI) was identified to review additional informat n1 relative to the implementation of design change package (DCP) 92-tl8, Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Replacement. [Section 2,b.(1)] - The licensee has a strong program for the review, prior.itization and scheduling of plant modifications which emphasizes nuclear and personnel safety, g[ $ [[
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The Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Temporary Modifications (TMs) - reviewed were technically adequate with sufficiently detailed 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations.
Adequate post modification test requirements were specified. The DCPs were sufficiently documented to verify closure .. including drawing revisions and procedure updates.
Drawing changes reviewed were clear and accurate.
- The DCPs effectively addressed plant problems and nuclear safety issues i.e., the charging pump speed increaser oil mist problems and feedwater regulating valve issues.
- Organization and staffing levels for station engineering which included both site design engineering and systems engineering groups appeared to be adequate to perform the assigned duties and responsibilities.
Engineering personnel having Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) or SRO/ Shift Technical Advisor SR0/STA certification was considered a positive attribute.
- The various engineering groups provide adequate and timely support to maintenance and operations for day-to-day activities and emergent issues.
Communications with interfacing organizations was good.
- Management initiatives were addressing the area of backlog reduction.
The licensee was meeting their goals for reducing backlogs. The process for elimination of Engineering Work Requests (EWRs) is ongoing. NRC review of the results will be conducted in future inspections.
- Engineering responses to station Deviation Reports (DRs) were timely with reasonably detailed and descriptive evaluations.
- Quality assurance (QA) audit and engineering self assessment activities , were effective in identifying several areas for improvement in the ' engineering groups.
Corrective actions in response to previous QA audits were generally being implemented.
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees A. K. Al-Hamdani, Sapervisor, Electrical Engineering M. Andrachea', Supervisor, Records
- G. T. Bischof, Superiisor, Civil Engineer
- D. A. Heacock, Superintendent, Engineering J. Hegner, Supervisor. Corporate Licensing E. S. Hendrixson, Supervisor, System Engineering
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- G. E. Kane,. Station Manager
- P. A. Kemp, Supervisor,, Licensing
- J. H. Leberstien, Staff Engineer - Licensing L. Runyon, Design Control Engineer
- J. P. Smith, Manager, Quality Assurance
- J. A. Stall, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing R. C. Sturgill, Supervisor, System Engineering J. E. Wroniewicz, Assistant Superintendent, Engineering Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, QA personnel, craftsmen, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. McWhorter, Senior Resident inspector D. Taylor, Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit meeting Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Design Changes and Plant Modifications (37700) .a.
Plant Modifications to Improve Reactor Safety The inspectors reviewed the initiatives taken by the licensee to identify and implement plant modifications to improve reactor safety and plant operation.
The following documents were reviewed: - Procedure VPAP-0304, Request for Engineering Assistance, Rev 0-PN01 Dated September 21, 1993 - 1994 Unit 1 Refueling Outage Minor Modification List dated March 15, 1994 - 1995 Unit 2 Proposed Refueling Minor Modification List dated April 14, 1994 ,,. , . .. _. - _,. .. .
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- Unit 1 1994 Refueling Outage Status Report dated March 21, 1994 The Inspectors discussed the implementation of Procedure VPAP-0304 and the above documents with the Superintendent of Station
Engineering and the Assistant Superintendent of Station ' Engineering.
< The licensee encouraged personnel who identified technical plant problems to submit a Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) to Nuclear Engineering Services (NES).
Procedure VPAP-0304 provided the instructions to be followed in the originating and processing of a REA.
Prior to submitting a request, the originator was required to investigate available documents to verify that the requested information was not available and the originator's superintendent reviewed the REA to ensure that the requested action was appropriate.
The REA was then forwarded to the Assistant Superintendent Station Engineering for an initial screening to determine what NES action was appropriate.
Requests for corrective actions for inoperative or degraded components, and requests for correction of Technical Specification (TS) related discrepancies were assigned a high priority for resolution.
OCPs were initiated if required.
REA requests for plant improvements and other similar requests were assigned by the Assistant Superintendent Station Engineering to the appropriate engineering section to identify the necessary.
engineering involvement and to develop preliminary cost information on the request.
