IR 05000335/1991011
| ML17223B215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1991 |
| From: | Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Goldberg J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9106270355 | |
| Download: ML17223B215 (35) | |
Text
'UN I g lSSl Docket No. 50-389 License No.
NPF-16 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. J.
H. Goldberg President - Nuclear P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
MEETING SUMMARY - ST.
LUCIE DOCKET NO. 50-389 This letter refers to the enforcement conference conducted at the NRC Region II office in Atlanta on May 30, 1991.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the circumstances surrounding the apparent violations identified in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-335/91-11 and 50-389/91-11.
During this meeting, the licensee made a presentation regarding their assessment of the apparent violations.
It is our opinion that this meeting provided a better understanding of the details 'surrounding the apparent violations and intended corrective actions.
You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please let us know.
Sincerely, Enclosures:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
Presentation Summary cc w/encls:
D. A. Sager, Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear. Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 cc w/encls cont'd:
(See page 2)
5'i06270355 920612 PDR ADOCf( 05000335 Q
PDR Original signed by Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects
S
'
Florida Power and Light Company cc w/encls cont'd:
Harold F. Reis,,Esq.
Newman II Holtzinger 1615 L Street, NW Washington, D. C.
20036 John T. Butler, Esq.
Steel, Hector and Davis 400 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 Jack Shreve Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madision Ave.,
Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 State Planning and Development.
Clearinghouse Office of Planning and Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 James V. Chisholm County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, MD 20852 State of Florida bcc w/encls:
(See page 3)
JUN 1 2 1S9$
Florida Power and Light Company cc w/encls:
Document Control Desk R. Crlenjak, RII J. Norris, NRR NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7585 South Highway AlA Jensen Beach, FL 33457 JUN
R 1S9'l
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE PAGE RII: DRP R II: DRP RII: DRP R II: DRP RII: E I CS R: D CO@le RSchin RCrleniak MSinkule GJenkins LRe e 067
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Florida Power and Light Company bcc w/enc5 Document Control Desk R. Crlenjak, RII J. Norris, NRR NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7585 South Highway A1A Jensen Beach, FL 33457 RI~I:0
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ENCLOSURE I LIST OF ATTENDEES U. S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
G.
R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff M. V. Sinkule, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, DRP R. V. Crlenjak, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, DRP R.
P. Schin, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie, DRP H. N. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate II-2, NRR J.
A. Norris, Licensing Project Manager, NRR C.
R. Ogle, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 2B, DRP D. H. Dorman, Project Engineer, Project Directorate II-2, NRR Florida Power and Li ht Com an FP8L J.
H. Goldberg, President - Nuclear Division W.
H. Bohlke, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing D. A. Sager, Site Vice President, St. Lucie C. L. Burton, Operations Superintendent G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager R.
E.
Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent K. N. Harris, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
ENCLOSURE
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Sea Turtle Refuge
~
!
AGENDA I.
INTRODUCTION NRC I GOLDBERG II. MISPOSITIONED COMPONENT COOLING WATER VALVEEVENT A.
EVENT DESCRIPTION B.
ROOT CAUSES C.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS D.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE E.
SUMMARY BURTON BURTON SAGER BOHLKE BOISSY III~ QUESTIONS ANDANSWERS IV. CLOSING REMARKS GOLDBERG /
NRC 5/28/91 910405.MAC
LOCATIONOF 2-SB-14365 IN THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM - UNIT42 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY 2-SB-14357 COMPONENT COOLING WATER RETURN REFUELING WATER TANK SHUTDOWN COOLING INLET SHUTDOWN COOLING OUT CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP TO CONTAINMENT SIAS OPENS
';;:'~'-'2A,'".',.80,C'.HX;:..':;:.:E
":.i " 2'88'=,,:1'48,65l:'.
HCV-14-3A FIS-14-1DA (IN CONTROL ROOM)
FE 5/28/91 910405.MAC
CURRENT POLICY AS OF 1987 This Standing Night Order shall not, expire until written notification is received.
sub)eots Locked Valves Instructions:
1. Locked valves shall be locked in a manner which prevents significant rotation of the handwheel.
2. Locking 2 valves in close proximity to each other with a single locking device is unacceptable.
3. The unlocking and repositioning of a locked valve recyxires the knowledge and authority of the Shift ANPS/NWE and shall be documented via the Locked Valve Deviation log.
4. To check the position of a valve which is apparently locked open, unlock the valve, close the valve slightly, re-open the valve and lock it.
5. To check the position of a valve which is apparently locked closed, unlock the valve, attempt to close the valve and re-lock it.
