IR 05000335/1992002
| ML17227A337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1992 |
| From: | Robert Carrion, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17227A335 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-92-02, 50-335-92-2, 50-389-92-02, 50-389-92-2, NUDOCS 9203180023 | |
| Download: ML17227A337 (19) | |
Text
<p,f, REGII (4
Cy UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 IIwO f7 Pg Report Nos:
50-335/92-02 and 50-389/92-02 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
January 27-31, 1992 Inspector:
ii'v ~<6~ ~
R.
P. Carrion Approved by:
b z'
4C r~~
T.
R. Decker, Chief Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards a ~fZz-Date Signed
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Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of the organization of the Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group, audits, plant water chemistry, the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), effluent processing and monitoring, the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, the Meteorological Monitoring Program, radioactive waste processing and transportation, and the contingencies for long term storage of low level radioactive waste.
Results:
The Chemistry Department and the Radwaste Group were staffed by knowledgeable, competent personnel.
(Paragraph 2)
Audits were found to be well-planned and documented with detailed
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comments and recommendations to aid the implementation of corrective actions.
(Paragraph 3).
9203180023 920304 PDR ADOCK 05000335
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, In general, plant water chemistry was maintained well within Technical Specification (TS) limits.
(Paragraph 4)-
An upgrade to the dissolved hydrogen analyzer had been made to the PASS of both units."
(Paragraph 5)
In general, effluent processing and monitoring was adequate to assure that all Technical Specification limits are met:.
(Paragraph 6)
In general, the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report was well-written and met the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
However, Non-Cited Violation 50-335, 50-389/92-02-01,
"Failure to Address an Unplanned Release in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release =Report,"
was identified.
(Paragraph 7)
The licensee's Meteorological Monitoring Program was well maintained and fulfilled its required function.
(Paragraph 8)
. Radwaste processing and shipping was conducted in a competent, professional manner.
(Paragraph 9)
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- The licensee had commissioned a study to prepare contingencies for long-term storage of low level radioactive waste in the'event that the current, disposal facility closes as scheduled.
(Paragraph 10)
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G
- H.
- R.
- R.
D.
- R.
D.
- G, M.
- H.
- D L. Boissy, Plant General Manager F. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor E. Cox, Chemistry Effluents Supervisor F. Englmeier, Site Quality Manager H. Faulkner, Primary Chemistry Supervisor J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor C.
Lowens, Senior Nuclear Energy Engineer Madden, Licensing Engineer R. Mullins, Nuclear Energy Analyst M. Mercer, Health Physics Technical Supervisor A. Sager, Plant Vice President B. Somers, Radioactive Waste Supervisor M. Wolf, Site Engineering Supervisor
.Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Scott, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Organization (84750 and 86750)
Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 describes the licensee's organization.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization, staffing levels, and lines of'authority as they related to the Chemistry Department and Radioactive Waste Group to verify that the. licensee had not made organizational 'changes which would adversely affect the ability to control radiation exposures or radioactive material.
There had been no personnel changes in the Chemistry Department.
However, as of January 27, 1992, the normal periodic rotation of technicians had taken place.
These periodic rotations are made to assure that the technici,ans maintain a high level of expertise in all areas within the Department.
There had been no changes in the Radwaste Group since the last time this area was reviewed.
(Refer to Inspection Report (IR) 91-15, Paragraph 2.b.)
The inspector concluded that the licensee's organization in the areas of Chemistry and Radioactive Waste was staffed with competent personnel, who continued to carry out their duties and responsibilities in a professional manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Audits (84750 and 86750)
TS 6.5.2..8 specifies the types and frequencies of audits to be conducted under the direction of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB).
The inspector reviewed audits conducted by CNRB within the scope of this inspection.
In order to evaluate compliance with the TSs and assess quality of the licensee's programs, the inspector reviewed the following audits:
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, QSL-OPS-90-740,,
conducted April and May, 1990.
Process Control Program, QSL-OPS-90-732, conducted February through April, 1990.