Upon completion of the initial engineering evaluation, the originator or the originator's superintendent and an engineering representative presented the REA to the North Anna plant Modification Management Review Team-(MMRT) for review and approval or rejection.
MMRT meetings were conducted on an as needed basis but normally were held at least every other week. The MMRT was composed of the following members: - Assistant Station Manager Operations and Maintenance - Superintendent Station Engineering - - Superintendent Nuclear Site Services - Superintendent Outage and Planning - Superintendent Maintenance The Superintendent Operations and Superintendent Radiological Protection participate in the MMRT reviews-if requested by the Assistant Manager Operations and Maintenance.
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REAs approved by the MMRT were sent to an engineering planner for scheduling and prioritization. Nuclear safety and personnel safety items were required by procedure VPAP-0304 to be assigned the highest priority rating factor.
Regulatory issues and operational improvements were assigned a lower priority rating factor. Approved REAs were then sent to the appropriate engineering section for development of a DCP.
Disapproved REAs were returned to the originator with an explanation as to why the REA was disapproved.
During this inspection, the Assistant Superintendent Engineering estimated that approximately 600 REAs have normally been generated per year.
Of these, approximately 40 percent were for corrective actions.
These REAs did not require a MMRT review and were generally promptly corrected or resolved.
Of the REA items sent to the MMRT, approximately 20 percent were rejected due to the lack of plant need or inadequate economic justification.
The remaining approximately 40 percent were developed into DCPs.
The inspectors reviewed the minutes from the MMRT meetings for March 10, March 31, April 8, and April 19, 1994.
At each of these meetings, the designated MMRT members or a designated representative were present..The MMRT reviewed the REAs on the docket and either approved, rejected or returned the REA to the originator or engineering for additional information.
The MMRT reviews appeared to be thorough and the inspectors had no problems with the items which were rejected.
Based on discussions with licensee engineering personnel, and review of the above documentation, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has a strong program for the review, prioritization and scheduling of plant modifications which emphasizes nuclear and , personnel safety in lieu of operational improvements or regulatory issues. The effective implementation of this program is considered a strength, b.
Planning, Development, and Implementation of Plant Modifications The inspectors reviewed the DCPs listed below to: (1) determine .. ' the adequacy of the safety evaluation screening and the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations; (2) verify that the modifications were reviewed and approved in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) and applicable administrative controls; (3) verify the modifications were installed and had proper sign-offs; (4) verify-that applicable design bases were included and design documents (drawings, plant procedures, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), TS, etc.) were revised; (5) verify that the modifications were properly turned over to operations; and, (6) verify that both installation testing and Post Modification Test (PMT) requirements were specified and that adequate testing was performed. The following plant modifications were examined: . - - _,.
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- DCP 92-007, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Flow Instrumentation - DCP 92-018, Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Replacement - DCP 92-100, Charging Pump Speed Increaser Oil Pressure Gauge Installation to Address Oil Mist Problems / Unit 1 - DCP 92-171, Feedwater Regulating Valve Internals Replacement / Unit 1 - DCP 92-241, Various Obsolete Reactor Coolant System Drain Valves Replacement During Steam Generator Replacement Project / Unit 1 - DCP 92-242, Charging Pump Speed Increaser Oil Pressure Gauge Installation to Address Oil Mist Problems / Unit 2 - DCP 92-352, Redesign of Make-up To Control Room Chilled Water System - DCP 93-145, Roofing Project for Safety Related Structures Sample plant documentation associated with each DCP was reviewed to verify that the changes were incorporated into the latest revision of the documents.
The inspectors reviewed affected instrument set point index drawings, vendor manuals, the Equipment Data System (EDS), and affected FSAR drawings, tables and figures, to determine if the applicable documents had been updated to accurately reflect the modifications.
The inspectors performed field inspections for some of the modifications and verified that the DCPs were installed in accordance with technical requirements specified in the applicable DCP packages and procedures. The inspectors' review of the above DCP packages indicated that, with the exception of the below listed comments, the modification packages were complete, contained an appropriate work instruction package, and required that priority procedures, drawings and other . documents be revised before turnover to operations.