Discussion:
'valves are locked at PSL based on regulatory recpxirements, drawing designations and Operations Supervision discretion.
All valves which are locked, need to be included in the Locked Valve Procedure, AP 0010123, and be properly documented when manipulated.
Distributions NPS, ANPS 1 4 2, Standing Night Order Book 1 k',
Training Department, Night Orders (Copies shall be retained in each Control Room's Standing Night Order Book)
4~O 5/28/91 910405.MAC
1021 9 EVENT CHRONOLOGY 2-SB-14365 WAS PLACED IN THE LOCKED OPEN POSITION.
%1L2ZRQ 2-SB-14365 WAS POSITIONED TO LOCKED THROTTLED TO BALANCECOMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW ANDWAS
'NTERED IN THE DEVIATIONLOG.
~11 ~23 QQ SHUTDOWN COOLING WAS SECURED'A SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER INDICATEDCOMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW.
~11 2~99+
THE SHIFT ASSISTANT NUCLEAR PLANT SUPERVISOR REVIEWED THE VALVEDEVIATIONLOG. AN OPERATOR WAS DISPATCHED TO 2-SB-14365, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESTORE IT TO THE LOCKED OPEN POSITION. VALVE2-SB-14365 WAS BELIEVEDTO BE MISPOSITIONED TO THE LOCKED CLOSED POSITION.
11 2-4 2
24 OPPORTUNITIES BY 13 DIFFERENT OPERATORS FAILEDTO DISCOVER THE MISPOSITIONED VALVE.
WHILE PERFORMING THE D.C. GROUND ISOLATIONPROCEDURE, 2-SB-14365 WAS FOUND LOCKED CLOSED. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OPENED THE VALVEAND ESTABLISHED PROPER COMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW TO THE 2A SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER. THE NRC WAS PROMPTLY NOTIFIED.
5/28/91 910405.MAC
EVENT ROOT CAUSES PROBLEM ¹1 2-SB-14365 WAS PLACED IN THE LOCKED CLOSED POSITION ROOT CAUSE COGNITIVE PERSONNEL'ERROR BY A NON-LICENSED OPERATOR PROBLEM ¹2 FAILURETO BETECT 2-SB-14365 IN THE CLOSED POSITION ON NUMEROUS SUBSEQUENT CHECKS I
ROOT CAUSES MANAGEMENTLEVELOF EXPECTATION WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY DISSEMINATEDTO OPERATIONS PERSONNEL.
2.
MANAGEMENTFOLLOW-UP OF EXISTING
. POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONWAS INSUFFICIENT.
3.
OPERATORS WERE USING VISUAL VERIFICATIONDURING LOCKED VALVE CHECKS.
5/28/91 910405.MAC
EVENT RQQT CAUSES (Continued)
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS'.
FAULTYVALVEPOSITION INDICATOR 2.
VALVEACCESSIBILITY
.
PROBLEM P3 OUR CURRENT VALVE VERIFICATION POLICY
.
ALLOWED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR POSSI B LE MISPOSITIONING OF THROTTLED VALVES ROOT CAUSE PRESENT METHOD OF VERIFYING POSITION OF THROTTLED VALVESIS INADEQUATE 5/28/91 910405.MAC
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMED A HANDS-ON VERIFICATIONOF 409 SAFETY RELATED VALVESFOR UNIT 1 AND 2
- RE-EMPHASIZED STANDING NIGHT ORDER REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCKED VALVE VERIFICATIONVIASHIFT MEETINGS-PERFORMED INTERNALINTERVIEWS WITH NON-LICENSED OPERATORS TO IDENTIFY ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VALVEPOLICY 5/28/91 910405.MAC
COMPLETED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- SITE VICE PRESIDENT MEMO ON RESPONSIBILITY ANDACCOUNTABILITYHAS BEEN ISSUED PLANT MANAGER POLICY ON PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE, INCLUDINGDISCIPLINARYPOLICY HAS BEEN COMMUNICATEDTO ALLPLANT PERSONNEL PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR DIVISION BRIEFING OF OPERATING CREWS'UMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM ANALYSISCOMPLETED NUCLEAR SAFETY SPEAKOUT REVIEW OF OTHER OPERATIONS'OLICIES UNANNOUNCED, RANDOM JOINT QUALITY CONTROL/OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCEOF DATASHEET 36 5/28/91 910405.MAC
COMPLETED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cantinued)
- PROCEDURE CHANGE TO MAKECLEAR EXPECTATIONS REGARDING VERIFICATION METHOD TO DATASHEET 36
- SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR/NON-LICENSED OPERATOR TANDEMWALKDOWNSOF DATA SHEET 36, TO IDENTIFYACCESSIBILITYAND TIME REQUIREMENTS