Radiological.Environmental Monitoring Program, QAS-ENV-91-1, conducted May through August, 1991.
The audits were found to be well-planned and documented and included findings of procedural noncompliance which were addressed by the responsible group by a written response which included:
actions taken or planned to.correct and/or prevent recurrence of the identified finding; date when corrective action was'(or will be)
achieved; identification of the individual(s) responsible for the corrective action; the results of their review and investigation of the.
findings.
The inspector noted that the comments and recommendations were detailed and would aid the implementation of adequate corrective. actions.
The inspector verified that the audit program was conducted in accordance with the TSs.
The inspector concluded that the audit process was capable of identifying programmatic weaknesses and making recommendations for corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identifie ~
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Plant Water Chemistry (84750)
a.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Water Chemistry TS 3.4.7 specifies that the concentrations of dissolved oxygen (DO), 'chloride, and fluoride in the.RCS be maintained below 0.10 parts per million (ppm),
0.15 ppm, and 0.10 ppm, respectively.
TS 3.4.8 specifies that the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less, than or equal to 1.0 microcuries/gram (uCi/g) dose equivalent iodine (DEI).
These parameters are related to corrosion resistance and fuel integrity.
Pursuant to the TS requirements, the inspector reviewed tabular summaries which correlated reactor power output to chloride, fluoride, and dissolved oxygen concentrations, as well as specific activity and dose equivalent iodine of the reactor coolant, for the period of October 1,
1991 through December 31, 1991, for both units.
With the exception of a chloride intrusion incident in Unit 1 during a hydrolazing process on November 26, all of the reviewed parameters satisfied the TS requirements.
Typical values for DO, chloride, and fluoride were less than five parts per billion (ppb) for each parameter, respectively.
Typical DEI values at steady-state conditions were less than 3.0E-2 uCi/g.
The inspector concluded that the Plant Water Chemistry was being maintained well within the TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Hydrolazing Event The hyrolazing event is fully documented in Inspection Reports (IRs) 50-335/91-22 and 50-389/91-22 and is addressed here only because of its direct relationship to RCS chemistry.
A brief summary of the event follows.
On November 25, 1991, while hydrolazing the Unit 1 reactor vessel flange, an estimated 1000 gallons of
~ Service Water (instead of the required Demineralized Water)
was introduced into the refueling cavity, resulting in a measured chloride concentration of 226 ppb.
The TS limit was 150 ppb.
,The elapsed time between the commencement of hydrolazing and the time that a RCS chemistry sample was determined to have a
chloride concentration below 150 ppb was approximately 39.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Engineering Evaluation JPN-PSL-SENS-91-035
was done to analyze the chloride effects on the nuclear fuel, assemblies and on the remainder of the RCS wetted surfaces (those exposed to reactor coolant).
The evaluation concluded that no degradation to RCS integrity or fuel assemblies resulted from this event due to the relatively low chloride concentrations, low system temperature, and its short duration.
It was noted that a Notice of Violation was issued as a result of this event in the previously-referenced IRs.
Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
(84750)
NUREG-0737 requires that the licensee be able to obtain a sample of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere.
Furthermore, the sample must be promptly obtained and analyzed (within three hours total) under accident conditions without incurring a radiation exposure to any individual in excess of 3 and 18 3/4 rem to the whole body or extremities, respectively.
TS 6.8.4.e requires that a program be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant, radioactive iodides and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples.
The PASS should provide these capabilities and should enable the licensee to obtain i'nformation critical to the efforts to assess and control the course and effects of an accident.
The inspector reviewed the most recent PASS operability log sheets for both units and discussed the results with the Primary Chemistr'y Supervisor as well as the status of the dissolved hydrogen analyzer installation, referenced in IR 90-21.
An upgrade to the dissolved hydrogen analyzer had been made to the PASS of both units.
In the case of Unit 1, I&C had not yet started pre-operation calibrations.
In the case of Unit 2, the upgrade had been completed about a year ago and six months were needed for its calibration.
It was fully operational at the time of this inspection.