' (1) DCP 92-018, Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Replacement To meet the NRC 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Protection Rule, the-licensee originally installed Thermo-Lag 1-hour fire rated barriers for the armored jacketed power cables from Unit 1 "C" Charging Pump and the Unit 2 "A" Component Cooling Water ' Pump.
These installations provided a fire barrier for a ' length of approximately 25 feat for armored power cable from - the Charging Pump and for a length of approximately 40 feet I for the armored power cable for the Component Cooling Water-l Pump.
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After the licensee had completed this installation of Thermo-Lag, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin 92-01 which identified a number of NRC concerns with Thermo-Lag. The Bulletin indicated that Thermo-Lag may not provide the l specified fire endurance to meet the NRC requirements and that licensees who had installed this material to meet the , 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire protection requirements could be in noncompliance with these requirements.
To resolve these concerns the licensee took the initiative and replaced the Thermo-Lag installed at North Anna with another material, INTERAM E-50 Series One Hour Fire Barrier manufactured by 3M Fire Protection Products, which had been-tested and approved by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., an international recognized testing laboratory.
The inspectors reviewed the completed DCP documentation records on the Thermo-Lag replacement and noted the following discrepancies: - The DCP construction drawings for the installation of the 3M INTERAM fire barrier material had not been-incorporated into the station permanent "As Built" drawings.
- Although procedure 0-PT-108.4, Visual Inspection-Auxiliary Building Fire Retardant Coatings, Cable _ Tray ' Fire Stops, and Penetration Seals Required by Appendix R, had been revised to require a visual inspection of the fire barriers, the procedure lacked clarity in some areas.
The procedure did not provide sufficient detail on specific installation features associated , with the wrap, banding, wire mesh and other construction features to assure that appropriate ' inspections are. performed.
- The Vendor Manual for the 3M INTERAM Fire Barrier installation had not been incorporated into the , plant's Vendor Manual Program.
However, a copy of the vendor manual and recommended installation and construction procedures were included with the completed-DCP documentation-records.
> - The 3M INTERAM material was installed by a vendor (Progressive Materials and Technologies, Inc.) who was not on the licensee's current approved vendor list.
Documentation was not available to indicate that the licensee had performed appropriate audits and inspections to assure that the purchased fire barrier materials conformed to the construction specifications and were installed in accordance with the manufacturers requirements.
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This inspection did not evaluate the technical adequacy of these fire barrier installations.
However, the inspectors did notice several apparent installation discrepancies associated with the location and spacing of the banding and penetration of the barrier material by interfering piping and other structural supports.
These concerns were identified to the licensee and following further evaluation by the licensee, these items will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection and are identified as Inspector Follow-up Item 338, 339/94-11-01, Evaluation of 3M Appendix R Fire Barrier Installation.
(2) DCP 92-171, Feedwater Regulating Valves Internals Replacement The internals to the feedwater regulating valves for Unit I were replaced by DCP 92-171 and the internals for the Unit 2 valves were replaced by DCP 92-263.
DCP 92-263 was not reviewed during this inspection. The new internals utilize a pneumatic actuator which yields a longer valve stroke and is less susceptible to the effects of flow vibrations and differential pressure across the valve than the original valve internals.
The original actuators, which utilized air to open and a spring to close, had a long history of maintenance and operational problems and were the cause of a significant number of unit trips and other transients.
A number of modifications were made to the old actuators, valve internals, and position controllers but these were not i successful in eliminating the problems.
j These DCPs installed new actuators for the feedwater
regulating valves which utilize air to both open and close the regulating valves.
Each feedwater regulating valve has a dedicated air receiver.
The air receivers and associated tubing and piping from the receiver to the regulating valve are seismically mounted.
Each air receiver is maintained pressurized and is sized to close each valve and maintain the valve in the closed position.
Also, the pneumatic actuator system is fail-safe in that the pneumatic valves ) reposition on loss of air to their closed fail-safe ' position.
The DCPs for these modifications were completed during each units most recent refueling outage and have been in service for approximately one year in Unit I and six months in Unit i 2.
During this time,.with the exception of one problem on Unit 2, the modified valves have proven to be satisfactory.
' On January 20, 1994,- Main Feedwater Regulating Valve 2A closed due.to a component failure on a pneumatic booster relay on the valve positioner. This failure caused the unit to trip.