- VALVEPOSITION INDICATORENHANCEMENT COMPLETED ON ALLUNIT 1 AND UNIT2 SAFETY RELATED VALVES
- QUALITYINSTRUCTION 11-PR/PSL-2 TEST CONTROL NOW ADDRESSES POST MAINTENANCEOF VALVEPOSITION INDICATORS INPO NUCLEAR NETWORK ENTRY-
"ENHANCEMENTTO BUTTERFLYVALVE POSITION INDICATION" DATASHEET 36 CHANGED TO INCORPORATE FUNCTIONALCHECK OF THROTTLED VALVE POSITION 5/28/91 910405.MAC
FUTURE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I
- VALVEPOSITION INDICATORENHANCEMENTON REMAININGUNIT 1 AND UNIT2 PRATT VALVES WILLBE COMPLETED
- ACCESSIBILITYPROBLEMS IDENTIFIEDDURING SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR/NON-LICENSED OPERATOR WALKDOWNSWILLBE RESOLVED TO SATISFACTION OF OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT FOLLOW UP BRIEFING OF OPERATING CREWS WILLBE CONDUCTED PERIODICALLY CONCERNING THIS POLICY
- THROTTLE VALVEPOSITION VERIFICATIONWILL BE ADDRESSED FOR REMAININGVALVELINEUP PROCEDURES TO REQUIRE FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATIONWHENEVER POSSIBLE
5/28/91 910405.MAC
ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT
.
OF THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FOR VALVE2-SB-14365 MISALIGNMENT 5/28l91 910405.MAC
CONTAINMENT HEAT REMOYALSYSTEM ST. LUCIE UNIT2 SDCHX 2A
/Ix.
/8 CONTAINMENTSP RAY SDCHX 2B CCW SYSTEM 1A 1B 1G 1D CCW SYSTEM ICW SYSTEM CONTAINMENTFAN COOLERS ICW SYSTEM ULTIMATE HEAT SINK ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TO TRAIN
FROM RWT SDCHX - SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER CGW,; COMPONENT COOLING WATER EGGS - EMERGENCY CORE COOUNG SYSTEM IGW - INTAKECOOLING WATER RWT-REFUELING WATER TANK CS
- CONTAINMENTSPRAY
5/28/91 910405.II/IAC
ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT
~ OBJ ECTIVE DETERMINETHE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSOCIATED WITH COMPONENT COOLING WATER ISOLATED TO THE 2A SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER
~ CONCLUSIONS
- SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF CORE COOLING AND CONTAINMENTHEAT REMOVALARE ACHIEVEDASSURING THATTHE HEALTHAND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AFFECTED
5/28/91 910405.MAC
DESIGN BASIS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
~
PEAK CONTAINMENTPRESSURE/TEMPERATURE AND PEAK FUEL CLADDINGTEMPERATURE OCCUR DURING INJECTION MODE
40 PRESSURE, s'NJECTION MODE CONTAINMENTDESIGN 44 psig 42.5 psig RECIRCULATION MODE
20
H PEAK CLADTEMP 200-300 SEC 1680 SEC 1.0E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+01 1.0E+02 1.0E+03 1.0E+04 1.0E+05 TIME (SECONDS)
300 250 TEMPERATURE, F INJECTION MODE 267oF RECIRCULATION MODE 200 150 100 1680 SEC 1.0E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+01 1.0E+02 1.0E+03 1.0E+04 1.0E+05 TIME (SECONDS)
5/28/91 910405.MAC
BOUNDINGACCIDENT SCENARIO
~ EFFECT OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER VALVE 2-SB-14365 CLOSED DURING INJECTION MODE NO SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER COOLING DURING INJECTION MODE
- NO IMPACT
~ LARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT IS BOUNDINGACCIDENTSCENARIO FOR VALVE 2-SB-14365 CLOSED ENERGY RELEASE TO CONTAINMENT ISOLATED FOR MAINSTEAM LINE BREAK DURING REFUELING WATER TANKINJECTION ENERGY RELEASE RATES TO CONTAINMENT LOWER FOR SMALLBREAK LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENTAND OTHER ACCIDENTS
5/28/91 910405.MAC
LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT YERSUS MAINSTEAM LINE.BREAK CONTAINMENTTEMPERATURE
~ LOCA WILLBE BOUNDING IN THE LONG TERM
~ NO IMPACT DURING REFUELING WATER TANK INJECTION MODE 88-ID a C9 8R-I0
n 8-ec P
OQ a W
I CV MSLB LOCA RECIRCULATIONMODE 1680SECONDS Oa cv Ow CO
10
TIME(SECONDS)
I I
I I IIII
10 5/28/91 910405.MAC
LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT VERSUS MAINSTEAM LINE.BREAK CONTAINMENTPRESSURE
~ LOCA WILLBE BOUNDING IN THE LONG TERM
~ NO IMPACT DURING REFUELING WATER TANK INJECTION MODE
~
LOCA a.