For a technician to be considered qualified to operate the PASS, a training module must be successfully completed and a
"walk through" of the procedure must be satisfactorily completed.
After the initial qualification, requalification is required every two years.
In addition, the system itself (for both units) undergoes operability testing every six months, allowing additional
"hands on" experience for the technicians.
Furthermore, management is considering conducting operability testing on a quarterly basi The inspector concluded that the PASS was capable of fulfillingits intended sampling function.
No violations of deviations were identified.
6.
Effluent Processing and Monitoring (84750)
a.
Release Permit Review b.
TSs 3.11.1 and 3.11.2 define the requirements for liquid and gaseous effluent concentrations, doses and dose rates, and waste treatments released to Unrestricted Areas.
These requirements are intended to ensure that the limits of 10 CFR 20 and
CFR 50 are satisfied.:
TSs 4.11.1 and 4.11.2 define the surveillance requirements for the sampling and analysis program.
The inspector reviewed eight randomly-selected Liquid Release Permits (1-91-35, 1-91-36, 1-91-41, 1-91-48, 1-91-55, 1-91-62, 1-91-.84, and 1-91-95)
and nine randomly-selected Gaseous Release Permits (2-91-18, 1-91-21, 1-91-28, 1-91-13, 1-91-19, 2-91-128, 2-91-136, 2-91-87, and 2-91-70) to verify compliance.
Permits from b'oth units were included, from throughout calendar year 1991.
The permits included both release information and projected dose calculations and were found to be complete, including the identification of the source of the release, the activity released (identified by isotope),
and the volume of the effluent discharged; I
Unplanned Release On February 5,
1991, Gas Release Permit 2-91-18 was initiated to release the contents of the 2C Gas'Decay Tank (GDT).
The tank was sampled and aligned to the Plant Vent as required by -procedure.
The release was started at 17:30 with a pressure of 165 psig in the 2C GDT.
The pressure of all three GDTs (2A, 2B, and 2C)
was monitored during the progress of the release.
At 20:00, everything appeared to be proceeding normally, i.e. the pressure in the 2C GDT was decreasing and the pressure in the 2A and 2B GDTs was increasing.
However, at midnight the pressure of both the 2B and 2C GDTs had decreased from their former readings, while that of the 2A GDT remained constant.
(The decrease in pressure in the 2B GDT was not recognized because a new log sheet was started at midnight and it did not have the readings taken 20:00.)
When the pressures were checked at 04:00 on February 6, the decrease in pressure of both the 2B and 2C GDTs was readily evident and the release was terminated by the Control Room at 04:15.
A sample of the contents of the 2B GDT was
taken and analyzed shortly thereafter.
The licensee then initiated a Gaseous Release Permit to reflect the release from the 2B GDT (to coincide with the release from the 2C GDT).
The simultaneous release of both GDTs through the Plant Vent achieved only 0.06 percent of the Administrative Limit for releases.
The inspector reviewed Drawing No. 2998-G-078, Rev.
8, issued April 24, 1991, entitled "Flow Diagram
- Waste Management."
The inspector also reviewed and discussed Operating Procedure No. 2-0530021, Rev.
15, entitled
"Controlled Gaseous Batch Release to Atmosphere" with the Chemistry Effluents Supervisor.
With these documents, the inspector checked the sequence of activities involved in making a release, including pump and valve alignments, and flow paths and locations of system components.
The inspector noted that the path of the combined tank 'effluent passed a radiation monitor which had the ability to automatically terminate the release if its setpoint was reached.
The monitor had been source checked as part of the pre-release procedure.
Since the release was not terminated by the radiation monitor, the conclusion was made that the combined release of the two GDTs was within the allowable release limits.
This incident was reviewed by the Chemistry Department which concluded that the most probable cause was that the outlet valve of the 2B GDT had not fully seated during the release of the 2C GDT, allowing leakage around it.
The Facility Review Group (FRG) reviewed the incident also and concluded that it was not an uncontrolled release because the radiation monitor could have automatically tripped to terminate the release if its setpoint had been reached.
The inspector accepted this rational.