For details refer to LER 339/94-03.
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investigation found that the failure was caused by a manufacturing defect for one of the actuator components.
j Otherwise, these modifications have been satisfactory.
The Operations staff advised the inspectors that this modification is considered one of the best plant changes in ' recent years and has resulted in an improvement in overall plant performance.
c.
Temporary Modifications The inspectors reviewed and assessed the licensee's Temporary Modification (TM) process to determine its adequacy for controlling and tracking temporary changes to_the plant's configuration.
TMs could be prepared by any station personnel.
This included the Shift Supervisor, System Engineer or Craft Foreman.
Station procedure VPAP-1403, " Temporary Modifications" provided controls for preparation, review, installation, extension, and removal of TMs.
At the time of this inspection only three active TMs were in place.
The TMs were reviewed to verify and ensure that: (1) adequate safety evaluations and technical reviews were performed and was in accordance with procedure VPAP-3001, " Safety Evaluations"; (2) testing was specified and performed where applicable; and (3) TMs installed greater than 6 months were reviewed and renewed in accordance with VPAP-1403.
The following active TMs were reviewed: - TM 1581 Jumpered Cell 29 of Battery 1-III TM 1572 Installed jumper to defeat Hi-Hi alarm for the incore instrument room sump IM 1063 Installed leakage deflection shield on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to deflect steam leakage away from the bearing The inspectors questioned the involvement of engineering in the TM process because, VPAP-1403 did not require engineering reviews of IMs.
During further discussion with engineering personnel and review of VPAP-3001, the inspectors determined.that safety evaluations involving temporary modifications required review and approval by the design authority prior to implementation.--Station Engineering represents the design authority onsite.
The inspectors performed field inspection of TM 1581 and TM 1063 to determine if they were installed in accordance with technical requirements specified in the applicable TM packages and procedure VPAP-1403.
The inspectors also visited the control room to verify and ensure that tags required by the TMs were generated and TMs were logged and updated.
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. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's process for control, review, installation, and removal of TMs was adequate and in accordance with established procedures.
The TM packages were technically sound and the safety evaluations were technically adequate for determining the safety impact of the TM on plant operations.
The inspectors also noted that control of TMs was , effective as evidenced by the low number of TMs.
d.
Drawing Control The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program and procedures that were developed and implemented to maintain drawing control.
Methods for making plant design changes, including drawing control, were controlled in accordance with procedure VPAP-0302, " Station Drawing Annotation and Revision".
The program and procedures were examined to ensure that design control was maintained and drawings were updated in a timely manner to reflect the as-built plant.
The inspectors reviewed the following sample drawings associated with selected DCPs to verify and ensure they were updated and controlled in accordance with procedure VPAP-0302.
- ll715-FM-093A, Sheet 1, Revision 25 ' - ll715-FM-093A, Sheet 2, Revision 23 R - Il715-FM-093A, Sheet 3, Revision 28 - Il715-FM-74A, Sheet 1, Revision 37 ) - ll715-FM-74A, Sheet 4, Revision 03
- ll715-FM-9A, Revision 11 - Il715-FMC-074A, Revision 26 - 11715-FE-13N-13, Sheet 13, Revision 13 The inspectors concluded that the licensee's controls for updating and maintaining critical drawings were being adequately controlled and implemented.
3.
Engineering and Technical Support Activities (37700) a.
Organization, Staffing, and Training The inspectors reviewed the licensee's organization and staffing to determine whether the-engineering' organization was adequately staffed to provide effective engineering support to the plant.
Engineering and technical support were-provided by both onsite and corporate organizations.
The Nuclear Engineering organization was comprised of six' departments which reported via managers to the Vice President Nuclear Engineering Services.
Station Engineering was part of NES and reported through the Manager Nuclear Engineering to the Vice President NES.
Real time day-to-day onsite support was provided mainly by Station Engineering, which includes onsite design engineering and system engineerin.. - - - - - . -. . __ - . . .-_ . . . .
In addition to reviewing the licensee's organization and staffing, the inspectors also reviewed the training and qualification of the ) engineering organization.
The inspectors noted that several of j the supervisors and managers (site and corporate) have received - , operations training. Also, several of the supervisors and managers have either worked on shift in the control room as a SRO, or have SR0/STA certification.