O NIll
L cj MSLB
10
TIME(SECONDS)
!7 5/28/91 910405.MAC
LARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT.ACCIDENTS EXAMINED
~ CASE I:
DESIGN BASIS
- ONE SPRAY TRAIN FOUR EMERGENCY FAN COOLERS
~ CASE II:
2-SB-14365 CLOSED - FAILURE OF SPRAY PUMP B SPRAY TRAINAAVAILABLE(NO SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER 2A COOLING)
FOUR EMERGENCY FAN COOLERS AVAILABLE
~ CASE lll: 2-SB-14365 CLOSED - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR B
- SPRAY TRAINA AVAILABLE{NO SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER 2A COOLING)
- TWO EMERGENCY FAN COOLERS AVAILABLE 5/28f91 910405.MAC
CONTAINMENTANALYSIS RESULTS
~ CASE III
- SB-14365 CLOSED - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EMERGENCY.'IESEL GENERATOR B PRESSURE, si
~ RECIRCULATION I
I I
I I
WITHOUTSDCHX
WITHSDCH 1.0E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+01 1.0E+02 1.0E+03 1.0E+04 1.0E+05 TIME(SECONDS)
TEMPERATURE,F
~ RECIRCULATION I
WITHOUTSDCHX WITHSDCH 1.0E-01 1.0E+00 1.0E+01 1.0E+02 1.0E+03 1.0E+04 1.0E+05 TIME(SECONDS)
5/28/91 910405.MAC
OTHER ENGINEERING FACTORS
~
NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD AVAILABLEIN THE RECIRCULATIONMODE IS GREATER THANTHE NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD REQUIRED BYTHE SPRAY, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION AND LOW PRESSURE INJECTION PUMPS
~ CORE COOLING ANALYSES INDICATEDCORE REMAINS COVERED WITH CORE TEMPERATURE DECREASING DURING THE RECIRCULATIONMODE
~
DOSE BOUNDED BY FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT DESIGN BASIS CASE WHICH ASSUMES LEAKAGE FOR FIRST 24 HOURS AT PEAK ACCIDENT PRESSURE
~ EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION COMPONENTS INSIDE CONTAINMENTWERE
~ EXAMINEDAND ADEQUATE MARGINEXIST SUCH THAT EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATIONIS MAINTAINED'OR THE ANALYZEDRECIRCULATIONMODE TEMPERATURES
5/28/91 910405.MAC
CONCLUSIONS
~ THE LARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT WAS EXAMINEDWITH 2-SB-14365 CLOSED
- THE CORE REMAINS COOLED PREVENTING CORE DAMAGEIN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN BASIS LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT
- THE CALCULATEDLARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENTCONTAINMENT PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RESPONSES REMAIN BELOW DESIGN VALUES
- THE ACCIDENT DOSE RELEASE FOR THE LARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT REMAIN BOUNDED BY THE FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS THEREFORE; SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF CORE COOLING AND CONTAINMENTHEATREMOVALARE ACHIEVED,ASSURING THATTHE HEALTH ANDSAFETY OF THE PUBLIC WOULD NOTHAVEBEEN AFFECTED 5/28/91 910405.MAC
SUMMARY
~ THIS PARTICULAR EVENT DID NOT POSE A RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTHAND SAFETY
~ THE ORIGINALPOLICY REQUIRING HANDS-ON VERIFICATIONOF VALVEPOSITION IS ADEQUATE
~ A BREAKDOWN IN THE IMPLEMENTATIONAND VERIFICATIONOF THIS POLICY OCCURRED
~ MANAGEMENTIS COMMITTEDTO IMPLEMENT AND VERIFYTHIS POLICY THROUGH'OLLOW UP CREW BRIEFINGS
- QUALITYCONTROL/OPERATIONS UNANNOUNCED RANDOM SURVEILLANCES DISCIPLINARYACTION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
5/28/91 910405.MAC