Also, he noted that the event was an Unplanned Release and, therefore, should have been addressed in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the first half of 1991, as required by TS 6.9.1.7.
Observation of Sample Collection The inspector observed the activities associated with Gaseous Release Permit 1-92-2, from the 1C GDT.
The inspector reviewed Chemistry Operating Procedure C-72, Rev.
29, entitled "Processing Gaseous Wastes,"
approved November 20, 1991, and verified that the Permit was being completed as required by the procedure.
The
technician also reviewed the procedure before" taking a grab sample for analysis.
The inspector observed the technician as he obtained the sample and noted that he'ollowed the procedure closely and completed his work in a competent manner, without incident.
The technician took the 'sample directly to the laboratory to be analyzed.
The sample analysis showed that the contents of the tank did not exceed
CFR 20 or
CFR 50 requirements and; therefore, could be released to an Unrestricted Area."
Setpoints for the Waste Gas Monitor were established and a source check using a 11.52 milliCurie (mCi) Am-241 source was done.
A copy of the of the completed Release Permit was supplied to the inspector the following day.
It indicated that the release had been successfully completed, discharging 2.857E+7 cubic centimeters (cc)
of tank volume with an activity of 1.313E+3 uCi, which yielded a dose of 9. 65E-5 milliRad (mRad),
combined beta and gamma.
The inspector concluded that effluent processing and monitoring was generally well controlled and ensured that regulatory requirements 'ere satisfied.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (84750)
TS 6.9.1.7 requires the licensee to submit a Semiannual Radiological Effluent Release Report within specified time periods covering the operation of the facility during the
,previous six months of operation.
The inspector reviewed the semiannual radioactive effluent release report for the first half of 1991.
This review included an examination of the liquid and gaseous effluents for that period as compared to those of 1989 and 1990.
The data are summarized below.
St. Lucie Radioactive Effluent Release Summary Activity Released (curies)
1989 1990 1991*
a Liquid 1.
Fission and Acti-vation Products 2.
Tritium 3.
Gross Alpha 8.30E+2 8.81E-5 5.67E+2 5.22E-5 3.76E+2 3.10E-5 5.09E-1 1.59E+0 1.37E-1
b.
Gaseous 1.
,Fission and Acti-vation Products Iodides Particulates Tritium 1.40E-2 8.32E-S 3.87E+2 1.41E-2 8.05E-5 1.06E+2 4,.15E-3 9.45E-5 5.01E+1 6.75E+3 1.15E+3 8.41E+2
- First half only.
A comparison of the listed data for 1989, 1990, and the first half of 1991 showed no significant changes.
For the first half of 1991, St. Lucie liquid, gaseous, and particulate effluents were well within TS, 10 CFR=20, and
CFR 50 effluent limitations.
No Unplanned Releases were identified in the Report, even though the Chemistry Department and FRG had discussed an incident characteri'zed as such.
(Refer to Paragraph 6.b).
When asked about this point, the Chemistry Supervisor acknowledged the oversight and stated that it would be addressed by an amendment or supplement and would be issued with the Semiannual 'Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the second half of 1991, to be issued by the end of February, 1992.
Although this represents a Severity Level V Violation, the violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section V.A. of the Enforcement -Policy were satisfied.
It is documented as Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-335, 50-389/92-02-01,
"Failure to Address an Unplanned Release in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report."
Meteorological Monitoring Program (84750)
The information obtained -from the Meteorological Monitoring Program is integral to the determination of off-site dose projection.
TS 6.10.2.o requires an annual summary of hourly meteorological data collected over the previous calendar year, including wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and precipitation (if measured).
The inspector reviewed the Meteorological Monitoring Program of St. Lucie.
The review included direct observation and discussions with a cognizant licensee representative.
The inspector determined that St. Lucie had one meteorological tower. It was new, having been erected in the autumn of 1991.
Its design incorporated some unique features, specifically, a lightening suppression system to minimize lightening damage and hoist system to allow the three instrument platforms to be lowered for maintenance and/or calibration instead of requiring a technician to climb up
the tower to the instrumentation.