The inspectors considered the i engineering personnel having SR0/STA experience and/or certification to be a positive attribute.
The inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel and reviewed documentation of selected plant activities to evaluate i the engineering involvement and support of day-to-day plant operations.
This support included, but was not limited to developing DCPs for minor plant modifications; preparing and reviewing temporary modifications; preparing and performing post modification testing; responding to and resolving design questions from station departments; EWR backlog reduction; reviewing results of surveillance tests; preparing and coordinating the performance of special tests with operations; and, providing responses / resolutions to Commitment Tracking System (CTS) items, Deviation Reports (DR), Quality Assurance (QA) audits, etc.
The inspectors reviewed the staffing in the Engineering Testing Group, which was part of Station Engineering.
The Engineering Testing Group was responsible for the coordination and/or performance of PMT and post maintenance testing.
The supervisor and two of the more experienced testing personnel had announced their retirement. The inspectors noted that the personnel retiring represented the experience in electrical / instrumentation & controls testing.
During discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors questioned if these retirements would have an impact on the Engineering Testing Group.
Station Engineering management indicated that no replacements had been named for the three retirees who are scheduled to leave June in 1994, as part of the licensee's company wide early retirement program.
Licensee personnel further indicated that the PMT program would be impacted ) if none of the testing personnel are replaced.
Licensee personnel i indicated that actions had been initiated to address the staffing reductions in the Engineering Testing Group.
During this inspection, the inspectors noted several ongoing i examples of engineering involvement in day-to-day support to the plant.
These examples included, but were.not limited to the following: - Boron injection tank inlet isolation valve 2-SI-M0V-2867A leak by causing dilution of the boric acid storage tank and the boron injection tank - Spent fuel pool cooling pump 1-FC-P-1A breaker replacement - , - _ _. _
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- Charging pump 2-CH-P-lC discharge check valve 2-CH-208 sticking open During review of licensee efforts to resolve the above issues, the inspectors noted that there was good communication and~ interface among the various engineering departments (Station Engineering and NES at the corporate office) and the plant staff.
The inspectors reviewed various performance indicators for , selected engineering activities.
These indicators showed that i Station Engineering provided timely support to the plant during 1993.
Drawing updates were completed on time.
The number of minor modifications under development greater than 90 days old was 33, which continued to be below the target of less than 50 modifications. The/ System Engineering quarterly reports provided , summaries for systems that were chosen for in-depth review during the quarter.
Based on the reviews and plant experiences, the systems chosen for this level of evaluation varied during the year.
The intent of-the reviews was for the applicable system engineers to perform the following: - - Methodically review the system to identify the problems using maintenance records, deviation reports, and personnel
interviews.
- Develop a realistic and minimum cost action plan to resolve i the problems.
- Follow through on the action plan to ensure that corrective actions were taken.
- Followup on corrective actions to ensure that problems were resolved.
- Keep management informed of key issues and ongoing actions.
The inspectors reviewed selected System Engineering quarterly reports and found that the reports provided a thorough description of the problems and corrective actions for the chosen systems.
After reviewing licensee efforts and documentation for the above activities, the inspectors concluded that, except for the questions concerning the staffing in the Engineering Testing Group, the current staffing levels within the various engineering
departments appeared to be adequate to provide support to the .l plant.
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Engineering Work Request Backlog Reduction '
, The inspectors reviewed the licensee's efforts to reduce the backlog of EWRs. The engineering action plan for the EWR closecut was presented to and approved by the MMRT on March 10, 1994.
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memorandum dated April 11, 1994, the Superintendent of Station Engineering delineated the process being used by Station Engineering to close out the EWR process by July 31, 1994. The first step in this process involved voiding EWRs in the categories of scoping, unplanned, planned, and working.
These categories applied to EWRs that were still within the Station Engineering Department.
The EWRs in these categories were voided from the EWR log and will not be worked by the Design Engineering Office in Station Engineering.
The EWRs were to be returned to the originators for review.
If, after review, the originator determined that action was still required, then a REA should be submitted in accordance with procedure VPAP-0304.
The inspectors held discussions with engineering personnel who indicated that the EWRs had not yet been returned to the originators for review.