Furthermore, all instrumentation had been upgraded.
For example, the temperature elements which had previously been static had been replaced with.dynamic models.
The tower had three sets of instrumentation, located at the 10-, 33-,
and 60-meter levels.
Wind speed, wind direction, and wind variance were measured at the highest and lowest levels.
Temperature elements were located at all three levels and had two channels each.
Differential temperature could be taken from any combination of the three but was primarily determined using the highest and lowest levels.
Total precipitation and dew point instrumentation were located near ground level inside the security fenced-in area of the instrumentation shack.
The inspector verified by direct observation that the meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels were operable and maintained.
Instruments utilizing continuous-recording tape were used to save information concerning the various meteorological parameters.
The upper wind speed and direction were recorded on one plot and the lower wind speed and direction on another.
On yet another, upper temperature (both channels),
lower temperature (both channels),
differential temperature (both channels),
and rainfall were all recorded.
The inspector noted that the location of the tower was such that there would be no interference with the flow of air.
In the event that the tower is out of service, there was no back-up system on the site.
However, the essential parameters could be obtained from the commercial airport of West Palm Beach, Florida, about forty-five miles from the plant.
Based on the scope of this review, the inspector determined that the Meteorological Measurement System was capable of fulfillingits required functions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radwaste Processing and Transportation (86750)
CFR 71.5 (a) requires each licensee who transfers licensed material outside of the confines of its plant or other place of use, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of DOT in 49 CFR, Parts 170 through 18 Pursuant to these requirements, the ins'pectors reviewed the licensee's activities affiliated with these requirements, to determine whether the licensee effectively packages, stores, and ships radioactive solid materials.
The licensee's program for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, including solid radwaste, was conducted by the Radioactive Waste Group within the Health Physics Department.
Radwaste was processed and packaged (including the preparation of shipping documentation)
by the Radwaste Group, with the assistance of Radiation Protection Men.(RPM)
on loan from the Health Physics Operations Department to complete specific tasks, such as loading a shipment or compacting contaminated material.
a.
Facility Familiarization
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The Radioactive Waste Supervisor showed the inspector the Dry Waste Storage Building.
Although it was originally designed to store Dry Active Waste (DAW) for a five-year period it had been (and continued to be)
used for the storage of contaminated items such as tools, lead blankets, pumps, rigging splices, and resin transfer equipment.
An inventory system was utilized to track all stored items.
The facility was equipped with a floor drain and sump system, a monorail, a
communication system, and a service air system, and was insulated and ventilated.
b.
Radwaste Shipments Shipment of radioactive materials was the responsibility of the Radioactive Waste Group, which prepared all shipping documents and procured the necessary disposal containers and shipping casks.
The inspector reviewed three shippin'g packages for radwaste shipments since Inspection 91-15.
They were Radwaste Shipment Nos.
91-52, 91-61, and 91-67.
The packages thoroughly documented the shipments and included items such as unique shipment and shipping container numbers, waste content and volume, total activity, analytical summary and breakdown of isotopes with a half-life greater than five years, special comments etc.
The radiation and contamination survey results were within the limits specified and the shipping documents were being maintained as required.
No shipments were made during the period that the inspector was on site and, therefore, no observation of the actual activities involved therein could be made to evaluate the effectiveness of training, attitudes of personnel, et C.
Volume Reduction Program The licensee had a Volume Reduction Program to reduce radioactive waste generated for burial.
The inspectors were shown graphs illustrating a steady reduction in the volume over the last several years.
The Radioactive Waste Supervisor stated that the reduction had begun in 1990 with the introduction of "reusables,"
i.e. cloth items in place of-plastic, plus the "clean can," i.e. clean containment, initiative to control and minimize waste generation in all areas and activities of the site.
The initiative succeeded due to the concerted efforts of all,site employees and was a
"worker initiative" rather than a formal program.
Its widespread acceptance enabled the licensee to reduce its volume buried from 11221 cubic feet in 1989 to 6432 cubic feet in 1991, a forty-three percent reduction.