Issued EWRs not actively being worked were placed on hold per a memorandum from the design control engineer dated April 13, 1994.
The list of EWRs for the various categories were reviewed. The inspectors noted that some of the EWRs being voided were addressed by another DCP or another method in the licensee's design control process.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had adequate controls for the reduction and closecut of the EWR process. The inspectors noted that the EWR closecut process was still ongoing.
The inspectors will review the licensee's final closeout of the EWR process during a future inspection.
c.
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed plant records to evaluate the determination of plant operability, reportability and involvement of engineering in support of plant operations.
Records reviewed included, but were not limited to the following: - Procedure No. VPAP-1501, Revision 3, Station Deviation Reports This procedure _ prescribes the responsibilities for identifying, evaluating, reporting, and dispositioning deficiencies, the distribution path, and time limitations.
Open Deviation Reports Status (as of April 18,'1994) - Report by licensee staff identifying by department any active or overdue DR resolutions.
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. DRs Assigned To Engineering Since January 1, 1994 - This report identifies the DRs issued in this time frame assigned to Engineering, a description of the deviation, the discovery dates, and the engineering corrective action plan for the deficient area.
The inspectors were unable to determine the involvement of engineering in the identification of problems.
While the identifying individual is recorded on each DR, no composite record of the identifying plant department is maintained in the DR tracking computer data base.
However, it was determined that of the 1958 plant DRs written in 1993, 641 (32%) were assigned to Engineering, which included the maintenance engineers, for determination of the resolution. A review of active Dk status report for a three month period showed that engineering had no overdue DR items.
To evaluate the adequacy of the operability assessments and problem resolutions, the inspectors reviewed the following: DR No.
Problem Sub.iect N-94-0076 Appendix R Emergency Lights Failed Eight-Hour Battery Test PM-ll-ELT/C-3.
N-94-0082 Service Air Compressors failed to load and Produce Air to Support Operations.
N-94-269 Unit 1 Pipe Support Snubber Leaking 011.
N-94-236 Units 1 and 2 "A" Train Primary Safeguard Exhaust Fans Observed with Less Than Expected Outputs.
The inspectors concluded that the engineering groups were actively involved in the resolution of problems in support of reliable plant operations.
The DR documentation supported the licensee's evaluation of operability and reportability with an adequate description of the condition.
Engineering responses for DRs were adequate, with reasonably descriptive evaluations and dispositions.
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. 4.
Quality Assurance (QA) Assessment and Oversight The inspectors reviewed QA Internal Audit Program audits and various assessments of site engineering safety related activities conducted by the Quality Assurance Department organization.
The assessments and audits were part of the overall quality assurance program at North Anna Power Station.
The inspectors reviewed results of the following quality i assurance activities: - Audit Report 93-07, July 1993, Nuclear Fuels Audit.
- Assessment Report 93-03, May 1993, Assessment of the Design Change Implementation Process.
- Assessment Report 93-33, December 1993, Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Root Cause Evaluation Process.
- Assessment Report N94-03-EN, March 1994, Assessment of Design Change Package Preparation.
Based on these reviews, the inspectors concluded that the Quality Assurance Department had been actively involved in assessing engineering activities.
These assessments had been successful in identifying engineering program areas that need improvement.
In general, corrective actions in response to the audits and assessments were being implemented.
Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspected.
5.
Exit interview-The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 22, 1994, with ' those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following item was identified: Item Number Descrintion and Reference 50-338, 339/94-11-01 IFI Evaluation of 3M Appendix R Fire Barrier Installation - paragraph 2.b.(1) 6.
Acronyms and Initialisms CFR Code of Federal Regulations CTS Commitment Tracking System DCP Design Change Package DR Deviation Report EDS Equipment Data System EWR Engineering Work Request j FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
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Ifl-Inspector followup Item LER Licensee Event Report MMRT ' Modification Management Review Team MOV Motor Operated Valve NES Nuclear Engineering Services NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PMT Post Modification Test REA Request for Engineering Assistance l SR0 Senior Reactor Operator STA Shift Technical Advisor > QA Quality Assurance TM Temporary Modification TS Technical Specifications
VPAP Virginia Power Administrative Procedure i . l
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