The inspector concluded that.the licensee's program for
"'rocessing and transporting radwaste was adequate to satisfy regulatory requirements and that the Volume Reduction Program had been effective in its mission.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Low Level Radwaste (LLW)- Storage (84760)
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Background In 1985, the Federal Government enacted the Low Level Radioactive Waste Amendments Act, which required all states.to provide for disposal of LLW.
Eight southeastern states voted to form the Southeast Compact for this purpose.
Barnwell, South Carolina has served as the Compact's LLW disposal site since that time but it is scheduled to close on December 31, 1992.
North Carolina was chosen as the next host state for the LLW burial facility.
In 1987, the North Carolina General Assembly established the North Carolina Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Authority, chartered with the responsibility to site, build, lease, or operate a
LLW disposal facility in North Carolina for the Southeast Compact so that members could properly dispose of waste by-product materials produced by nuclear generators.
The siting process is approximately two years behind schedule and the facility is not anticipated to be completed when the current facility closes.
If that happens, the members of the Southeast Compact will be without a disposal facility for an estimated two-year perio The governor of South Carolina and the South Carolina Budget and Control Board have recommended keeping 'the Barnwell facility open to regional and non-regional radwaste generators.
However, legislative action by the South Carolina Genera'1 Assembly is required to extend the license and determine under what conditions and cost.
St. Lucie Contingencies The inspector requested to see the licensee's long-term LLW storage facilities to review issues such as ensuring integrity of packaging and maintenance of waste form (shielding from the elements and extremes of temperature and humidity); procedures and equipment available to repackage waste, should the need arise; and locating wastes in a restricted area secured against unauthorized removal.
The Radioactive Waste Supervisor explained to the inspector that St. Lucie did not currently have a
LLW storage facility, per se.
However, the issue was being addressed by FPL management via a study commissioned to evaluate existing radwaste storage capabilities for interim storage.for a period of time during which the Southeast Compact may not have access to a disposal facility.
Two storage durations were considered, 1.5'ears and 5 years, reflecting two possible scenarios.
One was that the Barnwell facility may receive an extension to its scheduled closing for a period of time until North Carolina can site its disposal facility.
The 1.5-year storage plan could be used until the facility -is constructed and ready for service.
The second scenario foresaw Barnwell closing as sch'eduled, whereby the 5-year storage plan could be utilized.
Potential storage locations, generated radwaste quality data, and existing facilities were considered in the study.
Shielding estimates were made based on expected radwaste generation and adherence to ALMA. principles, site license limits, and the new 10 CFR 20 limits.
Various storage schemes were proposed, including the use of existing facilities as well as the construction of new ones.
FPL management will evaluate the alternatives and a decision of which course of action to pursue is expected by summer, 199 The inspector concluded that the study was complete and that-the licensee's management was acting in a prudent manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 31, 1992, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Non-Cited Violation 50-335, 50-389/92-'02-01 was identified and reviewed during the inspection.
(Refer to Paragraph 7.)
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Acronyms and Initialisms ALARA - As =Low As Reasonably Achievable cc
- cubic centimeter CFR
.- Code of Federal Regulations Ci - curie CNRB - Company Nuclear Review Board DAW - Dry Active Waste DEI - Dose Equivalent Iodine DO - Dissolved Oxygen
- FRG
- Facility Review Group g - gram GDT - Gas Decay Tank I&C - Instrumentation and Controls IR - Inspection Report LLW - Low Level Radwaste mCi
- micro-Curie (1.0E-3 Ci)
mRad
- milli-Rad NCV - Non-Cited Violation No.
- Number NRC
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODCM - Off-site Dose Calculation Manual PASS
- Post Accident Sampling System ppb
- parts per billion ppm - parts per million psig
- pounds per square inch gage PSL
- Plant Saint Lucie RCS
- Reactor Coolant System Rev
- Revision RPM - Radiation Protection Man TS
- Technical Specification uCi
- micro-Curie (1.0E-6 Ci)
0